Hi Mike and all,
In a chapter for an encyclopedia on urban education, I write about
identity, which similarly involves a triple dialectic: between same and
other, material body and person, and between the two sets. I developed
this from some ideas that i got from ONESELF AS ANOTHER (Ricœur, 1992),
but which I now realize are already present in PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
(MIND) (Hegel, 1977)--e.g., "they (subjectivities) _recognize_
themselves as _mutually recognizing_ one another" p.112).
Meaning, too, is related to these dialectics (the same person -- other
person dimension, for example, constituting the individual|collective
dialectic). Subjectivity and intersubjectivity always arise together,
are dialectically related, with social interaction occupying the
middle, mediating ground.
Figure 1. Different dialectical relations emerge from the contrast of
same and other, on the one hand, and material body and person, on the
other, both in cultural (phylogenetic) and individual (ontogenetic)
On 22-Jul-05, at 9:58 AM, Mike Cole wrote:
> You suggest:
> "personal" to situate "sense."
> Perhaps that gives us an entry point to understanding meaning, as a
> generalized version of personal sense, that is, the possibilities of
> sense available at the collective level.
> Personal sense certainly seems to be what is mean't. (Where personal
> is a synthesis of self-other interactions/experiences). And meaning is
> generalized, embodied in words and other semiotic means. Meaning
> but at a cultural-historical, not an ontogenetic or microgenetic time
> We might be able to use this same example to illlustrate the way in
> meaning, having become generalized (used to mediate activity in many
> is "relatively" stable-- relative to the stabililty of the local
> dynamics of life, at least.
> I hope this makes sense. I am somewhat unuzed tothinking in triple
> dialectics, Michael,
> but your summary is plausible to me.
> On 7/22/05, Wolff-Michael Roth <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
>> When I was reading Peg's lines, MY first question was not about
>> linguistic issues but about what people are making in
>> Then after reading Mike's and Gordon's comments, I was further
>> about meaning and its relation to sense.
>> If I understand right, sense is tied to the relation of activity
>> (something collectively motivated) and action (something individually
>> realized). So sense arises from the dialectic relation of self and
>> other, individual and collective. Some writers use the qualifier
>> "personal" to situate "sense."
>> Perhaps that gives us an entry point to understanding meaning, as a
>> generalized version of personal sense, that is, the possibilities of
>> sense available at the collective level.
>> Such an approach would allow us to approach meaning in a dialectical
>> way, paralleling the individual|collective dialectic, and therefore
>> locating it as the dialectic of two other dialectics.
>> On 22-Jul-05, at 8:08 AM, Mike Cole wrote:
>> > Great timing, Gordon. you answered part of my question re Halliday
>> > the
>> > equivalent distinction. Thanks!
>> > mike
>> > On 7/22/05, Gordon Wells <email@example.com> wrote: >Gordon, I've
>> > thought along the lines you explore about how it relates
>> >> >to Vygotsky's meaning/sense discussion.Maybe it reflects his
>> >> in
>> >> >philology.If so, then maybe we can push it a little further.
>> >> >
>> >> >Gordon's list of alternatives were: "dynamic/everyday/narrative v.
>> >> >synoptic/scientific/paradigmatic modes of meaning-making."When I
>> >> see
>> >> >"paradigmatic," I look for "syntagmatic."Maybe for Gordon this is
>> >> in both
>> >> >or either "dynamic" and "synoptic?"
>> >> >I understand paradigmatic and syntagmatic as mutually constitutive
>> >> not so
>> >> >much "versus."So, for example, for linguists (I think whether you
>> >> look
>> >> >back to Prague School or further to Panini) the copula verb ("to
>> >> in
>> >> >English) as a paradigm (for example: be am is are were been) is
>> >> relentlessly
>> >> >tied to/emerging with its syntax (I am. She is. etc.).The
>> >> syntagmatic
>> >> >patterning is not just a methodological frame for the
>> >> >paradigm; neither one is necessarily primitive to the other (but
>> >> theories of
>> >> >language might explore to establish this).Each constitutes the
>> >> other.
>> >> >
>> >> >So, maybe 'meaning' can be understood as the paradigmatic and
>> >> 'sense' as the
>> >> >syntagmatic of a mutually constitutive set.
>> >> Peg,
>> >> I agree that syntagmatic complements paradigmatic. One way of
>> >> interpreting Bruner's narrative/paradigmatic distinction might be
>> >> that narrative is concerned with the relations between
>> >> who does what to whom, when and for what reason. Similarly,
>> >> Halliday's dynamic/ synoptic distinction might be equated with
>> >> narrative/syntagmatic - to some degree!!, while synoptic highlights
>> >> the paradigmatic relationship between alternative lexicogrammatical
>> >> realizations of the same event, with a focus on grammatical
>> >> through nominalization.
>> >> I think I'm happy with your final paragraph above but I'll give
>> >> more thought to this.
>> >> Gordon
>> >> --
>> >> Gordon Wells
>> >> Dept of
>> >> Education,http://education.ucsc.edu/faculty/gwells
>> >> UC Santa Cruz.
>> >> firstname.lastname@example.org
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