Although the discussion was somehow closed, I just wanted to add a few
thoughts about Rommetveit's article.
I found his distinction between a first person or individualistic and a
second person or culturalist psychology quite similar to the one drawn by
Jerry Bruner between paradigmatic and narrative thought. He also thought of
the former as dealing with a world of causality and the latter as dealing
with a world of meanings.
As Rommetveit advances the idea of a psychology of a second person I started
to acknowledge some claims that are now somehow common currency in
culturally oriented psychologist. In particular, the idea the understanding
of meaning requires a different understanding of the methods we use.
And then is where I found myself in a known problem. The question that
arises is, then, what is proper of an empirical culturalist study of the
mind who is not plain empiricist and how can we move from a principled
epistemological stage to a progressive program of culturalist research,
question that is somehow closer to what Mike was just asking about findings
Beyond these issues, it is also the problem that not a minor set of the
psychological establishment is not just aculturalist but overtly
David D. Preiss
home page: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~ddp6/
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