Il'enkov: The ideal

From: Eugene Matusov (ematusov@udel.edu)
Date: Sun May 02 2004 - 17:58:44 PDT


Dear Victor-

 

Thanks a lot for the useful link!!! Although I can't be 100% sure, but I
highly suspect that this translated 1977 Russian publication was not
original but rather re-publication of Il'enkov's earlier article about the
concept of Ideal from the 1964 Philosophical Encyclopedia. I wonder if this
re-publication (if I'm right that it was a re-publication) was exact or
changed (edited) since the early 60s were much more politically liberal than
the end of 70s in the Soviet Union.

 

With regard of the ideal as "image", I think Il'enkov had to "dance" to
avoid being seen as anti-Leninist. As far as I remember reading Lenin, Lenin
gave a very primitive definition of the ideal as the material transferred
into individual heads (or something like that - it is interesting that
Il'enkov avoided citing Lenin in his article but instead uses Rubenstein).
In contrast, Il'enkov had an activity-, culture-, and history-based
definition of the ideal, "what is 'represented' here [in the ideal] as a
thing is the form of people's activity, the form of life [sociocultural and
historical] activity which they perform together, which has taken shape
'behind the back of consciousness' and is materially established in the form
of the relationship between things described above." In my view, this is the
key of Il'enkov's approach.

 

What do you think?

 

Eugene

PS I wish somebody wrote a biography of Il'enkov and tracked his writings in
the historical, philosophical, and political contexts.

 

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Oudeyis [mailto:victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il]

> Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2004 4:47 PM

> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

> Subject: Re: Does no one read [between] Vygotsky's words?: reposting
Victor's post

>

> Gene,

> This was taken directly from the translation of the article in MIA:

> http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm

>

> Problems of Dialectical Materialism, 1977

> Evald Ilyenkov

>

>

>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

> ----

>

> The Concept of the Ideal

> Written: 1977;

> Source: Problems of Dialectical Materialism;

> Publisher: Progress Publishers, 1977;

> Transcribed: Andy Blunden;

> HTML Markup: Andy Blunden.

>

> Regards,

> Victor

>

>

> ----- Original Message -----

> From: "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>

> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2004 10:14 PM

> Subject: RE: Does no one read [between] Vygotsky's words?: reposting

> Victor's post

>

>

> > Dear everybody-

> >

> > As far as I know, the article "The Concept of the Ideal" was written by

> > El'enkov in the early 60s or even the late 50s for the Philosophical

> > Encyclopedia that was published in the early 60s (1964?). I'm not aware
of

> > 1977 (re?)publication of this paper. Does anybody know anything about
1977

> > publication? Is it the same article?

> >

> > Also,

> > > Ilyenkov in "The Concept of the Ideal." describe the

> > > object as representing the ideational "image of the object" presumably

> in

> > > the mind of the observer.

> >

> > This does not fit my memory of Il'enkov's argument about object. Does

> > anybody have a direct quote?

> >

> > Eugene

> >

> >

> > > -----Original Message-----

> > > From: Steve Gabosch [mailto:bebop101@comcast.net]

> > > Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2004 12:32 PM

> > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

> > > Subject: Re: Does no one read [between] Vygotsky's words?: reposting

> > Victor's post

> > >

> > > I happen to have it handy, here is Victor's post again.

> > > - Steve

> > >

> > >

> > > Mike,

> > > These ideas are still in a somewhat formative state, but I'll give it
a

> > try.

> > >

> > >

> >
-----------------------------------Background-----------------------------

> --

> > > Just a bit of background: about three months ago, P. Jones asked if I

> had

> > > written something on Ilyenkov's concepts of Ideality, i.e. those he

> > > presented in his 1977 article "The Concept of the Ideal." After
reading

> > the

> > > article about 8-9 times and finding it no less clear at the 8th
reading

> > than

> > > it was at the first reading I went through the corpus of Ilyenkov's

> works

> > > (those translated into English that is) and reviewed all available

> > > interpretations of EVI's works by D. Bakhurst's and of P. Jones. My

> > general

> > > impression was that the subjective idealist implications of the
article

> of

> > > 1977 (I basically agree with Bakhurst here) were a striking anomaly
when

> > > compared to the rest of EVI's writings, both those preceding and

> following

> > > the publication of the 1977 article (here I take exception to
Bakhurst's

> > > efforts to regard "The Concepts..." as an integral part of Ilyenkov's

> life

> > > work). This raised the interesting question; how did EVI - one of the

> > > sharpest critics of Logical Positivism of the last century - come to

> write

> > > up what is in essence a subjective idealist theory of the ideal?!
"The

> > > Concept of the Ideal" was part of a collection of articles including

> > Leont'

> > > ev's important "Activity and consciousness" published as,(1977)

> Philosophy

> > > in the USSR: Problems of dialectical materialism. I just finished

> > > reading/rereading the available writings of Leontiev (reread his,
(1978)

> > > Activity Consciousness and Personality, and read and reread his,
(1977)

> > > "Activity and Consciousness," several times) and a respectable number
of

> > > links between "The Concept...," and "Activity and Consciousness,"

> suggests

> > > that the anomalies of "The Concept of the Ideal" might well be the

> > > consequence of a theoretical expansion of Leont'ev's Activity theory.

> > >

> > > -----------------------------On the

> Issues--------------------------------

> > >

> > > As I wrote earlier Vygotsky's work is one of the most accomplished

> > > adaptation of materialist dialectics to new issues. I can't say the
same

> > for

> > > Leontiev. Leont'ev's theorizing represents a reversion to subjective

> > > idealism; interesting because he succeeds in doing this without

> appearing

> > to

> > > reject official dialectical materialism. He manages to do this mainly

> by

> > > refraining from writing about the general philosophic implications of

> his

> > > ideas. It appears to me that Ilyenkov in his article of 1977 presents
a

> > > broad philosophical foundation for Leont'ev's Action Theory and
collides

> > > head on with the subjective idealism implicit to Leont'evs basic
ideas.

> > Our

> > > differential evaluation of Vygotsky's work - especially his theories
on

> > the

> > > production of language - from the Action model of Leont'ev is mostly

> based

> > > on several basic features of material logic and its .

> > >

> > > First, a definition of terms: the abstract and the concrete; the

> > > universal, the particular and the singular

> > > (You can skip this if you're acquainted with these terms).

> > > 1. Abstract and Concrete: Materialist logic (and here my main
reference

> is

> > > Ilyenkov's 1960 work The *Dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in

> > Marx'

> > > s Capital* particularly Chapter 2 - The Unity of the Abstract & the

> > Concrete

> > > as a Law of Thought and Chapter 3 - Ascent from the Abstract to the

> > > Concrete) regards abstract and concrete concepts as being equally
linked

> > to

> > > the material world and distinguishes between them only in terms of
their

> > > relatedness to other concepts regarding that world. For example,

> > primitive

> > > exchange or barter represents the most elementary form of

> commodification

> > > and can be regarded as both historically abstract and as a fairly

> abstract

> > > feature of Capitalist economy. It is historically abstract because as
a

> > > pre-capitalist form of exchange it plays a rather minimal role, i.e.
it

> is

> > a

> > > fairly isolated form of activity, in the general mode of production by

> > which

> > > men produced the conditions that perpetuate the life of their
households

> > > etc. It is abstract within the context of modern Capitalism because it

> is

> > > only the basic cell of the whole system of the Capitalist mode of

> > > production. To arrive at the latter, a great many other abstractions;

> > > theory of surplus value, money, and so on must be added to the basic

> > > abstraction of primitive exchange.

> > > 2. Universal, particular and singular (individual): The logical

> categories

> > > of general, particular and singular (individual) are generally, though

> not

> > > universally related to the distinction between the abstract and the

> > > concrete. The Materialist version of universality (here I also rely

> > > considerably on Ilyenkov's (1974) *Dialectical Logic* Chapter 11:

> Problem

> > > of the General in Dialectics) is essentially one of shared origin
rather

> > > than one of shared properties (as it is in the case of formal logical

> > > reasoning). Take, for example, the principle of exchange of
commodities

> > as

> > > a universal feature of Capitalism. The contradictions implicit to

> > commodity

> > > exchange that so characterize the whole of the Capitalist mode of

> > production

> > > are as fundamental as primitive exchange itself, yet primitive
exchange

> is

> > a

> > > most rare and marginal form of social relation in modern Capitalism.

> > > Relations may and usually do develop from individual cases as singular

> > > phenomena, become particular forms of social activity as limited but

> > > recurrent events, and may as in the case of commodity exchange become

> > > universal features of whole social systems.

> > >

> > > The important theoretical achievement of Vygotsky is a thoroughly

> material

> > > and dialectical theory of the production of a special kind of object;

> the

> > > object produced strictly as a means for information transmission.
This

> > kind

> > > of object emerges from a dialectical union of material production (in

> the

> > > case of spoken language this is the production of speech), with the

> > > formation of the notion or logic. No less brilliant are the means

> whereby

> > > LSV demonstrates the processes whereby this union is first achieved
and

> > > develops. LSV's scientific research shows is that the production of

> > objects

> > > for transmission of information (let's call them semiotic objects)

> enables

> > > 1. Objectification of the notion at any and all stages of its

> development

> > > 2. The objective representation of the structures of simple and
complex

> > > stages of the notion: syntax and logic.

> > > 3. Interaction between the production of semiotic objects and the

> > > development of more complex forms of the notion.

> > > Though LSV's research is realized through structured examination of

> > > individual activity, its aims are to determine and test general -

> > > universal - laws of the production of semiotic objects (see the

> > definitions

> > > of universal, particular and singular (individual) using the same

> > scientific

> > > approach as that used by Marx to determine the laws of production and

> > their

> > > manifestation in the Capitalist mode of production.

> > > VYGOTSKY DOES NOT PRODUCE A PSYCHOLOGY!

> > >

> > > Leont'ev's "Activity and Consciousness," makes no explicitly

> philosophical

> > > observations and appears on the surface to be what its author asserts
it

> > to

> > > be; a materialist theory of personality. However, a careful reading

> > raises

> > > some pretty pointed questions concerning the materialist character of

> > Leont'

> > > ev's version of Activity Theory. For example, Leontiev in "Activity
and

> > > consciousness", and Ilyenkov in "The Concept of the Ideal." describe
the

> > > object as representing the ideational "image of the object" presumably

> in

> > > the mind of the observer. This is a very peculiar assertion for

> > > materialists and even for objective idealists. Ideation - the
formation

> > of

> > > the Notion - is ideality because it involves the development of

> knowledge

> > -

> > > that of recurrent relation - that cannot be immediately sensed by
human

> > > perception (by the active spirit for Hegelians). Both Idealist
realism

> > and

> > > Materialism firmly assert that the object itself is immediately

> detectable

> > > by sensual means. The various forms of subjective idealism; Kantian,

> > > Logical Positivism and so on, do argue that perception is as
ideational

> as

> > > relation and that immediate access to the material world is beyond
human

> > > abilities. The assertion that the object represents an image of the

> object

> > > is much more consistent with how subjective idealists regard the

> relation

> > > between the mind and the world than it does either objective idealism
or

> > > Marxist materialism.

> > >

> > > Leontiev aim; the formulation of laws of individual behaviour, is a

> direct

> > > challenge to objectivist logic. In objectivist logic; Idealist and

> > > Materialist there can be no laws of individual behaviour.
Individuals'

> > > behaviours are singular manifestations of laws involving relations on

> the

> > > scale of communities, social system, humanity, and life forms in

> general.

> > > Leontiev does not even make an effort to justify the formation of a

> > general

> > > theory of personality. He just makes one, and ignores the broader

> > > ontological and epistemological implications. I think Ilyenkov's 1977

> > > article may well have been an attempt to deal with the philosophic

> > problems

> > > posed by Leont'ev's general theory of personality. It's an
interesting

> > but

> > > unconvincing effort. Bakhurst, (1991) "The Problem of the Ideal."

> > > Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks

> to

> > > Evald Ilyenkov, makes a considerable effort to distinguish between

> > > Ilyenkov's concept of the ideal and the general run of subjective

> idealist

> > > philosophy; but ultimately comes to the conclusion that Ilyenkov's

> > writings

> > > on the ideal are neither clear nor decisive. No great wonder!
Ilyenkov

> > was

> > > trying to find some way of reconciling a philosophical argument at
least

> > as

> > > ancient as the first publication of Aristotle's logics.

> > >

> > > Enough for now.

> > >

> > > Addendum: the place of psychology as a scientific discipline.

> > > As I wrote above, there is a general or rough correspondence between

> > > development towards the concrete and the development of less general

> > > concepts. Simple statistics is sufficient to show that the more

> concrete

> > > the concept, the more relations are incorporated in its formation, and

> so

> > > the more likely that at least some of the relations that contribute to

> its

> > > formation will differ from other similarly concrete concepts. The

> > > individual case, be it a person, a movement or whatever will, by

> > definition

> > > be one that contains some or many relations or combination of
relations

> to

> > > the material world that are entirely its own. Such an individual or

> > > singularity may serve as the subject of analysis as a manifestation of

> > more

> > > general laws governing human activity in the case of the individual,
but

> > it

> > > is worthless as a basis for the formation of a general theory. For
this

> > way

> > > of thinking psychology and research into individual personality is an

> > > important application of theory to real problems (like the engineer
who

> > > concentrates all the general and particular knowledge about bridge

> > building

> > > to actually construct a bridge in an actual location having specific -

> > > unique - material conditions etc.), but it cannot form the basis for

> > general

> > > theory.

> > >

> > >

> > > ----- Original Message -----

> > > From: "Mike Cole" <mcole@weber.ucsd.edu>

> > > To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> > > Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2004 9:55 PM

> > > Subject: Re: Does no one read [between] Vygotsky's words?

> > >

> > >

> > > > Victor-- Could you elaborate on the comment about the differences

> > between

> > > > LSV and his students/colleagues? Davydov, for example, was a big

> > champion

> > > > of Ilyenkov and a critic of LSV's ideas on concepts on, I believe,

> > their

> > > > marxist foundations. Leontiev is used by a lot of current AT people

> as

> > a

> > > > guiding light. What differences that make a difference do you see?

> > > > mike

> >



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