I wonder how much the notions of "goal" and "agency", given their
individualistic bias, are part of what we could call a USA reading of
CHAT. How much autonomy should we give to the individual and how much
power should we give to the forces of society/culture when sketching
the working of the mind?
Quoting Renee Hayes <rhayes@UDel.Edu>:
> OK, since we are discussing goals, and how and when they are defined,
> what
> do you all see as the relationship between "goal" and "agency"? I
> mean,
> there has been a lot of criticism about the notion of agency (and who
> has it
> in which situations). I am thinking that everybody has goals,
> regardless of
> there positioning in the activity (so for example teacher and
> students in
> classroom, despite inequity of power, all have goals, I suppose).
> And these
> goals can be misaligned, even mutually excluding. But I think there
> has
> been some argument against the possibility of these students (or
> anybody in
> relatively powerless position) having agency.
>
> So what is the relationship between goals and agency? Can CHAT help
> us to
> understand this?
>
> Renee Hayes
> University of Delaware
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Eugene Matusov [mailto:ematusov@UDel.Edu]
> Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 10:24 AM
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> Subject: RE: RE: cr&c
>
> In addition to what Sarah wrote, Leont'ev (1981) found an
> interesting
> Hegel's insight about the development of goal, "As Hegel correctly
> noted, an
> individual 'cannot define the goal of his action until he has
> acted....'"
> (p. 62)
>
> Eugene
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Sarah Woodward Beck [mailto:sarah.beck@nyu.edu]
> > Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 9:44 AM
> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: Re: RE: cr&c
> >
> > David,
> > When I wrote that shared goals imply consciousness, I was thinking
> of
> goals as described
> > by Wertsch (1979, 1981) in an activity system. Goals are what
> give
> direction to an activity,
> > and according to Wertsch, Marx argued that the ability to set
> conscious
> goals is part of what
> > makes us human. So I was extrapolating from the level of activity
> to the
> level of culture in
> > my assumptions about the characteristics of a goal.
> > But perhaps the definition of "goal" needs to be expanded at the
> level of
> culture. What do
> > you see as some examples of "unconscious" goals in an ideological,
> complex
> society?
> > --Sarah
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: david.preiss@yale.edu
> > Date: Monday, March 22, 2004 1:06 am
> > Subject: Re: RE: cr&c
> >
> > >
> > > Hi Sarah,
> > >
> > > Why do shared goals imply consciousness? I think some shared
> goals
> > > can
> > > be quite unconscious, specially in complex (ideological)
> societies.
> > >
> > > David
> > >
> > > Quoting Sarah Woodward Beck <sarah.beck@nyu.edu>:
> > >
> > > > I agree with Judy - I would remove trust and shared goals.
> Trust,
> > > > because it has strong moral connotations that don't seem to
> > > belong in
> > > > a basic definition of culture, and Shared Goals because this
> implies
> > > > a consciousness (of goals) that participants in a culture may
> not
> > > > possess. We are often not conscious of our participation in
> a
> > > > culture as culture.
> > > > --Sarah Beck
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > From: Judy Diamondstone <jdiamondstone@clarku.edu>
> > > > Date: Saturday, March 20, 2004 1:57 pm
> > > > Subject: RE: cr&c
> > > >
> > > > > > Establshing shared goals/visions?
> > > > > > trust?
> > > > > > division of labor?
> > > > > > complementarity?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Which of these things would remove from your own
> conception
> > > of
> > > > > culture?
> > > > > SHAREDness of goals
> > > > > Trust.
> > > > >
> > > > > What do you think?
> > > > >
> > > > > Judy
> > > > >
> > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > From: Mike Cole [mcole@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > > > > Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 1:38 PM
> > > > > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > Subject: re: cr&c
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I can see that those working to create activities where
> > > > > > reflective practice
> > > > > > is valued and implemented have good reason not to want to
> > > > substitute
> > > > > > culture into Bill's paragraph. I am, of course, speaking
> of
> > > > > culture as
> > > > > > (better, from) a particular perspective and it is
> polysemic.
> > > > > Reflective> practice is also polysemic. Even the word
> > > polysemic is
> > > >
> > > > > polysemic.>
> > > > > > However, which of the following things is not
> characteristic of
> > > >
> > > > > culture> as understood in chat discourse:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I am also uncomfortable about the substtution as I think
> > > > > collaborative> reflection is a highly specific practice and
> there
> > > >
> > > > > are some important
> > > > > > principles that givern it including the establishment of
> a
> > > > shared
> > > > > > vision or
> > > > > > goal, the establishment of trust, division of labor,
> > > > > complementarity, etc.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Establshing shared goals/visions?
> > > > > > trust?
> > > > > > division of labor?
> > > > > > complementarity?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Which of these things would remove from your own
> conception
> > > of
> > > > > culture?> mike
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 11:42:23 PST