Re: Leont'ev-Vygotsky controversy

From: Oudeyis (victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il)
Date: Tue Feb 17 2004 - 05:52:45 PST


I'm in the midst of researching for a paper on the broader implications of the debate concerning the differentiation between Nature and Ideational objects for Objective Materialism so up to now I've followed the arguments on the Leont'ev-Vygotsky controversy as a spectator. Andy's comments on the debate have - as usual - considerably clarified the issues, and since these are so much a part of the issues I'm researching, a response is in order here.

Andy: was surprised a couple of years ago when I discovered that activity as the unit of analysis only appeared with Leontyev, but I think Mike is right when said that "there is no such thing as a one right unit of analysis for the study of human nature

I was also surprised when I discovered that Leont'ev used activity (in the sense of Tätigkeit from the verb "to do" and the noun for "deed" - "Im Anfang was der Tat"?). Surprised because as Andy puts it, "Activity" as the unit of analysis for "human nature" comes closest to what Hegel calls "self-consciousness," which I translate into modern, postmetaphysical language as "Subject,"("self-conscious system of activity,") in line with Hegel's usage in the Science of Logic (which is the topic of my long dialogue a few months ago)," and it appeared to me that Leont'ev was 'standing Marx on his head' by regarding the subject as the fundamental unit of analysis. The famous Leont'ev/Engstrom diagram (that triangular flow chart describing the relations between subject - instrument - object ) confirms this view. A comparison of of the Leont'ev/Engstrom diagram with Ilyenkov's cycle of object - deed - ideal - deed - object etc. etc., (1974) Dialectical Logic, part 2 chap 8, graphically describes the difference between a schema that starts begins with subject from one that is based on object.

The anchoring of the schema of the analysis in "human nature" transforms the analysis from one that regards human activity as dependent on objective historical conditions to one that regards activity as self-originated adaptation to world conditions - in a word, 'pragmatism.'

 ." Word-meaning" was introduced by Vygotsky (AFSIK) in "Thinking and Speaking" as the unit of analysis for the understanding of language, not of human nature as a whole.

Vygotsky makes no claims for word-meaning as the unit of analysis of human nature as a whole; but, in contrast to Leont'ev's choice for that role of 'activity',word-meaning is a strictly objective ideation, i.e. it is about objects external to subject.

 But what Mike says is right: the whole idea of "unit of analysis" is that you must find the simplest unit of the thing you are trying to understand which contains the properties of the whole; so, if you are trying to understand language-use, then "word meaning" makes sense as a unit of analysis. But human beings are not just language-users are they?

While I agree whole-heartedly with this statement, I seems to me that Leont'ev's Marxism and Psychology does not present a viable unit or for that matter a schema for analysis of the relation between objects-in-general and the subject. An important reason for this is implicit in the high levels of abstraction of his formulation of the relation between subject and object. His categories are so ethereal that they appear to concern everything without saying very much about anything in particular. He does not, for example, even make the distinction between Natural objects and Ideal objects which lies at the root of the dialectical relation between the 'forces of production' and the 'relations of production' as presented in Capital. Vygotsky, in his more restricted aim of explaining production and use of language made a more limited yet more helpful tool for analysis.

Regards,
Victor

  

  ----- Original Message -----
  From: Andy Blunden
  To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
  Sent: Monday, February 16, 2004 2:58 AM
  Subject: RE: Leont'ev-Vygotsky controversy

  I was busy writing so I let this fascinating discussion go by, but it is so relevant to what I am doing I couldn't ignore it!

  At 03:03 PM 13/02/2004 -0800, you wrote:

    1. Leontiev dropped idea of mediation and replaced it by activity and this was the big advance.
    2. Leontiev integrated idea of mediation and activity and this was the big advance.
    3. Vygotsky ignored activity which was invented by Rubenshtein and Leontiev, so that is the big advance.
    mike

  I was surprised a couple of years ago when I discovered that activity as the unit of analysis only appeared with Leontyev, but I think Mike is right when said that "there is no such thing as a one right unit of analysis for the study of human nature." Word-meaning" was introduced by Vygotsky (AFSIK) in "Thinking and Speaking" as the unit of analysis for the understanding of language, not of human nature as a whole.

  "Activity" as the unit of analysis for "human nature" comes closest to what Hegel calls "self-consciousness," which I translate into modern, postmetaphysical language as "Subject," in line with Hegel's usage in the Science of Logic (which is the topic of my long dialogue a few months ago). I define "Subject" as a "self-conscious system of activity," and in this sense, "activity" is to be taken as the "unit of analysis" not just for individual psychology, but of subjects in the wider context, e.g., social movements, states, nations, a developing child, a company, etc., etc.

  But what Mike says is right: the whole idea of "unit of analysis" is that you must find the simplest unit of the thing you are trying to understand which contains the properties of the whole; so, if you are trying to understand language-use, then "word meaning" makes sense as a unit of analysis. But human beings are not just language-users are they?

  thanks for this fascinating dialogue, and it makes me feel privileged to share the insights particularly of comrades like Ana, Dot and Mike, etc., who have first-hand experience of the Soviet groups who pioneered this work under such difficult conditions.

  I think the observations about the "instrumental" interpretations of "activity" as opposed to the "critical" interpretations of "word meaning" are valid, though of course both usages are potentially misusages!

  Andy



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