Kuhn's theory of scientific revolution could be interpreted as providing
examples of everyday life impinging on the formation of scientific concepts
since the "anomalies" arise precisely in the scientists carrying out his
everyday activities, but that's probably stretching it for most folks.
On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the impact of post-Colombian
transoceanic travel on scientific concepts in a number of areas.
One could develop a framework in which everyday human a NEEDS call forth
adaptations which in turn feed back on the higher order concepts which then
shape the structure of everyday life which in turn confronts new needs
derived from the new adaptations leading to the confrontation with new
problems calling forth modifications of the scientific theories, unfolding
but not necessarily since the outcomes could range from pyrrhic victories,
to mutual annihalation (when transposed to a level of social relations a la
religious wars), to an actual transformation. Kind of reminds me of the
biblical parable of the seeds landing on rock, sand, and fertile soil
respectively.
Flat earth anyone?
Paul H. Dillon
----- Original Message -----
From: Jay Lemke <jllbc@cunyvm.cuny.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2002 8:06 PM
Subject: Re: enculturation/instruction
>
> At 08:52 AM 2/21/2002 -0800, you wrote:
>
> David-- In your reply to Tina, I was wondering what the enculturation/
> deliberate instruction contrast has in common, or not, with the Vygotskian
> notion of everyday and scientific concepts. My colleague, Margie Gallego,
> has been wondering in what ways everyday concepts might promote
transformations
> in scientific concepts -- her interpretation being that Vygotsky treats
> scientific concepts as transformers of everyday, but perhaps not the other
> way around.
>
> mike
>
> -----------------------
>
> The other way around does present an interesting issue I think.
>
> Everyday _concepts_ tend not to influence scientific ones, except at the
> origins of the latter (a historical effect), because the strategy of
> science is to insulate itself from contradiction by everyday experience;
> this is a slightly jaundiced, but still fair I hope, reading of Latour.
>
> On the other hand, everyday _thinking_ (the processes and strategies,
> insofar as they can be separated from the contents) is, as Gary noted,
> still quite basic to scientific reasoning. And not just abductions and
> inferences, prototype categorization, etc., but even narrative -- there
are
> a lot of narrative forms of meaning-making carefully buried out of sight
in
> scientific work (as it proceeds from, say, the experimental or fieldwork
> stage to the finished/published generalization stage). Science has not
> really invented any new forms of reasoning; it just tends to sustain
> systematic inquiry over longer timescales, I think, with more
institutional
> memory, more collective winnowing, and of course more precise and
> specialized contents (measurements, definitions).
>
> The everyday does of course influence the scientific when the scientific
> deigns to the concrete .... i.e. when it is applied science, for then its
> careful insulation must be frayed away, if it is to be of any use (mostly
> of course it is not of any instrumental use; we use it for legitimation,
> rhetorically, as in education or political science or even, I think, much
> of economics). Good applied science has to make major compromises with the
> logics of practice, and in doing so it can learn from them ... and take
> away new variations to be re-insulated in the creation of new theories or
> sciences. I think this has happened, for example, when linguistics has
> tried to deal with text and meaning and come away changed (or at least new
> schools of linguistics have been born in this way). One might say that
> (some) psychology has been influenced likewise by its encounters with
child
> development, cultural difference, everyday practices ... though I am not
> entirely sure it has taken any lessons from its encounters with education.
> I think that ecology is starting to learn from its encounters with
> environmentalism (for example that people and social institutions are part
> of, not outside, ecosystems).
>
> By and large, though, science abhors the everyday ... it's just too messy
> for the paradigms of theoretical neatness and all-cases generalizations.
> Applying science to the everyday is usually a terrible mistake ... fraught
> with danger for the everyday, if nonetheless also filled with new
> possibilities for future sciences.
>
> JAY.
>
>
>
>
> ---------------------------
> JAY L. LEMKE
> PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION
> CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
> JLLBC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
> <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/education/jlemke/index.htm>
> ---------------------------
>
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