crises in natural science?

From: Bill Barowy (wbarowy@yahoo.com)
Date: Thu Aug 30 2001 - 08:13:01 PDT


László and everyone,

The question I offered about the distinction between natural and cultural
historical sciences is one that has been buzzing around a bit, and a quick but
arduous getaway to the top of a mountain yesterday offered some mediation on
the matter. Very quickly here, because things are pressing, I'd simply like to
put a bookmark, a caveat so to speak, about building barriers between natural
and ch sciences by marking them as separate categories at this time and place.
I am familiar with the argument that mike makes in cp too, but IMHO, it may be
problematic to make a dated distinction with a view of natural science as a
positivistic venture. Granted, Vygotsky was brilliant, but standing upon his
shoulders, and those of all who have followed, might we not see a little
further?

"natural science" is far more complex and pluralistic than such a simple
distinction makes. The natural sciences may be considered to be in a "crises"
also, with interpretation becoming a more more important element. Perhaps Jay
and Dewey D. could offer their own views. What I'd like to offer, especially
with the revolutions with quantum mechanics, (which is not incompatible with
special or general theories of relativity) such examples as the "copenhagen
interpretation" debate, and the "many-worlds interpretation" of QM, the
Einstein-Rosen-Podolky paradox, Bell's theorem, and Alain Aspect's experimental
work. Special relativity per se, might be viewed as a way to transform between
the reference frames of what observers in different reference frames *measure*,
and consequently (perhaps?) extending a bridge between what was once considered
objective to one that is observer and frame dependent.

Furthermore, the (natural) sciences of complexity and scale, while often not
seeking to explain cultural happenings, are indeed considering the
developmental, evolutionary pathways of systems to their states of equilibrium,
punctuated or otherwise. Does this qualify as "historical"? Per Bak has
considered physical systems, but perhaps getting closer to the interests of
xmca'ers, Thelen and Smith has a book out about the neurological basis of
cognition and action, and Scott Kelso has looked at the dynamics of "brain and
behavior". Granted, these approaches continue to seek "general principles",
but arguably, dialectics offers something similar, does it not? It is also
interesting, but perhaps the similarity is specious, that this realm of natural
science has been considering "path-dependence" and such is what Adams writes
about with the codevelopment of technological and social relations in 'paths of
fire'.

Another interesting look at natural science, a different perspective, might be
as a system of activity. The historical objective of "discovering reality" has
been a very powerful one for driving the system, and its scientists, to its
past history of success -- witness for example Weinbergs "dreams of a final
theory" book, in which he writes about his goal with clear and durable
conviction, and yet, there are strong elements of valuation that can be placed
in tension with the positivist notion of "objectivity", i.e. what Weinber terms
beauty, elegance and simplicity:

"Rather, we hope for a theory that rigidly will allow us to describe only those
forces -- gravitational, electroweak, and strong -- that actually as it happens
do exist. This kind of rigidity in our physical theories is part of what we
recognize as beauty." (p 147).

gotta go,
bb

=====
"One of life's quiet excitements is to stand somewhat apart from yourself and watch yourself softly become the author of something beautiful."
[Norman Maclean in "A river runs through it."]

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