posting for Deborah

From: Mike Cole (mcole@weber.ucsd.edu)
Date: Fri Feb 23 2001 - 16:48:04 PST


More gremlins, but here is a note from Deborah.
mike

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>From deborah.hicks@uc.edu  Fri Feb 23 08:29:05 2001

I apologize for being absent from the XMCA community for so long and for taking a while to join the Bakhtin discussion. Iíve been trying to figure out how to do action research and advocacy in a low-income urban community/school and do the kind of in-depth scholarship I want to do. This has been a lot more difficult than I could have ever imagined. I welcome private exchanges (deborah.hicks@uc.edu) from folks who have sorted through similar issues.

There are a few themes in the emerging Bakhtin discussion that Iíd like to pick up. First, the historical/biographical changes in Bakhtinís own writing ? from the early philosophical essays to the later essays on the discourses of the novel. Second, the notion of answerability. Third, the concept(s) of moral action that are reverberating throughout our discussions.

Early vs. Later Bakhtin I agree completely with Ricardo O.V.J. when he argues that subjects can change, and that personality is not "stable" in that sense. B. would certainly argue the same thing, and indeed would argue this point even in relation to moment-to-moment living. I think he saw subjectivity/personality as a project, perhaps we could use the word, praxis. Still, he saw the "authorship" of subjectivity as something for which one should assume responsibility, even in those small "moments" (acts, deeds) of living.

We could surely apply the same "project" metaphor to Bís own life, and his own writing. I fully agree with Paul and others that were radical changes in Bís writing over the course of his lifetime. Who among us could say differently about our writing? Still, I see the value in considering how the early essays might shed light on how the later ones have been used to construct a theory of discourse and conscious activity. Obviously, one can read any of the essays in various ways. Readings are, after all, subjective in and of themselves. I (as one subject) read echoes of the themes that appear in Bís early essays in his later ones. This is not to say that I merge "early Bakhtin" and "later Bakhtin", but rather that I look for traces and accents in his writings across time. This, in my view, constitutes a richer reading, engaged with the breadth and depth of his work. We can never completely know what B. intended to do with the early essays. He was living in a time of extreme material hardship, and apparently fragments of TPA were lost due to water and rat damage. I, as one interpretive reader, do not believe Bakhtin to be the author of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language and, furthermore, believe there to be connections between the "humanism" of Bís early work and the concepts like accent in his later writings on discourse. I do not believe that B. saw these as incommensurable.

Answerability I agree completely with Jayís reading (of my essay and Bakhtinís TPA) that B. viewed answerability in two ways. First is the sense in which subjects/collectives are responsive to other subjects/collectives. Second is the sense in which subjects are responsible for their actions and responsible to concrete others. I echo the comments by Judy and Phil that there is an interpersonal dimension to the second sense of "answerability." (Jay has also made similar points in his comments). I was thinking about this in terms of the Kundera novel that I cited in my B. essay, The Unbearable Lightness of Being. Tomas, the character whose actions toward women seem to personify the kind of morality that B. critiqued, has trouble seeing women as other than "objective". "Conquest time has been drastically reduced," he utters on one occasion about his repeated seductions. It isnít until he confronts the complexities of a concrete subject/relationship that he begins to understand a different kind of moral action. His partner (I am blocking on her name in the novel) tells him that she can smell the presence of other women in his hair (he has forgotten to wash his hair after each sexual encounter). Tomas has to see her ? a complex subject ? and to live/see/feel the particulars of their relationship (to follow on Jayís points about moving beyond simplistic dyads) ? before he can begin to see things differently. The kind of answerability that B. was describing is, as Phil describes, moral action in which the concrete particulars of subjects and real relations are constitutive of a philosophy of living.

I like Jayís point about individual and collective subjectivity. Clearly, B. moves more toward collective subjectivity as his theory of discourse "refracts" the subject whom he portrayed in TPA as more singular. Still, I think there is room for the kind of moral action that B. describes in TPA to be extended to collective discourses and actions, as Jay suggests. I like a phrase in Raymond Williamsí book, The Country and the City: structures of feeling. As I understand the term, it indicates for Williams a relation between sociolinguistic forms, group ideologies, and creative practices that lend new meanings (or "intonations") and create new group subjectivities and values. I think B. was looking for similar sorts of descriptions and phrases ? ones that could capture the ways in which each "given" genre, act, subject was also, as the moment of acting, infused with something slightly new. The concept of answerability argues for this "slightly new" being partly a response to the concrete particulars of other subjects (TPA) and other discourses that are always infused with the concreteness of feeling and value (DN). However, I also completely agree with Helena that B. relies too heavily in his early essays on the "goodness" of such responsive encounters. Surely, responses can be intoned with things other than love. Five minutes inside of a school building would reveal other types of relations between subjects. B., like Iris Murdoch, draws heavily on a Christian ideology (as Jay notes) that sometimes, particularly in his early essays, blinds him to the real-life moral complexities of living. Arguably, he sees this kind of "attention" (verínost) as a project toward which one should aim.

Moral Action I was most moved by the discussions of moral action. B. argued, in my view, for a theory of moral action that is not, countering what Paul suggests, "the rules that govern the interaction of a community in an activity system." This view of moral action is precisely what B. critiques throughout his essay, Toward a Philosophy of the Act. Rather, he argues in the essay and in those in Art and Answerability, for a kind of moral action that is sensitive to context, including (like in the case of Milan Kunderaís novel) concrete, embodied subjects. It is when we see other subjects (collective or otherwise) as the "rules that govern the interaction of a community in an activity system" that we lose the specialness (freedom, possibility), for B., of human interactions. I see links between Jayís comments about the possibilities of unpacking the discourses of contemporary theory, Paulís early comments about what I was trying to do in my essay, and Philís comments about moral action as a kind of praxis. In response to Paul Dillonís comments that "I (P.D.) donít think that Hicks has provided a viable interpretation for advancing the development of Bakhtinian directions with that [AT] theory", I would (D.H.) would respond, "Iím not trying to." I donít aim to develop Activity Theory, but rather to develop other kinds of theoretical languages, other discourses, outside of it. I make no pretense to trying to develop a "meta-theory" of any sort. If I have edged one tiny step toward arguing that "without taking into account the moral attunement and ethical particularity one cannot account for the rationality of any discourse at all" (Paul Dillonís remarks), I would be content. If this step were to have some small change effect on relations or social practices (including theories of learning) that can be oppressive, some impact that causes others to see things in a different light, I would be ecstatic. I see links myself between the way that we (as theorists) shape our discourses and the ways in which children are shaped within discourses of "learning." I echo Jayís concerns that we might need to search for languages of inquiry that boldly address why such things as feeling and value are not present in theoretical depictions of learning. This need not detract our attention from things like social/cultural/ideological factors that constitute such oppressions (e.g., systems of oppression), but rather make their moral force even more salient in our theoretical languages. "To write in different ways is to live in different ways", argues Raymond Williams (in Marxism and Literature). Our texts as scholars are themselves moral actions in the world ? they can and do have real moral consequences for concrete subjects and communities.

-- Deborah

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<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en"> <html> dear Mike, <p>I've tried sending this posting (below) twice, and my colleagues on the East Coast tell me they haven't seen this yet.&nbsp; I sent it last night (Thursday) around 10:00 p.m., and also earlier on Thursday morning.&nbsp; I am on the system because I am receiving postings.&nbsp; How long would it normally take for something to appear?&nbsp; Would you be able, in the interim, to post the following response from me?&nbsp; Thanks so much,&nbsp; Deborah <br>&nbsp; <p>I apologize for being absent from the XMCA community for so long and for taking a while to join the Bakhtin discussion.&nbsp; I’ve been trying to figure out how to do action research and advocacy in a low-income urban community/school and do the kind of in-depth scholarship I want to do.&nbsp; This has been a lot more difficult than I could have ever imagined.&nbsp; I welcome private exchanges (deborah.hicks@uc.edu) from folks who have sorted through similar issues. <p>There are a few themes in the emerging Bakhtin discussion that I’d like to pick up.&nbsp; First, the historical/biographical changes in Bakhtin’s own writing &shy; from the early philosophical essays to the later essays on the discourses of the novel.&nbsp; Second, the notion of answerability.&nbsp; Third, the concept(s) of moral action that are reverberating throughout our discussions.<b></b> <p><b>Early vs. Later Bakhtin</b> <br>I agree completely with Ricardo O.V.J. when he argues that subjects can change, and that personality is not "stable" in that sense.&nbsp; B. would certainly argue the same thing, and indeed would argue this point even in relation to moment-to-moment living.&nbsp; I think he saw subjectivity/personality as a project, perhaps we could use the word, praxis.&nbsp; Still, he saw the "authorship" of subjectivity as something for which one should assume responsibility, even in those small "moments" (acts, deeds) of living. <p>We could surely apply the same "project" metaphor to B’s own life, and his own writing.&nbsp; I fully agree with Paul and others that were radical changes in B’s writing over the course of his lifetime.&nbsp; Who among us could say differently about our writing?&nbsp; Still, I see the value in considering how the early essays might shed light on how the later ones have been used to construct a theory of discourse and conscious activity.&nbsp; Obviously, one can read any of the essays in various ways.&nbsp; Readings are, after all, subjective in and of themselves.&nbsp; I (as one subject) read echoes of the themes that appear in B’s early essays in his later ones.&nbsp; This is not to say that I merge "early Bakhtin" and "later Bakhtin", but rather that I look for traces and accents in his writings across time.&nbsp; This, in my view, constitutes a richer reading, engaged with the breadth and depth of his work.&nbsp; We can never completely know what B. intended to do with the early essays.&nbsp; He was living in a time of extreme material hardship, and apparently fragments of TPA were lost due to water and rat damage.&nbsp; I, as one interpretive reader, do not believe Bakhtin to be the author of <i>Marxism and the Philosophy of</i> <i>Language</i> and, furthermore, believe there to be connections between the "humanism" of B’s early work and the concepts like accent in his later writings on discourse.&nbsp; I do not believe that B. saw these as incommensurable. <p><b>Answerability</b> <br>I agree completely with Jay’s reading (of my essay and Bakhtin’s TPA) that B. viewed answerability in two ways.&nbsp; First is the sense in which subjects/collectives are responsive to other subjects/collectives.&nbsp; Second is the sense in which subjects are responsible for their actions and responsible to concrete others.&nbsp; I echo the comments by Judy and Phil that there is an interpersonal dimension to the second sense of "answerability."&nbsp; (Jay has also made similar points in his comments).&nbsp; I was thinking about this in terms of the Kundera novel that I cited in my B. essay, <i>The Unbearable Lightness of Being</i>.&nbsp; Tomas, the character whose actions toward women seem to personify the kind of morality that B. critiqued, has trouble seeing women as other than "objective".&nbsp; "Conquest time has been drastically reduced," he utters on one occasion about his repeated seductions.&nbsp; It isn’t until he confronts the complexities of a concrete subject/relationship that he begins to understand a different kind of moral action.&nbsp; His partner (I am blocking on her name in the novel) tells him that she can smell the presence of other women in his hair (he has forgotten to wash his hair after each sexual encounter).&nbsp; Tomas has to see her &shy; a complex subject &shy; and to live/see/feel the particulars of their relationship (to follow on Jay’s points about moving beyond simplistic dyads) &shy; before he can begin to see things differently.&nbsp; The kind of answerability that B. was describing is, as Phil describes, moral action in which the concrete particulars of subjects and real relations are constitutive of a philosophy of living. <p>I like Jay’s point about individual and collective subjectivity.&nbsp; Clearly, B. moves more toward collective subjectivity as his theory of discourse "refracts" the subject whom he portrayed in TPA as more singular.&nbsp; Still, I think there is room for the kind of moral action that B. describes in TPA to be extended to collective discourses and actions, as Jay suggests.&nbsp; I like a phrase in Raymond Williams’ book, <i>The Country and the City</i>: <u>structures of feeling</u>.&nbsp; As I understand the term, it indicates for Williams a relation between sociolinguistic forms, group ideologies, and creative practices that lend new meanings (or "intonations") and create new group subjectivities and values.&nbsp; I think B. was looking for similar sorts of descriptions and phrases &shy; ones that could capture the ways in which each "given" genre, act, subject was also, as the moment of acting, infused with something slightly new.&nbsp; The concept of answerability argues for this "slightly new" being partly a response to the concrete particulars of other subjects (TPA) and other discourses that are always infused with the concreteness of feeling and value (DN).&nbsp; However, I also completely agree with Helena that B. relies too heavily in his early essays on the "goodness" of such responsive encounters.&nbsp; Surely, responses can be intoned with things other than love.&nbsp; Five minutes inside of a school building would reveal other types of relations between subjects.&nbsp; B., like Iris Murdoch, draws heavily on a Christian ideology (as Jay notes) that sometimes, particularly in his early essays, blinds him to the real-life moral complexities of living.&nbsp; Arguably, he sees this kind of "attention" (<i>ver’nost</i>) as a <u>project</u> toward which one should aim. <p><b>Moral Action</b> <br>I was most moved by the discussions of moral action.&nbsp; B. argued, in my view, for a theory of moral action that is not, countering what Paul suggests, "the rules that govern the interaction of a community in an activity system."&nbsp; This view of moral action is precisely what B. critiques throughout his essay, Toward a Philosophy of the Act.&nbsp; Rather, he argues in the essay and in those in Art and Answerability, for a kind of moral action that is sensitive to context, including (like in the case of Milan Kundera’s novel) concrete, embodied subjects.&nbsp; It is when we see other subjects (collective or otherwise) as the "rules that govern the interaction of a community in an activity system" that we lose the specialness (freedom, possibility), for B., of human interactions.&nbsp; I see links between Jay’s comments about the possibilities of unpacking the discourses of contemporary theory, Paul’s early comments about what I was trying to do in my essay, and Phil’s comments about moral action as a kind of praxis.&nbsp; In response to Paul Dillon’s comments that "I (P.D.) don’t think that Hicks has provided a viable interpretation for advancing the development of Bakhtinian directions with that [AT] theory", I would (D.H.) would respond, "I’m not trying to."&nbsp; I don’t aim to develop Activity Theory, but rather to develop other kinds of theoretical languages, other discourses, outside of it.&nbsp; I make no pretense to trying to develop a "meta-theory" of any sort.&nbsp; If I have edged one tiny step toward arguing that "without taking into account the moral attunement and ethical particularity one cannot account for the rationality of any discourse at all" (Paul Dillon’s remarks), I would be content.&nbsp; If this step were to have some small change effect on relations or social practices (including theories of learning) that can be oppressive, some impact that causes others to see things in a different light, I would be ecstatic.&nbsp; I see links myself between the way that we (as theorists) shape our discourses and the ways in which children are shaped within discourses of "learning."&nbsp; I echo Jay’s concerns that we might need to search for languages of inquiry that boldly address why such things as feeling and value are not present in theoretical depictions of learning.&nbsp; This need not detract our attention from things like social/cultural/ideological factors that constitute such oppressions (e.g., systems of oppression), but rather make their moral force even more salient in our theoretical languages.&nbsp; "To write in different ways is to live in different ways", argues Raymond Williams (in Marxism and Literature).&nbsp; Our texts as scholars are themselves moral actions in the world &shy; they can and do have real moral consequences for concrete subjects and communities. <p>-- Deborah</html>

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