from phil g re moral

From: Mike Cole (mcole@weber.ucsd.edu)
Date: Mon Feb 19 2001 - 13:58:00 PST


Phil is still experiencing trouble posting. Heree is a forward.
mike
>From phil.graham@mailbox.uq.edu.au Mon Feb 19 13:49:52 2001

Hi Mike,
At 11:08 PM 18/02/01 -0800, PD wrote:
>1. Wittgenstein repudiated the Tractatus

"Misleading parallel: the expression of pain is a cry--the expression of
thought, a proposition.

As if the purpose of the proposition were to convey to one person how it is
with another: only, so to speak, in his thinking part and not in his
stomach" (Philosophical investigations #317).

Wittgenstein does not do what you say (refute the tractatus in toto and
deny the existence of propositions): he places propositions in context;
refuses to separate fact (proposition) from evaluation
(feeling/orientation/attitude); utterance from context; or speech from
action (so no surprise in Toulmin's relating PI with AT). He most certainly
does not deny the existence of propositions _tout court; rather, he refutes
their decontextualisation in the manner of of B Russell et al (who has
different, far less defensible reasons for saying that values do not belong
in philosophy).

>2. I was not writing about "theoretical immorality "

You said: "I really question the proposed role for "the other's emotions"
in any consistent moral framework. That is I don't think you can produce a
coherent moral theory on such a basis". My point is that morality is not a
matter of theory, but of practice. Surely taking others' feelings into
account is a very big part of day-to-day moral action (Philosophical
Investigations #403-409). Do you think otherwise? Or, do you think that
discourse is not praxis (and does not manifest "theory"; is not
dialectically intertwined with the rest of social totality)? If yes to the
last question, how do you reconcile such a perspective with an AT perspective?

Your treatment of "incest" is most certainly theoretical -- a very high
abstraction --- since you use it to encompass a whole range of acts and
definitions thereof across the totality of human experience throughout the
whole of history.

But then again you seem uncertain of its status as a "universal": "all
incest is considered immoral"; "most humans find some form or other of
incest to be immoral"; "Marrying cousins (specifically certain categories
of cousins) is most definitely not incest for many people but marrying your
sister always is (unless you were a Pharoah, an Inca, or a Hawaiian king or
queen)": all, most, some, many, unless ... You are confusing normative
praxis with morality (which either leads to cultural relativism or a
normatively derived utilitarianism), as well as confusing an abstract,
universalised category with cultural specificities. All cultures have
rituals of death, stances on killing ("thou shalt not kill unless----"),
ways of cooking, making music, reproducing myths, reproducing, making, etc.
All these categories have their normatively inculcated transgressions in
all cultures. Some of these are actually considered to be (more and less)
immoral (like preaching in the twelfth century if you were not a priest).

> I think you missed the point I'm making. The point is that this isn't a
>"theory of incest"; it is a framework for defining categories of moral and
>immoral actions. It is not a theory in the same sense that any system of
>classifications is not a theory, but in this case it is a system of
>classification that defines what is and what isn't moral action, as such it
>contains an imperative for action, not simply a framework of perception
>(what kinds of animals belong together, what kinds of medicinal herbs there
>are, etc.

See Wittgenstein above. I do not see how observation can be separated from
evaluation. You cannot taxonomise without evaluating (by definition),
regardless of whether you preclude (or include) a taxonomy of morals (as
you have done). Your child says: "I am hungry" -- do you say: "So what?".
There is no more a single taxonomy of plants and animals than there is a
single definition of "family" or a single moral Universal. Further, the
definition of "incest" is most certainly not identical to that of "family",
at least not everywhere (although the opposite might be true), however
flexible you make the category.

>3. Your post confuses incest and rape but not all incest is rape
>Nevertheless all incest is considered immoral. Consensual incest is even
>more immoral insofar as both parties are guilty.

I'll ignore the non-sequitur (or elision) smudged over by your
"nevertheless" (I mean I am assuming that you consider rape to be immoral).
So in your moral discourse, consensual incest (let's say between siblings)
is more immoral than a father raping his child? In which society do such
moral standards apply?

>Linking incest to rape is totally not at issue here since the form of
>incest that is found most repugnant according to numerous studies is
>mother-son, the least repugnant brother-sister. That is the least common
>is most repugnant, the more common less repugnant, less morally
>offensive. Female rape of males, while being a favorite fantasy of male
>adolescents, is not very common at all.

Now that is what I would call a convoluted, if not inverted, utilitarianism
(which I understand to be, crudely, the greatest good for the greatest
number rather than with hurting people): the more common the offense, the
less morally offensive it is (the least amount of harm for the most
people). If we take that as the basis for a moral framework, then the act
that offends the least people is the most moral act? Regardless, you
contradict yourself with this next example:

>On the other hand, not all rape is considered immoral everywhere and some
>is deemed socially appropriate. Among the Yanamomo and other lowland south
>american tribes, gang rape of girls who do not take a boy friend is
>considered to be a morally acceptable, i.e.., the people (including
>family members) basically say:: "she had it coming", which is about as
>clear an expression of what a people deems moral as one could make.

How is "she had it coming" in relation to gang rape the clearest expression
of what a people deems moral?! Are you saying that the (theoretetical) girl
is considered immoral for not taking a boyfriend? Or are you saying that
the endorsement of gang rape ("she deserved that pain") is an expression of
morality in itself (i.e. a moral proposition)? Or are you saying that just
because everyone in the community endorses inflicting a young woman with
the unquestionable agony of gang rape (which I refuse to believe in any
case) that that is a statement of morality!? (the worst pain for the least
number of people [the transgressors] defines what is moral).

>So when you say > My apologies if I have caused pain to anybody affected
>by incest< it isn't all that clear what you mean. It sounds like you're
>addressing rape victims. Incest doesn't really have "victims" in that sense.

Yes it does. Incest and rape go together very often. You might wish to take
yourself out of anthropology and into, eg, prison or child sexual abuse
statistics. Almost 70% of all prisoners (at least in Australia) are victims
of violent, incestual rape suffered as children. That's just for a start.
The figures are quite staggering and I could go on at length. I have first
hand experience of the effects which drove me to find out as much about it
as I could. Here. Now.

>The issue has nothing to do with rape.

So you keep saying. I think you are wrong.

>I realize this point will raise a lot of hackles but the bottom line here
>is: on what basis do you impose YOUR morality on other people?

On the basis of what I think is evil: namely, systematically doing harm to
people, regardless of the circumstances or the "kind" of harm it is.

> Is and ought are constantly struggling with each other

Every "is" contains or implies an "ought", and vice versa, even though they
are not reducible to each other.

>and there is a difference insofar as ought is a lot more arbitrary than is.

I'd like to see you justify that. Isness is as much a matter of sociality
(or normativity, if that is what you mean by "arbitrary", it also seems to
be your definition of morality) as oughtness is.

>But discussions of incest should not be confused with discussions of rape
>within the family.

Here you invoke an arbitrary ought (I should not confuse...) to abolish my
right to report a matter-of-fact IS. It IS a fact that most cases of
incest, at least as far as reported statistics in the western world go, are
also cases of rape. If you wish to define incest as ONLY consensual, then
go ahead. But that would be just another arbitrary distinction in your very
flexible "incest" category.

>Once this 'phenomenological' dimension of the incest 'taboo' is made clear,
>it becomes easier to discuss the kibbutz and china cases and to wonder about
>the probable bases for theis most important NORMATIVE/MORAL dimension of all
>human existence.

You equate normativity with morality. That would make genocidal conventions
moral (i.e. "good") acts.

Is that the case?

Or are you confusing one dimension of evaluative meanings with another (the
is/normative with the ought/moral)?

What is *your* coherent theory of morality?

Phil (also looking forward to reading the Hicks article)

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Phil Graham, Lecturer (Communication)
University of Queensland
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