Theatre as a Model System for Learning to Create Yrjv Engestrvm, University of Helsinki Timo Kallinen, Theatre Academy of Finland, Helsinki Introduction The basic argument of this paper is simple. We maintain that artistic creation can best be understood as a real, sensuous, object-bound, instrumentally mediated and communicative activity, taking place in concrete socio- historically determined but inherently contradictory and mobile forms. What is the dominant socio-historical form of artistic creation in today's society? The common image depicts the artist as a free private producer, working alone and selling his or her products the same way medieval artisans sold theirs. We maintain that this handicraft image of artistic production belongs essentially to the past, though today's artistic practices still have their handicraft layers and elements. The dominant form of artistic production today is that of wage labor, concentrated into large organizations and mediated by a complex division of labor. In contrast to the traditional handicraft form, we call this the rationalized form of artistic production. When we say that rationalized wage labor is the dominant form of artistic creation, we make no claims concerning the quantitative prevalence of this form. Being the dominant form means being the leading form which determines the current qualitative mode of development. Film industry is a natural example of artistic production in the form of rationalized wage labor; record industry may be considered as another one. But there is a much older, classic form - namely the theatre. In theatre, we may study the basic developmental features and problems of artistic creation as wage labor in a condensed, 'pure' form. This is why we have taken theatre as the object of the present analysis. Theatre is compact, yet complex. In many respects theatre comes close to being the germ cell or ancestor of the subsequent various forms of artistic wage labor. "The ancestor, as a rule, does not die but continues to live alongside all its offspring as an individuum among other individua, and the problem consists in discovering among the existing separate individua the one that was born before the others and therefore could have given birth to all the rest." (Ilyenkov, 1977, p. 347) When we say that artistic creation shall be studied as activity, we mean the total process of the elaboration of an artistic product - in our case, leading to the performance of a play on the stage. In this respect, our approach resembles Howard Becker's (1982) notion of 'art worlds'. Moreover, we see contradictions and conflicts as essential for the understanding of any real activity. As Billig (1987, p. 15) notes, "it is these arguments, lasting months, years and sometimes lifetimes, which contribute to the activity which enables the performers to follow their scripts without argument for an hour or two in front of the footlights". The theatre company, with salaried personnel and relatively fixed division of labor, originates in the 16th century. Theatre institutions based on wage labor take manifold forms today. However, their differences are not essential for our present purposes, although the empirical material of our paper is collected in Finnish circumstances.1 Characterizing artistic creation as rationalized wage labor makes people uneasy. Questions arise: Can we seriously talk about creation anymore, in such socio- historical form of activity? What will be the future of artistic creation under this dominant form? Shouldn't we return to the golden ages of free individual artists? What implications does the dominant form of theatrical production have for the learning and cognitive development of those studying and learning for theatre or through drama? In the following sections, we make an attempt at forming some preliminary tools for elaborating on questions like these. In the second section, drawing upon the work of Stanislavsky and Leont'ev, we'll work out a model and certain instrumental concepts for analyzing theatre as activity. In the third section, we will report and discuss some attempts of theatre professionals to employ our model in the analysis of their own creative work. In the fourth and final section, we'll turn to the implications our conceptualization may have for learning and cognition. Analyzing Theatre as Activity: Lessons from Stanislavsky and Leont'ev In the theory of theatre, the classical activity-oriented approach stems from the work of Konstantin Stanislavsky (1863-1938). In the early Soviet theatre, Meyerhold and Vakhtangov were simultaneously followers and adversaries of Stanislavsky. Later two other activity-oriented approaches emerged, namely those of Brecht and Artaud. The three traditions may be regarded as absolutely incompatible with each other. Yet they together, as if aufgehoben in a unified triangle, provide the preconditions for envisaging and practically realizing the theatre of the future. But in the present context, we restrict our deliberations to the first cornerstone, Stanislavsky. Stanislavsky's 'system' is well known. In My Life in Art (1924) he divides it in two main parts: (1) the inner and the outer work of the actor on himself, and (2) the inner and the outer work of the actor on his part. These two poles are treated in Stanislavsky's subsequent books: the actor himself in An Actor Prepares (1936) and Building a Character (1950); and the part in Creating a Role (1961). The inner work on the actor himself is based on a psychic technique which enables him to evoke a creative state of mind during which inspiration descends on him more easily. The actor's external work on himself consists of the preparation of his bodily mechanism for the embodiment of his part and the exact presentation of its inner life. The work on the part consists of the study of the spiritual essence of a dramatic work, the germ from which it has emerged and which defines its meaning as well as the meaning of all its parts (Magarshack, 1961, p. 27). So the fundamental relation for Stanislavsky is that between the actor and the text. The aim is to produce truth. Truth in turn is a presentation which is believed both by the actors and the audience. To reach the truth, the actor must merge with his role character, become one with it, literally live through the actions and emotions of the role character. It is not a question of copying life on the stage. It is a question of making and living life itself on the stage. But not just any life. The task is to make and live the life of the play which represents classical, essential features and forces of the human nature. Thus, the actors must turn the text into a truthful performance on the stage. "No part, in fact, can be really successful unless the actor believes in it. The actor must believe in everything that is taking place on the stage and, above all, he must believe in himself. But he can only believe in what is true. He must, therefore, always be aware of truth and know how to find it, and to do that he must develop his artistic sensibility for truth. And Stanislavsky makes it clear that what he means by truth is the truth of the actor's feelings and sensations, the truth of the inner creative impulse which is striving to express it. 'I am not interested in the truth outside me', he declares. 'What is important to me is the truth in me, the truth of my attitude towards one scene or another on the stage, towards the different things on the stage, the scenery, my partners, who are playing the other parts in the play, and their feelings and thoughts." (Magarshack, 1961, p. 22) The worst enemy of the actor is his tendency to act for the audience - to make theater instead of life. To avoid this, theatre needs an invisible 'fourth wall' between the stage and the audience. The actors must concentrate on their course of action and follow its own logic, forgetting the audience. Only this way the audience can fully merge with the play. What is so activity-oriented in Stanislavsky's approach? As we know, the differentia specifica of human activity is the systematic production and preservation of tools. Stanislavsky made theatre conscious of its own tool production. He made theatrical creation an endeavour not only of producing performances but also of producing instruments for its own perfection at the same time. A long list of such instruments may be found in Stanislavsky's work: the magic "if," given circumstances, imagination, attention, relaxation of muscles, dividing a part into "pieces and problems," emotional memory, communication through "irradition," and extraneous aids - to name only some of the central ones (Magarshack, 1961, p. 32). None of these is there from the beginning, just to be picked up and used by the actor. They are all instruments to be continuously constructed and reconstructed in the activity of acting. But the instruments listed above are not yet the most general and powerful ones for Stanislavsky. There are three general instruments that truly possess the status of principles. These are (1) physical actions, (2) the superobjective, and (3) the through action. We'll now turn to a closer examination of each of these three. (1) Physical Actions At the very outset of his career, Stanislavsky realised that dramatic art and the art of the actor are based on action. The actor was to act externally and internally, purposefully and productively. However, only toward the end of his life Stanislavsky developed the principle of approaching inner actions and emotions from and through external physical actions. "The creation of the physical life is half the work on a role because, like us, a role has two natures, physical and spiritual. You will say that the main purpose of our art does not consist of externals, that the creation of the life of a human spirit is what it looks to in order to inform what we do on the stage. I quite agree, but precisely because of this I begin our work with the physical life of any part. (...) This is something material, tangible, it responds to orders, to habits, discipline, exercise, it is easier to handle than elusive, ephemeral, capricious feeling which slips away. But that is not all. There are more important factors hidden in my method: The spirit cannot but respond to the actions of the body, provided of course that these are genuine, have a purpose, and are productive. This state of things is particularly important on the stage because a role, more than action in real life, must bring together the two lines - of external and of internal action - in mutual effort to achieve a given purpose. (...) The physical approach to a part can act as a kind of storage battery for creative feeling. Inner emotions and feelings are like electricity. Scatter them into space and they disappear. But fill up the physical life of your part with feelings, and the emotions aroused will become rooted in your physical being, in your deeply felt physical actions." (Stanislavski, 1981, p. 149-150) The actor has to learn to use his physical actions as instruments for reaching the unity of feeling and doing. Even words become physical tools of action. "The point is that if I had not taken the text away from you, you would have worked too hard over the printed words and would have rendered them without thought, formally, before you had penetrated to the underlying meaning which shapes the line of your role. (...) Let the words themselves become for you only the weapons with which to go into action, one of the external means to embody the inner essence of your role." (Stanislavski, 1981, p. 141) (2) The Superobjective Actions in themselves are meaningless if they are not subordinated to a motive. In every play and every role, there is a hidden ruling idea, a motivating force giving direction and tension to the events. Stanislavsky calls this the superobjective. "In this innermost center, this core of the role, all the remaining objectives of the score converge, as it were, into one superobjective. That is the inner essence, the all- embracing goal, the objective of all objectives, the concentration of the entire score of the role, of all its major and minor units. The superobjective contains the meaning, the inner sense, of all the subordinate objectives of the play. In carrying out this one superobjective you have arrived at something even more important, superconscious, ineffable (...). In Dostoyevski's novel The Brothers Karamazov the superobjective is the author's search for God and Devil in the soul of man. In Shakespeare's tragedy of Hamlet such a superobjective would be the comprehending of the secrets of being. With Chekhov's The Three Sisters it is the aspiration for a better life ('to Moscow, to Moscow'). With Leo Tolstoy it was his unending search for 'self- perfection,' and so forth. Only artists of genius are capable of the emotional experience of a superobjective, the complete absorption into themselves of the soul of the play, and the synthesis of themselves with the playwright." (Stanislavski, 1981, p. 77-78) (3) The Through Action "Nevertheless a creative superobjective is still not creativeness itself. In an actor it consists of constant striving toward the superobjective and the expression of that striving in action. This striving, which expresses the essence of creativeness, is the through action of the role or play. If for the writer this through action is expressed by the progression of his superobjective, then for the actor the through action is the active attainment of the superobjective. Thus the superobjective and the through action represent creative goal and creative action, which contain in themselves all the thousands of separate, fragmentary objectives, units, actions in a role. (...) Often, in life and also on the stage, the through line will manifest itself unconsciously. It will become defined only after the fact, and its ultimate goal, the superobjective, will have been secretly, unconsciously, exercising a pull, drawing to itself our human aspirations. (...) Thus the process of living your part consists of composing a score for your role, of a superobjective, and of its active attainment by means of the through line of action." (Stanislavski, 1981, p. 78-80) Magarshack (1961) depicts the idea of the through action with the following graphs (Figure 1). The upper graph represents a line of through action where each single action of the actor is subordinated to the superobjective. The lower graph represents a situation where the through action and the superobjective are lacking. The actions have different and conflicting directions and the whole play is torn into bits and pieces. Figure 1: Acting with a through action and without it (adapted from Magarshack, 1961, p. 71-72) How are the superobjective and the through action to be found? Stanislavsky gives the following advice. "While analysing Chaykovsky's characters you find in the first act, in the second, twice in the third, and in the fifth one and the same qualities, one and the same characteristic traits. You make a careful note of them. Furthermore, in the third and final scenes you again discover one and the same qualities. As you go on with your analysis, you again find general features in the second and the third acts. You note them all down. At the end of your analysis you find that you have jotted down 37 different qualities. A further examination shows that 3, 5, 10, 18 are really only one and the same quality, and you mark them now with one number. (...) After reducing still further the remaining (...) qualities to more fundamental ones, you get out of the original 37 qualities only four, and finally you detect one, or two, or three out of which you compose the unbroken line of your part, from which you deduce the through-action of your part in the whole play. Now you have also obtained a clear conception of the ruling idea of the play (...)." (Stanislavsky, 1961, p. 148-149) This inductive empirical generalization represents the procedures that cause Magarshack (1961, p. 3-4) to argue that Stanislavsky "knew nothing of the laws of drama" because the art and technique of the dramatist had never been studied. Certainly the procedure suggested above is a far cry from a genetic analysis of the play. Stanislavsky's concepts are original and they continue to exert powerful influence on the theory and practice of theatre. At the same time, they are clearly of interest to the psychological theory. From the 1930's, Lev Vygotsky's disciple and collaborator A. N. Leont'ev elaborated on a general psychological theory of activity (see Leont'ev, 1978; 1981). It is reasonable to ask whether any affinity may be found between Stanislavsky's concepts and those worked out by Leont'ev. Biographically it seems evident that Stanislavsky had no contact with and was not aware of the work of the cultural-historical school where Leont'ev belonged (see Polyakova, 1982). Thus, the possible affinity must be of purely substantial and logical kind. Leont'ev uses the Vygotskian scheme of instrumentally mediated action, consisting of the subject, the object, and the instrument (technical and/or psychological tool) (see Leont'ev, 1981, p. 281-282). In this process man's cognition of the objects takes place, exceeding the possibilities of direct sensory reflection. If in direct action, 'subject- object,' the latter discloses its properties only within limits conditioned by the kind and degree of subtlety that the subject can sense, then in then in the process of interaction mediated by an instrument, cognition goes beyond these limits. Thus, in mechanical processing of an object made of one material with an object made of another, we carry out an unmistakable test of their relative hardness within limits completely inaccessible to our organs of skin-muscle sensitivity: On the basis of the change of form of one of the objects, we draw a conclusion about the greater hardness of the other. In this sense the instrument is the first real abstraction. (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 23.) Besides these three elements of productive human activity, Leont'ev points out other equally important constituents. He notes that the unity of individual goal- directed actions and the overall activity is achieved through "nothing other than the given individual's relation with the other members of the group, by virtue of which he gets his share (...) from them, i.e., part of the product of their joint labor activity" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 212). Consequently, Leont'ev differentiates between three structural levels of activity. "Thus in the total flow of activity that forms human life, in its higher manifestations mediated by psychic reflection, analysis isolates separate (specific) activities in the first place according to the criterion of motives that elicit them. Then actions are isolated - processes that are subordinated to consciou goals, finally, operations that directly depend on the conditions of attaining concrete goals." (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 66-67; italics added) A further central principle of Leont'ev's theory is the structural correspondence of external and internal activity. From this principle it follows that internalization is regarded as the central mechanism of cultural-historical and individual development. Even when the molding of mental processes in the child was being investigated their sources were at best considered to be his sense perceptions; the development of mental acts, however, was represented as an independent process on which the development even of external actions (...) depended. It was overlooked that inner, theoretical processes were originally differentiated within external, outward activity, and only later transformed into a special kind of activity. (...) Psychological analysis demonstrates that inner, ideal activity has the same structure as practical activity. In thinking, too, we should consequently distinguish between activity, acts, and operations proper (...). It is precisely because of the commonness of the structure of inner theoretical activity and outward practical activity that their separate structural elements can and do pass into into one another (...)." (Leontyev, 1981, p. 249) When we now look for parallels between Stanislavsky and Leont'ev, at least three can be pointed out. These correspond to Stanislavsky's three most general conceptual tools. Firstly, both Stanislavsky and Leont'ev emphasized the priority of physical, external, object-oriented and instrumentally mediated actions in learning and development. Both developed experimental procedures to enhance and study internalization. Both saw the unity and structural correspondence of external and internal activity as a fundamental point of departure. Secondly, both Stanislavsky and Leont'ev emphasize the overall, superindividual and superconscious nature of the highest motivating and directing factors of human activity. Stanislavsky calls these factors superobjectives, Leont'ev calls them motives. These two concepts have a very close affinity with each other. Thirdly, both Stanislavsky and Leont'ev emphasize that a singular action must be seen in a larger context, as one link in a chain. Stanislavsky calls this chain through action; Leont'ev calls it activity. To proceed beyond mere parallels, we shall use Leont'ev's general framework to analyze Stanislavsky's theory and practice. Leont'ev's concept of activity has been extended into the following model (Engestrom, 1987). Figure 2: The general structure of human activity In Stanislavsky's "system," the subject is the actor. The object is the text (the play, the part). The outcome is the truthful performance. The instruments are manifold, but the most general and powerful ones are the three discussed above: physical actions, superobjective and through action. But the bottom line of the triangle is more difficult to define. Stanislavsky doesn't really analyze the theatre community, the ensemble - he rather takes it for granted. The clearest representative of the community is the partner actor with whom the subject actor communicates on the stage. The rules of the theatre community are treated as ethical norms and rules of discipline (Stanislavsky, 1968, p. 249-267). The division of labor within the theatre community is briefly discussed in terms of the authority of the leadership and the collective nature of the work (Stanislavsky, 1968, pp. 254-259). Thus, the following picture emerges (Figure 3). The model of theatrical production depicted in Figure 3 is not only a model of Stanislavsky's theory. It is also a model of a type of productive practice tremendously influential both in the Soviet Union and in the West. As such, it is a model of dynamic movement. To get hold of this dynamism, we shall enter the problems and contradictions experienced within the model. Figure 3: Model of Stanislavsky's conception of the activity of theatre The inner contradictions of this model manifest themselves symptomatically in the last theatre productions in which Stanislavsky was directly involved (Gogol's Dead Souls and Ostrovsky's Talents and Devotees ). "The Stanislavsky System came into its own in these two productions; the combined efforts of producer, designer, cast and all had reached a gratifying conclusion. And yet the net result still fell short of the total integration, the absolute conviction that Stanislavsky sought. The brilliant rehearsals were succeeded by oddly flaccid - though totally credible - performances. The form remained, but the jolt of immediate experience was lost (...). The distance between rehearsals in Leontyevsky Lane and stage performances was alarming. Moreover although the Theatre badly needed new plays written by contemporary dramatists, Stanislavsky held that the pursuit of novelty for its own sake was to be avoided at all costs. On his return from Nice in 1930, he had been greatly perturbed by the decline in Art Theatre standards when applied to living playwrights, by the interest in quantity at the expense of quality. (...) To avoid catastrophe, the Theatre must be issued with 'precise governmental and Party directives on its place in the contemporary context as a theatre devoted to the classical drama and the best, most artistic and meaningful, plays in the contemporary repertoire'." (Polyakova, 1982, p. 347) This fragment tells about an activity system tendentially sealing itself off from the world. Stanislavsky saw the object of theatrical production in the text, not in the world and the audience as a part of the world. He warned the actors of the dangers of creating a direct contact with the audience. The world was to enter theatre only indirectly, through the text and through the experiences of the actors. "That is why an actor must be constantly filling the storehouse of his memory by studying, reading, observing, traveling, keeping in touch with current social, religious, political and other forms of life. And when he turns over these handfuls of thought to his subconscious he must not be in a hurry; he must know how to wait patiently. Otherwise, so say the yogis, he will be like the stupid child who planted a seed in the ground and then dug it up every half hour to see if it was putting down roots. " (Stanislavski, 1981, p. 83) No doubt Stanislavsky himself had an exceptional ability to sense and follow the current of history. As Polyakova (1982, p. 325) reports, he "listened attentively, in discussion groups or after a performance, to the remarks of a government official or a worker at the former Alexeyev factory who had been awarded a free pass to the Theatre for surpassing required work norms". Things became much more problematic when alternative realities entered the theatrical production process itself, as was manifested in the troublesome relations between Stanislavsky and the dramatist Bulgakov. Bulgakov's play Molihre was thoroughly altered by Stanislavsky. Written in 1931, it went through "endless modification and 296 rehearsals - and had a seven-night run in 1936" (Polyakova, 1982, p. 348). With classical texts, this would have been utterly unthinkable for Stanislavsky. As Joachim Fiebach (1975, p. 280) observes, "products like the literary ones are eventually presented only as something general, self-sufficient, as something that one may not or cannot touch". The dominant inner contradiction of Stanislavsky's system may be characterized by two aspects: Firstly, there is a contradiction between the striving for truthfulness and the exclusion of the outside world (including the audience) from the theatre's immediate circle of concern. In other words, the intended outcome and the defined object of the activity are in conflict with each other. Even though Stanislavsky reached external credibility in separate performances, he did not reach a full internal credibility in the overall activity. He seems to have realized this occasionally himself. V. O. Toporkov, a famous student of Stanislavsky's, reports the maestro's own recollection of one such incident. "We were once visiting St.Petersburg. Before performances we rehearsed a lot in the theatre where we were to perform. Sometimes the rehearsals went on till two, three o'clock in the night. Once when I was leaving the theatre to rest in the hotel, exhausted from the work, I was astonished by the scene that opened from the steps of the theatre. It was very cold. In the darkness of the night, fires were lit here and there, and the whole square was full of people. Some were warming themselves in the glow of the fire, rubbing their hands, feet and ears, some had formed groups and were arguing heatedly about something. Smoke was rising from the fires and thousands of voices were crossing the air. I didn't understand anything, so I asked someone standing near: 'What is happening here?' - 'They are waiting to get tickets to your performances.' My God, I thought, what a responsibility we are taking when we want to satisfy the spiritual needs of these people who are freezing here all through the night, how great ideas and thoughts we must transmit to them! (...) That night excitement and feeling of responsibility kept me awake for a long time. I realized that beyond the superobjective of the play there must be a super- superobjective. I cannot yet define it but that night I felt that those people who stood on the square must get still much more than what we had prepared for them." (Toporkov, 1984, p. 69) This super-superobjective was never worked out by Stanislavsky. Obviously it would have required an expansive solution to the contradiction described above, a breaking out from the hermetic system in the process of theatrical production itself. The second aspect of the contradiction is the conflict between Stanislavsky's insistence on the creativity of acting and the strict adherence to the already given text of the playwright. This time it is a tension between the ideal subject (actor as creator) and the defined object (text as given). As we noted above, Stanislavsky himself broke this adherence when he did not consider a contemporary text "classical" enough. But this was not an emancipatory process for Stanislavsky's actors, rather on the contrary. On the other hand, Stanislavsky's practical progress with the physical actions approach led to experimentation that opened vistas toward an expansive solution. This is clearly demonstrated in his paper From Physical Actions to Living Image, written in 1934 and included as a chapter in Creating a Role. The role figure Tortsov represents Stanislavsky. 'Here is my approach to a new role,' said Tortsov. 'Without any reading, without any conferences on the play, the actors are asked to come to a rehearsal of it.' 'How is it possible?' was the bewildered reaction of the students. 'More than that. One can act a play not yet written.' We were at a loss even for words to express our reaction to that idea. 'You do not believe me? Let us put it to the test. I have a play in mind; I shall tell you the plot by episodes and you will act it out. I shall watch what you say and do in your improvisation, and whatever is most successful I shall jot down. So that by our joint efforts we shall write and immediately act out a play not yet in existence. We shall share the profits equally.'" (Stanislavski, 1981, p. 213) Unfortunately such a play never took shape in reality during Stanislavsky's career. It was only an instructional thought experiment. But in principle this excerpt shows the potential of physical actions to override the given text and move into territories unknown. Analyzing Today's Theatre Practice: How Professionals Reconstruct Their Own Work. In August 1985, we held a workshop with 24 Finnish theatre professionals, representing actors, directors, dramatists and theatre educators. The participants first received a conceptual orientation to Leont'ev's theory of activity. They were instructed in the application of the model of activity presented above in Figure 2. In groups they worked out an analysis of the development of their own work in terms of the model. They were asked (a) to describe the work of their professional group as it 'used to be', (b) to describe their work as it presently is, (c) to identify the main contradictions of their present work, and (d) to sketch the structure of their work in the future, after the solution of the present contradictions. The groups worked intensively on the task for half a day. It was very difficult for the groups to produce any models to the last part (d) of the task. The two future descriptions produced (by actors and dramatists) did not apply the model of Figure 2 - they were metaphorical images rather than analytic conceptual models. In the following, we present the solutions of the four groups to parts (b) and (c) of the task in a somewhat simplified manner. Figure 4: The actor group's analysis of their work at present The actors' model is very clear and ironic. They see themselves as emotional acrobats at the mercy of all- powerful directors. The demand is for more independence, for less quantitative stress in the work. It is symptomatic that the future image of the group was that of actor as a butterfly - beautiful, free and untouched. It is a rather egocentric analysis, echoing a longing for an artisan-like creative autonomy of the individual actor. Typically the despotic director was seen as the source of much evil. Figure 5: The director group's analysis of their work at present The directors' model is not quite so clear. The logic of the model is broken in the elements of community and division of labor. Instead of the ensemble or the theatre institution, the directors saw their community as including the audience and the general spiritual atmosphere. And they considered the division of labor in terms of the role of the theatre in the society at large, not within the theatre. Not surprisingly the directors complained that too many tasks are falling into the hands of the director. At the same time, they complained that the "institutions" (e.g., the city financing the theatre) have taken over planning tasks and economic responsibilities. Thus, the institutions and rules that are conquering the role of subjects and artists are being pushed into the position of instruments. Again we witness the quest for autonomy. Figure 6: The dramatist group's analysis of their work at present The dramatists had a clear division of two alternatives in their model. Either the dramatist works as a subordinate member of the production group, losing his autonomy but gaining his sense of belonging. Or the dramatist becomes an independent contractor, working much in the manner of free novelists and playwrights. The latter alternative was preferred by the group. Figure 7: The educator group's analysis of their work at present Finally the theatre educators' group saw themselves as losing the position of artists and becoming instructional bureaucrats. But the threat does not come only from the rules. Also the students, often already working professionally while still studying, make unrealistic demands and are difficult to motivate. A glance at the four models reveals two common features. First, the groups did not really identify contradictions (as clashes between two opposing yet mutually dependent forces). Rather they listed problems and threats felt among the professional group in question, stemming from conflicts between the autonomy of the subject-group and the restrictive influence of other constituents of the activity structure (e.g., despotic directors, bureaucratic rules, demanding students). Secondly, the unifying aspiration of all four groups is autonomy within the theatre. It seems as if each group believed that problems would be solved if only they could more freely realize their particular talents. None of the groups focused on the relationship between the theatre and the life outside of it, or between the audience and other elements of theatre. Indeed, none of the groups (a partial exception being the dramatists) placed the audience and/or people's societal lifeworld in the "object" corner of the model. For actors and directors, the object was the text or the role, for dramatists the object was the people they try to influence to get their ideas through, and for educators the object was students. This understanding of the object might be characterized as degenerate Stanislavskyism. It is degenerate because the originality and conviction typical to Stanislavsky's argumentation are lacking, being replaced by self-irony and worry. In the discussion following the presentation of the four models, this hermetic view of the object of theatre work was realized by the participants in a self-critical manner. A quest for further, expansive working out of the object was expressed. Progress along such lines may consist of three steps in the cognition of the contradictions of theatrical creation, from external manifestations to the internal core: Step 1: Contradictions are formulated as problems and threats to autonomy felt by each professional group in relation to other, restrictive constituents of its activity structure. This step was taken by the participants of the workshop. Step 2: Contradictions are formulated as stemming from one major source common to all professional groups, namely the contradiction between the lifeworld of the potential audience and the relatively hermetic, self-sufficient world of the theatre. This step was anticipated as necessary in the workshop discussion. Step 3: Contradictions are traced back to the primary inner contradiction characteristic of all objects and activities in capitalist society, namely the dualism of the use value and the exchange value of a commodity. A theatre performance as a product of theatre labor is no exception. "The picture that an artist puts all his skill into, he has to paint in order to convert it into money, into a thing that has nothing in common with painting. Nevertheless the picture retains its real sense for the rich industrialist who buys it. For him it may, perhaps, acquire the sense of a thing in which he wants to invest some of his money, or a thing testifying to the prosperity of his firm. (...) The penetration of these relations into consciousness also finds psychological reflection in a 'disintegration' of its general structure characterized by the rise of an estrangement between the senses and meanings in which the world around man and his own life are refracted for him." (Leontyev, 1981, p. 254-255) Implications for Cognition and Learning: The Model Systems of Theatre Gavin Bolton has recently analyzed the historical development of American and English ideas of drama in education. According to him, the dominant practice of drama education in schools concentrates on the teaching of performance skills and formal techniques. Children are trained to "simulate and 'parade' emotions in a vacuum" (Bolton, 1985, p. 151). Bolton argues that behind this misguided practice there is a history of theoretical distortions of the nature of drama and theatre, produced by the leading authorities of education through drama. A central feature of these distortions is the idea of drama as a liberator of individual potentials of creative self-expression. "I suggest that to see drama in this way is to misunderstand drama. Of all the arts, drama is a collective experiencing, celebrating, or commenting, not on how we are different from each other, but on what we share, on what ways we are alike. To encourage individual children to search for a drama within themselves is to distort the meaning of dramatic form. Drama is not self-expression; it is a form of group symbolism seeking universal, not individual truths." (Bolton, 1985, p. 154) Following Dorothy Heathcote, Bolton (1985, p. 154) further argues that artists "must look outward before they can look inward." He sees the meaning of drama in the interplay between two worlds - the real world and the imagined world. But then comes a disappointing conclusion: "above all drama is a mental state" (Bolton, 1985, p. 155). Dramatic production is reduced to "modification, adjustment, reshaping, and realignment of concepts already held" (Bolton, 1985, p. 156). Here we have a curious anomaly. First we get a refreshing opening-up of drama to the world, badly needed in the atmosphere of self-sufficient theatre and technical drama education. Then we ge a reduction of drama back to the mentalism from which Stanislavsky showed an expansive way out. The problem of mentalism is essential because it entails a certain view of creation or production. For mentalism, creation and production are something subjective, taking place within the head of the individual but not bringing about new material, societal artifacts, instruments and structures of activity. Thus a theatre production, for example, is viewed as a symbolic form that helps the participants rearrange their conceptions and feelings - albeit collectively (for Bolton). It is not viewed as a symbolic but no less material product (or a dynamic model) which may enter the life activities of people and become a novel instrument for them in their interaction with real, sensuous objects. Thus we get a series of three dimensions: HERMETIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY vs INTERPLAY OF THE REAL AND IMAGINED WORLDS MENTALISM, COGNITIVISM vs OBJECT-ORIENTED COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITY SUBJECTIVE REARRANGEMENT vs OBJECTIVE CREATION AND PRODUCTION These three dimensions are relatively independent of each other, as we see from the comparison between Stanislavsky and Bolton. The perspective of opening-up to the world, combined with the perspectives of object oriented activity and objective creation, leads to a conception of theatre as collective worldmaking, the term "worldmaking" being borrowed from Goodman (1978). The object of theatre would in this perspective be the "real world" or the life activity of people (potential audience). The outcome would be an imagined world, or a dynamic model - imagined but very real and material, too. In entering the life activity of the audience, this outcome would be turned into an instrument of that object-activity. This structure may be depicted with a diagram (Figure 8). Figure 8: An expansive model of theatre production The concept of imagined worlds is nicely discussed by Cecily O'Neill (1985). She points out the importance of "what if...?" questions - something essentially similar to Stanislavsky's "magic if." The dramatic construction of imagined worlds is essentially a process that takes us "beyond ourselves," to a level of consciousness and generalization beyond the mere individual and accidental. This process may first be restricted by stereotypic responses, but these fade away as the work grows in complexity: "rules of behavior are partly anticipated and partly forged in the process" (O'Neill, 1985, p. 159). The characteristics of imagined worlds in theatre include non-linear systemic interaction, discontinuity and incompleteness (Elam, 1980, p. 99). In our view, creativity is based on imagination. Imagination in turn is not just an internal disposition. We agree with Wartofsky's (1979, p. 209) point that imagination as internal representation is "derivative from the actual making of imaginative artifacts." We may consider theatre as an ideal model system for learning to create collectively imagined worlds. What makes it ideal is that it is compact yet socially and semiotically complex, transparent yet never fully predictable. It is at the same time handy to manage and mobile enough to create trouble. Cole (1986, p. 31) characterizes the idea of model systems as "a set of constraints that allows for voluntary participation but also for rigorous analysis" and makes possible the systematic observation of "selected disorganization in complicated, voluntary behavior." Essential here is the quality of the constraints. In a productive model system, the constraints - or instruments - must be given and created at the same time. For example, the constraints proposed and practiced by Stanislavsky - the superobjective and the through action - had to be created for each play and each part (even for each performance) by the ensemble and every individual actor. They could not be taken in a finished form from manuals: they were not techniques but principles. The same is true of Brecht's constraints, "distancing" and the gestus. Dorothy Heathcote proposes another, instructionally interesting type of constraint. She calls it the "mantle of the expert." "When the mantle of the expert is used in drama, the teacher assumes a fictional role which places the student in the position of being 'the one who knows' or the expert in a particular branch of human knowledge. (Heathcote & Herbert, 1985, p.173.) A teacher cannot presume to give direct information to experts but instead must set up ways in which the experts will discover what they know while at the same time protecting them from the awareness that they do not as yet have this expertise. (...) The teacher enables the group to gain the expertise through the application of the dramatic imagination to whatever social reality is to be symbolically represented." (Heathcote & Herbert, 1985, p.174.) Although promising in many respects, this type of constraint no more than those developed by Stanislavsky attacks the problem of turning the imagined world created into a living instrument for those whose life activity was the object in the first place (naturally this potential audience may also consist of the students themselves). Nor does the mantle of the expert provide any instruments for dealing with the inner contradiction (use value vs. exchange value) of the artifacts and life structures of the potential audience. If our analysis of the contradictions of theatre activity are correct, the constraints (instruments) with which the model system is constructed must answer to these very demands in order to be succesful in the long run. In other words, we suggest that if drama education is to be developmentally valuable, it has to address the same methodological questions that are faced in the activity of theatre. It is questionable to teach children a kind of 'theatre' that does not and cannot exist - not even as a future project - in the world outside school. In real theatre, nobody protects the directors and actors from realizing their own ignorance and lacking expertise of the outside world - nobody but themselves. The models of activity developed above are tools with which theatre peole may analyze their own activity structure and concentrate their efforts on the solution of the essential contradictions. They may also function as tools for those wishing to develop education through drama into a productive model system for learning to create collectively imagined worlds. The decisive developmental question is that of the adequate constraints or instruments. Note 1. In Finland, the typical form is a municipal theatre, financed largely through taxes and employing its staff on the basis of lengthy contracts. Actors, directors and other main personnel groups are educated at the Theatre Academy of Finland and at the University of Tampere, and there is little unemployment in theatre professions. We are aware that the situation is very different in the United States, for example. References Becker, H. S. (1982). Art worlds. Berkeley: University of California Press. Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bolton, G. (1985). Changes in thinking about drama in education. Theory into Practice XXIV(3), 151-157. 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