Nate,
Of course, both directions occur. I think Leont'ev actually discussed this
in some detail in Ch 3 . The question is one of primacy in the relation.
Marx's discussion in the Grundrisse of why production is the determinant
economic relation (as opposed to consumption, distribution, exchange) seems
very much to the point here and (i have no time for this now) I think a
parallel analysis of placing externalization and internalization on the same
level, or even --as Dot seems to imply -- making externalization the
determinant moment, would be revealing. And I find it astounding that this
issue tends to be treated as though we aren't already midstream in a long
history of phylogenetic development. This is the only context that allows
me to understand Vygotsky's marginal comment about having a word "on the tip
of his toungue".
Just as the primacy of production in the analysis of economic systems is
fundamental for the structure of the theory of those systems, so is the
primacy of the social fundamental for the structure of psychological
theory.
Paul H. Dillon
----- Original Message -----
From: Nate Schmolze <nate_schmolze@yahoo.com>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2000 8:02 AM
Subject: RE: The Core
> Paul,
>
> It seems, maybe not a close reading on my part, that internalization /
> externalization are being seen oppositionally rather than relationally.
If
> we take Vygotsky's double stimulation, research on concepts, egocentric
> spech etc - both are true, right. Let's take the external first - Vygotsky
> showed genetically through concept formation how through signs those
> proceses became internalized - social to individual. But if we want to
> understand this concept formation what Dot said is equally true - that
> through the use of signs internal processes are externalized. It is here
we
> see, undertand, study that process in its formation - internal/s being
> externalized - external (social) being internalized. Vygotsky a master
> dialectician then and now.
>
> nATE
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul H.Dillon [mailto:illonph@pacbell.net]
> Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2000 8:14 AM
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> Subject: The Core
>
>
> Dot Robbins wrote.
>
> "However, the core of
> Vygotsky's view consists in the fact that by means of signs, mental
> functions are brought outwards, objectivized, and transformed into
> external...actions and activities."
>
> This seems very strange to me but it seems to be the position that
underlies
> everything else in the message.
>
> Do I have it wrong then? I thought Vygotsky's theory was exactly the
> opposite.
>
> I throw my finger randomly across the pages of a book chosen randomly from
> the shelf that has books by and about Vygtosky and come up with the
> following passage in Wertsch's "Vygotsky and the Social Formation of the
> Mind" (p 62):
>
> "It is necessary that everything internal in higher forms was external,
that
> is, for others if was what is now is for oneself. [Wonderfully
non-dualistic
> distinction of external/internal]. Any higfher mental function
necessarily
> goes through an external stage in its development because it is initially
a
> social function. Thjis is the center of the whole problem of internal and
> external behavior . . . When we speak of a process, "external" means
> "social". Any higher medntal function was external because it was social
at
> some point before becoming an internal, truly mental function."
>
> I wonder, Dot, whether you could present some evidence from Vygotsky's
> writing to substantiate your rather unusual claim concerning the nature
and
> meaning of his theory.
>
> Paul H. Dillon
>
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