Re: Leontiev

From: Andy Blunden (a.blunden@pb.unimelb.edu.au)
Date: Sun Oct 01 2000 - 15:34:22 PDT


Carl, I would add to your comment the fact that the conceptual foundations
of any science must be (1) relatively fragmentary and (2) in transition,
because human society is.
In relation to Marxism providing the conceptual foundations of cognitive
psychology, one must take into account the embattled and isolated nature of
the social base upon which Marxist ideas have grown up, alongside the fact
that so much scientific work is carried out within different conceptual
organisations.
What this means for me is that I have to keep my attention open to insights
that may come, not only come from outside marxism, but may even be at the
moment relatively incompatible with marxism.
But my reaction would be try to revolutionise my conceptual framework by
way of a deeper marxism, tolerating eclecticism only so long as necessary.
Because despite our fragmentation and class division, we are one human
society.
Thus Charles' Principle of Complementarity for psychology is, I think, an
expression of the incompleteness of Psychology. However, I would not
advocate a solution along the lines of an Einstein Unified (Field) Theory.
Einstein was an advocate of World Government, and I think his Unified Field
Theory was a translation of this theory into Physics. ...
Andy
At 08:32 01/10/2000 -0700, you wrote:
>Charles,
> Please give an example of how different contexts could require different
>explanatory concepts of psychological phenomena. I can see that particular
>may be more directly influenced by particular cultural contexts -- e.g.,
>family, work, religion. But these relations would still seem to be within
>the general explanatory framework that psychological phenomena originate in,
>embody, and perpetuate social activities (and occasionally lead to changing
>activities). Therefore, I wouldn't see particular relations within cultural
>psych. as contradicting the general formulation. Please provide some
>examples that we can discuss in detail.
>Carl
>--
>Carl Ratner, Ph.D.
>cr2@humboldt1.com
>http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2
>
>P.O.B. 1294
>Trinidad, CA 95570
>USA
>
>> From: Charles Nelson <c.nelson@mail.utexas.edu>
>> Reply-To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2000 07:24:32 -0700 (PDT)
>> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> Subject: Re: Leontiev
>> Resent-From: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> Resent-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2000 07:24:36 -0700 (PDT)
>>
>> Carl,
>>
>> I was wondering not which conceptual system was considered to be
>> primary in a particular social environment, but more along the lines
>> of Einstein's essential principles, whether in some contexts, some
>> principles explain pychological phenomena better, but in different
>> contexts, other principles better explain them, something along the
>> lines of whether to consider light as a particle or wave phenomenon.
>>
>> Charles Nelson
>>
>>> Charles,
>>> Yes any conceptual system is only primary in particular social
>>> environments. INdividualism is primary under capitalism and that's why
>>> Vygotsky's marxism has been denigrated. Valsiner & Van der Veer, in their
>>> new book, The Social Mind, go so far as to say that "it SEEMS that
Vygotsky
>>> was influenced by Marxism..." They refuse to acknowledge Vyg.'s passionate
>>> belief in Marxism and his insistence that any good psychology will be a
>>> marxist psychology.
>>>
>>> Even natural science paradigms are only primary in particular social
>>> environments. E.g., conceptual paradigms like evolutionary theory, the
>>> atomic theory of matter, etc. are only accepted in particular
societies. Of
>>> course, they may be very accurate, but they are still inspired by a
cultural
>>> weltanschauung.
>>> Regards, Carl
>>>
>>> --
>>> Carl Ratner, Ph.D.
>>> cr2@humboldt1.com
>>> http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2
>>>
>>> P.O.B. 1294
>>> Trinidad, CA 95570
>>> USA
>>>
>>>> From: Charles Nelson <c.nelson@mail.utexas.edu>
>>>> Reply-To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2000 21:25:55 -0700
>>>> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> Subject: Re: Leontiev
>>>> Resent-From: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> Resent-Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2000 19:21:04 -0700 (PDT)
>>>>
>>>> Carl,
>>>>
>>>> That makes a lot of sense. Still, I wonder, Is one conceptual system
>>>> always primary? Can context/environment/time influence the
>>>> primariness of a conceptual system?
>>>>
>>>> Charles Nelson
>>>>
>>>>> IN response to Charles Nelson's question about how we tie
>>> diverse viewpoints
>>>>> together:
>>>>> I think that one has to decide on the essential concepts/elements of a
>>>>> viable cultural psychological approach. These need to be
>>> logically coherent
>>>>> among themselves. All the related facets of the approach should
>>> be logically
>>>>> coherent as well. I think this is the essence of scientific thinking.
>>>>> Einstein explained this in great detail. He firmly believed in
>>> identifying a
>>>>> small core of essential principles that underlie all phenomena. In
>>>>> developing a cultural psychology, IF we agree w. Marx & Leontiev that
the
>>>>> social organization of activities is basic to psychological
phenomena, and
>>>>> that the social relations of production are the most impt.
>>> activity within a
>>>>> social system, then all of our concepts about self, agency, personality,
>>>>> emotions, cognition, mental illness, etc. would have to construe
these as
>>>>> originating in, bearing the characteristics of, and functioning to
>>>>> recapitulate the social organization of activities, and especially of
>>>>> economic activity. Any concepts about psychological change would also
have
>>>>> to be related to concepts of social change.
>>>>> These, of course, are all daunting questions. But I believe that this is
>>>>> the general approach that cultural psychs. need to explore. It would
>>>>> comprise a logically coherent conceptual system. I don't think
>>> that progress
>>>>> will be made by trying to combine antithetical conceptual
>>> viewpoints such as
>>>>> marxism + individualism + Freudianism. That's why I believe it is
impt. to
>>>>> distinguish conceptual systems, decide which is primary, and then
extract
>>>>> elements of other systems that can be logically integrated with the
basic
>>>>> one.
>>>>> Does this make sense?
>>>>> Carl
>>>>> --
>>>>> Carl Ratner, Ph.D.
>>>>> cr2@humboldt1.com
>>>>> http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2
>>>>>
>>>>> P.O.B. 1294
>>>>> Trinidad, CA 95570
>>>>> USA
>>>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>
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