Re: ilyenkov-ideal: synopsis >>> "consciousness"; freedom / responsibility
(an addendum to my long post of yesterday)
I may have been a bit cryptic in my paragraphs towards the end of my
message responding to Peter's treating of historical forms of
existence with emphasis on the animal - human difference. So I should
expand a bit.
Not only did I want, firstly, to avoid speaking of "consciousness":
an abstract word ("-ness"!) obviously reified and treated sometimes
as a substance or a something that can have changing qualities, even
has gotten a kinship such as with the sub-, un-, over-,
full-"consciousnesses", at any rate located within the single
individuals or also within society as a whole, sometimes as a
location where "things" and "ideas" and even people are in, etc. etc.
-- a real fiction! Do you "have" it, day and night, or only awake?
No, you are not conscious in sleep but you have "consciousness"? What
about dozing? -- I also did not want to become entangled in what is
special about humans in terms of "consciousness" as was to expect the
discussion would go.
I'll have a so much simpler and embedded view in the framework of
semiotic ecology of what usually is so thoughtlessly called
"consciousness" that these endless discussions of whether only humans
have "consciousness", probably arising from the the motive to make
sure we are different simply bores me. The question is unanswerable
for two reasons: (a) we don't know and cannot find consensus what it
is, (b) we can't ask the animals, not even our babies. In fact, (c) I
think we cannot even know for sure whether you and I and anybody else
"have" the same "consciousness" or different "ones". Find out whether
your sweetheart "sees" that rose in the same or a different "red" as
you see it!
I am sure all a bit more complex animals are aware of the things in
their environment pertinent or interesting to them and in particular
of their co-specific social partners on all levels of relation, and
also of predators and prey / food in general etc. Because they can
compare, they can anticipate their acts to some extent (e.g. only
display and go away or fight) and the probable consequences of their
own acts. There is so ample evidence for that from the last few
decades of research that the astonishing problem is one of the
development of the pertinent sciences: to what degree are they to be
trusted in view of the fact that they could for so long operate in
the myth only humans were aware of things. Structurally spoken to be
aware is based in internal symbolization or semionization. I'll
discuss that later on. At least, phylogenetically, those having
front-brains are well equipped with all required preconditions. If
anybody contends: to be aware of X is not "consciousness", I think,
s/he is obliged to say how the latter is to be understood and how it
differs from the former. Would it not be ethical to choose the words
so as not to contradict their common use.
Secondly, I thought it more germane to our discussion to point to
something that characterizes the human condition in its heart and
that has a deep connection to the idealism and materialism Ilyenkov
is suggesting. Also it is something of the greatest political and
ethical scope -- and with Ilyenkov & Co., indeed with cultural
psychology this cannot be avoided. Humans are animals that can act
this or that way to some extent and at least in part on the basis of
their knowing of context and its past and of their related ability to
imagine possible futures and to some extent imagine the probable
consequences of their acts and so their desirability from this or
that point of view. Herder had this insight and if it had been
accepted with the beginning of the 19th century our human world would
look crucially different, I am sure. This is the core of freedom and,
I wrote it already, the other face of it is responsibility. I think
of individuals and of groups.
If you don't accept that, and it appears to me from my limited
knowledge of his texts that Ilyenkov does not (I guess he did
personally, but he did philosophize in another world, and his text is
what I have), then you better forget about social life. Indeed, you
better forget to be a human being. It often seems to me modern
Westerners act as if they were purely biotic beings. Not only
medicals and psychologists do so; also the law folks define a person
on being an exemplar of a biologically defined species; and is it not
so that the highest of all values held today appears to be any single
individual's life (in spite of death being unavoidable)? Look at
money spent and media's rush to lethal accidents (strangely enough,
one or two dead do not suffice as an incident to excite about and the
life-long handicapped, who really suffer the most miserable fate are
avoided whenever possible).
No, in my view, freedom and responsibility are better candidates for
crucial qualities of humans in culture than anything else. Will you
readers now call me an idealist? The alternatives, so fashionable in
science and philosophy, not at all only Marxian, are:
(a) we are preprogrammed -- the Leibnizian solution of "prestabilized
harmony" of matter and ideas/spirit;
(b) we are programmed with a bit of chance mixed in (by definition of
unknown origin) -- the Platonian solution of the truly real and
eternally programmed world of ideas and the shadowy and erroneous
copy of it we are forced to live in;
(c) we are the playthings of some superman which we imagine,
depending probably on our's and other's experiences and on what our
masters have told and tell us and force us to believe and some more
such factors. A superman, at times said to be mighty and powerful, at
others just and benevolent. Only nobody has seen that superman, only
his self-declared representatives here.
These are the extant historical options I can think of. (c) has a
long tradition in many parts of the world; (b) is the scientific
stance today; (a) has arisen time an again and implements the highest
dream of our "best" scientists. (Hegel and Marx and, obviously,
Ilyenkov made use of (a). For a modern scientist example read E. O.
Wilson, in his "Consilience" book: a strange mixture of all there:
babtist background, accepting chance in his research, but dreaming of
enlightenment with absolute rationality coming finally true and
reigning science and society.) Are there other, principally
different, options?
None of these perspectives on the human condition is satisfying and
we do in fact not live and organize living together accordingly.
Rather we try to have our co-humans liable and amenable and make
rules and have invented law to assure these expectations. More and
more and increasingly denser laws, indeed. If we are not accountable
ourselves to some real persons, our life is truly senseless -- more
and more people feel like that; if we could not make others
accountable towards us life becomes pure Las Vegas (but even there we
want the machines to be accountable on the basis of true chance at
least!) Life, i.e. to live makes simply no sense in the former two of
the three worldviews above; in the last only when everybody beliefs
and trusts in the same superman. If we took any of those options
serious, then anybody transgressing could always say: oh, I am
programmed thus; I have wanted to be nice, but you know, this
perfidious chance element in me; gee, I am being used as my
superman's instrument, so don't interfere with my duty -- if yours
wants me different, let's see which one is stronger, let's fight in
place of them.
No, our principles of understanding are way off our attempts to live
together. Why let we guide, no disturb our striving for a decent life
together by so crazy theorizing?
But there is a fourth view, (d), as I have sketched, if you like a
Herderian image of the world and of humans, an entirely different
conception of the human condition. An evolutive view, basing on but
going beyond biotic evolution: in making use of the latter's
emergence of individuals becoming capable of accumulating; and also
making use of personal experience; and in making use of the
biotic/individual combined emergence of socially communicating,
namely the emergencies of the individual evolutions and so forming
cultural traditions. Making experiences in a cultural setting,
suggesting innovations, and accepting and furthering innovations are
all acts of individuals that are not possible in the social void and
they all impact in such a grave way on others and the rest of the
world that they must not become irresponsible because this should
immediately call for restrictions of the freedom of the so acting.
Irresponsibility and restriction of freedom thus stand in the way of
being human. Often irresponsible acts are the only option open under
pressure, i.e. restricted freedom, so those involved get into vicious
circles. Why do we let all that happen all the time everywhere?
Alfred
-- --------------------------------------------------------------------- Alfred Lang, Psychology, Univ. Bern, Switzerland --- alfred.lang@psy.unibe.ch Website: http://www.psy.unibe.ch/ukp/langpapers/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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