Re: Re(2): Ideal - Ilyenkov

From: Andy Blunden (a.blunden@pb.unimelb.edu.au)
Date: Sun Sep 03 2000 - 17:08:21 PDT


Diane asked: "what is the relation seen here between "intellect" and
"consciousness"?"

My understanding is that the concept of "intellect" is the result of
abstracting from consciousness that side which accommodates itself to the
ideal object, as opposed to *will*, that side of consciousness which takes
the object as something to be subordinated; a concept made possible by the
deveelopment of intellectual activities, separate from actually changing
the world.

Q: "what is the difference between "idea" - "ideal" and David Hume's
concepts of "impressions"?"

As part of the whole line of British Empiricism, Hume took 'ideas' to be
the result of a working up, by the Ego, of sensual impressions into various
forms of aggregate, but for Ilyenkov et al, "idea" comes from a completely
different direction. The ideal exists objectively to mental activity, as
part of social activity, before it is part of individual, mental activity.

Q: "are we to accept here that consciousness is (a) effectively human and
so (b) essentially social and cultural and historical?"

I think at this point it is worth re-looking at Ilyenkov's advice to
recognise the concept of 'ideal' as the importantly human entity, rather
than 'consciousness'.

About 80% of the way through Ilyenkov's article, I read:

"... the passage (of Marx) may be understood to mean that man acquires a
new, second plane of life activity precisely because he possesses
consciousness and will, which the animal does not possess. But this is just
the opposite of the case. Consciousness and will appear in man only because
he already possesses a special plane of life activity that is absent in the
animal world - activity directed towards the mastering of forms of life
activity that are specifically social, purely social in origin and essence,
and, therefore, not biologically encoded in him."

So the question is whether the objects recognised by the animal include
ideal objects. I don't see any great problem here. The extent to which the
world an animal lives in is a cultural product, and a non-human cultural
product, is something which is not a 'philosophical', but a practical
question.

I would add that it is not so much the "appearance" of consciousness and
will, but the separation of the psyche into "intellect" and "will" as
distinct, opposed mental activities.

Andy
**************************************************
* Andy Blunden, Teaching Space Consultant,
* and Manager of Videoconferencing Operations
* http://home.mira.net/~andy/
* University of Melbourne 9344 0312 (W) 9380 9435 (H)
**************************************************



This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Sun Oct 01 2000 - 01:00:44 PDT