[Paul]
2. [to Peter] The fundamental issue of your critique of Lakoff, it seems to me,
concerns the origin of categories and their relationship to reality. Of the
many theories out there that deny "in principle the possibility of objective
knowledge of anything" CL is an important target. One cannot simply say,
as Elisa does, that Lakoff is trying to deal with semantic processes, not
scientific thinking. This would imply that everyday thinking and scientific
thinking don't deal with the same world.
[Elisa]
Maybe they deal with the same world with different grasps of it. Like in some explanation by Putnam in which most people only have a "rigid designation" or stereotipical use of words, without knowing the scientific rationale for their correct use. And other people - the scientists - know how to use corretly the word, how to determine its extension, and so they inform the common people. So there is "division of linguistic labour".
But this wouldn't happen with all words, only with words of scientific relevance. But a similar "division of linguistic labour" could occur with other types of words. Maybe to know the correct reference of "work of art" you would have to seek the assistance of another group of experts, say, "art critics" or "art historians". And maybe to know the correct meaning of some term as "soul" you would have to seek the assistance of another group of experts, say, "theologians" or "philosophers" or "prophets" or "mystics".
[Paul]
What possibly could be the category system that underlies scientific thinking if it is not constructed out of concrete everyday human practice?
[Elisa]
How can scientific thinking be thoroughly constructed out of everyday human practice? What is concrete?
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Sat Jul 01 2000 - 01:00:29 PDT