Stanton,
You wrote, "Personalization of everything would become narcissism when
directed to
self and rudeness when directed to others."
This is a very complex statement, full of culturally specific notions. For
example, narcissism is a concept drawn straight out of mythology. I wonder
if I'm alone in that upon hearing the term I always envision a person
looking at themself in the mirror. Similarly, what constitutes rudeness is
relative to what is accepted/expected as polite (similarly from the greek
'polis') behavior.
This implies that what appears as rudeness on the basis of one cultural
frame of reference might not appear so from another. This has implications
for any kind of interaction where the perception of rudeness can break the
flow of communication, as for example, multiloguing in a virtual space.
Reliance on the subjective experience of the investigator as a guide to the
interpretation of social phenomena, as in Walkerdine's work, is certainly of
value for understanding our possible relations to and interests in the the
phenomena we observe and how those relations and interests could predispose
what we report as our findings, our theory, our case study, our evaluation,
etc. And certainly no matter how we approach our subject, the commonality
of our social situation with others (real and vicarious) assures an audience
for whom what we write will have meaning, if not utility.
However, our interest in or relationship to what we observe and study does
not necessarily determine what we conclude or how we report on it,
especially if we can specify the procedures we followed so that anyone else
might be able to follow them as well. With regard to the subjective
approach Walkerdine (1997:45-77) advocates, I don't see how the procedures
could be specified for obtaining a description that depend on a subjectivity
formed in the process of a unique and irrepeatable life. As a result, from
the point of view of the development of scientific concepts (as in the
Vygotsky and Ilyenkov notions Bakhurst describes), this kind of study
can't contribute much although they can provide other kinds of insight into
social phenomena.
These other kinds of insight can be though of from a Habermasian
perspective as addressing different ontological domains, e.g., ethical or
aesthetical, than those addressed through the process of methodically
well-defined investigative procedures. I think being clear about the
ontological scope of the validity claims one is making is important. It is
ludicrous, and perhaps rude, to tell someone doing one kind of study that
they failure to address the validity claims of another type of study at the
risk of invalidating their findings.
I wonder if Is this an acceptable framework or if it too much limits the
scope of the truths that those pursuing the subjectivist approaches claim?
Paul H. Dillon
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