I've been following this thread (by its various names) with some interest.
It seems that Mike's comment about 'the difficulty of putting one part of
the system "before" another' appears to me to carry a deeper message
concerning determinism but it's hard to get at it because there's something
of a muddle here. My dictionary (MW Collegiate) defines structuration
simply as "the interrelation of parts in an organized whole". Giddens
definition is more complex: "The structuring of social relations across time
and space, in virtue of duality of structure" where "duality of structure"
is "structure as medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes;
the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action
but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction." Giddens
was very concerned to overcome "structural determinism" in social theory
whether it be that of Marxians, Durkheimians, Parsonians, etc. Perhaps
this kind of determinism is what Luiz refers to as the parts-whole fallacy;
i.e., that idea the whole determines the behavior of the parts. Giddens
would probably say that the whole is defined as an interlinked system of
codetermining parts.
Insofar as Mike refers to three components: the social, the physical, and
the psychological, it is pretty easy to see how one could draw concentric
circles with the psychological inside the social that is inside the
physical. But it is very hard to see how these categories could provide the
basis for any theoretical description. Furthermore, every tool and
structure of behavior could in some sense be said to partake of all three.
I don't know of anyone who has used these broad categories in any
hiearchical patterns of determinism. (sociobiologists not included)
There's a muddle here that potentially confuses "tool" with "physical". Our
idea of physical is a product of the relation between our environment
(WORLD) and the tools with which we produce the necessary conditions for our
existence.
The idea of context seems to me to be even more general than "physical,
social, psychological" and to lack any explanatory power in and of itself.
I know that Giddens doesn't use it. He does use a very general term
"contextuality" that is defined as "the situated character of interaction in
time-space, involving the setting of interaction, the actors co-present, and
communication between them." But it is never given explanatory weight.
CHAT works with the notion of an activity system which is most definitely
not "a context" although I think it could be argued that activity systems
generate specific types of "contextualities" in Giddens definition. But I
also do believe that when one deals with activity systems some relations
have a crucial weight that determines, over time, the direction and
regularity of the system's behavior. Which elements are dominant in any
given historical epoch varies but there is a way to get at this: look to the
processes that are central for the reproduction of the activities in
question. I believe hierarchies and deterministic relations can be
identified from this perspective that extend from the broadest behavior of
the macro-system down through component activity systems; e.g., a computer
learning lab.
Of course one is looking at threads that are interwoven but some of these
threads are "load bearing" others simply "free design." In the historical
flow nothing is immutable so something that is "free design" at one time can
be "load bearing" at a different time and vice versa. Think about "horse
back riding". But historical change really isn't that quick when one looks
at the broadest structuring relations; e.g., commodification. Thus one can
specify theories valid for historically defined periods which is what it
seems Vygotsky and Luria, at least, were trying to do.
Paul H. Dillon
p.s. Mike mentioned Leont'ev. I have been trying to get a hold of his work
and find it virtually impossible--totally out of print and not available
through any of used book dealers on the various internet services. Are
there any plans afoot to republish his key works or make them available on a
website?
-----Original Message-----
From: genevieve patthey-chavez <ggpcinla who-is-at yahoo.com>
To: xmca <xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Wednesday, September 01, 1999 10:56 PM
Subject: 'firsts'
>
>Hmmm. As is obviously not clear from my writing, I
>used the word 'first' with a typical sequence of
>events in mind, interpreting
>
>Leont'iev's "idea of internalization-externalization
>as transitive processes in the system of man's object-
>related activity"
>
>in part as a temporal process. The particular case
>from which I got my data also was a place full of
>users rather than designers.
>
>Of course, first does have another meaning, and even
>with a temporal emphasis, there are real time sequences
>and other sequences.
>
>What fascinated and continues to fascinate me is how
>these processes unfold in 'object-related activity,'
>what resources are deployed, how they are deployed,
>and how skillfully human beings juggle multiple
>intelligences.
>
>I'm not sure I could do much with circles to even begin
>to represent processes and sequences, but I'm no good
>with graphics anyhow ...
>
>Genevieve
>__________________________________________________
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>