from Ilias on Indiv/Social

Mike Cole (mcole who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu)
Sun, 25 Jul 1999 11:04:33 -0700 (PDT)

ilias is having gremlin problems with xmca and asked me to post the
following:

>From ikaras who-is-at phl.uoc.gr Sun Jul 25 07:18:08 1999
Hi,

I hope eveyrbody is having a nice holiday.

I'd like to say that I find this discussion both interesting
and thought provoking. I have just finished reading the posts on
this thread and, while reading takes an hour or so,
I presume that thinking things out and possibly resolving problems
may take a lifetime...or two.

Running the risk or reiterating some of the points already made,
I will pose some naive questions and provide tentative answers
in an attempt to spice up the discussion.
Some of these questions have been bugging me for some time now
and I think this is an opportune time to share them with you
and seek answers.

*Individual vs. Social*

The observation that man is an inherently 'social animal' dates
back to Aristotle. I'm pretty sure that others had
already made that ingenious observation but Aristotle is probably
the first documented source.
But what do we mean by 'individual' and/or 'social'?
When or under what conditions does an activity qualify as 'individual'
activity and when is it considered to be a 'social' one?
What are the boundaries between 'individual' and 'social'?
*Are* there any boundaries in the conventional sense?
That is, where do we draw the line between the two?
Suppose I'm home alone, writing a letter to a friend. On the surface,
this activity is a solitary/solo one, but is it actually an individual
activity?Better put, is it an individual activity alone? If we claim
that it is also a social activity, then social in what sense?
Or, let's say that I'm writing a poem; is that an individual activity?
Would I write the poem if there was no addressee? (Maybe I would,
as we keep sending messages to outer space hoping that someone is
listening).
I don't doubt that we can speak of an individual organism in a
biological sense, but is it reasonable to speak of an individual
organism in a psychological sense? Does it make sense to talk about an
"individual
consciousness"?
Bakhtin argued that an 'individual consciousness' is a contradiction in
terms and that consciousness is essentially multiple.
Of course, traditionally psychology has been concerned with the study of
individuals. But as Luria put it, we may need to go beyond the
individual mind to understand what is taking place inside it.
Vygotsky also maintained that in their private sphere humans still
maintain elements of social interaction.
So, what do these accounts tell us? Is it perhaps time to choose
different concepts or make some other type of distinctions?

*General Genetic Law of Cultural Development*

Upon asked to provide a brief account of Vygotksy's theory by a groupd
of teachers once, I referred to the general genetic law of cultural
development. Maybe my explanation wasn't good enough for laymen or it
was too simplistic, I don't know. The fact of the matter is that they
found it
too obvious and asked me how could it be that such an obvious principle
constitutes
the core of a theory of cognitive development!!! I didn't honestly know
what to say to
that. The fact that it was so evident to them kind of took me by
surprise.

In terms of theory and from an epistemological point of view, I think
the main problem is to account for the new, that which is contributed
by the new generations. It is obvious that knowledge and skills
are passed down from one generation to the next, but newer generations
do contribute considerably to civilization and so on. Vygotsky's law
does explain how cultural knowledge is transmitted but, I think, it does
not account for all thoese properties (creativity, imagination, reason)
which create something essentially "new", "original", and "innovative".
Isaac Newton said that he could see further because he stood on the
shoulders of giants, thereby ackowledging the significant contributions
of Kepler, Galileo and others. There is no doubt that their work was of
essential
importance to the work of Newton, but he nevertheless did come up with
something *new*. James Clerk Maxwell said that "what is done by what is
called
myself is, I feel, done by something greater than myself in me". The
same holds for
Maxwell's case as well: he also drew on the work of others but he
eventually made an
*original* contribution. How can that (i.e. going beyond what is given)
be
explained?

*Internalization vs. Mastery/Appropriation & Constructivism*

In his latest book Jim argued that the internalization metaphor implies
more than is actually taking place as some things cannot be
internalized. I find his multiplication example very appealing as it
shows that we hardly
ever "internalize" how much is 343 times 822. Jim describes
internalization
in terms of 'mastery' and 'appropriation'. I found the argument
convincing but I
believe there's more to it. I must confess that I have not read the
Human Development
papers on internalization, so maybe all the answers are there and I'm
simply being
ignorant.

My perception is that we (I) are skeptical regarding internalization
because we cannot describe *what* is internalized and *how*. Moreover,
internalization entails the *transmission* of
knowledge/information/skills etc from more
experienced society members to youngsters. In my opinion, the use of
constructs such as 'mastery' and/or 'appropriation' instead of
internalization only
solves part of the problem. We may speak of 'mastery' but we must
somehow
define what is actually mastered or appropriated. Popular constructs
like 'scaffolding'
and 'apprenticeship', I think, only address how something is learned;
they
only cover the intstructional conditions and the teacher-student (or
expert-novice)
relationship during the learning process. They describe teacher and
student roles and functions. What I feel is missing is a description of
what exactly has
to be learned in the course of teacher-student interaction. After all,
something has to be learned or all instruction will be downright
aimless.

My position (based on my reading and interpretation of Vygotsky's work
on concept formation) is that part of the process of internalization
necessarily involves the transmission of something (be it knowledge,
information, skills,
strategies etc - please forgive my use of those concepts in an
objective way). Everything
is transmitted and passed down from one generation to another: we need
not discover all
over again that the earth revolves around the sun; we are simply told
that that's the way it is and celestial observations are unecessary.
Considerable time and effort is saved in that way and that's
how progress is possible: future generations can draw on the work or
earlier ones. Every generation does not have to reinvent the wheel or
put forward relativity theory. That's already been taken care of by our
ancestors so
we can focus on other things, among which is improving what they endowed
us with.

My guess is that because traditional schooling was founded on the idea
of transmission of knowledge from the teacher to the student we
are having trouble accepting the concept of internatlization.
After all, according to the popular trend, knowledge is not transmitted
from teacher to student; knowledge is activly constructed by the
learner. Students are not empty
boxes and passive recipients of knowledge and information. Teachers are
not supposed to
instill knowledge in the heads of the learners anymore. According to
this new
learning paradigm (constructivism), in the course of the learning
process teachers are
supposed to be coaches, assistants, and facilitators. They are not
supposed to
present the students with the new material, i.e. merely transmit
knowledge to the students. It is the students themselves who are charged
with the
construction of this knowledge. Students are supposed to discover or
construct quite a
lot, under guidance of course. Now, whether that is attainable and to
what extent
is a matter of interest.

Why do I emphasize the importance of transmission? Because without it
there is nothing to work with as Mike noted in discussing Gordon's dance
example. Something has to be provided by adults, be it a sign, a word, a
gesture,
an algorithm, a mnemonic strategy etc. Unless of course we expect the
young society
members to develop something themselves. That is also a possibility, but
history shows that it takes a true genius to e.g. put forward relativity
theory.
We cannot expect the same from every society member (or can we?).

For example, take the development of a scientific concept such as
momentum. Vygotsky was very explicit about what is transmitted/given by
the adults: a name, a definition, and a host of relationships to other
concepts. These are directly provided to the children by the teacher,
they are
*not* constructed by the children. Children are given signs and they
populate them with
meaning. This process of meaning making is what I see as an actual
construction.
But again, it is not an individual matter; nor is it a solitary effort.
It is a guided construction, which is heavily influenced by adults.
Even though Vygotsky's work on concept formation was very important,
I think that Bakhtin's work fills in some very important gaps.

It is usually the case that Vygotsky is cited as being one of the very
first constructivists, typically falling into the cateogry of social
constructivism. Even though I think of theories as tools, I am inclined
to see this type of citing as absurd.

Uh...let's hope this makes sense.

regards,
Ilias