Thanks for the clarification. I was taking the second approach more as
social macrocosm, but it appears it is more aligned to social
constructivism (interactionist approach). I took it more as in Vygotsky's
approach that the individual can be seen as a cell of society. If that is
the case I have difficult time seeing the second as sociogenetic. I am
reading and rereading *Psychologyof Art* at the moment in which Vygotsky
discusses and differentiates betweeen social and collective psychology.
Social being the study of the individual as a social macrocosm and
collective being the study of groups, social practice. The collective I am
correlating with the first approach with its emphasis on intersubjectivity.
> Nate, Let me give the full paragraph context of the above quote.
>
> As a matter of course, researchers working in the
> sociocultural tradition initiated by Vygotsky give
> priority to social and cultural processes when
> accounting for an individual's mathematical activity
> (Kozulin, 1990; Wertsch, 1985). Thus as Vygotsky
> (1979) himself put it, "the social dimension of
> consciousness is primary in time and in fact.
> The individual dimension of consciousness
> is derivative and secondary" (p. 30).
> From this perspective, the link between social and cultural
> processes and individual development is a direct one.
> Students' mathematical conceptions are said to be
> directly derived or generated by interpersonal relations and
> their use of cultural tools (cf. Forman, 1996; Minick, 1987;
> van Oers, 1990). Analyses conducted in this tradition
> therefore leave little room for psychological approaches,
> such as constructivism, that focus on the individual.
> (Cobb et al., 1997, p. 152)
If the individual dimension is historical, as I assume it is, it can not be
a-social, a-historical. I think Cobb does make a mistake of confusing the
beginning and ending of a process with a cause/effect mentality. The
action and individual agency occurs within this process not alien to it.
To say, social is primary, how can it not be, does not imply a
social-individual transmission. The double nature of mediation occurs, so
the process itself goes through development. I would also disagree it
leaves no room for psychological approaches, I think Vygotsky showed it
does. To say, mathmatical conceptions are "derieved" from interpersonal
relations would assume an individual not as participant not active in the
activity, a view of individual seperate from the social. If we see the
individual in "activity" it seems we could mutually study, understand
his/her development/transformation in/of the practice (externalization) and
the development/transformation of "activity" toward internal consciousness
(internalization).
>
> I feel uncomfortable interpreting what Cobb et al. _might_ have
> meant, but at least let me attempt a redescription. It seems
> that they are interpreting the notion of individual consciousness
> as "derivative and secondary" as indicating that it is directly
> derived from the social dimension. Now you may argue that
> Vygotsky's notion of "derivative and secondary" incorporates
> a true dialectic. But how this is theorized (and not just claimed)
> is by no means obvious. If two elements are dialectically
> constituted, can one speak of a major and minor partner?
> In their emergent approach Cobb et al. are arguing for a balance,
> which, perhaps, is a more natural way to conceive a dialectic.
I think a possible problem with a balance is an assumption of an a-social,
a-historical individual. The individual is social at its very core I would
assume. By this I mean that we, as individual we are part of the "social"
so the interaction or dialectic occurs within the social not as one
seperate from it. Within the social I have certain interests, motivations,
needs but they are not a-social or a-historical. Hommi Bhabha discusses
the historical "I" which is useful for me, an I that is dynamic - always in
the process of change. So, yes there is a dialectic but it is not between
an "I" (the capitalist I, sorry I couldn't resist) as priori to the social,
but one who can not be seperated from it.
Nate