Flavell and his colleagues come to a very similar conclusion on the basis
of a series of experiements (SRCD Monograph, 1995) where the kids are
provided a mindboggling experience of some sort and then asked a little
while later what they were thinking about (the experiments are not as
dumb as that short description suggests).
Estes does experiments with mental rotation of human figurines on a
computer screen which is game-like enough to be doable and fun for
kids from 4- adulthood. He finds that even 4 year olds can tell you
something about what they were doing to get correct answers, but they
differ qualitatively from the explanations of 6 year olds who are
a lot like the adults.
4-year-old: My brain has eyes and they helpo me see things on the screen.
It comes straight from the screen into my head, and then my noodle
turns it around
6-year-old: Pretend your mind put them right side up. I turn this one around in
my mind."
adults are the same as 6 year olds but use words like invert and rotate.
Estes explicitly argues against Bruner as a representative of the discursive
explanation that introspection talk is a social construction on the grounds
that the little kids get it so fast. Not much of an argument.
The data are interesting for those interested in this issue.
mike