Re: Mike's chapter/Metacognition

Paul Dillon (dillonph who-is-at northcoast.com)
Wed, 7 Jul 1999 09:10:53 -0700

Hi David,

It's rather difficult to make a comment on a statement that has been
bulwarked with a reference to a work that I haven't read, ie Gee's book, but
maybe you could briefly summarize exactly what you mean by "the truth about
what one thinks" in opposition to "the cultural practice" of talking about
what is in one's mind. In particular I would be interested to know if you
think there is some discourse that yields a way to talking about what is in
one's mind that isn't a "cultural practice" and that therefor confers an
"objective" order of truth to what is thought or said about what is in one's
mind. Or would you hold that one can't know the truth of what is in one's
mind but only the truth of what is in another's mind?

Paul

-----Original Message-----
From: dkirsh who-is-at lsu.edu <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Wednesday, July 07, 1999 7:56 AM
Subject: Re: Mike's chapter/Metacognition

>Hi Eva.
>Talking about what is in one's mind IS a cultural practice to be valued
>as reflection. But being "right" (i.e., being in a position to report the
>"truth" about what or how one thinks), that's another matter entirely
>that comes out of a particular epistemological stance that I think is
>questionable. Jim Gee's (1992) book makes this argument most
>cogently.
>
>Gee, J. P. (1992). The social mind: Language, ideology, and social
practice.
>New York: Bergin & Garvey.
>
>David
>
>PS. Please allow me to recommend your lovely paper on Skinner's
>struggles to maintain a personal lexicon free from mentalist imagery
>or assumption.
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>Eva Ekeblad <eva.ekeblad who-is-at ped.gu.se> on 07/07/99 02:44:47 AM
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>Please respond to xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu
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> To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu
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> cc: (bcc: David H Kirshner/dkirsh/LSU)
>
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> Subject: Re: Mike's chapter/Metacognition
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>Hi David
>
>Funny to get into this topic over the list after our sideline exchange
>concerning my old paper on Skinner's verbal self-discipline! I'd say even
>behaviorists cherish the behavior of talking about paths of reasoning
>within curricular subjects... isn't it just the terminology of "reflection"
>they'd prohibit?
>
>There aren't so many -ists in Mikes chapter text -- only innatists,
>environmentalists and nationalists (which agrees well with the main purpose
>of steering away from religious beliefs in ubiquitous testing, which I see
>as the main goal of the chapter. I got the feeling the Coles wouldn't
>burden their student readers with too many contending schools, which was
>why I formulated myself a bit vaguely. Wondering if the audience would not
>be ready for a somewhat less cognitivist discourse.
>
>But... why should cognitive processes be what is accessible (or not) to
>introspection? Can't they be what IS accessible in the interpersonal
>exchanges of talk about all kinds of topics, including meta talk about
>cognition. I mean, except for the still-dominance of cognitivism in public
>consciousness :-)
>
>Eva
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>At 12.55 -0500 99-07-06, dkirsh who-is-at lsu.edu wrote:
>>Connectionist theorists, on the other hand, reject the idea that
>>cognitive processes are accessible to introspection at all, so
>>the reflection they espouse is a reflective practice (i.e., a cultural
>>practice of reflection) valued for other than the introspective access
>>implied by metacognition. I think this is what Eva is hoping Mike is
>>valuing through his references to metacognition.
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