>On the other hand, the definitions of the related functions --
>subject-tool-object -- in the Vygotskian triadic system (and its AT
>expansions) should of course be clear. Aren't they?
>
No, I cannot find that the the definitions of the related functions --
subject-tool-object -- in the Vygotskian triadic system are clear in the
discourse here,when I read:
>>Depending on situation, depending on perspective or a way of
>>participation, what is subject, object, or tool is different and
>>changing, and reorganizing.
(Peter's email is just in and looks wonderful, but I cannot include here)
Unfortunately, I am without the Leontv paper (175 in think) that initially
interested me in AT. It was light and airey, lots of space between the
ideas, but held promise.
As I only had 'distributed cognitions' and CP available, at home, I tried
looking there. Object does not appear in the index of either. On the net
then..
The best I can do is a paper on the web 'the concept of activity... by
Reijo Miettinen
"Later Activity theory developed further the ideas of Vygotsky. A.N.
Leontjev, a disciple of Vygotsky stressed that activity is also socially
mediated: consciousness and meaning are always formed in joint, collective
activity (Leontjev 1978). As a result, the unit of analysis in studying
human mediated activity, is an activity system, community of actors who have
a common OBJECT of activity (Engestr=F6m 1987, Cole & Engestr=F6m 1994). In =
this
model social mediatedness is characterized by division of labour and rules
mediating the interaction between the individuals in the activity system.
The collective activity system as unit of analysis connects the
psychological, cultural and institutional perspective to analysis. The study
of activity ceases to be psychology of an individual but instead focuses on
the interaction between an individual, systems of artifacts and other
individuals in historically developing institutional settings."
Seems like he means either "something mental or physical toward which
thought, feeling, or action is directed" or " the goal or end of an effort
or activity : purpose,objective " These are not COG definitions, they
actually come from my unabridged Websters circa 1880, which seems to
predate cognitive science. You can see how I make the association with
volition "an act of making a choice or decision; also : a choice or
decision made" or " the power of choosing or determining" which comes to
my attention not from cognitive science but actually from an old interest
in existentialism, which again predates cog sci. Motive comes from the
latin motivus, moving or tending to move to action , which also seems a
reasonable association. Intent gives me "having the mind, attention, or
will concentrated on something or some end or purpose".
But these connections seem rejected here. And I have not been able to
elicit any simple, however crude, definition of Object. It leads me to
believe that 'shared understanding' is only so much yahdeyahdeyahda,
especially when I cannot find it here.
But I don't mind being called a psychologist or even more recently a
cognitive scientist. I'm flattered that I can pretend (without
intention.... ooops!) with only one grad AI and one undergrad psych
course (It was Cog. Sci) under my belt. But the act of name-calling is
specifically a cartesian move of placing me in what I have come to perceive
as the enemy camp. It is an ironic act for anyone who pursues a theory
claiming rejection of dualisms. But I think we can learn to separate the
tool from the man. I really wish we would.
Since, according to Miettinen, the focus is on interaction between an
individual and yahdeyah, it is a matter of where you draw the lines
demarking the boundaries of the theoretical tool. It does not seem that AT
is incommensurable, or even incompatible, with theories of individual
cognition, but that it is only the reaction of AT followers to exclude any
attempts at reconciliation. The bottom line is that without a translation
between psychology of the individual and activity theory (or inclusion
therein), then AT has limited utility for educators in the US. We are
forced to deal with assessments that are on the individual level. And
assessments, according to some wonderful cognitive scientists, Collins and
=46rederickson, are a driving force, (what I might call Object) in a very
large educational system! Without a connection, a translation, then the
theory doesn't have much purchase.
Going away for the weekend ... Sorry, to drop out just when things are
getting interesting...
Bill Barowy, Associate Professor
Technology in Education
Lesley College, 29 Everett Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
Phone: 617-349-8168 / Fax: 617-349-8169
_______________________
"One of life's quiet excitements is to stand somewhat apart from yourself
and watch yourself softly become the author of something beautiful."
[Norman Maclean in "A river runs through it."]