Dear Naoki,
I think you ask these questions in true ELIZA style, although perhaps there
is something distinguising you from ELIZA. ELIZA just asks questions. I
think you are trying to lead me somewhere! Perhaps to form a 'reductio ad
adsurdum' argument? What ARE your intentions???!!! Let me rephrase that.
What are YOUR intentions???!!!
>However, I am not sure that "human kind" really has intelligence,
>intention or
>motivation inside of them.
I sometimes wonder about this also. Recently, I was at home, ill, and
watched Jerry Springer for the first time. There was evidence for group
and individual motivation and intent, but little intelligence! There was
also a lot of beeping. I think beeping is the way people communicate on
Jerry Springer. The idea seems to be viable at this moment. Hmm. Come
to think of it, my computer beeps at me occasionally. Do you think it is
trying to tell me something?
>The term "volition" is a very convenient tool in order to account people's
>( or machine's) actions and to give a consistent account of people' s
>actions.
Exactly! Volition is a viable construct to account for *peoples* actions.
In the analyst view, I make the distinction between peoples intent and
computers lack of intent - whether the subjects and artifacts within a
system make the distinctions themselves or not!
>However, It will be difficult to answer the questions as following.
>"Where is volition in brain?", "What is volition"?"
To paraphrase Denis Newman, Volition is "out there". Part of out there is
also "In there." Let's do a thought experiment. We can reduce the
complexity of an activity system to ONE PERSON. It becomes necessary for
the activity theory to describe the behaviors of an individual.
Artifacts may provide evidence of volition. And you might argue that, in
this thought experiment, we should also consider the artifacts. I agree.
OK, lets simplify the system further. Remove all artifacts, including
clothing. Here now is a nude, perhaps in a field. What does (s)he do? If
the person were in my hometown, they might run for cover, away from the
insects in the summer, or to find warmth otherwise. Hmmm. On the beach
in La Jolla, they might just hang out and catch some rays. (I accidentally
discovered this latter minimal system recently.) There is definitely
evidence for local culture.
Now build up the system complexity. Put two nudes in the field or on the
beach. Perhaps they are attracted and they mate. (The ability to mate is
another thing that separates subject and artifact, but this activity
doesn't occur very often in the situations I study.) Perhaps the nudes are
not attracted and they run away from each other. In La Jolla, two nudes
seem to act nonchalant. (I think they intend to impress the observers!)
In another culture one might be attracted to the other, but the feeling
might not be reciprocated. Accounting for the differences in individual
'intent' and 'volition' provides a way to account for the very different
actions that occur in our thought experiment.
This miminal system seems to require some more observations. Hmmm. What
are MY intentions?
My question is, if we do not begin distinguishing artifact and subject via
such constructs as 'volition' and 'interaction' and 'cognition' then does
our basic CHAT triangle become a line simply linking 'subject-artifact' and
'object'?
>AI research had attempted to design the machine actor or "interactive
>machine" who has plan, intelligence, intention or motivation inside of it.
>And we know it was illusion. How was it illusion?
I think it was just a ploy to get more grant money. That is the usual
intention.
Bill Barowy, Associate Professor
Technology in Education
Lesley College, 29 Everett Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
Phone: 617-349-8168 / Fax: 617-349-8169
_______________________
"One of life's quiet excitements is to stand somewhat apart from yourself
and watch yourself softly become the author of something beautiful."
[Norman Maclean in "A river runs through it."]