Those radical constructivists...

Bill Barowy (wbarowy who-is-at lesley.edu)
Mon, 4 May 1998 19:07:47 -0400

Radical Constructivism (RC) as Dewey points out is quite different from
other forms. I think that it is true that von Glasersfeld draws from Kant
and Piaget, but there are some significant distinctions that Dewey makes
and I'll just support them with some of Ernst's writings and some random
opinions.

The best part of these discussions is how one is confronted with the
modern meanings made of these theorists' work. There are always new
treasures to be found by going back to the original texts! RC has
historically seemed to me to be a reaction against the logical postivist
position - it is curious to see Ernst's work interpreted as being dualist.

But first, Cole and Scribner point out in the introduction to Mind in
Society that Vygotsky's laboratory existed for a short time - that much of
his work was exploratory. It shows in the collected works there in MiS,
the ideas are wonderful, but I find that there is a lot of space between
them. (Piaget's works are relatively more dense.) The chapter on play
does treat the development of the child as an individual much like Piaget
does. I find myself in agreement with Dot Robbins that it is the
internalization-appropriation, self-regulation as a result of"concept
formation" that allows a theory of individual development within
aVygotskian perspective, but unlike Dot, I do not find the reconciliation
with Piaget handled fully in the Wertsch-Cole article.

Specifically, one area of interest to me and probably also to Dewey, as
science educators, is the special focus placed by Piaget on the physical
world in shaping the ideas of the child about that world. The development
of the child's ideas about the physical world is what science educators
generally concern themselves with. We can tell the child about the world
and we can allow and guide the child in experiencing that world. We have
found that just telling does not work - Piaget's studies have formed the
basis for us to understand why. Children come to the classroom with
notions about the physical world that are often quite different from
scientists and often quite resistent to change. But then we have also
found that just experiencing also does not work. (There has not been good
support for Papert's discovery learning) We have discovered the
distinction between learning and development made by Vygotsky, and one
issue emerging is how children can come to understand (in a developmental
sense) what Peter Hewson has called 'pre-ordained science'.

You see, trained as a scientist, it is necessary for me to make the
ontological statement 'there is a real, physical world' because that is
about what science makes its theories. But as a student, however
irreverant, of von Glasersfeld, I will not make any claim about what
actually is the real world. Ernst writes: "From the constructivist
perspective, however, the reality of knowledge is in one respect radically
different from the reality sought by metaphysical realists; viable
knowledge fits onto the ontic world but makes no claim whatever that it
represents that world iconically." (An interpretation of Piaget's
constructivism, in The construction of knowledge)' Ernst refers to the
distinction Piaget makes between the knower and the experiential world:

'Much of what seems contradictory in Piaget's writings can, I believe, be
resolved if one continuously keeps in mind that he is analyzing the
subjects "cognitive instruments" and the kinds of objects and objectivity
the subject could conceivably construct with them. That means he is trying
to explicate the subject's knowledge and reality exclusively in terms of
elements which, by definition, are *within* the subjects experience.
Although his method is different, and although he explicitly refutes the
assumption of any a priori concepts and categories, Piaget's enterprise is
close to how Kant describes his own in the Kritik: "I therefore call all
insight transcendental that does not concern objects as well, but only our
way of knowing objects insofar as such know is supposed to be a priori
possible"'

Granted, Piagets studies were flawed with respect to gender, culture etc.
I find that I am not agreeing with Kuhn that the Piagetian and Vygotskian
theories are incommensurable - that the observations supporting one are
theory laden, and are of no use to the other. Perhaps I find myself in
agreement with Jay and Feyerabend that 'anything goes', and like
Wolf-Michael Roth, pick and choose elements of either framework much like
bricolage. It would be interesting to put all radical constructivists in
one room and see if consensus could be reached. Somehow, the idea of
'critical mass' comes to mind...

Bill Barowy, Associate Professor
Technology in Education
Lesley College, 29 Everett Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
Phone: 617-349-8168 / Fax: 617-349-8169
_______________________
"One of life's quiet excitements is to stand somewhat apart from yourself
and watch yourself softly become the author of something beautiful."
[Norman Maclean in "A river runs through it."]