legitimizing practice

diane celia hodges (dchodges who-is-at interchg.ubc.ca)
Sat, 22 Nov 1997 14:37:53 -0800

I been reading Lyotard (1984), (did I mention my new book, an anthology of
everything potentially cool about 20th century thought,
Art in Theory 1900-1990? hee hee)

and he writes,

"Take for example, a closed door. Between the 'The door is closed' and
'Open the door' there is no relation of consequence as defined in
propositional logic. The two statements belong to two autonomous sets of
rules defining different kinds of relevance, and therefore of competence.
Here, the effect of dividing reason into cognitive or theoretical reason on
the one hand, and practical reason on the other,
is to attack the legitimacy of the discourse of science. Not directly, but
indirectly, by revealing that it is a language game with its own rules...

...Wittgenstein's strength is that he did not opt for the positivism that
was being developed by the Vienna Circle [e.g., Habermas], but outlined in
his investigation of language games a kind of legitimation not based on
performativity."
(Jean-Francois Lyotard, _The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge_;
p191-192)

without really feeling "competent" to say how, this seems relevant
to the current discussions.
diane

"Every tool is a weapon if you hold it right."
Ani Difranco
*********************************
diane celia hodges
faculty of education
university of british columbia
vancouver, bc canada
tel: (604)-253-4807
email: dchodges who-is-at interchange.ubc.ca