In Good Natured, Frans de Waal studies the relationships between
biology and morality as well as the evolution of morality between species.
In chapter one, he outlines Darwinian dilemmas, or issues that have been
raised against natural selection and morality co-existing, arguing that
incorporating a social context into the biological explanation will
answer these problems. After illustrating common social practices amongst
species, he identifies conditions for the evolution of morality, and
demonstrates how many primates exemplify these in their community
practices. Finally, he concludes that a theory of morality should
emphasize similarities amongst animals, rather than their differences in
order to accord with evolutionary theory.
One of de Waal's Darwinian dilemmas involves the empirical
observation that contrary to natural selection, sometimes "unfit" animals
survive. He answers this problem by incorporating a social component into
group survival to explain that these "less fit" animals contribute to
their societies in some way, allowing them to be tolerated in the
community. Furthermore, in response to the interpretation of natural
selection as the unrestricted competition between selfish agents, de Waal
cites evidence of altruism in many species. "Reciprocal altruism,"
defined as helping, which is costly in the short term, but may provide
long term benefits when a favor is returned, should not be interpreted
as having selfish motivations. Rather, according to the author, we should
view animals as exhibiting community concern, or having a stake in
promoting the characteristics of the community that increase the benefits
of living in it, both for the individual and for the entire group
regardless of their awareness of it.
The conditions for the evolution of morality are as follows.
(1) group value: individuals depend on the group
(2) mutual aid: there is cooperation and reciprocal exchange in the group
(3) internal conflict: individual members have disparate interests
Through the notions of a hierarchial structure that enforces punishment
and rewards good behavior, the development of social norms, the capacities
of empathy and sympathy, reciprocal altruism, conflict resolution, and
peacemaking, the author illustrates how examples of these exist in primate
communities and form the requisites for morality, and that these requisite
conditions are a product of evolution.
In conclusion, the author offers his floating pyramid account of morality,
which allows for an evolutionary perspective on morality as well as
cross-species applications. Altruism and moral obligation are ranked with
responsibility to the self as the most important, followed by family, then
community, tribe/nation, humanity, and lastly, all life forms.
The access we have to resources determines how many tiers of the
pyramid we are able to extend our responsibility toward; non-human animals
also exhibit moral obligations similarly, so we have preserved the
evolutionary aspect of morality in this account. De Waal concludes with
the Phineas Gage example, showing how morality is grounded in
neurobiology, and since human brains are a product of evolution, evolution
must be a part of any satisfactory account of morality.