Re: intermental and intramental planes

cfran who-is-at micron.net
Wed, 25 Sep 96 07:32 MDT

Are not the ideas of intermental and intramental processes (however
configured) as moments only half the story? It seems to me that artifacts
(both within the person (e.g., identity and memory) and within the
intramental realm (e.g., institutions, laws, traditions)) represent the
reified structures that both carry process along and stimulate the
development of new processes. Further, that these are troublesome because we
cannot (except with great discipline and training, e.g., Buddhism) maintain
a view or understanding of them as "moments" or processes?

I would like to be able to engage in dialogue with another subject but I am
forced to understand that subject's history, personality, assumptions,
knowledge, and power. If I can't meet or match my fellow subject on these
criteria our communication breaks down and one of us becomes "marginal" to
the other (we cease being co-subjects). Whichever one of us is most
powerfully affiliated with other linked subjects gets to define what is
whole and what is part. And I am not making a purely political argument
here; I understand these functions to be essentially "hardwired" into our
consciousness.

Or am I looking at the efforts to synthesize the social and the individual
through a structuralist lens that forces a mundane categorical analysis?

Chris Francovich


> From: James Wertsch <jwertsch who-is-at artsci.wustl.edu>
>
> For [Vygotsky], the point was that the _same_ mental functions appear
> on the intermental and intramental planes. Furthermore, the fact that
> mediational means, or cultural tools inherently shape processes on both
> planes means that the connection between individual and social processes
> is even closer. From this perspective, the important point is to view
> neural, mediational, social, economic, and other such processes as
> _moments_ in human action rather than stand-alone entities.
>
>
>