Re: [2]Qualification & ideal

Matvey Sokolovsky (sokolovs who-is-at uconnvm.uconn.edu)
Tue, 30 Jul 1996 10:37:43 -0700 (PDT)

> [1]Qualification & ideal 29/7/96
>
>
>At 10:04 PM 6/13/96 -0400, Judy Diamondstone wrote:
>
>>I admit I am having difficulty with this notion of the "ideal" as
>>objective, unless you allow that the object may be, must be contested.
>>That there be conflicting ideals. Counter-ideals? I sat on the
>>admissions committee for my department at Harvard. Qualifications are
>>contested. However "objective" they might be, they're assessed
>>differently by different members of the committee. How do you
>>explain this, outside the subject-object dichotomy?

On 6/29/96 Eugene Matusov wrote
>
>Judy, let me give an analogy of defining price value of a used radio of a
>market. A seller may go to see how much new radio costs, or for how much
>other people sell their used stuff, or negotiate the price with a potential
>buyer. You may call this process as "subjective:" persuasion of the seller
>and negotiation abilities of the buyers can be rather idiosyncratic and
>circumstantial. However, their exchange of radio and piece of paper with
>fancy pictures called money is fully based on the network of relationship
>among people that far exceeds the buyer, seller, and the whole market. This
>global network was defined by Marx as alienated labor exchange. The buyer
>and seller can trick each other or leave the network (e.g., the seller gives
>the radio to the buyer as a gift) but their context of market exchange
>exists "objectively" and not their caprice, illusion, idiosyncracy, or
>arbitrary.
>
>Similarly, you are sitting at the admissions committee for your department
>at Harvard. You guys can argue with each other and negotiate qualification
>requirements. However, in my view, you are a part of the global network of
>production and consumption of skills alienated from people. In other words,
>"objectivity" of job qualification is not in the nature of answers on what
>is qualification but in the nature of the questions themselves.
>

I'm having trouble to accept the parallel between selling/buying a radio,
and deciding on the candidate for a position in Harvard. It is more or less
clear what one may expect from a radio. In terms of Eugene's quote from
Il'enkov, radio is not a thinking thing; so its repertoire is limited.
Basically (and/or metaphorically), it can be judged on how loudly it speaks.
If the candidate for a position in Harvard can also be judged on how loudly
he or she speaks, Eugene's parallel would be legitimate. However, at least
theoretically, it is possible that candidates are diverse enough to offer
very different things. One can teach a course on Vygotsky, anther -- on
qualitative research, the third -- on family policy and child development
in the US, etc. To say more, one may have had already written whatever he or
she has planned to write; another one may not be a famous scholar but still
has desire to work; the third one may be an APA division chair and have a
lot of connections in Washington (State). In order to work, Marx-Matusov's
market-type model has to assume that it is possible to find or to educate a
person who would combine significant parts of advantages of all. It may not
be true. Persons may be different different, and the judgment whom to accept
will remain purely subjective. To some extent, it can be supported by, I
believe, a realistic example of A, B, C, looking for jobs in Departments of
Education of X, Y, Z. It is very possible that A will get the highest rating
in X, B -- in Y, and C -- in Z. Not a good support for the market-type model.
Matvey Sokolovsky