Material

HDCS6 who-is-at jetson.uh.edu
Sun, 28 Jan 1996 14:36:57 -0600 (CST)

Following the conversation on material I think it is important to remember
where Marx's, and I think then Vygotsky's notion of the material came
from, and how their position is different from the source. The notion
of all things being based in the material comes (or was at least
popularized) by Feuerbach. Feuerbach suggested a radical materialism
that is often used to represent all arguments based in materialism.
That is that all things must be recognized in their primary material
nature, and this primary material has a direct impact on the human.
Some of the arguments I have been reading, such as are words material
(e.g., because they create waves) seems to represent this view of
materialism. I think it is important to remember, however, that
Vygotsky rejected Feuerbach's radical position (though not materialism)
claiming that it was too mechanistic. I think it is also important
to remember that Marx's writings on Feuerbach were in many ways
critiques of this radical position. It also seems to me that
Vygotsky, and the activity theorists who followed him, following
Marx, wanted to figure out to incorporate materialism into the
study of human activity. They was I see it this was accomplished
by making the abstract into what I see as second generation
material. That is abstract concepts are the result of the
special quality of human activity. They are based on the
ability of humans to work collectively and pass abstract signs
that emerge from that work on to succeeding generations. Are
the word cab and an actual cab the same in terms of their
material essence: of course not. But the word cab and the
actual cab emanated from the same material source: the
society's material work and its decision to organize so
that one person does a majority of the driving. The word
cab becomes a repetitive social marker in the place of the
cab itself.

I think that there is also a third generation of the material.
The way the individual understands the word cab in his or
her mind. This is the sense the individual gets of the cab
as a meaningful repetitive symbol. The thinking of the cab,
however, could not exist unless there was both a symbol for
cab and a history of ativity for a cab, and the symbol and
the history of the cab would not have existed unless the
material need for the cab had existed. Taking this one more
step, individuals can then take this third generation material
thinking and turn around and use it to create first generation
material products in reaction to need (Leontiev's product->
activity->product cycle) of the social organization (e.g.,
an electric cab). It is very easy to lose the thread in
all this leading you to believe that the idea of the electric
cab sprung whole from the mind of a great person. I see,
in many ways, the whole social historical school as attempting
to show how this is not possible.

I guess that this whole long preamble is to say that there
really is no argument from a social historical perspective as
to whether a word, or a theory, or the wildest dream or
invention you can come up with is material: it is, but
not in a Feuerbachian manner. Still, I think, the material
nature of words and ideas is an important pre-supposition
that should not be lost.

Michael Glassman
University of Houston