Re: Musing while I art "feverish" . . . . (Part-1)

Eugene Matusov (ematusov who-is-at cats.ucsc.edu)
Mon, 15 Jan 1996 23:53:36 -0800

Hi Ed--

I think you exaggerate a bit the difference between scientific thinking (and
practice) and so-called everyday thinking (and practice). It seems to me
that so-called scientific thinking makes sense only within the science
(which sound almost like tautology) like school thinking makes sense only
within school, and so far. People who will try to use consistantly formal
logic outside the special fields of science and school subjects may go
quickly to mental hospital (or worse). People who apply their opportunistic
skills of inferring from the context usefull in many practices may fail
school exam in formal logic. In this regard, the science is a part of
everyday practices for scientists like street begging is a part of everyday
practice for urban homeless. Each practice requires its own thinking and
skills that may not make sense in other (also everyday) practices. I think
that the myth of scientific thinking is that it exists outside everyday
scientific practice which is culturally, historically, and field specific.
What do you think?

Take care of yourself. Have a quick recovery from your exotic flu,

Eugene
PS How is your job search?

At 10:26 AM 1/13/96 -0800, Edouard Lagache wrote:
>Hello everyone,
>
>My apologies for not getting back to the group. My little barb and a lot
of issues have remained buried inside my own sphere of worries. However, I
brought back from New Zealand a particularly tenacious Kiwi Flu (turned
entrenched Bronchitis.) These musings have made me somewhat "feverish" (how
much to attribute the fever to the topic remains to be seen.)
>
>What truly jolted me was reference quiet a while back to the process of
"meaning making" of children playing in a sandbox. During this time I had
been having some private conversations about the sorry state of academic
enterprises and had spoken of them as "big kids playing in their own
sandbox." The resulting analogy is most troubling to me and I think well
worth pursuing.
>
>Michael Glassman writes:=20
>>One child says the box is a castle. The other
>>children agree to have the meaning of the box repeat as a castle
>>for a certain period of time. Now I would guess all the children
>>have a different sense of how the castle actually looks, how it
>>appears in their consciousness, but they are able to get enough
>>agreement to create a fantasy game between them,
>
>It seems to me this analysis leaves out the one important ingredient: the
world. In our world there are Castles, and ultimately children (and adults)
are held accountable not simply to social conventions, but also to the large
structures built of stone. It is very tempting within a social
constructivist stance to forget the referents of words (like Castles.) As a
scuba diver, I've learned the hard way that no amount of discourse
conventions will make an 8 foot breaker any smaller.
>
>However, let us consider the sand box for "big kids." When science
educators (for example) get together to talk about scientific constructivism
- what do they mean? Well, it is not like the referent to Castle that
essentially a public object. Scientific terms are private - not to
individuals, but to the "fields" of discourse (Bourdieu.) Moreover, the
meaning of such terms is not defined ubiquitously throughout the public
world (What Heidegger/Dreyfus would call "The One"). Instead, the right and
privilege to coin, refine, and extend terms is itself part of the
functioning of the scientific field. As such it is a realm of human
struggle and very much the result of power relations. Thus paradoxically,
scientific definitions are more detached from the phenomena than everyday
terms. The scientific method assures that scientific definitions are less
accountable to reality than everyday meanings.
>
>This is why terms like =8Cfar=B9 are more problematic in science than=
everyday
life. If I ask: =B3Is it far to Los Angeles from San Francisco=B2 most=
people
in the United States can answer the question. If I ask: =B3Is it far from
Hamilton to Wellington.=B2 The same group of people not only won=B9t know=
the
answer, but they will know that they don=B9t know the answer. Either case=
the
term =8Cfar=B9 is unproblematic. However, ask if a particular instance of
transfer is a an example of =8Cnear=B9 or =8Cfar=B9 transfer. Even=
Cognitive
Scientist types may disagree violently - not over the =B3facts=B2 but over=
the
meaning of the term =8Cfar transfer.=B9
>
>Because of the underlying power relations, terms are more likely to survive
than their everyday counterpart. Scientific fields split just as
conversation analysis split off from Linguistics and Ethnomethodology. As a
result, very similar terminology now has three uses depending on the field.
>
>If I compare the sandbox with the little kids making sand castles to the
big kids making conceptual castles, I am left with a troubling conclusion.
Little kids are more likely to come to some accommodation of the everyday
world than the big kids in academia. The social infrastructure of
scientific practice combined with the arbitrarily disproportionate respect
given science results in enormous autonomy. Alas that autonomy can be from
reality itself; the result has been the =B3intellectual runaway trains=B2=
that
we can all point to.
>
>So I leave the group with the first source of my fever - what are the
mechanisms (existing or possible) that keep the "big kids" of academia aware
of the fact that 8 foot breakers exist? (and aren't healthy for divers no
matter what the schedule might demand.)
>
>Edouard
>
>. - - - . . . - - - . . . - - - . . . - - - . . . - - - . =20
>: Edouard Lagache :
>: lagache who-is-at violet.berkeley.edu :
>:...................................................................:
>: We can not recapture the past any more than we can escape from it :
>: Linda Lichter :
>. - - - . . . - - - . . . - - - . . . - - - . . . - - - .
>
>

------------------------
Eugene Matusov
UC Santa Cruz