structural theory

Rolfe Windward (IBALWIN who-is-at mvs.oac.ucla.edu)
Fri, 29 Dec 95 09:07 PST

What I liked/like about EM is what I consider to be it's crucial subtext of
trouble-making. I heard Garfinkel talk at UCLA some years ago and a few of
his points sounded almost like something a Lakota ('Sioux' nation) Hey-O-ka
man might say (the 'contrary ones'; the 'thunder-clowns'): Turn the thing on
it's head -- what does it look like THAT way (and why do people insist on
looking at it THIS way) -- now try DOING it that way for awhile (what does
it feel like?) -- now LISTEN!

There is also a principle of landscape ecology that runs along similar
lines: don't always search for, or think in terms of, the 'pristine' case;
sometimes disturbed systems tell you a great deal more (including crucial
things about the 'ideal' that would otherwise go unnoticed).

What I meant by metaphysics is largely defined in terms of its aim: to
provide a coherent and comprehensive way of thinking about what is. I think
I used the term because even though arguments can be drawn from one, it is
generally not possible to completely falsify a metaphysic - it just becomes
more and more riddled with exceptions until it's following attenuates
(witness the flat earthers). Upon reflection, I don't think I meant a world
view (although that's perhaps what I should have meant -- certainly all
practitioners do not spend time pursuing the consequential logics of their
practices - I don't really believe I did until I took a breather from the
classroom to attend university).

I still like the term though and I think that if one hopes to generate a
vision of reflective practice, one must use it. Plato's theory of
universals would qualify as would Spinoza's pantheism, Descartes' dualism,
Hegel's biography of the absolute, or Russell's neutral monism. A metaphysic
must have some quality of creative vision but also a strong discursive
quality since it would hard to imagine any metaphysic that was not permeated
with argument. In other words, a metaphysic may "shake our shackles," may be
extremely revolutionary, but will not itself revolt against reason -- and of
course one of the most neglected commonplaces of metaphysics is that it is
possible to appreciate an argument(s) derived from one and yet strongly
desire that the conclusion be untrue (Kekes, 1976). A metaphysic inherently
concerns itself with the reality of values.

It's too bad the term has fallen out of favor (possibly due to it's
connection with theological argument) -- it's a rich word.

Rolfe

Kekes, John (1976). _A Justification of Rationality_. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.

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Rolfe Windward (UCLA GSE&IS, Curriculum & Teaching)
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"I respect belief, but doubt is what gets you an education." W. Mizener