[Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object oriented activity and communication

[David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>]

Voloshinov begins his discussion on pp. 88-89 of Marxism and the Philosophy
of Language with the simple idea that the "I experience" of hunger is one
end of a pole, the end we share with animals, one which cannot be
communicated and ultimately leads to self-extinction, either when food is
provided or the experiencer dies of inanition. As far as we know, this
experience is undifferentiated: it is felt but not apperceived (that is,
the feeling of feeling it is not felt; it is "live" but not "life o'er
lived", "zhivanie" but not "perezhivanie").  At the other end of the pole
is the "we experience" which is necessarily differentiated because it is
over-lived differently by people of different classes--the vagabond sullen
and envious in hunger, the mystic fasting sententiously unto death, the
peasant resigned and blaming the weather, and finally the proletarians who
reject hunger altogether precisely because they have the obscene sight of a
satiated boss and family before them and starving children at their side.
(Voloshinov also says that there are human sexual experiences at both
poles, but he refers us to pp. 135-136 of his book on Freudianism, and my
English edition doesn't have a p. 135.)

Brecht discusses how to convey this operatically (because of course Brecht
was a big fan of Chinese opera, and met the diva Mei Lanfang in Moscow,
where Eisenstein was putting his work on film in the attached). He wonders
why the Biblical phrase "pluck out the eye that offends thee" is so much
more "gestic" and horrifying the way that it is translated into German by
Martin Luther ("If thine eye offend thee...pluck it OUT!"). I think this is
the "indexicality" that Greg is really interested in: not the pure "I
experience" of sensation but the way that "I experience" goes out to "we
experience" and then returns to an "I experience" and alchemically
transforms it into something new, wine from water. It's not primordially an
"I experience" but an "I experience"  which is now an individuation of a
social emotion. Brecht describes how workers parading through Berlin on
Christmas eve are chanting "Wir haben HUNG-ER!" and some of them actually
supplement this with "Helft euch sel-ber, wahlt Thalmann!" ("Help
yourselves--vote Thalmann", the then candidate of the German Communist
Party).

Incredibly, I just discovered that this is actually a children's song:

We have hunger, hunger, hunger
Have hunger, hunger hunger
Have hunger, hunger hunger
Have thirst.

If we don't get something, get, get, get
We'll eat flies, flies, flies
We'll eat flies, flies, flies
>From the wall.

If they don't taste good, taste, taste
We'll eat snails, snails, snails,
We'll eat snails, snails, snails,
>From the forest.

If they don't last, last, last
We'll eat corpses, corpses, corpses
We'll eat corpses, corpses, corpses
>From the grave.

If they don't suffice, suffice, suffice
We'll eat snakes, snakes, snakes
We'll eat snakes, snakes, snakes
>From the forest.

(Notice that the tendency of German and French to make pains and lacks into
virtual entities that you can possess and be dispossessed of makes the song
much more gestic and indexical, because it allows parallelism of "hunger"
with "flies", "snails", "corpses" and "snakes".. Note also that it would be
far more gestic to put the verse about corpses at the end...)

David Kellogg

(In this clip, Eisenstein films Mei Lanfang showing us the great heroine
Mui Guiying who challenges an enemy general to battle and falls in love
with him mid-struggle. Notice how much you can understand "gestically"..)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nlf5LW_nrQ

dk

On Wed, Nov 1, 2017 at 7:32 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> ​And funny that, in addition to stumbling across David's review of
> Volosinov that I just posted, I also just happened to have a tab open to
> this conversation between David and me in August of 2009:
>
> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Mail/xmcamail.2009_08.dir/msg00054.html
>
> History repeats itself. All the more the less you remember (but are
> archived).
>
> Also, just to be clear, I'm not suggesting that there is no such think as
> "privileged access", I'm simply suggesting that it may be a
> cultural-historically peculiar phenomena and thus one worth being careful
> about while also asking tough questions about it. I think the most
> important question remains "what is it that we are gaining privileged
> access to?" (and to jump ahead of myself, in the end, I think that this is
> a Schroedinger's cat moment where access to the thing is, in part, the
> constitution of the thing being accessed).
>
> -greg​
> p.s. has anyone heard anything about Tony Whitson lately? I just realized
> how much I miss his snide and biting comments.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 4:09 PM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Perhaps I should say this was my privileged access because when I saw
> > Volosinov in Greg's message it immediately reminded me of the link
> between
> > his inner sign and the notion of privileged access.
> >
> > James
> >
> > 2017年10月31日 下午9:50，"James Ma" <jamesma320@gmail.com>写道：
> >
> > I'm inclined to think Volosinov's inner sign resembles privileged access
> -
> > both are located within oneself, inaccessible for other people.
> >
> > James
> >
> > On 31 October 2017 at 20:36, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > and for those curious about Volosinov, here is a great review of one of
> > > Volosinov's works, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (it happens
> to
> > be
> > > the one that I was referring to with the mention of hunger):
> > > http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1473-4192.
> 2009.00210.x/full
> > >
> > > -greg
> > >
> > > On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 11:12 AM, Greg Thompson <
> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > > >
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > David,
> > > >
> > > > I'd like to resist some of the individualism and internalism implied
> by
> > > > your notion of "privileged access". (and I suspect that this capacity
> > > > presupposes "guess what I'm thinking" kinds of games, and these are
> > WEIRD
> > > > phenomena in as much as they aren't culturally universal - in some
> > > cultural
> > > > contexts they are seen to be rude!).
> > > >
> > > > To put my concern slightly differently and into questions:
> > > > 1. What exactly is it that one has "privileged access" to?
> > > > 2. Are there really no times in which we can have a feeling that is
> > > > someone else's? Can a child's fear not be the mother's fear?
> > > > 3. Are our feelings all ours? and not of others? (Here I'm thinking
> of
> > > the
> > > > experience of watching my children be socialized into feelings by
> > seeing
> > > > what kinds of emotional expressions lead to what kinds of practical
> > > > outcomes (and here refer back to #1). But I'm also thinking of
> > > Volosinov's
> > > > notion of behavioral ideology - a feeling of hunger is something
> > > different
> > > > when shared by thousands of others).
> > > > 4. What is inside (and privileged) and what is outside (and not?)?
> > > >
> > > > Anyway, that's a bit of a mess, philosophically and otherwise, but
> > seems
> > > > like questions very relevant to thinking about Vygotsky in the vein
> of
> > > > Hegel/Marx and attempts to transcend simple dualisms of
> subject/object,
> > > > inside/outside, individual/society, etc.
> > > >
> > > > Hope you are well wherever you may be
> > > > and may my well-being be your well-being...
> > > >
> > > > -greg
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 3:35 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> I think that when your grandson feels fear, what the child feels is
> > his
> > > >> own fear and not your fear. As you point out, what is communicated
> is
> > a
> > > >> vague uneasiness and not urgent and immediately actionable thought
> > "I'm
> > > >> afraid that my grandson is going to electrocute himself" or even
> > > "Grandpa
> > > >> is afraid that I am going to electrocute myself".  I think that when
> > > Alan
> > > >> Bennet's mother sees the cow, what she feels is the sensation of
> > seeing
> > > >> shapes and colors and remembering seeing such patterns in some
> > concrete
> > > >> context and not the precise location of a specifiable semantic
> > address.
> > > So
> > > >> it seems to me that Wittgenstein is confirmed and not confounded.
> > > >>
> > > >> Vygosky says that when a wild goose is startled and the whole flock
> > > takes
> > > >> wing, we should call it "contamination' rather than "communication".
> > > What
> > > >> is "communicable" here is symptom not cause. The first goose is
> afraid
> > > of
> > > >> something and not because the other geese are afraid. The other
> geese
> > > are
> > > >> not afraid of whatever it was that startled the first goose; they
> are
> > > >> afraid because the first goose is afraid, and that is all.
> > > >>
> > > >> If you have a cold and sneeze, and I am sneezing because of the
> pepper
> > > on
> > > >> my pickle sandwich, then I cannot say that I have caught your cold.
> > > There
> > > >> is a well-known joke which makes the same point: if you scream in a
> > > >> theatre, everybody tells you to shut up, but if you scream on an
> > > airplane
> > > >> they all join in. In neither case, however, is there a feeling
> > > >> communicated: in both cases, the only thing being communicated was
> the
> > > >> fact
> > > >> of screaming, not the emotion that gave rise to it.
> > > >>
> > > >> It makes a difference to an undamaged human brain. Here's Dr. Adolfo
> > > >> Garcia
> > > >> demonstrating that there are good neurological reasons why you can
> say
> > > "My
> > > >> grandson ate breakfast" and even "My grandson felt/thought that it
> was
> > > >> time
> > > >> for breakfast'" but you cannot say "My grandson ate that it was time
> > for
> > > >> breakfast".  Mental processes are one thing, and material processes
> > are
> > > >> another: a human brain knows the difference, and our languages
> reflect
> > > >> this
> > > >> knowledge.
> > > >>
> > > >> https://vimeo.com/111374335
> > > >>
> > > >> Dr. Garcia has a good paper on this in Functions of Language:
> > > >>
> > > >> https://benjamins.com/#catalog/journals/fol.23.3.02gar/details
> > > >>
> > > >> If Alan Bennet's mum confirms Wittgenstein, but Alan Bennett thinks
> > > >> Wittgenstein is confounded, can we really say that he has understood
> > > >> Wittgenstein? if you prove my point, but you think you are actually
> > > >> contradicting it, have we communicated or not?
> > > >>
> > > >> David Kellogg
> > > >>
> > > >> On Sat, Oct 28, 2017 at 10:36 PM, Julian Williams <
> > > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> > David
> > > >> >
> > > >> > When I see my grandchild fall and bang their head I ‘feel their
> > pain’
> > > >> and
> > > >> > wince even before I hear him cry… even more so, my grandson seems
> to
> > > >> feel
> > > >> > my fear before I actually say anything about it (when they poke
> > their
> > > >> > finger into the socket), and even though he is too young to have
> any
> > > >> words
> > > >> > for ‘fear’… when you see someone’s face twist in such and such a
> > way,
> > > >> you
> > > >> > mirror it and feel the sensation associated with the expression
> > > straight
> > > >> > away, don’t you?
> > > >> >
> > > >> > At some level of perception, we do communicate without words. As
> > Alan
> > > >> > Bennet said in his diaries (when his demented mother pointed to a
> > cow
> > > in
> > > >> > the field and said ‘I know what they are but not what they are
> > > called’)
> > > >> > “Thus Wittgenstein was confounded by my mother”.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Am I missing your point?
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Julian
> > > >> >
> > > >> > On 26/10/2017, 11:58, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
> of
> > > >> David
> > > >> > Kellogg" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
> > > >> > dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >> >
> > > >> >      All Vygotsky says is that thinking is represented in the
> brain
> > > >> > differently
> > > >> >     than immediate sensation. Vygotsky didn't have access to MRI
> > scans
> > > >> or
> > > >> >     computerized tomography. In fact these can and do distinguish
> > > >> between
> > > >> > verbs
> > > >> >     of sensation and verbs of verbal report. But what Vygotsky did
> > > have
> > > >> > access
> > > >> >     to is the grammar of reported speech.
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     In all languages that I know, it is possible to quote the
> words
> > of
> > > >> > another
> > > >> >     person. I can say, for example:
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     Sasha says "Obviously, this has nothing to do with Marxism".
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     I can also quote the thoughts of another person.
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     Sasha thinks, "Obviously, this has nothing to with Marxism."
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     I can do this even when there are no actual words, just as I
> can
> > > >> read
> > > >> >     Sasha's thoughts without him speaking them.
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     However, in no languages that Iknow is it possible to quote
> the
> > > >> > actions or
> > > >> >     the immediate sensations of another person. I cannot say, for
> > > >> example:
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     "Sasha stood "Up""
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     "Sasha felt 'Cold'".
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     When I try to say this, what I end up saying is that Sasha
> > > thought a
> > > >> > word
> > > >> >     meaning, not that he felt an immediate sensation.
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     In Chinese we say, "The speaker has gone, and the tea is
> cold."
> > > >> This
> > > >> > is
> > > >> >     originally a line from the revolutionary opera "Shajiabang",
> > > about a
> > > >> > woman
> > > >> >     who runs a teahouse used by communists. In this scene, the
> > > children
> > > >> are
> > > >> >     acting out a visit by a Chinese quisling and a Japanese
> officer;
> > > >> they
> > > >> >     accuse the woman of communist sympathies, and she says that
> all
> > > >> people
> > > >> > who
> > > >> >     come to her teahouse have sympathies, but as soon as they go,
> > > their
> > > >> > tea is
> > > >> >     cold, and she throws it out (6:13).
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uUYvyRMvCNU
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     There is no way, as Wittgenstein says, to feel the toothache
> of
> > > >> another
> > > >> >     person; all you can do is to describe it in thoughts and
> words.
> > > >> >     Paradoxically, when we want to share thoughts, we can do it
> > > >> > "immediately",
> > > >> >     because thoughts and words have already made the dialectical
> > > >> leap--the
> > > >> > leap
> > > >> >     from idiolect into a sharable dialect.
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     David Kellogg
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     other verbs). First of all, notice that he is saying that
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 5:14 PM, Andy Blunden <
> > ablunden@mira.net>
> > > >> > wrote:
> > > >> >
> > > >> >     > That is a tendency within our heritage, David. Some people
> > > >> >     > take the category of "labour" rather than "activity" to be
> > > >> >     > the key category.
> > > >> >     >
> > > >> >     > As I understand it, "labour," or "production," is activity
> > > >> >     > in the case where production and consumption and socially
> > > >> >     > mediated, but I think that activity whose object is an
> > > >> >     > object of consumption should be included within the basic
> > > >> >     > category of Activity Theory, even if there are important
> > > >> >     > psychological differences. Some are also concerned to
> > > >> >     > separate symbolic activity, such as speech or supervision of
> > > >> >     > labour, from the fundamental category, giving tool-use
> > > >> >     > priority over sign use, and use of the term "labour"
> > > >> >     > suggests that. Vygotsky expressed himself firmly against
> > > >> >     > this move.
> > > >> >     >
> > > >> >     > So use of "activity" rather than "labour" or vice versa does
> > > >> >     > reflect certain tensions within the tradition.
> > > >> >     >
> > > >> >     > Andy
> > > >> >     >
> > > >> >     > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Tool%20and%
> > > >> >     > 20Sign%20in%20Vygotskys%20Development.pdf
> > > >> >     >
> > > >> >     > ------------------------------
> ------------------------------
> > > >> >     > Andy Blunden
> > > >> >     > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
> > > >> >     > On 26/10/2017 6:14 PM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote:
> > > >> >     > > Xmca seems to have a workerist tendency operating - for
> > > myself I
> > > >> > have
> > > >> >     > always found that the work of generalising (in Vygotsky's
> > sense)
> > > >> is a
> > > >> >     > labour of object-oriented activity. But that's just me
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > -----Original Message-----
> > > >> >     > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > xmca-l-bounces@
> > > >> >     > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alexander Surmava
> > > >> >     > > Sent: 26 October 2017 00:13
> > > >> >     > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity;
> > Mike
> > > >> > Cole;
> > > >> >     > ivan-dgf; Martin John Packer; ‪Haydi ‪Zulfei‬‬
> > > >> >     > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object
> oriented
> > > >> > activity
> > > >> >     > and communication
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > Dear Alfredo,
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > thank you for your very accurate reaction. You definitely
> > > >> noticed
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > main thing. Today, in the era of globalization and developed
> > > >> > technologies,
> > > >> >     > the class antagonism between exploited people and their
> > > >> exploiters,
> > > >> > between
> > > >> >     > capital and wage labor, assumes the appearance of the
> opposite
> > > >> > between
> > > >> >     > different ethnic groups and cultures. Capital itself has
> > always
> > > >> been
> > > >> > a
> > > >> >     > global phenomenon, and a class of capitalists - a
> cosmopolitan
> > > >> class.
> > > >> >     > Putting military overcoats on workers and sending them to
> > fight
> > > >> and
> > > >> > to kill
> > > >> >     > each other under nationalist slogans, they continued to
> > > cooperate
> > > >> > with
> > > >> >     > their exploitation colleagues, somehow continuing to receive
> > > >> > dividends from
> > > >> >     > their enterprises located on the territory of their "enemy."
> > > Today
> > > >> > Putin's
> > > >> >     > friends and henchmen who curse the "insidious West" take
> their
> > > >> > capitals to
> > > >> >     > this West, buy property there, send their children to study
> > > there
> > > >> > and go
> > > >> >     > there themselves to rest and be treated. And today Mr.
> > > Poroshenko
> > > >> -
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > president of the country that was subje
> > > >> >     > >  cted to the aggression of the neighboring state, owns
> > > chocolate
> > > >> >     > factories located on the territory of this country.
> > > >> >     > > In Russia, and in Western Europe, and in the United
> States,
> > > the
> > > >> > policy
> > > >> >     > of the ruling classes is based today on inciting against
> each
> > > >> other
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > working people of different ethnic groups and confessions,
> on
> > > >> their
> > > >> >     > juxtaposition of each other as superior and second-class
> > > >> creatures.
> > > >> >     > > And as an ideological justification of the enmity incited
> by
> > > the
> > > >> > ruling
> > > >> >     > class towards working people of a different skin color,
> > working
> > > >> > people
> > > >> >     > speaking a different language and praying to other gods,
> > public
> > > >> >     > consciousness is infected with totally false ideas
> constructed
> > > >> > allegedly on
> > > >> >     > a scientific basis. All this is not new. One hundred years
> > ago,
> > > >> the
> > > >> >     > dominant ideology rested on undisguised racism. Today, the
> > same
> > > >> task
> > > >> > is
> > > >> >     > being solved by more sophisticated means, appealing to
> > so-called
> > > >> > "cultural"
> > > >> >     > differences. Although the old ideology appealing to
> biological
> > > >> > differences
> > > >> >     > has not disappeared. Only today it is covered by a new,
> > > >> > molecular-genetic
> > > >> >     > argumentation, an appeal not only to livestock farming, but
> > also
> > > >> to
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > "psychology of culture".
> > > >> >     > > It is possible to unmask this bourgeois lie, not only in
> > words
> > > >> but
> > > >> > also
> > > >> >     > in deeds, if we can understand that human development is not
> > the
> > > >> > ability of
> > > >> >     > individuals to experience (perejivat’) the meaning of words,
> > but
> > > >> to
> > > >> > be
> > > >> >     > genuine subjects of object-oriented activity, the subjects
> of
> > > >> labor.
> > > >> >     > > If we stay on Vygotsky's theoretical positions, which
> > believed
> > > >> > that the
> > > >> >     > human psyche begins with acts of sensation that thinking is
> > > just a
> > > >> > verbal
> > > >> >     > "generalization" of the material that our senses deliver to
> > us,
> > > >> then
> > > >> > any
> > > >> >     > wretched ideologist, with a well-suspended language, will
> seem
> > > to
> > > >> us
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > owner of perfect wisdom, whereas a worker or a peasant doing
> > his
> > > >> own
> > > >> > work,
> > > >> >     > but not possessing the skill of ideological verbosity, will
> > look
> > > >> > something
> > > >> >     > inferior.
> > > >> >     > > If someone is shocked by such an evaluation of Vygotsky's
> > > >> theory,
> > > >> > open
> > > >> >     > his "Thinking and speach" and reread this key paragraph.
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > "It has been said that the dialectical leap is not only a
> > > >> > transition
> > > >> >     > from matter that is incapable of sensation to matter that is
> > > >> capable
> > > >> > of
> > > >> >     > sensation, but a transition from sensation to thought. This
> > > >> implies
> > > >> > that
> > > >> >     > reality is reflected in consciousness in a qualitatively
> > > different
> > > >> > way in
> > > >> >     > thinking than it is in immediate sensation. This qualitative
> > > >> > difference is
> > > >> >     > primarily a function of a generalized reflection of reality.
> > > >> > Therefore,
> > > >> >     > generalization in word meaning is an act of thinking in the
> > true
> > > >> > sense of
> > > >> >     > the word. At the same time, however, meaning is an
> inseparable
> > > >> part
> > > >> > of the
> > > >> >     > word; it belongs not only to the domain of thought but to
> the
> > > >> domain
> > > >> > of
> > > >> >     > speech. A word without meaning is not a word, but an empty
> > > sound.
> > > >> A
> > > >> > word
> > > >> >     > without meaning no longer belongs to the domain of speech.
> One
> > > >> > cannot say
> > > >> >     > of word meaning what we said earlier of the elements of the
> > word
> > > >> > taken
> > > >> >     > separately. Is word meaning speech or is it thought? It is
> > both
> > > at
> > > >> > one and
> > > >> >     > the same time; it is a unit of verbal thi
> > > >> >     > >  nking. It is obvious, then, that our method must be that
> of
> > > >> > semantic
> > > >> >     > analysis. Our method must rely on the analysts of the
> > meaningful
> > > >> > aspect of
> > > >> >     > speech; it must be a method for studying verbal meaning.
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > We can reasonably anticipate that this method will produce
> > > >> answers
> > > >> > to
> > > >> >     > our questions concerning the relationship between thinking
> and
> > > >> speech
> > > >> >     > because this relationship is already contained in the unit
> of
> > > >> > analysis. In
> > > >> >     > studying the function, structure, and development of this
> > unit,
> > > we
> > > >> > will
> > > >> >     > come to understand a great deal that is of direct relevance
> to
> > > the
> > > >> > problem
> > > >> >     > of the relationship of thinking to speech and to the nature
> of
> > > >> verbal
> > > >> >     > thinking."
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > Obviously, such an "understanding" of thinking has not the
> > > >> > slightest
> > > >> >     > relation to either Spinozism or Marxism. It is a naive
> attempt
> > > to
> > > >> > combine
> > > >> >     > eclectically the old ideas of empirical psychology with the
> > > school
> > > >> > textbook
> > > >> >     > of formal logic.
> > > >> >     > > (Of course, I understand that this paragraph needs more
> > > detailed
> > > >> >     > theoretical analysis. And I will not slow down this analysis
> > in
> > > >> the
> > > >> > very
> > > >> >     > near future. In the meantime, I only note that Vygotsky's
> > > >> assertion
> > > >> > that
> > > >> >     > "generalization is a verbal act of thought" is a maximally
> > > >> aphoristic
> > > >> >     > expression of his idealistic position. For us, as for the
> > > >> > materialists, the
> > > >> >     > generalization is a practical act and its instrument is the
> > > >> > instrument of
> > > >> >     > labor. And the initial and universal instrument of
> > > generalization
> > > >> is
> > > >> > not a
> > > >> >     > sign, but an instrument of labor. So the ax is a means of
> > > >> > generalizing the
> > > >> >     > properties of wood. The ax is, in the same time, a means of
> > > >> > analyzing all
> > > >> >     > the same wood. All this is obvious, looking through the
> optics
> > > of
> > > >> >     > Spinoza-Ilyenkov, that is, simply a Marxist definition of
> > > >> ideality.)
> > > >> >     > Theoretical conclusions made by Vygotsky from the results of
> > > >> Luria's
> > > >> > trip
> > > >> >     > to Uzbekistan logically follow from the above. The Uzbek
> > > >> illiterate
> > > >> >     > peasant, not from school textbooks, but from his own labo
> > > >> >     > >  r experience knowing how the earth, aryk, water, hoe and
> > > melon
> > > >> are
> > > >> >     > connected, and therefore refusing to produce meaningless
> > formal
> > > >> > logical
> > > >> >     > operations with words denoting these things, is declared a
> > > >> primitive
> > > >> >     > thinking by "complexes". Simultaneously, any school crap who
> > > knows
> > > >> > how to
> > > >> >     > pronounce definitions from his textbook and familiar with
> the
> > > >> melon
> > > >> > only
> > > >> >     > when it is bought, washed and cut by his mommy, is declared
> > the
> > > >> > bearer of
> > > >> >     > scientific consciousness.
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > Only in this way can we, as psychologists and teachers,
> come
> > > to
> > > >> the
> > > >> >     > value of instruments of labor, not only for the distribution
> > of
> > > >> > material
> > > >> >     > wealth, but also for the distribution of the spiritual
> wealth,
> > > for
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > distribution of the ability to think, for the distribution
> of
> > > >> > culture. Only
> > > >> >     > in this way can we approach the Marxist definition of
> culture
> > as
> > > >> the
> > > >> >     > totality of the means of its object-oriented activity
> > > accumulated
> > > >> by
> > > >> >     > humankind the means of its labor. Only on the path of such
> > based
> > > >> on
> > > >> > idea of
> > > >> >     > object-oriented activity understanding of man we will be
> able
> > to
> > > >> get
> > > >> > out of
> > > >> >     > the deadlock of the semiotic, with its symbolic
> arbitrariness.
> > > >> >     > > Vygotsky's merit is that he was the first who seriously
> set
> > > the
> > > >> > task of
> > > >> >     > creating a Marxist psychology and his merit can be
> considered
> > > that
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > first real step in this direction was made by his friend and
> > > >> student
> > > >> > AN
> > > >> >     > Leontiev.Our task is to continue their mission.
> > > >> >     > > Sasha
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >       От: Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
> > > >> >     > >  Кому: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > >> > >;
> > > >> >     > Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>; ivan-dgf <
> ivan-dgf@migmail.ru
> > >;
> > > >> > Martin
> > > >> >     > John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>; ‪Haydi ‪Zulfei‬‬ <
> > > >> >     > haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; Alexander Surmava <
> > > >> >     > alexander.surmava@yahoo.com>
> > > >> >     > >  Отправлено: среда, 25 октября 2017 15:03
> > > >> >     > >  Тема: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object oriented
> > > >> activity
> > > >> > and
> > > >> >     > communication
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > #yiv0081188988 #yiv0081188988 -- P
> > > >> {margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:
> > > >> > 0px;}#yiv0081188988
> > > >> >     > Dear Sasha, all,
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > apologies for late response, as we've had some health
> issues
> > > at
> > > >> > home
> > > >> >     > that fortunately are now dissipating but which have limited
> > > >> > participation
> > > >> >     > anywhere else than home life.
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > The real need of democratic pedagogy. That sounds like a
> > > >> concrete
> > > >> > aspect
> > > >> >     > to begin moving on to what we had hoped at the beginning of
> > this
> > > >> >     > conversation: how is this all gonna be of practical (real)
> > > >> relevance
> > > >> > to us
> > > >> >     > and not only armchair discussion. So, in what sense is this
> > > >> 'real,'
> > > >> > and is
> > > >> >     > this a 'need'? (I am not addressing Sasha alone, I am
> > addressing
> > > >> any
> > > >> > and
> > > >> >     > everyone)
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > Alfredo
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > From: Alexander Surmava <alexander.surmava@yahoo.com>
> > > >> >     > > Sent: 21 October 2017 13:36
> > > >> >     > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Mike Cole; Alfredo
> > > Jornet
> > > >> > Gil;
> > > >> >     > ivan-dgf; Martin John Packer; ‪Haydi ‪Zulfei‬‬
> > > >> >     > > Subject: Отв: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object
> oriented
> > > >> > activity
> > > >> >     > and communication Dear Martin,I think that if we're going to
> > > >> discuss
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > method of Marx, then it is better to do it discussing his
> most
> > > >> > mature work.
> > > >> >     > That is evidently "Das Kapital" and Ilyenkov's monograph
> > > >> "Dialectics
> > > >> > of the
> > > >> >     > abstract and concrete in theoretical thinking". I am aware
> > that
> > > >> > there is a
> > > >> >     > point of view that the position of Marx as a humanist was
> > > >> adequately
> > > >> >     > presented in Gründrisse, whereas the humanistic core of
> Marx's
> > > >> > theory was
> > > >> >     > allegedly lost in “Das Kapital”. Accordingly, Marxism is
> > better
> > > to
> > > >> > study
> > > >> >     > with the help of Gründrisse, and not with the help of “Das
> > > >> Kapital”.
> > > >> > Along
> > > >> >     > with Ilyenkov I do not share this view.I'm afraid that the
> > > >> > discussion of
> > > >> >     > this topic would take us too far from our psychological
> > themes.
> > > I
> > > >> > think
> > > >> >     > that we should not get stuck in discussing the order of
> > "steps",
> > > >> but
> > > >> >     > immediately put our foot on the first "step" so that after
> > that
> > > >> try
> > > >> > to rise
> > > >> >     > from it to the seco
> > > >> >     > >  nd, and so on ... Taking into account my not young age,
> it
> > > >> seems
> > > >> > to me
> > > >> >     > that at least for me, it's time to move on from the
> discussion
> > > of
> > > >> the
> > > >> >     > method to the discussion of the subject, from the
> preparation
> > to
> > > >> > thinking,
> > > >> >     > to the thinking as such. Especially because the Method can
> not
> > > be
> > > >> > studied
> > > >> >     > before and regardless of the study of the very subject.
> > Perhaps
> > > >> this
> > > >> > seems
> > > >> >     > paradoxical, but it is a paradox only for those who are not
> > > >> familiar
> > > >> > with
> > > >> >     > the dialectic of Spinoza and Marx. Meanwhile, instead of
> > > >> discussing
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > question - what is activity, or what is the psyche - we
> > continue
> > > >> to
> > > >> > carry
> > > >> >     > water in a sieve, discussing the singular or plural of the
> > term
> > > >> > activity.
> > > >> >     > Without a doubt, this topic is very useful for translators
> > from
> > > >> > Russian (or
> > > >> >     > German) language to English, but theoretically it is not
> very
> > > >> > informative.
> > > >> >     > And besides, we are convinced that Andy Blunden completely
> > > >> exhausted
> > > >> > this
> > > >> >     > topic a few years ago. Much more interesting would be to
> > discuss
> > > >> the
> > > >> >     > question: what is the justificati
> > > >> >     > >  on to declare Vygotsky the founder of activity theory.
> > Where,
> > > >> in
> > > >> > any
> > > >> >     > > of his works, Vygotsky introduces the concept of activity,
> > not
> > > >> > just uses
> > > >> >     > the term «activity» in the theoretical contexts in which it
> is
> > > >> used
> > > >> >     > habitually by idealistic psychology. “The activity (or
> > > >> activities) of
> > > >> >     > consciousness”, “the activity (or activities) of mental
> > > >> functions”,
> > > >> > “speech
> > > >> >     > activity (or activities)”, the concrete activities of the
> > > >> > personality”- all
> > > >> >     > this has nothing to do with object-oriented activity, with
> > > Spinoza
> > > >> > and
> > > >> >     > Marx. It seems to me that our main mistake is that we are
> > > >> discussing
> > > >> > the
> > > >> >     > subtleties of understanding the categories of activity by
> > > Vygotsky
> > > >> > and
> > > >> >     > Leontyev, whereas we need something different. It is
> necessary
> > > to
> > > >> > try to
> > > >> >     > formulate OUR OWN UNDERSTANDING of the activity, proceeding
> > from
> > > >> THE
> > > >> > REAL
> > > >> >     > NEED OF THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRATIC PEDAGOGY.It is impossible
> > to
> > > >> > understand
> > > >> >     > activity based on Vygotsky's ideas, because there was no
> such
> > > >> > theoretical
> > > >> >     > category in his theoretical system of views. AN Leontiev
> > > >> introduces a
> > > >> >     > category of object-oriented a
> > > >> >     > >  ctivity into psychology, but his theory is of little use
> > for
> > > >> > solving
> > > >> >     > practical problems too, for saying “A”, Leontyev never said
> > “B”.
> > > >> > Having
> > > >> >     > proposed the principle of activity as the universal basis of
> > the
> > > >> >     > psychological theory, its germ cell AN Leontiev did not go
> > > further
> > > >> > failing
> > > >> >     > to concretize this correctly chosen abstract category.Once
> > > again,
> > > >> > from
> > > >> >     > thehobby group of lovers of Vygotsky, with his
> > > >> "Сultural-Рistorical
> > > >> >     > Psychology" and AN Leontyev with his "Psychological Theory
> of
> > > >> > Activity" we
> > > >> >     > all have to become community of researchers developing
> > > >> fundamentally
> > > >> > new
> > > >> >     > approaches to education, based on dialectical, revolutionary
> > > >> method
> > > >> > of
> > > >> >     > Marx.For the realization of this dream, it is necessary to
> > begin
> > > >> not
> > > >> > so
> > > >> >     > much - to learn to listen to each other...
> :-)Sincerely,Sasha
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > От: Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> > > >> >     > > Кому: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > >> >     > > Отправлено: пятница, 20 октября 2017 3:08
> > > >> >     > > Тема: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object oriented
> > activity
> > > >> and
> > > >> >     > communication
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > Right, Marx was himself well aware of this difference. My
> > > point
> > > >> is
> > > >> > that
> > > >> >     > we have begin to talk about “the start” of Marx’s analysis,
> > and
> > > >> > about its
> > > >> >     > “stages,” but these should not be equated with the order of
> > the
> > > >> > treatment
> > > >> >     > in Capital.
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > Martin
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > On Oct 19, 2017, at 5:40 PM, Andy Blunden <
> > ablunden@mira.net
> > > >> > <mailto:ablu
> > > >> >     > nden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.
> htm
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >   Of course the method of presentation must differ in form
> > > >> >     > >   from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the
> > > >> >     > >   material in detail, to analyse its different forms of
> > > >> >     > >   development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only
> > > >> >     > >   after this work is done, can the actual movement be
> > > >> >     > >   adequately described. If this is done successfully, if
> > > >> >     > >   the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as
> > > >> >     > >   in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a
> > > >> >     > >   mere a priori construction.
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > Andy
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > ------------------------------
> > ------------------------------
> > > >> >     > > Andy Blunden
> > > >> >     > > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
> > > >> >     > > On 20/10/2017 3:23 AM, Martin John Packer wrote:
> > > >> >     > > Seems to me that if we’re going to talk about the details
> of
> > > >> Marx’s
> > > >> >     > analysis we need to look not at Capital but at the
> Grundrisse.
> > > The
> > > >> > two have
> > > >> >     > virtually opposite organizations; it’s clear that the order
> of
> > > >> > presentation
> > > >> >     > in Capital was not the order of analysis.
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > > Martin
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     > >
> > > >> >     >
> > > >> >     >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > Assistant Professor
> > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > Assistant Professor
> > > Department of Anthropology
> > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > Brigham Young University
> > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>