[Xmca-l] Re: Philosophie des Geistes?

Mon Jul 27 18:00:16 PDT 2020

: )

On Mon, Jul 27, 2020 at 8:07 PM Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:

> Hello Beth,
>
> Thank you for putting Virginia back on my radar. She is a favorite of
> mine.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Annalisa
> ------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of Beth Ferholt <bferholt@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, July 27, 2020 5:13 PM
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Philosophie des Geistes?
>
>
> *  [EXTERNAL]*
> I have also been thinking of Pete Seger this summer!  : ) -- Beth
>
> On Mon, Jul 27, 2020 at 1:45 PM HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> You’re nailing it, Beth. Like John Henry and Pete Seger. A quiet hammer.
> Maybe every problem IS a nail? Every tool a hammer? Affordances. Just got
> to know how to swing. And it don’t mean a thing if it ain’t got that…..
> Henry
>
>
>
>
> On Jul 27, 2020, at 11:07 AM, Beth Ferholt <bferholt@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I am so glad to hear.  This is my goal for everything during this illness
> of the world.  Like flowers in a sick room, the main goal is to get to the
> other side of this ordeal, and the heavy thoughts are precious and often
> exceptionally clear at this time but the thing is to join them to beautiful
> things when we can.
>
> I'm working from a favorite essay, that I'm referring to alot lately --
> Virginia Woolf's On Being Ill -- her mom also wrote brilliantly on the
> topic, my favorite part is about crumbs on the sheets : ) .
>
> Beth
>
> On Mon, Jul 27, 2020 at 12:51 PM HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Nice, Beth! Proleptic development at any age, in any relation? A light
> touch. I have to constantly remember to have a sense of humor, a playful
> approach. I can get sooooo heavy. There has to be some laughter. Lesson
> plans, agendas can weigh things down. Sweet spot intentions have the most
> potential for development. I thought your post hit a sweet spot.
> Henry
>
>
> On Jul 27, 2020, at 12:35 AM, Beth Ferholt <bferholt@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Thank you, all in this thread.
>
> Sometimes XMCA hits right when needed!
>
> If you want to know the mind of a person raising a person, study the
> object-oriented activity of raising people.  I think that if you use a
> playworld to help shape and gain access to observing this activity, you can
> actually see that emotion, the state of the whole adult, and also
> visa-versa, meaning the state of the whole child (in some way, although
> it's not parallel), so a certain presence with the other person or
> embodiment/communication of emotion, makes possible the one becoming a
> bridge (portal) for the other and visa-versa through time, and it is this
> that is both the mind of of the adult and the development of/developing of
> the mind of the child -- proleptic development.
>
> This thread just fit right into what I was thinking about Paley's writing
> on emotions  -- I know that what I just wrote is still short, raw and hard
> to decipher -- I just wanted to share.
>
> Beth
>
> On Sun, Jul 26, 2020 at 6:15 PM Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi David W!
>
> True what you say!
>
> The concept of *conatus* likely goes back further than the Romans. My
> point was that the definitions differ over time. That is why I insisted we
> understand what Spinoza intended when he used the word.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Annalisa
> ------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of WEBSTER, DAVID S. <d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk>
> *Sent:* Sunday, July 26, 2020 3:42 PM
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Philosophie des Geistes?
>
>
> *  [EXTERNAL]*
> Going back even further than Spinoza and conatus is its origins in
> Aristotle's construction of energeia - entelecheia: between being-at-work
> [ergon] and being at-an-end [entelecheia]  or working to maintain one's
> proper identity i.e. being a human being.
> ------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> *Sent:* 26 July 2020 19:49
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Philosophie des Geistes?
>
> Hello,
>
> My pace on this conversation is clearly out of step with the others on
> this thread, as such, I shall try to catch up. Please forgive my tardiness.
> Unfortunately to make up for the short email I must add this long one.
>
> Something I had started to write became lost and now must start again.
> However as I recollect my main point had been I do not believe David has
> the proper understanding of Spinoza's concept of *conatus*.
>
> *Stage direction: And then they embarked upon an exercise of defining the
> word conatus*
>
> Conatus has its own history and development, and this is exactly why it is
> important to agree on the definition of terms, because words can be
> polysemantic, and the more nuanced the meaning, the more imperative it is
> to define the terms, if only so that people can know what you mean, but
> also if a word is mis-taken, this can change the entire argument, upon
> which the argument sits (on the word) as a conceptual foundation.
>
> I asked the sage Wikipedia about the word "conatus" and it starts back
> with the Romans, the term being Latin, of course, to signify "endeavor."
>
> However for Spinoza, this was a core concept for his worldview, and so it
> makes sense to be very precise about understanding what he meant when he
> uses the word to reflect his concept of it.
>
> It doesn't make sense for Vygotsky to reject conatus, if conatus was the
> basis for Spinoza's philosophy. This is again lifting the cream, enjoying
> it, and simultaneously refuting the cow exists.
>
> If we get the meaning of *conatus* wrong, then everything that sits upon
> its shoulders will be too. So we have to really be precise about what
> contatus means to fully appreciate Spinoza.
>
> According to Sage Wiki, Spinoza states *conatus* is an innate property
> whereby "*each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere
> in its being*" (*Ethics*, part 3, prop. 6).
>
> This has nothing to do with sociability, but pertains to matters of
> existence and being. Of course some people do not feel that they exist
> unless they reside in a social context, or even that self-preservation
> depends upon others, which has some truth, but that is not what we are
> discussing, methinks.  Existence isn't political or social
> self-preservation. It's just being in the world. Given Spinoza was
> excommunicated and reviled, this makes a lot of sense.
>
> Going down farther the page, Vico seems to use the word conatus in the way
> that you seem to use the word, David.
>
> "Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) defined *conatus* as the essence of human
> society, and also, in a more traditional, hylozoistic sense, as the
> generating power of movement which pervades all of nature."
>
>
> This word * hylozoistic* is interesting as it pertains to a living
> essence in all matter, but not of mind (which seems to be Cartesian in
> terms of a split between mind and body, even though this was pre-Cartesian
> that the word was coined). When referring to a worldview that sees mind in
> all matter, Sag Wiki says hylopsychism is the word, in a panpsychism sense.
> To me, [blank]-psychism is just anthropomorphizing "mind" and "mentality"
> upon non-human entities.
>
> The ancient Greeks, where the concept of hylozoistic derives, in saying
> there is a living essence in all matter, did not mean that there was mind
> in all matter, but they did mean there was conscious-awareness in all
> matter (Same as for the ancient Vedics). They chose to say there were
> deities within matter, which is also projecting human qualities upon the
> non-human, something we are really good at doing without thinking much
> about it.
>
> This is why it's important to distinguish consciousness from mind. Mind is
> human, in the sense
>
> consciousness human = mind.
>
>
> Consciousness is everywhere, it is not solely human. We are of it, it is
> not of us. Mind is the human flavor of consciousness, but there are other
> different forms of consciousness, and we see this in animals, and plants.
>
> Still if we can have a little more objectivity (and allow mind to rest
> with humans and allow consciousness to express itself as it is where it
> is), we also see it in the earth in a gaia sense, and in the stars and
> heavens. So David, there can be relationships between the clouds and the
> lithosphere. Like consciousness, "relationship" isn't a word reserved for
> humans.
>
> If we do not purchase a Cartesian worldview, and mind and body are one,
> then we have to sort out how we have a mind in the first place. If we are
> made of material, the same as everything else (such as water, minerals,
> etc), and we have minds, what makes us express mind the way we do? Why
> doesn't a rock have a mind as well?
>
> Yet, if we can say the rock is alive (think magma), why can't we say rock
> is conscious in that it animates and how it organizes itself in nature? It
> doesn't have mind, but it is conscious. In that sense every rock on the
> earth is like a leaf dropped from the tree. The lithosphere is like the
> bark of the tree. It's all motion outside and beyond us, whether we are
> present or not.
>
> If instead we say only humans are conscious, then where is the line
> between us and everything else that "isn't conscious?" You can't say
> language divides us, because animals have language, as do insects and
> reptiles, even if it may not be vocal or sound-based, it can be pheromones,
> it still communicates and it does so intelligently (if we can allow the
> word intelligent to be used in a non-human sense, as in the way "artificial
> intelligence" is used). Just because we can't understand a language doesn't
> mean it isn't a language. There could be languages that just do not express
> themselves as we express our language vocal or written.
>
> We are too human-centric in our worldview. We see humans commit this sin
> over and over again (even to each other). We have a tendency to make
> ourselves the center of the universe and discount everything else.
>
> Once we can start to accept consciousness being pervasive in the universe,
> then we can start to understand ourselves much better and our place in the
> universe, as well as see we are quite small in a much larger entity from
> which we spring.
>
> So you are right David that Spinoza is not writing about an upkeep of a
> machine. He is talking about motivations and intentions that spring from
> within that are not mental per se. In the same wikipage, Bidney likens
> *conatus* to desire, but even Spinoza was explicit to distinguish conatus
> from desire and from affect:
>
> "Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is
> generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of the appetite. So
> desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the
> appetite." (Scholium of IIIP9 of the *Ethics*)
>
> Let's think on that.
>
> appetite = desire
>
>
> however the equation might be better put this way:
>
> desire = appetite x awarenesshuman
>
>
> Conatus generates appetite. Conatus in all its expression derives from
> non-human awareness and the drive of life/existence. The conundrum is in a
> sense it is turtles all the way down.
>
> appetite = conatus x awarenessnon-human
>
>
> where
>
> conatus = drive x awarenessnon-human
>
>
> indeed
>
> anything = anything x awarenessnon-human
>
>
> because awareness/consciousness pervades all.
>
> What is beautiful about *conatus* as a concept is that it provides a
> basis, instead of getting bogged down with turtles.
>
> It is analogous to the story of the king with three sons. The king had 17
> elephants and said upon his death the oldest son would get one half of the
> number of elephants, the second son would get a third, and the youngest
> would get a ninth. When the king died, the sons did not know how to divide
> from the number 17. So they pressed a sage to help them. The sage, glad to
> be of assistance, explained they could add his own white elephant to the
> number to make the division easier. In doing this, the eldest was provided
> 9 elephants (one-half of 18), the middle was given 6 (one-third of 18) and
> the youngest 2 (one-ninth of 18). This left the white elephant remaining,
> which of course belonged to the wise man, to which he asked for its return.
>
> And everyone was happy.
>
> That is why Vygotsky could object, I suppose, if he did object. Because,
> it seems slight of hand and unscientific. But there is everywhere in
> reality a variety illusions and appearances as such, that we have to accept
> them as they are without getting into why they appear as they do.
>
> Like the setting sun, which in reality never sets.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Annalisa
> ------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, July 23, 2020 3:46 PM
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Philosophie des Geistes?
>
>
> *  [EXTERNAL]*
> Thanks for that point, and even for its uncharacteristic succinctness,
> Annalisa. I should emulate it, but I as you can see I am not doing so
> because of Jakobson's conative function of language (what Halliday calls
> the interpersonal meta-function).
>
> Vygotsky starts out by noticing that Lange (but not James) make an
> explicit appeal to Spinoza, on precisely this point: fight-or-flight
> reactions are essentially preservative in purpose, and the changes in the
> vasomotor system he puts at the root of all human feeling are therefore
> examples of what Spinoza calls conatus. Vygotsky rejects this. Spinoza is
> not writing about the upkeep of a machine: that's a Cartesian schtick. The
> Ethics is not Zen and the art of bipedal maintenance.
>
> Spinoza's conatus is more like our sociability, the sense of togetherness
> that humans try to maintain in almost all their interactions. Yes,
> sociability is instinctive, but it's not just instinctive, is it? The
> conative functions of language (the functions which allow us to exchange
> goods and services and to share information) are something we all learn the
> hard way, something we have to create anew with every communicative act,
> and even, to a very large extent, something that was anathema to old
> Spinoza--free will.
>
> David Kellogg
> Sangmyung University
>
> New Article: Ruqaiya Hasan, in memoriam: A manual and a manifesto.
> Outlines, Spring 2020
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2tAxv5Kw$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!SzPofQ6h21mdc6sSygodTQ2e4fCNsswBfkbVWtM7vNQCtLwz2k9zMc7-H4BHI46v2mfisQ$>
> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov: *L.S. Vygotsky's Pedological Works* *
> Volume One: Foundations of Pedology*"
>  https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2RX_Z6wA$ 
>
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!SzPofQ6h21mdc6sSygodTQ2e4fCNsswBfkbVWtM7vNQCtLwz2k9zMc7-H4BHI45TUmJtBg$>
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 24, 2020 at 6:29 AM Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>
> David,
>
> But what of * conatus*? Isn't that something innate within all beings?
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Annalisa
>
> P.S. This is likely the shortest post I've made in some lifetimes on this
> list. 🙂
> ------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, July 23, 2020 3:01 PM
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Philosophie des Geistes?
>
>
> *  [EXTERNAL]*
> Well, it's not me turning it around, of course. The James-Lange theory is
> what it is: you perceive something, your viscera or vasomotor muscles
> respond, and the emotion is the feeling of that happening to you. Lange, at
> any rate, seems to be thinking of the male sexual response.
>
> I think that's why Dewey says that Hegel's anticipation of the theory is
> crude. Vygotsky wouldn't (and doesn't) agree that an emotion is
> "expressed". An emotion is not a mental state of affairs expressed in
> physiological changes in the viscera/vasomotor muscles or contrariwise a
> change in the visceral/vascular state of affairs expressed in a mental one.
> (For that very reason, I think that Vygotsky wouldn't agree with Andy's
> waving analogy....)
>
> Spinoza uses the term "affect" or "affection" instead. It means more or
> less what it sounds like: the way in which a body is affected by the
> environment and vice versa. This can either increase or decrease the
> potential for a body for activity. The problem is that in order to make
> this a theory of specifically human emotions, this activity has to include
> the "activity" of making meanings, and Spinoza can't seem to address THAT
> issue without slipping into psycho-physical parallelism. (Halliday can,
> though....)
> :
> David Kellogg
> Sangmyung University
>
> New Article: Ruqaiya Hasan, in memoriam: A manual and a manifesto.
> Outlines, Spring 2020
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2tAxv5Kw$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!QLEoxL29F3RatvgkaIG1vsUhEgaWkdE-vCDs0vMv8gD5JVN33eCV8_ZTlPUZ5zPbYeeQHQ$>
> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov: *L.S. Vygotsky's Pedological Works* *
> Volume One: Foundations of Pedology*"
>  https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2RX_Z6wA$ 
>
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!QLEoxL29F3RatvgkaIG1vsUhEgaWkdE-vCDs0vMv8gD5JVN33eCV8_ZTlPUZ5zOCrzEKFA$>
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 23, 2020 at 8:19 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>
> No, don't turn it around. The point is that organs are subordinate parts
> of the whole organism. The emotion *is* the state of a whole organism, in
> particular, a mental state. Like a hand expresses a feeling when we wave to
> someone.
>
> andy
> ------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Hegel for Social Movements
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://brill.com/view/title/54574__;!!Mih3wA!W1x0zBm8fkXksY2M64OKgpNL_TPx1e8eTQyWJEtxUBueZNW1leqHSuR9yBEWIW_pdhtxwg$>
> Home Page
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm__;!!Mih3wA!W1x0zBm8fkXksY2M64OKgpNL_TPx1e8eTQyWJEtxUBueZNW1leqHSuR9yBEWIW9bL-5LGQ$>
> On 23/07/2020 8:55 pm, David Kellogg wrote:
>
> Thanks, Andy--this is it!
>
> "In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts
> subservient to the animal organism; but they form at the same time a
> physical system for the expression of mental states, and in this way they
> get quite another interpretation."
>
> The only problem is the word "expression". In the James-Lange theory, the
> mental states are the expression of the viscera and the organs. But perhaps
> that's what Hegel really means here: the viscera and organs are a system
> that expresses a state which we interpret as an emotion.
>
> (I remember a dear friend of mine getting a messy divorce and remarking,
> when I worried that he was losing a lot of weight, that it wasn't his heart
> that was broken but his stomach....)
>
>
> David Kellogg
> Sangmyung University
>
> New Article: Ruqaiya Hasan, in memoriam: A manual and a manifesto.
> Outlines, Spring 2020
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2tAxv5Kw$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!TttD-npmriYNiq_GkGHggjRPJwdnhAwRmpOFFclfTRlXC2fTkBviD-tAkaQPh-R8158beQ$>
> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov: *L.S. Vygotsky's Pedological Works* *
> Volume One: Foundations of Pedology*"
>  https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2RX_Z6wA$ 
>
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!TttD-npmriYNiq_GkGHggjRPJwdnhAwRmpOFFclfTRlXC2fTkBviD-tAkaQPh-Q7yWc-iw$>
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 23, 2020 at 5:19 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>
> If you're interested in s. 401, then you'll probably be interested in 402
> as well.
>
> One other possibility: The "official" way of citing Hegel nowadays is to
> cite the page no. in the authoritative version of *Hegel Werke*. The
> German word for "page" is *Seite*, so you would say "S. 401" of the *Enc*,
> This turns out also to be an interesting passage of the Subjective Spirit,
> on Self-consciousness, concerned with the infamous Master-Slave dialectic,
> though in a much reduced form, not like in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.
>
> See p. 401 in the other attachment, ENZYKl3.PDF, in German. English
> translation is here:
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suconsci.htm*SU428__;Iw!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp3TcWuFwQ$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suconsci.htm*SU428__;Iw!!Mih3wA!V5yS3WiqsE4SSOtcY1SJElXpnzzhFH035NnO1lZ49z3QJYH4kQO68Wccu2Y86C642xXiTQ$>
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Hegel for Social Movements
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://brill.com/view/title/54574__;!!Mih3wA!V5yS3WiqsE4SSOtcY1SJElXpnzzhFH035NnO1lZ49z3QJYH4kQO68Wccu2Y86C4MltIy3g$>
> Home Page
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm__;!!Mih3wA!V5yS3WiqsE4SSOtcY1SJElXpnzzhFH035NnO1lZ49z3QJYH4kQO68Wccu2Y86C7AtYM8hA$>
> On 23/07/2020 5:47 pm, Andy Blunden wrote:
>
> The Philosophy of Spirit is the Third Part of the Encyclopaedia, itself
> composed of three parts:
>
>    - Subjective Spirit, which is commonly taken as Psychology
>    - Objective Spirit, which is commonly taken as Social Theory, and
>    - Absolute Spirit, which covers Art, religion, Science and Philosophy.
>
> The Encyclopaedia has numbered paragraphs. These do vary between 2 or
> editions, but these will be limited probably by those translated into
> English,
>
> I would start with the 1930 version"
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/susoul.htm*SU401__;Iw!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2gOWG5iQ$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/susoul.htm*SU401__;Iw!!Mih3wA!UcUFXSCRfRh-5aW0-7m25WJ_9mWTvjd1a6nOCEuF7RAbpt35sEPbx38XfvY3Rj0va8zujw$>
> - a very early stage in the development of mental life, or.
>
> The 1817 version has
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/sspirit.htm*SS399__;Iw!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp0OmJUmzg$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/sspirit.htm*SS399__;Iw!!Mih3wA!UcUFXSCRfRh-5aW0-7m25WJ_9mWTvjd1a6nOCEuF7RAbpt35sEPbx38XfvY3Rj24gIDBAA$>
> - this version puts s. 401 at the beginning of a version of Objective
> Spirit.
> The 1830 one, above, has a long Note to it written by his students on the
> basis of Hegel's lectures which is a long discourse on the development of
> thinking from sensation. I am thinking this is what you mean. I will
> photocopy it and send it on.
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Hegel for Social Movements
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://brill.com/view/title/54574__;!!Mih3wA!UcUFXSCRfRh-5aW0-7m25WJ_9mWTvjd1a6nOCEuF7RAbpt35sEPbx38XfvY3Rj2Rs_DLCQ$>
> Home Page
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm__;!!Mih3wA!UcUFXSCRfRh-5aW0-7m25WJ_9mWTvjd1a6nOCEuF7RAbpt35sEPbx38XfvY3Rj0L0JHIrA$>
> On 23/07/2020 5:09 pm, David Kellogg wrote:
>
> We are trying to turn Vygotsky's "Teaching on Emotion" into one of those
> cartoon books that are so popular here in Korea (e.g. the "Why?" series).
> It's not Vygotsky for dummies, but it will have a lot of pictures with
> questions and answers alongside Vygotsky's rather difficult text.
>
> We've got to figure out the text first. For example, what does John Dewey
> mean when he says:
>
> "On the historical side, it may be worth noting that a crude anticipation
> of James' theory is found in Hegel's Philosophie des Geistes, 401."?
>
> Did Hegel ever write a Philosophie des Geistes? If so, does the number
> refer to a page number or a section or what?
>
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Dewey/Dewey_1895.html__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2VqjfQ5g$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Dewey/Dewey_1895.html__;!!Mih3wA!RLGVUv48gomTR2KJ99jcR-ruYcur4TKLR3u-7WeR_HhShIfYJpHP0U7EwICkluTj4uvZOA$>
> David Kellogg
> Sangmyung University
>
> New Article: Ruqaiya Hasan, in memoriam: A manual and a manifesto.
> Outlines, Spring 2020
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2tAxv5Kw$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!RLGVUv48gomTR2KJ99jcR-ruYcur4TKLR3u-7WeR_HhShIfYJpHP0U7EwICkluSzhBnr9w$>
> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov: *L.S. Vygotsky's Pedological Works* *
> Volume One: Foundations of Pedology*"
>  https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2RX_Z6wA$ 
>
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!RLGVUv48gomTR2KJ99jcR-ruYcur4TKLR3u-7WeR_HhShIfYJpHP0U7EwICkluRBlvE9VA$>
>
>
>
> --
> Beth Ferholt (pronouns: she/her/hers)
> Associate Professor
> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education
> Brooklyn College, City University of New York
>
> Affiliated Faculty, Program in Urban Education, CUNY Graduate Center
> Affiliated Faculty, School of Education and Communication, Jönköping
> University
>
> Cultural Praxis Website: https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2qX_Aa-g$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net/__;!!Mih3wA!W_9CO7P482asAhgvThGe5z2ZAGH-vtBVme7iACfT4CkbofAVKeYpXeW66KJultd2hetCOQ$>
> Re-generating CHAT Website: re-generatingchat.com
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://re-generatingchat.com/__;!!Mih3wA!W_9CO7P482asAhgvThGe5z2ZAGH-vtBVme7iACfT4CkbofAVKeYpXeW66KJultdNL80lUA$>
> Narrative history of LCHC: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu
>
> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu
> CC bferholt@gmail.com if writing to CUNY address.
> Phone: (718) 951-5205
> Office: 2306 James Hall
> 2900 Bedford Avenue
> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889
>
>
>
>
> --
> Beth Ferholt (pronouns: she/her/hers)
> Associate Professor
> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education
> Brooklyn College, City University of New York
>
> Affiliated Faculty, Program in Urban Education, CUNY Graduate Center
> Affiliated Faculty, School of Education and Communication, Jönköping
> University
>
> Cultural Praxis Website: https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2qX_Aa-g$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net/__;!!Mih3wA!Xxq0NKn9awiKBT9y_z4T4ukZIYN7_xFrmEewMEYY8zIC5gI5WeAP-Ib0tQU4jy9KZqCDwA$>
> Re-generating CHAT Website: re-generatingchat.com
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://re-generatingchat.com/__;!!Mih3wA!Xxq0NKn9awiKBT9y_z4T4ukZIYN7_xFrmEewMEYY8zIC5gI5WeAP-Ib0tQU4jy_oGU5How$>
> Narrative history of LCHC: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu
>
> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu
> CC bferholt@gmail.com if writing to CUNY address.
> Phone: (718) 951-5205
> Office: 2306 James Hall
> 2900 Bedford Avenue
> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889
>
>
>
>
> --
> Beth Ferholt (pronouns: she/her/hers)
> Associate Professor
> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education
> Brooklyn College, City University of New York
>
> Affiliated Faculty, Program in Urban Education, CUNY Graduate Center
> Affiliated Faculty, School of Education and Communication, Jönköping
> University
>
> Cultural Praxis Website: https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2qX_Aa-g$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net/__;!!Mih3wA!UQV-6fmj6_7Sju6joBxHLDQSzVeNU5wZkf2XzhNBSA-N9eA-0kLlS-fUldt7CqmCdBDW_A$>
> Re-generating CHAT Website: re-generatingchat.com
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://re-generatingchat.com/__;!!Mih3wA!UQV-6fmj6_7Sju6joBxHLDQSzVeNU5wZkf2XzhNBSA-N9eA-0kLlS-fUldt7CqkPaeHLUQ$>
> Narrative history of LCHC: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu
>
> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu
> CC bferholt@gmail.com if writing to CUNY address.
> Phone: (718) 951-5205
> Office: 2306 James Hall
> 2900 Bedford Avenue
> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889
>
>

-- 
Beth Ferholt (pronouns: she/her/hers)
Associate Professor
Department of Early Childhood and Art Education
Brooklyn College, City University of New York

Affiliated Faculty, Program in Urban Education, CUNY Graduate Center
Affiliated Faculty, School of Education and Communication, Jönköping
University

Cultural Praxis Website: https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!RnwvhqA7GLKH0KzlxI8fLctJBC3wzvP-kVKYlY0Ff2UjNN4n4HzXuulQWaNnMp2qX_Aa-g$ 
Re-generating CHAT Website: re-generatingchat.com
Narrative history of LCHC: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu

Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu
CC bferholt@gmail.com if writing to CUNY address.
Phone: (718) 951-5205
Office: 2306 James Hall
2900 Bedford Avenue
Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889
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