[Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a Participation Question)
Andy Blunden
andyb@marxists.org
Wed Aug 19 19:35:51 PDT 2020
Ha, ha. Well done, Martin. That passage in "Crisis" is truly
one of my favourite passages as well. And I had remembered
it as being about a candle, too! Funny that.
It's all in the expressions like "an appearance, not
something that really exists," isn't it? As Lenin said:
"There is no sharp line between the thing-in-itself and
phenomena."
The other bit which I like to join with that quote from
"Crisis" is that bit at the end of his famous 1924 talk:
"The historian and the geologist reconstruct the facts
(which already do not exist) indirectly, and
nevertheless in the end/they study the facts that have
been,/not the traces or documents that remained and were
preserved. Similarly, the psychologist is often in the
position of the historian and the geologist. Then he
acts like a detective who brings to light a crime he
never witnessed."
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Hegel for Social Movements <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://brill.com/view/title/54574__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjyynAMJvA$ >
Home Page <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjyxcCD2Cg$ >
On 20/08/2020 5:55 am, Martin Packer wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> Going back to look at /The historical meaning of the
> crisis in psychology /I see that LVS’s example involves a
> table not a candle, so I’ll modify my reply to your
> question accordingly:
>
> The behaviorist studies the table, ignores the mirror, and
> insists that the study of reflections is unscientific.
> The neuroscientist studies the table and is aware of the
> mirror, but is unable to explain how the mirror exists.
> The typical cognitive psychologist studies the table's
> reflection and ignores both the mirror and the real table.
> LSV insists that we need to study the real table and the
> mirror and study too the reflection of the table,
> understanding that it is an appearance, not something that
> really exists.
>
> To put those statements in context, here is the passage...
>
> Let us compare consciousness, as is often done, with a
> mirror image. Let the object A be reflected in the mirror
> as a. Naturally, it would be false to say that a in itself
> is as real as A. It is real in another way. A table and
> its reflection in the mirror are not equally real, but
> real in a different way. The reflection as reflection, as
> an image of the table, as a second table in the mirror is
> not real, it is a phantom. But the reflection of the table
> as the refraction of light beams on the mirror sur-
> face-isn't that a thing which is equally material and real
> as the table? Everything else would be a miracle. Then we
> might say: there exist things (a table) and their phantoms
> (the reflection). But only things exist-(the table) and
> the reflection of light upon the surface. The phantoms are
> just apparent relations between the things. That is why no
> science of mirror phantoms is possible. But this does not
> mean that we will never be able to explain the reflection,
> the phantom. When we know the thing and the laws of
> reflection of light, we can always explain, predict,
> elicit, and change the phantom. And this is what persons
> with mirrors do. They study not mirror reflections but the
> movement of light beams, and explain. the reflection. A
> science about mirror phantoms is impossible, but the
> theory of light and the things which cast and reflect it
> fully explain these "phantoms."
>
> It is the same in psychology: the subjective itself, as a
> phantom, must be un- derstood as a consequence, as a
> result, as a godsend of two objective processes. Like the
> enigma of the'mirror, the enigma of the mind is not solved
> by studying phantoms, but by studying the two series of
> objective processes from the coopera- tion of which the
> phantoms as apparent reflections of one thing in tire
> otlrer arise. In itself the appearance does not exist.
>
> Let us return to the mirror. To identify A and a, the
> table and its mirror re- flection, would be idealism: a is
> nonmaterial, it is only A which is material and its
> material nature is a synonym for its existence independent
> of a. But it would be exactly the same idealism to
> identify a with X-with the processes that take placein the
> mirror. It would be wrong to say: being and thinking do
> not coincide outside the mirror, in nature (there A is not
> a, there A is a thing and a a phantom); being and
> thinking, however, do coincide inside the mirror (here a
> is X, a is a phantom and X is also a phantom). We cannot
> say: the reflection of a table is a table. But neither can
> we say: the reflection of a table is the refraction of
> light beams and a is neither A nor X. Both A and X are
> real processes and a is their apparent, i.e., unreal
> result. The reflection does not exist, but both the table
> and the light exist. The reflection of a table is
> identical neither with the real processes of the light in
> the mirror nor with the table itself.
>
> Not to mention the fact that otherwise we would have to
> accept the existence in the world of both things and
> phantoms. Let us remember that the mirror itself is, after
> all, part of the same nature as the thing outside the
> mirror, and subject to all of its laws. After aB, a
> cornerstone of materialism is the proposition that con·
> sciousness and the brain are a product, a part of nature,
> which reflect the rest of nature. And, therefore, the
> objective existence of X and A independent of a is a dogma
> of materialistic psychology. (pp. 327-328)
>
> Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). The historical meaning of the
> crisis in psychology: A methodological investigation. In
> R. W. Reiber & J. Wollock (Eds.), /The collected works of
> L. S. Vygotsky: Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history
> of psychology/ (pp. 233-343). New York, NY: Plenum.
>
> Martin
>
>
>
>> On Aug 18, 2020, at 9:13 PM, Andy Blunden
>> <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>
>> Martin, how would you respond to a Behaviourist or a
>> "brain scientist" who responded to what you have just
>> said by saying: "At last you agree with me! Mind does not
>> exist! It is an illusion!"?
>>
>> andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> Hegel for Social Movements
>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://brill.com/view/title/54574__;!!Mih3wA!R53F7Q9dcfsf21mBbSTgVC6YexgI8_72x0cMqLYMWUp85LCvtsnoQuEedW_4rYxASIfGVw$>
>> Home Page
>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm__;!!Mih3wA!R53F7Q9dcfsf21mBbSTgVC6YexgI8_72x0cMqLYMWUp85LCvtsnoQuEedW_4rYyxVPFOdA$>
>>
>> On 19/08/2020 11:45 am, Martin Packer wrote:
>>> Hi David,
>>>
>>> I can’t quite tell from your message whether "Mind is
>>> the Body's Idea of Itself” comes from Vygotsky or from
>>> 17th century Dutch painting, but I love it! I’ve been
>>> working unsuccessfully for years trying to convince
>>> psychologists that trying to study ‘mind’ is a fruitless
>>> endeavor.
>>>
>>> But the statement must be Vygotsky's because it is so
>>> consistent with his metaphor in Crisis: to believe that
>>> mind exists and can be studied is like thinking the
>>> reflection of a candle in a mirror is a second real
>>> candle, and trying to study it while paying no attention
>>> to either the mirror or the real candle.
>>>
>>> Sorry not to have been paying attention: which text is
>>> this from?
>>>
>>> Martin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Aug 18, 2020, at 5:46 PM, David Kellogg
>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Dear Henry:
>>>>
>>>> As far as I know, there are many different schools of
>>>> Kabuki, including a 'social realist' one and a much
>>>> more stylized one. But like Stanislavsky's method, all
>>>> of them are "depth" approaches which seek out inner
>>>> truth by deep-diving into something called 'character'.
>>>> For me, Noh is a much more "heights" approach, and like
>>>> Brecht it involves holding character at a distance and
>>>> trying to form overall judgements about it rather than
>>>> getting lost in the details of a personality. There is
>>>> a similar tension in Chinese opera, between Shanghai
>>>> Opera (deep-diving) and Beijing (stylized). I'm not
>>>> sure I could call that a grammar; it looks more like
>>>> granularity on stage (consider, for example, the use of
>>>> make-up, the importance of costume, and place of
>>>> recitative).
>>>>
>>>> Michael probably knows more than I do about
>>>> Stanislavsky. But when you are in a conversation and
>>>> somebody says something like "You've completely lost
>>>> me", there are three possibilities. One is just
>>>> interpersonal--I'm not very interested in what you are
>>>> saying and I've got other things to do. Another
>>>> possibility is more ideational--I can't follow what you
>>>> are saying--maybe because of the lexicogrammar you use
>>>> or because of the unfamiliar ideas you have--and I need
>>>> some other way of understanding it, like a familiar
>>>> example or a story. A third is textual: I am interested
>>>> in what you say and I recognize the setting and the
>>>> characters you are referring to, but I can't really get
>>>> my arms around the interpretative frame. Usually the
>>>> problems I have communicating are of the textual
>>>> type--not always, but more often than not.
>>>>
>>>> We're having a similar problem with our new book, which
>>>> is about the emotions: Vygotsky has left us a fragment,
>>>> and it's long, circuitous and assumes a very thorough
>>>> knowledge of seventeenth century philosophy. So we want
>>>> to turn it into a kind of comic book, using seventeenth
>>>> century Dutch paintings, which include a lot of the
>>>> ideas that I think are most troublesome (e.g. "Deus
>>>> Sive Natura", "Mind is the Body's Idea of Itself",
>>>> "Freedom is an illusion, but recognition of necessity
>>>> is real"). That format in itself can create an
>>>> interpretive frame that people have trouble with (can I
>>>> take this seriously--it's a comic book!). I was looking
>>>> forward to mansplaining in a face to face meeting with
>>>> our readers this Saturday, but that's now been
>>>> cancelled because of the spike we are having in Seoul
>>>> (like our first one, incubated by a religious sect
>>>> owing fealty to the remnants of the former military
>>>> dictatorship and to Donald Trump).
>>>>
>>>> If you compare Cognitive Grammar to Systemic-Functional
>>>> Grammar, you'll notice three differences right away.
>>>>
>>>> a) Cognitive Grammar assumes a COGNITIVE semantics.
>>>> Systemic-Functional Grammar treats 'cognitive
>>>> processes' as a black box and studies visible
>>>> social-semiotic processes instead.
>>>> b) Cognitive Grammar has, as you say, TWO strata--form
>>>> and meaning. Systemic-Functional grammar has three, and
>>>> allows for coupling all three in different ways,
>>>> because a two stratal model, particularly one that
>>>> emphasizes fixed units of redounding elements, is
>>>> essentially replicative and cannot account for development.
>>>> c) Cognitive Grammar is, as we have said before,
>>>> speculative. Systemic-Functional Grammar depends on a
>>>> dialectic of research into empirical facts in many
>>>> languages and theoretical generalizations, all of which
>>>> (to date, anyway) avoid universalization.
>>>>
>>>> I remember asking Ruqaiya Hasan about Langacker and
>>>> cognitive grammar. She told me that when they were in
>>>> Singapore together, Langacker complained that his
>>>> cognitive grammar was being largely ignored. "And what
>>>> about Halliday?" Ruqaiya asked. Fortunately, MCA is NOT
>>>> ignoring Halliday! (See link below!)
>>>>
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Sangmyung University
>>>>
>>>> New article in Mind, Culture, and Activity:
>>>> Realizations: non-causal but real relationships in and
>>>> between Halliday, Hasan, and Vygotsky
>>>>
>>>> Some free e-prints today available at:
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Y8YHS3SRW42VXPTVY2Z6/full?target=10.1080*10749039.2020.1806329__;Lw!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjzZNlQV6A$
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Y8YHS3SRW42VXPTVY2Z6/full?target=10.1080*10749039.2020.1806329__;Lw!!Mih3wA!WzhE4UmkZC17BnEoGQS1fRQ5ws_X1EarH5Yqn8YDscsZhL7pAkoHazqpRwBbKJIMxdHi6w$>
>>>>
>>>> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov: L.S. Vygotsky's
>>>> Pedological Works Volume One: Foundations of Pedology"
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjwWT3VQoQ$
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!WzhE4UmkZC17BnEoGQS1fRQ5ws_X1EarH5Yqn8YDscsZhL7pAkoHazqpRwBbKJIh1AzN2g$>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 10:21 AM HENRY SHONERD
>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> David,
>>>> I am guessing that your apochyphal story and
>>>> analysis has something to do with how languaging
>>>> works. Langacker--a proponent of what he calls
>>>> Cognitive Grammar,--asserts that a/grammar/, is a
>>>> structured inventory of conventional linguistic
>>>> units, a linguistic unit being a symbolic coupling
>>>> of form and meaning for linguistic purposes. I find
>>>> that definition useful. How does that relate, if at
>>>> all, to what you have been trying to explain to
>>>> Michael G?
>>>>
>>>> And yes, believe it or not,I was wondering about
>>>> Noh theater. To be honest, what I saw could have
>>>> been Noh, but I am pretty sure my parents told me
>>>> it was Kabuki. I can’t ask them now, but I think
>>>> they would have remembered when they were living.
>>>> So back to my question in the first paragraph: Do
>>>> Kabuki/Stanislavsky and/or Noh/Brecht draw on any
>>>> theatrical grammar? Keeping in mind that any
>>>> grammar in theater would have to draw massively on
>>>> gesture, in ways that written language would not.
>>>> And gesture may have its own grammar.
>>>>
>>>> I should add that Langacker recognizes that
>>>> grammars are built through use and are as much in
>>>> the context of language usage as in the head(s) of
>>>> the user(s). Though he also recognizes that
>>>> Cognitive Grammar is short on the analysis of real
>>>> language in context. This is an old conversation I
>>>> have had with you, but it seems relevant here. I am
>>>> thinking now about improvisation, which we assume
>>>> is mostly true of “natural” language use, though
>>>> Langacker argues that much language use is based on
>>>> the use of common phrases, rather than being very
>>>> “creative", like my first phrase in the first
>>>> paragraph of this post: “I am guessing…” and
>>>> “believe it or not” that starts the second
>>>> paragraph, and the “I should add” that starts this
>>>> paragraph. These are all over-learned linguistic units
>>>>
>>>> I think what I am getting to is the distinction
>>>> between grammar and discourse, how they bleed into
>>>> one another and how every use of language is in
>>>> some sense staged.
>>>>
>>>> Henry
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Aug 17, 2020, at 5:51 PM, David Kellogg
>>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> There is a completely apocryphal story in China
>>>>> about Stanislavsky and Brecht. They are both
>>>>> visiting a liberated area in my wife's home
>>>>> province of Shaanxi. There is a village production
>>>>> of the White Haired Girl, in which the heroine is
>>>>> raped by the landlord's son, Huang Shiren. To
>>>>> prevent the rape, a peasant in the audience draws
>>>>> a pistol and shoots the actor through the heart.
>>>>> Since the whole village has been reading
>>>>> Chairman's Mao's essay on the necessity of holding
>>>>> funerals for martyrs, "In Memory of Dr. Norman
>>>>> Bethune", there is a funeral the next day.
>>>>> Stanislavskky presents a wreath of white
>>>>> carnations with the legend, "To the greatest actor
>>>>> in China, a martyr to his art". Brecht's envoy
>>>>> reads "To the worst actor in the world, on a
>>>>> particularly bad night."
>>>>>
>>>>> Isaiah Berlin argued that romanticism was a great
>>>>> shift from enlightenment rationalism: for the
>>>>> romantic, it doesn't matter what you believe so
>>>>> long as you sincerely believe it (this is why
>>>>> German romanticism produced both communists and
>>>>> fascists). For the romantic actor, it doesn't
>>>>> matter what you feel so long as the feeling is
>>>>> deeply felt. The anti-romantic view--and Brecht
>>>>> was an anti-romantic--is that it doesn't matter
>>>>> whether you deeply feel the feeling or not; the
>>>>> only thing that matters is what people learn from
>>>>> it and whether it will help or harm them.
>>>>>
>>>>> Why do we despise or pity a teacher or a politican
>>>>> who is merely a showman? Because a communication
>>>>> that fails to communicate an idea, or which
>>>>> communicates only the pulchritude of the
>>>>> communcator, is simply off topic. If Anthony takes
>>>>> away from my video "Spinoza, Chess, and Other
>>>>> Magic Gateways" only the story about the Danish
>>>>> chess grandmaster in Beijing, I have done nothing
>>>>> but entertain or enthrall him.So for example if
>>>>> you read the little story about Brecht and
>>>>> Stanislavsky as a biographical account, or a
>>>>> colorful anecdote that has nothing to do with my
>>>>> argument, I have failed as a communicator (Alas, I
>>>>> often do!).
>>>>>
>>>>> A good friend of mine is a well-known novelist in
>>>>> the USA. She told me once that she became a
>>>>> novelist because she learned that words can not
>>>>> only report an experience but reproduce it. I must
>>>>> have wrinkled my nose at that, because we got off
>>>>> into a discussion on whether inner speech can
>>>>> actually be written down or not (which is
>>>>> essentially the point that divides Woolf and
>>>>> Joyce). As a novelist, she said it could; as a
>>>>> linguist, I said it couldn't.
>>>>>
>>>>> If we take Stanislavsky's annotated scripts
>>>>> literally, then the emotional subtext attributed
>>>>> to Chatskii and Sophia are a kind of mentalese:
>>>>> their external language is simply an editing or a
>>>>> translation of the inner subtext. But that's not
>>>>> what verbal thinking is at all; it is entirely
>>>>> predicative, and incomprehensible without its
>>>>> internal context.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Henry--compare Kabuki with Noh. Kabuki is
>>>>> Stanislavsky. Noh is Brecht.)
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Sangmyung University
>>>>>
>>>>> New article in Mind, Culture, and Activity:
>>>>> Realizations: non-causal but real relationships in
>>>>> and between Halliday, Hasan, and Vygotsky
>>>>>
>>>>> Some free e-prints today available at:
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Y8YHS3SRW42VXPTVY2Z6/full?target=10.1080*10749039.2020.1806329__;Lw!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjzZNlQV6A$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Y8YHS3SRW42VXPTVY2Z6/full?target=10.1080*10749039.2020.1806329__;Lw!!Mih3wA!XgGKXuGHbf-4OH_o5GvbFeTXs47ccHePHKYFG8MHBzAxxDUiIJk2_bjxgY7zjfrVE7ftQA$>
>>>>>
>>>>> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov: L.S.
>>>>> Vygotsky's Pedological Works Volume One:
>>>>> Foundations of Pedology"
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjwWT3VQoQ$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!XgGKXuGHbf-4OH_o5GvbFeTXs47ccHePHKYFG8MHBzAxxDUiIJk2_bjxgY7zjfo9s_ZqtA$>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 8:28 AM Glassman, Michael
>>>>> <glassman.13@osu.edu <mailto:glassman.13@osu.edu>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> David,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You completely lost me.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> *On
>>>>> Behalf Of *David Kellogg
>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 17, 2020 6:44 PM
>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness
>>>>> enters through the gate" (a Participation
>>>>> Question)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think we all tend to read our current
>>>>> opinions into our Vygotsky, Michael. The only
>>>>> real advantage I claim for my own reading of
>>>>> "The Psychology of the Actor's Creative Work"
>>>>> is that it is unpopular, eccentric,
>>>>> counter-conventional, or at least stridently
>>>>> anti-romantic, and it will serve as a tonic or
>>>>> at least a foil for people on this list.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So this is a late work, if we are to believe
>>>>> the textological note. It belongs to the
>>>>> period Vygotsky is writing "Teaching on the
>>>>> Emotions", where he uses the actor's paradox
>>>>> as evidence against Lange and James (1999:
>>>>> 117) and where he seems to be developing a
>>>>> theory of higher emotions consistent with
>>>>> Spinoza's distinction between emotions that
>>>>> are passions (caused by the environment) and
>>>>> those which are active (self-caused), by which
>>>>> he means caused by understanding and knowledge
>>>>> (and not by acts of recall and imitation).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Vygotsky counterposes Stanislavsky's system to
>>>>> the system of psychotechnical selection
>>>>> ('talent-scouting, acting-aptitude tests, your
>>>>> comparison with Ribot is one that Vygotsky
>>>>> himself makes, and it is very a propos). He
>>>>> seems to wish a plague upon both, because both
>>>>> conflate the actor's own emotions with the
>>>>> shareable, social emotions that actors have to
>>>>> build on stage. You are of course right that
>>>>> this is what gives that emotion a conditional,
>>>>> historically specific, and even class specific
>>>>> character--and you are right that
>>>>> Stanislavsky, but not Craig, was convinced of
>>>>> this, even if Stanislavsky developed a
>>>>> technique that eventually ran directly counter
>>>>> to it (the excesses of "method" acting in
>>>>> Hollywood).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I prefer to think of art as a special social
>>>>> technique of sharing ideas--similar to
>>>>> academic discourse--and not a form of
>>>>> self-deception. But I'll admit that this is
>>>>> the direct result of my own artistic training:
>>>>> we don't try to reproduce what we see when we
>>>>> paint: we try to communicate what we are
>>>>> thinking about it. I was an actor once
>>>>> too, and we were trained to be very careful
>>>>> not to do snuff porn on stage, not even in our
>>>>> heads. It is basically the same mistake that
>>>>> we all commit when we conflate our current
>>>>> opinions with Vygotsky's.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>
>>>>> Sangmyung University
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> New article in Mind, Culture, and Activity:
>>>>>
>>>>> Realizations: non-causal but real
>>>>> relationships in and between Halliday, Hasan,
>>>>> and Vygotsky
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Some free e-prints today available at:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Y8YHS3SRW42VXPTVY2Z6/full?target=10.1080*10749039.2020.1806329__;Lw!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjzZNlQV6A$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Y8YHS3SRW42VXPTVY2Z6/full?target=10.1080*10749039.2020.1806329__;Lw!!Mih3wA!W8PZ43eu4LC1xSAffVdIDqmaRIq4PDLOb-P4KTvfV_DUJXqxOtYGf2tEuR4oh4ukrPPgQg$>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov: L.S.
>>>>> Vygotsky's Pedological Works Volume One:
>>>>> Foundations of Pedology"
>>>>>
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjwWT3VQoQ$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!W8PZ43eu4LC1xSAffVdIDqmaRIq4PDLOb-P4KTvfV_DUJXqxOtYGf2tEuR4oh4ut7JrDdw$>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 10:15 PM Glassman,
>>>>> Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu
>>>>> <mailto:glassman.13@osu.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi David,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I honestly don’t know why Stanislavski’s
>>>>> nephew was sent to Siberia. It just seems
>>>>> to have spooked him. I never read
>>>>> Selenick’s book. Everything I have read
>>>>> about the 1912 production I have read has
>>>>> been from Stanislavski’s perspective,
>>>>> primarily Bennedetti so it would be an
>>>>> interesting read.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As for Diderot. Why would you say that
>>>>> Vygotsky sided with Diderot (actually
>>>>> sided with directors who followed Diderot
>>>>> and avoided lived experience). This seems
>>>>> almost the opposite of what Vygotsky was
>>>>> after in his later writings. Diderot in
>>>>> an Actor’s Paradox claimed the actor had
>>>>> to make the choice to avoid
>>>>> emotion/affect. It was genuine but it was
>>>>> disorganized and performances became too
>>>>> volatile. I was recently watching a movie
>>>>> about actor auditions (Every Little Step
>>>>> She Takes). There was one episode that
>>>>> speaks directly to Diderot. An actress
>>>>> gives a great, emotional reading. She gets
>>>>> called back and reads again. The director
>>>>> asks he to do what she did the first time.
>>>>> She screams, I don’t know what I did the
>>>>> first time, I don’t know why it was good.
>>>>> That is the Actor’s Paradox in a nutshell.
>>>>> Stanislavski was I think the first to try
>>>>> and solve this paradox. The combine
>>>>> affective memory with text. I see Vygotsky
>>>>> trying to do much the same thing in
>>>>> development, and I think it gives us a
>>>>> window into the relationship between
>>>>> spontaneous concepts and scientific
>>>>> concepts (did you know Ribot called
>>>>> emotional memory spontaneous. I wonder if
>>>>> it was the same word).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I also disagree with your interpretation
>>>>> of Stanislavski and inner speech. I would
>>>>> call him anything from mentalese. As a
>>>>> matter of fact I think you could make a
>>>>> really good argument that Vygotsky took
>>>>> his idea of inner speech directly from the
>>>>> first few chapters of An Actor’s Work. The
>>>>> similarities are uncanny. Now before you
>>>>> write back that An Actor’s work was not
>>>>> published until 1938, there were chapters
>>>>> in circulation as early as 1928. What I
>>>>> find important is that Gurevich, who was
>>>>> acting as his editor (I begin to wonder
>>>>> how much she actually wrote) was worried
>>>>> about Stanislavski’s use of psychological
>>>>> phrases. Even though Stanislavski seemed
>>>>> to be allergic to read anything but plays
>>>>> he thought of himself as a psychologist.
>>>>> According to Bennedetti, Gurevich gave the
>>>>> manuscript to three psychologists to look
>>>>> over. Is it logical to make the argument
>>>>> that Vygotsky might have been one of those
>>>>> psychologists? The reason for my original
>>>>> query. But there are so many similarities
>>>>> between those early chapters of an Actor’s
>>>>> Work and especially chapters six and seven
>>>>> of Thinking and Speech.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don’t know if Vygotsky’s ideas on affect
>>>>> evolved. Again, I think he might have read
>>>>> Stanislavski and found a way in to
>>>>> discussing this. Perhaps the most
>>>>> influential thing (for me) I have read in
>>>>> this second reading of Vygotsky is Mike’s
>>>>> introduction to the special issue of MCA
>>>>> on Spinoza. I think it is right on point
>>>>> except I would replace the cryptic and
>>>>> opaque Spinoza with the over the top
>>>>> Stanislavski.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Okay, enough for now. Got to get back to
>>>>> salt mines.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *On Behalf Of *David Kellogg
>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 17, 2020 4:45 AM
>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious
>>>>> awareness enters through the gate" (a
>>>>> Participation Question)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael--
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There's a good book on the 1912 production
>>>>> (you've probably read it).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Senelick, L (1982) Gordon Craig's Moscow
>>>>> Hamlet. Westport, CN and London: Greenwood.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have a chapter on it in my own book,
>>>>> 'The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit"
>>>>> (Sense: 2014). My impression is that the
>>>>> stage version Vygotsky is hard on in
>>>>> Psychology of Art is actually the Second
>>>>> Moscow Art Theatre production of 1924,
>>>>> which is one of the revivals of
>>>>> Stanislavsky/Craig you are talking about.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Stanislavsky was from a very wealthy
>>>>> family, and most wealthy families were
>>>>> active counter-revolutionaries during the
>>>>> Civil War. The Alekseivs were certainly
>>>>> what you could call conservative, and they
>>>>> were all quite displeased with
>>>>> Constantin's acting career. Are you sure
>>>>> that the nephew was sent to Siberia for
>>>>> artistic reasons?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (I have always felt that Vygotsky was more
>>>>> inclined to Diderot than Stanislavsky, and
>>>>> would have supported Brecht and Olivier
>>>>> against Stanislavsky and Mel Gibson. But
>>>>> maybe we need to ask WHICH Vygotsky,
>>>>> because his views on emotion certainly
>>>>> evolve a lot, and he is only inclined to
>>>>> view higher emotions as the product of
>>>>> reflection in the sense of ideation than
>>>>> as reflection in the sense of reproduction
>>>>> in the 1930s, when he writes the actor
>>>>> essay. I think the main problem with his
>>>>> use of Stanislavsky's method in Thinking
>>>>> and Speech is that it assumes a kind of
>>>>> 'mentalese' which is only a description of
>>>>> emotion. Vygotsky would really require at
>>>>> least three planes--volitional affective
>>>>> impulse, non-verbal thought, and verbal
>>>>> thinking. Only the last one could be put
>>>>> into words, and then the syntax would be
>>>>> very different from what Stanislavsky is
>>>>> using in his scripts. There is a similar
>>>>> problem in the different ways that
>>>>> Virginial Woolf and James Joyce treat
>>>>> inner speech--one of them tries to write
>>>>> about it and the other tries to write it.)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>
>>>>> Sangmyung University
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> New Article in Mind, Culture, and Activity:
>>>>>
>>>>> Realizations: non-causal but real
>>>>> relationships in and between Halliday,
>>>>> Hasan, and Vygotsky
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/url310.tandfonline.com/ls/click?upn=odl8Fji2pFaByYDqV3bjGMQo8st9of2228V6AcSFNq3t86qU90pAx-2BEad4OTI0D6Bi1fwTdsuN-2BfXNLD3YVMjcLIX-2BmEuxF9NP5zGw-2BdLfY-3D7ljy_X7XaRk1WbLfx0WH87lwk8dq9sJwzGg6rYuMbUaEYJVSc-2Brn9o4kZxBH7VyDFXQG2cW-2FVpvW8kKmgCrEcZ9b01hknKR451ObdcFj2BjoQzt7GbzMiYiThGgitFYjHGo14NDXURJCBt80ZRKh9rhZiCz3ERpw5ZHeOlHPYX1rSnIqI9nfjq4FunlRWMWO46RMruhVV-2BsN-2BP3WHvbuOtvoLOg8W0MWktZcDt85Q8BK7UYuIOL31Osd02-2BMwIuIZ3U6ud9iCFOaXu9e0DjKARw9ftcuTIz2WiuLgDtTkR2I8YcY-3D__;!!Mih3wA!X-sPHj2yRj7CruRKtdoJzuSguNRxxRa07dqeIoZ9GHqxdbAkzGcN-Ue9sxFcWs26bXpP7Q$>
>>>>>
>>>>> Some free e-prints available.
>>>>>
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Y8YHS3SRW42VXPTVY2Z6/full?target=10.1080*10749039.2020.1806329__;Lw!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjzZNlQV6A$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Y8YHS3SRW42VXPTVY2Z6/full?target=10.1080*10749039.2020.1806329__;Lw!!Mih3wA!X-sPHj2yRj7CruRKtdoJzuSguNRxxRa07dqeIoZ9GHqxdbAkzGcN-Ue9sxFcWs3BnshQdA$>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov:
>>>>> /L.S. Vygotsky's Pedological Works/
>>>>> /Volume One: Foundations of Pedology/"
>>>>>
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjwWT3VQoQ$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!X-sPHj2yRj7CruRKtdoJzuSguNRxxRa07dqeIoZ9GHqxdbAkzGcN-Ue9sxFcWs0U-run5w$>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Aug 16, 2020 at 9:11 PM Glassman,
>>>>> Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu
>>>>> <mailto:glassman.13@osu.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi David,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Actually the Hamlet of 1912 was even
>>>>> more consequential than you might
>>>>> think. It seems Isadora Duncan got
>>>>> Stanislavski and Craig together. Craig
>>>>> came to Russia but there were problems
>>>>> from the start, and pretty soon they
>>>>> were actually directing separately.
>>>>> Stanislavski saw this as his great
>>>>> opportunity to bring his ‘system’
>>>>> (which I believe influenced Vygotsky a
>>>>> great deal) to an international
>>>>> production and a Shakespeare play. Up
>>>>> to that point he used his system
>>>>> mostly in workshop productions with
>>>>> Russian playwright working with the
>>>>> MAT. Stanislavsky was doing another
>>>>> small production simultaneously.
>>>>> Anyway, Craig, who was upset about the
>>>>> money he was receiving eventually took
>>>>> less of a hand in the production. He
>>>>> was a symbolist but I think not in the
>>>>> way Russians were symbolists, in other
>>>>> words he saw himself as the director
>>>>> creating the symbols rather than the
>>>>> actors exploring the sub-texts of the
>>>>> words. He also wanted Hamlet to be
>>>>> portrayed in the traditional
>>>>> bombastic, over the top Elizabethan
>>>>> fashion. Stanislavski wanted the actor
>>>>> playing Hamlet to really explore his
>>>>> emotions in the context of his system.
>>>>> The production only ran for a few
>>>>> weeks as most people do not like
>>>>> change (which makes me think Vygotsky
>>>>> at the young age did not see it) so it
>>>>> was a financial flop for the MAT but
>>>>> an international critical success and
>>>>> was in many ways a springboard for
>>>>> Stanislavski’s fame. My reading on
>>>>> Vygotsky’s essay on Hamlet, and
>>>>> Psychology of Art in general, was that
>>>>> he read a great many of the writings
>>>>> on the production, which continued for
>>>>> years. I feel he came down distinctly
>>>>> on the side of Stanislavski in his
>>>>> essay. Of course there is no way to
>>>>> know this for sure, except he could
>>>>> have never written that essay if there
>>>>> had never been the 1912 production. It
>>>>> changed the way people look at theater.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As for socialist realism becoming
>>>>> state policy in 1932, that might be
>>>>> right. But Stanislavski was already
>>>>> retired from directing and he did a
>>>>> number of productions promoting
>>>>> socialist realism (he was not enamored
>>>>> with it, but it let the MAT keep
>>>>> working). Also his nephew had been
>>>>> exiled to Siberia. So it may have been
>>>>> an important component before it was
>>>>> state policy.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:*
>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *On Behalf Of *David Kellogg
>>>>> *Sent:* Sunday, August 16, 2020 6:00 AM
>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious
>>>>> awareness enters through the gate" (a
>>>>> Participation Question)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael--
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Actually, socialist realism was only
>>>>> declared official state policy in
>>>>> 1932--Lenin had been dead for eight
>>>>> years. During most of Vygotsky's
>>>>> career the arts scene in the USSR was
>>>>> probably the liveliest and freest in
>>>>> the world. But slightly crazy too--see
>>>>> the attached photograph “Every
>>>>> Komsomol (male Young Communist League
>>>>> member) can and must satisfy his
>>>>> sexual needs” and the woman has to
>>>>> hold a sign that says “Every
>>>>> Komsomolka (female Young Communist
>>>>> League member) should aid him in this,
>>>>> otherwise she’s a philistine”). This
>>>>> is the kind of thing Vygotsky was
>>>>> fighting AGAINST in his sex education
>>>>> work with Zalkind. My wife grew up
>>>>> during the Cultural Revolution, and I
>>>>> can tell you that it was not at all
>>>>> the same thing.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In 1912, when Vygotsky was sixteen and
>>>>> visiting Moscow for the first time,
>>>>> there was a famous production of
>>>>> Hamlet than in some ways still
>>>>> influences us today: it was a little
>>>>> bit as if you had the Olivier
>>>>> production on stage and Zeffirelli
>>>>> doing the lighting and props.
>>>>> Stanislavsky wanted to treat Hamlet as
>>>>> historical characters, but the stage
>>>>> director and producer was the English
>>>>> symbolist Gordon Craig, who actually
>>>>> wanted, at one point, to turn it into
>>>>> a one man show, wiith every character
>>>>> except Hamlet in a mask. He got his
>>>>> way with the props, which were highly
>>>>> abstract and geometrical, but
>>>>> Stanislavsky got his way with the
>>>>> actual production, which (I gather)
>>>>> was gritty and grimey.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I would love to know if the Hamlet
>>>>> Vygotsky saw and wrote about was the
>>>>> original Stanislavsky-Craig emulsion
>>>>> or if it was some toned down restaging
>>>>> of the original 1912 production. Do
>>>>> you know?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>
>>>>> Sangmyung University
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> New Article: Ruqaiya Hasan, in
>>>>> memoriam: A manual and a manifesto.
>>>>>
>>>>> Outlines, Spring 2020
>>>>>
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjwFF_xQZg$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/tidsskrift.dk/outlines/article/view/116238__;!!Mih3wA!WC2B2d3sHzBVQzHe3_Gk-N5cH4sDTZXudPEFrikW3AbMDxvPNWZML6XSytkIU2nP5psr4Q$>
>>>>>
>>>>> New Translation with Nikolai Veresov:
>>>>> /L.S. Vygotsky's Pedological Works/
>>>>> /Volume One: Foundations of Pedology/"
>>>>>
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjwWT3VQoQ$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811505270__;!!Mih3wA!WC2B2d3sHzBVQzHe3_Gk-N5cH4sDTZXudPEFrikW3AbMDxvPNWZML6XSytkIU2mAEEqXaA$>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Aug 16, 2020 at 6:12 PM
>>>>> Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu
>>>>> <mailto:glassman.13@osu.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> A couple of things, especially
>>>>> about the Uzbekistan experiments.
>>>>> As I have alluded to in some
>>>>> earlier posts I have been doing
>>>>> some reading on theater during the
>>>>> time Vygotsky was writing. One
>>>>> thing I have come across multiple
>>>>> times is the issue of socialist
>>>>> realism. The idea (and this is
>>>>> probably not a very good
>>>>> definition) is that we have to
>>>>> understand people as they really
>>>>> are and think, but we also have to
>>>>> accept that humans can become
>>>>> better actors (broadly defined)
>>>>> and thinkers under a socialist
>>>>> system. It seems the people
>>>>> pushing this was somewhat akin to
>>>>> cadres in the cultural revolution.
>>>>> In other words you better do it.
>>>>> Even Stanislavski, who both Lenin
>>>>> and Stalin loved, was forced to do
>>>>> a number of productions that
>>>>> promoted socialist realism. If you
>>>>> did not toe the line you were sent
>>>>> to Siberia (or worse). I am sure
>>>>> this is discussed somewhere in
>>>>> relationship to Vygotsky but I
>>>>> wonder if we she take that into
>>>>> account when thinking about things
>>>>> like the Uzbekistan experiment.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A second thing. I wonder if
>>>>> sometimes we have a tendency to
>>>>> over think and over philosophize
>>>>> Vygotsky. In some ways he was just
>>>>> trying to get things done and a
>>>>> concept like conscious awareness
>>>>> in Thinking and Speech is mostly a
>>>>> means to solving a problem, not
>>>>> any philosophical statement. The
>>>>> problem it seems to me is that we
>>>>> do not have consistent conceptual
>>>>> systems based solely on our
>>>>> experience. A five year old can
>>>>> have five different best friends
>>>>> on five days on the playground
>>>>> depending on what people brought
>>>>> for lunch or who got to the swings
>>>>> first. Still, it is these
>>>>> affective based concepts that
>>>>> drive our activity. But we don’t
>>>>> offer use these concepts with any
>>>>> conscious use of attention or
>>>>> memory or any of our other
>>>>> intellectual functions. “Hmmm,
>>>>> Jerry brought salami today, maybe
>>>>> I should think about making him my
>>>>> best friend.” On the other hand
>>>>> social concepts are developed
>>>>> separately from our experiences
>>>>> and our emotions. They are
>>>>> developed specifically to organize
>>>>> and bring consistency to our
>>>>> feelings. But they are meaningless
>>>>> from an affective, everyday
>>>>> perspective. Why would we even
>>>>> want to think about them. In order
>>>>> to bring them into our lives we
>>>>> have to consciously engage in
>>>>> volitional activities using them.
>>>>> So we have to have conscious
>>>>> awareness. How then do you bring
>>>>> the two together, for which he
>>>>> takes the remainder of chapter six.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Dewey also was really, really
>>>>> inconsistent in the way he used
>>>>> words. I would argue he used words
>>>>> as tools not as philosophical
>>>>> statements. You have to read the
>>>>> texts and figure it out.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:*
>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *On Behalf Of *Martin Packer
>>>>> *Sent:* Saturday, August 15, 2020
>>>>> 8:15 PM
>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture,
>>>>> Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious
>>>>> awareness enters through the gate"
>>>>> (a Participation Question)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Mike,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Well you and I may differ on this.
>>>>> My interpretation is that in the
>>>>> passage that Anthony gave us, LSV
>>>>> is talking about the growing
>>>>> consciousness *of their own
>>>>> thinking* on the part of
>>>>> school-age children. (In Thought &
>>>>> Language he shifts a bit on
>>>>> whether this happens in middle
>>>>> childhood or adolescence, but that
>>>>> needn't concern us.) That is to
>>>>> say, he is writing about what he
>>>>> calls “introspection."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As evidence for this
>>>>> interpretation let me cite a
>>>>> couple of other passages (these
>>>>> are from the excellent Kellogg
>>>>> translation) where I think the
>>>>> point is made more clearly:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 100 "I make a knot. I do
>>>>> it consciously. I cannot,
>>>>> however, tell you exactly how
>>>>> I did it. My conscious act is
>>>>> unconscious, because my
>>>>> attention is focused on the
>>>>> act of the tying, but not on
>>>>> how I do it. Consciousness
>>>>> is always some piece
>>>>> of reality. The object of my
>>>>> consciousness is tying the
>>>>> knot, a knot, and what was
>>>>> happening to it but not those
>>>>> actions that I make when
>>>>> tying, not how I do it. But
>>>>> the object of consciousness
>>>>> can be just that - then it
>>>>> will be awareness.
>>>>> Awareness is an act
>>>>> of consciousness, the object
>>>>> of which is itself the very
>>>>> same activity of consciousness”
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 102 "Even Piaget's research
>>>>> showed that introspection does
>>>>> not begin to develop in
>>>>> any significant degree until
>>>>> school age. Further
>>>>> investigations have shown that
>>>>> the development
>>>>> of introspection in the school
>>>>> age contains something similar
>>>>> to what occurs in the
>>>>> development of the external
>>>>> perception and observation in
>>>>> the transition from infancy to
>>>>> early childhood. As is well
>>>>> known, the most important
>>>>> change in external perception
>>>>> of this period [i.e. infancy
>>>>> to early childhood] is that a
>>>>> child from a wordless and,
>>>>> consequently, meaningless
>>>>> perception, to a semantic,
>>>>> verbal and
>>>>> objective perception. The same
>>>>> can be said of introspection
>>>>> on the threshold of school
>>>>> age. The child is moving from
>>>>> mute introspection to speech
>>>>> and words. He develops an
>>>>> internal semantic perception
>>>>> of his own mental
>>>>> processes…. I realize that I
>>>>> can recall, i.e. I do recall
>>>>> the subjectivity of my own
>>>>> consciousness."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 104 "By their very
>>>>> nature, spontaneous concepts
>>>>> include the fact that they are
>>>>> unconscious. Children know how
>>>>> they operate spontaneously but
>>>>> are not aware of them. This is
>>>>> what we saw in the children's
>>>>> concept of "because."
>>>>> Obviously, by themselves,
>>>>> spontaneous concepts need to
>>>>> be unconscious, because
>>>>> consideration is always
>>>>> directed to their
>>>>> objects, rather than to the
>>>>> act of thought which is
>>>>> grasping it.”
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 106 "only in a system [of
>>>>> concepts] can the concept
>>>>> become the object of awareness
>>>>> and only in a system can
>>>>> the child acquire
>>>>> volitional control [of concepts]."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In his Lectures on Child
>>>>> Psychology LSV is very clear, in
>>>>> my view, that at each stage the
>>>>> child has consciousness of
>>>>> different aspects of the world and
>>>>> of their own psychological
>>>>> processes. For example:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "In an infant, there is no
>>>>> intellectual perception: he
>>>>> perceives a room but does not
>>>>> separately perceive chairs, a
>>>>> table, etc.; he will perceive
>>>>> everything as an undivided
>>>>> whole in contrast to the
>>>>> adult, who sees figures
>>>>> against a background. How does
>>>>> a child perceive his own
>>>>> movements in early childhood?
>>>>> He is happy, unhappy, but does
>>>>> not know that he is happy,
>>>>> just as an infant when he is
>>>>> hungry does not know that he
>>>>> is hungry. There is a great
>>>>> difference between feeling
>>>>> hunger and knowing that I
>>>>> am hungry. In early childhood,
>>>>> the child does not know his
>>>>> own experiences…. Precisely as
>>>>> a three-year-old child
>>>>> discovers his relation to
>>>>> other people, a
>>>>> seven-year-old discovers the
>>>>> fact of his own experiences.”
>>>>> (p. 291)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course, one might find it
>>>>> objectionable that LSV might
>>>>> suggest that non-literate peoples
>>>>> might be unaware of their own
>>>>> thinking. But I agree with Andy,
>>>>> in such cultures there may well be
>>>>> systematic instruction in systems
>>>>> of concepts — legal, religious… —
>>>>> that would have the same effect as
>>>>> LSV says that school instruction
>>>>> does in the west.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Stay safe,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Aug 15, 2020, at 6:06 PM,
>>>>> mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I was not being ironic, David
>>>>>
>>>>> If scientific concepts are
>>>>> required for conscious
>>>>> awareness (as specified in the
>>>>> quotation I was asked to
>>>>> respond to) and people who
>>>>>
>>>>> have not been to school do not
>>>>> acquire Piagetian concepts
>>>>> related to formal operations
>>>>> (for example) or other measure
>>>>> of "thinking in
>>>>>
>>>>> scientific concepts) if seems
>>>>> to follow that they have not
>>>>> achieved conscious awareness.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> LSV writes about non-literate,
>>>>> indigenous, peoples that they
>>>>> are capable of complexes, but
>>>>> not true concepts (I think the
>>>>> use of the term.
>>>>>
>>>>> "scientific" is not helpful
>>>>> here). Luria interprets his
>>>>> data on self-consciousness
>>>>> that are a part of the same
>>>>> monograph as his work on
>>>>> syllogisms,
>>>>>
>>>>> classification, etc among
>>>>> Uzbekis who had experienced
>>>>> various degrees of involvement
>>>>> in modern (e.g. Russian) forms
>>>>> of life as evidence for
>>>>>
>>>>> what might be termed "lack of
>>>>> conscious awareness I am not
>>>>> sure."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 3:31
>>>>> PM David H Kirshner
>>>>> <dkirsh@lsu.edu
>>>>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe I missed an ironic
>>>>> intention, Michael, but on
>>>>> August 11 Anthony asked
>>>>> about the meaning of a
>>>>> couple of paragraphs from
>>>>> /Thinking and Speech/.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Here is the passage in
>>>>> question*, from /Thinking
>>>>> and Speech/, Ch. 6, pp. 190-1:
>>>>>
>>>>> "To perceive something in
>>>>> a different way means to
>>>>> acquire new potentials for
>>>>> acting with respect to it.
>>>>> At the chess board, to see
>>>>> differently is to play
>>>>> differently. By
>>>>> generalizing the process
>>>>> of activity itself, I
>>>>> acquire the potential for
>>>>> new relationships with it.
>>>>> To speak crudely, it is as
>>>>> if this process has been
>>>>> isolated from the general
>>>>> activity of consciousness.
>>>>> I am conscious of the fact
>>>>> that I remember. I make my
>>>>> own remembering the object
>>>>> of consciousness. An
>>>>> isolation arises here. In
>>>>> a certain sense, any
>>>>> generalization or
>>>>> abstraction isolates its
>>>>> object. This is why
>>>>> conscious awareness –
>>>>> understood as
>>>>> generalization – leads
>>>>> directly to mastery.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> /Thus, the foundation of
>>>>> conscious awareness is the
>>>>> generalization or
>>>>> abstraction of the mental
>>>>> processes, which leads to
>>>>> their mastery/.
>>>>> Instruction has a decisive
>>>>> role in this process.
>>>>> Scientific concepts have a
>>>>> unique relationship to the
>>>>> object. This relationship
>>>>> is mediated through other
>>>>> concepts that themselves
>>>>> have an internal
>>>>> hierarchical system of
>>>>> interrelationships. It is
>>>>> apparently in this domain
>>>>> of the scientific concept
>>>>> that conscious awareness
>>>>> of concepts or the
>>>>> generalization and mastery
>>>>> of concepts emerges for
>>>>> the first time. And once a
>>>>> new structure of
>>>>> generalization has arisen
>>>>> in one sphere of thought,
>>>>> it can – like any
>>>>> structure – be transferred
>>>>> without training to all
>>>>> remaining domains of
>>>>> concepts and thought.
>>>>> Thus, /conscious awareness
>>>>> enters through the gate
>>>>> opened up by the
>>>>> scientific concept/."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Mike’s reply, in total was:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I understand that to mean
>>>>> that humans who have not
>>>>> achieved scientific/real
>>>>> concepts do not have
>>>>> conscious awareness.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What am I missing?
>>>>>
>>>>> Mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:*
>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *On Behalf Of *Martin Packer
>>>>> *Sent:* Saturday, August
>>>>> 15, 2020 4:36 PM
>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind,
>>>>> Culture, Activity
>>>>> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re:
>>>>> "conscious awareness
>>>>> enters through the gate"
>>>>> (a Participation Question)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you saying that either
>>>>> Mike Cole or Lev Vygotsky,
>>>>> or both, are claiming that
>>>>> 5-year old children (for
>>>>> example) lack conscious
>>>>> awareness of the world
>>>>> they live in?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Puzzled...
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Aug 14, 2020, at
>>>>> 9:16 PM, David H
>>>>> Kirshner
>>>>> <dkirsh@lsu.edu
>>>>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That “any ‘actual’
>>>>> concept is the
>>>>> intersection or
>>>>> merging of both the
>>>>> scientific and
>>>>> spontaneous path,”
>>>>> speaks to their
>>>>> complementarity,
>>>>> making them akin to
>>>>> Type 1 and Type 2
>>>>> processing I referred
>>>>> to in my post.
>>>>>
>>>>> But they’re also
>>>>> hierarchically
>>>>> related, since
>>>>> according to Mike’s
>>>>> interpretation of a
>>>>> Vygotsky’s passage
>>>>> cited by Anthony a few
>>>>> days ago, “humans who
>>>>> have not achieved
>>>>> scientific/real
>>>>> concepts do not have
>>>>> conscious awareness.”
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I do not question
>>>>> Vygotsky’s genius.
>>>>> What I do question is
>>>>> the coherence of the
>>>>> interpretive frames
>>>>> that have evolved from
>>>>> his work. As Michael
>>>>> observed in a recent
>>>>> post, “like the writer
>>>>> he wanted to be he
>>>>> [Vygotsky] used
>>>>> phrases and ideas less
>>>>> as truths and more to
>>>>> move his narrative
>>>>> forward.” What I
>>>>> always wonder in
>>>>> eavesdropping on XMCA
>>>>> is whether the issues
>>>>> we discuss are
>>>>> resolvable, or is the
>>>>> theoretical backdrop
>>>>> to our conversation so
>>>>> heterogeneous as to
>>>>> make the possibility
>>>>> of resolution illusory.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:*xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *On Behalf Of *Andy
>>>>> Blunden
>>>>> *Sent:* Friday, August
>>>>> 14, 2020 10:32 AM
>>>>> *To:*
>>>>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l]
>>>>> Re: "conscious
>>>>> awareness enters
>>>>> through the gate" (a
>>>>> Participation Question)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> No David, as I said,
>>>>> the term "scientific
>>>>> concept" as it is
>>>>> understood nowadays,
>>>>> tends to mislead. The
>>>>> distinction for
>>>>> Vygotsky is entirely,
>>>>> as you say,
>>>>> /developmental/, and
>>>>> it is not a
>>>>> categorisation either
>>>>> (as in putting things
>>>>> into boxes), and
>>>>> nothing to do with
>>>>> "sophistication."
>>>>> "Scientific concept"
>>>>> refers to the path of
>>>>> development that
>>>>> begins with an
>>>>> abstract
>>>>> (decontextualised)
>>>>> concept acquired
>>>>> through instruction in
>>>>> some more or less
>>>>> formal institution.
>>>>> "Spontaneous concept"
>>>>> refers to the path of
>>>>> development which
>>>>> begins with everyday
>>>>> experience, closely
>>>>> connected with
>>>>> immediate
>>>>> sensori-motor
>>>>> interaction and
>>>>> perception, i.e., it
>>>>> begins from the
>>>>> concrete, whereas the
>>>>> "scientific" is
>>>>> beginning from the
>>>>> abstract.
>>>>>
>>>>> Any "actual" concept
>>>>> is the intersection or
>>>>> merging of both the
>>>>> scientific and
>>>>> spontaneous path. For
>>>>> example (1) everyday
>>>>> life is full of ideas
>>>>> which have their
>>>>> source in
>>>>> institutions, but have
>>>>> made their way out of
>>>>> the institutional
>>>>> context into everyday
>>>>> life. On the other
>>>>> hand, for example (2)
>>>>> any scientific concept
>>>>> worth its salt has
>>>>> made its way out of
>>>>> the classroom and
>>>>> become connected with
>>>>> practice, like the
>>>>> book-learning of the
>>>>> medical graduate who's
>>>>> spent 6 months in A&E.
>>>>>
>>>>> I admit, this is not
>>>>> clear from Vygotsky's
>>>>> prose. But here's the
>>>>> thing: when you're
>>>>> reading a great
>>>>> thinker and what
>>>>> they're saying seems
>>>>> silly, trying reading
>>>>> it more generously,
>>>>> because there's
>>>>> probably a reason this
>>>>> writer has gained the
>>>>> reputation of being a
>>>>> great thinker.
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy
>>>>>
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>> Hegel for Social
>>>>> Movements
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fnam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com*2F*3Furl*3Dhttps*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fbrill.com*2Fview*2Ftitle*2F54574__*3B!!Mih3wA!XxSEPVIR0yRJgFaNSBm_i4WM3CddjlgSG_ngNcugdSCaXGC-tM-WRY9GIob6WVqti5Nn5Q*24*26data*3D02*7C01*7Cdkirsh*40lsu.edu*7Ca67ad4b8e1054ad0908108d840677d4e*7C2d4dad3f50ae47d983a09ae2b1f466f8*7C0*7C0*7C637330160531086326*26sdata*3DklbbGOD961jWAJJ2y9AC4ITYXCnaDGFBvC0IbUJKVVs*3D*26reserved*3D0__*3BJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJQ!!Mih3wA!Xj5wWxgfwuTDZiCehf_tnNDlXD6gP8BpwnjrYGS24qDQcMEd3gC6xhsU3N_JiNLOorai4A*24&data=02*7C01*7Cdkirsh*40lsu.edu*7C4c9f97baa48249eab87b08d841637595*7C2d4dad3f50ae47d983a09ae2b1f466f8*7C0*7C0*7C637331242718851133&sdata=W*2FK*2BTbTCBGe1eDIjlq4*2BhdhmoNfNxW11ayTlKsOia*2FA*3D&reserved=0__;JSUlJSUlJSUlJSUqKioqKioqKioqKioqJSUqKioqKioqKiUlKiUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUl!!Mih3wA!WoFSvqRItZRFG-Wb6AmS0wx0inVUDXaV3gD2ZV6rpV81b-0KImklvCD1pGLY8v7_UV-zxA$>
>>>>> Home Page
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fnam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com*2F*3Furl*3Dhttps*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fwww.ethicalpolitics.org*2Fablunden*2Findex.htm__*3B!!Mih3wA!XxSEPVIR0yRJgFaNSBm_i4WM3CddjlgSG_ngNcugdSCaXGC-tM-WRY9GIob6WVoUDL1M-A*24*26data*3D02*7C01*7Cdkirsh*40lsu.edu*7Ca67ad4b8e1054ad0908108d840677d4e*7C2d4dad3f50ae47d983a09ae2b1f466f8*7C0*7C0*7C637330160531096322*26sdata*3DUFQ8UqQhHon5sIjNEsW88BFc3G*2FEZq0s1nUehQfL3W4*3D*26reserved*3D0__*3BJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJQ!!Mih3wA!Xj5wWxgfwuTDZiCehf_tnNDlXD6gP8BpwnjrYGS24qDQcMEd3gC6xhsU3N_JiNLEfO6ohg*24&data=02*7C01*7Cdkirsh*40lsu.edu*7C4c9f97baa48249eab87b08d841637595*7C2d4dad3f50ae47d983a09ae2b1f466f8*7C0*7C0*7C637331242718861146&sdata=hQHaTHs78nCNPgn9gG2NkTNb*2BHrhTO8uhtoAzo5bpdE*3D&reserved=0__;JSUlJSUlJSUlJSUqKioqKioqKioqKiolJSoqKioqKioqJSUqKiUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUl!!Mih3wA!WoFSvqRItZRFG-Wb6AmS0wx0inVUDXaV3gD2ZV6rpV81b-0KImklvCD1pGLY8v77et7hHw$>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 15/08/2020 1:14 am,
>>>>> David H Kirshner wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for your
>>>>> accessible
>>>>> example, Michael.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Vygotsky’s
>>>>> scientific /
>>>>> spontaneous
>>>>> distinction
>>>>> between types of
>>>>> concepts has
>>>>> always struck me
>>>>> as such an
>>>>> unfortunate
>>>>> solution to the
>>>>> problem of
>>>>> differential
>>>>> sophistication in
>>>>> modes of
>>>>> reasoning. I’m
>>>>> sure this problem
>>>>> must have deep
>>>>> roots in classical
>>>>> and contemporary
>>>>> philosophy, even
>>>>> as it is reflected
>>>>> in cognitive
>>>>> psychology’s Dual
>>>>> Process Theory
>>>>> that at its
>>>>> “theoretical core
>>>>> amounts to a
>>>>> dichotomous view
>>>>> of two types of
>>>>> processes…: type
>>>>> 1—intuitive, fast,
>>>>> automatic,
>>>>> nonconscious,
>>>>> effortless,
>>>>> contextualized,
>>>>> error-prone, and
>>>>> type 2—reflective,
>>>>> slow, deliberate,
>>>>> cogitative,
>>>>> effortful,
>>>>> decontextualized,
>>>>> normatively
>>>>> correct” (Varga &
>>>>> Hamburger, 2014).
>>>>> What externalizing
>>>>> this distinction
>>>>> as different kinds
>>>>> of cognitive
>>>>> products (this or
>>>>> that kind of
>>>>> concept) seems to
>>>>> do is
>>>>> distract/detract
>>>>> from the
>>>>> sociogenetic
>>>>> character of
>>>>> development.
>>>>> Surely, a
>>>>> sociogenetic
>>>>> approach seeks to
>>>>> interpret these
>>>>> different forms of
>>>>> reasoning as
>>>>> differential
>>>>> discursive
>>>>> practices,
>>>>> embedded in
>>>>> different cultural
>>>>> contexts
>>>>> (Scribner, Cole,
>>>>> etc.). But talking
>>>>> about different
>>>>> kinds of concepts
>>>>> seems like the
>>>>> wrong departure
>>>>> point for that
>>>>> journey.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:*xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> *On Behalf Of
>>>>> *Glassman, Michael
>>>>> *Sent:* Friday,
>>>>> August 14, 2020
>>>>> 7:03 AM
>>>>> *To:* eXtended
>>>>> Mind, Culture,
>>>>> Activity
>>>>> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l]
>>>>> Re: "conscious
>>>>> awareness enters
>>>>> through the gate"
>>>>> (a Participation
>>>>> Question)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Andy, Henry,
>>>>> Anna Lisa,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Let me start by
>>>>> saying that this
>>>>> is completely
>>>>> restricted to the
>>>>> way conscious
>>>>> awareness is used
>>>>> in Thinking and
>>>>> Speech. If it is
>>>>> use differently in
>>>>> other places this
>>>>> perspective may be
>>>>> wrong. To my mind
>>>>> (with the proviso
>>>>> that my mind if
>>>>> often wrong)
>>>>> Vygotsky is using
>>>>> the idea of
>>>>> conscious
>>>>> awareness for a
>>>>> specific purpose.
>>>>> To differentiate
>>>>> the role of
>>>>> spontaneous
>>>>> concepts with
>>>>> non-spontaneous
>>>>> concepts.
>>>>> Spontaneous
>>>>> concepts are based
>>>>> initially in
>>>>> affective memory
>>>>> and they give
>>>>> energy and
>>>>> motivation to many
>>>>> of our activities.
>>>>> However we are not
>>>>> consciously aware
>>>>> of them. To go
>>>>> back to chess, I
>>>>> am at the pool and
>>>>> my friend comes up
>>>>> to me and says
>>>>> “Chess?” I say
>>>>> yes. I have no
>>>>> conscious
>>>>> awareness of the
>>>>> concept of chess
>>>>> in my life, why I
>>>>> say yes so easily
>>>>> why it may be a
>>>>> way to make a
>>>>> social connection
>>>>> between me and my
>>>>> friend. It is
>>>>> residue of my
>>>>> affective memory
>>>>> (I don’t know how
>>>>> much Vygotsky was
>>>>> using Ribot when
>>>>> making this
>>>>> argument). We are
>>>>> playing chess and
>>>>> I remember that my
>>>>> brother showed me
>>>>> the
>>>>> non-spontaneous/scientific
>>>>> concept of the
>>>>> bishop’s gambit.
>>>>> As this point in
>>>>> my life I have to
>>>>> think about it and
>>>>> whether I want to
>>>>> use it. I must
>>>>> summon the
>>>>> intellectual
>>>>> functions of
>>>>> memory and
>>>>> attention as I
>>>>> think about the
>>>>> use of the
>>>>> bishop’s gambit.
>>>>> This then is
>>>>> conscious
>>>>> awareness of the
>>>>> scientific
>>>>> concept. I used
>>>>> the bishop’s
>>>>> gambit and win the
>>>>> game and I applaud
>>>>> myself. I got home
>>>>> and tell my
>>>>> brother, the
>>>>> bishop’s gambit
>>>>> was great, thanks.
>>>>> I am mediating the
>>>>> scientific concept
>>>>> of the bishop’s
>>>>> gambit with my
>>>>> everyday concept
>>>>> of playing chess.
>>>>> Voila, development!!!!
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don’t know if
>>>>> Vygotsky uses
>>>>> conscious
>>>>> awareness
>>>>> differently elsewhere.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:*xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> *On Behalf Of
>>>>> *Andy Blunden
>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday,
>>>>> August 13, 2020
>>>>> 11:51 PM
>>>>> *To:*
>>>>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l]
>>>>> Re: "conscious
>>>>> awareness enters
>>>>> through the gate"
>>>>> (a Participation
>>>>> Question)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Henry, my aim was
>>>>> just to introduce
>>>>> Annalisa and
>>>>> whoever to the
>>>>> scientific way
>>>>> that the terms
>>>>> "conscious
>>>>> awareness" and
>>>>> "consciousness"
>>>>> are used in CHAT.
>>>>> I say "scientific"
>>>>> in the sense that
>>>>> in CHAT we have a
>>>>> system of concepts
>>>>> and associated
>>>>> word meanings
>>>>> which have, if you
>>>>> like, conventional
>>>>> meanings. There is
>>>>> nothing wrong with
>>>>> "automatic and
>>>>> controlled
>>>>> processing" and
>>>>> "ballistic
>>>>> processing" but so
>>>>> far as I am aware
>>>>> these terms were
>>>>> not in Vygotsky's
>>>>> vocabulary. I
>>>>> could be wrong of
>>>>> course and I am
>>>>> sure I will be
>>>>> rapidly corrected
>>>>> if this is the case.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> I<image001.jpg>
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angelus_Novus__;!!Mih3wA!XaZ0ldsk3LvHtURqQPa9pqhSzqJcTkfT9WpcH9iXCnnFdDWAkGk2rg5ikc9GFgnQRyK9kw$>The
>>>>> Angel's View of History
>>>>>
>>>>> It is only in a social context
>>>>> that subjectivism and
>>>>> objectivism, spiritualism and
>>>>> materialism, activity and
>>>>> passivity cease to be
>>>>> antinomies, and thus cease to
>>>>> exist as such antinomies. The
>>>>> resolution of the
>>>>> *theoretical* contradictions
>>>>> is possible only through
>>>>> practical means, only through
>>>>> the practical energy of
>>>>> humans. (Marx, 1844).
>>>>>
>>>>> Cultural Praxis Website:
>>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!VUrO8KHBiAD3F4WA25vN4AjLHzQRRdeDAQ4IbR_OdE8IBF8PBBN1OC2CRTN9KjwuFCrCJA$
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!XaZ0ldsk3LvHtURqQPa9pqhSzqJcTkfT9WpcH9iXCnnFdDWAkGk2rg5ikc9GFglySosYvA$>
>>>>>
>>>>> Re-generating CHAT Website:
>>>>> re-generatingchat.com
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/re-generatingchat.com__;!!Mih3wA!XaZ0ldsk3LvHtURqQPa9pqhSzqJcTkfT9WpcH9iXCnnFdDWAkGk2rg5ikc9GFgkzDUEbGA$>
>>>>>
>>>>> Archival resources website:
>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/lchc.ucsd.edu/__;!!KGKeukY!ji0gqdjldexgATihzgPnPYay6rvvh9I-ydkDxJ6UtfV9X-x5XFtXmKGtowQioPBLBZI$>.
>>>>>
>>>>> Narrative history of LCHC:
>>>>> lchcautobio.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/__;!!KGKeukY!ji0gqdjldexgATihzgPnPYay6rvvh9I-ydkDxJ6UtfV9X-x5XFtXmKGtowQiQEfFUzs$>.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>
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