[Xmca-l] Re: Trust and Science

Sun Sep 29 08:40:17 PDT 2019

Alfredo,

You point to an important possibility that I would not want to rule out,
the possibility of false consciousness. Yet, I'd like to also just point to
the fact that one must undertake such a claim with the utmost of humility
since "they" are making precisely the same kind of claim about you.

You say that THEY are the ones who live in a world of false consciousness,
while WE are the ones who are awake to the reality of things. This is
precisely what climate deniers say of you!!! They say that you are caught
up in the pseudo-science of climate change that works to further the
introduce governmental control over our daily lives (an outcome that for
them is just as monstrous as what you describe).

We can stand and shout and say that we are right and they are wrong, but we
have to recognize that they are doing the same thing. We could try and kill
them off since we are convinced that they are murders, but they might do
the same. To me it seems, there is still something more that is needed.

Another way to go about this is to seek some kind of true understanding
across these divides. Rather than dismissing "them" as a bunch of
manipulators who are just trying to get theirs or a bunch of dupes who are
going along with a line that they've been sold, why not try to engage
"them" as humans just like "we" are humans? How many climate change deniers
have we actually talked to and treated as humans? (but, you object, they
aren't human!)

I don't think that this needs to be ALL of the work of climate justice, but
I do think that it should be part of this work. And it happens to be one
that is sorely lacking in many approaches. (and just to be clear, I'm not
saying that it is lacking in yours, Alfredo, I'm just posing the question,
perhaps you know and have had conversation with many deniers and realize
their humanity).

-greg
p.s., I spoke with a recruiter for ExxonMobil this past week and he noted
that their new CEO stated unequivocally that man-made climate change is
real and that oil is a major cause of it.

On Sun, Sep 29, 2019 at 8:39 AM Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@ils.uio.no>
wrote:

> Andy,
>
>
>
> I see and Greg’s point. I can see that not everyone denying climate change
> is necessarily a “bad” person or the evil in and of themselves.
>
>
>
> However, I cannot agree with the statement that “everyone acts because
> they think it right to do so”. I’ve done (and keep doing) enough stupid
> (and wrong!) things in my life to be convinced of the falsehood of that
> statement. That statement, in my view, would ONLY apply to (a) instances in
> which people indeed ponder/consider what they are about to do before they
> do it, and (b) the nature of their pondering is in fact ethical.
>
>
>
> Should we refer to Exxon corporate decision-makers who initiated
> misinformation campaigns to cast doubt on climate science as psychopaths
> (as per your definition)? Would that be fair to people with actual
> pathologies? I’d rather call them criminals.
>
>
>
> You seem to assume (or I misread you as assuming) that all actions are
> taken based on a pondering on what is right or wrong, even when that
> pondering has not taken place. First, I don’t think we always act based on
> decision-making. Second, not every decision-making or pondering may
> consider ethical dimensions of right or wrong. I invite you to consider how
> many people among those who deny the climate science has actually gone
> through an ethical pondering when they “choose” to deny the science. My
> sense is that most deniers do not “choose,” but rather enact a position
> that is, in the metaphorical terms that the author of the article that
> Anne-Nelly has shared uses, in the air they breath within their
> communities. I am of the view that exercising ethics, just as exercising
> science denial in the 21st century, is engaging in a quite definite
> historical practice that has its background, resources, and patterns or
> habits. I think that if we exercised (practiced) more of ethics, science
> denial would be less of a “right” choice. That is, decision-making is a
> sociocultural endeavor, not something an individual comes up with alone.
> Sometimes we cannot choose how we feel or react, but we can choose who we
> get together to, the types of cultures within which we want to generate
> habits of action/mind.
>
>
>
> We cannot de-politicize science, for it is only in political contexts that
> science comes to effect lives outside of the laboratory. But we can
> generate cultures of critical engagement, which I think would bring us
> closer to your option (3) at the end of your e-mail when you ponder
> whether/how to disentangle bipartisanism and scientific literacy. I don’t
> think then relativism (that you act ethically or not depending on what you
> think it’s right or not, independently of whether great amounts of
> suffering happen because of your actions) is what would thrive. Rather, I
> believe (and hope!) **humanity** would thrive, for it would always ponder
> the question Dewey posed when considering why we should prefer democracy
> over any other forms of political organization, such as fascism:
>
>
>
> “Can we find any reason that does not ultimately come down to the belief
> that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human
> experience, one which is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do
> nondemocratic and antidemocratic forms of social life? Does not the
> principle of regard for individual freedom and for decency and kindliness
> of human relations come back in the end to the conviction that these things
> are tributary to a higher quality of experience on the part of a greater
> number than are methods of repression and coercion or force?” (Dewey,
> Experience and Education, chapter 3).
>
>
>
> Please, help me see how Exxon leaders considered any of these when they
> chose to deny the science, and thought it was right. I know voters did not
> “choose” in the same way (Exxon staff trusted the science, indeed!). But it
> is back there where you can find an explanation for climate change denial
> today; it is in the cultural-historical pattern of thinking they
> contributed engineering, along with political actors, and not in the
> individual head of the person denying that you find the explanation.
>
>
>
> Alfredo
>
> *From: *<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Andy Blunden <
> andyb@marxists.org>
> *Reply to: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Date: *Sunday, 29 September 2019 at 15:28
> *To: *"xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Trust and Science
>
>
>
> Alfredo, I think Greg's point is basically right, that is, everyone acts
> because they think it right to do so. The only exception would be true
> psychopaths. The issue is: *why* does this person believe this is the
> right thing to do and believe that this is the person I should trust and
> that this is the truth about the matter?
>
> Take Darwinian Evolution as an example. In the USA, this question has been
> "politicised," that is, people either accept the science or not according
> to whether they vote Democrat or Republican. There are variants on this,
> and various exceptions, but for the largest numbers belief in the Bible or
> belief in the Science textbook are choices of being on this side or the
> other side. This is not the case in many other countries where Evolution is
> simply part of the Biology lesson.
>
> In the UK, Anthropogenic climate change is not a Party question  either.
> People believe it whether they vote Tory or Labour. Still, how much people
> change their lives, etc., does vary, but that varies according to other
> issues; it is not a Party question.
>
> In Australia, Anthropogenic climate change is a Party question, even
> though this year right-wing political leaders no longer openly scorn
> climate science, but everyone knows this is skin deep. But like in the UK,
> Evolution is not a partisan question and eve the right-wing support public
> health (though it was not always so).
>
> The strategic questions, it seems to me are: (1) is it possible to break a
> single issue away from the partisan platform, and for example, get
> Republicans to support the teaching of Biology and sending their kids to
> science classes with an open mind? Even while they still support capital
> punishment and opposed abortion and public health? Or (2) Is it possible to
> lever a person away from their partisan position on a scientific or moral
> question, without asking for them to flip sides altogether? or (3) Is it
> easier to work for the entire defeat of a Party which opposes Science and
> Humanity (as we see it)?
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------
>
> *Andy Blunden*
> Hegel for Social Movements <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
> Home Page <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>
> On 29/09/2019 8:16 pm, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>
> Thanks Anne-Nelly, I had not read this one. Very telling!
>
> Alfredo
>
>
>
>
> On 29 Sep 2019, at 10:20, PERRET-CLERMONT Anne-Nelly <
> Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch> wrote:
>
> Alfredo,
>
> You probably remember  this very interesting report from a journalist :
>
>
> https://www.dailykos.com/story/2019/6/8/1863530/-A-close-family-member-votes-Republican-Now-I-understand-why-The-core-isn-t-bigotry-It-s-worse
>
> I like to mention it because it contributes to illustrate your point,
> shading light on powerful micro-mechanisms.
>
> Anne-Nelly
>
>
>
> Prof. emer. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont
>
> Institut de psychologie et éducation Faculté des lettres et sciences
> humaines
>
> Université de Neuchâtel
>
> Espace Tilo-Frey 1 (Anciennement: Espace Louis-Agassiz 1)
>
> CH- 2000 Neuchâtel (Suisse)
>
> http://www.unine.ch/ipe/publications/anne_nelly_perret_clermont
>
> A peine sorti de presse:
> https://www.socialinfo.ch/les-livres/38-agir-et-penser-avec-anne-nelly-perret-clermont.html
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *De : *<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil <
> a.j.gil@ils.uio.no>
> *Répondre à : *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >
> *Date : *dimanche, 29 septembre 2019 à 09:45
> *À : *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Cc : *Vadeboncoeur Jennifer <j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca>
> *Objet : *[Xmca-l] Re: Trust and Science
>
>
>
> Greg,
>
>
>
> Thanks, we are on the same page. But you write: «most climate change
> deniers are such because they feel that this is the ethically good and
> right position for humanity». I agree on the difficulties, but I would like
> to emphasize that being on the right or the wrong side in issues of climate
> change in today’s Global societies is a matter of having fallen pray to
> self-interested manipulation by others, or of being yourself one engaged in
> manipulating others for your own.
>
>
>
> When you pick up a scientific article (very unlikely if you are a denier)
> or a press article, and read that the Earth is warming due to human
> civilization, and then think, “nah, bullshit”, you most likely are inclined
> to infer that way cause that’s a cultural pattern of thinking
> characteristic of a group or community you belong to. There are out there
> many psychology studies showing the extent to which “opinions” on climate
> science vary not with respect to how much one knows or understand, but
> rather with respect to your religious and political affiliation (see, for
> example, https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1547 ).
>
>
>
> My point being that, when you deny climate change today, you engage in a
> practice that has a very definite historical origin and motive, namely the
> coordinated, systematic actions of a given set of fossil fuel corporations
> that, to this date, continue lobbying to advance their own interests,
> permeating through many spheres of civic life, including education:
>
>
> https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/sep/19/shell-and-exxons-secret-1980s-climate-change-warnings
>
>
> http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Greenpeace_Dealing-in-Doubt-1.pdf?53ea6e
>
>
>
> We know that the motives of these corporations never were the “feel that
> this is the ethically good and right position for humanity”. Or do we?
>
> Again, educating about (climate) **justice** and accountability may be
> crucial to the “critical” approach that has been mentioned in prior
> e-mails.
>
>
>
> I too would love seeing Jen V. chiming in on these matters.
>
> Alfredo
>
>
>
> *From: *<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Greg Thompson <
> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> *Reply to: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Date: *Sunday, 29 September 2019 at 04:15
> *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Cc: *Jennifer Vadeboncoeur <j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Trust and Science
>
>
>
> Alfredo and Artin, Yes and yes.
>
>
>
> Alfredo, yes, I wasn't suggesting doing without them, but simply that
> something more is needed perhaps an "ethical dimension" is needed
> (recognizing that such a thing is truly a hard fought accomplishment -
> right/wrong and good/evil seems so obvious from where we stand, but
> others will see differently; most climate change deniers are such because
> they feel that this is the ethically good and right position for humanity
> not because they see it as an evil and ethically wrong position).
>
>
>
> Artin, I wonder if Dr. Vadeboncoeur might be willing to chime in?? Sounds
> like a fascinating and important take on the issue. Or maybe you could
> point us to a reading?
>
>
>
> (and by coincidence, I had the delight of dealing with Dr. Vadebonceour's
> work in my data analysis class this week via LeCompte and Scheunsel's
> extensive use of her work to describe data analysis principles - my
> students found her work to be super interesting and very helpful for
> thinking about data analysis).
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> greg
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 28, 2019 at 9:19 AM Goncu, Artin <goncu@uic.edu> wrote:
>
>
>
> The varying meanings and potential abuses of the connection between
> imagination and trust appear to be activity specific.  This can be seen
> even in the same activity, i.e., trust and imagination may be abused.  For
> example, I took pains for many years to illustrate that children’s
> construction of intersubjectivity in social imaginative play requires trust
> in one another.  Children make the proleptic assumption that their
> potential partners are sincere, know something about the topics proposed
> for imaginative play, and will participate in the negotiations of assumed
> joint imaginative pasts and anticipated futures.  However, this may not
> always be the case.  As Schousboe showed, children may abuse play to
> institute their own abusive agendas as evidenced in her example of two five
> year old girls pretending that actual urine in a bottle was soda pop
>  trying to make a three year old girl to drink it.  This clearly supports
> exploring how we can/should inquire what Alfredo calls the third
> dimension.  More to the point, how do we teach right from wrong in shared
> imagination?  Vadeboncoeur has been addressing the moral dimensions of
> imagination in her recent work.
>
>
>
> Artin
>
>
>
> Artin Goncu, Ph.D
>
> Professor, Emeritus
>
> University of Illinois at Chicago
>
> www.artingoncu.com/
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:*xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] *On Behalf Of *Alfredo Jornet Gil
> *Sent:* Saturday, September 28, 2019 9:35 AM
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Trust and Science
>
>
>
> Yes, Greg, I agree there is all grounds and rights to question trust and
> imagination, but I am less inclined to think that we can do without them
> both. So, if there is a difference between imaginative propaganda aimed at
> confusing the public, and imaginative education that grows from hope and
> will for the common good, then perhaps we need a third element that
> discerns good from evil? Right from wrong? That may why, in order for
> people to actually engage in transformational action, what they need the
> most is not just to understand Climate Change, but most importantly,
> Climate Justice. Don’t you think?
>
>
>
> Alfredo
>
>
>
> *From: *<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Greg Thompson <
> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> *Reply to: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Date: *Saturday, 28 September 2019 at 16:05
> *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Trust and Science
>
>
>
> Note that there is a great deal of trust and imagination going on right
> now in the US. We have the most imaginative president we’ve had in years.
> He can imagine his way to bigly approval ratings and a massive inaugural
> turnout. He imagines that trying to get dirt on an opponent is a “beautiful
> conversation”. And if you watch the media these days, he has a cadre of
> others who are doing additional imagining for him as well - they are
> imagining what the DNC is trying to do to ouster this president, they are
> imagining what Joe Biden might really have been up to with that prosecutor.
> And what makes matters worst is that there is a rather large contingent of
> people in the US who trust this cadre of imaginative propagandists and who
> trust Trump and believe that they are the only ones who have the real truth.
>
> So I guess I’m suggesting there might be reason to question imagination
> and trust (and this all was heightened for me by a dip into the imaginative
> and trust-filled land of conservative talk radio yesterday - but you can
> find the same message from anyone who is a Trump truster - including a
> number of politicians who are playing the same game of avoiding the facts
> (no one on those talk shows actually repeated any of the damning words from
> Trumps phone call) while constructing an alternative narrative that
> listeners trust).
>
> Sadly,
>
> Greg
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 28, 2019 at 5:17 AM Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@ils.uio.no>
> wrote:
>
> Henry, all,
>
>
>
> Further resonating with Beth et al’s letter, and with what Henry and Andy
> just wrote, I too think the point at which trust and imagination meet is
> key.
>
>
>
> A couple of days ago, I watched, together with my two daughters (10 and 4
> years old respectively) segments of the *Right to a Future *event
> organized by The Intercept
> https://theintercept.com/2019/09/06/greta-thunberg-naomi-klein-climate-change-livestream/,
> where young and not-so-young activists and journalists discussed visions of
> 2029 if we, today, would lead radical change. It was a great chance to
> engage in some conversation with my children about these issues, specially
> with my older one; about hope and about the importance of fighting for
> justice.
>
>
>
> At some point in a follow-up conversation that we had in bed, right before
> sleep, we spoke about the good things that we still have with respect to
> nature and community, and I–perhaps not having considered my daughter’s
> limited awareness of the reach of the crisis–emphasized that it was
> important to value and enjoy those things we have in the present, when
> there is uncertainty as to the conditions that there will be in the near
> future. My daughter, very concerned, turned to me and, with what I felt was
> a mix of fair and skepticism, said: “but dad, are not people fixing the
> problem already so that everything will go well?”
>
>
>
> It truly broke my heart. I reassured her that we are working as hard as we
> can, but invited her not to stop reminding everyone that we cannot afford
> stop fighting.
>
>
>
> My daughter clearly exhibited her (rightful) habit of trust that adults
> address problems, that they’ll take care of us, that things will end well,
> or at least, that they’ll try their best. In terms of purely formal
> scientific testing, it turns out that my daughter’s hypothesis could easily
> be rejected, as it is rather the case that my parent’s generation did very
> little to address problems they were “aware” of (another discussion is what
> it is meant by “awareness” in cases such as being aware of the effects of
> fossil fuels and still accelerating their exploitation). Yet, it would
> totally be against the interest of science and society that my daughter
> loses that trust. For if she does, then I fear she will be incapable of
> imagining a thriving future to demand and fight for. I fear she will lose a
> firm ground for agency. Which teaches me that the pedagogy that can help in
> this context of crisis is one in which basic trust in the good faith and
> orientation towards the common good of expertise is restored, and that the
> only way to restore it is by indeed acting accordingly, reclaiming and
> occupying the agency and responsibility of making sure that younger and
> older can continue creatively imagining a future in which things will go
> well at the end.
>
>
>
> Alfredo
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Andy Blunden <
> andyb@marxists.org>
> *Reply to: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Date: *Saturday, 28 September 2019 at 04:38
> *To: *"xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Trust and Science
>
>
>
> Science is based on trust, isn't it, Henry. Only a handful of people have
> actually measured climate change, and then probably only one factor. If we
> have a picture of climate change at all, for scientists and non-scientists
> alike, it is only because we *trust* the institutions of science
> sufficiently. And yet, everyone on this list knows how wrong these
> institutions can be when it comes to the area of our own expertise. So
> "blind trust" is not enough, one needs "critical trust" so to speak, in
> order to know anything scientifically. Very demanding.
>
> Important as trust is, I am inclined to think trust and its absence are
> symptoms of even more fundamental societal characteristics, because it is
> never just a question of *how much* trust there is in a society, but *who*
> people trust. It seems that nowadays people  are very erratic about *who *they
> trust about *what *and who they do not trust.
>
> Probably the agreement you saw between Huw and me was probably pretty
> shaky, but we have a commonality in our trusted sources, we have worked
> together in the past and share basic respect for each other and for
> science. Workable agreement. I despair over what I see happening in the UK
> now, where MPs genuinely fear for their lives because of the level of
> hatred and division in the community, which is beginning to be even worse
> than what Trump has created in the US. A total breakdown in trust
> *alongside* tragically misplaced trust in a couple of utterly cynical
> criminals! The divisions are just as sharp here in Oz too, but it has not
> go to that frightening level of menace it has reached in the UK and US.
>
> Greta Thunberg talks of a plural, collective "we" in opposition to a
> singular personal "you." She brilliantly, in my opinion, turns this
> black-and-white condition of the world around in a manner which just could
> turn it into its negation. Her use of language at the UN is reminiscent of
> Churchill's "we fill fight them on the beaches ..." speech and Martin
> Luther King's "I have a dream" speech. There's something for you linguists
> to get your teeth into!
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------
>
> *Andy Blunden*
> Hegel for Social Movements <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
> Home Page <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>
> On 28/09/2019 2:42 am, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>
> Andy and Huw,
>
> This is a perfect example of what I was talking about in the discussion of
> your article on Academia: Two philosophers having a dialog about the same
> pholosophical object, a dialog manifesting an experience of common
> understanding. In the same way that two mathematicians might agree on a
> mathematical proof. I have to believe that you are not bull shitting, that
> you really have understood each other via your language. So, of course this
> is of interest to a linguist, even though he/I don’t really get the
> “proof”. I may not understand the arguments you are making, but I can
> imagine, based on slogging through thinking as a lingist, what it’s like to
> get it.
>
>
>
> I think this relates to the problem in the world of a lack of trust in
> scientific expertise, in expertise in general. Where concpetual thinking
> reigns. So many climate deniers. So many Brexiters. But can you blame them
> entirely? Probably it would be better to say that trust isn’t enough. The
> problem is a lack of connection between trust and the creative imagination.
> It’s what Beth Fernholt and her pals have sent to the New Yorker.
>
>
>
> Henry
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sep 27, 2019, at 6:40 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> Thanks, Huw.
>
> The interconnectedness of the "four concepts," I agree, they imply each
> other, but nonetheless, they remain distinct insights. Just because you get
> one, you don't necessarily get the others.
>
> Hegel uses the expression "true concept" only rarely. Generally, he simply
> uses the word "concept," and uses a variety of other terms like "mere
> conception" or "representation" or "category" to indicate something short
> of a concept, properly so called, but there is no strict categorisation for
> Hegel. Hegel is not talking about Psychology, let alone child psychology.
> Like with Vygotsky, all thought-forms (or forms of activity) are just
> phases (or stages) in the development of a concept. Reading your message, I
> think I am using the term "true concept" in much the same way you are.
>
> (This is not relevant to my article, but I distinguish "true concept" from
> "actual concept." All the various forms of "complexive thinking" fall
> short, so to speak, of "true concepts," and further development takes an
> abstract concept, such as learnt in lecture 101 of a topic, to an "actual
> concept". But that is not relevant here. Hegel barely touches on these
> issues.)
>
> I don't agree with your specific categories, but yes, for Vygotsky,
> chapters 4, 5 and 6 are all talking about concepts in a developmental
> sense. There are about 10 distinct stages for Vygotsky. And they are not
> equivalent to any series of stages identified by Hegel. Vgotsky's "stages"
> were drawn from a specific experiment with children; Hegel's Logic is cast
> somewhat differently (the Logic is not a series of stages) and has a domain
> much larger than Psychology.
>
> The experienced doctor does not use what I would call "formal concepts" in
> her work, which are what I would call the concepts they learnt in
> Diagnostics 101 when they were a student. After 20 years of experience,
> these formal concepts have accrued practical life experience, and remain
> true concepts, but are no longer "formal." Of course, the student was not
> taught pseudoconcepts in Diagnostics 101. But all this is nothing to do
> with the article in question.
>
> Hegel and Vygotsky are talking about different things, but even in terms
> of the subject matter, but especially in terms of the conceptual form,
> there is more Hegel in "Thinking and Speech" than initially meets the eye.
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------
>
> *Andy Blunden*
> Hegel for Social Movements <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
> Home Page <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>
> On 27/09/2019 4:32 pm, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>
> The "four concepts", for me, are four aspects of one understanding -- they
> imply each other.
>
>
>
> Quoting this passage:
>
>
> "The ‘abstract generality’ referred to above by Hegel, Vygotsky aptly
> called a ‘pseudoconcept’ - a form of abstract generalization, uniting
> objects by shared common features, which resembles conceptual thinking
> because, within a limited domain ofexperience, they subsume the same
> objects and situations as the true concept indicated by the same word.
> The pseudoconcept is not the exclusive achievement of the child. In our
> everyday lives, our thinking frequently occurs in pseudoconcepts. From the
> perspective of dialectical logic, the concepts that we find in our living
> speech are not concepts in the true sense of the word. They are actually
> general representations of things. There is no doubt, however, that these
> representations are a transitional stage between complexes or
> pseudoconcepts and true concepts. (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, p. 155)"
>
>
>
> My impression from your text, Andy, is that you are misreading Vygotsky's
> "Thinking and Speech". Implicit LSV's whole text of vol. 1 is an
> appreciation for different kinds of conception (3 levels: pseudo, formal,
> and dialectical), but the terminology of "concept" is only applied to the
> formal concept, i.e. where Vygotsky writes "concept" one can read "formal
> concept".
>
>
>
> In vol. 1, the analysis of the trajectory of the thought of the child is
> towards a growing achievement of employing formal concepts. These formal
> concepts are only called "true concepts" (not to be confused with Hegel's
> true concept) in relation to the pseudo (fake or untrue) formal concepts.
> The pseudo concepts pertain to a form of cognition that is considered by
> Vygotsky (quite sensibly) to precede the concepts of formal logic.  This is
> quite obvious to any thorough-going psychological reading of the text.
>
>
>
> However, within the frame of analysis of the text there is another form of
> conception which is Vygotsky's approach towards a dialectical
> understanding. None of Vygotsky's utterances about dialectics (in this
> volume) should be conflated with the "true concept" which he is using as a
> short-hand for the "true formal concept", similarly none of Vygotsky's
> utterances about "pseudo concepts" should be confused with formal concepts.
>
>
>
> I hope that helps,
>
> Huw
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, 21 Sep 2019 at 06:37, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>
> I'd dearly like to get some discussion going on this:
>
> It will be shown that at least four foundational concepts of Cultural
> Historical Activity Theory were previously formulated by Hegel, viz., (1)
> the unit of analysis as a key concept for analytic-synthetic cognition, (2)
> the centrality of artifact-mediated actions, (3) the definitive distinction
> between goal and motive in activities, and (4) the distinction between a
> true concept and a pseudoconcept.
>
>
> https://www.academia.edu/s/7d70db6eb3/the-hegelian-sources-of-cultural-historical-activity-theory
>
> Andy
>
> --
> ------------------------------
>
> *Andy Blunden*
> Hegel for Social Movements <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
> Home Page <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>
> Assistant Professor
>
> Department of Anthropology
>
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>
> Brigham Young University
>
> Provo, UT 84602
>
> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>
> Assistant Professor
>
> Department of Anthropology
>
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>
> Brigham Young University
>
> Provo, UT 84602
>
> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>
>

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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