[Xmca-l] Trust and Science
Andy Blunden
andyb@marxists.org
Fri Sep 27 19:32:34 PDT 2019
Science is based on trust, isn't it, Henry. Only a handful
of people have actually measured climate change, and then
probably only one factor. If we have a picture of climate
change at all, for scientists and non-scientists alike, it
is only because we /trust/ the institutions of science
sufficiently. And yet, everyone on this list knows how wrong
these institutions can be when it comes to the area of our
own expertise. So "blind trust" is not enough, one needs
"critical trust" so to speak, in order to know anything
scientifically. Very demanding.
Important as trust is, I am inclined to think trust and its
absence are symptoms of even more fundamental societal
characteristics, because it is never just a question of *how
much* trust there is in a society, but *who* people trust.
It seems that nowadays people are very erratic about *who
*they trust about *what *and who they do not trust.
Probably the agreement you saw between Huw and me was
probably pretty shaky, but we have a commonality in our
trusted sources, we have worked together in the past and
share basic respect for each other and for science. Workable
agreement. I despair over what I see happening in the UK
now, where MPs genuinely fear for their lives because of the
level of hatred and division in the community, which is
beginning to be even worse than what Trump has created in
the US. A total breakdown in trust *alongside* tragically
misplaced trust in a couple of utterly cynical criminals!
The divisions are just as sharp here in Oz too, but it has
not go to that frightening level of menace it has reached in
the UK and US.
Greta Thunberg talks of a plural, collective "we" in
opposition to a singular personal "you." She brilliantly, in
my opinion, turns this black-and-white condition of the
world around in a manner which just could turn it into its
negation. Her use of language at the UN is reminiscent of
Churchill's "we fill fight them on the beaches ..." speech
and Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech. There's
something for you linguists to get your teeth into!
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Hegel for Social Movements <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
Home Page <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
On 28/09/2019 2:42 am, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
> Andy and Huw,
> This is a perfect example of what I was talking about in
> the discussion of your article on Academia: Two
> philosophers having a dialog about the same pholosophical
> object, a dialog manifesting an experience of common
> understanding. In the same way that two mathematicians
> might agree on a mathematical proof. I have to believe
> that you are not bull shitting, that you really have
> understood each other via your language. So, of course
> this is of interest to a linguist, even though he/I don’t
> really get the “proof”. I may not understand the arguments
> you are making, but I can imagine, based on slogging
> through thinking as a lingist, what it’s like to get it.
>
> I think this relates to the problem in the world of a lack
> of trust in scientific expertise, in expertise in general.
> Where concpetual thinking reigns. So many climate deniers.
> So many Brexiters. But can you blame them entirely?
> Probably it would be better to say that trust isn’t
> enough. The problem is a lack of connection between trust
> and the creative imagination. It’s what Beth Fernholt and
> her pals have sent to the New Yorker.
>
> Henry
>
>
>> On Sep 27, 2019, at 6:40 AM, Andy Blunden
>> <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>
>> Thanks, Huw.
>>
>> The interconnectedness of the "four concepts," I agree,
>> they imply each other, but nonetheless, they remain
>> distinct insights. Just because you get one, you don't
>> necessarily get the others.
>>
>> Hegel uses the expression "true concept" only rarely.
>> Generally, he simply uses the word "concept," and uses a
>> variety of other terms like "mere conception" or
>> "representation" or "category" to indicate something
>> short of a concept, properly so called, but there is no
>> strict categorisation for Hegel. Hegel is not talking
>> about Psychology, let alone child psychology. Like with
>> Vygotsky, all thought-forms (or forms of activity) are
>> just phases (or stages) in the development of a concept.
>> Reading your message, I think I am using the term "true
>> concept" in much the same way you are.
>>
>> (This is not relevant to my article, but I distinguish
>> "true concept" from "actual concept." All the various
>> forms of "complexive thinking" fall short, so to speak,
>> of "true concepts," and further development takes an
>> abstract concept, such as learnt in lecture 101 of a
>> topic, to an "actual concept". But that is not relevant
>> here. Hegel barely touches on these issues.)
>>
>> I don't agree with your specific categories, but yes, for
>> Vygotsky, chapters 4, 5 and 6 are all talking about
>> concepts in a developmental sense. There are about 10
>> distinct stages for Vygotsky. And they are not equivalent
>> to any series of stages identified by Hegel. Vgotsky's
>> "stages" were drawn from a specific experiment with
>> children; Hegel's Logic is cast somewhat differently (the
>> Logic is not a series of stages) and has a domain much
>> larger than Psychology.
>>
>> The experienced doctor does not use what I would call
>> "formal concepts" in her work, which are what I would
>> call the concepts they learnt in Diagnostics 101 when
>> they were a student. After 20 years of experience, these
>> formal concepts have accrued practical life experience,
>> and remain true concepts, but are no longer "formal." Of
>> course, the student was not taught pseudoconcepts in
>> Diagnostics 101. But all this is nothing to do with the
>> article in question.
>>
>> Hegel and Vygotsky are talking about different things,
>> but even in terms of the subject matter, but especially
>> in terms of the conceptual form, there is more Hegel in
>> "Thinking and Speech" than initially meets the eye.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> Hegel for Social Movements
>> <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
>> Home Page
>> <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>> On 27/09/2019 4:32 pm, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>>> The "four concepts", for me, are four aspects of one
>>> understanding -- they imply each other.
>>>
>>> Quoting this passage:
>>>
>>> "The ‘abstract generality’ referred to above by Hegel,
>>> Vygotsky aptly called a ‘pseudoconcept’ - a form of
>>> abstract generalization, uniting objects by shared
>>> common features, which resembles conceptual thinking
>>> because, within a limited domain ofexperience, they
>>> subsume the same objects and situations as the true
>>> concept indicated by the same word.
>>> The pseudoconcept is not the exclusive achievement of
>>> the child. In our everyday lives, our thinking
>>> frequently occurs in pseudoconcepts. From the
>>> perspective of dialectical logic, the concepts that we
>>> find in our living speech are not concepts in the true
>>> sense of the word. They are actually general
>>> representations of things. There is no doubt, however,
>>> that these representations are a transitional stage
>>> between complexes or pseudoconcepts and true concepts.
>>> (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, p. 155)"
>>>
>>> My impression from your text, Andy, is that you are
>>> misreading Vygotsky's "Thinking and Speech". Implicit
>>> LSV's whole text of vol. 1 is an appreciation for
>>> different kinds of conception (3 levels: pseudo, formal,
>>> and dialectical), but the terminology of "concept" is
>>> only applied to the formal concept, i.e. where Vygotsky
>>> writes "concept" one can read "formal concept".
>>>
>>> In vol. 1, the analysis of the trajectory of the thought
>>> of the child is towards a growing achievement of
>>> employing formal concepts. These formal concepts are
>>> only called "true concepts" (not to be confused with
>>> Hegel's true concept) in relation to the pseudo (fake or
>>> untrue) formal concepts. The pseudo concepts pertain to
>>> a form of cognition that is considered by Vygotsky
>>> (quite sensibly) to precede the concepts of formal
>>> logic. This is quite obvious to any thorough-going
>>> psychological reading of the text.
>>>
>>> However, within the frame of analysis of the text there
>>> is another form of conception which is Vygotsky's
>>> approach towards a dialectical understanding. None of
>>> Vygotsky's utterances about dialectics (in this volume)
>>> should be conflated with the "true concept" which he is
>>> using as a short-hand for the "true formal concept",
>>> similarly none of Vygotsky's utterances about "pseudo
>>> concepts" should be confused with formal concepts.
>>>
>>> I hope that helps,
>>> Huw
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, 21 Sep 2019 at 06:37, Andy Blunden
>>> <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>> I'd dearly like to get some discussion going on this:
>>>
>>> It will be shown that at least four foundational
>>> concepts of Cultural Historical Activity Theory
>>> were previously formulated by Hegel, viz., (1)
>>> the unit of analysis as a key concept for
>>> analytic-synthetic cognition, (2) the centrality
>>> of artifact-mediated actions, (3) the definitive
>>> distinction between goal and motive in
>>> activities, and (4) the distinction between a
>>> true concept and a pseudoconcept.
>>>
>>> https://www.academia.edu/s/7d70db6eb3/the-hegelian-sources-of-cultural-historical-activity-theory
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> --
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> Hegel for Social Movements
>>> <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
>>> Home Page
>>> <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
>>>
>
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