From anamshane@gmail.com Wed May 1 08:40:50 2019 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 15:40:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Message-ID: Dear friends, I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. ?This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into them with their mind and heart.? (Palgrave - https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) What do you think? Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190501/ebe498a3/attachment.html From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed May 1 09:34:12 2019 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 10:34:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ana, This looks lovely. I wonder if you might have a few moments to explain to us the notion of "ethical ontological dialogism"? I'm sure it would take an entire book to properly explain (hence, well, this book), but it would be nice if you might be able to offer a few paragraphs, or maybe even just a few sentences? -greg On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 9:42 AM Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote: > Dear friends, > > > > I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana > Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic > Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. > > ?This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical > practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. > Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational > practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors > provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired > classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational > relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in > which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of > innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, > Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which > the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing > dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into > them with their mind and heart.? (Palgrave - > https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) > > What do you think? > > > > Ana > > > > -- > > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > > Phone: 267-334-2905 > > Email: anamshane@gmail.com > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190501/d79ec0a0/attachment.html From Peg.Griffin@att.net Wed May 1 10:14:29 2019 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 13:14:29 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] May I via PS Message-ID: <003101d50041$5701fd00$0505f700$@att.net> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ly5ZKjjxMNM https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iAIM02kv0g Peg -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190501/000f8180/attachment.html From bferholt@gmail.com Wed May 1 10:22:38 2019 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 13:22:38 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: May I via PS In-Reply-To: <003101d50041$5701fd00$0505f700$@att.net> References: <003101d50041$5701fd00$0505f700$@att.net> Message-ID: Thanks! Beth On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 1:16 PM Peg Griffin wrote: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ly5ZKjjxMNM > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iAIM02kv0g > > > > Peg > > > -- Beth Ferholt (pronouns: she/her/hers) Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Affiliated Faculty, Program in Urban Education, CUNY Graduate Center Affiliated Faculty, School of Education and Communication, J?nk?ping University Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu CC bferholt@gmail.com if writing to CUNY address. Phone: (718) 951-5205 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190501/f1b90064/attachment.html From bferholt@gmail.com Wed May 1 10:33:23 2019 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 13:33:23 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: May I via PS In-Reply-To: References: <003101d50041$5701fd00$0505f700$@att.net> Message-ID: New Pete Seeger film by my classmate, BTW: https://vimeo.com/261693837. Beth On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 1:22 PM Beth Ferholt wrote: > Thanks! Beth > > On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 1:16 PM Peg Griffin wrote: > >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ly5ZKjjxMNM >> >> >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iAIM02kv0g >> >> >> >> Peg >> >> >> > > > -- > Beth Ferholt (pronouns: she/her/hers) > Associate Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Affiliated Faculty, Program in Urban Education, CUNY Graduate Center > Affiliated Faculty, School of Education and Communication, J?nk?ping > University > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > CC bferholt@gmail.com if writing to CUNY address. > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > -- Beth Ferholt (pronouns: she/her/hers) Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Affiliated Faculty, Program in Urban Education, CUNY Graduate Center Affiliated Faculty, School of Education and Communication, J?nk?ping University Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu CC bferholt@gmail.com if writing to CUNY address. Phone: (718) 951-5205 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190501/be259c1f/attachment.html From goncu@uic.edu Wed May 1 18:52:09 2019 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 01:52:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Congratulations, dear Ana, Eugene, and Mikhail. It looks wonderful. With best wishes, ag Artin Goncu, Ph.D Professor, Emeritus University of Illinois at Chicago www.artingoncu.com/ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ana Marjanovic-Shane Sent: Wednesday, May 1, 2019 8:41 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Dear friends, I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. "This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into them with their mind and heart." (Palgrave - https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) What do you think? Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190502/991fb136/attachment.html From goncu@uic.edu Wed May 1 18:58:00 2019 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 01:58:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ditto! ag From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Wednesday, May 1, 2019 9:34 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Ana, This looks lovely. I wonder if you might have a few moments to explain to us the notion of "ethical ontological dialogism"? I'm sure it would take an entire book to properly explain (hence, well, this book), but it would be nice if you might be able to offer a few paragraphs, or maybe even just a few sentences? -greg On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 9:42 AM Ana Marjanovic-Shane > wrote: Dear friends, I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. ?This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into them with their mind and heart.? (Palgrave - https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) What do you think? Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190502/7a0613ea/attachment.html From a.j.gil@ils.uio.no Thu May 2 12:05:26 2019 From: a.j.gil@ils.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 19:05:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1556823926451.95427@ils.uio.no> Looks great, Ana, thanks for sharing! ?Alfredo ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ana Marjanovic-Shane Sent: 01 May 2019 17:40 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Dear friends, I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. "This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into them with their mind and heart." (Palgrave - https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) What do you think? Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190502/bcae826f/attachment.html From anamshane@gmail.com Thu May 2 12:35:35 2019 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 19:35:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: <1556823926451.95427@ils.uio.no> References: <1556823926451.95427@ils.uio.no> Message-ID: Dear Alfredo, Thanks! Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com From: "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu" on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date: Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 3:07 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Looks great, Ana, thanks for sharing! ?Alfredo ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ana Marjanovic-Shane Sent: 01 May 2019 17:40 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Dear friends, I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. ?This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into them with their mind and heart.? (Palgrave - https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) What do you think? Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190502/09987476/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu May 2 14:34:58 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 06:34:58 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: <1556823926451.95427@ils.uio.no> Message-ID: Greg--I don't think your question should be ignored: it's a good one, and besides I know that you are very interested in the way the worm can ontological turn. About five years ago, Fang and I went to the Fourth Interdisciplinary Conference on the work of Bakhtin: Perspectives and Limitations. Like most good conferences, there was, in the background, something of a theoretical kerfuffle going on. "Ontological" Bakhtinians (Matusov, but also Ana herself) made the case for dialogue on purely existential grounds: dialogue is an essential condition of human life, and revealing this in pedagogy was simply a matter of truth-telling. There is always dialogue in every interaction, and ethically no dialogue can be hierarchical in its essence. But the "epistemological" Bakhtinians (Rupert Wegerif, and at the time Fang and myself) considered dialogue to be a way of knowing among other ways of knowing: the interpersonal middle point of a continuum which includes both the extreme dialogic pole of intra-personal communication and the extreme monologic pole of written speech. I think that's what "ethical ontological dialogism" refers to. But since I am of the epistemological school, I am ready to stand corrected! David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 4:38 AM Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote: > Dear Alfredo, > > > > Thanks! > > > > Ana > > > > -- > > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > > Phone: 267-334-2905 > > Email: anamshane@gmail.com > > > > > > *From: *"xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu" > on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > *Reply-To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Date: *Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 3:07 PM > *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic > Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators > > > > Looks great, Ana, thanks for sharing! > > ?Alfredo > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ana Marjanovic-Shane > *Sent:* 01 May 2019 17:40 > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research > Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators > > > > Dear friends, > > > > I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana > Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic > Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. > > ?This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical > practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. > Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational > practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors > provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired > classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational > relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in > which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of > innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, > Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which > the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing > dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into > them with their mind and heart.? (Palgrave - > https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) > > What do you think? > > > > Ana > > > > -- > > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > > Phone: 267-334-2905 > > Email: anamshane@gmail.com > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190503/53cd19cc/attachment.html From anamshane@gmail.com Tue May 7 18:42:18 2019 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:42:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Greg and all, Thanks a lot! What an interesting invitation to write directly on the notion of ?ethical ontological dialogism.? I know that by now you probably thought I was ignoring your question, but in fact it took me a little time to write about it in a very short way. EOD (Ethical Ontological Dialogism) is an approach to human studies that is in many ways different from CHAT, so I am always anxious that it may sound very strange to the XMCA community, and I tried to be as clear as possible. But you will judge how successful I was in that. My reply is probably very long for an email, it is an outline of a paper, references and all. So if you are not interested, stop right here. But if you are, I am really curious to hear your comments. What is ?ethical ontological dialogism?? To me Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD) means to be in a dialogue in which one relates to all participants of a pedagogical event (students, teachers) as ?a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, [that] combine but are not merged in the unity of the event? (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6, italics are in the original). This implies that people in dialogue take each other seriously, and with an awareness that ?[c]onsciousnesses themselves cannot be equal to each other ? only their rights?because consciousnesses are unique, immeasurable, unfinalizable and opaque both to oneself and to each other? (Matusov, 2018, p. 1478). This is true not only for the immediate participants in a pedagogical (and other) events, but is also true for the researcher who joins these dialogues with his/her heart and mind in a new, now scholarly, event of studying the original dialogic encounters. But let me backtrack for a moment to provide some background for this claim (which I will repeat below). In our book Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019), we attempt to transcend the main problem of positivism in the social sciences. Paradoxically, the positivist focus on the given (e.g. the positive) in its search for truth, is its greatest strength, and also its greatest limitation! This ?given truth? which is assumed to exist in itself, outside of any human observation and knowledge, has to be reached in its ?pure? form, uncontaminated by anyone?s subjectivity or ideological/religious dogma that could distort it. To achieve this, positivist science scrupulously follows methods that gradually lead to de-subjectification of the truth. Latour described science-in-action as a practice of cleaning out researchers? statements about studied phenomenon from the researchers? subjectivity through a special discursive practice in a scientific community (Latour, 1987). However, it is exactly this practice of the modern positivist approach that effectively limits this approach and keeps it from reaching the very human core of people?s existence, i.e. their constant unique and authorial participation in dialogic meaning-making. Elsewhere my colleagues and I claimed that dialogism can and must transcend the pitfalls of positivism/modernism in approaching the study of human meaning-making (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, & Curtis, 2019). Positivist/modernist assumption about meaning-making is based on the concept of pattern recognition, i.e. the notion that meaning can be extracted from the self-contained, given patterns (cognitive, linguistic, communicational, etc.) (Gee, 2014; Kahneman, 2011; Linell, 2009, and others; Vygotsky, 1986, 2004; Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). Positivism ?tries to capture the ?objective,? the ?given,? ?how things really are,? the phenomenon as it is in its essence, independent of anyone?s subjectivity? (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, et al., 2019, p. E54). However, the humanness cannot be objectivized, because humanness means constantly creating and re-creating unique relationships with others by giving recognition to each other?s authorial subjectivities and taking responsibility for one?s own critically important voice in dialogue. This never-ending meaning-making that is a mark of people?s humanity, is NOT the given and cannot be studied as a given. It does not exist outside of the moment of its making nor outside of the particular human beings that make it. It cannot be ?captured? as an object. Dialogic meaning-making can be only joined in the never-ending and unrestricted dialogue, in which ?[t]ruth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable? (Morson, 2004). Furthermore, trying to capture the other?s humanity as an object, according to Bakhtin is not just a futile exercise! It is also deeply unethical! Let me use Bakhtin?s analysis of a small episode from Dostoyevsky?s Brothers Karamazov. ?? in Alyosha's conversation with Liza about Captain Snegirev, who had trampled underfoot the money offered him. Having told the story, Alyosha analyzes Snegirev's emotional state and, as it were, predetermines his further behavior by predicting that next time he would without fail take the money. To this Liza replies: . . . Listen, Alexey Fyodorovich. Isn't there in all our analysis?I mean your analysis . . . no, better call it ours?aren't we showing contempt for him, for that poor man?in analyzing his soul like this, as it were, from above, eh? In deciding so certainly that he will take the money? [SS IX, 271-72; The Brothers Karamazov, Book Five, I]? (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 60). Bakhtin commented on this episode from Dostoyevskian novel that there is something deeply monological and unethical, full of contempt, when one takes a ?position from above? towards the other and begins to calculate that other person, her/his desires, motives, thoughts, positions, plans? Bakhtin argued that Dostoyevsky was developing the implicit concept of what does it mean to have an ethical stance toward others though many of his characters across all of his novels and stories. Bakhtin claimed that the ultimate breach of ethics toward the other is to calculate, finalize, objectify, and predict the other, ??a living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process. In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal [in dialogue with others], in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition? (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 58, italics in the otriginal). However, is the goal of social science to calculate, finalize, objectify, and predict people?s subjectivities?! Bakhtin described how a Dostoyevskian approach to life and to the others, runs against the very core of psychology as a science, from the day its emergence in the 19th century, which does exactly that: attempting to turn the other human being?s soul into a calculatable object, Toward the psychology of his [Dostoevsky?s] day?as it was expressed in scientific and artistic literature, and as it was practiced in the law courts?Dostoevsky had no sympathy at all. He saw in it a degrading reification of a person's soul, a discounting of its freedom and its unfinalizability, and of that peculiar indeterminacy and indefiniteness which in Dostoevsky constitute the main object of representation: for in fact Dostoevsky always represents a person on the threshold of a final decision, at a moment of crisis, at an unfinalizable?and unpredeterminate?turning point for his soul (ibid, p. 61). Although Bakhtin described Dostoyevsky?s thoughts of more than 100 years ago, this ethical stance can be applied to the psychology of today, too, including sociocultural psychology, in my view. By definition, psychology is about objectivizing people, i.e. reducing them to predictable and calculatable, voiceless ?categories? ?mechanisms,? ?processes,? ?developmental stages,? ?what is shaped by culture, institution, history,? etc. Contemporary psychology (from the times of Dostoyevsky and Bakhtin to our times today), and much of education, studies the cultural, institutional, biological, political, historical, psychological GIVEN. It deals with the objectifiable aspects of humans, attempting to reify them by effectively excluding their authorial voices from serious dialogues and talking about them and to them, but not addressing them and taking their voices into account. Bakhtin wrote, The truth about a man in the mouths of others, not directed to him dialogically and therefore a secondhand truth, becomes a lie degrading and deadening him, if it touches upon his "holy of holies," that is, "the man in man." (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 59) When we talk to a child not with our sincere interest and curiosity about his/her unique experiences, joys, desires, sorrows, fears, hopes, dreams, aspirations, feelings, thoughts, but, rather to ?package? her/his unique subjectivity into objective, calculatable and manipulatable categories-boxes (e.g. coding), we are not studying humanity ? what makes us uniquely human. In the eyes of Russian contemporary educationalist Alexander Lobok, this means that we are actually outside of the world of deeply human subjective experience, The problem with this conventional approach to psychology, however, is that the human being is the only ?object? in the Universe that is defined by a subjective cognizing world of her or his own, building above the subjective lived experiences and feelings and redefining them ? a world, unique for each person, which cannot possibly be viewed from outside, except for some of its outward objective artifact manifestations of this subjective cognizing world. (Lobok, 2017, p. SIa:2). The main problem with conventional social sciences is that they study what is objective (positive, given) in humans. They study objective subjectivity. In itself there is nothing wrong with that when it is viewed as a study of human limitations rather than human essence and potential. As a study of human limitations, conventional social sciences are very helpful. However, they are highly distortive, harmful, and, arguably, unethical when they claim to study the whole person. Genuine social science must address ?the surplus of humanness? (Bakhtin, 1991, p. 37). ?The surplus of humanness? is ?a leftover? from the biologically, socially, culturally, historically, and psychologically given ? the typical and general ? in the human nature. It is about the human authorship of the ever-unique meaning-making (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, et al., 2019). The concept of ethical ontological dialogism is aimed at addressing the described problem of objective subjectivity studied by conventional social sciences. Ontological dialogic pedagogy inspired by Bakhtin aspires to be a pedagogy of ethical ontological dialogism. As I stated at the start of this short outline, to me Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD) means to be in dialogue in which one relates to all participants of a pedagogical event (students, teachers) as ?a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, [that] combine but are not merged in the unity of the event? (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6, italics are in the original). People in genuine dialogue take each other seriously, and with an awareness that ?[c]onsciousnesses themselves cannot be equal to each other ? only their rights?because consciousnesses are unique, immeasurable, unfinalizable and opaque both to oneself and to each other? (Matusov, 2018, p. 1478). In genuine dialogue, participants expect to be surprised by the other, her/his unique ideas, views, desires, hopes, fears, etc. For me, ethical ontological dialogism is about authorial meaning-making where meaning emerges in the relationship ?between genuinely interested questions and seriously provided answers? (Matusov, 2018, p. 1478) where people in a dialogic encounter recognize each other as creatively and/or critically authoring their views and truths. In an authorial meaning-making encounter, participants address each other by making bids for their emerging ideas, points of view, questions, etc., and by seriously responding to these bids by recognizing their importance and providing their evaluations and questions (Matusov, 2019 in preparation; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). Serious recognition of the other?s ideas establishes the existence the other?s creative and/or critical authorship (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017), it gives it a life. Serious recognition of the other?s creative and/or critical ideas, opinions, desires, dreams, plans and questions is an expression of a genuine interest in the other?s voice and ideas. Such a genuine interest also opens a way to find new meanings in one?s own ideas and truths, recognize something about them that would otherwise stay invisible and unrecognized, or inspire completely new, transcendent meanings. Ethical ontological dialogism is rooted not only in the recognition of the authorship of the one?s own and others? bids for meaning, but also in taking responsibility for one?s own views, ideas, desires, judgments and decisions that may result from them. Bakhtin?s motto ?There is no alibi in being? (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40) expresses this dialogic responsibility, a responsibility that comes from being unique, unrepeatable, once-occurrent and irreplaceable human being, whose participation in dialogue is both acknowledged/recognized and indispensable. Bakhtin wrote, I occupy a place in once-occurrent Being that is unique and never-repeatable, a place that cannot be taken by anyone else and is impenetrable for anyone else. In the given once-occurrent point where I am now located, no one else has ever been located in the once-occurrent time and once-occurrent space of once-occurrent Being. [?]. That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone else. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40) Ethical ontological dialogism is about recognizing the uniqueness of the participants and of each moment of dialogic meaning-making. Moreover, it recognizes the responsibility of dialogic partners to be answerable for their unique, unrepeatable and irreplaceable dialogic offers, recognitions, evaluations and judgments. For me, ethical ontological dialogism is an approach to life, to educational practice, and to the study of human meaning-making in general, including education, psychology, sociology and other human sciences. What do you think? Ana References Bakhtin, M. M. (1991). The dialogic imagination: Four essays by M. M. Bakhtin (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Bakhtin, M. M. (1993). Toward a philosophy of the act (V. Liapunov & M. Holquist, Trans. 1st ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press. Bakhtin, M. M. (1999). Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics (Vol. 8). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bakhtin, M. M., & Emerson, C. (1999). Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics (Vol. 8). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gee, J. P. (2014). An introduction to discourse analysis : theory and method (Fourth edition. ed.). New York: Routledge. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow (1st ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically : interactional and contextual theories of human sense-making. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Pub. Lobok, A. (2017). The Cartography of Inner Childhood: Fragments from the book. Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal, 5, SIa: 1-42. Matusov, E. (2018). Ethic authorial dialogism as a candidate for post-postmodernism. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 50 (14), 1478?1479. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2018.1461367 Matusov, E. (2019 in preparation). Students and teachers as authors in a Bakhtinian critical dialogue. Matusov, E., & Marjanovic-Shane, A. (2017). Dialogic authorial approach to creativity in education: Transforming a deadly homework into a creative activity. In V. Glaveanu (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Creativity and Culture Research (pp. 307-325): Palgrave. Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., & Gradovski, M. (2019). Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research art: Bakhtin by and for Educators: Palgrave Macmillan US. Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., Kullenberg, T., & Curtis, K. (2019). Dialogic analysis vs. discourse analysis of dialogic pedagogy (and beyond). Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal, 7, E20-E62. doi:10.5195/dpj.2019.272 Morson, G. S. (2004). The process of ideological becoming. In A. F. Ball & S. W. Freedman (Eds.), Bakhtinian perspectives on language, literacy, and learning (pp. 317-331). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language. lxi, 287 p. Vygotsky, L. S. (2004). Imagination and creativity in childhood. Journal of Russian and Eastern European Psychology, 42(1), 7 - 97. Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1994). Tool and Symbol in Child Development. In R. Van Der Veer & J. Valsiner (Eds.), The Vygotsky Reader (pp. 73-98). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com From: "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu" on behalf of Greg Thompson Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date: Wednesday, May 1, 2019 at 12:37 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Ana, This looks lovely. I wonder if you might have a few moments to explain to us the notion of "ethical ontological dialogism"? I'm sure it would take an entire book to properly explain (hence, well, this book), but it would be nice if you might be able to offer a few paragraphs, or maybe even just a few sentences? -greg On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 9:42 AM Ana Marjanovic-Shane > wrote: Dear friends, I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. ?This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into them with their mind and heart.? (Palgrave - https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) What do you think? Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190508/aa6ebf98/attachment.html From dkirsh@lsu.edu Tue May 7 22:38:31 2019 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 05:38:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ana, Let me add my congratulations to you, Eugene, and Mikhail on this latest publication. Your description of ethical ontological dialogism (EOD) and your motives in exploring it are compelling, and doubtless will draw much commentary from XMCA. I suspect your inclusion of "sociocultural psychology [as scientific in the sense of] ... objectivizing people, i.e. reducing them to predictable and calculatable, voiceless 'categories' 'mechanisms,' 'processes,' 'developmental stages,' 'what is shaped by culture, institution, history'" will sting for some who have sought an ethical engagement in psychology through sociocultural psychology. If the discourse of XMCA can be taken as a guide, sociocultural theory is broadly open to philosophical conversation, and therefore not insulated within itself in the manner of traditional science. So it is as difficult to count sociocultural theory as reductive as it is to characterize it as scientific. The ethical challenge you undertake in EOD is fraught. There's tremendous resistance to asserting a point of view that obscures or damages each child's "unique experiences, joys, desires, sorrows, fears, hopes, dreams, aspirations, feelings, thoughts [by] 'packag[ing]' her/his unique subjectivity into objective, calculatable and manipulatable categories-boxes." But does this not, then, render invisible the subject relations framed by institutional schooling that enmesh you and the child? Does it not leave unexamined the cultural position that frames your own ethical stance, and hence your posture of openness to the child? Do you not tremble at the selflessness this posture demands? David From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu On Behalf Of Ana Marjanovic-Shane Sent: Tuesday, May 7, 2019 8:42 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Eugene Matusov ; mikhail.gradovski@uis.no Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Dear Greg and all, Thanks a lot! What an interesting invitation to write directly on the notion of "ethical ontological dialogism." I know that by now you probably thought I was ignoring your question, but in fact it took me a little time to write about it in a very short way. EOD (Ethical Ontological Dialogism) is an approach to human studies that is in many ways different from CHAT, so I am always anxious that it may sound very strange to the XMCA community, and I tried to be as clear as possible. But you will judge how successful I was in that. My reply is probably very long for an email, it is an outline of a paper, references and all. So if you are not interested, stop right here. But if you are, I am really curious to hear your comments. What is "ethical ontological dialogism?" To me Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD) means to be in a dialogue in which one relates to all participants of a pedagogical event (students, teachers) as "a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, [that] combine but are not merged in the unity of the event" (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6, italics are in the original). This implies that people in dialogue take each other seriously, and with an awareness that "[c]onsciousnesses themselves cannot be equal to each other - only their rights-because consciousnesses are unique, immeasurable, unfinalizable and opaque both to oneself and to each other" (Matusov, 2018, p. 1478). This is true not only for the immediate participants in a pedagogical (and other) events, but is also true for the researcher who joins these dialogues with his/her heart and mind in a new, now scholarly, event of studying the original dialogic encounters. But let me backtrack for a moment to provide some background for this claim (which I will repeat below). In our book Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019), we attempt to transcend the main problem of positivism in the social sciences. Paradoxically, the positivist focus on the given (e.g. the positive) in its search for truth, is its greatest strength, and also its greatest limitation! This "given truth" which is assumed to exist in itself, outside of any human observation and knowledge, has to be reached in its "pure" form, uncontaminated by anyone's subjectivity or ideological/religious dogma that could distort it. To achieve this, positivist science scrupulously follows methods that gradually lead to de-subjectification of the truth. Latour described science-in-action as a practice of cleaning out researchers' statements about studied phenomenon from the researchers' subjectivity through a special discursive practice in a scientific community (Latour, 1987). However, it is exactly this practice of the modern positivist approach that effectively limits this approach and keeps it from reaching the very human core of people's existence, i.e. their constant unique and authorial participation in dialogic meaning-making. Elsewhere my colleagues and I claimed that dialogism can and must transcend the pitfalls of positivism/modernism in approaching the study of human meaning-making (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, & Curtis, 2019). Positivist/modernist assumption about meaning-making is based on the concept of pattern recognition, i.e. the notion that meaning can be extracted from the self-contained, given patterns (cognitive, linguistic, communicational, etc.) (Gee, 2014; Kahneman, 2011; Linell, 2009, and others; Vygotsky, 1986, 2004; Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). Positivism "tries to capture the 'objective,' the 'given,' 'how things really are,' the phenomenon as it is in its essence, independent of anyone's subjectivity" (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, et al., 2019, p. E54). However, the humanness cannot be objectivized, because humanness means constantly creating and re-creating unique relationships with others by giving recognition to each other's authorial subjectivities and taking responsibility for one's own critically important voice in dialogue. This never-ending meaning-making that is a mark of people's humanity, is NOT the given and cannot be studied as a given. It does not exist outside of the moment of its making nor outside of the particular human beings that make it. It cannot be "captured" as an object. Dialogic meaning-making can be only joined in the never-ending and unrestricted dialogue, in which "[t]ruth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable" (Morson, 2004). Furthermore, trying to capture the other's humanity as an object, according to Bakhtin is not just a futile exercise! It is also deeply unethical! Let me use Bakhtin's analysis of a small episode from Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov. "... in Alyosha's conversation with Liza about Captain Snegirev, who had trampled underfoot the money offered him. Having told the story, Alyosha analyzes Snegirev's emotional state and, as it were, predetermines his further behavior by predicting that next time he would without fail take the money. To this Liza replies: . . . Listen, Alexey Fyodorovich. Isn't there in all our analysis-I mean your analysis . . . no, better call it ours-aren't we showing contempt for him, for that poor man-in analyzing his soul like this, as it were, from above, eh? In deciding so certainly that he will take the money? [SS IX, 271-72; The Brothers Karamazov, Book Five, I]" (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 60). Bakhtin commented on this episode from Dostoyevskian novel that there is something deeply monological and unethical, full of contempt, when one takes a "position from above" towards the other and begins to calculate that other person, her/his desires, motives, thoughts, positions, plans... Bakhtin argued that Dostoyevsky was developing the implicit concept of what does it mean to have an ethical stance toward others though many of his characters across all of his novels and stories. Bakhtin claimed that the ultimate breach of ethics toward the other is to calculate, finalize, objectify, and predict the other, "...a living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process. In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal [in dialogue with others], in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition" (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 58, italics in the otriginal). However, is the goal of social science to calculate, finalize, objectify, and predict people's subjectivities?! Bakhtin described how a Dostoyevskian approach to life and to the others, runs against the very core of psychology as a science, from the day its emergence in the 19th century, which does exactly that: attempting to turn the other human being's soul into a calculatable object, Toward the psychology of his [Dostoevsky's] day-as it was expressed in scientific and artistic literature, and as it was practiced in the law courts-Dostoevsky had no sympathy at all. He saw in it a degrading reification of a person's soul, a discounting of its freedom and its unfinalizability, and of that peculiar indeterminacy and indefiniteness which in Dostoevsky constitute the main object of representation: for in fact Dostoevsky always represents a person on the threshold of a final decision, at a moment of crisis, at an unfinalizable-and unpredeterminate-turning point for his soul (ibid, p. 61). Although Bakhtin described Dostoyevsky's thoughts of more than 100 years ago, this ethical stance can be applied to the psychology of today, too, including sociocultural psychology, in my view. By definition, psychology is about objectivizing people, i.e. reducing them to predictable and calculatable, voiceless "categories" "mechanisms," "processes," "developmental stages," "what is shaped by culture, institution, history," etc. Contemporary psychology (from the times of Dostoyevsky and Bakhtin to our times today), and much of education, studies the cultural, institutional, biological, political, historical, psychological GIVEN. It deals with the objectifiable aspects of humans, attempting to reify them by effectively excluding their authorial voices from serious dialogues and talking about them and to them, but not addressing them and taking their voices into account. Bakhtin wrote, The truth about a man in the mouths of others, not directed to him dialogically and therefore a secondhand truth, becomes a lie degrading and deadening him, if it touches upon his "holy of holies," that is, "the man in man." (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 59) When we talk to a child not with our sincere interest and curiosity about his/her unique experiences, joys, desires, sorrows, fears, hopes, dreams, aspirations, feelings, thoughts, but, rather to "package" her/his unique subjectivity into objective, calculatable and manipulatable categories-boxes (e.g. coding), we are not studying humanity - what makes us uniquely human. In the eyes of Russian contemporary educationalist Alexander Lobok, this means that we are actually outside of the world of deeply human subjective experience, The problem with this conventional approach to psychology, however, is that the human being is the only 'object' in the Universe that is defined by a subjective cognizing world of her or his own, building above the subjective lived experiences and feelings and redefining them - a world, unique for each person, which cannot possibly be viewed from outside, except for some of its outward objective artifact manifestations of this subjective cognizing world. (Lobok, 2017, p. SIa:2). The main problem with conventional social sciences is that they study what is objective (positive, given) in humans. They study objective subjectivity. In itself there is nothing wrong with that when it is viewed as a study of human limitations rather than human essence and potential. As a study of human limitations, conventional social sciences are very helpful. However, they are highly distortive, harmful, and, arguably, unethical when they claim to study the whole person. Genuine social science must address "the surplus of humanness" (Bakhtin, 1991, p. 37). "The surplus of humanness" is "a leftover" from the biologically, socially, culturally, historically, and psychologically given - the typical and general - in the human nature. It is about the human authorship of the ever-unique meaning-making (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, et al., 2019). The concept of ethical ontological dialogism is aimed at addressing the described problem of objective subjectivity studied by conventional social sciences. Ontological dialogic pedagogy inspired by Bakhtin aspires to be a pedagogy of ethical ontological dialogism. As I stated at the start of this short outline, to me Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD) means to be in dialogue in which one relates to all participants of a pedagogical event (students, teachers) as "a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, [that] combine but are not merged in the unity of the event" (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6, italics are in the original). People in genuine dialogue take each other seriously, and with an awareness that "[c]onsciousnesses themselves cannot be equal to each other - only their rights-because consciousnesses are unique, immeasurable, unfinalizable and opaque both to oneself and to each other" (Matusov, 2018, p. 1478). In genuine dialogue, participants expect to be surprised by the other, her/his unique ideas, views, desires, hopes, fears, etc. For me, ethical ontological dialogism is about authorial meaning-making where meaning emerges in the relationship "between genuinely interested questions and seriously provided answers" (Matusov, 2018, p. 1478) where people in a dialogic encounter recognize each other as creatively and/or critically authoring their views and truths. In an authorial meaning-making encounter, participants address each other by making bids for their emerging ideas, points of view, questions, etc., and by seriously responding to these bids by recognizing their importance and providing their evaluations and questions (Matusov, 2019 in preparation; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). Serious recognition of the other's ideas establishes the existence the other's creative and/or critical authorship (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017), it gives it a life. Serious recognition of the other's creative and/or critical ideas, opinions, desires, dreams, plans and questions is an expression of a genuine interest in the other's voice and ideas. Such a genuine interest also opens a way to find new meanings in one's own ideas and truths, recognize something about them that would otherwise stay invisible and unrecognized, or inspire completely new, transcendent meanings. Ethical ontological dialogism is rooted not only in the recognition of the authorship of the one's own and others' bids for meaning, but also in taking responsibility for one's own views, ideas, desires, judgments and decisions that may result from them. Bakhtin's motto "There is no alibi in being" (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40) expresses this dialogic responsibility, a responsibility that comes from being unique, unrepeatable, once-occurrent and irreplaceable human being, whose participation in dialogue is both acknowledged/recognized and indispensable. Bakhtin wrote, I occupy a place in once-occurrent Being that is unique and never-repeatable, a place that cannot be taken by anyone else and is impenetrable for anyone else. In the given once-occurrent point where I am now located, no one else has ever been located in the once-occurrent time and once-occurrent space of once-occurrent Being. [...]. That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone else. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40) Ethical ontological dialogism is about recognizing the uniqueness of the participants and of each moment of dialogic meaning-making. Moreover, it recognizes the responsibility of dialogic partners to be answerable for their unique, unrepeatable and irreplaceable dialogic offers, recognitions, evaluations and judgments. For me, ethical ontological dialogism is an approach to life, to educational practice, and to the study of human meaning-making in general, including education, psychology, sociology and other human sciences. What do you think? Ana References Bakhtin, M. M. (1991). The dialogic imagination: Four essays by M. M. Bakhtin (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Bakhtin, M. M. (1993). Toward a philosophy of the act (V. Liapunov & M. Holquist, Trans. 1st ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press. Bakhtin, M. M. (1999). Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics (Vol. 8). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bakhtin, M. M., & Emerson, C. (1999). Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics (Vol. 8). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gee, J. P. (2014). An introduction to discourse analysis : theory and method (Fourth edition. ed.). New York: Routledge. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow (1st ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically : interactional and contextual theories of human sense-making. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Pub. Lobok, A. (2017). The Cartography of Inner Childhood: Fragments from the book. Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal, 5, SIa: 1-42. Matusov, E. (2018). Ethic authorial dialogism as a candidate for post-postmodernism. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 50 (14), 1478-1479. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2018.1461367 Matusov, E. (2019 in preparation). Students and teachers as authors in a Bakhtinian critical dialogue. Matusov, E., & Marjanovic-Shane, A. (2017). Dialogic authorial approach to creativity in education: Transforming a deadly homework into a creative activity. In V. Glaveanu (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Creativity and Culture Research (pp. 307-325): Palgrave. Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., & Gradovski, M. (2019). Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research art: Bakhtin by and for Educators: Palgrave Macmillan US. Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., Kullenberg, T., & Curtis, K. (2019). Dialogic analysis vs. discourse analysis of dialogic pedagogy (and beyond). Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal, 7, E20-E62. doi:10.5195/dpj.2019.272 Morson, G. S. (2004). The process of ideological becoming. In A. F. Ball & S. W. Freedman (Eds.), Bakhtinian perspectives on language, literacy, and learning (pp. 317-331). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language. lxi, 287 p. Vygotsky, L. S. (2004). Imagination and creativity in childhood. Journal of Russian and Eastern European Psychology, 42(1), 7 - 97. Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1994). Tool and Symbol in Child Development. In R. Van Der Veer & J. Valsiner (Eds.), The Vygotsky Reader (pp. 73-98). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com From: "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu" > on behalf of Greg Thompson > Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Date: Wednesday, May 1, 2019 at 12:37 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Ana, This looks lovely. I wonder if you might have a few moments to explain to us the notion of "ethical ontological dialogism"? I'm sure it would take an entire book to properly explain (hence, well, this book), but it would be nice if you might be able to offer a few paragraphs, or maybe even just a few sentences? -greg On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 9:42 AM Ana Marjanovic-Shane > wrote: Dear friends, I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. "This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into them with their mind and heart." (Palgrave - https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) What do you think? Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190508/ff11d15d/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Fri May 17 02:20:49 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 19:20:49 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] New book on Ilyenkov Message-ID: https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. */Finding Evald Ilyenkov/*draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. -- ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190517/68d61e07/attachment.html From a.j.gil@ils.uio.no Fri May 17 14:09:02 2019 From: a.j.gil@ils.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 21:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1558127342839.89548@ils.uio.no> Andy, the website/project ?as part of which the book is announcement and sold interested me almost as much as the book. Thanks for sharing, Alfredo ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 17 May 2019 11:20 To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] New book on Ilyenkov https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. Evald Ilyenkov's dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov's impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today's crises. -- ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190517/7d0fe6e5/attachment.html From a.j.gil@ils.uio.no Fri May 17 14:09:02 2019 From: a.j.gil@ils.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 21:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1558127342839.89548@ils.uio.no> Andy, the website/project ?as part of which the book is announcement and sold interested me almost as much as the book. Thanks for sharing, Alfredo ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 17 May 2019 11:20 To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] New book on Ilyenkov https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. Evald Ilyenkov's dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov's impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today's crises. -- ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190517/7d0fe6e5/attachment-0001.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat May 18 03:02:06 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 18 May 2019 19:02:06 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Andy, Alfredo-- The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ > > In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very > possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is > attracting growing interest. > > Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel > and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist > authorities of his day. > > The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted > during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. > > *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of researchers > in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, > psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in > the light of today?s crises. > -- > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190518/1b25fcaa/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Sat May 18 03:14:58 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 May 2019 20:14:58 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <47a485f3-fdf9-c597-075f-392fc0a1cd61@marxists.org> Ask the author/editor: Corinna Lotz Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 18/05/2019 8:02 pm, David Kellogg wrote: > Andy, Alfredo-- > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the > statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of > ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side > of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their > inclusion. > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of > times (true, without understanding?much of it). But?I > didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing > something? > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without > SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s > construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: > 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: > https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ > > In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism > about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a > defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. > > Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy > from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for > persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities > of his day. > > The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or > harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise > to an enhanced view of his contribution. > > */Finding Evald Ilyenkov/*draws on the personal > experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and > Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, > psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues > to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190518/1d5e2e6f/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat May 18 03:16:49 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 18 May 2019 19:16:49 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: <47a485f3-fdf9-c597-075f-392fc0a1cd61@marxists.org> References: <47a485f3-fdf9-c597-075f-392fc0a1cd61@marxists.org> Message-ID: That would be rude, Andy. I'd better order the book. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 7:16 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > Ask the author/editor: Corinna Lotz > > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 18/05/2019 8:02 pm, David Kellogg wrote: > > Andy, Alfredo-- > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov > fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. > On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their > inclusion. > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, > without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against > cybernetics. Am I missing something? > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > >> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >> >> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >> attracting growing interest. >> >> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel >> and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist >> authorities of his day. >> >> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted >> during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >> >> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >> -- >> ------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190518/0c26b6be/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat May 18 07:29:51 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 May 2019 15:29:51 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. Huw On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg wrote: > Andy, Alfredo-- > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov > fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. > On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their > inclusion. > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, > without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against > cybernetics. Am I missing something? > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > >> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >> >> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >> attracting growing interest. >> >> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel >> and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist >> authorities of his day. >> >> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted >> during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >> >> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >> -- >> ------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190518/9acb84f9/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat May 18 18:02:21 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 10:02:21 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Huw... So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd wrote: > Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into > second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics > recognised. > > Huw > > On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Andy, Alfredo-- >> >> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov >> fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. >> On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their >> inclusion. >> >> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, >> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >> understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>> >>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >>> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>> attracting growing interest. >>> >>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>> >>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted >>> during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >>> >>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>> -- >>> ------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>> >> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190519/265bb280/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun May 19 04:59:35 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 12:59:35 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi David, This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics , is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz von Foerster and others. [1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask , and is closely allied to radical constructivism , which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld .[3] " Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". >From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. Best, Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw... > > So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble > understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to > understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this > person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it > rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time > and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just > clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just > over-sensitive. > > So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the > one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are > essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite > independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a > child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. > (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they > are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) > > In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree > of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are > stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is > generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then > there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order > cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when > we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that > are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as > instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses > to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize > responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a > well-defined context but in a context of context. > > Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and > then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH > language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This > inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object > of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. > > Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox > is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of > themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that > Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very > artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, > like those of physics and cybernetics). > > Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order > cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical > types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? > > > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >> recognised. >> >> Huw >> >> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>> >>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>> hard for their inclusion. >>> >>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, >>> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Sangmyung University >>> >>> New Article: >>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>> understanding narratives by >>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> Some e-prints available at: >>> >>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>> >>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >>>> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>> attracting growing interest. >>>> >>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>> >>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted >>>> during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >>>> >>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>> -- >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>> >>> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190519/c05090b8/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Sun May 19 06:36:59 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 23:36:59 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David, where did you find this claim about "fighting against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics"? I don't disagree with the claim but I don't know where it comes from and suspect the discussion around it is overcooking whatever the original claim was. andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 18/05/2019 8:02 pm, David Kellogg wrote: > Andy, Alfredo-- > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the > statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of > ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side > of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their > inclusion. > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of > times (true, without understanding?much of it). But?I > didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing > something? > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without > SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s > construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: > 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: > https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ > > In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism > about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a > defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. > > Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy > from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for > persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities > of his day. > > The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or > harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise > to an enhanced view of his contribution. > > */Finding Evald Ilyenkov/*draws on the personal > experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and > Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, > psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues > to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190519/b1f644e5/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Sun May 19 07:44:15 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 00:44:15 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <06872d3a-b451-ec0c-c8c7-1adbd4ce1c35@marxists.org> "It must be added that the Hegelian variant of a deified notion or logical idea was nevertheless more humane than the newest deity on the altar (the worship of the cybernetic-mathematical notion)." https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/articles/humanism-science.htm Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 19/05/2019 11:36 pm, Andy Blunden wrote: > > David, where did you find this claim about "fighting > against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics"? I > don't disagree with the claim but I don't know where it > comes from and suspect the discussion around it is > overcooking whatever the original claim was. > > andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 18/05/2019 8:02 pm, David Kellogg wrote: >> Andy, Alfredo-- >> >> The most intriguing thing about this book was the >> statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction >> of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other >> side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for >> their inclusion. >> >> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of >> times (true, without understanding?much of it). But?I >> didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing >> something? >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without >> SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s >> construalism in understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: >> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >> >> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and >> scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, >> the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting >> growing interest. >> >> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy >> from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for >> persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities >> of his day. >> >> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or >> harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise >> to an enhanced view of his contribution. >> >> */Finding Evald Ilyenkov/*draws on the personal >> experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and >> Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, >> psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it >> continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. >> >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190520/4e804b03/attachment.html From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Sun May 19 09:35:20 2019 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (alexander.surmava@yahoo.com) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 19:35:20 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: <47a485f3-fdf9-c597-075f-392fc0a1cd61@marxists.org> Message-ID: <00d201d50e60$da227c00$8e677400$@yahoo.com> As far as I know, Ilyenkov fought against an idealistic explanation of human nature. Including, against speculation, the term "information", which, ostensibly, is identical to the concept of ideality, and which, ostensibly, explains something in the phenomenon of ideality. One of the main theoretical opponents of Ilyenkov was, in particular, the positivist-minded theorists, who believed that thinking as such is the ?process of processing information? inside the brain. From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 1:17 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov That would be rude, Andy. I'd better order the book. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 7:16 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: Ask the author/editor: Corinna Lotz Andy _____ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 18/05/2019 8:02 pm, David Kellogg wrote: Andy, Alfredo-- The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. -- _____ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190519/9585245a/attachment.html From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun May 19 11:10:01 2019 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 11:10:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Huw- I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. Is this extrapolation reasonable? mike PS-- Andy There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But they were also Stalinist ideology. On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi David, > > This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, > which I don't have any significant quibbles with: > > "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics > , is the recursive application > of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and > 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz > von Foerster and > others.[1] > Von > Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas > first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] > It > is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon > Pask , and is closely allied > to radical constructivism > , which was > developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld > .[3] > " > > Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is > between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily > maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to > the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. > made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, > distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are > discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" > system that may be produced as a result. > > One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned > with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a > concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. > > One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and > epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics > recognises its potential fluidity and importance. > > Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are > typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the > application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend > cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place > to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their > cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture > and design. > > One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but > they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels > are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in > mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. > > I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by > Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout > much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to > "typological errors". > > From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a > booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of > papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Huw... >> >> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >> over-sensitive. >> >> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >> >> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >> well-defined context but in a context of context. >> >> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >> >> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >> >> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >> understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>> recognised. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>> >>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>> >>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, >>>> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Sangmyung University >>>> >>>> New Article: >>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>> understanding narratives by >>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>> >>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>> >>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >>>>> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>> >>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>> >>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted >>>>> during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >>>>> >>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>> -- >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>> >>>> -- At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190519/87e16e87/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun May 19 13:31:45 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 05:31:45 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It's here, Andy: https://realdemocracymovement.org/how-evald-ilyenkov-was-found-2/ "(Ilyenkov) boldly stated that Marx?s and Lenin?s actual thought had practically zero influence in Soviet philosophy; that neo-positivism was rampant grafting ideas taken from cybernetics into philosophy, and that Soviet economists knew a great deal more about the economies of the US and Europe than they did about their own economy." The last part of this was very true of China: the Marxism-Leninism department that my wife attended was run by a guy who was studying stock-market speculation (but I remember getting into furious arguments with him over the viability of the Great Leap Forward, which he claimed was essentially a Chinese version of Roosevelt's New Deal rather than a Chinese version of Stalin's disastrous war on "kulaks"). Still, you can see that the first part depicts a situation that is just about the opposite of what Mike describes--a Stalinism more interested in the "latest thing" in the West than in developing their own Marxist tradition (my father said this was also true in physics: they actually found it safer to cite foreign physics papers than to cite their own physicists, because you never know when the man you cited as a genius might run into trouble with the OGPU). How else can we explain the disdain for the work of Vygotsky and the utter devotion to the work of the anti-Bolshevik Pavlov, so well received in the West? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 10:39 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > David, where did you find this claim about "fighting against the > introduction of ideas from cybernetics"? I don't disagree with the claim > but I don't know where it comes from and suspect the discussion around it > is overcooking whatever the original claim was. > > andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 18/05/2019 8:02 pm, David Kellogg wrote: > > Andy, Alfredo-- > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov > fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. > On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their > inclusion. > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, > without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against > cybernetics. Am I missing something? > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > >> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >> >> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >> attracting growing interest. >> >> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel >> and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist >> authorities of his day. >> >> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted >> during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >> >> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >> -- >> ------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190520/9d706dbd/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun May 19 14:15:13 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 06:15:13 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Huw: In Part 3 of "Steps to an Ecology of Mind", Bateson develops the Theory of Logical Types, and he argues that the "double bind" that he sees as pathogenic in schizophrenia has its origins in a category error similar to the one which creates Russell's paradox. He argues that the defining characteristic of schizophrenia is the inability to distinguish between messages and messages about messages (e.g. the inability to know when a question is not a question but a complaint). Russell's paradox originates whenever messages and messages about messages are placed on the same level (as when a child places "flower" and "rose" on the same level). What you say about second order cybernetics is very interesting and useful (and I was clearly barking up the wrong tree when I associated second order cybernetics with Bateson's deutero-learning). Do you think that "perezhivanie" is a way of transition from an observed system to the observing one? This would fit perfectly with what LSV thinks as the distinguishing characteristic of schizophrenia (over-literalness, over-concreteness, and a failure in one direction or the other in the child's ability to distince him/herself from experience). David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 9:02 PM Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi David, > > This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, > which I don't have any significant quibbles with: > > "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics > , is the recursive application > of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and > 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz > von Foerster and > others.[1] > Von > Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas > first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] > It > is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon > Pask , and is closely allied > to radical constructivism > , which was > developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld > .[3] > " > > Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is > between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily > maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to > the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. > made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, > distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are > discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" > system that may be produced as a result. > > One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned > with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a > concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. > > One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and > epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics > recognises its potential fluidity and importance. > > Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are > typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the > application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend > cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place > to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their > cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture > and design. > > One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but > they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels > are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in > mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. > > I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by > Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout > much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to > "typological errors". > > From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a > booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of > papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Huw... >> >> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >> over-sensitive. >> >> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >> >> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >> well-defined context but in a context of context. >> >> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >> >> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >> >> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >> understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>> recognised. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>> >>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>> >>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, >>>> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Sangmyung University >>>> >>>> New Article: >>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>> understanding narratives by >>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>> >>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>> >>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >>>>> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>> >>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>> >>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted >>>>> during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >>>>> >>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>> -- >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>> >>>> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190520/41a88f9d/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon May 20 03:11:04 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 11:11:04 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi David, Yes, Bateson's appreciation for logical types plays a central role in his exploration of schizophrenia. But this is not at odds with Russell. Rather it was Russell who was " 'upset' that the (mathematical) logical types did not form a closed system within (mathematical) formal logic" (quoted as a subjective simplification). There are three of four papers in the steps anthology in which Bateson explored "levels" of learning. These are also related to his exploration of pathology. such as the hypothesis that it was hazardous to undergo certain kinds of higher learning in some circumstances, in addition to the common garden variety of incongruent communication inducing pathology. There are hundreds of connections that may be made. However, perhaps a necessary one in order to connect this wth Vygotskian appreciations is to more explicitly bring in reflection into the process of deutero-learning rather than referring to these levels as stochastic sets. This link can be appreciated by relating Bateson typologies to Donald Sch?n's reflexivity. The clearest bridge between them perhaps being the account of "double loop learning" by Chris Argyris, colleague of Sch?n, which one can relate to deutero-learning. Vygotsky, Bateson and Sch?n all have an appreciation for morphogenesis (for Bateson see his paper on the plasticity of the giraffe's heart in relation to Waddington's "genetic assimilation"; for Sch?n see his account of metaphor as a technical process described in terms of the technical development of a paintbrush). Deutero-learning can be connoted with second-order cybernetics in the sense that its discovery entailed a form of learning about one's learning. The milestone of 2nd order cybernetics was perhaps established in response to those who overlooked it, who adopted the cultural conventions of the (then) typical engineering (and scientific) paradigm of occluding the observer. Occluding the observer is not necessarily bad, it can be very productive, but it makes it difficult to account for changes in the observer (i.e. ontological and epistemological factors). You are also correct in identifying a certain literalness or "stckiness" to the circumstances of "hard" sciences etc. But in this one need not sacrifice precision or technicality. It is sloppy and incorrect to connect "vague" with "soft" in this sense (cf. Sch?n's elaboration of metaphor in terms of a paintbrush). In (popular) psychological circles that kind literalness has often been related to "autism' rather than "schizophrenia". In all of this one needs to be careful about how the words are used in the contexts from which they are drawn. Von Foerster, for instance, refers to metaphysics as a kind of short-hand for ontology and epistemology (which are the same thing seen from different perspectives), whilst Ilyenkov talks of metaphysics in disparaging ways pertaining to typological errors in philosophy. If one takes the surface meaning they appear to be in flagrant opposition, however much of it pertains to the way the words are used and the audience they're intended for. I have not dug that far into the conceptualisation of "perezhivanie", seeing the same issues of interpretation. It was not a concise principle in my formulations, but rather bridged across numerous principles. Nevertheless, reflexivity is obviously quite central to its basis. Reflexivity can be viewed as quite a natural process. It isn't really a "pathology" to be excessively literal, it's a question of fit or deemed fitness. Nevertheless one can relate reflexivity to cognitive development, which is what I did in my explorations. Best, Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 22:18, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > In Part 3 of "Steps to an Ecology of Mind", Bateson develops the Theory of > Logical Types, and he argues that the "double bind" that he sees as > pathogenic in schizophrenia has its origins in a category error similar to > the one which creates Russell's paradox. He argues that the defining > characteristic of schizophrenia is the inability to distinguish between > messages and messages about messages (e.g. the inability to know when a > question is not a question but a complaint). Russell's paradox originates > whenever messages and messages about messages are placed on the same level > (as when a child places "flower" and "rose" on the same level). > > What you say about second order cybernetics is very interesting and useful > (and I was clearly barking up the wrong tree when I associated second order > cybernetics with Bateson's deutero-learning). Do you think > that "perezhivanie" is a way of transition from an observed system to the > observing one? This would fit perfectly with what LSV thinks as the > distinguishing characteristic of schizophrenia (over-literalness, > over-concreteness, and a failure in one direction or the other in the > child's ability to distince him/herself from experience). > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 9:02 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Hi David, >> >> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, >> which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >> >> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics >> , is the recursive >> application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >> , Heinz von Foerster >> and others.[1] >> Von >> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >> It >> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >> Pask , and is closely allied >> to radical constructivism >> , which was >> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >> .[3] >> " >> >> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is >> between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >> system that may be produced as a result. >> >> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned >> with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a >> concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >> >> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and >> epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics >> recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >> >> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >> and design. >> >> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >> changes either. >> >> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by >> Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >> "typological errors". >> >> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Huw... >>> >>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>> over-sensitive. >>> >>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >>> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>> >>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>> >>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >>> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>> >>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>> >>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>> >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Sangmyung University >>> >>> New Article: >>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>> understanding narratives by >>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> Some e-prints available at: >>> >>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>> recognised. >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>> >>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>> >>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, >>>>> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article: >>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>> >>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >>>>>> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>> >>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>> >>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>> contribution. >>>>>> >>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>> -- >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>> >>>>> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190520/65f880f4/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon May 20 06:26:03 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 14:26:03 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Mike, I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! Best, Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: > Huw- > > I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of > cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of > an idea that has been batted around for some time: > > Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" > whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter > Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational > projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which > requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , > and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between > a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we > have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work > as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of > psychosocioanthropological inquiry. > > Is this extrapolation reasonable? > > mike > > PS-- Andy > There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. > It affected people like > Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still > in force when I arrived > in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in > October, 1962! > The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than > Stalinist ideology. But > they were also Stalinist ideology. > > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Hi David, >> >> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, >> which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >> >> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics >> , is the recursive >> application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >> , Heinz von Foerster >> and others.[1] >> Von >> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >> It >> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >> Pask , and is closely allied >> to radical constructivism >> , which was >> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >> .[3] >> " >> >> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is >> between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >> system that may be produced as a result. >> >> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned >> with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a >> concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >> >> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and >> epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics >> recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >> >> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >> and design. >> >> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >> changes either. >> >> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by >> Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >> "typological errors". >> >> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Huw... >>> >>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>> over-sensitive. >>> >>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >>> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>> >>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>> >>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >>> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>> >>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>> >>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>> >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Sangmyung University >>> >>> New Article: >>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>> understanding narratives by >>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> Some e-prints available at: >>> >>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>> recognised. >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>> >>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>> >>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, >>>>> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article: >>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>> >>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very >>>>>> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>> >>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>> >>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>> contribution. >>>>>> >>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>> -- >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>> >>>>> > > -- > At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, > many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. > Anon > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190520/a2f90dd5/attachment-0001.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Glanville-SECOND_ORDER_CYBERNETICS.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 375907 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190520/a2f90dd5/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon May 20 16:12:53 2019 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 16:12:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Huw- I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish between different realtions of observer to observed, The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the people we were working with. A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. Perhaps relevant? *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. Mike On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Mike, > > I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but > rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a > change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was > included within it. > > I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard > system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that > system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of > your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. > They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the > structure of the "observed". > > The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! > > Best, > Huw > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: > >> Huw- >> >> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of >> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of >> an idea that has been batted around for some time: >> >> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" >> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter >> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational >> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which >> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , >> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >> >> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between >> a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we >> have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work >> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of >> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >> >> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >> >> mike >> >> PS-- Andy >> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. >> It affected people like >> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still >> in force when I arrived >> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in >> October, 1962! >> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than >> Stalinist ideology. But >> they were also Stalinist ideology. >> >> >> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> Hi David, >>> >>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, >>> which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>> >>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of >>> cybernetics , is the >>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>> , Heinz von Foerster >>> and others.[1] >>> Von >>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >>> It >>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >>> Pask , and is closely allied >>> to radical constructivism >>> , which was >>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>> .[3] >>> " >>> >>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is >>> between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>> system that may be produced as a result. >>> >>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned >>> with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a >>> concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>> >>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and >>> epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics >>> recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>> >>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >>> and design. >>> >>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >>> changes either. >>> >>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by >>> Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >>> "typological errors". >>> >>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Huw... >>>> >>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>>> over-sensitive. >>>> >>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >>>> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>> >>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>> >>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >>>> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>> >>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>> >>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Sangmyung University >>>> >>>> New Article: >>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>> understanding narratives by >>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>> >>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>>> recognised. >>>>> >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>> >>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, >>>>>> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>> >>>>>> New Article: >>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the >>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>>> contribution. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>> >>>>>> >> >> -- >> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, >> many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. >> Anon >> > -- ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190520/df0df11f/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Mon May 20 19:51:29 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 12:51:29 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ... just to play my usual role of throwing in the Hegelian perspective. ... This distinction is built into the structure of Hegel's Logic as follows: The first phase of the Logic, Being, represents the Idea from the standpoint of an observer (qualities, quantities and measures). The third phase of the Logic, Concept, represents the idea as Self-conscious (i.e., participant). In between these two, the second phase, is Reflection, in which the living objective movement is reflected in old concepts, and generates theories, appearances, forms, etc., up to the point of a leap to self-consciousness. As I understand it, Ilyenkov fought against the positivist program of modelling the mind as a computer, processing information from the senses and generating outputs. I think he was completely correct in this. Long Live Evald Ilyenkov. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 21/05/2019 9:12 am, mike cole wrote: > Hi Huw- > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the? 2 > cybernetics idea.? I was focused on how > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that > have existed in philosophy for a long > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which > I think may also mark the way that > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, > the way that ethnographers distinguish > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark > two poles of our relationship with the > people we were working with. > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation > offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do.? > There seems to be close matching here too. > Perhaps relevant? > /Theoria/?is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking > at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives > from the word /theoros/, which is said to come from > /thea/?(sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) > plus /orao/?(to see). In other words /theoros/?combines > the seeing with the seen. So a /theoros/?is a spectator or > a witness to what is there to be seen. A /theoros/?can > also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the > oracle being someone through whom a god (/theos/) speaks. > What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or > puzzle which the /theoros/?must figure out for himself or > herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this > spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to > speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work > of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, > like the oracular statements, were viewed as /theorytis/, > (spoken by a god). > > The idea of the /theoros/?is interesting in that it > involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an > action (as Aristotle?noted, drama is the imitation of > action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing > and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a > dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a > god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the > god into the /phrenoi /(the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous > with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of > someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn > speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the > /theoros/?to report his or her /theoria/?to others -- the > tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- > /theorytis/, given by a god. Politically in early Greek > society, this translated into the use of the plural > /theoroi/?to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted > the intent of the state to "those who speak strange > tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > Mike > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > Hi Mike, > > I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a > novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary > distinction, one that recognised a change in the > landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer > was included within it. > > I think one could extrapolate "established form or > structure" from "hard system" and then consider > reflections about that establishing of that system as > orthogonal yet related, but according to my > interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute > reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can > refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the > structure of the "observed". > > The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! > > Best, > Huw > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > > wrote: > > Huw- > > I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the > two generations of cybernetics, which is new to > me, interesting and potentially a variant of an > idea that has been batted around for some time: > > Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of > "observing systems" whereas first order > cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... > Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in > their study of organisational projects, > distinguishing, for example, between the process > by which requirements are discerned (amidst > complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the > "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > In our research in community settings we have been > distinguishing between a participant observer and > an observant participant.? In our practice we have > played both roles.? I think of the "hard" system > in our work > as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a > part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. > > Is this extrapolation reasonable? > > mike > > PS-- Andy > ? ? ?There was a big and organized opposition to > cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like > Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's > thinking. It was still in force when I arrived > in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw.? > Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! > The distinction Huw makes suggests that the > objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But > they were also Stalinist ideology. > > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > Hi David, > > This is an extract from the start of the text > from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have > any significant quibbles with: > > "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the > cybernetics of cybernetics > , > is the recursive application of cybernetics to > itself. It was developed between approximately > 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead > , > Heinz von Foerster > ?and > others.^[1] > > ?Von Foerster referred to it as the > cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas > first order cybernetics is that of "observed > systems".^[2] > > ?It is sometimes referred to as the "new > cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon > Pask > , > and is closely allied to radical > constructivism > , > which was developed around the same time by > Ernst von Glasersfeld > .^[3] > " > > ^ > Another way to describe this distinction on > the dimension of observer is between "hard > systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" > most easily maps on to a model of some > apparatus. The "soft system" however applies > to the system by which the hard system is > discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this > distinction in their study of organisational > projects, distinguishing, for example, between > the process by which requirements are > discerned (amidst complex interactions of > stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may > be produced as a result. > > One can equally apply this distinction in > psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic > processes of action and construal in > distinction to a concern to map things out in > terms of brain architecture etc. > > One might say that 1st order cybernetics is > typically ontologically and epistemologically > naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order > cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity > and importance. > > Regarding objects, objects still exist in > cybernetic thinking but are typically defined > by communicational boundaries. Once one > understands the application of black boxes or > systems, then one can more readily apprehend > cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on > black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph > was also deeply interested in objects (and > their cybernetic construal) related to his > life-long engagement with architecture and design. > > One needs to take some care in interpreting > Bateson's learning levels, but they can be > mapped on to other initiatives. The steps > between his levels are quite large and one > could easily interpose additional levels. Bear > in mind that Bateson's levels do not > necessarily imply positive changes either. > > I can't say I recall coming across material in > which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. > Rather he applies typological distinctions > throughout much of his work and can be > considered a champion of drawing attention to > "typological errors". > > From the description, it seems the finding > Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), > the impression I had is that is either a > collection of papers or a summary of > llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Huw... > > So actually this is the bit of Bateson > that I'm having trouble understanding, and > it's quite different from what I am > failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't > really do what Andy suggests, becuse this > person has written a whole book about it, > and as an author I always find it rather > rude when anybody writes to me to say that > they don't have the time and don't want to > spend the money to get my book and they > want me to?just clear up a few points for > them and save them the?trouble. Maybe I am > just over-sensitive. > > So this Bateson is working with a world > that is almost the opposite of the one > physicists work with. That is, it's a > world where objects are essentially > unimportant ("feedback" is a structure > that is quite independent of whether we > are talking about a microphone, a > thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). > It's a world where only communication > matters. (There are some forms of physics > which handle a world like this, but they > are precisely the realms of physics I > don't really get.) > > In this world, there is something > called?Learning Zero, or the?Zero Degree > of Learning,?which is essentially making > responses that are stimulus-specific. Then > there is something called Learning One, > which is generalizing responses to a > well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And > then there is Learning Two, which I think > is what you mean by second order > cybernetics. That is what people like to > call "learning to learn", but when we say > this, we are ignoring that the two uses of > "learn" mean?things that are as > different?as Learning Zerio and Learning > One, as different as instinct and habit, > as different as unconditioned and > conditioned responses to stimuli. This is > being able to generalize the ability to > generalize responses to well defined > stimuli, so that they operate not only > within a well-defined context but in a > context of context. > > Children do a lot of this. They learn > language, first as Learning Zero and then > as Learning One. Then they have to learn > how to learn THROUGH language, treating > language itself as context and not simply > text. This inevitably leads to a Learning > Three, where language is itself the object > of learning--Halliday calls it learning > ABOUT language. > > Bateson is very disturbed by this, because > he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking > behind all of these sets which both are > and are not members of themselves.?I don't > have any problem with it, because I think > that Russell's world is math and not > language (I think of math as a kind of > very artificial form of language that only > operates in very artificial worlds, like > those of physics and cybernetics). > > Is this what?you mean by the discontinuity > of second order cybernetics??Isn't it an > artifact of imposing Russell's theory of > logical types and an artifact of the > artificiality of the cybernetic world? > > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A > story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and > Halliday?s construalism in understanding > narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, > DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: > https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > Quite possibly it was from a lack of > recognising the continuity into second > order cybernetics, which many of the > founding members of cybernetics > recognised. > > Huw > > On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David > Kellogg > wrote: > > Andy, Alfredo-- > > The most intriguing thing about > this book was the statement that > Ilyenkov fought against the > introduction of ideas from > cybernetics into psychology. On > the other side of the world, > Gregory Bateson was fighting hard > for their inclusion. > > I read through "The Ideal in Human > Activity" a couple of times (true, > without understanding?much of it). > But?I didn't see anything against > cybernetics. Am I missing something? > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg > (2019): A story without SELF: > Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism > and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and > Education, DOI: > 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: > https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM > Andy Blunden > wrote: > > https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ > > In the era of alt-truth, > disinformation and scepticism > about the very possibility of > knowledge, the work of a > defiant Soviet thinker is > attracting growing interest. > > Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical > approach to philosophy from > Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made > him a target for persecution > by the bureaucratic Stalinist > authorities of his day. > > The re-discovery of his > original texts, suppressed or > harshly redacted during his > lifetime, is giving rise to an > enhanced view of his contribution. > > */Finding Evald > Ilyenkov/*draws on the > personal experiences of > researchers in the UK, Denmark > and Finland. It traces > Ilyenkov?s impact on > philosophy, psychology, > politics and pedagogy and how > it continues to be relevant in > the light of today?s crises. > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > > > > -- > At the moment we need consensus points to anchor > our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep > roots.? Like a cypress tree living in brackish > water.? Anon > > > > -- > > > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already > thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must > think them over again honestly, until they take root in > our personal experience.? ? -Goethe > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/5432978e/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue May 21 02:07:32 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 10:07:32 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Yes, relevant to the wider perspective. :) One could add phenomenology to the disciplines interested in the distinction. Interesting to think about frame, window and latch in that regard. Best, Huw On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 00:18, mike cole wrote: > Hi Huw- > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I > was focused on how > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in > philosophy for a long > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may > also mark the way that > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that > ethnographers distinguish > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our > relationship with the > people we were working with. > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant > distinction from Aristotle in > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to > be close matching here too. > Perhaps relevant? > *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by > extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, > which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- > something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines > the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to > what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to > consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) > speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle > which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic > poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices > for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work > of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular > statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). > > The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the > spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama > is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to > viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic > production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through > inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- > for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) > of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for > others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her > *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to > ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early Greek > society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to mean > ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who > speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > Mike > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Hi Mike, >> >> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but >> rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a >> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was >> included within it. >> >> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard >> system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that >> system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of >> your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. >> They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the >> structure of the "observed". >> >> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Huw- >>> >>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of >>> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of >>> an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>> >>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" >>> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter >>> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational >>> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which >>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , >>> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>> >>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing >>> between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our >>> practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our >>> work >>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of >>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>> >>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS-- Andy >>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the >>> USSR. It affected people like >>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was >>> still in force when I arrived >>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw >>> in October, 1962! >>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than >>> Stalinist ideology. But >>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi David, >>>> >>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, >>>> which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>> >>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of >>>> cybernetics , is the >>>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >>>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>>> , Heinz von Foerster >>>> and others.[1] >>>> Von >>>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >>>> It >>>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >>>> Pask , and is closely >>>> allied to radical constructivism >>>> , which was >>>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>>> .[3] >>>> " >>>> >>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer >>>> is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >>>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >>>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >>>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >>>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >>>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>>> system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned >>>> with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a >>>> concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>> >>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and >>>> epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics >>>> recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>> >>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >>>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >>>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >>>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >>>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >>>> and design. >>>> >>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >>>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >>>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >>>> changes either. >>>> >>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset >>>> by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >>>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >>>> "typological errors". >>>> >>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >>>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw... >>>>> >>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>>>> over-sensitive. >>>>> >>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >>>>> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>>> >>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>>>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>>> >>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >>>>> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>>> >>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>>> >>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article: >>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>>>> recognised. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times >>>>>>> (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> New Article: >>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: >>>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the >>>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>>>> contribution. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> >>> -- >>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One >>> tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish >>> water. Anon >>> >> > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but > to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they > take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/bd0d78de/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue May 21 02:34:13 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 10:34:13 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I think you are overlooking the value that the computing metaphor had in yielding a gap in institutional attachment to behaviourism, Andy. Evald would be attempting to short-cut his own understandings by doing away with intermediate misunderstandings -- temporary abatements from the compulsion of myopic literalness, even if the notion of symbolic was completely misconstrued. This has little to do with coherent cybernetics however. Huw On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 03:54, Andy Blunden wrote: > ... just to play my usual role of throwing in the Hegelian perspective. ... > > This distinction is built into the structure of Hegel's Logic as follows: > The first phase of the Logic, Being, represents the Idea from the > standpoint of an observer (qualities, quantities and measures). The third > phase of the Logic, Concept, represents the idea as Self-conscious (i.e., > participant). In between these two, the second phase, is Reflection, in > which the living objective movement is reflected in old concepts, and > generates theories, appearances, forms, etc., up to the point of a leap to > self-consciousness. > > As I understand it, Ilyenkov fought against the positivist program of > modelling the mind as a computer, processing information from the senses > and generating outputs. I think he was completely correct in this. Long > Live Evald Ilyenkov. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 21/05/2019 9:12 am, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Huw- > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I > was focused on how > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in > philosophy for a long > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may > also mark the way that > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that > ethnographers distinguish > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our > relationship with the > people we were working with. > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant > distinction from Aristotle in > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to > be close matching here too. > Perhaps relevant? > *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by > extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, > which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- > something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines > the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to > what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to > consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) > speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle > which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic > poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices > for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work > of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular > statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). > > The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the > spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama > is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to > viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic > production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through > inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- > for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) > of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for > others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her > *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to > ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early Greek > society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to mean > ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who > speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > Mike > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Hi Mike, >> >> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but >> rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a >> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was >> included within it. >> >> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard >> system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that >> system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of >> your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. >> They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the >> structure of the "observed". >> >> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Huw- >>> >>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of >>> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of >>> an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>> >>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" >>> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter >>> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational >>> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which >>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , >>> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>> >>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing >>> between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our >>> practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our >>> work >>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of >>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>> >>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS-- Andy >>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the >>> USSR. It affected people like >>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was >>> still in force when I arrived >>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw >>> in October, 1962! >>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than >>> Stalinist ideology. But >>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi David, >>>> >>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, >>>> which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>> >>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of >>>> cybernetics , is the >>>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >>>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>>> , Heinz von Foerster >>>> and others.[1] >>>> Von >>>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >>>> It >>>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >>>> Pask , and is closely >>>> allied to radical constructivism >>>> , which was >>>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>>> .[3] >>>> " >>>> >>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer >>>> is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >>>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >>>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >>>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >>>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >>>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>>> system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned >>>> with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a >>>> concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>> >>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and >>>> epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics >>>> recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>> >>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >>>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >>>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >>>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >>>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >>>> and design. >>>> >>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >>>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >>>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >>>> changes either. >>>> >>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset >>>> by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >>>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >>>> "typological errors". >>>> >>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >>>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw... >>>>> >>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>>>> over-sensitive. >>>>> >>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >>>>> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>>> >>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>>>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>>> >>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >>>>> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>>> >>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>>> >>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article: >>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>>>> recognised. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times >>>>>>> (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> New Article: >>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: >>>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the >>>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>>>> contribution. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> >>> -- >>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One >>> tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish >>> water. Anon >>> >> > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but > to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they > take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/20774dd2/attachment.html From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue May 21 06:48:02 2019 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 06:48:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Frame, window, latch is also interesting to think with, Huw. Thnx for the thought Mike On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 2:11 AM Huw Lloyd wrote: > Yes, relevant to the wider perspective. :) > > One could add phenomenology to the disciplines interested in the > distinction. > > Interesting to think about frame, window and latch in that regard. > > Best, > Huw > > On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 00:18, mike cole wrote: > >> Hi Huw- >> >> I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. >> I was focused on how >> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in >> philosophy for a long >> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may >> also mark the way that >> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that >> ethnographers distinguish >> between different realtions of observer to observed, >> >> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our >> relationship with the >> people we were working with. >> >> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant >> distinction from Aristotle in >> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to >> be close matching here too. >> Perhaps relevant? >> *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by >> extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, >> which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- >> something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines >> the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to >> what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to >> consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) >> speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle >> which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the >> epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the >> voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which >> the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the >> oracular statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). >> >> The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the >> spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, >> drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to >> viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic >> production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through >> inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- >> for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) >> of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for >> others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her >> *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to >> ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early >> Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to >> mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to >> "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and >> vice-versa. >> >> Mike >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Mike, >>> >>> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but >>> rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a >>> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was >>> included within it. >>> >>> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard >>> system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that >>> system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of >>> your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. >>> They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the >>> structure of the "observed". >>> >>> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Huw- >>>> >>>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of >>>> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of >>>> an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>>> >>>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" >>>> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter >>>> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational >>>> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which >>>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , >>>> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing >>>> between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our >>>> practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our >>>> work >>>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of >>>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>>> >>>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS-- Andy >>>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the >>>> USSR. It affected people like >>>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was >>>> still in force when I arrived >>>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw >>>> in October, 1962! >>>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than >>>> Stalinist ideology. But >>>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi David, >>>>> >>>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia >>>>> entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>>> >>>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of >>>>> cybernetics , is the >>>>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >>>>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>>>> , Heinz von Foerster >>>>> and others.[1] >>>>> Von >>>>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>>>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >>>>> It >>>>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >>>>> Pask , and is closely >>>>> allied to radical constructivism >>>>> , which was >>>>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>>>> .[3] >>>>> " >>>>> >>>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer >>>>> is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >>>>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >>>>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >>>>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >>>>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >>>>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>>>> system that may be produced as a result. >>>>> >>>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being >>>>> concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction >>>>> to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>>> >>>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically >>>>> and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order >>>>> cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>>> >>>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >>>>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >>>>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >>>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >>>>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >>>>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >>>>> and design. >>>>> >>>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>>>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >>>>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >>>>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >>>>> changes either. >>>>> >>>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset >>>>> by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >>>>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >>>>> "typological errors". >>>>> >>>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>>>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >>>>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Huw... >>>>>> >>>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>>>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>>>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>>>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>>>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>>>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>>>>> over-sensitive. >>>>>> >>>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite >>>>>> of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>>>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>>>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>>>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>>>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>>>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>>>> >>>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>>>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>>>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>>>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>>>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>>>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>>>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>>>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>>>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>>>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>>>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>>>>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>>>> >>>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning >>>>>> Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>>>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>>>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>>>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>>>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>>>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>>>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>>>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>>>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>>>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>> >>>>>> New Article: >>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>>>>> recognised. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times >>>>>>>> (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> New Article: >>>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: >>>>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the >>>>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza >>>>>>>>> to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>>>>> contribution. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One >>>> tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish >>>> water. Anon >>>> >>> >> >> -- >> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; >> but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until >> they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >> >> -- ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/96a5cb1e/attachment.html From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue May 21 08:10:42 2019 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 09:10:42 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike and Huw, I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming language such that different programming languages make different kinds of objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...). Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself? -greg On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole wrote: > Hi Huw- > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I > was focused on how > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in > philosophy for a long > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may > also mark the way that > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that > ethnographers distinguish > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our > relationship with the > people we were working with. > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant > distinction from Aristotle in > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to > be close matching here too. > Perhaps relevant? > *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by > extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, > which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- > something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines > the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to > what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to > consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) > speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle > which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic > poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices > for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work > of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular > statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). > > The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the > spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama > is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to > viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic > production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through > inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- > for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) > of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for > others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her > *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to > ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early Greek > society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to mean > ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who > speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > Mike > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Hi Mike, >> >> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but >> rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a >> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was >> included within it. >> >> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard >> system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that >> system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of >> your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. >> They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the >> structure of the "observed". >> >> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Huw- >>> >>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of >>> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of >>> an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>> >>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" >>> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter >>> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational >>> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which >>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , >>> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>> >>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing >>> between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our >>> practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our >>> work >>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of >>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>> >>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS-- Andy >>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the >>> USSR. It affected people like >>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was >>> still in force when I arrived >>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw >>> in October, 1962! >>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than >>> Stalinist ideology. But >>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi David, >>>> >>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, >>>> which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>> >>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of >>>> cybernetics , is the >>>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >>>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>>> , Heinz von Foerster >>>> and others.[1] >>>> Von >>>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >>>> It >>>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >>>> Pask , and is closely >>>> allied to radical constructivism >>>> , which was >>>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>>> .[3] >>>> " >>>> >>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer >>>> is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >>>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >>>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >>>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >>>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >>>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>>> system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned >>>> with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a >>>> concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>> >>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and >>>> epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics >>>> recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>> >>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >>>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >>>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >>>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >>>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >>>> and design. >>>> >>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >>>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >>>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >>>> changes either. >>>> >>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset >>>> by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >>>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >>>> "typological errors". >>>> >>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >>>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw... >>>>> >>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>>>> over-sensitive. >>>>> >>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >>>>> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>>> >>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>>>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>>> >>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >>>>> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>>> >>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>>> >>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article: >>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>>>> recognised. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times >>>>>>> (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> New Article: >>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: >>>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the >>>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>>>> contribution. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> >>> -- >>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One >>> tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish >>> water. Anon >>> >> > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but > to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they > take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/c1e777ee/attachment.html From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue May 21 10:03:45 2019 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 17:03:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello All, I wonder if it is important to keep in mind in this discussion that cybernetics did not take its ideas from computers but that computing and such took many of their ideas from cybernetics. The beginnings of cybernetics come from Norbert Weiner, a sort of mathematician/philosopher I would place in the mode of Russell. He actually did a year long post doc with Dewey (pre-cybernetic). The idea it seems came from the use of automated technology during WW II. In particular anti-aircraft guns that responded to pilot moves even as pilot moves respond to replacing gun sights. The idea is that activity takes place in a constant feedback loop between subject and object. It was the tip of the spear for the idea that if we could control feedback loops we could achieve desired outcomes. needed to stop looking at direct transmission between subjects and objects and focus instead on continuous feedback loops. Everybody is changing based on activities all the time. As a matter of fact the concept of feedback (almost always misinterpreted) comes from cybernetics. There was a series of conferences on how society was going to shake out post war called the Macy?s conferences, and one of the hot topics was cybernetics. A lot of computer people were gravitating, I think Weiner himself was becoming immersed in computers. There was also a conferences on the human issues of cybernetics that included Bateson, his wife Margaret Mead and Kurt Lewin along with von Foester who became a driving force. Second order cybernetics was not a second wave of cybernetics, they emerged simultaneously through the Macy?s conferences. It is call second order, or the cybernetics of cybernetics, because it asks, if the observer is defining the system he is observing, who is defining the observer? Humans are the product of continuous feedback loops not matter what their position in the world. The reason von Foester became so important is he brought in some interesting research being done in biology at the time (he was a biologist I believe). It had something to do with frogs, I don?t want to look it up. But it basically suggested that we are defined by our field of vision. We don?t know what we can?t see and we don?t know that what we can?t see exists because we can?t see it. Our field of vision (as opposed to frogs) comes from our feedback loops. Cybernetics has a wild history. Von Foester had a relationship with Ivan Illich, Bateson was close to Stuart Brand the Merry Prankster and founder of whole earth catalogues. Members of the whole second order cybernetics thing knew people in the Homebrew Computer Club and spent time in the commune movement and the diy movement. Cyberntics may not be the best theory (though it?s pretty damn interesting), until somebody can provide proof Hegel dropped acid and/or got excommunicated by the Pope I?m call dibs for the most historically interesting. Michael From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 11:11 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov Mike and Huw, I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming language such that different programming languages make different kinds of objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...). Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself? -greg On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole > wrote: Hi Huw- I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish between different realtions of observer to observed, The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the people we were working with. A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. Perhaps relevant? Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. Mike On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: Hi Mike, I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! Best, Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: Huw- I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. Is this extrapolation reasonable? mike PS-- Andy There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But they were also Stalinist ideology. On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: Hi David, This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics, is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead, Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask, and is closely allied to radical constructivism, which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld.[3]" Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. Best, Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: Huw... So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. Huw On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: Andy, Alfredo-- The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. -- ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm -- At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon -- ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/a97ef42b/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue May 21 10:28:11 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 18:28:11 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Programming language ontologies are different to ontology in the epistemological sense. They have a different basis, it is just a poor use of wording -- a reduction, as with just about everything. The shared meaning is about the basis of an object. But the object in a conventional digital computing is a defined entity using a formal language rather than a way of construing that entails action and understanding. To make things simpler one can start with the meaning of "information". In standard computing, this pertains to "useful data", but in the cybernetic sense it is a verb, it is a process of informing, of changing the form -- a difference that makes a difference. There are certainly cybernetic ideas in computing, but they are not coherently applied. The demise of higher profile cybernetics as a research vehicle came about through funding being diverted into narrower forms of research -- such as generations of investment into AI and the dull computing we see everywhere. Cybernetics strikes through the digital/analog world/model problem with one stroke, whereas standard computing is entirely locked into formal models. Nevertheless, with care computing can be a powerful tool within a project conceived on cybernetic principles. The people behind these ideas were equally interesting in other areas. It is a shame that "culture" has reduced cybernetics to the kitsch. Best, Huw On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 16:13, Greg Thompson wrote: > Mike and Huw, > I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a > second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went > ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming > languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making > possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and > the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming > language such that different programming languages make different kinds of > objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...). > Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment > that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself? > -greg > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole wrote: > >> Hi Huw- >> >> I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. >> I was focused on how >> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in >> philosophy for a long >> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may >> also mark the way that >> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that >> ethnographers distinguish >> between different realtions of observer to observed, >> >> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our >> relationship with the >> people we were working with. >> >> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant >> distinction from Aristotle in >> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to >> be close matching here too. >> Perhaps relevant? >> *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by >> extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, >> which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- >> something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines >> the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to >> what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to >> consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) >> speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle >> which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the >> epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the >> voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which >> the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the >> oracular statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). >> >> The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the >> spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, >> drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to >> viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic >> production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through >> inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- >> for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) >> of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for >> others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her >> *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to >> ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early >> Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to >> mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to >> "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and >> vice-versa. >> >> Mike >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Mike, >>> >>> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but >>> rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a >>> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was >>> included within it. >>> >>> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard >>> system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that >>> system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of >>> your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. >>> They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the >>> structure of the "observed". >>> >>> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Huw- >>>> >>>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of >>>> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of >>>> an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>>> >>>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" >>>> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter >>>> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational >>>> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which >>>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , >>>> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing >>>> between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our >>>> practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our >>>> work >>>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of >>>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>>> >>>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS-- Andy >>>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the >>>> USSR. It affected people like >>>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was >>>> still in force when I arrived >>>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw >>>> in October, 1962! >>>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than >>>> Stalinist ideology. But >>>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi David, >>>>> >>>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia >>>>> entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>>> >>>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of >>>>> cybernetics , is the >>>>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >>>>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>>>> , Heinz von Foerster >>>>> and others.[1] >>>>> Von >>>>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>>>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >>>>> It >>>>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >>>>> Pask , and is closely >>>>> allied to radical constructivism >>>>> , which was >>>>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>>>> .[3] >>>>> " >>>>> >>>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer >>>>> is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >>>>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >>>>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >>>>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >>>>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >>>>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>>>> system that may be produced as a result. >>>>> >>>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being >>>>> concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction >>>>> to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>>> >>>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically >>>>> and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order >>>>> cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>>> >>>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >>>>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >>>>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >>>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >>>>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >>>>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >>>>> and design. >>>>> >>>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>>>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >>>>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >>>>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >>>>> changes either. >>>>> >>>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset >>>>> by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >>>>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >>>>> "typological errors". >>>>> >>>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>>>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >>>>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Huw... >>>>>> >>>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>>>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>>>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>>>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>>>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>>>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>>>>> over-sensitive. >>>>>> >>>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite >>>>>> of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>>>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>>>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>>>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>>>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>>>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>>>> >>>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>>>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>>>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>>>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>>>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>>>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>>>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>>>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>>>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>>>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>>>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>>>>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>>>> >>>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning >>>>>> Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>>>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>>>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>>>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>>>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>>>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>>>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>>>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>>>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>>>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>> >>>>>> New Article: >>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>>>>> recognised. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times >>>>>>>> (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> New Article: >>>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: >>>>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the >>>>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza >>>>>>>>> to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>>>>> contribution. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One >>>> tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish >>>> water. Anon >>>> >>> >> >> -- >> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; >> but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until >> they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >> >> > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/84ff4e0d/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue May 21 11:37:17 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 19:37:17 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Von Foester was a mathematician to start with, from recollection. His papers certainly read that way. Lettvin, McCulloch, Maturana & Pitts were the authors of the "frog's eye" paper. Maturana went on to develop autopoiesis with Varela. Varelea went on to study consciousness, and practiced Tibetan Buddhism. Gordon Pask was concerned with drama, attended a lecture by Luria in London and embedded key ideas from the regulation of speech and dialectics in his architectures. Ross Ashby formalised requisite variety and was a founding member of the ratio club, which included Alan Turing. Stafford Beer took hold of ashby's requisite variety and exploded it into an architecture for studying the health of organisations. Stafford also taught yoga and studied the Upanishads. I suppose I am intimate with the works of three cyberneticians and familiar with the works of five or six others. To get back to the original thread, I am quite convinced these are compatible with the work of Ilyenkov. Huw On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 18:07, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hello All, > > > > I wonder if it is important to keep in mind in this discussion that > cybernetics did not take its ideas from computers but that computing and > such took many of their ideas from cybernetics. The beginnings of > cybernetics come from Norbert Weiner, a sort of mathematician/philosopher I > would place in the mode of Russell. He actually did a year long post doc > with Dewey (pre-cybernetic). The idea it seems came from the use of > automated technology during WW II. In particular anti-aircraft guns that > responded to pilot moves even as pilot moves respond to replacing gun > sights. The idea is that activity takes place in a constant feedback loop > between subject and object. It was the tip of the spear for the idea that > if we could control feedback loops we could achieve desired outcomes. > needed to stop looking at direct transmission between subjects and objects > and focus instead on continuous feedback loops. Everybody is changing based > on activities all the time. As a matter of fact the concept of feedback > (almost always misinterpreted) comes from cybernetics. > > > > There was a series of conferences on how society was going to shake out > post war called the Macy?s conferences, and one of the hot topics was > cybernetics. A lot of computer people were gravitating, I think Weiner > himself was becoming immersed in computers. There was also a conferences on > the human issues of cybernetics that included Bateson, his wife Margaret > Mead and Kurt Lewin along with von Foester who became a driving force. > Second order cybernetics was not a second wave of cybernetics, they emerged > simultaneously through the Macy?s conferences. It is call second order, or > the cybernetics of cybernetics, because it asks, if the observer is > defining the system he is observing, who is defining the observer? Humans > are the product of continuous feedback loops not matter what their position > in the world. The reason von Foester became so important is he brought in > some interesting research being done in biology at the time (he was a > biologist I believe). It had something to do with frogs, I don?t want to > look it up. But it basically suggested that we are defined by our field of > vision. We don?t know what we can?t see and we don?t know that what we > can?t see exists because we can?t see it. Our field of vision (as opposed > to frogs) comes from our feedback loops. > > > > Cybernetics has a wild history. Von Foester had a relationship with Ivan > Illich, Bateson was close to Stuart Brand the Merry Prankster and founder > of whole earth catalogues. Members of the whole second order cybernetics > thing knew people in the Homebrew Computer Club and spent time in the > commune movement and the diy movement. Cyberntics may not be the best > theory (though it?s pretty damn interesting), until somebody can provide > proof Hegel dropped acid and/or got excommunicated by the Pope I?m call > dibs for the most historically interesting. > > > > Michael > > > > *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu *On > Behalf Of *Greg Thompson > *Sent:* Tuesday, May 21, 2019 11:11 AM > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov > > > > Mike and Huw, > > I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a > second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went > ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming > languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making > possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and > the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming > language such that different programming languages make different kinds of > objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...). > > Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment > that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself? > > -greg > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole wrote: > > Hi Huw- > > > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I > was focused on how > > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in > philosophy for a long > > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may > also mark the way that > > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that > ethnographers distinguish > > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our > relationship with the > > people we were working with. > > > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant > distinction from Aristotle in > > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to > be close matching here too. > > Perhaps relevant? > > *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by > extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, > which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- > something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines > the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to > what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to > consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) > speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle > which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic > poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices > for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work > of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular > statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). > > > > The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the > spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama > is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to > viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic > production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through > inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- > for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) > of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for > others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her > *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to > ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early Greek > society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to mean > ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who > speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > Hi Mike, > > > > I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but > rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a > change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was > included within it. > > > > I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard > system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that > system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of > your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. > They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the > structure of the "observed". > > > > The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: > > Huw- > > > > I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of > cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of > an idea that has been batted around for some time: > > > > Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" > whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter > Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational > projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which > requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , > and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > > > In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between > a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we > have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work > > as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of > psychosocioanthropological inquiry. > > > > Is this extrapolation reasonable? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- Andy > > There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. > It affected people like > > Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still > in force when I arrived > > in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in > October, 1962! > > The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than > Stalinist ideology. But > > they were also Stalinist ideology. > > > > > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > Hi David, > > > > This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, > which I don't have any significant quibbles with: > > > > "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics > , is the recursive application > of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and > 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz > von Foerster and > others.[1] > Von > Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas > first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] > It > is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon > Pask , and is closely allied > to radical constructivism > , which was > developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld > .[3] > " > > > > Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is > between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily > maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to > the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. > made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, > distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are > discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" > system that may be produced as a result. > > > > One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned > with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a > concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. > > > > One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and > epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics > recognises its potential fluidity and importance. > > > > Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are > typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the > application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend > cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place > to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their > cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture > and design. > > > > One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but > they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels > are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in > mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. > > > > I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by > Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout > much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to > "typological errors". > > > > From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a > booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of > papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg wrote: > > Huw... > > > > So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble > understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to > understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this > person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it > rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time > and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just > clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just > over-sensitive. > > > > So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the > one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are > essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite > independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a > child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. > (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they > are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) > > > > In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree > of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are > stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is > generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then > there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order > cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when > we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that > are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as > instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses > to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize > responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a > well-defined context but in a context of context. > > > > Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and > then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH > language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This > inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object > of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. > > > > Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox > is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of > themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that > Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very > artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, > like those of physics and cybernetics). > > > > Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order > cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical > types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > Sangmyung University > > > > New Article: > > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > Some e-prints available at: > > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > > > > > On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into > second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics > recognised. > > > > Huw > > > > On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg wrote: > > Andy, Alfredo-- > > > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov > fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. > On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their > inclusion. > > > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, > without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against > cybernetics. Am I missing something? > > > David Kellogg > > Sangmyung University > > > > New Article: > > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > Some e-prints available at: > > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden wrote: > > https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ > > In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very > possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is > attracting growing interest. > > Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel > and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist > authorities of his day. > > The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted > during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. > > *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of researchers > in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, > psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in > the light of today?s crises. > > -- > ------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > > > > -- > > At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, > many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. > Anon > > > > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but > to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they > take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/d1d22cf3/attachment.html From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue May 21 13:39:20 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 14:39:20 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <87E6F8B0-1CC6-49CC-B088-AE1AC21A31EE@gmail.com> Michael, I can make very little heads or tails of the elaborations on cybernetics, but in trying I found this in the wiki on autopeisis, a concept introduced by Chilean biologists Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana in 1972: In his discussion of Hegel, the philosopher Slavoj ?i?ek argues, "Hegel is ? to use today's terms ? the ultimate thinker of autopoiesis, of the process of the emergence of necessary features out of chaotic contingency, the thinker of contingency's gradual self-organisation, of the gradual rise of order out of chaos."[11] I understand that the brain itself generates psychoactive agents akin to LSD. Apparently that was the case with Hegel? Henry > On May 21, 209, at 11:03 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hello All, > > I wonder if it is important to keep in mind in this discussion that cybernetics did not take its ideas from computers but that computing and such took many of their ideas from cybernetics. The beginnings of cybernetics come from Norbert Weiner, a sort of mathematician/philosopher I would place in the mode of Russell. He actually did a year long post doc with Dewey (pre-cybernetic). The idea it seems came from the use of automated technology during WW II. In particular anti-aircraft guns that responded to pilot moves even as pilot moves respond to replacing gun sights. The idea is that activity takes place in a constant feedback loop between subject and object. It was the tip of the spear for the idea that if we could control feedback loops we could achieve desired outcomes. needed to stop looking at direct transmission between subjects and objects and focus instead on continuous feedback loops. Everybody is changing based on activities all the time. As a matter of fact the concept of feedback (almost always misinterpreted) comes from cybernetics. > > There was a series of conferences on how society was going to shake out post war called the Macy?s conferences, and one of the hot topics was cybernetics. A lot of computer people were gravitating, I think Weiner himself was becoming immersed in computers. There was also a conferences on the human issues of cybernetics that included Bateson, his wife Margaret Mead and Kurt Lewin along with von Foester who became a driving force. Second order cybernetics was not a second wave of cybernetics, they emerged simultaneously through the Macy?s conferences. It is call second order, or the cybernetics of cybernetics, because it asks, if the observer is defining the system he is observing, who is defining the observer? Humans are the product of continuous feedback loops not matter what their position in the world. The reason von Foester became so important is he brought in some interesting research being done in biology at the time (he was a biologist I believe). It had something to do with frogs, I don?t want to look it up. But it basically suggested that we are defined by our field of vision. We don?t know what we can?t see and we don?t know that what we can?t see exists because we can?t see it. Our field of vision (as opposed to frogs) comes from our feedback loops. > > Cybernetics has a wild history. Von Foester had a relationship with Ivan Illich, Bateson was close to Stuart Brand the Merry Prankster and founder of whole earth catalogues. Members of the whole second order cybernetics thing knew people in the Homebrew Computer Club and spent time in the commune movement and the diy movement. Cyberntics may not be the best theory (though it?s pretty damn interesting), until somebody can provide proof Hegel dropped acid and/or got excommunicated by the Pope I?m call dibs for the most historically interesting. > > Michael > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 11:11 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov > > Mike and Huw, > I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming language such that different programming languages make different kinds of objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...). > Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself? > -greg > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole > wrote: > Hi Huw- > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the > people we were working with. > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. > Perhaps relevant? > Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). > > The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > Mike > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > Hi Mike, > > I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. > > I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". > > The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! > > Best, > Huw > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: > Huw- > > I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: > > Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work > as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. > > Is this extrapolation reasonable? > > mike > > PS-- Andy > There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like > Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived > in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! > The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But > they were also Stalinist ideology. > > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > Hi David, > > This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: > > "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics , is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask , and is closely allied to radical constructivism , which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld .[3] " > > Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. > > One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. > > Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. > > One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. > > I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". > > From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: > Huw... > > So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. > > So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) > > In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. > > Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. > > Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). > > Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? > > > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. > > Huw > > On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: > Andy, Alfredo-- > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article:https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: > https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ > In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. > > Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. > > The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. > > Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. > > -- > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > > -- > At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon > > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190521/f3f101fa/attachment.html From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed May 22 04:31:07 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 11:31:07 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <507914025.6946317.1558524667826@mail.yahoo.com> The people behind these ideas were equally interesting in other areas.? It is a shame that "culture" has reduced cybernetics to the kitsch. Dear Huw,Cybernetics is within the "Culture" , how can this latter reduce that former to the kitsch?There's talk of scientists trying to delve into matters of finding the way the inanimate turned into the animate. People are curiously taking glance at vehicles running on the roads without drivers in safety. They believe in the successful end.?The problems is somewhere else:In one issue of the MCA Journal , there's a very good article titled : "The early history of the scaffolding metaphor:Bernstein, Luria, Vygotsky, and before" by?Anna Shvarts & Arthur Bakker. It's very detailed. At one point it reaches the explication of the metaphor getting help from some biologists including the renown one , Nikolai Bernstein. It was a long time I had been in wait to read him , Okhtomsky and Anokhin. Bernstein's "Dexterity" book reveals a lot good things about evolution. Let's see what he has to say in what have drawn our attention: [In mammals it grows dramatically compared to birds, and especially with reptiles, the relative number of single, target, attacks, hunting, etc. All these movements are not stereotyped and are not the same from time to time, but are distinguished by large, accurate?and fast adaptability. . They are increasingly increasing the ability to instantly create new, unlearned motor combinations, just right for?the occasion.] Further ahead: [If it is possible to apply here a comparison from the field of music, then mammals, relatively less and less of their movements, perform by heart or notes, and improvise more and more. It is quite understandable in connection with what has been said?that their ability to acquire motor skills is increasing more and more: they are becoming easier to train. They greatly increase the?number and variety of self-service and toilet movements: In a constant and wide use of the family enters the upbringing of the young. Who has not seen a cat bring a half-tailed mouse to kittens to teach them? Who did not observe how a lioness or a tigress in a zoo generously, but reasonably distributes to children "pedagogical" slaps? Both the she-wolf, the beaver, and the macaque teach their offspring the peculiarities of their life craft. The family produces and a huge amount of soul and shades. of experiences unknown to reptiles: affection, selflessness, gratitude, obedience, friendship. The actions forming the transition to real, so-called object and chain actions are becoming very abundant: various games in the company, showing an example with a pedagogical purpose, equipment with objects, etc. Birds have sounds-signals and sounds-songs?in mammals A whole series of expressive and semantic sounds appear ? almost words. How diverse and meaningful, for example, are?the sounds made on various occasions by an intelligent dog! Seton-Thompson says the same about bears, Prishvin - about beavers,?Kipling - about fur seals. Appears and facial expressions, completely absent in birds, and, expressive movement. Each of us observed?how changeable and understandable without words are the words "face" in a dog when it is glad, or ashamed, or offended.] And the conclusion of the Chapter: [The outer side of the event, played out in the Cretaceous epoch of the history of the Earth, was that warm-blooded mammals had eaten all the cold reptiles. The inner side of the same event was incomparably more important and deeper. It consisted in the fact that the pyramidal motor system ate the extrapyramidal and established itself over its debris. From now on, the mammals have been dominating over the entire animal world for *2 or 3 "years"* of our conditional historical scale. *The last "week" or one and a half* on the throne of the Earth is seated by a man.? We conclude this essay with a brief estimate of the historical events closer to us at the same?time scale. Continuously developing, the brain of the owner of the Earth all increases and asserts its real domination over the world. About our time, on our scale, man invented writing and laid the foundation for the historical period of his existence. He suffered a?severe migraine of dark medieval stagnation of thought, but healthy beginnings overcame it. Experimental study of nature, true?positive science began about *5 "minutes" ago*.? The physiology of the brain and nervous system exists *a second "minute."* We excuse?her for her *still sensitive and large gaps*, her numerous so far ?*white spots* **are more than natural** for such a short period of her?existence.] And I ask myself how far "self-generating" goes to the "Suis Generis" of Spinoza and Marx versus the "Autopoiesis" here discussed in the name of ... 3D?representation?of?a?living?cell?during?theprocess?of?mitosis,?example?of?anautopoietic?system The?term?"autopoiesis"?(from?Greek????o-?(auto-),?meaning?"self",?and????????(poiesis),?meaning?"creation,?production")?refers?to?a?system?capable?of?reproducing?and?maintaining?itself.?The?term?was?introduced?in?1972?by?Chilean?biologists?Humberto Maturana?and?Francisco Varela?to?define?the?self-maintaining?chemistry?of?living?cells.?Since?then?the?concept?has?been?also?applied?to?the?fields?of?systems theory?and?sociology. Regards Haydi ? ? ? On Tuesday, May 21, 2019, 10:01:11 PM GMT+4:30, Huw Lloyd wrote: Programming language ontologies are different to ontology in the epistemological sense. They have a different basis, it is just a poor use of wording -- a reduction, as with just about everything. The shared meaning is about the basis of an object. But the object in a conventional digital computing is a defined entity using a formal language rather than a way of construing that entails action and understanding. To make things simpler one can start with the meaning of "information". In standard computing, this pertains to "useful data", but in the cybernetic sense it is a verb, it is a process of informing, of changing the form -- a difference that makes a difference. There are certainly cybernetic ideas in computing, but they are not coherently applied. The demise of higher profile cybernetics as a research vehicle came about through funding being diverted into narrower forms of research -- such as generations of investment into AI and the dull computing we see everywhere. Cybernetics strikes through the digital/analog world/model problem with one stroke, whereas standard computing is entirely locked into formal models. Nevertheless, with care computing can be a powerful tool within a project conceived on cybernetic principles. The people behind these ideas were equally interesting in other areas.? It is a shame that "culture" has reduced cybernetics to the kitsch. Best,Huw On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 16:13, Greg Thompson wrote: Mike and Huw,I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming language such that different programming languages make different kinds of objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...).Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself?-greg On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole wrote: Hi Huw- I was not at all focused on the originality of the? 2 cybernetics idea.? I was focused on howit (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a longtime (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way thatfollowers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguishbetween different realtions of observer to observed,? The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with thepeople we were working with.? A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle inthe context of discussions about the kind of work we do.? There seems to be close matching here too.Perhaps relevant?Theoria?is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word?theoros, which is said to come from?thea?(sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus?orao?(to see). In other words?theoros?combines the seeing with the seen. So a?theoros?is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A?theoros?can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the?theoros?must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as?theorytis, (spoken by a god).? The idea of the?theoros?is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as?Aristotle?noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the?phrenoi?(the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the?theoros?to report his or her?theoria?to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth --?theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural?theoroi?to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa.? Mike On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd wrote: Hi Mike, I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! Best,Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: Huw- I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".? ...?Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant.? In our practice we have played both roles.? I think of the "hard" system in our workas "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. Is this extrapolation reasonable? mike PS-- Andy??? ? ?There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people likeBernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrivedin Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw.? Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962!?The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. Butthey were also Stalinist ideology. On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd wrote: Hi David, This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of?cybernetics, is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by?Margaret Mead,?Heinz von Foerster?and others.[1]?Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2]?It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by?Gordon Pask, and is closely allied to?radical constructivism, which was developed around the same time by?Ernst von Glasersfeld.[3]" Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc.?? One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". >From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. Best,Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg wrote: Huw... So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to?just clear up a few points for them and save them the?trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) In this world, there is something called?Learning Zero, or the?Zero Degree of Learning,?which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean?things that are as different?as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves.?I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). Is this what?you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics??Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world???? David KelloggSangmyung University New Article:?Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives byKorean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd wrote: Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. Huw On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg wrote: Andy, Alfredo-- The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding?much of it). But?I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? David KelloggSangmyung University New Article:?Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives byKorean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden wrote: https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. Finding Evald Ilyenkov?draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. -- Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm -- At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots.? Like a cypress tree living in brackish water.? Anon -- ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.?? ? -Goethe -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.Assistant ProfessorDepartment of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball TowerBrigham Young UniversityProvo, UT 84602WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu? http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190522/b3aef5ce/attachment.html From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed May 22 04:36:52 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 11:36:52 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] The article References: <2147283767.6972228.1558525012787.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <2147283767.6972228.1558525012787@mail.yahoo.com> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190522/26e310a2/attachment-0001.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: The_early_history_of_the_scaffolding_met.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 2162856 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190522/26e310a2/attachment-0001.pdf From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed May 22 08:47:57 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 09:47:57 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <49A4C1CF-4FAB-402D-8D56-D6B749C256C7@gmail.com> All: A friend of mine has suggested a get together to discuss a book by Addy Prossy, What is Life?: How Chemistry Becomes Biology (Oxford Landmark Science) As I said I have been having trouble following the discussion cybernetics. I was wondering whether Prossy?s book is in anyway related to this discussion and how credible the ideas in the book seem. Thanks for any feedback. https://www.amazon.com/What-Life-Chemistry-Becomes-Landmark/dp/0198784791/ref=sr_1_4?keywords=what+is+life&qid=1558466932&s=gateway&sr=8-4 From the blurb: "Seventy years ago, Erwin Schrodinger posed a profound question: 'What is life, and how did it emerge from non-life?' This problem has puzzled biologists and physical scientists ever since. "Living things are hugely complex and have unique properties, such as self-maintenance and apparently purposeful behaviour which we do not see in inert matter. So how does chemistry give rise to biology? What could have led the first replicating molecules up such a path? Now, developments in the emerging field of 'systems chemistry' are unlocking the problem. Addy Pross shows how the different kind of stability that operates among replicating molecules results in a tendency for chemical systems to become more complex and acquire the properties of life. Strikingly, he demonstrates that Darwinian evolution is the biological expression of a deeper, well-defined chemical concept: the whole story from replicating molecules to complex life is one continuous process governed by an underlying physical principle. The gulf between biology and the physical sciences is finally becoming bridged. "This new edition includes an Epilogue describing developments in the concepts of fundamental forms of stability discussed in the book, and their profound implications." Henry > On May 21, 2019, at 12:37 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Von Foester was a mathematician to start with, from recollection. His papers certainly read that way. > > Lettvin, McCulloch, Maturana & Pitts were the authors of the "frog's eye" paper. > > Maturana went on to develop autopoiesis with Varela. Varelea went on to study consciousness, and practiced Tibetan Buddhism. > > Gordon Pask was concerned with drama, attended a lecture by Luria in London and embedded key ideas from the regulation of speech and dialectics in his architectures. > > Ross Ashby formalised requisite variety and was a founding member of the ratio club, which included Alan Turing. > > Stafford Beer took hold of ashby's requisite variety and exploded it into an architecture for studying the health of organisations. Stafford also taught yoga and studied the Upanishads. > > I suppose I am intimate with the works of three cyberneticians and familiar with the works of five or six others. > > To get back to the original thread, I am quite convinced these are compatible with the work of Ilyenkov. > > Huw > > On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 18:07, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > Hello All, > > > > I wonder if it is important to keep in mind in this discussion that cybernetics did not take its ideas from computers but that computing and such took many of their ideas from cybernetics. The beginnings of cybernetics come from Norbert Weiner, a sort of mathematician/philosopher I would place in the mode of Russell. He actually did a year long post doc with Dewey (pre-cybernetic). The idea it seems came from the use of automated technology during WW II. In particular anti-aircraft guns that responded to pilot moves even as pilot moves respond to replacing gun sights. The idea is that activity takes place in a constant feedback loop between subject and object. It was the tip of the spear for the idea that if we could control feedback loops we could achieve desired outcomes. needed to stop looking at direct transmission between subjects and objects and focus instead on continuous feedback loops. Everybody is changing based on activities all the time. As a matter of fact the concept of feedback (almost always misinterpreted) comes from cybernetics. > > > > There was a series of conferences on how society was going to shake out post war called the Macy?s conferences, and one of the hot topics was cybernetics. A lot of computer people were gravitating, I think Weiner himself was becoming immersed in computers. There was also a conferences on the human issues of cybernetics that included Bateson, his wife Margaret Mead and Kurt Lewin along with von Foester who became a driving force. Second order cybernetics was not a second wave of cybernetics, they emerged simultaneously through the Macy?s conferences. It is call second order, or the cybernetics of cybernetics, because it asks, if the observer is defining the system he is observing, who is defining the observer? Humans are the product of continuous feedback loops not matter what their position in the world. The reason von Foester became so important is he brought in some interesting research being done in biology at the time (he was a biologist I believe). It had something to do with frogs, I don?t want to look it up. But it basically suggested that we are defined by our field of vision. We don?t know what we can?t see and we don?t know that what we can?t see exists because we can?t see it. Our field of vision (as opposed to frogs) comes from our feedback loops. > > > > Cybernetics has a wild history. Von Foester had a relationship with Ivan Illich, Bateson was close to Stuart Brand the Merry Prankster and founder of whole earth catalogues. Members of the whole second order cybernetics thing knew people in the Homebrew Computer Club and spent time in the commune movement and the diy movement. Cyberntics may not be the best theory (though it?s pretty damn interesting), until somebody can provide proof Hegel dropped acid and/or got excommunicated by the Pope I?m call dibs for the most historically interesting. > > > > Michael > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 11:11 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov > > > > Mike and Huw, > > I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming language such that different programming languages make different kinds of objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...). > > Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself? > > -greg > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole > wrote: > > Hi Huw- > > > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how > > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long > > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that > > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish > > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the > > people we were working with. > > > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in > > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. > > Perhaps relevant? > > Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). > > > > The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > Hi Mike, > > > > I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. > > > > I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". > > > > The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: > > Huw- > > > > I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: > > > > Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > > > In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work > > as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. > > > > Is this extrapolation reasonable? > > > > mike > > > > PS-- Andy > > There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like > > Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived > > in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! > > The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But > > they were also Stalinist ideology. > > > > > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > Hi David, > > > > This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: > > > > "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics , is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask , and is closely allied to radical constructivism , which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld .[3] " > > > > Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > > > One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. > > > > One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. > > > > Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. > > > > One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. > > > > I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". > > > > From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Huw... > > > > So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. > > > > So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) > > > > In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. > > > > Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. > > > > Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). > > > > Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > Sangmyung University > > > > New Article: > > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > > > > On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. > > > > Huw > > > > On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Andy, Alfredo-- > > > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. > > > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? > > > > David Kellogg > > Sangmyung University > > > > New Article: > > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: > > https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ > In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. > > Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. > > The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. > > Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. > > -- > > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > > > > -- > > At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon > > > > > > -- > > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190522/a1faf688/attachment.html From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed May 22 08:51:47 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 09:51:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Re: New book on Ilyenkov References: <49A4C1CF-4FAB-402D-8D56-D6B749C256C7@gmail.com> Message-ID: Whoops! It?s Addy Pross, no ?y? needed. > Begin forwarded message: > > From: HENRY SHONERD > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov > Date: May 22, 2019 at 9:47:57 AM MDT > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > All: > A friend of mine has suggested a get together to discuss a book by Addy Prossy, > What is Life?: How Chemistry Becomes Biology (Oxford Landmark Science) > > As I said I have been having trouble following the discussion cybernetics. I was wondering whether Prossy?s book is in anyway related to this discussion and how credible the ideas in the book seem. Thanks for any feedback. > > https://www.amazon.com/What-Life-Chemistry-Becomes-Landmark/dp/0198784791/ref=sr_1_4?keywords=what+is+life&qid=1558466932&s=gateway&sr=8-4 > > From the blurb: > > "Seventy years ago, Erwin Schrodinger posed a profound question: 'What is life, and how did it emerge from non-life?' This problem has puzzled biologists and physical scientists ever since. > > "Living things are hugely complex and have unique properties, such as self-maintenance and apparently purposeful behaviour which we do not see in inert matter. So how does chemistry give rise to biology? What could have led the first replicating molecules up such a path? Now, developments in the emerging field of 'systems chemistry' are unlocking the problem. Addy Pross shows how the different kind of stability that operates among replicating molecules results in a tendency for chemical systems to become more complex and acquire the properties of life. Strikingly, he demonstrates that Darwinian evolution is the biological expression of a deeper, well-defined chemical concept: the whole story from replicating molecules to complex life is one continuous process governed by an underlying physical principle. The gulf between biology and the physical sciences is finally becoming bridged. > > "This new edition includes an Epilogue describing developments in the concepts of fundamental forms of stability discussed in the book, and their profound implications." > > Henry > > >> On May 21, 2019, at 12:37 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> >> Von Foester was a mathematician to start with, from recollection. His papers certainly read that way. >> >> Lettvin, McCulloch, Maturana & Pitts were the authors of the "frog's eye" paper. >> >> Maturana went on to develop autopoiesis with Varela. Varelea went on to study consciousness, and practiced Tibetan Buddhism. >> >> Gordon Pask was concerned with drama, attended a lecture by Luria in London and embedded key ideas from the regulation of speech and dialectics in his architectures. >> >> Ross Ashby formalised requisite variety and was a founding member of the ratio club, which included Alan Turing. >> >> Stafford Beer took hold of ashby's requisite variety and exploded it into an architecture for studying the health of organisations. Stafford also taught yoga and studied the Upanishads. >> >> I suppose I am intimate with the works of three cyberneticians and familiar with the works of five or six others. >> >> To get back to the original thread, I am quite convinced these are compatible with the work of Ilyenkov. >> >> Huw >> >> On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 18:07, Glassman, Michael > wrote: >> Hello All, >> >> >> >> I wonder if it is important to keep in mind in this discussion that cybernetics did not take its ideas from computers but that computing and such took many of their ideas from cybernetics. The beginnings of cybernetics come from Norbert Weiner, a sort of mathematician/philosopher I would place in the mode of Russell. He actually did a year long post doc with Dewey (pre-cybernetic). The idea it seems came from the use of automated technology during WW II. In particular anti-aircraft guns that responded to pilot moves even as pilot moves respond to replacing gun sights. The idea is that activity takes place in a constant feedback loop between subject and object. It was the tip of the spear for the idea that if we could control feedback loops we could achieve desired outcomes. needed to stop looking at direct transmission between subjects and objects and focus instead on continuous feedback loops. Everybody is changing based on activities all the time. As a matter of fact the concept of feedback (almost always misinterpreted) comes from cybernetics. >> >> >> >> There was a series of conferences on how society was going to shake out post war called the Macy?s conferences, and one of the hot topics was cybernetics. A lot of computer people were gravitating, I think Weiner himself was becoming immersed in computers. There was also a conferences on the human issues of cybernetics that included Bateson, his wife Margaret Mead and Kurt Lewin along with von Foester who became a driving force. Second order cybernetics was not a second wave of cybernetics, they emerged simultaneously through the Macy?s conferences. It is call second order, or the cybernetics of cybernetics, because it asks, if the observer is defining the system he is observing, who is defining the observer? Humans are the product of continuous feedback loops not matter what their position in the world. The reason von Foester became so important is he brought in some interesting research being done in biology at the time (he was a biologist I believe). It had something to do with frogs, I don?t want to look it up. But it basically suggested that we are defined by our field of vision. We don?t know what we can?t see and we don?t know that what we can?t see exists because we can?t see it. Our field of vision (as opposed to frogs) comes from our feedback loops. >> >> >> >> Cybernetics has a wild history. Von Foester had a relationship with Ivan Illich, Bateson was close to Stuart Brand the Merry Prankster and founder of whole earth catalogues. Members of the whole second order cybernetics thing knew people in the Homebrew Computer Club and spent time in the commune movement and the diy movement. Cyberntics may not be the best theory (though it?s pretty damn interesting), until somebody can provide proof Hegel dropped acid and/or got excommunicated by the Pope I?m call dibs for the most historically interesting. >> >> >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > On Behalf Of Greg Thompson >> Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 11:11 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov >> >> >> >> Mike and Huw, >> >> I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming language such that different programming languages make different kinds of objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...). >> >> Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself? >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole > wrote: >> >> Hi Huw- >> >> >> >> I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how >> >> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long >> >> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that >> >> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish >> >> between different realtions of observer to observed, >> >> >> >> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the >> >> people we were working with. >> >> >> >> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in >> >> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. >> >> Perhaps relevant? >> >> Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). >> >> >> >> The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. >> >> >> >> Mike >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> >> Hi Mike, >> >> >> >> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. >> >> >> >> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". >> >> >> >> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: >> >> Huw- >> >> >> >> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: >> >> >> >> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >> >> >> >> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work >> >> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >> >> >> >> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >> >> >> >> mike >> >> >> >> PS-- Andy >> >> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like >> >> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived >> >> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! >> >> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But >> >> they were also Stalinist ideology. >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> >> Hi David, >> >> >> >> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >> >> >> >> "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics , is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask , and is closely allied to radical constructivism , which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld .[3] " >> >> >> >> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >> >> >> >> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >> >> >> >> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >> >> >> >> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. >> >> >> >> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. >> >> >> >> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". >> >> >> >> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: >> >> Huw... >> >> >> >> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. >> >> >> >> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >> >> >> >> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. >> >> >> >> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >> >> >> >> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >> >> >> >> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> >> Sangmyung University >> >> >> >> New Article: >> >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >> >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> >> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. >> >> >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: >> >> Andy, Alfredo-- >> >> >> >> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. >> >> >> >> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> >> Sangmyung University >> >> >> >> New Article: >> >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >> >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. >> >> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. >> >> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >> >> Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. >> >> -- >> >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> >> Assistant Professor >> >> Department of Anthropology >> >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> >> Brigham Young University >> >> Provo, UT 84602 >> >> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190522/ee2598e2/attachment.html From ewall@umich.edu Wed May 22 15:23:23 2019 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 17:23:23 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> Mike Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a mathematical theorem (pace Euclid) was ended with a QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have always thought, perhaps erroneously, that Euclid was calling attention to the participating/viewing (in/of the proof) as well the final assessment that the whole was, in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the prover/viewer. Ed > On May 20, 2019, at 6:12 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Huw- > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the > people we were working with. > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. > Perhaps relevant? > Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). > > The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > Mike > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > Hi Mike, > > I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. > > I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". > > The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! > > Best, > Huw > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: > Huw- > > I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: > > Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work > as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. > > Is this extrapolation reasonable? > > mike > > PS-- Andy > There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like > Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived > in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! > The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But > they were also Stalinist ideology. > > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > Hi David, > > This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: > > "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics , is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask , and is closely allied to radical constructivism , which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld .[3] " > > Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. > > One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. > > One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. > > Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. > > One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. > > I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". > > From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: > Huw... > > So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. > > So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) > > In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. > > Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. > > Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). > > Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? > > > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. > > Huw > > On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: > Andy, Alfredo-- > > The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. > > I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: > https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ > In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. > > Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. > > The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. > > Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. > > -- > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > -- > At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon > > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190522/e1c4fbfb/attachment.html From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed May 22 15:53:32 2019 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:53:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> References: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> Message-ID: That's really interesting, Ed. Thanks. I never stopped to inquire what QED mean't. I was taught mathematics as a series of routines. Note that I might not have picked that up from Wikipedia. "*Q.E.D.*" (sometimes written "*QED*") *is* an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "quod erat demonstrandum" ("that which was to be demonstrated"), a notation which *is* often placed at the *end* of a *mathematical proof* to *indicate* its completion. Your translation makes clear the mixing of participant observer/observant participant in QED. Unfortunately, I was the kind who often didn't "get" the demonstration and found tricks of memory to keep things straight enough to pass tests. mike On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 3:27 PM Edward Wall wrote: > Mike > > Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a mathematical theorem > (pace Euclid) was ended with a QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have always > thought, perhaps erroneously, that Euclid was calling attention to the > participating/viewing (in/of the proof) as well the final assessment that > the whole was, in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the prover/viewer. > > Ed > > On May 20, 2019, at 6:12 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Huw- > > I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I > was focused on how > it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in > philosophy for a long > time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may > also mark the way that > followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that > ethnographers distinguish > between different realtions of observer to observed, > > The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our > relationship with the > people we were working with. > > A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant > distinction from Aristotle in > the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to > be close matching here too. > Perhaps relevant? > *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by > extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, > which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- > something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines > the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to > what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to > consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) > speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle > which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic > poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices > for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work > of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular > statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). > > The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the > spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama > is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to > viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic > production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through > inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- > for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) > of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for > others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her > *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to > ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early Greek > society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to mean > ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who > speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. > > Mike > > > > On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Hi Mike, >> >> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but >> rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a >> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was >> included within it. >> >> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard >> system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that >> system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of >> your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. >> They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the >> structure of the "observed". >> >> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Huw- >>> >>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of >>> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of >>> an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>> >>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" >>> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter >>> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational >>> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which >>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , >>> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>> >>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing >>> between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our >>> practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our >>> work >>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of >>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>> >>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS-- Andy >>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the >>> USSR. It affected people like >>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was >>> still in force when I arrived >>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw >>> in October, 1962! >>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than >>> Stalinist ideology. But >>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi David, >>>> >>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, >>>> which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>> >>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of >>>> cybernetics , is the >>>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >>>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>>> , Heinz von Foerster >>>> and others.[1] >>>> Von >>>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >>>> It >>>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >>>> Pask , and is closely >>>> allied to radical constructivism >>>> , which was >>>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>>> .[3] >>>> " >>>> >>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer >>>> is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >>>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >>>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >>>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >>>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >>>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>>> system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned >>>> with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a >>>> concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>> >>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and >>>> epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics >>>> recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>> >>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >>>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >>>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >>>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >>>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >>>> and design. >>>> >>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >>>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >>>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >>>> changes either. >>>> >>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset >>>> by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >>>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >>>> "typological errors". >>>> >>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >>>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Huw... >>>>> >>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>>>> over-sensitive. >>>>> >>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of >>>>> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>>> >>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>>>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>>> >>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero >>>>> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>>> >>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>>> >>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article: >>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>>>> recognised. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times >>>>>>> (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> New Article: >>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: >>>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the >>>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to >>>>>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>>>> contribution. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> >>> -- >>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One >>> tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish >>> water. Anon >>> >> > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but > to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they > take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > > -- ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190522/c8c38413/attachment.html From ewall@umich.edu Thu May 23 17:20:53 2019 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 19:20:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: References: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> Message-ID: <3D08AD9A-310F-477C-9E51-8D4C1371AA2D@umich.edu> Mike Most contemporary mathematicians do not end a proof with a QED although Eric Livingston (whose name has come up on this list) might tend to side with my interpretation of Euclid. There is mathematics as application - a quite respectable use - and mathematics as, one might say, exploration. In the first case, mathematics provides a means of doing something; it is, in a sense, secondary as one?s primary focus is elsewhere. Memorization of the relevant mathematics seems, to me, a reasonable response. In the second case, mathematics is - I think this way anyway - like writing a poem, painting a picture, composing a melody, etc.. You are trying somehow to capture structure or a pattern. I read your work as trying to capture structure/patterns of behavior. I don?t read you as one who just memorizes the reasonable notions of other scholars and doesn?t look further (and I may have been once a bit like that - smile). However, one could perhaps argue that is what it takes to be an effective social worker or teacher. That is, certain things are so obvious, we are no longer puzzled. Ed ?Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom.? ~ Viktor Frankl > On May 22, 2019, at 5:53 PM, mike cole wrote: > > That's really interesting, Ed. Thanks. I never stopped to inquire what QED mean't. I was > taught mathematics as a series of routines. Note that I might not have picked that up from > Wikipedia. > > "Q.E.D." (sometimes written "QED") is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "quod erat demonstrandum" ("that which was to be demonstrated"), a notation which is often placed at the end of a mathematical proof to indicate its completion. > > Your translation makes clear the mixing of participant observer/observant participant in QED. Unfortunately, > I was the kind who often didn't "get" the demonstration and found tricks of memory to keep things straight enough to pass tests. > > mike > > On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 3:27 PM Edward Wall > wrote: > Mike > > Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a mathematical theorem (pace Euclid) was ended with a QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have always thought, perhaps erroneously, that Euclid was calling attention to the participating/viewing (in/of the proof) as well the final assessment that the whole was, in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the prover/viewer. > > Ed > >> On May 20, 2019, at 6:12 PM, mike cole > wrote: >> >> Hi Huw- >> >> I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how >> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long >> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that >> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish >> between different realtions of observer to observed, >> >> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the >> people we were working with. >> >> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in >> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. >> Perhaps relevant? >> Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). >> >> The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. >> >> Mike >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> Hi Mike, >> >> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. >> >> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". >> >> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: >> Huw- >> >> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: >> >> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >> >> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work >> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >> >> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >> >> mike >> >> PS-- Andy >> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like >> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived >> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! >> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But >> they were also Stalinist ideology. >> >> >> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> Hi David, >> >> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >> >> "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics , is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask , and is closely allied to radical constructivism , which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld .[3] " >> >> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >> >> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >> >> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >> >> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. >> >> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. >> >> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". >> >> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: >> Huw... >> >> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. >> >> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >> >> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. >> >> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >> >> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >> >> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. >> >> Huw >> >> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: >> Andy, Alfredo-- >> >> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. >> >> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: >> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. >> >> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. >> >> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >> >> Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. >> >> -- >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> >> -- >> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon >> >> >> -- >> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >> >> > > > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190523/c76c332d/attachment.html From hhdave15@gmail.com Fri May 24 06:23:08 2019 From: hhdave15@gmail.com (Harshad Dave) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 18:53:08 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] Does an exchange generate a profit? Message-ID: Hi, Here I present one example. There is a fisherman living in a habitation. Generally, he catches fishes and exchanges part of the quantity against wheat with a farmer living in the habitation. ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? Harshad Dave . -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190524/4d73bac5/attachment.html From dkirsh@lsu.edu Fri May 24 09:39:14 2019 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 16:39:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Yes, according to two criteria: 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen as profiting off the investment of the other. Along with the original question ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? One might also ask, ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other party as reaping unfair profits. I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the wellbeing of each to the other is as important as the wellbeing of self. An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as necessary. Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. David From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu On Behalf Of Harshad Dave Sent: Friday, May 24, 2019 8:23 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Does an exchange generate a profit? Hi, Here I present one example. There is a fisherman living in a habitation. Generally, he catches fishes and exchanges part of the quantity against wheat with a farmer living in the habitation. ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? Harshad Dave . -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190524/6a7fa7f1/attachment.html From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 24 12:30:27 2019 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 13:30:27 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ana, Thank you so much for your very thoughtful description/explanation of Ethical Ontological Dialogism. I know that by now you probably thought I was avoiding your answer, but I've been trying to figure how to offer a reasonable response to the feast that you put forward in your email and trying to figure out how I might respond to your post in a manner consonant with ethical ontological dialogism. I'm pretty sure I'll fail at the latter, but feast I did. I'm also curious if a medium like a listserve can brook the challenge of slow replies - replies that don't come for days or even weeks. I'm always surprised to see how quickly conversations come and go even in a (virtual) place as thoughtful as XMCA. Perhaps this is a sign of the times; you can find "dialogue" everywhere but seldom does it amount to much - whether ethically (cf. the dialogical fires that regularly erupt in social media) or ontologically (cf. the "dialogue" of talking heads on just about any media outlet who are expected to instantly opine on subjects about which they've had little time to think). The dialogues on XMCA are perhaps a bit slower than some of these other "dialogues" but even here on XMCA it seems the half-life of a comment is about 24 hours. So I'm wondering what a slower listserve might look like and whether slow replies might perhaps be a step toward what you have outlined as ethical ontological dialogism. That's all just to say that I was delighted by your response (and the fact that you took some time to respond) and I hope you'll forgive me for multiplying that time in my response (and, of course, that last paragraph could be seen as just an attempt to rationalize my failure to be a responsible partner in dialogue...). Anyway, as for the project itself, I find it quite exciting and invigorating. It is a wonderfully interesting project to tease out the implications of Bakhtin's work for teachers' practice and the way you have outlined this in your email really sings to me. If I were to ask questions about the project (and maybe some of these answers are contained in the book - I've asked our library to order it), I have two major questions that stand out. One has to do with sustainability of these principles and the other has to do with the universality of them. With regard to sustainability, along with David Kirshner's question: "Do you not tremble at the selflessness that this posture demands?", I wonder if this is the kind of thing that teachers in major public school systems can easily sustain? Or is there something else that is needed in order to be able to enable teachers to realize this kind of practice? What things might need to change? With regard to universalizability, I wonder if you have thought much about the ideology of the subject that underlies this project? As much as the project sings to me, I wonder how much of that is because it is based on an ideology of the subject that resonates with me (I'm a fan of Bakhtin's notion of the subject as articulated in Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). As an anthropologist I have to ask the question: what if the culture that you are working in requires acknowledgment of some fixed characteristics of the subject being addressed, perhaps even as finalized and finished categories? Relatedly, I wonder if there might not be need for some awareness of patterns of difference whether developmental differences, cultural differences, and other differences that are important to engage with in order to engage in an EOD manner with others? Put slightly differently, is it possible that recognizing pre-existing persons as part of (fixed) pre-existing categories might be a necessary part of an ethical ontological dialogism. In other words, is there some other end of the spectrum opposite of a total rejection of these positive categories and patterns that is necessary for an ethical ontological dialogism? It seems that this positive categorization is a part of ethical dialogical practice in much of our intimate encounters - whether the mother anticipating the needs of a nursing child, a child anticipating their parent's wishes (in Korea there is a term "nunchi" which is one of the most fundamental ethical values of certain kinds of relationships and involves the anticipation of the needs of significant others; importantly, these are often in hierarchical relationships), a teacher designing a curriculum for incoming students based on what little is known of their developmental age, or the anticipatory removal of images of snakes by a man whose spouse is ophidiophobic. Prediction as part of the anticipation of needs hardly seems ethically problematic in these cases and, in fact, it seems to be exactly the opposite. I would think that this would also mean that the goal of psychology -understanding others - has the potential to be a deeply ethical practice in the EOD sense. The one caveat is that it shouldn't be seen as the final word on any one subject - i.e., you can never fully "know" a person via the categories that they might fit into. If I may anticipate(!) your response, I assume that an EOD approach would not avoid this but would simply be to emphasize that this is NOT the same as using one's knowledge of the Other as a final determination - as a determination of the Other's "essence and potential". That seems a critical point. A few other thoughts: I can't help but see strong parallels between your critique of social science research and the critique offered by Martin Packer in his book The Science of Qualitative Research. Latour seems to be one of the main common touchpoints, but thematically you are engaged in very similar projects - the question of how to study "subjectivity" "objectively". The major difference is that where you turn to Bakhtin's notion of unfinalizability, he turns to Foucault's notion of an "historical ontology of ourselves". Regardless of that, I see huge resonances between your work. And regardless of those resonances, I imagine that bringing EOD to social science research would be another angle to develop more substantially (if you haven't already!). Oh, and a question: what is "ontological" about EOD? I have more thoughts but I think I've already said too much... Once again, many thanks for your thoughtful and lengthy response. I look forward to reading more. Very best, Greg On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:46 PM Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote: > Dear Greg and all, > > > > Thanks a lot! What an interesting invitation to write directly on the > notion of ?ethical ontological dialogism.? I know that by now you probably > thought I was ignoring your question, but in fact it took me a little time > to write about it in a very short way. EOD (Ethical Ontological Dialogism) > is an approach to human studies that is in many ways different from CHAT, > so I am always anxious that it may sound very strange to the XMCA > community, and I tried to be as clear as possible. But you will judge how > successful I was in that. > > > > My reply is probably very long for an email, it is an outline of a paper, > references and all. So if you are not interested, stop right here. But if > you are, I am really curious to hear your comments. > > > > What is ?ethical ontological dialogism?? > > To me Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD) means to be in a dialogue in > which one relates to all participants of a pedagogical event (students, > teachers) as ?*a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each > with its own world*, [that] combine but are not merged in the unity of > the event? (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6, italics are in the original). This implies > that people in dialogue take each other seriously, and with an awareness > that ?[c]onsciousnesses themselves cannot be equal to each other ? only > their rights?because consciousnesses are unique, immeasurable, > unfinalizable and opaque both to oneself and to each other? (Matusov, 2018, > p. 1478). This is true not only for the immediate participants in a > pedagogical (and other) events, but is also true for the researcher who > joins these dialogues with his/her heart and mind in a new, now scholarly, > event of studying the original dialogic encounters. > > But let me backtrack for a moment to provide some background for this > claim (which I will repeat below). > > In our book *Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by > and for Educators* (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019), we > attempt to transcend the main problem of positivism in the social sciences. > Paradoxically, the positivist focus on the given (e.g. the positive) in its > search for truth, is its greatest strength, and also its greatest > limitation! This ?given truth? which is assumed to exist in itself, outside > of any human observation and knowledge, has to be reached in its ?pure? > form, uncontaminated by anyone?s subjectivity or ideological/religious > dogma that could distort it. To achieve this, positivist science > scrupulously follows methods that gradually lead to de-subjectification of > the truth. Latour described science-in-action as a practice of cleaning out > researchers? statements about studied phenomenon from the researchers? > subjectivity through a special discursive practice in a scientific > community (Latour, 1987). However, it is exactly this practice of the > modern positivist approach that effectively limits this approach and keeps > it from reaching the very human core of people?s existence, i.e. their > constant unique and authorial participation in dialogic meaning-making. > Elsewhere my colleagues and I claimed that dialogism can and must transcend > the pitfalls of positivism/modernism in approaching the study of human > meaning-making (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, & Curtis, 2019). > Positivist/modernist assumption about meaning-making is based on the > concept of pattern recognition, i.e. the notion that meaning can be > extracted from the self-contained, given patterns (cognitive, linguistic, > communicational, etc.) (Gee, 2014; Kahneman, 2011; Linell, 2009, and > others; Vygotsky, 1986, 2004; Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). Positivism ?tries to > capture the ?objective,? the ?given,? ?how things really are,? the > phenomenon as it is in its essence, independent of anyone?s subjectivity? > (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, et al., 2019, p. E54). > > However, the humanness cannot be objectivized, because > humanness means constantly creating and re-creating unique relationships > with others by giving recognition to each other?s authorial subjectivities > and taking responsibility for one?s own critically important voice in > dialogue. This never-ending meaning-making that is a mark of people?s > humanity, is NOT the given and cannot be studied as a given. It does not > exist outside of the moment of its making nor outside of the particular > human beings that make it. It cannot be ?captured? as an object. Dialogic > meaning-making can be only joined in the never-ending and unrestricted > dialogue, in which ?[t]ruth becomes dialogically tested and forever > testable? (Morson, 2004). > > Furthermore, trying to capture the other?s humanity as an > object, according to Bakhtin is not just a futile exercise! It is also > deeply unethical! Let me use Bakhtin?s analysis of a small episode from > Dostoyevsky?s Brothers Karamazov. > > ?? in Alyosha's conversation with Liza about Captain Snegirev, who had > trampled underfoot the money offered him. Having told the story, Alyosha > analyzes Snegirev's emotional state and, as it were, predetermines his > further behavior by predicting that next time he would without fail take > the money. To this Liza replies: > > . . . Listen, Alexey Fyodorovich. Isn't there in all our analysis?I mean > your analysis . . . no, better call it ours?aren't we showing contempt for > him, for that poor man?in analyzing his soul like this, as it were, from > above, eh? In deciding so certainly that he will take the money? [SS IX, > 271-72; The Brothers Karamazov, Book Five, I]? (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. > 60). > > Bakhtin commented on this episode from Dostoyevskian novel > that there is something deeply monological and unethical, full of contempt, > when one takes a ?position from above? towards the other and begins *to > calculate* that other person, her/his desires, motives, thoughts, > positions, plans? Bakhtin argued that Dostoyevsky was developing the > implicit concept of what does it mean to have an ethical stance toward > others though many of his characters across all of his novels and stories. > Bakhtin claimed that the ultimate breach of ethics toward the other is to > calculate, finalize, objectify, and predict the other, ??a living human > being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, > finalizing cognitive process. *In a human being there is always something > that only he himself can reveal [in dialogue with others], in a free act of > self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an > externalizing secondhand definition*? (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 58, > italics in the otriginal). > > However, is the goal of social science to calculate, > finalize, objectify, and predict people?s subjectivities?! Bakhtin > described how a Dostoyevskian approach to life and to the others, runs > against the very core of psychology as a science, from the day its > emergence in the 19th century, which does exactly that: attempting to > turn the other human being?s soul into a calculatable object, > > Toward the psychology of his [Dostoevsky?s] day?as it was expressed in > scientific and artistic literature, and as it was practiced in the law > courts?Dostoevsky had no sympathy at all. He saw in it a degrading > reification of a person's soul, a discounting of its freedom and its > unfinalizability, and of that peculiar indeterminacy and indefiniteness > which in Dostoevsky constitute the main object of representation: for in > fact Dostoevsky always represents a person on the threshold of a final > decision, at a moment of crisis, at an unfinalizable?and > unpredeterminate?turning point for his soul (ibid, p. 61). > > Although Bakhtin described Dostoyevsky?s thoughts of more > than 100 years ago, this ethical stance can be applied to the psychology of > today, too, including sociocultural psychology, in my view. By definition, > psychology is about objectivizing people, i.e. reducing them to predictable > and calculatable, voiceless ?categories? ?mechanisms,? ?processes,? > ?developmental stages,? ?what is shaped by culture, institution, history,? > etc. Contemporary psychology (from the times of Dostoyevsky and Bakhtin to > our times today), and much of education, studies the cultural, > institutional, biological, political, historical, psychological GIVEN. It > deals with the objectifiable aspects of humans, attempting to reify them by > effectively excluding their authorial voices from serious dialogues and > talking about them and to them, but not addressing them and taking their > voices into account. Bakhtin wrote, > > The truth about a man in the mouths of others, not directed to him > dialogically and therefore a *secondhand* truth, becomes a lie degrading > and deadening him, if it touches upon his "holy of holies," that is, "the > man in man." (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 59) > > When we talk to a child not with our sincere interest and > curiosity about his/her *unique* experiences, joys, desires, sorrows, > fears, hopes, dreams, aspirations, feelings, thoughts, but, rather to > ?package? her/his unique subjectivity into objective, calculatable and > manipulatable categories-boxes (e.g. coding), we are not studying humanity > ? what makes us uniquely human. In the eyes of Russian contemporary > educationalist Alexander Lobok, this means that we are actually outside of > the world of deeply human subjective experience, > > The problem with this conventional approach to psychology, however, is > that the human being is the only ?object? in the Universe that is defined > by a *subjective cognizing world* of her or his own, building above the > subjective lived experiences and feelings and redefining them ? a world, > unique for each person, which cannot possibly be viewed from outside, > except for some of its outward objective artifact manifestations of this > subjective cognizing world. (Lobok, 2017, p. SIa:2). > > The main problem with conventional social sciences is that > they study what is *objective* (positive, given) in humans. They study > objective subjectivity. In itself there is nothing wrong with that when it > is viewed as a study of human limitations rather than human essence and > potential. As a study of human limitations, conventional social sciences > are very helpful. However, they are highly distortive, harmful, and, > arguably, unethical when they claim to study the whole person. Genuine > social science must address ?the surplus of humanness? (Bakhtin, 1991, p. > 37). ?The surplus of humanness? is ?a leftover? from the biologically, > socially, culturally, historically, and psychologically given ? the typical > and general ? in the human nature. It is about the human authorship of the > ever-unique meaning-making (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, et al., > 2019). > > The concept of ethical ontological dialogism is aimed at addressing the > described problem of objective subjectivity studied by conventional social > sciences. Ontological dialogic pedagogy inspired by Bakhtin aspires to be a > pedagogy of ethical ontological dialogism. As I stated at the start of this > short outline, to me Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD) means to be in > dialogue in which one relates to all participants of a pedagogical event > (students, teachers) as ?*a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal > rights and each with its own world*, [that] combine but are not merged in > the unity of the event? (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6, italics are in the original). > People in genuine dialogue take each other seriously, and with an awareness > that ?[c]onsciousnesses themselves cannot be equal to each other ? only > their rights?because consciousnesses are unique, immeasurable, > unfinalizable and opaque both to oneself and to each other? (Matusov, 2018, > p. 1478). In genuine dialogue, participants expect to be surprised by the > other, her/his unique ideas, views, desires, hopes, fears, etc. > > For me, ethical ontological dialogism is about authorial > meaning-making where meaning emerges in the relationship ?between genuinely > interested questions and seriously provided answers? (Matusov, 2018, p. > 1478) where people in a dialogic encounter recognize each other as > creatively and/or critically authoring their views and truths. In an > authorial meaning-making encounter, participants address each other by > making bids for their emerging ideas, points of view, questions, etc., and > by seriously responding to these bids by recognizing their importance and > providing their evaluations and questions (Matusov, 2019 in preparation; > Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). Serious recognition of the other?s ideas > establishes the existence the other?s creative and/or critical authorship > (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017), it gives it a life. Serious recognition > of the other?s creative and/or critical ideas, opinions, desires, dreams, > plans and questions is an expression of a genuine interest in the other?s > voice and ideas. Such a genuine interest also opens a way to find new > meanings in one?s own ideas and truths, recognize something about them that > would otherwise stay invisible and unrecognized, or inspire completely new, > transcendent meanings. > > Ethical ontological dialogism is rooted not only in the > recognition of the authorship of the one?s own and others? bids for > meaning, but also in taking responsibility for one?s own views, ideas, > desires, judgments and decisions that may result from them. Bakhtin?s motto > ?There is no alibi in being? (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40) expresses this dialogic > responsibility, a responsibility that comes from being unique, > unrepeatable, once-occurrent and irreplaceable human being, whose > participation in dialogue is both acknowledged/recognized and > indispensable. Bakhtin wrote, > > I occupy a place in once-occurrent Being that is unique and > never-repeatable, a place that cannot be taken by anyone else and is > impenetrable for anyone else. In the given once-occurrent point where I am > now located, no one else has ever been located in the once-occurrent time > and once-occurrent space of once-occurrent Being. [?]. That which can be > done by me can never be done by anyone else. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40) > > Ethical ontological dialogism is about recognizing the > uniqueness of the participants and of each moment of dialogic > meaning-making. Moreover, it recognizes the responsibility of dialogic > partners to be answerable for their unique, unrepeatable and irreplaceable > dialogic offers, recognitions, evaluations and judgments. For me, ethical > ontological dialogism is an approach to life, to educational practice, and > to the study of human meaning-making in general, including education, > psychology, sociology and other human sciences. > > > > What do you think? > > > > Ana > References > > Bakhtin, M. M. (1991). *The dialogic imagination: Four essays by M. M. > Bakhtin* (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). Austin, TX: University of > Texas Press. > > Bakhtin, M. M. (1993). *Toward a philosophy of the act* (V. Liapunov & M. > Holquist, Trans. 1st ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press. > > Bakhtin, M. M. (1999). *Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics* (Vol. 8). > Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. > > Bakhtin, M. M., & Emerson, C. (1999). * Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics* > (Vol. 8). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. > > Gee, J. P. (2014). *An introduction to discourse analysis : theory and > method* (Fourth edition. ed.). New York: Routledge. > > Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow* (1st ed.). New York: > Farrar, Straus and Giroux. > > Latour, B. (1987). *Science in action: How to follow scientists and > engineers through society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. > > Linell, P. (2009). *Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically : > interactional and contextual theories of human sense-making*. Charlotte, > NC: Information Age Pub. > > Lobok, A. (2017). The Cartography of Inner Childhood: Fragments from the > book. *Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal, 5*, SIa: 1-42. > > Matusov, E. (2018). Ethic authorial dialogism as a candidate for > post-postmodernism. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 50 *(14), > 1478?1479. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2018.1461367 > > Matusov, E. (2019 in preparation).* Students and teachers as authors in a > Bakhtinian critical dialogue*. > > Matusov, E., & Marjanovic-Shane, A. (2017). Dialogic authorial approach to > creativity in education: Transforming a deadly homework into a creative > activity. In V. Glaveanu (Ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Creativity and > Culture Research* (pp. 307-325): Palgrave. > > Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., & Gradovski, M. (2019). *Dialogic > Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research art: Bakhtin by and for Educators*: > Palgrave Macmillan US. > > Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., Kullenberg, T., & Curtis, K. (2019). Dialogic > analysis vs. discourse analysis of dialogic pedagogy (and beyond). *Dialogic > Pedagogy: An International Online Journal, 7*, E20-E62. > doi:10.5195/dpj.2019.272 > > Morson, G. S. (2004). The process of ideological becoming. In A. F. Ball & > S. W. Freedman (Eds.), *Bakhtinian perspectives on language, literacy, > and learning* (pp. 317-331). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge > University Press. > > Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language. lxi, 287 p. > > Vygotsky, L. S. (2004). Imagination and creativity in childhood. *Journal > of Russian and Eastern European Psychology, 42*(1), 7 - 97. > > Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1994). Tool and Symbol in Child > Development. In R. Van Der Veer & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *The Vygotsky > Reader* (pp. 73-98). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. > > > > > > > > -- > > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > > Phone: 267-334-2905 > > Email: anamshane@gmail.com > > > > > > *From: *"xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu" > on behalf of Greg Thompson > *Reply-To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Date: *Wednesday, May 1, 2019 at 12:37 PM > *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic > Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators > > > > Ana, > > This looks lovely. I wonder if you might have a few moments to explain to > us the notion of "ethical ontological dialogism"? I'm sure it would take an > entire book to properly explain (hence, well, this book), but it would be > nice if you might be able to offer a few paragraphs, or maybe even just a > few sentences? > > -greg > > > > On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 9:42 AM Ana Marjanovic-Shane > wrote: > > Dear friends, > > > > I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana > Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic > Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. > > ?This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical > practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M. > Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational > practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors > provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired > classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational > relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in > which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of > innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov, > Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which > the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing > dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into > them with their mind and heart.? (Palgrave - > https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566) > > What do you think? > > > > Ana > > > > -- > > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > > Phone: 267-334-2905 > > Email: anamshane@gmail.com > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190524/bbf3479f/attachment.html From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 24 12:59:08 2019 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 13:59:08 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Harshad, What is meant by "profit"? Is this defined simply as "mutual beneficence" or is it something more like "surplus value" or even "surplus capital"? What you describe Harshad is precisely what Adam Smith describes and what becomes the basis for the ethical argument for capitalism - the truck, barter, and trade that is mutually beneficial. Marx says "yes, but... (power)". David Kirshner, I love your suggestion about the importance of familial relations, but I wonder if you would limit familial relations in the traditional way it is often limited in the West to biological relations? Or might you and I be family? -greg On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 10:41 AM David H Kirshner wrote: > Yes, according to two criteria: > > > > 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds > that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. > > 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training > demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen > as profiting off the investment of the other. > > > > Along with the original question > > ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on > either side?? > > One might also ask, > > ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an > unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? > > > > A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what > has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other > party as reaping unfair profits. > > > > I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness > is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the wellbeing > of each to the other is as important as the wellbeing of self. > > > > An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established > class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as > necessary. > > > > Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. > > > > David > > > > *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu *On > Behalf Of *Harshad Dave > *Sent:* Friday, May 24, 2019 8:23 AM > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Does an exchange generate a profit? > > > > Hi, > > Here I present one example. > > There is a fisherman living in a habitation. Generally, he catches fishes > and exchanges part of the quantity against wheat with a farmer living in > the habitation. > > ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on > either side?? > > Harshad Dave > > . > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190524/53aac0e2/attachment.html From dkirsh@lsu.edu Fri May 24 20:49:42 2019 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sat, 25 May 2019 03:49:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Being biologically related is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing familial relations, in the sense I used it. David From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Friday, May 24, 2019 2:59 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? Harshad, What is meant by "profit"? Is this defined simply as "mutual beneficence" or is it something more like "surplus value" or even "surplus capital"? What you describe Harshad is precisely what Adam Smith describes and what becomes the basis for the ethical argument for capitalism - the truck, barter, and trade that is mutually beneficial. Marx says "yes, but... (power)". David Kirshner, I love your suggestion about the importance of familial relations, but I wonder if you would limit familial relations in the traditional way it is often limited in the West to biological relations? Or might you and I be family? -greg On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 10:41 AM David H Kirshner > wrote: Yes, according to two criteria: 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen as profiting off the investment of the other. Along with the original question ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? One might also ask, ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other party as reaping unfair profits. I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the wellbeing of each to the other is as important as the wellbeing of self. An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as necessary. Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. David From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > On Behalf Of Harshad Dave Sent: Friday, May 24, 2019 8:23 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Does an exchange generate a profit? Hi, Here I present one example. There is a fisherman living in a habitation. Generally, he catches fishes and exchanges part of the quantity against wheat with a farmer living in the habitation. ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? Harshad Dave . -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190525/8df494bc/attachment.html From hhdave15@gmail.com Fri May 24 21:42:51 2019 From: hhdave15@gmail.com (Harshad Dave) Date: Sat, 25 May 2019 10:12:51 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David K., I copy pest your reply and put my points in bracket. Yes, according to two criteria: [Here I presume that "Yes" means... such exchange generates profit on either side but as per given two criteria.] 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen as profiting off the investment of the other. [I understand after going through above two points that above two points are the parameters that influence the exchange ratio that finally gets determined in an exchange process.] Along with the original question ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? One might also ask, ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? [At which exchange ratio we shall label it as an *equal exchange*? If we are not aware of or not in a position to determine an exchange ratio that puts the exchange into the column of equal exchange then we will not be able to determine if it is unequal.] A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other party as reaping unfair profits. [It is the feeling of the either party as you say above. However, here we discuss the out come of our contemplation on the exchange process.] I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the well being of each to the other is as important as the well being of self. [To some extent you are touching one more parameter that might influence the process of determination of exchange ratio between fish and wheat.] An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as necessary. [I feel.... unconsciously you are pointing towards some unknown parameters that play a critical role to determine an exchange ratio between two commodities and inflict inequality. You have treated (and accepted) the same as class ideology as well as they are natural and /or necessary. This is debatable but at present we shall not take it in our discussion as it might divert our main line of discussion.] Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. NB: Part of the reply you will find in my reply to Greg. Harshad Dave On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 10:11 PM David H Kirshner wrote: > Yes, according to two criteria: > > > > 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds > that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. > > 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training > demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen > as profiting off the investment of the other. > > > > Along with the original question > > ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on > either side?? > > One might also ask, > > ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an > unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? > > > > A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what > has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other > party as reaping unfair profits. > > > > I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness > is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the wellbeing > of each to the other is as important as the wellbeing of self. > > > > An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established > class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as > necessary. > > > > Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. > > > > David > > > > *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu *On > Behalf Of *Harshad Dave > *Sent:* Friday, May 24, 2019 8:23 AM > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Does an exchange generate a profit? > > > > Hi, > > Here I present one example. > > There is a fisherman living in a habitation. Generally, he catches fishes > and exchanges part of the quantity against wheat with a farmer living in > the habitation. > > ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on > either side?? > > Harshad Dave > > . > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190525/58059a4e/attachment.html From dkirsh@lsu.edu Fri May 24 23:58:45 2019 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sat, 25 May 2019 06:58:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks for your reply, Dave. Greg asked you: ?What is meant by "profit"? Is this defined simply as "mutual beneficence" or is it something more like "surplus value" or even "surplus capital"?? I?ve assumed you meant the latter, which requires some sort of metric to measure ?surplus.? The first part of my note suggested two different bases for this metric, hence two different ways to calculate whether the exchange is equitable, or if one side has profited and the other lost. You suggested, ?If we are not aware of or not in a position to determine an exchange ratio that puts the exchange into the column of equal exchange then we will not be able to determine if it is unequal.? But here is where I introduced a psychological dimension, as being in a position to determine an exchange is not objectively determinable. I can feel you?ve cheated me based on some kind of inner metric, even if I am not able to or in a position to make it explicit. On the other hand, if I perceive us as being in solidarity with one another, then I do not do calculations that measure my individual benefit, only our mutual benefit?perhaps this is the ideal of communism. I agree with you that the question of whether this sense of solidarity is rooted in ideology (political) or familial bonding (biological) is beyond the trajectory of the discussion. David From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu On Behalf Of Harshad Dave Sent: Friday, May 24, 2019 11:43 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? David K., I copy pest your reply and put my points in bracket. Yes, according to two criteria: [Here I presume that "Yes" means... such exchange generates profit on either side but as per given two criteria.] 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen as profiting off the investment of the other. [I understand after going through above two points that above two points are the parameters that influence the exchange ratio that finally gets determined in an exchange process.] Along with the original question ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? One might also ask, ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? [At which exchange ratio we shall label it as an equal exchange? If we are not aware of or not in a position to determine an exchange ratio that puts the exchange into the column of equal exchange then we will not be able to determine if it is unequal.] A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other party as reaping unfair profits. [It is the feeling of the either party as you say above. However, here we discuss the out come of our contemplation on the exchange process.] I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the well being of each to the other is as important as the well being of self. [To some extent you are touching one more parameter that might influence the process of determination of exchange ratio between fish and wheat.] An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as necessary. [I feel.... unconsciously you are pointing towards some unknown parameters that play a critical role to determine an exchange ratio between two commodities and inflict inequality. You have treated (and accepted) the same as class ideology as well as they are natural and /or necessary. This is debatable but at present we shall not take it in our discussion as it might divert our main line of discussion.] Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. NB: Part of the reply you will find in my reply to Greg. Harshad Dave On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 10:11 PM David H Kirshner > wrote: Yes, according to two criteria: 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen as profiting off the investment of the other. Along with the original question ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? One might also ask, ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other party as reaping unfair profits. I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the wellbeing of each to the other is as important as the wellbeing of self. An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as necessary. Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. David From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > On Behalf Of Harshad Dave Sent: Friday, May 24, 2019 8:23 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Does an exchange generate a profit? Hi, Here I present one example. There is a fisherman living in a habitation. Generally, he catches fishes and exchanges part of the quantity against wheat with a farmer living in the habitation. ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on either side?? Harshad Dave . -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190525/95c559b7/attachment.html From hhdave15@gmail.com Sat May 25 03:35:30 2019 From: hhdave15@gmail.com (Harshad Dave) Date: Sat, 25 May 2019 16:05:30 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, Here I reproduce the words of your reply and put my views. [Your words in black font. My reply in blue font] What is meant by "profit"? Is this defined simply as "mutual beneficence" or is it something more like "surplus value" or even "surplus capital"? [I talk about *profit* that has been addressed by Marx in the ?theory of surplus value?. It is rightly explained in *theory of surplus value* that *profit* is nothing but an unpaid labor only. Here I want to raise a point that there are simple exchanges between/among two or more parties for different commodities also and that might generate a *profit*.] What you describe Harshad is precisely what Adam Smith describes and what becomes the basis for the ethical argument for capitalism - the truck, barter, and trade that is mutually beneficial. [I shall try to clarify my views against your comment as above. Let us take five cases as follow, There are two parties P1 and P2. There are two commodities in the process of exchange cmdt1 and cmdt2 produced by P1 and P2 respectively. 1. P1 and P2 produce cmdt1 and cmdt2 respectively and they consume them. There is no exchange. 2. P1 and P 2 enter an exchange process. They consume the received commodity. They do not exchange received commodity again with third party. 3. P1 receives cmdt2 and consumes it. P2 does not consume cmdt1 but going to exchange it with third party. 4. P1 is a producer of cmdt1. P2 is not the consumer of cmdt1 but going to exchange cmdt1 with third party. 5. P1 and P2 are not producers of the commodity (cmdt1 and cmdt2) but they command them before exchange. Neither P1 nor P2 is going to consume the commodity cmdt2 and cmdt1 respectively received after exchange process. Both the parties exchange the received commodity with third party. If you analyze the above cases, the case at sr. number 4 is taken to explain the ?theory of surplus value?. Ultimately, my question is targeted if other cases generate *profit* or not (leaving case at sr. No. 1). Marx says "yes, but... (power)". [I request you (if possible) to give me further link/address where I can read the detail of above phrase] David Kirshner, I love your suggestion about the importance of familial relations, but I wonder if you would limit familial relations in the traditional way it is often limited in the West to biological relations? Or might you and I be family? - Greg Harshad Dave On Sat, May 25, 2019 at 1:31 AM Greg Thompson wrote: > Harshad, > What is meant by "profit"? Is this defined simply as "mutual beneficence" > or is it something more like "surplus value" or even "surplus capital"? > > What you describe Harshad is precisely what Adam Smith describes and what > becomes the basis for the ethical argument for capitalism - the truck, > barter, and trade that is mutually beneficial. Marx says "yes, but... > (power)". > > David Kirshner, I love your suggestion about the importance of familial > relations, but I wonder if you would limit familial relations in the > traditional way it is often limited in the West to biological relations? > > Or might you and I be family? > > -greg > > > > On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 10:41 AM David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Yes, according to two criteria: >> >> >> >> 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds >> that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. >> >> 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level >> training demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can >> be seen as profiting off the investment of the other. >> >> >> >> Along with the original question >> >> ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on >> either side?? >> >> One might also ask, >> >> ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being >> an unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? >> >> >> >> A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what >> has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other >> party as reaping unfair profits. >> >> >> >> I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of >> unfairness is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and >> the wellbeing of each to the other is as important as the wellbeing of >> self. >> >> >> >> An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established >> class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as >> necessary. >> >> >> >> Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. >> >> >> >> David >> >> >> >> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> *On Behalf Of *Harshad Dave >> *Sent:* Friday, May 24, 2019 8:23 AM >> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Does an exchange generate a profit? >> >> >> >> Hi, >> >> Here I present one example. >> >> There is a fisherman living in a habitation. Generally, he catches fishes >> and exchanges part of the quantity against wheat with a farmer living in >> the habitation. >> >> ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on >> either side?? >> >> Harshad Dave >> >> . >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190525/3a576002/attachment.html From hhdave15@gmail.com Sat May 25 04:06:07 2019 From: hhdave15@gmail.com (Harshad Dave) Date: Sat, 25 May 2019 16:36:07 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Here I put my views and request you to read it carefully. 1. The subject matter of the exchange process and generation of mutual benefits (profit) is influenced by a permutations and combinations of innumerable parameters where many of them are absolutely beyond our control and varies on time line. It is not possible to calculate them with the help of any formula. Neither it is known nor it will be in future. While contemplating/pondering and debating on such interesting issues, I believe, it is a challenging task to refrain us from getting trapped/involved into a matter that gets terminated at "mission impossible". The direction of our discussion is not the calculation of *profit*. 2. Somewhere in your last reply I read a word "cheated". Please trust me, there might be weakness in my explanation as English is not my mother tongue, but there is no *cheating*. 3. I request you to read my reply to Greg and you will have better clarity where the discussion is targeted. __Harshad On Sat, May 25, 2019 at 12:30 PM David H Kirshner wrote: > Thanks for your reply, Dave. > > > > Greg asked you: ?What is meant by "profit"? Is this defined simply as > "mutual beneficence" or is it something more like "surplus value" or even > "surplus capital"?? > > I?ve assumed you meant the latter, which requires some sort of metric to > measure ?surplus.? > > The first part of my note suggested two different bases for this metric, > hence two different ways to calculate whether the exchange is equitable, or > if one side has profited and the other lost. > > > > You suggested, ?If we are not aware of or not in a position to determine > an exchange ratio that puts the exchange into the column of equal exchange > then we will not be able to determine if it is unequal.? > > But here is where I introduced a psychological dimension, as being in a > position to determine an exchange is not objectively determinable. I can > feel you?ve cheated me based on some kind of inner metric, even if I am not > able to or in a position to make it explicit. On the other hand, if I > perceive us as being in solidarity with one another, then I do not do > calculations that measure my individual benefit, only our mutual > benefit?perhaps this is the ideal of communism. I agree with you that the > question of whether this sense of solidarity is rooted in ideology > (political) or familial bonding (biological) is beyond the trajectory of > the discussion. > > > > David > > > > *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu *On > Behalf Of *Harshad Dave > *Sent:* Friday, May 24, 2019 11:43 PM > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Does an exchange generate a profit? > > > > David K., > > > > I copy pest your reply and put my points in bracket. > > > > Yes, according to two criteria: > > [Here I presume that "Yes" means... such exchange generates profit on > either side but as per given two criteria.] > > 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds > that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. > > 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training > demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen > as profiting off the investment of the other. > > [I understand after going through above two points that above two points > are the parameters that influence the exchange ratio that finally gets > determined in an exchange process.] > > Along with the original question > > ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on > either side?? > > One might also ask, > > ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an > unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? [At which > exchange ratio we shall label it as an *equal exchange*? If we are not > aware of or not in a position to determine an exchange ratio that puts the > exchange into the column of equal exchange then we will not be able to > determine if it is unequal.] > > A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what > has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other > party as reaping unfair profits. > > [It is the feeling of the either party as you say above. However, here we > discuss the out come of our contemplation on the exchange process.] > > I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness > is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the well being > of each to the other is as important as the well being of self. [To some > extent you are touching one more parameter that might influence the process > of determination of exchange ratio between fish and wheat.] > > An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established > class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as > necessary. [I feel.... unconsciously you are pointing towards some > unknown parameters that play a critical role to determine an exchange ratio > between two commodities and inflict inequality. You have treated (and > accepted) the same as class ideology as well as they are natural and /or > necessary. This is debatable but at present we shall not take it in our > discussion as it might divert our main line of discussion.] > > Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. > > NB: Part of the reply you will find in my reply to Greg. > > > > > > Harshad Dave > > > > > > > > On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 10:11 PM David H Kirshner wrote: > > Yes, according to two criteria: > > 1. The time/labor taken by one party to produce the exchange unit exceeds > that of the other party who can then be said to be making a profit. > > 2. Production time is equal, but capital investment / skill level training > demanded by one party exceeds that of the other who therefore can be seen > as profiting off the investment of the other. > > Along with the original question > > ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on > either side?? > > One might also ask, > > ?What determines if this exchange is perceived by either party as being an > unequal exchange (i.e., as yielding a profit for one party)?? > > A critical element is history: If one party demands an increase from what > has historically been the exchange rate, this might be seen by the other > party as reaping unfair profits. > > I think the only way to avoid the possibility of perceptions of unfairness > is when familial relations exist between the two parties, and the wellbeing > of each to the other is as important as the wellbeing of self. > > An alternative/variation of this at the societal level is an established > class ideology in which unequal benefit is seen as natural and/or as > necessary. > > Wish I knew more about this, and hope others will enlighten. > > David > > > > *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu *On > Behalf Of *Harshad Dave > *Sent:* Friday, May 24, 2019 8:23 AM > *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Does an exchange generate a profit? > > Hi, > > Here I present one example. > > There is a fisherman living in a habitation. Generally, he catches fishes > and exchanges part of the quantity against wheat with a farmer living in > the habitation. > > ?Does this exchange process have possibility to generate a profit on > either side?? > > Harshad Dave > > . > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190525/65b13abe/attachment.html From anamshane@gmail.com Sat May 25 09:48:28 2019 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Sat, 25 May 2019 16:48:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Greg, David and all, Thanks, David, for another thoughtful and provoking email. Although I am faster this time in my reply, I would still like to count it in the ?slow dialogue?! ? Thanks for the opportunity for having a very thoughtful Saturday morning. See my responses between your lines below (in red). Ana -- Ana Marjanovic-Shane Phone: 267-334-2905 Email: anamshane@gmail.com From: "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu" on behalf of Greg Thompson Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date: Friday, May 24, 2019 at 3:33 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Cc: Eugene Matusov , "mikhail.gradovski@uis.no" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators Ana, Thank you so much for your very thoughtful description/explanation of Ethical Ontological Dialogism. I know that by now you probably thought I was avoiding your answer, but I've been trying to figure how to offer a reasonable response to the feast that you put forward in your email and trying to figure out how I might respond to your post in a manner consonant with ethical ontological dialogism. I'm pretty sure I'll fail at the latter, but feast I did. ANA: Thanks I'm also curious if a medium like a listserve can brook the challenge of slow replies - replies that don't come for days or even weeks. I'm always surprised to see how quickly conversations come and go even in a (virtual) place as thoughtful as XMCA. Perhaps this is a sign of the times; you can find "dialogue" everywhere but seldom does it amount to much - whether ethically (cf. the dialogical fires that regularly erupt in social media) or ontologically (cf. the "dialogue" of talking heads on just about any media outlet who are expected to instantly opine on subjects about which they've had little time to think). The dialogues on XMCA are perhaps a bit slower than some of these other "dialogues" but even here on XMCA it seems the half-life of a comment is about 24 hours. So I'm wondering what a slower listserve might look like and whether slow replies might perhaps be a step toward what you have outlined as ethical ontological dialogism. ANA: I think that we should try to do slow dialogues among other dialogues. It is true that your original email and a simple question on elaborating Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD), made me slow down and start to think about what I see as an essence that can be somehow described in a concentrated way but without loss of life and subjectivity. It was me, first who slowed down the discussion. And I liked the time it took to think about the issue. That's all just to say that I was delighted by your response (and the fact that you took some time to respond) and I hope you'll forgive me for multiplying that time in my response (and, of course, that last paragraph could be seen as just an attempt to rationalize my failure to be a responsible partner in dialogue...). Anyway, as for the project itself, I find it quite exciting and invigorating. It is a wonderfully interesting project to tease out the implications of Bakhtin's work for teachers' practice and the way you have outlined this in your email really sings to me. If I were to ask questions about the project (and maybe some of these answers are contained in the book - I've asked our library to order it), I have two major questions that stand out. One has to do with sustainability of these principles and the other has to do with the universality of them. ANA: Before I reply to any one of them below ? you may notice that both questions are about issues important in a different, more prevalent, monologic approach of searching the ?universal? and erasing the uniqueness of subjectivity by the notion of ?sustainability? ? which implies that teaching should strive to be something that can be replicated by others. (just a quick comment ? which ties into your next paragraph) With regard to sustainability, along with David Kirshner's question: "Do you not tremble at the selflessness that this posture demands?", I wonder if this is the kind of thing that teachers in major public school systems can easily sustain? Or is there something else that is needed in order to be able to enable teachers to realize this kind of practice? What things might need to change? ANA: Sustainability, in my interpretation, (correct me if I am wrong), runs directly in contradiction to dialogicity! Sustainability means basing teaching on ?the best practices? ? or replicating past ?models,? that seem to be working good. That very process in its nature is monologic, introducing something that is above and erases the uniqueness of each person?s subjectivity, and thus each teacher?s striving to create and be surprised by new moment-to-moment evolving meanings in dialogic relationships with the equally unique and unpredictable students. That cannot be ?sustained?, because such a process cannot be guaranteed, as it is different for each participant. Yes, you, Greg and David Kirschner might say ?I tremble at the selflessness that this posture demands? but this trembling for me is the sign of a pulse of life. Pulse of life that can live freed of the mechanization through which the contemporary education attempts to process the participants in education. What needs to change to enable teachers this kind of practice? A lot of things! But some countries may be timidly starting on this path (For instance New Zealand removed national educational standards https://education.govt.nz/news/national-standards-removed/ !) Of course, removing national standards is just a first step. There are for sure many more things that will have to be changed ? and not all the same things for all the people in education. But I also think that the changes need to be broadly directed at creating ecologies of education in which teaching and learning can take a lot more authorial and creative turn than it is possible now. What exactly would that mean ? will probably be very different for each teacher and each student. With regard to universalizability, I wonder if you have thought much about the ideology of the subject that underlies this project? As much as the project sings to me, I wonder how much of that is because it is based on an ideology of the subject that resonates with me (I'm a fan of Bakhtin's notion of the subject as articulated in Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). As an anthropologist I have to ask the question: what if the culture that you are working in requires acknowledgment of some fixed characteristics of the subject being addressed, perhaps even as finalized and finished categories? Relatedly, I wonder if there might not be need for some awareness of patterns of difference whether developmental differences, cultural differences, and other differences that are important to engage with in order to engage in an EOD manner with others? ANA: You ask ?what if the culture that you are working in requires acknowledgment of some fixed characteristics of the subject being addressed, perhaps even as finalized and finished categories?? I think that when a culture requires acknowledgement of some fixed characteristics of the subject being addressed, that culture in itself has a non-dialogic ideology ? ideology that requires and counts on suppressing the uniqueness of subjectivity and, thus, suppressing the meaning-making practices. So, yes, if the ideology of a culture is monologic, a project to fully dialogize teaching would be hard, potentially impossible, and would have to be ?smuggled? under the radar of what the educational authorities demand. This is, in fact, what happens today in most conventional schools that are governed in a strictly hierarchical, authoritarian way, demanding reproduction of culture, ideology and dogma by setting these ideologies, standards and dogmas as the only legitimate ones, and enforcing them with standardized testing. Even the recognition of differences in the form of the talk about developmental differences (developmentally appropriate curriculum), cultural differences (culturally sensitive curriculum), individual differences in special education (various accommodations specified in the Individual Service Plans (ISPs), etc. ? this recognition is still about how to strive toward, aim at, and somehow reach the prescribed standardized and pre-set educational end-points, despite the special circumstances of diversity, which are all perceived as forms of an educational handicap! In my view, Bakhtin inspired dialogism does not recognize any preexisting subject, nor any pre-existing fixed characteristics of the subject. Dialogicity is a stance that assumes that subjectivity is born in dialogue ? it is not a given, not even for the person her/him-self. Rather, one?s subjectivity is constantly being born in one?s own dialogic project of becoming a person, in dialogue, where one discovers pregnant possibilities for ?I? to become ?ME?. Put slightly differently, is it possible that recognizing pre-existing persons as part of (fixed) pre-existing categories might be a necessary part of an ethical ontological dialogism. ANA: For me: No! (see above). In other words, is there some other end of the spectrum opposite of a total rejection of these positive categories and patterns that is necessary for an ethical ontological dialogism? ANA: You assume that the opposite of not recognizing unique individual subjectivity of others ? is ?recognition of preexisting person as part of (fixed) pre-existing categories?. This assumption is a trap ? as it stays in the same realm of the given (positive), i.e. given in the world as such. However, the question is not whether the uniqueness of the subjectivity is given or not, the question is about whether our subjectivity is a given or our subjectivity emerges in a continuing transcendence of the given. It seems that this positive categorization is a part of ethical dialogical practice in much of our intimate encounters - whether the mother anticipating the needs of a nursing child, a child anticipating their parent's wishes (in Korea there is a term "nunchi" which is one of the most fundamental ethical values of certain kinds of relationships and involves the anticipation of the needs of significant others; importantly, these are often in hierarchical relationships), a teacher designing a curriculum for incoming students based on what little is known of their developmental age, or the anticipatory removal of images of snakes by a man whose spouse is ophidiophobic. Prediction as part of the anticipation of needs hardly seems ethically problematic in these cases and, in fact, it seems to be exactly the opposite. ANA: It is very important, in my view that you notice that a mother (caregiver) keeps anticipating the needs (and the subjectivity) of a child ? i.e. that an ethical thing is to anticipate someone?s subjectivity!! I think that this is the core of an ethical approach ? to anticipate someone?s subjectivity ? and yet not to assume that one can know it, or that subjectivity is (fully) knowable. To me, that means what Bakhtin conceptualized as ?unfinalizability?. I would think that this would also mean that the goal of psychology -understanding others - has the potential to be a deeply ethical practice in the EOD sense. The one caveat is that it shouldn't be seen as the final word on any one subject - i.e., you can never fully "know" a person via the categories that they might fit into. If I may anticipate(!) your response, I assume that an EOD approach would not avoid this but would simply be to emphasize that this is NOT the same as using one's knowledge of the Other as a final determination - as a determination of the Other's "essence and potential". That seems a critical point. ANA: No. EOD approach is different for me. EOD approach is in anticipating surprises from oneself and the others, inviting oneself and the others to further transcend the given and making opportunities for such transcendence; rather than simply being aware that one should not finalize the other. And to develop it further, ?anticipation? of the other?s subjectivity is about being genuinely interested in the other. This genuine interests opens a door for the other to join the dialogue ? in which all the participants can have an opportunity for discovering/constructing and transcending their subjectivities. A few other thoughts: I can't help but see strong parallels between your critique of social science research and the critique offered by Martin Packer in his book The Science of Qualitative Research. Latour seems to be one of the main common touchpoints, but thematically you are engaged in very similar projects - the question of how to study "subjectivity" "objectively". ANA: In fact, NO. The Ethical Ontological Dialogism is not about studying subjectivity ?objectively?, but is about providing opportunities for and inviting people?s subjectivities to start/continue emerging in all the unpredictable and intrepid ways imaginable (and unimaginable) transcendence. The major difference is that where you turn to Bakhtin's notion of unfinalizability, he turns to Foucault's notion of an "historical ontology of ourselves". Regardless of that, I see huge resonances between your work. And regardless of those resonances, I imagine that bringing EOD to social science research would be another angle to develop more substantially (if you haven't already!). Oh, and a question: what is "ontological" about EOD? ANA: Ahh, the most important question!?. To say it quickly ? to me the ?ontological? means that for the dialogic participants the dialogue matters on the level of their dialogic subjectivity! It matters for who they are! It matters for their ideas about the world, the others and themselves. It matters for what they desire, what they fear, what they think they can?t live with or without, etc. ?Ontologically? engaged dialogue makes a difference for the continuing transcendence of the given ? it can and does change big and/or small things relevant for the person and her/his personhood. But, of course, this question requires a lot more analysis. I have more thoughts but I think I've already said too much... ANA: ?. Me too. Once again, many thanks for your thoughtful and lengthy response. I look forward to reading more. Very best, Greg -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190525/786793a7/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Mon May 27 22:19:38 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 15:19:38 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov In-Reply-To: <3D08AD9A-310F-477C-9E51-8D4C1371AA2D@umich.edu> References: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> <3D08AD9A-310F-477C-9E51-8D4C1371AA2D@umich.edu> Message-ID: <2a6b90f9-c28f-484e-3f88-3089b4979c49@marxists.org> My copy of the Ilyenkov book arrived today. It is a kind of intellectual biography of Ilyenkov and the reception of ideas in the West. As David noted, it is very small, only 48 pages of text. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 24/05/2019 10:20 am, Edward Wall wrote: > Mike > > ? ? ?Most contemporary mathematicians do not end a proof > with a QED although Eric Livingston (whose name has come > up on this list) might tend to side with my interpretation > of Euclid. > > ? ? ?There is mathematics as application - a quite > respectable use - and mathematics as, one might say, > ?exploration. In the first case, mathematics provides a > means of doing something; it is, in a sense, secondary as > one?s primary focus is elsewhere. Memorization of the > relevant mathematics seems, to me, a reasonable response. > In the second case, mathematics is - I think this way > anyway - like writing a poem, painting a picture, > composing a melody, etc.. You are trying somehow to > capture structure or a pattern. > > ? ? ? I read your work as trying to capture > structure/patterns of behavior. I don?t read you as one > who just memorizes the reasonable notions of other > scholars and doesn?t look further (and I may have been > once a bit like that - smile). However, one could perhaps > argue that is what it takes to be an effective social > worker or teacher. That is, certain things are so obvious, > we are no longer puzzled. > > Ed > > ?Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that > space is our power to choose our response. In our response > lies our growth and our freedom.? ~ Viktor Frankl > > > > >> On May 22, 2019, at ?5:53 PM, mike cole > > wrote: >> >> That's really interesting, Ed. Thanks.? I never stopped >> to inquire what QED mean't. I was >> taught mathematics as a series of routines. Note that I >> might not have picked that up from >> Wikipedia. >> >> "*Q.E.D.*" (sometimes written "*QED*") *is*?an >> abbreviation for the Latin phrase "quod erat >> demonstrandum" ("that which was to be demonstrated"), a >> notation which *is*?often placed at the *end*?of a >> *mathematical proof*?to *indicate*?its completion. >> >> Your translation makes clear the mixing of participant >> observer/observant participant in QED. Unfortunately, >> I was the kind who often didn't "get" the demonstration >> and found tricks of memory to keep things straight enough >> to pass tests. >> >> mike >> >> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 3:27 PM Edward Wall >> > wrote: >> >> Mike >> >> ? ? Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a >> mathematical theorem (pace Euclid) was ended with a >> QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have always thought, >> perhaps erroneously, ?that Euclid was calling >> attention to the participating/viewing (in/of the >> proof) as well the final assessment that the whole >> was, in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the prover/viewer. >> >> Ed >> >>> On May 20, 2019, at ?6:12 PM, mike cole >>> > wrote: >>> >>> Hi Huw- >>> >>> I was not at all focused on the originality of the? >>> 2 cybernetics idea.? I was focused on how >>> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions >>> that have existed in philosophy for a long >>> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and >>> which I think may also mark the way that >>> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize >>> Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish >>> between different realtions of observer to observed, >>> >>> The observant participant "vs" participant observer >>> mark two poles of our relationship with the >>> people we were working with. >>> >>> A classical scholar colleague not in this >>> conversation offered a relevant distinction from >>> Aristotle in >>> the context of discussions about the kind of work we >>> do.? There seems to be close matching here too. >>> Perhaps relevant? >>> /Theoria/?is generally translated as "viewing" or >>> "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It >>> actually derives from the word /theoros/, which is >>> said to come from /thea/?(sight, or view, as in a >>> vista -- something viewed) plus /orao/?(to see). In >>> other words /theoros/?combines the seeing with the >>> seen. So a /theoros/?is a spectator or a witness to >>> what is there to be seen. A /theoros/?can also be >>> someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle >>> being someone through whom a god (/theos/) speaks. >>> What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle >>> or puzzle which the /theoros/?must figure out for >>> himself or herself. Even the epic poets were >>> participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as >>> the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes >>> obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men >>> were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the >>> oracular statements, were viewed as /theorytis/, >>> (spoken by a god). >>> >>> The idea of the /theoros/?is interesting in that it >>> involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an >>> action (as Aristotle?noted, drama is the imitation >>> of action). This implies an interpretive approach to >>> viewing and telling about an event, whether an >>> oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some >>> way been spoken by a god (literally, through >>> inspiration, the breathing of the god into the >>> /phrenoi /(the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with >>> the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of >>> someone who is open to receiving that breath and in >>> turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes >>> for the /theoros/?to report his or her /theoria/?to >>> others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim >>> to ultimate truth -- /theorytis/, given by a god. >>> Politically in early Greek society, this translated >>> into the use of the plural /theoroi/?to mean >>> ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of >>> the state to "those who speak strange tongues" >>> (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. >>> >>> Mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd >>> >> > wrote: >>> >>> Hi Mike, >>> >>> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to >>> be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a >>> necessary distinction, one that recognised a >>> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry >>> when the observer was included within it. >>> >>> I think one could extrapolate "established form >>> or structure" from "hard system" and then >>> consider reflections about that establishing of >>> that system as orthogonal yet related, but >>> according to my interpretation of your >>> descriptions I would attribute reflexive >>> considerations to both roles. They both can >>> refer to the structure of "observing" rather >>> than the structure of the "observed". >>> >>> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems >>> appropriate! >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole >>> > wrote: >>> >>> Huw- >>> >>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization >>> of the two generations of cybernetics, which >>> is new to me, interesting and potentially a >>> variant of an idea that has been batted >>> around for some time: >>> >>> Von Foerster referred to it as the >>> cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed >>> systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made >>> this distinction in their study of >>> organisational projects, distinguishing, for >>> example, between the process by which >>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex >>> interactions of stakeholders) , and the >>> "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>> >>> In our research in community settings we >>> have been distinguishing between a >>> participant observer and an observant >>> participant.? In our practice we have played >>> both roles.? I think of the "hard" system in >>> our work >>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, >>> as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>> >>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS-- Andy >>> ? ? ?There was a big and organized >>> opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It >>> affected people like >>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to >>> Luria's thinking. It was still in force when >>> I arrived >>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised >>> thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! >>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the >>> objections were more than Stalinist >>> ideology. But >>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >>> >> > wrote: >>> >>> Hi David, >>> >>> This is an extract from the start of the >>> text from the wikipedia entry, which I >>> don't have any significant quibbles with: >>> >>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known >>> as the cybernetics of cybernetics >>> , >>> is the recursive application of >>> cybernetics to itself. It was developed >>> between approximately 1968 and 1975 by >>> Margaret Mead >>> , >>> Heinz von Foerster >>> ?and >>> others.^[1] >>> >>> ?Von Foerster referred to it as the >>> cybernetics of "observing systems" >>> whereas first order cybernetics is that >>> of "observed systems".^[2] >>> >>> ?It is sometimes referred to as the "new >>> cybernetics", the term preferred by >>> Gordon Pask >>> , >>> and is closely allied to radical >>> constructivism >>> , >>> which was developed around the same time >>> by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>> .^[3] >>> " >>> >>> ^ >>> Another way to describe this distinction >>> on the dimension of observer is between >>> "hard systems" and "soft systems". The >>> "hard system" most easily maps on to a >>> model of some apparatus. The "soft >>> system" however applies to the system by >>> which the hard system is discerned. >>> Peter Checkland and co. made this >>> distinction in their study of >>> organisational projects, distinguishing, >>> for example, between the process by >>> which requirements are discerned (amidst >>> complex interactions of stakeholders) , >>> and the "hard" system that may be >>> produced as a result. >>> >>> One can equally apply this distinction >>> in psychology -- being concerned with >>> the dynamic processes of action and >>> construal in distinction to a concern to >>> map things out in terms of brain >>> architecture etc. >>> >>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics >>> is typically ontologically and >>> epistemologically naive (or atleast >>> static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics >>> recognises its potential fluidity and >>> importance. >>> >>> Regarding objects, objects still exist >>> in cybernetic thinking but are typically >>> defined by communicational boundaries. >>> Once one understands the application of >>> black boxes or systems, then one can >>> more readily apprehend cybernetics. >>> Ranulph Glanville's writings on black >>> boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph >>> was also deeply interested in objects >>> (and their cybernetic construal) related >>> to his life-long engagement with >>> architecture and design. >>> >>> One needs to take some care in >>> interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>> but they can be mapped on to other >>> initiatives. The steps between his >>> levels are quite large and one could >>> easily interpose additional levels. Bear >>> in mind that Bateson's levels do not >>> necessarily imply positive changes either. >>> >>> I can't say I recall coming across >>> material in which Bateson is upset by >>> Russell or Godel. Rather he applies >>> typological distinctions throughout much >>> of his work and can be considered a >>> champion of drawing attention to >>> "typological errors". >>> >>> From the description, it seems the >>> finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had >>> is that is either a collection of papers >>> or a summary of llyenkov's influence >>> upon a group of academics. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David >>> Kellogg >> > wrote: >>> >>> Huw... >>> >>> So actually this is the bit of >>> Bateson that I'm having trouble >>> understanding, and it's quite >>> different from what I am failing to >>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't >>> really do what Andy suggests, becuse >>> this person has written a whole book >>> about it, and as an author I always >>> find it rather rude when anybody >>> writes to me to say that they don't >>> have the time and don't want to >>> spend the money to get my book and >>> they want me to?just clear up a few >>> points for them and save them >>> the?trouble. Maybe I am just >>> over-sensitive. >>> >>> So this Bateson is working with a >>> world that is almost the opposite of >>> the one physicists work with. That >>> is, it's a world where objects are >>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" >>> is a structure that is quite >>> independent of whether we are >>> talking about a microphone, a >>> thermostadt, a child, or a >>> civilization). It's a world where >>> only communication matters. (There >>> are some forms of physics which >>> handle a world like this, but they >>> are precisely the realms of physics >>> I don't really get.) >>> >>> In this world, there is something >>> called?Learning Zero, or the?Zero >>> Degree of Learning,?which is >>> essentially making responses that >>> are stimulus-specific. Then there is >>> something called Learning One, which >>> is generalizing responses to a >>> well-defined, closed set of stimuli. >>> And then there is Learning Two, >>> which I think is what you mean by >>> second order cybernetics. That is >>> what people like to call "learning >>> to learn", but when we say this, we >>> are ignoring that the two uses of >>> "learn" mean?things that are as >>> different?as Learning Zerio and >>> Learning One, as different as >>> instinct and habit, as different as >>> unconditioned and conditioned >>> responses to stimuli. This is being >>> able to generalize the ability to >>> generalize responses to well defined >>> stimuli, so that they operate not >>> only within a well-defined context >>> but in a context of context. >>> >>> Children do a lot of this. They >>> learn language, first as Learning >>> Zero and then as Learning One. Then >>> they have to learn how to learn >>> THROUGH language, treating language >>> itself as context and not simply >>> text. This inevitably leads to a >>> Learning Three, where language is >>> itself the object of >>> learning--Halliday calls it learning >>> ABOUT language. >>> >>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, >>> because he feels that Russell's >>> paradox is lurking behind all of >>> these sets which both are and are >>> not members of themselves.?I don't >>> have any problem with it, because I >>> think that Russell's world is math >>> and not language (I think of math as >>> a kind of very artificial form of >>> language that only operates in very >>> artificial worlds, like those of >>> physics and cybernetics). >>> >>> Is this what?you mean by the >>> discontinuity of second order >>> cybernetics??Isn't it an artifact of >>> imposing Russell's theory of logical >>> types and an artifact of the >>> artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Sangmyung University >>> >>> New Article: >>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg >>> (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism >>> and Halliday?s construalism in >>> understanding narratives by >>> Korean children, Language and >>> Education, DOI: >>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> To link to this article: >>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> Some e-prints available at: >>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw >>> Lloyd >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> Quite possibly it was from a >>> lack of recognising the >>> continuity into second order >>> cybernetics, which many of the >>> founding members of cybernetics >>> recognised. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, >>> David Kellogg >>> >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>> >>> The most intriguing thing >>> about this book was the >>> statement that Ilyenkov >>> fought against the >>> introduction of ideas from >>> cybernetics into psychology. >>> On the other side of the >>> world, Gregory Bateson was >>> fighting hard for their >>> inclusion. >>> >>> I read through "The Ideal in >>> Human Activity" a couple of >>> times (true, without >>> understanding?much of it). >>> But?I didn't see anything >>> against cybernetics. Am I >>> missing something? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Sangmyung University >>> >>> New Article: >>> Han Hee Jeung & David >>> Kellogg (2019): A story >>> without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>> pedology, Bruner?s >>> constructivism and >>> Halliday?s construalism in >>> understanding narratives by >>> Korean children, Language >>> and Education, DOI: >>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> To link to this article: >>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> Some e-prints available at: >>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 >>> PM Andy Blunden >>> >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>> >>> In the era of alt-truth, >>> disinformation and >>> scepticism about the >>> very possibility of >>> knowledge, the work of a >>> defiant Soviet thinker >>> is attracting growing >>> interest. >>> >>> Evald Ilyenkov?s >>> dialectical approach to >>> philosophy from Spinoza >>> to Hegel and Marx made >>> him a target for >>> persecution by the >>> bureaucratic Stalinist >>> authorities of his day. >>> >>> The re-discovery of his >>> original texts, >>> suppressed or harshly >>> redacted during his >>> lifetime, is giving rise >>> to an enhanced view of >>> his contribution. >>> >>> */Finding Evald >>> Ilyenkov/*draws on the >>> personal experiences of >>> researchers in the UK, >>> Denmark and Finland. It >>> traces Ilyenkov?s impact >>> on philosophy, >>> psychology, politics and >>> pedagogy and how it >>> continues to be relevant >>> in the light of today?s >>> crises. >>> >>> -- >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> At the moment we need consensus points to >>> anchor our diversity. One tree, many >>> branches, deep roots.? Like a cypress tree >>> living in brackish water. Anon >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already >>> thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, >>> we must think them over again honestly, until they >>> take root in our personal experience.? ? -Goethe >>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> >> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already >> thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we >> must think them over again honestly, until they take >> root in our personal experience.?? ? -Goethe >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190528/17381de8/attachment.html From mpacker@cantab.net Wed May 29 15:24:30 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:24:30 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] test on Working youth In-Reply-To: <2a6b90f9-c28f-484e-3f88-3089b4979c49@marxists.org> References: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> <3D08AD9A-310F-477C-9E51-8D4C1371AA2D@umich.edu> <2a6b90f9-c28f-484e-3f88-3089b4979c49@marxists.org> Message-ID: <7CB7C2AF-5FE3-4D02-AEC8-F95782C53B10@cantab.net> Anyone know anything about this text by LSV? A pdf would be magical! :) The structure of interests in the transitional age and the interests of working youth. In Problems of the ideology of working youth. Moscow, 1929, No, 4, pp. 25-68. Martin > On May 28, 2019, at 12:19 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > My copy of the Ilyenkov book arrived today. It is a kind of intellectual biography of Ilyenkov and the reception of ideas in the West. As David noted, it is very small, only 48 pages of text. > > Andy > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 24/05/2019 10:20 am, Edward Wall wrote: >> Mike >> >> Most contemporary mathematicians do not end a proof with a QED although Eric Livingston (whose name has come up on this list) might tend to side with my interpretation of Euclid. >> >> There is mathematics as application - a quite respectable use - and mathematics as, one might say, exploration. In the first case, mathematics provides a means of doing something; it is, in a sense, secondary as one?s primary focus is elsewhere. Memorization of the relevant mathematics seems, to me, a reasonable response. In the second case, mathematics is - I think this way anyway - like writing a poem, painting a picture, composing a melody, etc.. You are trying somehow to capture structure or a pattern. >> >> I read your work as trying to capture structure/patterns of behavior. I don?t read you as one who just memorizes the reasonable notions of other scholars and doesn?t look further (and I may have been once a bit like that - smile). However, one could perhaps argue that is what it takes to be an effective social worker or teacher. That is, certain things are so obvious, we are no longer puzzled. >> >> Ed >> >> ?Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom.? ~ Viktor Frankl >> >> >> >> >>> On May 22, 2019, at 5:53 PM, mike cole > wrote: >>> >>> That's really interesting, Ed. Thanks. I never stopped to inquire what QED mean't. I was >>> taught mathematics as a series of routines. Note that I might not have picked that up from >>> Wikipedia. >>> >>> "Q.E.D." (sometimes written "QED") is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "quod erat demonstrandum" ("that which was to be demonstrated"), a notation which is often placed at the end of a mathematical proof to indicate its completion. >>> >>> Your translation makes clear the mixing of participant observer/observant participant in QED. Unfortunately, >>> I was the kind who often didn't "get" the demonstration and found tricks of memory to keep things straight enough to pass tests. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 3:27 PM Edward Wall > wrote: >>> Mike >>> >>> Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a mathematical theorem (pace Euclid) was ended with a QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have always thought, perhaps erroneously, that Euclid was calling attention to the participating/viewing (in/of the proof) as well the final assessment that the whole was, in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the prover/viewer. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>>> On May 20, 2019, at 6:12 PM, mike cole > wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Huw- >>>> >>>> I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how >>>> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long >>>> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that >>>> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish >>>> between different realtions of observer to observed, >>>> >>>> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the >>>> people we were working with. >>>> >>>> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in >>>> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. >>>> Perhaps relevant? >>>> Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). >>>> >>>> The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. >>>> >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >>>> Hi Mike, >>>> >>>> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. >>>> >>>> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". >>>> >>>> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: >>>> Huw- >>>> >>>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>>> >>>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work >>>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>>> >>>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS-- Andy >>>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like >>>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived >>>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! >>>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But >>>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >>>> Hi David, >>>> >>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>> >>>> "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics , is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask , and is closely allied to radical constructivism , which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld .[3] " >>>> >>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>> >>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>> >>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. >>>> >>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. >>>> >>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". >>>> >>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: >>>> Huw... >>>> >>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. >>>> >>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>> >>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>> >>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>> >>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>> >>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Sangmyung University >>>> >>>> New Article: >>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: >>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>> >>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. >>>> >>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Sangmyung University >>>> >>>> New Article: >>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. >>>> >>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>> >>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >>>> >>>> Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>> >>>> -- >>>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >>> >>> >> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190529/6e082800/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed May 29 23:27:03 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 15:27:03 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: test on Working youth In-Reply-To: <7CB7C2AF-5FE3-4D02-AEC8-F95782C53B10@cantab.net> References: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> <3D08AD9A-310F-477C-9E51-8D4C1371AA2D@umich.edu> <2a6b90f9-c28f-484e-3f88-3089b4979c49@marxists.org> <7CB7C2AF-5FE3-4D02-AEC8-F95782C53B10@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin: There is an article by that name in the list of Volume Six of the Collected Works, but there's nothing in the Russian Electronic Library, and no trace of the journal either. It's published exactly the same year as the chapter on the structure of interests in Volume Five of the English Collected Works (Chapter 1 of the ECW and the RCW, though it is actually Chapter 9 of Vygotsky's Pedologiya Podrostka) There is a lot on how the interests of the working adolescent and that of the bourgeois adolescent differ in the fourth section of Chapter 8 (Conflicts and Complications). This hasn't been translated into English yet, but we published the Korean translation in February and I have a very rough English translation I did if you want it. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 7:27 AM Martin Packer wrote: > Anyone know anything about this text by LSV? > > A pdf would be magical! :) > > The structure of interests in the transitional age and the interests of > working youth. In *Problems of the ideology of working youth*. Moscow, > 1929, No, 4, pp. 25-68. > > Martin > > > On May 28, 2019, at 12:19 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > My copy of the Ilyenkov book arrived today. It is a kind of intellectual > biography of Ilyenkov and the reception of ideas in the West. As David > noted, it is very small, only 48 pages of text. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 24/05/2019 10:20 am, Edward Wall wrote: > > Mike > > Most contemporary mathematicians do not end a proof with a QED > although Eric Livingston (whose name has come up on this list) might tend > to side with my interpretation of Euclid. > > There is mathematics as application - a quite respectable use - and > mathematics as, one might say, exploration. In the first case, mathematics > provides a means of doing something; it is, in a sense, secondary as one?s > primary focus is elsewhere. Memorization of the relevant mathematics seems, > to me, a reasonable response. In the second case, mathematics is - I think > this way anyway - like writing a poem, painting a picture, composing a > melody, etc.. You are trying somehow to capture structure or a pattern. > > I read your work as trying to capture structure/patterns of > behavior. I don?t read you as one who just memorizes the reasonable notions > of other scholars and doesn?t look further (and I may have been once a bit > like that - smile). However, one could perhaps argue that is what it takes > to be an effective social worker or teacher. That is, certain things are so > obvious, we are no longer puzzled. > > Ed > > ?Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our > power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our > freedom.? ~ Viktor Frankl > > > > > On May 22, 2019, at 5:53 PM, mike cole wrote: > > That's really interesting, Ed. Thanks. I never stopped to inquire what > QED mean't. I was > taught mathematics as a series of routines. Note that I might not have > picked that up from > Wikipedia. > > "*Q.E.D.*" (sometimes written "*QED*") *is* an abbreviation for the Latin > phrase "quod erat demonstrandum" ("that which was to be demonstrated"), a > notation which *is* often placed at the *end* of a *mathematical proof* > to *indicate* its completion. > > Your translation makes clear the mixing of participant observer/observant > participant in QED. Unfortunately, > I was the kind who often didn't "get" the demonstration and found tricks > of memory to keep things straight enough to pass tests. > > mike > > On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 3:27 PM Edward Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a mathematical theorem >> (pace Euclid) was ended with a QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have always >> thought, perhaps erroneously, that Euclid was calling attention to the >> participating/viewing (in/of the proof) as well the final assessment that >> the whole was, in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the prover/viewer. >> >> Ed >> >> On May 20, 2019, at 6:12 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Hi Huw- >> >> I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. >> I was focused on how >> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in >> philosophy for a long >> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may >> also mark the way that >> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that >> ethnographers distinguish >> between different realtions of observer to observed, >> >> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our >> relationship with the >> people we were working with. >> >> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant >> distinction from Aristotle in >> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to >> be close matching here too. >> Perhaps relevant? >> *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by >> extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*, >> which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista -- >> something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines >> the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to >> what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to >> consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*) >> speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle >> which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the >> epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the >> voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which >> the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the >> oracular statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god). >> >> The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the >> spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, >> drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to >> viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic >> production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through >> inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs -- >> for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) >> of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for >> others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her >> *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to >> ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early >> Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to >> mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to >> "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and >> vice-versa. >> >> Mike >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Mike, >>> >>> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but >>> rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a >>> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was >>> included within it. >>> >>> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard >>> system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that >>> system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of >>> your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. >>> They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the >>> structure of the "observed". >>> >>> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Huw- >>>> >>>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of >>>> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of >>>> an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>>> >>>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" >>>> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter >>>> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational >>>> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which >>>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , >>>> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>>> >>>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing >>>> between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our >>>> practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our >>>> work >>>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of >>>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>>> >>>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS-- Andy >>>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the >>>> USSR. It affected people like >>>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was >>>> still in force when I arrived >>>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw >>>> in October, 1962! >>>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than >>>> Stalinist ideology. But >>>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi David, >>>>> >>>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia >>>>> entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>>> >>>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of >>>>> cybernetics , is the >>>>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between >>>>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>>>> , Heinz von Foerster >>>>> and others.[1] >>>>> Von >>>>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas >>>>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] >>>>> It >>>>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon >>>>> Pask , and is closely >>>>> allied to radical constructivism >>>>> , which was >>>>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld >>>>> .[3] >>>>> " >>>>> >>>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer >>>>> is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily >>>>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to >>>>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. >>>>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, >>>>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are >>>>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>>>> system that may be produced as a result. >>>>> >>>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being >>>>> concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction >>>>> to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>>> >>>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically >>>>> and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order >>>>> cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>>> >>>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are >>>>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the >>>>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend >>>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place >>>>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their >>>>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture >>>>> and design. >>>>> >>>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, >>>>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his >>>>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. >>>>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive >>>>> changes either. >>>>> >>>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset >>>>> by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout >>>>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to >>>>> "typological errors". >>>>> >>>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a >>>>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of >>>>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Huw... >>>>>> >>>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble >>>>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to >>>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this >>>>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it >>>>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time >>>>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just >>>>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just >>>>>> over-sensitive. >>>>>> >>>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite >>>>>> of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are >>>>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite >>>>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a >>>>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. >>>>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they >>>>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>>>> >>>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero >>>>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are >>>>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is >>>>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then >>>>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order >>>>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when >>>>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that >>>>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as >>>>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses >>>>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize >>>>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a >>>>>> well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>>>> >>>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning >>>>>> Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This >>>>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object >>>>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's >>>>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not >>>>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think >>>>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of >>>>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial >>>>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order >>>>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical >>>>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>> >>>>>> New Article: >>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into >>>>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics >>>>>>> recognised. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that >>>>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into >>>>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting >>>>>>>> hard for their inclusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times >>>>>>>> (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against >>>>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> New Article: >>>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: >>>>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>>>>>> understanding narratives by >>>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the >>>>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is >>>>>>>>> attracting growing interest. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza >>>>>>>>> to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic >>>>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly >>>>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his >>>>>>>>> contribution. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of >>>>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on >>>>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be >>>>>>>>> relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One >>>> tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish >>>> water. Anon >>>> >>> >> >> -- >> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; >> but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until >> they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >> >> >> > > -- > ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but > to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they > take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe > > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190530/edde59db/attachment-0001.html From annalie.pistorius@smu.ac.za Thu May 30 00:01:11 2019 From: annalie.pistorius@smu.ac.za (Annalie Pistorius) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 09:01:11 +0200 (SAST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: test on Working youth In-Reply-To: References: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> <3D08AD9A-310F-477C-9E51-8D4C1371AA2D@umich.edu> <2a6b90f9-c28f-484e-3f88-3089b4979c49@marxists.org> <7CB7C2AF-5FE3-4D02-AEC8-F95782C53B10@cantab.net> Message-ID: <003401d516b5$734b3d20$59e1b760$@smu.ac.za> David, could you please send me also your translation of LV (on how the interests of the working adolescent and that of the bourgeois adolescent differ in the fourth section of Chapter 8 (Conflicts and Complications); and I will appreciate any help/materials from you and others on perspectives regarding how youth may negotiate their interests from within their marginalised locations in today?s society. Thank you Annalie From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Thursday, 30 May 2019 8:27 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: test on Working youth Martin: There is an article by that name in the list of Volume Six of the Collected Works, but there's nothing in the Russian Electronic Library, and no trace of the journal either. It's published exactly the same year as the chapter on the structure of interests in Volume Five of the English Collected Works (Chapter 1 of the ECW and the RCW, though it is actually Chapter 9 of Vygotsky's Pedologiya Podrostka) There is a lot on how the interests of the working adolescent and that of the bourgeois adolescent differ in the fourth section of Chapter 8 (Conflicts and Complications). This hasn't been translated into English yet, but we published the Korean translation in February and I have a very rough English translation I did if you want it. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 7:27 AM Martin Packer > wrote: Anyone know anything about this text by LSV? A pdf would be magical! :) The structure of interests in the transitional age and the interests of working youth. In Problems of the ideology of working youth. Moscow, 1929, No, 4, pp. 25-68. Martin On May 28, 2019, at 12:19 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: My copy of the Ilyenkov book arrived today. It is a kind of intellectual biography of Ilyenkov and the reception of ideas in the West. As David noted, it is very small, only 48 pages of text. Andy _____ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 24/05/2019 10:20 am, Edward Wall wrote: Mike Most contemporary mathematicians do not end a proof with a QED although Eric Livingston (whose name has come up on this list) might tend to side with my interpretation of Euclid. There is mathematics as application - a quite respectable use - and mathematics as, one might say, exploration. In the first case, mathematics provides a means of doing something; it is, in a sense, secondary as one?s primary focus is elsewhere. Memorization of the relevant mathematics seems, to me, a reasonable response. In the second case, mathematics is - I think this way anyway - like writing a poem, painting a picture, composing a melody, etc.. You are trying somehow to capture structure or a pattern. I read your work as trying to capture structure/patterns of behavior. I don?t read you as one who just memorizes the reasonable notions of other scholars and doesn?t look further (and I may have been once a bit like that - smile). However, one could perhaps argue that is what it takes to be an effective social worker or teacher. That is, certain things are so obvious, we are no longer puzzled. Ed ?Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom.? ~ Viktor Frankl On May 22, 2019, at 5:53 PM, mike cole > wrote: That's really interesting, Ed. Thanks. I never stopped to inquire what QED mean't. I was taught mathematics as a series of routines. Note that I might not have picked that up from Wikipedia. "Q.E.D." (sometimes written "QED") is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "quod erat demonstrandum" ("that which was to be demonstrated"), a notation which is often placed at the end of a mathematical proof to indicate its completion. Your translation makes clear the mixing of participant observer/observant participant in QED. Unfortunately, I was the kind who often didn't "get" the demonstration and found tricks of memory to keep things straight enough to pass tests. mike On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 3:27 PM Edward Wall > wrote: Mike Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a mathematical theorem (pace Euclid) was ended with a QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have always thought, perhaps erroneously, that Euclid was calling attention to the participating/viewing (in/of the proof) as well the final assessment that the whole was, in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the prover/viewer. Ed On May 20, 2019, at 6:12 PM, mike cole > wrote: Hi Huw- I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish between different realtions of observer to observed, The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the people we were working with. A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. Perhaps relevant? Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. Mike On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: Hi Mike, I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! Best, Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: Huw- I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. Is this extrapolation reasonable? mike PS-- Andy There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But they were also Stalinist ideology. On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: Hi David, This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics, is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead, Heinz von Foerster and others. [1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". [2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask, and is closely allied to radical constructivism, which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld. [3]" Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". >From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. Best, Huw On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: Huw... So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. Huw On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: Andy, Alfredo-- The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. -- _____ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm -- At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon -- ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe -- ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190530/7ec22841/attachment.html From mpacker@cantab.net Thu May 30 15:11:05 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 17:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: test on Working youth In-Reply-To: References: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> <3D08AD9A-310F-477C-9E51-8D4C1371AA2D@umich.edu> <2a6b90f9-c28f-484e-3f88-3089b4979c49@marxists.org> <7CB7C2AF-5FE3-4D02-AEC8-F95782C53B10@cantab.net> Message-ID: <906ACB1D-420D-43F2-B33E-F083F43FC131@cantab.net> Hi David, Yes, please send me your English translation. Thanks! Martin > On May 30, 2019, at 1:27 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Martin: > > There is an article by that name in the list of Volume Six of the Collected Works, but there's nothing in the Russian Electronic Library, and no trace of the journal either. > > It's published exactly the same year as the chapter on the structure of interests in Volume Five of the English Collected Works (Chapter 1 of the ECW and the RCW, though it is actually Chapter 9 of Vygotsky's Pedologiya Podrostka) > > There is a lot on how the interests of the working adolescent and that of the bourgeois adolescent differ in the fourth section of Chapter 8 (Conflicts and Complications). This hasn't been translated into English yet, but we published the Korean translation in February and I have a very rough English translation I did if you want it. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 7:27 AM Martin Packer > wrote: > Anyone know anything about this text by LSV? > > A pdf would be magical! :) > > The structure of interests in the transitional age and the interests of working youth. In Problems of the ideology of working youth. Moscow, 1929, No, 4, pp. 25-68. > > Martin > > >> On May 28, 2019, at 12:19 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> My copy of the Ilyenkov book arrived today. It is a kind of intellectual biography of Ilyenkov and the reception of ideas in the West. As David noted, it is very small, only 48 pages of text. >> >> Andy >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> On 24/05/2019 10:20 am, Edward Wall wrote: >>> Mike >>> >>> Most contemporary mathematicians do not end a proof with a QED although Eric Livingston (whose name has come up on this list) might tend to side with my interpretation of Euclid. >>> >>> There is mathematics as application - a quite respectable use - and mathematics as, one might say, exploration. In the first case, mathematics provides a means of doing something; it is, in a sense, secondary as one?s primary focus is elsewhere. Memorization of the relevant mathematics seems, to me, a reasonable response. In the second case, mathematics is - I think this way anyway - like writing a poem, painting a picture, composing a melody, etc.. You are trying somehow to capture structure or a pattern. >>> >>> I read your work as trying to capture structure/patterns of behavior. I don?t read you as one who just memorizes the reasonable notions of other scholars and doesn?t look further (and I may have been once a bit like that - smile). However, one could perhaps argue that is what it takes to be an effective social worker or teacher. That is, certain things are so obvious, we are no longer puzzled. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> ?Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom.? ~ Viktor Frankl >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On May 22, 2019, at 5:53 PM, mike cole > wrote: >>>> >>>> That's really interesting, Ed. Thanks. I never stopped to inquire what QED mean't. I was >>>> taught mathematics as a series of routines. Note that I might not have picked that up from >>>> Wikipedia. >>>> >>>> "Q.E.D." (sometimes written "QED") is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase "quod erat demonstrandum" ("that which was to be demonstrated"), a notation which is often placed at the end of a mathematical proof to indicate its completion. >>>> >>>> Your translation makes clear the mixing of participant observer/observant participant in QED. Unfortunately, >>>> I was the kind who often didn't "get" the demonstration and found tricks of memory to keep things straight enough to pass tests. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 3:27 PM Edward Wall > wrote: >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a mathematical theorem (pace Euclid) was ended with a QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have always thought, perhaps erroneously, that Euclid was calling attention to the participating/viewing (in/of the proof) as well the final assessment that the whole was, in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the prover/viewer. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>>> On May 20, 2019, at 6:12 PM, mike cole > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Huw- >>>>> >>>>> I was not at all focused on the originality of the 2 cybernetics idea. I was focused on how >>>>> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long >>>>> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that >>>>> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish >>>>> between different realtions of observer to observed, >>>>> >>>>> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the >>>>> people we were working with. >>>>> >>>>> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in >>>>> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do. There seems to be close matching here too. >>>>> Perhaps relevant? >>>>> Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). >>>>> >>>>> The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. >>>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>> >>>>> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it. >>>>> >>>>> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed". >>>>> >>>>> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate! >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole > wrote: >>>>> Huw- >>>>> >>>>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time: >>>>> >>>>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems". ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>>>> >>>>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant. In our practice we have played both roles. I think of the "hard" system in our work >>>>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>>>> >>>>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> PS-- Andy >>>>> There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like >>>>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived >>>>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw. Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! >>>>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But >>>>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >>>>> Hi David, >>>>> >>>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with: >>>>> >>>>> "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics , is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead , Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask , and is closely allied to radical constructivism , which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld .[3] " >>>>> >>>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result. >>>>> >>>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc. >>>>> >>>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance. >>>>> >>>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design. >>>>> >>>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either. >>>>> >>>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors". >>>>> >>>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg > wrote: >>>>> Huw... >>>>> >>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive. >>>>> >>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.) >>>>> >>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. >>>>> >>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. >>>>> >>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). >>>>> >>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article: >>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd > wrote: >>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised. >>>>> >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg > wrote: >>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>> >>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. >>>>> >>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article: >>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest. >>>>> >>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day. >>>>> >>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution. >>>>> >>>>> Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov?s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today?s crises. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots. Like a cypress tree living in brackish water. Anon >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.? -Goethe >>>> >>>> >>> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190530/d758abad/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Thu May 30 19:14:56 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 12:14:56 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: test on Working youth In-Reply-To: <906ACB1D-420D-43F2-B33E-F083F43FC131@cantab.net> References: <1431E793-DB2B-4A53-87AD-8E0901623566@umich.edu> <3D08AD9A-310F-477C-9E51-8D4C1371AA2D@umich.edu> <2a6b90f9-c28f-484e-3f88-3089b4979c49@marxists.org> <7CB7C2AF-5FE3-4D02-AEC8-F95782C53B10@cantab.net> <906ACB1D-420D-43F2-B33E-F083F43FC131@cantab.net> Message-ID: <08126222-370a-2190-14bd-c2cbab270ee9@marxists.org> David, /any/ of your "rough" translations of Vygotsky which you would be willing to share with the world would be most welcome on marxists.org, perhaps with an introductory note explaining the context of the translation? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 31/05/2019 8:11 am, Martin Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > Yes, please send me your English translation. ?Thanks! > > Martin > > > > >> On May 30, 2019, at 1:27 AM, David Kellogg >> > wrote: >> >> Martin: >> >> There is an article by that name in the list of Volume >> Six of the Collected Works, but there's nothing in the >> Russian Electronic Library, and no trace of the journal >> either. >> >> It's published exactly the same year as the chapter on >> the structure of interests in Volume Five of the English >> Collected Works (Chapter 1 of the ECW and the RCW, though >> it is actually Chapter 9 of Vygotsky's Pedologiya Podrostka) >> >> There is?a lot on how the interests of the working >> adolescent and that of the bourgeois adolescent differ in >> the fourth section of Chapter 8 (Conflicts and >> Complications). This hasn't been translated into English >> yet, but we published the Korean translation in February >> and I have a very rough English translation I did if you >> want it. >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without >> SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s >> construalism in understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: >> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 7:27 AM Martin Packer >> > wrote: >> >> Anyone know anything about this text by LSV? >> >> A pdf would be magical! ?:) >> >> The structure of interests in the transitional age >> and the interests of working youth. In /Problems of >> the ideology of working youth/. Moscow, 1929, No, 4, >> pp.?25-68. >> >> Martin >> >> >>> On May 28, 2019, at 12:19 AM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>> >>> My copy of the Ilyenkov book arrived today. It is a >>> kind of intellectual biography of Ilyenkov and the >>> reception of ideas in the West. As David noted, it >>> is very small, only 48 pages of text. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>> On 24/05/2019 10:20 am, Edward Wall wrote: >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> ? ? ?Most contemporary mathematicians do not end a >>>> proof with a QED although Eric Livingston (whose >>>> name has come up on this list) might tend to side >>>> with my interpretation of Euclid. >>>> >>>> ? ? ?There is mathematics as application - a quite >>>> respectable use - and mathematics as, one might >>>> say, ?exploration. In the first case, mathematics >>>> provides a means of doing something; it is, in a >>>> sense, secondary as one?s primary focus is >>>> elsewhere. Memorization of the relevant mathematics >>>> seems, to me, a reasonable response. In the second >>>> case, mathematics is - I think this way anyway - >>>> like writing a poem, painting a picture, composing >>>> a melody, etc.. You are trying somehow to capture >>>> structure or a pattern. >>>> >>>> ? ? ? I read your work as trying to capture >>>> structure/patterns of behavior. I don?t read you as >>>> one who just memorizes the reasonable notions of >>>> other scholars and doesn?t look further (and I may >>>> have been once a bit like that - smile). However, >>>> one could perhaps argue that is what it takes to be >>>> an effective social worker or teacher. That is, >>>> certain things are so obvious, we are no longer >>>> puzzled. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> ?Between stimulus and response there is a space. In >>>> that space is our power to choose our response. In >>>> our response lies our growth and our freedom.? ~ >>>> Viktor Frankl >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On May 22, 2019, at ?5:53 PM, mike cole >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> That's really interesting, Ed. Thanks.? I never >>>>> stopped to inquire what QED mean't. I was >>>>> taught mathematics as a series of routines. Note >>>>> that I might not have picked that up from >>>>> Wikipedia. >>>>> >>>>> "*Q.E.D.*" (sometimes written "*QED*") *is*?an >>>>> abbreviation for the Latin phrase "quod erat >>>>> demonstrandum" ("that which was to be >>>>> demonstrated"), a notation which *is*?often placed >>>>> at the *end*?of a *mathematical proof*?to >>>>> *indicate*?its completion. >>>>> >>>>> Your translation makes clear the mixing of >>>>> participant observer/observant participant in QED. >>>>> Unfortunately, >>>>> I was the kind who often didn't "get" the >>>>> demonstration and found tricks of memory to keep >>>>> things straight enough to pass tests. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 3:27 PM Edward Wall >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps relevant, traditionally the proof of a >>>>> mathematical theorem (pace Euclid) was ended >>>>> with a QED (Quod Erat Demostrandum). I have >>>>> always thought, perhaps erroneously, ?that >>>>> Euclid was calling attention to the >>>>> participating/viewing (in/of the proof) as >>>>> well the final assessment that the whole was, >>>>> in some sense, ?satisfactory? to the >>>>> prover/viewer. >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>>> On May 20, 2019, at ?6:12 PM, mike cole >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Huw- >>>>>> >>>>>> I was not at all focused on the originality >>>>>> of the? 2 cybernetics idea.? I was focused on how >>>>>> it (presumably) provides formalisms for >>>>>> distinctions that have existed in philosophy >>>>>> for a long >>>>>> time (about this i am still a beginning >>>>>> learner) and which I think may also mark the >>>>>> way that >>>>>> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize >>>>>> Leontievians, the way that ethnographers >>>>>> distinguish >>>>>> between different realtions of observer to >>>>>> observed, >>>>>> >>>>>> The observant participant "vs" participant >>>>>> observer mark two poles of our relationship >>>>>> with the >>>>>> people we were working with. >>>>>> >>>>>> A classical scholar colleague not in this >>>>>> conversation offered a relevant distinction >>>>>> from Aristotle in >>>>>> the context of discussions about the kind of >>>>>> work we do.? There seems to be close matching >>>>>> here too. >>>>>> Perhaps relevant? >>>>>> /Theoria/?is generally translated as >>>>>> "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, >>>>>> "contemplation." It actually derives from the >>>>>> word /theoros/, which is said to come from >>>>>> /thea/?(sight, or view, as in a vista -- >>>>>> something viewed) plus /orao/?(to see). In >>>>>> other words /theoros/?combines the seeing >>>>>> with the seen. So a /theoros/?is a spectator >>>>>> or a witness to what is there to be seen. A >>>>>> /theoros/?can also be someone who goes to >>>>>> consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone >>>>>> through whom a god (/theos/) speaks. What the >>>>>> oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle >>>>>> or puzzle which the /theoros/?must figure out >>>>>> for himself or herself. Even the epic poets >>>>>> were participants in this spiritual "praxis," >>>>>> acting as the voices for the gods to speak >>>>>> their sometimes obscure narratives in which >>>>>> the work of gods and men were mutually >>>>>> implicated. So the epics, like the oracular >>>>>> statements, were viewed as /theorytis/, >>>>>> (spoken by a god). >>>>>> >>>>>> The idea of the /theoros/?is interesting in >>>>>> that it involves the spectator's presence as >>>>>> a witness to an action (as Aristotle?noted, >>>>>> drama is the imitation of action). This >>>>>> implies an interpretive approach to viewing >>>>>> and telling about an event, whether an oracle >>>>>> or a dramatic production, that has in some >>>>>> way been spoken by a god (literally, through >>>>>> inspiration, the breathing of the god into >>>>>> the /phrenoi /(the lungs -- for Homer, >>>>>> synonymous with the mind -- the center of >>>>>> human consciousness) of someone who is open >>>>>> to receiving that breath and in turn speaking >>>>>> it for others. The danger then becomes for >>>>>> the /theoros/?to report his or her >>>>>> /theoria/?to others -- the tendency of the >>>>>> theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- >>>>>> /theorytis/, given by a god. Politically in >>>>>> early Greek society, this translated into the >>>>>> use of the plural /theoroi/?to mean >>>>>> ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the >>>>>> intent of the state to "those who speak >>>>>> strange tongues" (Homer's expression for >>>>>> non-Greeks) and vice-versa. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd >>>>>> >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics >>>>>> claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather >>>>>> it seemed to be a necessary distinction, >>>>>> one that recognised a change in the >>>>>> landscape of the topic of inquiry when >>>>>> the observer was included within it. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think one could extrapolate >>>>>> "established form or structure" from >>>>>> "hard system" and then consider >>>>>> reflections about that establishing of >>>>>> that system as orthogonal yet related, >>>>>> but according to my interpretation of >>>>>> your descriptions I would attribute >>>>>> reflexive considerations to both roles. >>>>>> They both can refer to the structure of >>>>>> "observing" rather than the structure of >>>>>> the "observed". >>>>>> >>>>>> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville >>>>>> seems appropriate! >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole >>>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw- >>>>>> >>>>>> I found that the Wikipedia >>>>>> characterization of the two >>>>>> generations of cybernetics, which is >>>>>> new to me, interesting and >>>>>> potentially a variant of an idea that >>>>>> has been batted around for some time: >>>>>> >>>>>> Von Foerster referred to it as the >>>>>> cybernetics of "observing systems" >>>>>> whereas first order cybernetics is >>>>>> that of "observed systems". ... Peter >>>>>> Checkland and co. made this >>>>>> distinction in their study of >>>>>> organisational projects, >>>>>> distinguishing, for example, between >>>>>> the process by which requirements are >>>>>> discerned (amidst complex >>>>>> interactions of stakeholders) , and >>>>>> the "hard" system that may be >>>>>> produced as a result. >>>>>> >>>>>> In our research in community settings >>>>>> we have been distinguishing between a >>>>>> participant observer and an observant >>>>>> participant. In our practice we have >>>>>> played both roles.? I think of the >>>>>> "hard" system in our work >>>>>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, >>>>>> perhaps, as a part of >>>>>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry. >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this extrapolation reasonable? >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> PS-- Andy >>>>>> ? ?There was a big and organized >>>>>> opposition to cybernetics in the >>>>>> USSR. It affected people like >>>>>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were >>>>>> central to Luria's thinking. It was >>>>>> still in force when I arrived >>>>>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well >>>>>> advertised thaw.? Hard to feel the >>>>>> thaw in October, 1962! >>>>>> The distinction Huw makes suggests >>>>>> that the objections were more than >>>>>> Stalinist ideology. But >>>>>> they were also Stalinist ideology. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw >>>>>> Lloyd >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi David, >>>>>> >>>>>> This is an extract from the start >>>>>> of the text from the wikipedia >>>>>> entry, which I don't have any >>>>>> significant quibbles with: >>>>>> >>>>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also >>>>>> known as the cybernetics of >>>>>> cybernetics >>>>>> , >>>>>> is the recursive application of >>>>>> cybernetics to itself. It was >>>>>> developed between approximately >>>>>> 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead >>>>>> , >>>>>> Heinz von Foerster >>>>>> ?and >>>>>> others.^[1] >>>>>> >>>>>> ?Von Foerster referred to it as >>>>>> the cybernetics of "observing >>>>>> systems" whereas first order >>>>>> cybernetics is that of "observed >>>>>> systems".^[2] >>>>>> >>>>>> ?It is sometimes referred to as >>>>>> the "new cybernetics", the term >>>>>> preferred by Gordon Pask >>>>>> , >>>>>> and is closely allied to radical >>>>>> constructivism >>>>>> , >>>>>> which was developed around the >>>>>> same time by Ernst von >>>>>> Glasersfeld >>>>>> .^[3] >>>>>> " >>>>>> >>>>>> ^ >>>>>> Another way to describe this >>>>>> distinction on the dimension of >>>>>> observer is between "hard >>>>>> systems" and "soft systems". The >>>>>> "hard system" most easily maps on >>>>>> to a model of some apparatus. The >>>>>> "soft system" however applies to >>>>>> the system by which the hard >>>>>> system is discerned. Peter >>>>>> Checkland and co. made this >>>>>> distinction in their study of >>>>>> organisational projects, >>>>>> distinguishing, for example, >>>>>> between the process by which >>>>>> requirements are discerned >>>>>> (amidst complex interactions of >>>>>> stakeholders) , and the "hard" >>>>>> system that may be produced as a >>>>>> result. >>>>>> >>>>>> One can equally apply this >>>>>> distinction in psychology -- >>>>>> being concerned with the dynamic >>>>>> processes of action and construal >>>>>> in distinction to a concern to >>>>>> map things out in terms of brain >>>>>> architecture etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> One might say that 1st order >>>>>> cybernetics is typically >>>>>> ontologically and >>>>>> epistemologically naive (or >>>>>> atleast static), whilst 2nd order >>>>>> cybernetics recognises its >>>>>> potential fluidity and importance. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regarding objects, objects still >>>>>> exist in cybernetic thinking but >>>>>> are typically defined by >>>>>> communicational boundaries. Once >>>>>> one understands the application >>>>>> of black boxes or systems, then >>>>>> one can more readily apprehend >>>>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's >>>>>> writings on black boxes are a >>>>>> good place to start. Ranulph was >>>>>> also deeply interested in objects >>>>>> (and their cybernetic construal) >>>>>> related to his life-long >>>>>> engagement with architecture and >>>>>> design. >>>>>> >>>>>> One needs to take some care in >>>>>> interpreting Bateson's learning >>>>>> levels, but they can be mapped on >>>>>> to other initiatives. The steps >>>>>> between his levels are quite >>>>>> large and one could easily >>>>>> interpose additional levels. Bear >>>>>> in mind that Bateson's levels do >>>>>> not necessarily imply positive >>>>>> changes either. >>>>>> >>>>>> I can't say I recall coming >>>>>> across material in which Bateson >>>>>> is upset by Russell or Godel. >>>>>> Rather he applies typological >>>>>> distinctions throughout much of >>>>>> his work and can be considered a >>>>>> champion of drawing attention to >>>>>> "typological errors". >>>>>> >>>>>> From the description, it seems >>>>>> the finding Ilyenkov book is more >>>>>> of a booklet (64 pages), the >>>>>> impression I had is that is >>>>>> either a collection of papers or >>>>>> a summary of llyenkov's influence >>>>>> upon a group of academics. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw... >>>>>> >>>>>> So actually this is the bit >>>>>> of Bateson that I'm having >>>>>> trouble understanding, and >>>>>> it's quite different from >>>>>> what I am failing to >>>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I >>>>>> can't really do what Andy >>>>>> suggests, becuse this person >>>>>> has written a whole book >>>>>> about it, and as an author I >>>>>> always find it rather rude >>>>>> when anybody writes to me to >>>>>> say that they don't have the >>>>>> time and don't want to spend >>>>>> the money to get my book and >>>>>> they want me to?just clear up >>>>>> a few points for them and >>>>>> save them the?trouble. Maybe >>>>>> I am just over-sensitive. >>>>>> >>>>>> So this Bateson is working >>>>>> with a world that is almost >>>>>> the opposite of the one >>>>>> physicists work with. That >>>>>> is, it's a world where >>>>>> objects are essentially >>>>>> unimportant ("feedback" is a >>>>>> structure that is quite >>>>>> independent of whether we are >>>>>> talking about a microphone, a >>>>>> thermostadt, a child, or a >>>>>> civilization). It's a world >>>>>> where only communication >>>>>> matters. (There are some >>>>>> forms of physics which handle >>>>>> a world like this, but they >>>>>> are precisely the realms of >>>>>> physics I don't really get.) >>>>>> >>>>>> In this world, there is >>>>>> something called?Learning >>>>>> Zero, or the?Zero Degree of >>>>>> Learning,?which is >>>>>> essentially making responses >>>>>> that are stimulus-specific. >>>>>> Then there is something >>>>>> called Learning One, which is >>>>>> generalizing responses to a >>>>>> well-defined, closed set of >>>>>> stimuli. And then there is >>>>>> Learning Two, which I think >>>>>> is what you mean by second >>>>>> order cybernetics. That is >>>>>> what people like to call >>>>>> "learning to learn", but when >>>>>> we say this, we are ignoring >>>>>> that the two uses of "learn" >>>>>> mean?things that are as >>>>>> different?as Learning Zerio >>>>>> and Learning One, as >>>>>> different as instinct and >>>>>> habit, as different as >>>>>> unconditioned and conditioned >>>>>> responses to stimuli. This is >>>>>> being able to generalize the >>>>>> ability to generalize >>>>>> responses to well defined >>>>>> stimuli, so that they operate >>>>>> not only within a >>>>>> well-defined context but in a >>>>>> context of context. >>>>>> >>>>>> Children do a lot of this. >>>>>> They learn language, first as >>>>>> Learning Zero and then as >>>>>> Learning One. Then they have >>>>>> to learn how to learn THROUGH >>>>>> language, treating language >>>>>> itself as context and not >>>>>> simply text. This inevitably >>>>>> leads to a Learning Three, >>>>>> where language is itself the >>>>>> object of learning--Halliday >>>>>> calls it learning ABOUT >>>>>> language. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by >>>>>> this, because he feels that >>>>>> Russell's paradox is lurking >>>>>> behind all of these sets >>>>>> which both are and are not >>>>>> members of themselves.?I >>>>>> don't have any problem with >>>>>> it, because I think that >>>>>> Russell's world is math and >>>>>> not language (I think of math >>>>>> as a kind of very artificial >>>>>> form of language that only >>>>>> operates in very artificial >>>>>> worlds, like those of physics >>>>>> and cybernetics). >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this what?you mean by the >>>>>> discontinuity of second order >>>>>> cybernetics??Isn't it an >>>>>> artifact of imposing >>>>>> Russell's theory of logical >>>>>> types and an artifact of the >>>>>> artificiality of the >>>>>> cybernetic world? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>> >>>>>> New Article: >>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg >>>>>> (2019): A story without SELF: >>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s >>>>>> constructivism and Halliday?s >>>>>> construalism in understanding >>>>>> narratives by >>>>>> Korean children, Language and >>>>>> Education, DOI: >>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> To link to this article: >>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 >>>>>> PM Huw Lloyd >>>>>> >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Quite possibly it was >>>>>> from a lack of >>>>>> recognising the >>>>>> continuity into second >>>>>> order cybernetics, which >>>>>> many of the founding >>>>>> members of cybernetics >>>>>> recognised. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at >>>>>> 11:05, David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy, Alfredo-- >>>>>> >>>>>> The most intriguing >>>>>> thing about this book >>>>>> was the statement >>>>>> that Ilyenkov fought >>>>>> against the >>>>>> introduction of ideas >>>>>> from cybernetics into >>>>>> psychology. On the >>>>>> other side of the >>>>>> world, Gregory >>>>>> Bateson was fighting >>>>>> hard for their >>>>>> inclusion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I read through "The >>>>>> Ideal in Human >>>>>> Activity" a couple of >>>>>> times (true, without >>>>>> understanding?much of >>>>>> it). But?I didn't see >>>>>> anything against >>>>>> cybernetics. Am I >>>>>> missing something? >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>>> >>>>>> New Article: >>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David >>>>>> Kellogg (2019): A >>>>>> story without SELF: >>>>>> Vygotsky?s >>>>>> pedology, Bruner?s >>>>>> constructivism and >>>>>> Halliday?s >>>>>> construalism in >>>>>> understanding >>>>>> narratives by >>>>>> Korean children, >>>>>> Language and >>>>>> Education, DOI: >>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> To link to this >>>>>> article: >>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> Some e-prints >>>>>> available at: >>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 >>>>>> at 6:22 PM Andy >>>>>> Blunden >>>>>> >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ >>>>>> >>>>>> In the era of >>>>>> alt-truth, >>>>>> disinformation >>>>>> and scepticism >>>>>> about the very >>>>>> possibility of >>>>>> knowledge, the >>>>>> work of a defiant >>>>>> Soviet thinker is >>>>>> attracting >>>>>> growing interest. >>>>>> >>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov?s >>>>>> dialectical >>>>>> approach to >>>>>> philosophy from >>>>>> Spinoza to Hegel >>>>>> and Marx made him >>>>>> a target for >>>>>> persecution by >>>>>> the bureaucratic >>>>>> Stalinist >>>>>> authorities of >>>>>> his day. >>>>>> >>>>>> The re-discovery >>>>>> of his original >>>>>> texts, suppressed >>>>>> or harshly >>>>>> redacted during >>>>>> his lifetime, is >>>>>> giving rise to an >>>>>> enhanced view of >>>>>> his contribution. >>>>>> >>>>>> */Finding Evald >>>>>> Ilyenkov/*draws >>>>>> on the personal >>>>>> experiences of >>>>>> researchers in >>>>>> the UK, Denmark >>>>>> and Finland. It >>>>>> traces Ilyenkov?s >>>>>> impact on >>>>>> philosophy, >>>>>> psychology, >>>>>> politics and >>>>>> pedagogy and how >>>>>> it continues to >>>>>> be relevant in >>>>>> the light of >>>>>> today?s crises. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> At the moment we need consensus >>>>>> points to anchor our diversity. One >>>>>> tree, many branches, deep roots.? >>>>>> Like a cypress tree living in >>>>>> brackish water.? Anon >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought >>>>>> already thousands of times; but to make >>>>>> them truly ours, we must think them over >>>>>> again honestly, until they take root in our >>>>>> personal experience.? ? -Goethe >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ?All truly wise thoughts have been thought >>>>> already thousands of times; but to make them >>>>> truly ours, we must think them over again >>>>> honestly, until they take root in our personal >>>>> experience.? ? -Goethe >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >> > > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190531/47fca1d4/attachment.html From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 31 12:21:48 2019 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 13:21:48 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ana, Isn't it delightful to try to accomplish "dialogue" in a medium such as this? I think I'll have to respond in toto rather than as proper conversational second parts as you have done - for fear that things will get too messy and difficult to track (much different from if we were having this conversation in person - or, at least, a different kind of messiness!). Regarding the issue of universality, as an anthropologist, this is an occupational hazard. I should be clear that my question is different from the concern with "scaling up" (or "mechanization") which seeks to identify teaching practices that can be simply applied to all teaching encounters. My concern is precisely that there may be some places where this might not be the most ethical approach - or perhaps that it might need some further specification and/or modifications. As for "sustainability", yes I have a slightly different understanding from what you are describing (what you are describing seems to be more like the "scaling up" issue I've mentioned above - i.e., how to mass produce education). My question is more of an ecological one: is it sustainable in the sense that you can put it out into the world and it will be able to be taken up by teachers and others and practiced, and that this can be ongoing? Now, granted, the ecologies that I'm talking about are human ones. Hence my other question: what would need to change in order to make it sustainable? (and, relatedly, what is keeping it from being sustainable?). I like your suggestions and agree that standardized testing is a major impediment to the kind of EOD practice that you describe (as well as many other kinds of good pedagogical practices!). On the issue of the pre-existing nature of the subject, we may have to agree to disagree. Whether or not that is the case may, in part, depend on whether or not you equate "unfinalizable" with "undefined". I'm no expert in Bakhtin and I'm a bit out of touch, but from what I recall of my reading of him, the point is that we are consummated by the recognition of others and that is central to our emerging definitions of who we are. There is a subject here. The ethical caution that I see Bakhtin offering is that this moment of recognition (and hence this subject) should not be final - i.e., that is who we have come to be, not as finalized subjects, but as subjects-in-the-making, subjects abuilding (bildung?). Thus, for example, one doesn't wake each morning with a clean slate in one's relationship with one's partner as if their subject-hood is undefined. In other words, I don't think Bakthin is being ahistorical about subjects. Rather, in my reading of B, if one loves one's partner, one wakes each morning with a clean slate of who they can BECOME (unfinalized) but without neglecting who they have been to oneself (since to recognize them as "partner" is to already begin from an understanding of their subject-hood prior to your subsequent encounters with them that day). That's just my take. And note that we may in fact be in total agreement on this but just emphasizing different sides of the argument? As for the comment about Martin Packer's book, I should have clarified that it is not about studying subjectivity "objectively" but rather is a critique of this entire enterprise. If you get a chance to have a read of it, I think you'll find some strong resonances. Apologies to Martin for mischaracterizing his work in my initial comment ("that's not what I meant!"). As for how this is "ontological", I like the direction that you propose - this is about the constitution of subjects (and, perhaps, about the constitution of reality and the worlds that we inhabit?). That's some big stuff. Anyway, thanks much for the engagement (which I'm happy to continue - although maybe there are more productive directions than those I have taken thus far?). And to this point of possibility and becoming, I thought I'd offer a favorite quote of mine from Lloyd Alexander's book *The Castly Llyr.* This is Lord Dalben's parting advice to the young Princess Eilonwy as she sets out on an adventure and is rather unsure of her ability to handle the challenges that this adventure will entail. It captures the challenge of allowing others' becoming (even if it is in spite of themselves): Dalben says to Eilonwy: "For each of us comes a time when we must become more than what we are." Cheers, greg On Sat, May 25, 2019 at 10:51 AM Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote: > Dear Greg, David and all, > > > > Thanks, David, for another thoughtful and provoking email. Although I am > faster this time in my reply, I would still like to count it in the ?slow > dialogue?! J > > > > Thanks for the opportunity for having a very thoughtful Saturday morning. > > > > See my responses between your lines below (in red). > > > > > > Ana > > > > > > -- > > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane* > > Phone: 267-334-2905 > > Email: anamshane@gmail.com > > > > > > *From: *"xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu" > on behalf of Greg Thompson > *Reply-To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Date: *Friday, May 24, 2019 at 3:33 PM > *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Cc: *Eugene Matusov , "mikhail.gradovski@uis.no" < > mikhail.gradovski@uis.no> > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic > Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators > > > > Ana, > > > > Thank you so much for your very thoughtful description/explanation of > Ethical Ontological Dialogism. I know that by now you probably thought I > was avoiding your answer, but I've been trying to figure how to offer a > reasonable response to the feast that you put forward in your email and > trying to figure out how I might respond to your post in a manner consonant > with ethical ontological dialogism. I'm pretty sure I'll fail at the > latter, but feast I did. > > > > *ANA:* Thanks > > > > I'm also curious if a medium like a listserve can brook the challenge of > slow replies - replies that don't come for days or even weeks. I'm always > surprised to see how quickly conversations come and go even in a (virtual) > place as thoughtful as XMCA. Perhaps this is a sign of the times; you can > find "dialogue" everywhere but seldom does it amount to much - whether > ethically (cf. the dialogical fires that regularly erupt in social media) > or ontologically (cf. the "dialogue" of talking heads on just about any > media outlet who are expected to instantly opine on subjects about which > they've had little time to think). The dialogues on XMCA are perhaps a bit > slower than some of these other "dialogues" but even here on XMCA it seems > the half-life of a comment is about 24 hours. So I'm wondering what a > slower listserve might look like and whether slow replies might perhaps be > a step toward what you have outlined as ethical ontological dialogism. > > > > *ANA:* I think that we should try to do slow dialogues among other > dialogues. It is true that your original email and a simple question on > elaborating Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD), made me slow down and > start to think about what I see as an essence that can be somehow described > in a concentrated way but without loss of life and subjectivity. It was me, > first who slowed down the discussion. And I liked the time it took to think > about the issue. > > > > > > That's all just to say that I was delighted by your response (and the fact > that you took some time to respond) and I hope you'll forgive me for > multiplying that time in my response (and, of course, that last paragraph > could be seen as just an attempt to rationalize my failure to be a > responsible partner in dialogue...). > > > > Anyway, as for the project itself, I find it quite exciting and > invigorating. It is a wonderfully interesting project to tease out the > implications of Bakhtin's work for teachers' practice and the way you have > outlined this in your email really sings to me. > > > > If I were to ask questions about the project (and maybe some of these > answers are contained in the book - I've asked our library to order it), I > have two major questions that stand out. One has to do with sustainability > of these principles and the other has to do with the universality of them. > > > > *ANA:* Before I reply to any one of them below ? you may notice that both > questions are about issues important in a different, more prevalent, > monologic approach of searching the ?universal? and erasing the uniqueness > of subjectivity by the notion of ?sustainability? ? which implies that > teaching should strive to be something that can be replicated by others. > (just a quick comment ? which ties into your next paragraph) > > > > With regard to sustainability, along with David Kirshner's question: "Do > you not tremble at the selflessness that this posture demands?", I wonder > if this is the kind of thing that teachers in major public school systems > can easily sustain? Or is there something else that is needed in order to > be able to enable teachers to realize this kind of practice? What things > might need to change? > > > > > > *ANA:* Sustainability, in my interpretation, (correct me if I am wrong), > runs directly in contradiction to dialogicity! Sustainability means basing > teaching on ?the best practices? ? or replicating past ?models,? that seem > to be working good. That very process in its nature is monologic, > introducing something that is above and erases the uniqueness of each > person?s subjectivity, and thus each teacher?s striving to create and be > surprised by new moment-to-moment evolving meanings in dialogic > relationships with the equally unique and unpredictable students. That > cannot be ?sustained?, because such a process cannot be guaranteed, as it > is different for each participant. > > > > Yes, you, Greg and David Kirschner might say ?I tremble at the > selflessness that this posture demands? but this trembling for me is the > sign of a pulse of life. Pulse of life that can live freed of the > mechanization through which the contemporary education attempts to process > the participants in education. > > > > What needs to change to enable teachers this kind of practice? A lot of > things! But some countries may be timidly starting on this path (For > instance New Zealand removed national educational standards > https://education.govt.nz/news/national-standards-removed/ !) Of course, > removing national standards is just a first step. There are for sure many > more things that will have to be changed ? and not all the same things for > all the people in education. But I also think that the changes need to be > broadly directed at creating ecologies of education in which teaching and > learning can take a lot more authorial and creative turn than it is > possible now. What exactly would that mean ? will probably be very > different for each teacher and each student. > > > > With regard to universalizability, I wonder if you have thought much about > the ideology of the subject that underlies this project? As much as the > project sings to me, I wonder how much of that is because it is based on an > ideology of the subject that resonates with me (I'm a fan of Bakhtin's > notion of the subject as articulated in Author and Hero in Aesthetic > Activity). As an anthropologist I have to ask the question: what if the > culture that you are working in requires acknowledgment of some fixed > characteristics of the subject being addressed, perhaps even as finalized > and finished categories? Relatedly, I wonder if there might not be need for > some awareness of patterns of difference whether developmental differences, > cultural differences, and other differences that are important to engage > with in order to engage in an EOD manner with others? > > > > *ANA:* You ask ?what if the culture that you are working in requires > acknowledgment of some fixed characteristics of the subject being > addressed, perhaps even as finalized and finished categories?? > > I think that when a culture requires acknowledgement of some fixed > characteristics of the subject being addressed, that culture in itself has > a non-dialogic ideology ? ideology that requires and counts on suppressing > the uniqueness of subjectivity and, thus, suppressing the meaning-making > practices. So, yes, if the ideology of a culture is monologic, a project to > fully dialogize teaching would be hard, potentially impossible, and would > have to be ?smuggled? under the radar of what the educational authorities > demand. This is, in fact, what happens today in most conventional schools > that are governed in a strictly hierarchical, authoritarian way, demanding > reproduction of culture, ideology and dogma by setting these ideologies, > standards and dogmas as the only legitimate ones, and enforcing them with > standardized testing. > > > > Even the recognition of differences in the form of the talk about > developmental differences (developmentally appropriate curriculum), > cultural differences (culturally sensitive curriculum), individual > differences in special education (various accommodations specified in the > Individual Service Plans (ISPs), etc. ? this recognition is still about how > to strive toward, aim at, and somehow reach the prescribed standardized and > pre-set educational end-points, despite the special circumstances of > diversity, which are all perceived as forms of an educational handicap! > > > > In my view, Bakhtin inspired dialogism does not recognize any preexisting > subject, nor any pre-existing fixed characteristics of the subject. > > > > Dialogicity is a stance that assumes that subjectivity is born in dialogue > ? it is not a given, not even for the person her/him-self. Rather, one?s > subjectivity is constantly being born in one?s own dialogic project of > becoming a person, in dialogue, where one discovers pregnant possibilities > for ?I? to become ?ME?. > > > > Put slightly differently, is it possible that recognizing pre-existing > persons as part of (fixed) pre-existing categories might be a necessary > part of an ethical ontological dialogism. > > > > *ANA:* For me: No! (see above). > > > > In other words, is there some other end of the spectrum opposite of a > total rejection of these positive categories and patterns that is necessary > for an ethical ontological dialogism? > > > > *ANA:* You assume that the opposite of not recognizing unique individual > subjectivity of others ? is ?recognition of preexisting person as part of > (fixed) pre-existing categories?. This assumption is a trap ? as it stays > in the same realm of the given (positive), i.e. given in the world as such. > However, the question is not whether the uniqueness of the subjectivity is > given or not, the question is about whether our subjectivity is a given or > our subjectivity emerges in a continuing transcendence of the given. > > > > It seems that this positive categorization is a part of ethical dialogical > practice in much of our intimate encounters - whether the mother > anticipating the needs of a nursing child, a child anticipating their > parent's wishes (in Korea there is a term "nunchi" which is one of the most > fundamental ethical values of certain kinds of relationships and involves > the anticipation of the needs of significant others; importantly, these are > often in hierarchical relationships), a teacher designing a curriculum for > incoming students based on what little is known of their developmental age, > or the anticipatory removal of images of snakes by a man whose spouse is > ophidiophobic. Prediction as part of the anticipation of needs hardly seems > ethically problematic in these cases and, in fact, it seems to be exactly > the opposite. > > > > *ANA:* It is very important, in my view that you notice that a mother > (caregiver) keeps anticipating the needs (and the subjectivity) of a child > ? i.e. that an ethical thing is to anticipate someone?s subjectivity!! I > think that this is the core of an ethical approach ? to *anticipate* > someone?s subjectivity ? and yet not to assume that one can know it, or > that subjectivity is (fully) knowable. To me, that means what Bakhtin > conceptualized as ?unfinalizability?. > > > > I would think that this would also mean that the goal of psychology > -understanding others - has the potential to be a deeply ethical practice > in the EOD sense. The one caveat is that it shouldn't be seen as the final > word on any one subject - i.e., you can never fully "know" a person via the > categories that they might fit into. > > > > If I may anticipate(!) your response, I assume that an EOD approach would > not avoid this but would simply be to emphasize that this is NOT the same > as using one's knowledge of the Other as a final determination - as a > determination of the Other's "essence and potential". That seems a critical > point. > > > > *ANA:* No. EOD approach is different for me. EOD approach is in > anticipating surprises from oneself and the others, inviting oneself and > the others to further transcend the given and making opportunities for such > transcendence; rather than simply being aware that one should not finalize > the other. And to develop it further, ?anticipation? of the other?s > subjectivity is about being genuinely interested in the other. This genuine > interests opens a door for the other to join the dialogue ? in which all > the participants can have an opportunity for discovering/constructing and > transcending their subjectivities. > > > > A few other thoughts: > > > > I can't help but see strong parallels between your critique of social > science research and the critique offered by Martin Packer in his book The > Science of Qualitative Research. Latour seems to be one of the main common > touchpoints, but thematically you are engaged in very similar projects - > the question of how to study "subjectivity" "objectively". > > > > *ANA:* In fact, NO. The Ethical Ontological Dialogism is not about > studying subjectivity ?objectively?, but is about providing opportunities > for and inviting people?s subjectivities to start/continue emerging in all > the unpredictable and intrepid ways imaginable (and unimaginable) > transcendence. > > > > The major difference is that where you turn to Bakhtin's notion of > unfinalizability, he turns to Foucault's notion of an "historical ontology > of ourselves". Regardless of that, I see huge resonances between your work. > And regardless of those resonances, I imagine that bringing EOD to social > science research would be another angle to develop more substantially (if > you haven't already!). > > > > > > Oh, and a question: what is "ontological" about EOD? > > > > *ANA:* Ahh, the most important question!?. > > > > To say it quickly ? to me the ?ontological? means that for the dialogic > participants the dialogue matters on the level of their dialogic > subjectivity! It matters for who they are! It matters for their ideas about > the world, the others and themselves. It matters for what they desire, what > they fear, what they think they can?t live with or without, etc. > ?Ontologically? engaged dialogue makes a difference for the continuing > transcendence of the given ? it can and does change big and/or small things > relevant for the person and her/his personhood. > > > > But, of course, this question requires a lot more analysis. > > > > I have more thoughts but I think I've already said too much... > > > > *ANA: *?. Me too. > > > > > > Once again, many thanks for your thoughtful and lengthy response. I look > forward to reading more. > > > > Very best, > > Greg > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190531/e81094e0/attachment.html