From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Apr 2 13:12:08 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 14:12:08 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Repair in inner speech Message-ID: For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or second). I found this on the internet: "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and James Allen, 1994.) My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in inner speech in the CHAT universe? Henry -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190402/a3263be5/attachment.html From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Tue Apr 2 15:29:02 2019 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:29:02 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Henry, In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in social speech. I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also breaks and shifts topic. I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, private, or inner - can entail repairs. Peter On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD wrote: > For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second > language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on > self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of > before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or > second). I found this on the internet: > > "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, even > at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that the > speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt > speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their > inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, > when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is > immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that > short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. > "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, > error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in > turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is > thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short > cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to > the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), > suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was > interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is > initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and > James Allen, 1994.) > > My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in > inner speech in the CHAT universe? > > Henry > > > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190402/f11948c2/attachment.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Private and inner speech and the regulation of social speech communication_San Martin Martinez_Boada i Calbet_Feig Type: application/pdf Size: 357226 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190402/f11948c2/attachment.pdf From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Apr 2 16:02:31 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Assuming that inner speech lacks any necessity to resolve ambiguity in the use of words, because it emphasises particular meanings, there would not be a requirement to repair ambiguity. Although if one's inner speech was about the intention to declare something, then I suppose that intended declaration might be subject to 'repair' and considered part of the inner speech. But that would constitute a difference in logical type despite being "part of" the inner speech, hence concurring with Peter's description. By repair I assume you are referring to change in how a meaning is expressed rather than a change in the intended meaning. Huw On Tue, 2 Apr 2019 at 23:31, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > Henry, > > In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a > referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child > that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to > stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - > and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication > aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning > problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and > completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner > speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that > inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. > Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in > social speech. > > I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech > conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being > interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech > (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), > then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also > breaks and shifts topic. > > I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is > certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, > private, or inner - can entail repairs. > > Peter > > > > On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second >> language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on >> self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of >> before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or >> second). I found this on the internet: >> >> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, >> even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that >> the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt >> speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their >> inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, >> when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is >> immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that >> short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, >> error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in >> turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is >> thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short >> cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to >> the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), >> suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was >> interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is >> initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and >> James Allen, 1994.) >> >> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in >> inner speech in the CHAT universe? >> >> Henry >> >> >> > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190402/e4b2ea4b/attachment-0001.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Apr 2 16:09:09 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 08:09:09 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Peter, Henry-- I have always been very suspcious of the idea that inner speech is simply non-vocalized private speech. What Vygotsky says is that this may be true of very small children, but with seven-year-olds, there are huge grammatical differences between inner speech and private speech (in Hallidayan terms, inner speech deletes Theme and Given and consists only of a stream of Rheme and New: what Vygotsky says is that it is "predicative"). There is a kind of Chinese painting that is supposed to be spontaneous and calligraphic: you want to catch lots of aleatory effects like drips and "flying ink". Of course, these effects are hard to control, and so you end up throwing away hundreds of sheets of paper for every paper you save. Oil painting is exactly the opposite, because when you put a layer of oil paint over another layer, if the first layer hasn't dried, it will suck the oil out of the top layer and make it dull looking and lifeless. So each layer has to be left for days until you apply another layer. Before I learnt to use a word processor, I used a manual typewriter. With the typewriter, I would write in drafts which I would then "cellar" for a few days and then rewrite. I never do that now, and the effect seems to me very like Chinese painting: I have to throw away a lot of stuff to get what I want. (And even then...) It seems to me this has something to do with the difference between inner speech and private speech in adults. Inner speech (in me, before I have had my morning coffee at any rate) is a stream of sketches, a bunch of mis-strokes which are immediately effaced or over-written. But private speech is not like that: it is, in many ways, more developed than public speech because it includes public speech as its premise. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 7:31 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > Henry, > > In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a > referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child > that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to > stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - > and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication > aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning > problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and > completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner > speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that > inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. > Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in > social speech. > > I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech > conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being > interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech > (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), > then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also > breaks and shifts topic. > > I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is > certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, > private, or inner - can entail repairs. > > Peter > > > > On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second >> language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on >> self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of >> before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or >> second). I found this on the internet: >> >> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, >> even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that >> the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt >> speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their >> inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, >> when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is >> immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that >> short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, >> error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in >> turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is >> thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short >> cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to >> the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), >> suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was >> interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is >> initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and >> James Allen, 1994.) >> >> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in >> inner speech in the CHAT universe? >> >> Henry >> >> >> > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190403/b23775f7/attachment.html From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Apr 2 16:24:17 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 17:24:17 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <82F3A2A8-1A63-4720-90F7-05F9672608AA@gmail.com> Huw, You say, ?By repair, I assume you are referring to change in how a meaning is expressed rather than a change in the meaning.? I?m not sure I can alwahys answer that question unambiguously, either in a first or second language. Some repairs in L2 certainly seem to be simply efforts to express a meaning more like a native speaker. But, especially with L1 speakers, changing the how a meaning is expressed changes ever so slightly the meaning, especially in the framing of an utterance. And even a slight change in framing can alter radically how an utterance is received. I can?t think of an example right now, but they come up all the time when I am posting. Henry > On Apr 2, 2019, at 5:02 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Assuming that inner speech lacks any necessity to resolve ambiguity in the use of words, because it emphasises particular meanings, there would not be a requirement to repair ambiguity. Although if one's inner speech was about the intention to declare something, then I suppose that intended declaration might be subject to 'repair' and considered part of the inner speech. But that would constitute a difference in logical type despite being "part of" the inner speech, hence concurring with Peter's description. By repair I assume you are referring to change in how a meaning is expressed rather than a change in the intended meaning. > > Huw > > On Tue, 2 Apr 2019 at 23:31, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] > wrote: > Henry, > > In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in social speech. > > I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also breaks and shifts topic. > > I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, private, or inner - can entail repairs. > > Peter > > > > On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or second). I found this on the internet: > > "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. > > "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and James Allen, 1994.) > > My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in inner speech in the CHAT universe? > > Henry > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190402/d3d2abdd/attachment.html From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Apr 2 16:28:36 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 17:28:36 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Peter, Thank you! Very interesting paper. I knew there had to be something out there since 1994! Henry > On Apr 2, 2019, at 4:29 PM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > > Henry, > > In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in social speech. > > I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also breaks and shifts topic. > > I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, private, or inner - can entail repairs. > > Peter > > > > On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or second). I found this on the internet: > > "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. > > "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and James Allen, 1994.) > > My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in inner speech in the CHAT universe? > > Henry > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190402/aea4a088/attachment.html From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Apr 2 17:15:26 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:26 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David, Your Hallydayan analysis resonates with things Vera used to talk about. I am glad you brought in writing and visual art, also resonates with Vera?s work in creativity. I wrote the following just before I read your post, about things I was thinking about since I posted: 1) Repairs in writing. Not only through editing of a finished draft, but the inserts, cross-outs, etc. on the original draft. And how academics begin to ?talk like a book?. I am amazed at some of the posts on this listserv that are as polished as they are. I have to repair my own posts many times usually. I am sure that not everyone labors so hard to make something somewhat presentable. I assume that the more one writes about a topic, the more one writes like a book, a good book. And this bleeds over into written conversation, like here. Fluency. 2) How much of repair in inner speech is conscious? And are self reports considered good data? 3) Advances in research on the repairs in the private speech of children raised bilingually. Henry > On Apr 2, 2019, at 5:09 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Peter, Henry-- > > I have always been very suspcious of the idea that inner speech is simply non-vocalized private speech. What Vygotsky says is that this may be true of very small children, but with seven-year-olds, there are huge grammatical differences between inner speech and private speech (in Hallidayan terms, inner speech deletes Theme and Given and consists only of a stream of Rheme and New: what Vygotsky says is that it is "predicative"). > > There is a kind of Chinese painting that is supposed to be spontaneous and calligraphic: you want to catch lots of aleatory effects like drips and "flying ink". Of course, these effects are hard to control, and so you end up throwing away hundreds of sheets of paper for every paper you save. Oil painting is exactly the opposite, because when you put a layer of oil paint over another layer, if the first layer hasn't dried, it will suck the oil out of the top layer and make it dull looking and lifeless. So each layer has to be left for days until you apply another layer. > > Before I learnt to use a word processor, I used a manual typewriter. With the typewriter, I would write in drafts which I would then "cellar" for a few days and then rewrite. I never do that now, and the effect seems to me very like Chinese painting: I have to throw away a lot of stuff to get what I want. (And even then...) > > It seems to me this has something to do with the difference between inner speech and private speech in adults. Inner speech (in me, before I have had my morning coffee at any rate) is a stream of sketches, a bunch of mis-strokes which are immediately effaced or over-written. But private speech is not like that: it is, in many ways, more developed than public speech because it includes public speech as its premise. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 7:31 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] > wrote: > Henry, > > In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in social speech. > > I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also breaks and shifts topic. > > I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, private, or inner - can entail repairs. > > Peter > > > > On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or second). I found this on the internet: > > "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. > > "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and James Allen, 1994.) > > My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in inner speech in the CHAT universe? > > Henry > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190402/17a25a68/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Apr 2 18:10:36 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 01:10:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: <82F3A2A8-1A63-4720-90F7-05F9672608AA@gmail.com> References: <82F3A2A8-1A63-4720-90F7-05F9672608AA@gmail.com> Message-ID: Yes, Henry. But I don't think you have caught my point about not needing to correct a placeholder if no-one is questioning the meaning attributed to it. Personally, I am not convinced that the classification is useful beyond pointing to different appearances. If one thinks of inner-speech as a hand that manifests as a glove, then it is simple enough to see that it can manifest in any kind of glove -- spoken, mathematical, action-image, etc. Similarly it can then be considered to manifest within different degrees of formality depending upon the needs of the situation. The speech as the progenitor of thought argument merely seems to me to be a preoccupation for people who find themselves thinking that way. Contrary to that, speech and written language is extremely unwieldy when it comes to conveying anything complex. Cheerio, Huw On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 00:26, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Huw, > You say, ?By repair, I assume you are referring to change in how a meaning > is expressed rather than a change in the meaning.? I?m not sure I can > alwahys answer that question unambiguously, either in a first or second > language. Some repairs in L2 certainly seem to be simply efforts to express > a meaning more like a native speaker. But, especially with L1 speakers, > changing the how a meaning is expressed changes ever so slightly the > meaning, especially in the framing of an utterance. And even a slight > change in framing can alter radically how an utterance is received. I can?t > think of an example right now, but they come up all the time when I am > posting. > Henry > > > On Apr 2, 2019, at 5:02 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Assuming that inner speech lacks any necessity to resolve ambiguity in the > use of words, because it emphasises particular meanings, there would not be > a requirement to repair ambiguity. Although if one's inner speech was about > the intention to declare something, then I suppose that intended > declaration might be subject to 'repair' and considered part of the inner > speech. But that would constitute a difference in logical type despite > being "part of" the inner speech, hence concurring with Peter's > description. By repair I assume you are referring to change in how a > meaning is expressed rather than a change in the intended meaning. > > Huw > > On Tue, 2 Apr 2019 at 23:31, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >> Henry, >> >> In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a >> referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child >> that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to >> stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - >> and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication >> aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning >> problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and >> completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner >> speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that >> inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. >> Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in >> social speech. >> >> I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech >> conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being >> interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech >> (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), >> then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also >> breaks and shifts topic. >> >> I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is >> certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, >> private, or inner - can entail repairs. >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second >>> language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on >>> self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of >>> before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or >>> second). I found this on the internet: >>> >>> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, >>> even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that >>> the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt >>> speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their >>> inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, >>> when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is >>> immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that >>> short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >>> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, >>> error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in >>> turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is >>> thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short >>> cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to >>> the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), >>> suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was >>> interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is >>> initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and >>> James Allen, 1994.) >>> >>> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair >>> in inner speech in the CHAT universe? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190403/0c0f28cd/attachment.html From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Apr 2 20:51:06 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 21:51:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: <82F3A2A8-1A63-4720-90F7-05F9672608AA@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4554045F-1672-40AB-BAA2-D0E21481DF3D@gmail.com> Huw, Speaking hands and gloves, who out there remembers Johnny Cochran, defense attorney in 1995 for the iconic black professional football player accused of murdering his white wife: ?If it doesn?t fit, you must aquit?. https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/OJ-Simpson-20-Years-Later-Glove-Fit-Darden-Dunne-Murder-Trial-of-the-Century-262534821.html? Even when a glove or utterance seems to fit perfectly the hand or meaning, the person evaluating the fit of the glove or the meaning of the utterance may misconstrue. It seems to me repair could reflect the judgement by the speaker that an utterance could be misconstrued, making for uncertainty in how to couch an utterance in the first place. Meaning gets negotiated going in and coming out. Negotiation is constant repair. Now what is ?repair?? It does NOT mean the same thing as error, though it includes errors. But in looking for a definition on the web, I don?t come up with anything totally convincing, at least not when it comes to dealing with what you say: ??speech and language is extremely unwieldy when it comes to conveying anything complex.? But I am humbly open to a convincing definition. I just know what I want to be able to do with the term: analyze credibly how discourse works and to rise to the concrete in developmental settings. For example, in school. It was why I did my doctoral work in Educational Linguistics founded at UNM by Vera John-Steiner and Bernard Spolsky lo these many years ago. I still haven?t credibly risen to the concrete...but I?m a late bloomer. Help me out! Henry > On Apr 2, 2019, at 7:10 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Yes, Henry. But I don't think you have caught my point about not needing to correct a placeholder if no-one is questioning the meaning attributed to it. > > Personally, I am not convinced that the classification is useful beyond pointing to different appearances. If one thinks of inner-speech as a hand that manifests as a glove, then it is simple enough to see that it can manifest in any kind of glove -- spoken, mathematical, action-image, etc. Similarly it can then be considered to manifest within different degrees of formality depending upon the needs of the situation. > > The speech as the progenitor of thought argument merely seems to me to be a preoccupation for people who find themselves thinking that way. Contrary to that, speech and written language is extremely unwieldy when it comes to conveying anything complex. > > Cheerio, > Huw > > > > On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 00:26, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > Huw, > You say, ?By repair, I assume you are referring to change in how a meaning is expressed rather than a change in the meaning.? I?m not sure I can alwahys answer that question unambiguously, either in a first or second language. Some repairs in L2 certainly seem to be simply efforts to express a meaning more like a native speaker. But, especially with L1 speakers, changing the how a meaning is expressed changes ever so slightly the meaning, especially in the framing of an utterance. And even a slight change in framing can alter radically how an utterance is received. I can?t think of an example right now, but they come up all the time when I am posting. > Henry > > >> On Apr 2, 2019, at 5:02 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> >> Assuming that inner speech lacks any necessity to resolve ambiguity in the use of words, because it emphasises particular meanings, there would not be a requirement to repair ambiguity. Although if one's inner speech was about the intention to declare something, then I suppose that intended declaration might be subject to 'repair' and considered part of the inner speech. But that would constitute a difference in logical type despite being "part of" the inner speech, hence concurring with Peter's description. By repair I assume you are referring to change in how a meaning is expressed rather than a change in the intended meaning. >> >> Huw >> >> On Tue, 2 Apr 2019 at 23:31, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] > wrote: >> Henry, >> >> In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in social speech. >> >> I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also breaks and shifts topic. >> >> I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, private, or inner - can entail repairs. >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD > wrote: >> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or second). I found this on the internet: >> >> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >> >> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and James Allen, 1994.) >> >> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in inner speech in the CHAT universe? >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190402/85bb1777/attachment.html From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Apr 3 06:39:34 2019 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 14:39:34 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: <4554045F-1672-40AB-BAA2-D0E21481DF3D@gmail.com> References: <82F3A2A8-1A63-4720-90F7-05F9672608AA@gmail.com> <4554045F-1672-40AB-BAA2-D0E21481DF3D@gmail.com> Message-ID: I am saying that the evaluation is the same as the orientation of use. If you change perspectives on the use to hold a "conversation", then the meanings may change. On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 04:52, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Huw, > Speaking hands and gloves, who out there remembers Johnny Cochran, defense > attorney in 1995 for the iconic black professional football player accused > of murdering his white wife: ?If it doesn?t fit, you must aquit?. > > > https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/OJ-Simpson-20-Years-Later-Glove-Fit-Darden-Dunne-Murder-Trial-of-the-Century-262534821.html > > > Even when a glove or utterance seems to fit perfectly the hand or meaning, > the person evaluating the fit of the glove or the meaning of the utterance > may misconstrue. It seems to me repair could reflect the judgement by the > speaker that an utterance could be misconstrued, making for uncertainty in > how to couch an utterance in the first place. Meaning gets negotiated going > in and coming out. Negotiation is constant repair. Now what is ?repair?? It > does NOT mean the same thing as error, though it includes errors. But in > looking for a definition on the web, I don?t come up with anything totally > convincing, at least not when it comes to dealing with what you say: > ??speech and language is extremely unwieldy when it comes to conveying > anything complex.? But I am humbly open to a convincing definition. I just > know what I want to be able to do with the term: analyze credibly how > discourse works and to rise to the concrete in developmental settings. For > example, in school. It was why I did my doctoral work in Educational > Linguistics founded at UNM by Vera John-Steiner and Bernard Spolsky lo > these many years ago. I still haven?t credibly risen to the concrete...but > I?m a late bloomer. Help me out! > > Henry > > > > On Apr 2, 2019, at 7:10 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Yes, Henry. But I don't think you have caught my point about not needing > to correct a placeholder if no-one is questioning the meaning attributed to > it. > > Personally, I am not convinced that the classification is useful beyond > pointing to different appearances. If one thinks of inner-speech as a hand > that manifests as a glove, then it is simple enough to see that it can > manifest in any kind of glove -- spoken, mathematical, action-image, etc. > Similarly it can then be considered to manifest within different degrees of > formality depending upon the needs of the situation. > > The speech as the progenitor of thought argument merely seems to me to be > a preoccupation for people who find themselves thinking that way. Contrary > to that, speech and written language is extremely unwieldy when it comes to > conveying anything complex. > > Cheerio, > Huw > > > > On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 00:26, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Huw, >> You say, ?By repair, I assume you are referring to change in how a >> meaning is expressed rather than a change in the meaning.? I?m not sure I >> can alwahys answer that question unambiguously, either in a first or second >> language. Some repairs in L2 certainly seem to be simply efforts to express >> a meaning more like a native speaker. But, especially with L1 speakers, >> changing the how a meaning is expressed changes ever so slightly the >> meaning, especially in the framing of an utterance. And even a slight >> change in framing can alter radically how an utterance is received. I can?t >> think of an example right now, but they come up all the time when I am >> posting. >> Henry >> >> >> On Apr 2, 2019, at 5:02 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> Assuming that inner speech lacks any necessity to resolve ambiguity in >> the use of words, because it emphasises particular meanings, there would >> not be a requirement to repair ambiguity. Although if one's inner speech >> was about the intention to declare something, then I suppose that intended >> declaration might be subject to 'repair' and considered part of the inner >> speech. But that would constitute a difference in logical type despite >> being "part of" the inner speech, hence concurring with Peter's >> description. By repair I assume you are referring to change in how a >> meaning is expressed rather than a change in the intended meaning. >> >> Huw >> >> On Tue, 2 Apr 2019 at 23:31, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >> >>> Henry, >>> >>> In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a >>> referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child >>> that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to >>> stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - >>> and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication >>> aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning >>> problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and >>> completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner >>> speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that >>> inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. >>> Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in >>> social speech. >>> >>> I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech >>> conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being >>> interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech >>> (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), >>> then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also >>> breaks and shifts topic. >>> >>> I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is >>> certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, >>> private, or inner - can entail repairs. >>> >>> Peter >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >>>> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second >>>> language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on >>>> self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of >>>> before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or >>>> second). I found this on the internet: >>>> >>>> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, >>>> even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that >>>> the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt >>>> speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their >>>> inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, >>>> when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is >>>> immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that >>>> short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >>>> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, >>>> error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in >>>> turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is >>>> thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short >>>> cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to >>>> the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), >>>> suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was >>>> interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is >>>> initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman >>>> and James Allen, 1994.) >>>> >>>> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair >>>> in inner speech in the CHAT universe? >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research >>> >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>> >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190403/b17baf45/attachment.html From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Apr 3 07:21:38 2019 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 08:21:38 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: <82F3A2A8-1A63-4720-90F7-05F9672608AA@gmail.com> <4554045F-1672-40AB-BAA2-D0E21481DF3D@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hmmmm?.. > On Apr 3, 2019, at 7:39 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I am saying that the evaluation is the same as the orientation of use. If you change perspectives on the use to hold a "conversation", then the meanings may change. > > On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 04:52, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > Huw, > Speaking hands and gloves, who out there remembers Johnny Cochran, defense attorney in 1995 for the iconic black professional football player accused of murdering his white wife: ?If it doesn?t fit, you must aquit?. > > https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/OJ-Simpson-20-Years-Later-Glove-Fit-Darden-Dunne-Murder-Trial-of-the-Century-262534821.html? > > Even when a glove or utterance seems to fit perfectly the hand or meaning, the person evaluating the fit of the glove or the meaning of the utterance may misconstrue. It seems to me repair could reflect the judgement by the speaker that an utterance could be misconstrued, making for uncertainty in how to couch an utterance in the first place. Meaning gets negotiated going in and coming out. Negotiation is constant repair. Now what is ?repair?? It does NOT mean the same thing as error, though it includes errors. But in looking for a definition on the web, I don?t come up with anything totally convincing, at least not when it comes to dealing with what you say: ??speech and language is extremely unwieldy when it comes to conveying anything complex.? But I am humbly open to a convincing definition. I just know what I want to be able to do with the term: analyze credibly how discourse works and to rise to the concrete in developmental settings. For example, in school. It was why I did my doctoral work in Educational Linguistics founded at UNM by Vera John-Steiner and Bernard Spolsky lo these many years ago. I still haven?t credibly risen to the concrete...but I?m a late bloomer. Help me out! > > Henry > > > >> On Apr 2, 2019, at 7:10 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: >> >> Yes, Henry. But I don't think you have caught my point about not needing to correct a placeholder if no-one is questioning the meaning attributed to it. >> >> Personally, I am not convinced that the classification is useful beyond pointing to different appearances. If one thinks of inner-speech as a hand that manifests as a glove, then it is simple enough to see that it can manifest in any kind of glove -- spoken, mathematical, action-image, etc. Similarly it can then be considered to manifest within different degrees of formality depending upon the needs of the situation. >> >> The speech as the progenitor of thought argument merely seems to me to be a preoccupation for people who find themselves thinking that way. Contrary to that, speech and written language is extremely unwieldy when it comes to conveying anything complex. >> >> Cheerio, >> Huw >> >> >> >> On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 00:26, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: >> Huw, >> You say, ?By repair, I assume you are referring to change in how a meaning is expressed rather than a change in the meaning.? I?m not sure I can alwahys answer that question unambiguously, either in a first or second language. Some repairs in L2 certainly seem to be simply efforts to express a meaning more like a native speaker. But, especially with L1 speakers, changing the how a meaning is expressed changes ever so slightly the meaning, especially in the framing of an utterance. And even a slight change in framing can alter radically how an utterance is received. I can?t think of an example right now, but they come up all the time when I am posting. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Apr 2, 2019, at 5:02 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: >>> >>> Assuming that inner speech lacks any necessity to resolve ambiguity in the use of words, because it emphasises particular meanings, there would not be a requirement to repair ambiguity. Although if one's inner speech was about the intention to declare something, then I suppose that intended declaration might be subject to 'repair' and considered part of the inner speech. But that would constitute a difference in logical type despite being "part of" the inner speech, hence concurring with Peter's description. By repair I assume you are referring to change in how a meaning is expressed rather than a change in the intended meaning. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> On Tue, 2 Apr 2019 at 23:31, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] > wrote: >>> Henry, >>> >>> In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in social speech. >>> >>> I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also breaks and shifts topic. >>> >>> I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, private, or inner - can entail repairs. >>> >>> Peter >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD > wrote: >>> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or second). I found this on the internet: >>> >>> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >>> >>> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and James Allen, 1994.) >>> >>> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair in inner speech in the CHAT universe? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190403/27492876/attachment.html From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Wed Apr 3 08:00:21 2019 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 11:00:21 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David, Yes, you caught me making a statement about Vygotsky's account of the relationship between private and inner speech that is true as a general gloss, but that I know to be untrue in its particulars. While private speech does eventually assume the mental functions attributable to inner speech as it nears the end of its development around age 6 or 7, it does not start its life with those functions. Somewhere between its initial appearance (as early as age 1.5 to age 2 in precocious children) and age 6-7, private speech undergoes the most profound changes as an instrument of cognition, developing the capacity to not only *reflect* practical activity, but to also *direct* it. The development of the "planning function" of private speech is, I would argue, a prerequisite to private speech's functioning in a way that resembles the functioning of inner speech. Furthermore, the work has yet to be done that will reveal how speaking monologically (i.e., aloud to one's self) enables a child to think dialogically (i.e., inter-subjectively). That is the topic that I am currently investigating with Jeremy Sawyer. We are exploring how the fantasy-based private speech conversations of 4-year-olds (in a play activity) compare to the plan-based private speech conversations of 8-year-olds (in a problem-solving activity). We are seeking to understand not only how private speech operates differently for the two age groups with respect to its relation to ongoing activity, but also how the forms of conversational exchange develop during this period (e.g., comment-comment vs. question-answer). Much more work yet to be done on private speech! Cheers, Peter On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 7:11 PM David Kellogg wrote: > Peter, Henry-- > > I have always been very suspcious of the idea that inner speech is simply > non-vocalized private speech. What Vygotsky says is that this may be true > of very small children, but with seven-year-olds, there are huge > grammatical differences between inner speech and private speech (in > Hallidayan terms, inner speech deletes Theme and Given and consists only of > a stream of Rheme and New: what Vygotsky says is that it is "predicative"). > > There is a kind of Chinese painting that is supposed to be spontaneous and > calligraphic: you want to catch lots of aleatory effects like drips and > "flying ink". Of course, these effects are hard to control, and so you end > up throwing away hundreds of sheets of paper for every paper you save. Oil > painting is exactly the opposite, because when you put a layer of oil paint > over another layer, if the first layer hasn't dried, it will suck the oil > out of the top layer and make it dull looking and lifeless. So each layer > has to be left for days until you apply another layer. > > Before I learnt to use a word processor, I used a manual typewriter. With > the typewriter, I would write in drafts which I would then "cellar" for a > few days and then rewrite. I never do that now, and the effect seems to me > very like Chinese painting: I have to throw away a lot of stuff to get what > I want. (And even then...) > > It seems to me this has something to do with the difference between inner > speech and private speech in adults. Inner speech (in me, before I have had > my morning coffee at any rate) is a stream of sketches, a bunch of > mis-strokes which are immediately effaced or over-written. But private > speech is not like that: it is, in many ways, more developed than public > speech because it includes public speech as its premise. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 7:31 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >> Henry, >> >> In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a >> referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child >> that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to >> stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - >> and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication >> aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning >> problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and >> completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner >> speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that >> inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. >> Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in >> social speech. >> >> I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech >> conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being >> interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech >> (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), >> then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also >> breaks and shifts topic. >> >> I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is >> certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, >> private, or inner - can entail repairs. >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second >>> language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on >>> self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of >>> before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or >>> second). I found this on the internet: >>> >>> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, >>> even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that >>> the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt >>> speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their >>> inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, >>> when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is >>> immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that >>> short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >>> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, >>> error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in >>> turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is >>> thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short >>> cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to >>> the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), >>> suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was >>> interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is >>> initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman and >>> James Allen, 1994.) >>> >>> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair >>> in inner speech in the CHAT universe? >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190403/3bbf431d/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Apr 3 18:03:26 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 10:03:26 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Unfortunately, for technical reasons, most of the data we have of the sociogenesis of language is literary language; it is a little like studying history exclusively through the lives of kings). But we can make out a somewhat similar phenomenon in the sociogenesis of inner speech in literature (including voiceovers in movies). Before Shakespeare, private speech in theatre was largely limited to what we call "asides". This is what I would call an adult private speech: the function is to let the audience know that my public speech is not to be trusted. Such private speech is actually identical to speech which is addressed to someone else, but not to the general (onstage) public. So for example in the last scene of Hamlet, Claudius says "It is the poisoned cup!" when Gertrude is about to drink the fatal wine. In some productions he is talking to Laertes, but in other productions he is talking to himself and there isn't a very dramatic difference. Voiceovers in movies still tend to function this way. After Shakespeare, though, private speech in theatre is expanded into what we now call "soliloquies". This is not adult private speech: it's full-blown inner speech, but inner speech as Virginia Woolf interprets it, not inner speech as James Joyce mimics it. It is actually far richer, far more complex (yes, in the "complexive" sense) and far LESS simple than public speech is. But although it is semantically richer, it is lexicogrammatically a lot poorer, because it is a lot more elliptical. Woolf tries to render the semantic wealth of inner speech, while Joyce concentrates on the lexicogrammatical poverty. An analogy (excuse my analogies--I'm a very complexive thinker) is the distinction between recitative and aria in opera. Recitatives are dialogue, and they can also include asides, but when they do these asides do not have any independent role in the score. Arias are different. They are generally not addressed to other characters (and when they are, they tend to realize very intimate moments between lovers); they are essentially sung soliloquies. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 12:02 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > David, > > Yes, you caught me making a statement about Vygotsky's account of the > relationship between private and inner speech that is true as a general > gloss, but that I know to be untrue in its particulars. While private > speech does eventually assume the mental functions attributable to inner > speech as it nears the end of its development around age 6 or 7, it does > not start its life with those functions. Somewhere between its initial > appearance (as early as age 1.5 to age 2 in precocious children) and age > 6-7, private speech undergoes the most profound changes as an instrument of > cognition, developing the capacity to not only *reflect* practical > activity, but to also *direct* it. The development of the "planning > function" of private speech is, I would argue, a prerequisite to private > speech's functioning in a way that resembles the functioning of inner > speech. > > Furthermore, the work has yet to be done that will reveal how speaking > monologically (i.e., aloud to one's self) enables a child to think > dialogically (i.e., inter-subjectively). That is the topic that I am > currently investigating with Jeremy Sawyer. We are exploring how the > fantasy-based private speech conversations of 4-year-olds (in a play > activity) compare to the plan-based private speech conversations of > 8-year-olds (in a problem-solving activity). We are seeking to understand > not only how private speech operates differently for the two age groups > with respect to its relation to ongoing activity, but also how the forms of > conversational exchange develop during this period (e.g., comment-comment > vs. question-answer). > > Much more work yet to be done on private speech! > > Cheers, > Peter > > > > On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 7:11 PM David Kellogg wrote: > >> Peter, Henry-- >> >> I have always been very suspcious of the idea that inner speech is simply >> non-vocalized private speech. What Vygotsky says is that this may be true >> of very small children, but with seven-year-olds, there are huge >> grammatical differences between inner speech and private speech (in >> Hallidayan terms, inner speech deletes Theme and Given and consists only of >> a stream of Rheme and New: what Vygotsky says is that it is "predicative"). >> >> There is a kind of Chinese painting that is supposed to be spontaneous >> and calligraphic: you want to catch lots of aleatory effects like drips and >> "flying ink". Of course, these effects are hard to control, and so you end >> up throwing away hundreds of sheets of paper for every paper you save. Oil >> painting is exactly the opposite, because when you put a layer of oil paint >> over another layer, if the first layer hasn't dried, it will suck the oil >> out of the top layer and make it dull looking and lifeless. So each layer >> has to be left for days until you apply another layer. >> >> Before I learnt to use a word processor, I used a manual typewriter. With >> the typewriter, I would write in drafts which I would then "cellar" for a >> few days and then rewrite. I never do that now, and the effect seems to me >> very like Chinese painting: I have to throw away a lot of stuff to get what >> I want. (And even then...) >> >> It seems to me this has something to do with the difference between inner >> speech and private speech in adults. Inner speech (in me, before I have had >> my morning coffee at any rate) is a stream of sketches, a bunch of >> mis-strokes which are immediately effaced or over-written. But private >> speech is not like that: it is, in many ways, more developed than public >> speech because it includes public speech as its premise. >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >> understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 7:31 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >> >>> Henry, >>> >>> In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a >>> referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child >>> that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to >>> stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - >>> and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication >>> aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning >>> problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and >>> completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner >>> speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that >>> inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. >>> Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in >>> social speech. >>> >>> I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech >>> conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being >>> interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech >>> (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), >>> then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also >>> breaks and shifts topic. >>> >>> I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is >>> certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, >>> private, or inner - can entail repairs. >>> >>> Peter >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >>>> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second >>>> language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on >>>> self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of >>>> before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or >>>> second). I found this on the internet: >>>> >>>> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, >>>> even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that >>>> the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt >>>> speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their >>>> inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, >>>> when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is >>>> immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that >>>> short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >>>> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, >>>> error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in >>>> turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is >>>> thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short >>>> cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to >>>> the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), >>>> suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was >>>> interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is >>>> initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman >>>> and James Allen, 1994.) >>>> >>>> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair >>>> in inner speech in the CHAT universe? >>>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research >>> >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>> >> > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190404/75486584/attachment.html From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Thu Apr 4 09:47:23 2019 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 12:47:23 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you, David, for your insightful enumeration of the various expressions of private speech-like activity culled from the literary, theatrical, and cinematic traditions. Monologue, soliloquy, and voice-over are certainly first cousins to private speech, and they do provide rich examples of (almost) intra-personal forms of speech communication. But I find myself disagreeing with the notion that they are, in fact, true examples of private speech. My familiarity with the private speech conversations of the children I have studied now leads me to regard this phenomenon as distinctly different from those other traditions you cited for the simple reason that children do not intend their private speech for any audience at all. *Speaking* is not the purpose of private speech - *thinking* is. I believe that researchers have gone off track viewing private speech as speech and not as thinking, and that that simple mistake is the cause of so much misunderstanding. Piaget began that misreading from his very first report of the phenomenon back in 1923, viewing private speech as a form of misguided speech, reflecting undeveloped, egocentric thinking. And indeed, young children's thinking IS egocentric. As I see it, the only way out of that subjective prison is to embrace inter-subjectivity, which children do the moment they emancipate themselves from the restrictions of social speech and begin carrying on a full-fledged conversation with themselves - out loud. Taking both sides in a conversation enables them to *think* inter-subjectively. The *audience* for private speech has posed quite a conundrum over the years. Piaget claimed that children who are engaged in private speech are speaking to "no one in particular." G. H. Mead suggested that they are speaking to a "generalized other". Many other researchers (myself included) often refer to the audience of private speech as "one's self." For years, I've questioned the occupants of both the speaker and listener roles, asking myself "Who's talking to whom?", gravitating to R.D. Laing's work on The Divided Self, and Self and Others, to find answers. I'm finally coming to the conclusion that there IS no audience because private speech is not speech, but thought. Thought is personal and subjective and doesn't require any audience at all. So the search for an audience is actually futile. Private speech is an emancipating *mental* activity because it frees the child from the conversational restrictions imposed by social speech, in which a person either listens (comprehends someone else's utterance) or speaks (produces a new utterance for someone else's consumption). In social speech - confined to either the listener or speaker role - one *never* receives one's own utterance. The game is catch and throw - not throw and catch. And that restriction is disabling because the developing child has no possibility of experiencing the inter-subjectivity that accompanies the sharing of a single utterance by speaker and listener. To break out of that restriction requires a "peculiar" form of conversation (to use Piaget's adjective) in which a single individual plays all the roles, and thus experiences all of the accompanying subjective perspectives. I believe there are other significant cognitive benefits to private speech, all of which are wrapped up with the development of the planning function and with volitional control over *imagining* speakers and listeners. One of the earliest uses of private speech is to enact fantasy play, in which children alter their voices in order to have conversations among multiple imaginary characters. None of those voices indicate the child's "self" is involved; the conversation appears to be between *pretend* speakers and *pretend* listeners. It is an exercise in *playing* conversational roles in an attempt (in my opinion) to grasp the relations between the voices and perspectives embodied in those roles. So, for all of the resemblances between private speech and the literary, theatrical, and cinematic traditions of monologue, soliloquy, and voice-over, I submit that they are not one and the same. Many years ago, my dissertation adviser and mentor, John Dore, warned me against using any of those traditional terms because of their connotations. He suggested instead that I refer to private speech conversation in more neutral terms - as "narratives". Given the misunderstanding of private speech that continues to prevail, I still find that to be sound advice. My apologies for not addressing your earlier comments about the lexico-grammatical differences between private and inner speech. That omission is a reflection of my emphasis on the functional development of private speech as opposed to its structural development. I find the latter issue tends to limit discussion to the *withering away* of private speech, which to my mind takes a back seat. But I hope we can return to your thoughts on that topic at some point because the structural development of private speech between ages 2-7 is an important issue too. Peter On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 9:06 PM David Kellogg wrote: > Unfortunately, for technical reasons, most of the data we have of the > sociogenesis of language is literary language; it is a little like studying > history exclusively through the lives of kings). But we can make out a > somewhat similar phenomenon in the sociogenesis of inner speech in > literature (including voiceovers in movies). > > Before Shakespeare, private speech in theatre was largely limited to what > we call "asides". This is what I would call an adult private speech: the > function is to let the audience know that my public speech is not to be > trusted. Such private speech is actually identical to speech which is > addressed to someone else, but not to the general (onstage) public. So for > example in the last scene of Hamlet, Claudius says "It is the poisoned > cup!" when Gertrude is about to drink the fatal wine. In some productions > he is talking to Laertes, but in other productions he is talking to himself > and there isn't a very dramatic difference. Voiceovers in movies still tend > to function this way. > > After Shakespeare, though, private speech in theatre is expanded into what > we now call "soliloquies". This is not adult private speech: it's > full-blown inner speech, but inner speech as Virginia Woolf interprets it, > not inner speech as James Joyce mimics it. It is actually far richer, far > more complex (yes, in the "complexive" sense) and far LESS simple than > public speech is. But although it is semantically richer, it is > lexicogrammatically a lot poorer, because it is a lot more elliptical. > Woolf tries to render the semantic wealth of inner speech, while Joyce > concentrates on the lexicogrammatical poverty. > > An analogy (excuse my analogies--I'm a very complexive thinker) is the > distinction between recitative and aria in opera. Recitatives are dialogue, > and they can also include asides, but when they do these asides do not have > any independent role in the score. Arias are different. They are generally > not addressed to other characters (and when they are, they tend to > realize very intimate moments between lovers); they are essentially sung > soliloquies. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > > On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 12:02 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >> David, >> >> Yes, you caught me making a statement about Vygotsky's account of the >> relationship between private and inner speech that is true as a general >> gloss, but that I know to be untrue in its particulars. While private >> speech does eventually assume the mental functions attributable to inner >> speech as it nears the end of its development around age 6 or 7, it does >> not start its life with those functions. Somewhere between its initial >> appearance (as early as age 1.5 to age 2 in precocious children) and age >> 6-7, private speech undergoes the most profound changes as an instrument of >> cognition, developing the capacity to not only *reflect* practical >> activity, but to also *direct* it. The development of the "planning >> function" of private speech is, I would argue, a prerequisite to private >> speech's functioning in a way that resembles the functioning of inner >> speech. >> >> Furthermore, the work has yet to be done that will reveal how speaking >> monologically (i.e., aloud to one's self) enables a child to think >> dialogically (i.e., inter-subjectively). That is the topic that I am >> currently investigating with Jeremy Sawyer. We are exploring how the >> fantasy-based private speech conversations of 4-year-olds (in a play >> activity) compare to the plan-based private speech conversations of >> 8-year-olds (in a problem-solving activity). We are seeking to understand >> not only how private speech operates differently for the two age groups >> with respect to its relation to ongoing activity, but also how the forms of >> conversational exchange develop during this period (e.g., comment-comment >> vs. question-answer). >> >> Much more work yet to be done on private speech! >> >> Cheers, >> Peter >> >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 7:11 PM David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >>> Peter, Henry-- >>> >>> I have always been very suspcious of the idea that inner speech is >>> simply non-vocalized private speech. What Vygotsky says is that this may be >>> true of very small children, but with seven-year-olds, there are huge >>> grammatical differences between inner speech and private speech (in >>> Hallidayan terms, inner speech deletes Theme and Given and consists only of >>> a stream of Rheme and New: what Vygotsky says is that it is "predicative"). >>> >>> There is a kind of Chinese painting that is supposed to be spontaneous >>> and calligraphic: you want to catch lots of aleatory effects like drips and >>> "flying ink". Of course, these effects are hard to control, and so you end >>> up throwing away hundreds of sheets of paper for every paper you save. Oil >>> painting is exactly the opposite, because when you put a layer of oil paint >>> over another layer, if the first layer hasn't dried, it will suck the oil >>> out of the top layer and make it dull looking and lifeless. So each layer >>> has to be left for days until you apply another layer. >>> >>> Before I learnt to use a word processor, I used a manual typewriter. >>> With the typewriter, I would write in drafts which I would then "cellar" >>> for a few days and then rewrite. I never do that now, and the effect seems >>> to me very like Chinese painting: I have to throw away a lot of stuff to >>> get what I want. (And even then...) >>> >>> It seems to me this has something to do with the difference between >>> inner speech and private speech in adults. Inner speech (in me, before I >>> have had my morning coffee at any rate) is a stream of sketches, a bunch of >>> mis-strokes which are immediately effaced or over-written. But private >>> speech is not like that: it is, in many ways, more developed than public >>> speech because it includes public speech as its premise. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Sangmyung University >>> >>> New Article: >>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>> understanding narratives by >>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> >>> Some e-prints available at: >>> >>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 7:31 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>> >>>> Henry, >>>> >>>> In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of a >>>> referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a child >>>> that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he needed to >>>> stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted to use - >>>> and that that interruption took the form of a private speech communication >>>> aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the word-meaning >>>> problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had interrupted and >>>> completed it. To the extent that private speech is identical to inner >>>> speech in function (but not form), this piece of evidence suggests that >>>> inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when thinking is required. >>>> Such an interruption would appear externally as a 'thinking' pause in >>>> social speech. >>>> >>>> I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech >>>> conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being >>>> interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech >>>> (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), >>>> then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also >>>> breaks and shifts topic. >>>> >>>> I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is >>>> certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, >>>> private, or inner - can entail repairs. >>>> >>>> Peter >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a second >>>>> language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data on >>>>> self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought of >>>>> before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first or >>>>> second). I found this on the internet: >>>>> >>>>> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, >>>>> even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that >>>>> the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt >>>>> speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their >>>>> inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, >>>>> when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is >>>>> immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that >>>>> short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >>>>> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, >>>>> error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in >>>>> turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is >>>>> thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short >>>>> cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to >>>>> the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), >>>>> suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was >>>>> interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is >>>>> initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman >>>>> and James Allen, 1994.) >>>>> >>>>> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on repair >>>>> in inner speech in the CHAT universe? >>>>> >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>> Director, >>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>> >>>> Fordham University >>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>> >>> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190404/efec2428/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Apr 4 21:47:40 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 13:47:40 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Repair in inner speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Good to read from you, Peter. I often worry about your long silences, and whenever you come back I feel like... ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ("You and I have parted,; we are both gypsy scholar-bureaucrats; but so long as there are within the seven seas those who understand me, though far as China's end they are my neighbors", I think this is Wang Bo, from sometime in the seventh century, speaking to me through my wife's middle school education, but perhaps James Ma will set us straight momentarily...)But--let's see. Do we really understand each other, or am I simply remembering a wine-warmed conversation from Quebec City? I think you are straining at the gnat of using literary language to study the sociogenesis of inner speech, but you are swallowing the camel of equating private speech with thinking. I don't think I ever said that Chinese painting, arias, movie voiceovers, or theatrical asides were actual instances of inner speech or even private speech. In fact, I think I would not even accept that they are cousins, except in the sense of second or third cousins once removed (connected by a grandparent or greatgrandparent rather than a parent). I think that what I expressed was some frustration that we have to study the sociogenesis of inner speech through literary language: it is like studying Roman history through the "Lives of Plutarch" or English history through Shakespeare. But of course the study of inner speech through private speech (which is NOT the same thing) is an application of the same method of interpolation: you observe what is observable, and use it to infer what is hidden. So the method of using literary language to make inferences about the ontogenesis of inner speech is a respectable Vygotskyan tradition. One of the things that annoyed me slightly about van der Veer and Zavershneva's paper on "Thought and Word" (discussed on this list not too long ago) was that they used the fact that Vygotsky used whole passages, without quotation marks, from Vossler and Jakobinsky to show that using literary language to make inferences on the sociogenesis of inner speech was not new. That's true, and if Vygotsky had not been dictating that final chapter to a family friend from his deathbed, he probably would have been more punctilious about punctuating and acknowledging his sources. But van der Veer and Zavarshneva themselves didn't acknowledge that Vygotsky's use of this data to "triangulate" Piaget's experiments (which he replicated) really was new. The "revisionist revolution in Vygotsky studies" has well and truly fizzled out, as Kozulin predicted it might, but it has left, here and there in our work, an odor like rotten eggs.... Those very replication experiments demonstrated that it is not true that children who use self-directed speech are not addressing their speech to anyone. What is more consistent with the replication experiments, and also more consistent with the lack of differentiation between self-directed and other-directed speech in three year olds, is that children are addressing an Ur-wir--the "grandwe" that exists before the child has differentiated "we" into "I" and "me". So I really don't agree that the "function" of inner speech and private speech are the same. only their interpersonal aspect looks similar, and that is only in children that have yet to distinguish self-directed speech to that directed to an 'Ur wir"; in Hallidayan terms, neither the ideational metafunction nor the textual metafunction is comparable, because inner speech is ideationally inexplicit and textually truncated in a way that private speech is not. But, interpersonally, I still think of you as a kind of kind neighbor, Peter. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 1:50 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > Thank you, David, for your insightful enumeration of the various > expressions of private speech-like activity culled from the literary, > theatrical, and cinematic traditions. Monologue, soliloquy, and voice-over > are certainly first cousins to private speech, and they do provide rich > examples of (almost) intra-personal forms of speech communication. But I > find myself disagreeing with the notion that they are, in fact, true > examples of private speech. My familiarity with the private speech > conversations of the children I have studied now leads me to regard this > phenomenon as distinctly different from those other traditions you cited > for the simple reason that children do not intend their private speech for > any audience at all. *Speaking* is not the purpose of private speech - > *thinking* is. I believe that researchers have gone off track viewing > private speech as speech and not as thinking, and that that simple mistake > is the cause of so much misunderstanding. Piaget began that misreading from > his very first report of the phenomenon back in 1923, viewing private > speech as a form of misguided speech, reflecting undeveloped, egocentric > thinking. And indeed, young children's thinking IS egocentric. As I see it, > the only way out of that subjective prison is to embrace > inter-subjectivity, which children do the moment they emancipate themselves > from the restrictions of social speech and begin carrying on a full-fledged > conversation with themselves - out loud. Taking both sides in a > conversation enables them to *think* inter-subjectively. > > The *audience* for private speech has posed quite a conundrum over the > years. Piaget claimed that children who are engaged in private speech are > speaking to "no one in particular." G. H. Mead suggested that they are > speaking to a "generalized other". Many other researchers (myself included) > often refer to the audience of private speech as "one's self." For years, > I've questioned the occupants of both the speaker and listener roles, > asking myself "Who's talking to whom?", gravitating to R.D. Laing's work on > The Divided Self, and Self and Others, to find answers. I'm finally coming > to the conclusion that there IS no audience because private speech is not > speech, but thought. Thought is personal and subjective and doesn't require > any audience at all. So the search for an audience is actually futile. > > Private speech is an emancipating *mental* activity because it frees the > child from the conversational restrictions imposed by social speech, in > which a person either listens (comprehends someone else's utterance) or > speaks (produces a new utterance for someone else's consumption). In social > speech - confined to either the listener or speaker role - one *never* > receives one's own utterance. The game is catch and throw - not throw and > catch. And that restriction is disabling because the developing child has > no possibility of experiencing the inter-subjectivity that accompanies the > sharing of a single utterance by speaker and listener. To break out of that > restriction requires a "peculiar" form of conversation (to use Piaget's > adjective) in which a single individual plays all the roles, and thus > experiences all of the accompanying subjective perspectives. > > I believe there are other significant cognitive benefits to private > speech, all of which are wrapped up with the development of the planning > function and with volitional control over *imagining* speakers and > listeners. One of the earliest uses of private speech is to enact fantasy > play, in which children alter their voices in order to have conversations > among multiple imaginary characters. None of those voices indicate the > child's "self" is involved; the conversation appears to be between > *pretend* speakers and *pretend* listeners. It is an exercise in *playing* > conversational roles in an attempt (in my opinion) to grasp the relations > between the voices and perspectives embodied in those roles. > > So, for all of the resemblances between private speech and the literary, > theatrical, and cinematic traditions of monologue, soliloquy, and > voice-over, I submit that they are not one and the same. Many years ago, my > dissertation adviser and mentor, John Dore, warned me against using any of > those traditional terms because of their connotations. He suggested instead > that I refer to private speech conversation in more neutral terms - as > "narratives". Given the misunderstanding of private speech that continues > to prevail, I still find that to be sound advice. > > My apologies for not addressing your earlier comments about the > lexico-grammatical differences between private and inner speech. That > omission is a reflection of my emphasis on the functional development of > private speech as opposed to its structural development. I find the latter > issue tends to limit discussion to the *withering away* of private speech, > which to my mind takes a back seat. But I hope we can return to your > thoughts on that topic at some point because the structural development of > private speech between ages 2-7 is an important issue too. > > Peter > > > > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 9:06 PM David Kellogg wrote: > >> Unfortunately, for technical reasons, most of the data we have of the >> sociogenesis of language is literary language; it is a little like studying >> history exclusively through the lives of kings). But we can make out a >> somewhat similar phenomenon in the sociogenesis of inner speech in >> literature (including voiceovers in movies). >> >> Before Shakespeare, private speech in theatre was largely limited to what >> we call "asides". This is what I would call an adult private speech: the >> function is to let the audience know that my public speech is not to be >> trusted. Such private speech is actually identical to speech which is >> addressed to someone else, but not to the general (onstage) public. So for >> example in the last scene of Hamlet, Claudius says "It is the poisoned >> cup!" when Gertrude is about to drink the fatal wine. In some productions >> he is talking to Laertes, but in other productions he is talking to himself >> and there isn't a very dramatic difference. Voiceovers in movies still tend >> to function this way. >> >> After Shakespeare, though, private speech in theatre is expanded into >> what we now call "soliloquies". This is not adult private speech: it's >> full-blown inner speech, but inner speech as Virginia Woolf interprets it, >> not inner speech as James Joyce mimics it. It is actually far richer, far >> more complex (yes, in the "complexive" sense) and far LESS simple than >> public speech is. But although it is semantically richer, it is >> lexicogrammatically a lot poorer, because it is a lot more elliptical. >> Woolf tries to render the semantic wealth of inner speech, while Joyce >> concentrates on the lexicogrammatical poverty. >> >> An analogy (excuse my analogies--I'm a very complexive thinker) is the >> distinction between recitative and aria in opera. Recitatives are dialogue, >> and they can also include asides, but when they do these asides do not have >> any independent role in the score. Arias are different. They are generally >> not addressed to other characters (and when they are, they tend to >> realize very intimate moments between lovers); they are essentially sung >> soliloquies. >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >> understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 12:02 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >> >>> David, >>> >>> Yes, you caught me making a statement about Vygotsky's account of the >>> relationship between private and inner speech that is true as a general >>> gloss, but that I know to be untrue in its particulars. While private >>> speech does eventually assume the mental functions attributable to inner >>> speech as it nears the end of its development around age 6 or 7, it does >>> not start its life with those functions. Somewhere between its initial >>> appearance (as early as age 1.5 to age 2 in precocious children) and age >>> 6-7, private speech undergoes the most profound changes as an instrument of >>> cognition, developing the capacity to not only *reflect* practical >>> activity, but to also *direct* it. The development of the "planning >>> function" of private speech is, I would argue, a prerequisite to private >>> speech's functioning in a way that resembles the functioning of inner >>> speech. >>> >>> Furthermore, the work has yet to be done that will reveal how speaking >>> monologically (i.e., aloud to one's self) enables a child to think >>> dialogically (i.e., inter-subjectively). That is the topic that I am >>> currently investigating with Jeremy Sawyer. We are exploring how the >>> fantasy-based private speech conversations of 4-year-olds (in a play >>> activity) compare to the plan-based private speech conversations of >>> 8-year-olds (in a problem-solving activity). We are seeking to understand >>> not only how private speech operates differently for the two age groups >>> with respect to its relation to ongoing activity, but also how the forms of >>> conversational exchange develop during this period (e.g., comment-comment >>> vs. question-answer). >>> >>> Much more work yet to be done on private speech! >>> >>> Cheers, >>> Peter >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 7:11 PM David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Peter, Henry-- >>>> >>>> I have always been very suspcious of the idea that inner speech is >>>> simply non-vocalized private speech. What Vygotsky says is that this may be >>>> true of very small children, but with seven-year-olds, there are huge >>>> grammatical differences between inner speech and private speech (in >>>> Hallidayan terms, inner speech deletes Theme and Given and consists only of >>>> a stream of Rheme and New: what Vygotsky says is that it is "predicative"). >>>> >>>> There is a kind of Chinese painting that is supposed to be spontaneous >>>> and calligraphic: you want to catch lots of aleatory effects like drips and >>>> "flying ink". Of course, these effects are hard to control, and so you end >>>> up throwing away hundreds of sheets of paper for every paper you save. Oil >>>> painting is exactly the opposite, because when you put a layer of oil paint >>>> over another layer, if the first layer hasn't dried, it will suck the oil >>>> out of the top layer and make it dull looking and lifeless. So each layer >>>> has to be left for days until you apply another layer. >>>> >>>> Before I learnt to use a word processor, I used a manual typewriter. >>>> With the typewriter, I would write in drafts which I would then "cellar" >>>> for a few days and then rewrite. I never do that now, and the effect seems >>>> to me very like Chinese painting: I have to throw away a lot of stuff to >>>> get what I want. (And even then...) >>>> >>>> It seems to me this has something to do with the difference between >>>> inner speech and private speech in adults. Inner speech (in me, before I >>>> have had my morning coffee at any rate) is a stream of sketches, a bunch of >>>> mis-strokes which are immediately effaced or over-written. But private >>>> speech is not like that: it is, in many ways, more developed than public >>>> speech because it includes public speech as its premise. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Sangmyung University >>>> >>>> New Article: >>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >>>> understanding narratives by >>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> >>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>> >>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 7:31 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Henry, >>>>> >>>>> In a paper I co-authored on private speech produced in the context of >>>>> a referential communication task (see attached), we found evidence of a >>>>> child that interrupted his own social speech to another child when he >>>>> needed to stop and think about the meaning of a particular word he wanted >>>>> to use - and that that interruption took the form of a private speech >>>>> communication aimed at solving the problem. Once the child solved the >>>>> word-meaning problem, he returned to the social speech utterance he had >>>>> interrupted and completed it. To the extent that private speech is >>>>> identical to inner speech in function (but not form), this piece of >>>>> evidence suggests that inner speech can indeed interrupt social speech when >>>>> thinking is required. Such an interruption would appear externally as a >>>>> 'thinking' pause in social speech. >>>>> >>>>> I have frequently observed similar breaks and shifts in private speech >>>>> conversation, suggesting that the flow of thought and speech is being >>>>> interrupted and re-directed. And if private speech is inner speech >>>>> (differing only in the fact that it is vocalized and not sub-vocalized), >>>>> then there is every reason to believe that inner speech conversation also >>>>> breaks and shifts topic. >>>>> >>>>> I don't know if that qualifies as *repair*, but the possibility is >>>>> certainly consistent with the notion that conversation - whether social, >>>>> private, or inner - can entail repairs. >>>>> >>>>> Peter >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:14 PM HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> For my doctoral dissertation on the developmemt of fluency in a >>>>>> second language, finished more than three decades ago, I found a lot data >>>>>> on self-repair. I was surprised today by something I never really thought >>>>>> of before: Is there self-repair in inner speech? (whether it be in a first >>>>>> or second). I found this on the internet: >>>>>> >>>>>> "Levelt (1983) found that errors were often interrupted very quickly, >>>>>> even at mid-segment. The implication of such quick interruptions was that >>>>>> the speaker could not have detected the error while attending to his overt >>>>>> speech. Thus, Levelt (1983, 1989) proposed that speakers monitor their >>>>>> inner speech. According to what is known as the ?main interruption rule?, >>>>>> when an error is detected, whether internally or auditorily, speech is >>>>>> immediately interrupted (Nooteboom, 1980; Levelt, 1983). This means that >>>>>> short error-to-cut-off intervals are to be expected. >>>>>> "Thus in an incremental model of speech production such as Levelt?s, >>>>>> error-detection is followed by the decision to interrupt speech. This in >>>>>> turn is followed by the planning of the repair (repair- planning), which is >>>>>> thought to take place only upon interruption. If this is true, then short >>>>>> cut-off-to- repair intervals should not be anticipated. This is contrary to >>>>>> the short cut-off-to-repair intervals found by Blackmer and Mitton (1991), >>>>>> suggesting that repair-planning must have occurred before speech was >>>>>> interrupted. The question then remains as to when repair-planning is >>>>>> initiated.? (Detecting and Correcting Speech Repairs?, Peter Heeman >>>>>> and James Allen, 1994.) >>>>>> >>>>>> My question for anybody out there is this: Is there research on >>>>>> repair in inner speech in the CHAT universe? >>>>>> >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>> Director, >>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>> >>>>> Fordham University >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>> >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research >>> >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>> >> > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190405/6e8b61c3/attachment.html From yrjo.engestrom@helsinki.fi Fri Apr 5 04:48:10 2019 From: yrjo.engestrom@helsinki.fi (=?utf-8?B?RW5nZXN0csO2bSwgWXJqw7YgSCBN?=) Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 11:48:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Summer school on Activity Theory in Practice Message-ID: <987FD86F-6C12-4AE6-9A39-5C27772B0C8F@helsinki.fi> Dear colleagues, please find attached a flyer for a summer school on activity theory and practice, to be held in Sweden the coming summer. The summer school is meant primarily for doctoral students and Master?s students. There are still places in the summer school and late applications are OK. The details and application form can be found at: https://www.hv.se/en/education/third-cycle/activity-theory-in-practice-full-time-campus-atpf010/ With best regards, Yrj? Engestr?m -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190405/5fb3c743/attachment.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: flyer_a4_summerschool.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 318045 bytes Desc: flyer_a4_summerschool.pdf Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190405/5fb3c743/attachment.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Apr 8 09:02:34 2019 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 16:02:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Something to read with your morning coffee Message-ID: Hi Xmcars, Here's a recent article on an adjunct's life and death in the Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/04/adjunct-professors-higher-education-thea-hunter/586168/ And I learned the Japanese word "karoshi." Kind regards, Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190408/1908a07d/attachment.html From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Apr 14 10:05:53 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:05:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Saussure, Peirce, and Bill the cat.... Message-ID: <6988ED5A-B4DD-4668-9068-140AECDC3269@cantab.net> Hello everyone! With the help of antibiotic eyedrops I have regained my almost feline good looks, as the attached selfie will demonstrate: Now, where were we? Ack! Martin -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190414/b4747e27/attachment.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: images.jpeg Type: image/jpeg Size: 11169 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190414/b4747e27/attachment.jpeg From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Apr 14 10:11:43 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:11:43 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> Hi Haydi, First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die hard. If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, although we can never know it. I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s view. Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems. There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what it will look like from a different point of view. My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every institution has its own ontology. Martin > On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > Martin, > > This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or imagined?? **concrete entity." > > 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between the independent existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? > > 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. > > And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a concept. > > Haydi > > On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. > > Martin > > > > >> On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> > > Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give is a trivial one. In general you need all the numerous utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only because he took the activity system as a system not a unit in the first place. > > Andy > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: > > Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: > > A. How are you? > B. Fine, thanks, and you? > A. XXX > > One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. > > Martin > > > > >> On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >> >> Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the book and you put it back on the shelf. >> >> That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). >> >> We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. >> >> Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing is true of the way he uses "utterance". >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article; >> >> David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen > wrote: >> I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> >> >>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: >>> >>> According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much longer sequence. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>> I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two units. >>>> The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: >>>> >>>> https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf >>>> Andy >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>> On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: >>>>> Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. >>>>> >>>>> Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: >>>>> >>>>> The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Arturo >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Sent from Gmail Mobile >>> >>> >>> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190414/cf9078d8/attachment.html From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Apr 14 10:12:35 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:12:35 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: <8E1B8143-2B1A-4F52-AC3A-A84BBD0E74D1@gmail.com> References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <8E1B8143-2B1A-4F52-AC3A-A84BBD0E74D1@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Henry, Yes, I think this is what I was saying, though it depends a bit on how we understand ?evoke.? Conversation analysis thinks of a conversation as negotiated and improvised. I like to imagine a jazz quartet... So a speaker can, while speaking, indicate who they are inviting to speak next, and indicate what they would like that person to contribute to the conversation. Often this is done paralinguistically: through intonation or eye gaze or a smile? Whether THIS dialog is a cherry or its pit is open to further negotiation, I fear! :) Martin > On Mar 18, 2019, at 6:39 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Martin, > And you seem to be saying to David that evoked word meaning, as it develops while speaking, can evoke a call in the middle of an utterance and then invites a response, perhaps with downward intonation and the ending of a clause. The listener responds to the call, evokes a new call, and then points to a turn with either or both intonation and syntax. This is all done syntagmatically through dialog, but what is evoked is highly paradigmatic. Perhaps Andy would say coceptual. The cherry on top is THIS dialog. Me gusta mucho! > Henry > > >> On Mar 18, 2019, at 8:29 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: >> >> Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give is a trivial one. In general you need all the numerous utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only because he took the activity system as a system not a unit in the first place. >>> >>> Andy >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>> On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: >>>> Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: >>>> >>>> A. How are you? >>>> B. Fine, thanks, and you? >>>> A. XXX >>>> >>>> One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the book and you put it back on the shelf. >>>>> >>>>> That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). >>>>> >>>>> We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. >>>>> >>>>> Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing is true of the way he uses "utterance". >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article; >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen > wrote: >>>>> I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much longer sequence. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two units. >>>>>>> The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>> On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: >>>>>>>> Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Arturo >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Sent from Gmail Mobile >>>>>> >>>>>> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190414/7c9abe60/attachment.html From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Apr 14 10:12:56 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:12:56 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: <06ec51de-96f0-1c8f-fc59-7f9f8d34f15a@marxists.org> References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <06ec51de-96f0-1c8f-fc59-7f9f8d34f15a@marxists.org> Message-ID: <6E002B60-EF59-4ED5-8ADC-6FC2A01BC32E@cantab.net> Hi Andy, I think I may have hijacked this thread; feel free to put it back on its tracks. But I was responding to the proposal that "The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself.? (It was Arturo quoting Akhutina.) In terms of your terminology of ?unit? and ?system? it seems to me contradictory: the utterance is a unit, but an utterance is complete. If it?s complete, that means it?s a ?system,? right? I was worried by the suggestion that an utterance ?is complete in itself,? and that?s why I mentioned the assumption in Conversation Analysis that the minimal unit is always a *pair* of utterances (I may be putting the word ?unit? in their mouths). And these pairs are linked one after another, or embedded one within another, so that every conversation has its own unity... And then a little later in the same quotation we find, "Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness.? And you, Andy, proposed that word and utterance are micro and macro units. Organelles within cells within organs within bodies within ecosystems?? Anyhow, looking back over the thread, one persisting issue seems to have been whether we can study language objectively. And that is nested (it seems to me; or perhaps it?s in tension with?) the issue of how best to conceptualize language. As a system? As talk? As conceptualization? It?s intriguing that these issues prove so hard to resolve. I confess that I incline towards Haydi?s point that "Any word can be seen in its state of liquidity and flexibility.? I see this ?liquidity? in the changes in word meaning over time, in the ?flow? of sounds and words within and among communities as they come in contact, and in the ebb and flow of single conversations. But this may simply be my personal taste. I also find it helpful to try to step beyond subjective/objective: Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas were just two of the people who pointed out the need for a third category: language is ?intersubjective?; it is (using Taylor?s phrase) "the common property? of a society - even though that property is being continually reproduced and transformed in and through people?s daily talk. Martin > On Mar 18, 2019, at 8:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Yes, all true, Martin, but in my view in saying that a word is a sign for a concept, the real or imagined entity which is deemed to be a instance of the concept is a moment of the concept, as are the practices whereby those instances are subsumed under the universal. I should have made that clear. > > Andy > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 19/03/2019 1:29 am, Martin Packer wrote: >> Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give is a trivial one. In general you need all the numerous utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only because he took the activity system as a system not a unit in the first place. >>> >>> Andy >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>> On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: >>>> Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: >>>> >>>> A. How are you? >>>> B. Fine, thanks, and you? >>>> A. XXX >>>> >>>> One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the book and you put it back on the shelf. >>>>> >>>>> That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). >>>>> >>>>> We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. >>>>> >>>>> Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing is true of the way he uses "utterance". >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Sangmyung University >>>>> >>>>> New Article; >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >>>>> >>>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen > wrote: >>>>> I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much longer sequence. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two units. >>>>>>> The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>>>> On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: >>>>>>>> Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Arturo >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Sent from Gmail Mobile >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >> >> >> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190414/59b28108/attachment-0001.html From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Apr 14 12:12:52 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 14:12:52 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <9f3eef80-1caf-a662-84f1-42466abafec3@marxists.org> <5d7d0173-e9e7-23d6-e831-120d7e8e7289@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> Message-ID: Hi David, You write: "the fact that an utterance seems to end in the middle of a turn is embarrassing.? But (for CA) it?s not that an utterance can end in the middle of a turn. It?s that a turn can end in the middle of an utterance. That?s to say, an utterance can include more than one turn. Consider: T: Who can tell me the capital of South Korea? S: Is it Chiang Mai? T: No, it is not! Who knows the capital of Thailand? Last utterance by T is composed of two turns. And while there are plenty of games - chess, tennis - where players must alternate turns, taking only one turn at a time, there are plenty of other games where a player can take one turn and then take another. I think you would agree with me that it is not the lack of ?theoretical preconceptions? that prevents a dog with headphones from recognizing the units of speech. CA treats as unproblematic (or relatively so) the understanding and transcribing of the sounds and words of a language. It assumes that the researcher has a speaker?s competence in these matters: no one expects someone who speaks only Spanish to conduct CA on English speech. On the other hand, to a native speaker of English the sounds and words are (relatively) ?real, actual, and factual.? The (relative) absence of ?theoretical preconceptions? in CA refers to a preference to look for, to try to identify, the methods that participants are actually using to carry out their conversation. Based on concrete empirical evidence. Rather than assuming from the outset a theory about how speech is generated and how conversations are structured. So, returning to the larger issue (what the heck is language and how can we study it?), CA approaches language as a concrete practical accomplishment, achieved collaboratively by people whose acquired competence as language speakers amounts to a set of practical skills or methods. That approach will not be to everyone?s taste, but in my view it has plenty to recommend it. Martin > On Mar 20, 2019, at 10:27 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Martin: > > From the CA point of view, there isn't anything wrong with it. Like many branches of linguistics (and mathematics), CA has its ducks in a row, and its system is well designed to prevent internal contradictions. For example, CA insists that no theoretical "preconceptions" be brought to the data, and in that sense it is "radically empiricist". > > I think the problem arises when you try to incorporate concepts from abroad, including Bakhtin. If we say that turns are "real, actual, factual" units ("in the air", as J.J. Gibson used to say--quite incorrectly, as it turns out--of the phoneme), then the fact that an utterance seems to end in the middle of a turn is embarrassing. It undoes the attempt by CA to do an end run around Saussure's notion that the object of study in linguistics is created only by our attitude towards it (that is, we have to understand that something is language before we can study it as language and not simply noise). > > From a Vygotskyan point of view, this radical empiricism will not do: a dog with headphones could easily segment the "real, actual, factual" turns in data, but not the utterances if we define them by potential turn transition points (or TRPs, or whatever). But it's precisely units that would escape a dog in headphones that make the sound signal into human language, into a meaningful sign, and not simply a signal. > > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article; > > David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 > > > > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Martin Packer > wrote: > >> On Mar 17, 2019, at 11:06 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >> >> As soon as you do this, though, you have to admit (and real, actual, practical data will support this) that there are two such transition points--not just one--WITHIN your utterance (in addition to the real, actual, practical turn transition point. . > > Right: CA refers to this as speaker self-selection. At a TRP (transition relevant place) the person who has been speaking continues to speak. > > So what?s the problem with that? > > Martin > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190414/dd85de3c/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Apr 14 14:14:39 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 06:14:39 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <9f3eef80-1caf-a662-84f1-42466abafec3@marxists.org> <5d7d0173-e9e7-23d6-e831-120d7e8e7289@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> Message-ID: So the real source of this realist attempt to do away with linguistics is Bakhtin. Bakhtin it was who argued that the sentence is a fiction, and that the real, actual, factual unit for understanding text is the utterance. And the utterance is defined by the changing of speech subjects. So the utterance is the stretch of speaking from one change of speaking subjects to another. All this is real, actual, factual (i.e. perceptible with feline. canine, infant and foreign hears; as the Russians would say, an effect of rech' [speech] and not jazik [language]).The utterance is a unit of speech (the real, actual, factual set of things people have uttered), but the sentence is only a unit of language (the abstract, imaginary system of virtual and potential utterances). This is all in "The Problem of Speech Genres" ("Speech Genres and Other Late Essays", U of Texas Press 1986, p. 71). Martin's example (which is an invented one, as we can see from the sudden change of venue from South Korea to Thailand) manages to confuse things a very great deal. First, he uses "turn" to mean sentence, and "utterance" to mean "turn". In CA, which goes for radical empiricism and ontological realism, a turn is pretty much what Bakhtin says it is: it's the stretch of speaking we find from one change of speaking subjects to another. It's not a sentence, and in some data sets less than 11% of the data consists of grammatical sentences. By this standard, there are exactly three turns in Martin's invented dialogue, and the last turn consists of two somethings. That "something" is the problem. Bakhtin and CA try to get around this problem by saying that there is a virtual change of speakers (Bakhtin) or a potential change of speaker (CA) after the question mark. But that doesn't explain the question mark itself, or the peculiar order of elements we find in the question as opposted to the statement, or the peculiar fact that we find the verb before the subject in "Is it Chiang Mai" but the verb after the subject in "Who knows...". The real name of this mysterious "something," the real unit of speech communication, is not the "word", unless we assume that Vygotsky meant (as Russian allows) the expansive meaning of word (i.e. "In the beginning was the word; the word was made flesh; in a word; the last word on this question'"). The real unit is the wording: the clause. Clauses can be minor ("Hey! Martin!") or they can be elliptical ("You mean...") or they can be major clauses like all the examples Martin has invented. But clauses exist, even though you need to know the language to recognize them (hence languages too must exist, despite what Roy Harris and the integrationalists claim). Clauses are just as distinct from the utterances and turns that compose them as cities are from the heaps of brick and mortar that we find before cities are built and after they have been destroyed. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 4:15 AM Martin Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > You write: "the fact that an utterance seems to end in the middle of a > turn is embarrassing.? > > But (for CA) it?s not that an utterance can end in the middle of a turn. > It?s that a turn can end in the middle of an utterance. That?s to say, an > utterance can include more than one turn. Consider: > > T: Who can tell me the capital of South Korea? > S: Is it Chiang Mai? > T: No, it is not! Who knows the capital of Thailand? > > Last utterance by T is composed of two turns. And while there are plenty > of games - chess, tennis - where players must alternate turns, taking only > one turn at a time, there are plenty of other games where a player can take > one turn and then take another. > > I think you would agree with me that it is not the lack of ?theoretical > preconceptions? that prevents a dog with headphones from recognizing the > units of speech. CA treats as unproblematic (or relatively so) the > understanding and transcribing of the sounds and words of a language. It > assumes that the researcher has a speaker?s competence in these matters: no > one expects someone who speaks only Spanish to conduct CA on English > speech. On the other hand, to a native speaker of English the sounds and > words are (relatively) ?real, actual, and factual.? > > The (relative) absence of ?theoretical preconceptions? in CA refers to a > preference to look for, to try to identify, the methods that participants > are actually using to carry out their conversation. Based on concrete > empirical evidence. Rather than assuming from the outset a theory about how > speech is generated and how conversations are structured. > > So, returning to the larger issue (what the heck is language and how can > we study it?), CA approaches language as a concrete practical > accomplishment, achieved collaboratively by people whose acquired > competence as language speakers amounts to a set of practical skills or > methods. That approach will not be to everyone?s taste, but in my view it > has plenty to recommend it. > > Martin > > > On Mar 20, 2019, at 10:27 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Martin: > > From the CA point of view, there isn't anything wrong with it. Like many > branches of linguistics (and mathematics), CA has its ducks in a row, and > its system is well designed to prevent internal contradictions. For > example, CA insists that no theoretical "preconceptions" be brought to the > data, and in that sense it is "radically empiricist". > > I think the problem arises when you try to incorporate concepts from > abroad, including Bakhtin. If we say that turns are "real, actual, factual" > units ("in the air", as J.J. Gibson used to say--quite incorrectly, as it > turns out--of the phoneme), then the fact that an utterance seems to end in > the middle of a turn is embarrassing. It undoes the attempt by CA to do an > end run around Saussure's notion that the object of study in linguistics is > created only by our attitude towards it (that is, we have to understand > that something is language before we can study it as language and not > simply noise). > > From a Vygotskyan point of view, this radical empiricism will not do: a > dog with headphones could easily segment the "real, actual, factual" turns > in data, but not the utterances if we define them by potential turn > transition points (or TRPs, or whatever). But it's precisely units that > would escape a dog in headphones that make the sound signal into human > language, into a meaningful sign, and not simply a signal. > > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article; > > David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S > ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE > WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational > Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 > > > > Some e-prints available at: > > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 > > > > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Martin Packer wrote: > >> >> On Mar 17, 2019, at 11:06 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> As soon as you do this, though, you have to admit (and real, actual, >> practical data will support this) that there are two such transition >> points--not just one--WITHIN your utterance (in addition to the real, >> actual, practical turn transition point. . >> >> >> Right: CA refers to this as speaker self-selection. At a TRP (transition >> relevant place) the person who has been speaking continues to speak. >> >> So what?s the problem with that? >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190415/351908b4/attachment.html From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Apr 14 15:57:34 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 17:57:34 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <9f3eef80-1caf-a662-84f1-42466abafec3@marxists.org> <5d7d0173-e9e7-23d6-e831-120d7e8e7289@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> Message-ID: <9B9EAEB6-AB1D-4BDD-9365-380E12194F94@cantab.net> Hi David, In CA terms, turns are composed of ?turn construction units,? and TCU is a unit of conversation that completes a communicative act. And the utterance ?No, it is not. Who knows the capital of Thailand?? involves two communicative acts. The first is an evaluation of S?s response (?Is it Chiang Mai??) to T?s question ("Who can tell me the capital of South Korea??). The second communicative act is a (indirect) question. In other words, T uses their second utterance to do two things: to perform two communicative acts. An utterance is, as you suggest, "the stretch of speaking from one change of speaking subjects to another.? S is one speaking subject; T is another. (I am assuming that you are not equating ?subject? with ?topic.?) So sentences are not involved at all. Nor is there any attempt to do away with linguistics (that?s to say, grammar). Or perhaps I am confused by your shifting definitions: In your first paragraph: For Bakhtin "the utterance is the stretch of speaking from one change of speaking subjects to another.? In your second paragraph, "a turn is pretty much what Bakhtin says it is: it's the stretch of speaking we find from one change of speaking subjects to another." Ack! Martin > On Apr 14, 2019, at 4:14 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > So the real source of this realist attempt to do away with linguistics is Bakhtin. Bakhtin it was who argued that the sentence is a fiction, and that the real, actual, factual unit for understanding text is the utterance. And the utterance is defined by the changing of speech subjects. So the utterance is the stretch of speaking from one change of speaking subjects to another. All this is real, actual, factual (i.e. perceptible with feline. canine, infant and foreign hears; as the Russians would say, an effect of rech' [speech] and not jazik [language]).The utterance is a unit of speech (the real, actual, factual set of things people have uttered), but the sentence is only a unit of language (the abstract, imaginary system of virtual and potential utterances). This is all in "The Problem of Speech Genres" ("Speech Genres and Other Late Essays", U of Texas Press 1986, p. 71). > > Martin's example (which is an invented one, as we can see from the sudden change of venue from South Korea to Thailand) manages to confuse things a very great deal. First, he uses "turn" to mean sentence, and "utterance" to mean "turn". In CA, which goes for radical empiricism and ontological realism, a turn is pretty much what Bakhtin says it is: it's the stretch of speaking we find from one change of speaking subjects to another. It's not a sentence, and in some data sets less than 11% of the data consists of grammatical sentences. By this standard, there are exactly three turns in Martin's invented dialogue, and the last turn consists of two somethings. > > That "something" is the problem. Bakhtin and CA try to get around this problem by saying that there is a virtual change of speakers (Bakhtin) or a potential change of speaker (CA) after the question mark. But that doesn't explain the question mark itself, or the peculiar order of elements we find in the question as opposted to the statement, or the peculiar fact that we find the verb before the subject in "Is it Chiang Mai" but the verb after the subject in "Who knows...". > > The real name of this mysterious "something," the real unit of speech communication, is not the "word", unless we assume that Vygotsky meant (as Russian allows) the expansive meaning of word (i.e. "In the beginning was the word; the word was made flesh; in a word; the last word on this question'"). The real unit is the wording: the clause. Clauses can be minor ("Hey! Martin!") or they can be elliptical ("You mean...") or they can be major clauses like all the examples Martin has invented. But clauses exist, even though you need to know the language to recognize them (hence languages too must exist, despite what Roy Harris and the integrationalists claim). Clauses are just as distinct from the utterances and turns that compose them as cities are from the heaps of brick and mortar that we find before cities are built and after they have been destroyed. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 4:15 AM Martin Packer > wrote: > Hi David, > > You write: "the fact that an utterance seems to end in the middle of a turn is embarrassing.? > > But (for CA) it?s not that an utterance can end in the middle of a turn. It?s that a turn can end in the middle of an utterance. That?s to say, an utterance can include more than one turn. Consider: > > T: Who can tell me the capital of South Korea? > S: Is it Chiang Mai? > T: No, it is not! Who knows the capital of Thailand? > > Last utterance by T is composed of two turns. And while there are plenty of games - chess, tennis - where players must alternate turns, taking only one turn at a time, there are plenty of other games where a player can take one turn and then take another. > > I think you would agree with me that it is not the lack of ?theoretical preconceptions? that prevents a dog with headphones from recognizing the units of speech. CA treats as unproblematic (or relatively so) the understanding and transcribing of the sounds and words of a language. It assumes that the researcher has a speaker?s competence in these matters: no one expects someone who speaks only Spanish to conduct CA on English speech. On the other hand, to a native speaker of English the sounds and words are (relatively) ?real, actual, and factual.? > > The (relative) absence of ?theoretical preconceptions? in CA refers to a preference to look for, to try to identify, the methods that participants are actually using to carry out their conversation. Based on concrete empirical evidence. Rather than assuming from the outset a theory about how speech is generated and how conversations are structured. > > So, returning to the larger issue (what the heck is language and how can we study it?), CA approaches language as a concrete practical accomplishment, achieved collaboratively by people whose acquired competence as language speakers amounts to a set of practical skills or methods. That approach will not be to everyone?s taste, but in my view it has plenty to recommend it. > > Martin > > >> On Mar 20, 2019, at 10:27 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: >> >> Martin: >> >> From the CA point of view, there isn't anything wrong with it. Like many branches of linguistics (and mathematics), CA has its ducks in a row, and its system is well designed to prevent internal contradictions. For example, CA insists that no theoretical "preconceptions" be brought to the data, and in that sense it is "radically empiricist". >> >> I think the problem arises when you try to incorporate concepts from abroad, including Bakhtin. If we say that turns are "real, actual, factual" units ("in the air", as J.J. Gibson used to say--quite incorrectly, as it turns out--of the phoneme), then the fact that an utterance seems to end in the middle of a turn is embarrassing. It undoes the attempt by CA to do an end run around Saussure's notion that the object of study in linguistics is created only by our attitude towards it (that is, we have to understand that something is language before we can study it as language and not simply noise). >> >> From a Vygotskyan point of view, this radical empiricism will not do: a dog with headphones could easily segment the "real, actual, factual" turns in data, but not the utterances if we define them by potential turn transition points (or TRPs, or whatever). But it's precisely units that would escape a dog in headphones that make the sound signal into human language, into a meaningful sign, and not simply a signal. >> >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article; >> >> David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Martin Packer > wrote: >> >>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 11:06 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >>> >>> As soon as you do this, though, you have to admit (and real, actual, practical data will support this) that there are two such transition points--not just one--WITHIN your utterance (in addition to the real, actual, practical turn transition point. . >> >> Right: CA refers to this as speaker self-selection. At a TRP (transition relevant place) the person who has been speaking continues to speak. >> >> So what?s the problem with that? >> >> Martin >> >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190414/b19f1167/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Sun Apr 14 20:28:31 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:28:31 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Units, utterances, elements and systems In-Reply-To: <6E002B60-EF59-4ED5-8ADC-6FC2A01BC32E@cantab.net> References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <06ec51de-96f0-1c8f-fc59-7f9f8d34f15a@marxists.org> <6E002B60-EF59-4ED5-8ADC-6FC2A01BC32E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Wow! Nothing like a few weeks off the keyboard to get some thinking time, eh Martin? You've created about a dozen threads here, so I'll help us manage that by renaming this thread, OK? :) I'll make my points in between your paragraphs. ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 15/04/2019 3:12 am, Martin Packer wrote: > Hi Andy, > > I think I may have hijacked this thread; feel free to put > it back on its tracks. > > But I was responding to the proposal that "The minimal > holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An > utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself.? (It > was Arturo quoting Akhutina.) In terms of your terminology > of ?unit? and ?system? it seems to me contradictory: the > utterance is a unit, but an utterance is complete. If it?s > complete, that means it?s a ?system,? right? I was worried > by the suggestion that an utterance ?*is complete in > itself*,? and that?s why I mentioned the assumption in > Conversation Analysis that the minimal unit is always a > *pair* of utterances (I may be putting the word ?unit? in > their mouths). And these pairs are linked one after > another, or embedded one within another, so that every > conversation has its own unity... > > And then a little later in the same quotation we find, > "Thus, the utterance and the *word, as a compressed > version of the utterance*, are the units of speech acts, > communication, and?consciousness.? ? And you, Andy, > proposed that word and utterance are micro and macro > units. Organelles within cells within organs within bodies > within ecosystems?? Yes. It is normal but not necessary for an analysis by units to have two units, like you say: cell and organism, organism and ecosystem, word-meaning and concept (LSV), artefact-mediated action and activity (ANL), commodity and capital (KM). And I see utterance as the unit of dialogue, demarcated by turn-taking, and as I read Bakhtin, this was his view. I don't know what the units /of/ an utterance would be, given that an utterance can be an entire novel or a single word. I would have to be more familiar with Bakhtin than I am. A turn in a conversation does not constitute a self-standing whole, but nor would two consecutive utterances; probably only a whole conversation of many utterances would. An utterance might be responding to the previous turn but one, after all. But as I understand this approach, you break the conversation down into utterances and then you figure out what 'move' was being made with each utterance. Utterances form a series that are taken as meaningful in relation to other utterances in the conversation. If you conceive of a conversation as a series of "moves" in that way, then obviously the utterance is the unit, the basic "move." That's why I see conversation analysis as suitable for tracking power relations, a collaborative search, etc. That is the point: the *unit is a concept of the whole* (a kind of language game, in this case perhaps). So a word could be an utterance (e.g. "No!"), but "word" is a different concept from "utterance." And "word" is a very problematic concept. "Word-meaning" on the other hand is not problematic, because in "word-meaning" "word" simply means the sound which is the tool for the act of meaning - it could be a phrase or a single word. Word-meaning or utterance, the difference is conceptual, not the number of sounds, etc. A commodity is not "complete in itself" either, you need the commodity for which it is exchanged. But you can understand "commodity" viscerally, without the concepts of money or capital. But not vice versa. System analysis is a fundamentally different approach from analysis by units. Engestrom's idea is an example of systems analysis. A system is made up of qualitatively different *elements*, whereas analysis by units considers a whole as made up of conceptually equivalent *units*. So (subject, object/outcome, instruments,? rules, community, division-of-labour) constitutes a system. Within well-defined the boundary conditions the system is analysed as a self-standing whole. If more or less the same entity is approached for analysis by units it is an activity - an aggregate of artefact-mediated actions. This is an essentially open-ended approach, because all these actions use cultural artefacts from the wider community and have objects which originate in the wider community as well. So the difference between 'system' and 'unit' is not whether something is "complete in itself," but the conceptual difference - taking it as made up of elements (H and O) or units (H2O). The contradiction can be resolved by saying that the unit itself is analysed as a system (e.g. a commodity is use-value and exchange-value, word-meaning is sound and meaning, and activity-system is that list of 6 elements); in that sense, the activity /system can be a unit/ of a larger process, such as a social formation. > > Anyhow, looking back over the thread, one persisting issue > seems to have been whether we can study language > objectively. And that is nested (it seems to me; or > perhaps it?s in tension with?) the issue of how best to > conceptualize language. As a system? As talk? As > conceptualization? ?It?s intriguing that these issues > prove so hard to resolve. I confess that I incline towards > Haydi?s point that "Any word can be seen in its state of > liquidity and flexibility.? I see this ?liquidity? in the > changes in word meaning over time, in the ?flow? of sounds > and words within and among communities as they come in > contact, and in the ebb and flow of single conversations. > But this may simply be my personal taste. There is no doubt that there are many ways to conceptualise language-activity - many lenses each revealing different aspects of the whole. To my mind, the concept which get to the heart of what language is, is the relation between concepts and narratives. As I see it, concepts are meaningful only thanks to their place in a meaningful narrative, while narrative is (literally) inconceivable without concepts. Words of course are the tools and common substance which are used to realise both, and the analysis of words is a fascinating discipline in itself, but I do not believe that word-analysis is the best starting point for understanding language. It is just another lens, a side-view, so to speak. I believe that language pre-existed words, or at least, could have. BTW, when you talk of "changes in word meaning over time," you have in mind that meaning= what is in the relevant dictionary or look-up table. That is not how I see it. "Word-meaning" in my view is an artefact-mediated action. "Meaning" is an act, realised at a certain time and place in speech. The dictionary, if it is any good, is simply a history of word-meaning, not a look-up table consulted by the speaker and listener. > > I also find it helpful to try to step beyond > subjective/objective: Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas > were just two of the people who pointed out the need for a > third category: language is ?intersubjective?; it is > (using Taylor?s phrase) "the common property? of a society > - even though that property is being continually > reproduced and transformed in and through people?s daily > talk. According to my reading, it was Karl Popper who invented the word "intersubjective" in the sense I think you are using it, but later it took on a new meaning, radically opposed to Popper's meaning, viz., the conception of social life in terms one-on-one unmediated interactions. In this latter case, culture (books, libraries, speech, machinery, etc.) is simply a /background/, whereas for CHAT, units of culture (i.e., artefacts) mediate units of action (behavioral deeds in which the aim differs from the goal). So, in my view, the earlier Popperian meaning of "intersubjectivity," which you ascribe to Taylor and Habermas, is more or less the same as "culture," (which I prefer) but it seems to me a little vague becauise "culture" in the special sense I use it /pre-exists/ the interaction in question, while the more contemporary meaning implicitly excluding the already-existing means as if every communication is an original /ab novo/ act of creation, is fundamentally incompatible with CHAT, and in fact, I believe, our chief protagonist. Andy > > Martin > > > >> On Mar 18, 2019, at 8:27 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> Yes, all true, Martin, but in my view in saying that *a >> word is a sign for a concept*, the real or imagined >> entity which is deemed to be a /instance/ of the concept >> is a *moment**of the concept*, as are the /practices/ >> whereby those instances are subsumed under the universal. >> I should have made that clear. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190415/281ffa5a/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Sun Apr 14 23:16:25 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 16:16:25 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units, utterances, elements and systems In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <06ec51de-96f0-1c8f-fc59-7f9f8d34f15a@marxists.org> <6E002B60-EF59-4ED5-8ADC-6FC2A01BC32E@cantab.net> Message-ID: <91f3a3b8-f84e-b5b9-5719-a62b98077864@marxists.org> Martin, just a supplementary to this ... earlier you alluded to the "hermeneutic circle." In analysis by units, resort to the hermeneutic circle is frequently necessary before one can definitively determine the identity and meaning of the units, e.g. sentence or text as a unit of a tradition made up of those texts. Some of the issues you have raised about "completeness" are met with by the hermeneutic circle. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 15/04/2019 1:28 pm, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Wow! Nothing like a few weeks off the keyboard to get some > thinking time, eh Martin? You've created about a dozen > threads here, so I'll help us manage that by renaming this > thread, OK? :) I'll make my points in between your paragraphs. > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 15/04/2019 3:12 am, Martin Packer wrote: >> Hi Andy, >> >> I think I may have hijacked this thread; feel free to put >> it back on its tracks. >> >> But I was responding to the proposal that "The minimal >> holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An >> utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself.? (It >> was Arturo quoting Akhutina.) In terms of your >> terminology of ?unit? and ?system? it seems to me >> contradictory: the utterance is a unit, but an utterance >> is complete. If it?s complete, that means it?s a >> ?system,? right? I was worried by the suggestion that an >> utterance ?*is complete in itself*,? and that?s why I >> mentioned the assumption in Conversation Analysis that >> the minimal unit is always a *pair* of utterances (I may >> be putting the word ?unit? in their mouths). And these >> pairs are linked one after another, or embedded one >> within another, so that every conversation has its own >> unity... >> >> And then a little later in the same quotation we find, >> "Thus, the utterance and the *word, as a compressed >> version of the utterance*, are the units of speech acts, >> communication, and?consciousness.? And you, Andy, >> proposed that word and utterance are micro and macro >> units. Organelles within cells within organs within >> bodies within ecosystems?? > > Yes. It is normal but not necessary for an analysis by > units to have two units, like you say: cell and > organism, organism and ecosystem, word-meaning and > concept (LSV), artefact-mediated action and activity > (ANL), commodity and capital (KM). And I see utterance > as the unit of dialogue, demarcated by turn-taking, > and as I read Bakhtin, this was his view. > I don't know what the units /of/ an utterance would > be, given that an utterance can be an entire novel or > a single word. I would have to be more familiar with > Bakhtin than I am. > A turn in a conversation does not constitute a > self-standing whole, but nor would two consecutive > utterances; probably only a whole conversation of many > utterances would. An utterance might be responding to > the previous turn but one, after all. But as I > understand this approach, you break the conversation > down into utterances and then you figure out what > 'move' was being made with each utterance. Utterances > form a series that are taken as meaningful in relation > to other utterances in the conversation. If you > conceive of a conversation as a series of "moves" in > that way, then obviously the utterance is the unit, > the basic "move." That's why I see conversation > analysis as suitable for tracking power relations, a > collaborative search, etc. > That is the point: the *unit is a concept of the > whole* (a kind of language game, in this case perhaps). > So a word could be an utterance (e.g. "No!"), but > "word" is a different concept from "utterance." And > "word" is a very problematic concept. "Word-meaning" > on the other hand is not problematic, because in > "word-meaning" "word" simply means the sound which is > the tool for the act of meaning - it could be a phrase > or a single word. Word-meaning or utterance, the > difference is conceptual, not the number of sounds, etc. > A commodity is not "complete in itself" either, you > need the commodity for which it is exchanged. But you > can understand "commodity" viscerally, without the > concepts of money or capital. But not vice versa. > System analysis is a fundamentally different approach > from analysis by units. Engestrom's idea is an example > of systems analysis. A system is made up of > qualitatively different *elements*, whereas analysis > by units considers a whole as made up of conceptually > equivalent *units*. So (subject, object/outcome, > instruments,? rules, community, division-of-labour) > constitutes a system. Within well-defined the boundary > conditions the system is analysed as a self-standing > whole. If more or less the same entity is approached > for analysis by units it is an activity - an aggregate > of artefact-mediated actions. This is an essentially > open-ended approach, because all these actions use > cultural artefacts from the wider community and have > objects which originate in the wider community as well. > So the difference between 'system' and 'unit' is not > whether something is "complete in itself," but the > conceptual difference - taking it as made up of > elements (H and O) or units (H2O). The contradiction > can be resolved by saying that the unit itself is > analysed as a system (e.g. a commodity is use-value > and exchange-value, word-meaning is sound and meaning, > and activity-system is that list of 6 elements); in > that sense, the activity /system can be a unit/ of a > larger process, such as a social formation. > >> >> Anyhow, looking back over the thread, one persisting >> issue seems to have been whether we can study language >> objectively. And that is nested (it seems to me; or >> perhaps it?s in tension with?) the issue of how best to >> conceptualize language. As a system? As talk? As >> conceptualization? ?It?s intriguing that these issues >> prove so hard to resolve. I confess that I incline >> towards Haydi?s point that "Any word can be seen in its >> state of liquidity and flexibility.? I see this >> ?liquidity? in the changes in word meaning over time, in >> the ?flow? of sounds and words within and among >> communities as they come in contact, and in the ebb and >> flow of single conversations. But this may simply be my >> personal taste. > > > There is no doubt that there are many ways to > conceptualise language-activity - many lenses each > revealing different aspects of the whole. To my mind, > the concept which get to the heart of what language > is, is the relation between concepts and narratives. > As I see it, concepts are meaningful only thanks to > their place in a meaningful narrative, while narrative > is (literally) inconceivable without concepts. Words > of course are the tools and common substance which are > used to realise both, and the analysis of words is a > fascinating discipline in itself, but I do not believe > that word-analysis is the best starting point for > understanding language. It is just another lens, a > side-view, so to speak. I believe that language > pre-existed words, or at least, could have. > > BTW, when you talk of "changes in word meaning over > time," you have in mind that meaning= what is in the > relevant dictionary or look-up table. That is not how > I see it. "Word-meaning" in my view is an > artefact-mediated action. "Meaning" is an act, > realised at a certain time and place in speech. The > dictionary, if it is any good, is simply a history of > word-meaning, not a look-up table consulted by the > speaker and listener. > >> >> I also find it helpful to try to step beyond >> subjective/objective: Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas >> were just two of the people who pointed out the need for >> a third category: language is ?intersubjective?; it is >> (using Taylor?s phrase) "the common property? of a >> society - even though that property is being continually >> reproduced and transformed in and through people?s daily >> talk. > > According to my reading, it was Karl Popper who > invented the word "intersubjective" in the sense I > think you are using it, but later it took on a new > meaning, radically opposed to Popper's meaning, viz., > the conception of social life in terms one-on-one > unmediated interactions. In this latter case, culture > (books, libraries, speech, machinery, etc.) is simply > a /background/, whereas for CHAT, units of culture > (i.e., artefacts) mediate units of action (behavioral > deeds in which the aim differs from the goal). So, in > my view, the earlier Popperian meaning of > "intersubjectivity," which you ascribe to Taylor and > Habermas, is more or less the same as "culture," > (which I prefer) but it seems to me a little vague > becauise "culture" in the special sense I use it > /pre-exists/ the interaction in question, while the > more contemporary meaning implicitly excluding the > already-existing means as if every communication is an > original /ab novo/ act of creation, is fundamentally > incompatible with CHAT, and in fact, I believe, our > chief protagonist. > > Andy > >> >> Martin >> >> >> >>> On Mar 18, 2019, at 8:27 PM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>> >>> Yes, all true, Martin, but in my view in saying that *a >>> word is a sign for a concept*, the real or imagined >>> entity which is deemed to be a /instance/ of the concept >>> is a *moment**of the concept*, as are the /practices/ >>> whereby those instances are subsumed under the >>> universal. I should have made that clear. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>> >> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190415/2bf51b08/attachment.html From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Apr 15 04:10:07 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 11:10:07 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> Message-ID: <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> Hi Martin, We are all happy you are back safe and healthy. The trio , the book , the separate draft , the once messageto Huw are all excellent. You understand where to agree where to disagree. You say you oppose Positivists because they say they acceptthings they can touch as tangibles. Right. You say you don?t give so much value to Kant because despitethe fact that he assumes a world outside the Mind , he terminates as anagnostic. Right. Andy?s stance is obvious. Hegel is no idealist and he?s notalone in this. You are one. And my problem is how to compromise Hegel with this yourbrilliant saying: THE ALTERNATIVE , IN BRIEF , IS THAT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THEWORLD ARISES IN AND FROM OUR PRACTICAL ?ACTIVITYOF LIVING IN THAT WORLD. All through Hegel?s work the primacy of the IDEA blinks atyou. In one place he stresses that his only concern is with concepts. His worldis not YOUR world as stated so succinctly arising in and from ? He of coursedeals with this world but in alienation. If he were not for the IDEA , he wouldnot have thought of the public and civil rights and social institutions ashaving been constituted by their relation to an abstract iconic deemed assuperior and all competent as the Monarch , the embodiment and realization ofthe Institution of the Monarchy as something instilled in mentalities. What I then take in your phraseology is that you tend todeny the objectivity and necessity of the rules of Nature and Society whichalways show themselves within the sphere of your activity in objective materialcircumstances you apparently know yourself committed to in Brilliant expression(Dialectics in Nature reflecting in Logic as well). When we replace interestswith Needs we actually part ways with the workings of this world and seekshelter in the subjective world of interests and interested humans not theactual ones. Circumstances do not always dance to the rhythms of our likings.In many times we get entangled in impositions. How can we escape dislikings?Again by the very changing thoughts of the very changing world dressed in rules, categories , concepts , theories according to the tenets of theorization andscientific research , say , paradigms you say. Subjectivity is not realized Utilitarian way. By the way , know-how is fused , jointed , concomitant tothe Practical Activity , long way to be called science. >From the time our ancestors said farewell to the visualfield and the concrete situation , flights of thinking started in unboundedwonderlands. This we also have with ontogenesis. Part of this flight turn backand come to fruition just if they follow and conform to the very said rules ofafore-mentioned discussion. By this again one sees an inclination towardsunbounded agency. Some flights are mere phantoms. Some are sweet dreamingsnecessary to a life compensation. Some are strong enough to turn intolife-world transformations. Different points of views are visions and if theyare not Cartesian as you stress , they ultimately submit themselves to therules of the Ontology of This World. But in the beginning of your discussion awhile ago you stressed you don?t talk of visions but of a world in which realmen and real objects and real processes reign. How this could be regarding yourBrilliant expression? All sciences in a final count are abstractions fromobjective reality manipulated and acted upon by human agents. This means distinction does not mean disunity. We should notforget the contiguousness of the objective world with all concomitant to it asforms of its unique existence. Science now exhibits the 6.5 billion times theSun-size Black Hole with so huge a Mass. Have we been swallowed by the clearPic? All of us claim that we oppose Cartesianism. [I ALSO remainfervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entityexist: mental entities and material entities IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BUTJUST ONE SECONDARILY RELATED TO THE OTHER MEANING ONCE THERE WAS THE WORLDWITHOUT MEN AND THEIR THOUGHTS)]. This is Monism not Dualism. Dualism , nay ,Pluralism occurs when we say ?I think it?s clear that EVERY scientific PARADIGM(What?s a Paradigm?) HAS ITS OWN* ontology.? I would say :DERIVED EXISTENCE-implicit ontology- once inquiringly interrogated-meaningwithout men it?s gone! Derived existences or ontologies are but EPISTEMS!?governed by the Mind.??????? Haydi? On Sunday, April 14, 2019, 9:42:45 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer wrote: Hi Haydi, First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die hard. If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? ?These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, although we can never know it.? I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s view. Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems.? There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what it will look like from a different point of view. My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every institution has its own ontology.? Martin On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: Martin, This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or imagined?? **concrete entity."? 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between the independent? existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a concept.? Haydi? ? On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer wrote: Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. Martin On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many of them.? That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give is a trivial one. In general you need all the numerous utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth? generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only because he took the activity system as a system not a unit in the first place. Andy Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: A. How are you? B. Fine, thanks, and you? A. XXX One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A.? Martin On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the book and you put it back on the shelf. That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing is true of the way he uses "utterance".? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article; ?David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200???????????????????????????????? Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen wrote: I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. ? Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer wrote: According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is the adjacency pair:?a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is functionally dependent on the first.? Question-answer; greeting-greeting; request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move within a conversation.? An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much longer sequence. Martin On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: I would? have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two units. The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf Andy Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate.? Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness. Best Arturo -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190415/9be1747a/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Apr 15 20:37:42 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 12:37:42 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: <9B9EAEB6-AB1D-4BDD-9365-380E12194F94@cantab.net> References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <9f3eef80-1caf-a662-84f1-42466abafec3@marxists.org> <5d7d0173-e9e7-23d6-e831-120d7e8e7289@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <9B9EAEB6-AB1D-4BDD-9365-380E12194F94@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin: The point I was making was that where Bakhtin says "utterance", Sacks says "turn" (see Sacks, H. 1992, Lectures on Conversation, Volume Two, Lecture 3 on turn-taking, and also the famous paper with Gail Jefferson, the "simplest systemics"). In Sacks, "turn" is a physical unit of observable behavior, discernible to dog's ears. It's still why, when you design a listening test today, you use a conversation between a female voice and a male voice. And following that objectivist approach is what led extreme Conversation Analysis people (e.g. Jonathan Potter) to seriously write about conversations without minds. Yes, later work had to revise Sacks, and come up with a different unit. But when I read it (e.g. Heritage, or Pomerantz, or Paul Seedhourse) I feel like they are trying to re-invent grammar and thus re-introduce minds. It seems to me that the distinctions that we want in the last utterance (or turn, in early CA parlance) is much better understood as a grammatical distinction and not a distinction between two communicative "acts". Is Response and Evaluation two acts or one? Is "No, it's not" two acts or one? Why the comma separating them? What is the communicative difference between "No", "It's not" and "No, it's not"?. As far as I can see, CA explains none of this; it even makes it hard to ask about. A good grammatics can explain it all and much more. Systemic functional grammar, for example, can also explain the kinds of questions I'm interested in, e.g. why the Subject comes AFTER the verb in "Is it Chiang Mai" but before the verb in "Who knows?". This is in interesting question for me because I have to teach people to ask questions, and it's pretty hard to do in English. (You didn't explain the sudden change from South Korea to Thailand. What happened?) David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 8:00 AM Martin Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > In CA terms, turns are composed of ?turn construction units,? and TCU is a > unit of conversation that completes a communicative act. And the utterance > ?No, it is not. Who knows the capital of Thailand?? involves two > communicative acts. The first is an evaluation of S?s response (?Is it > Chiang Mai??) to T?s question ("Who can tell me the capital of South > Korea??). The second communicative act is a (indirect) question. In other > words, T uses their second utterance to do two things: to perform two > communicative acts. > > An utterance is, as you suggest, "the stretch of speaking from one change > of speaking subjects to another.? S is one speaking subject; T is another. > (I am assuming that you are not equating ?subject? with ?topic.?) > > So sentences are not involved at all. Nor is there any attempt to do away > with linguistics (that?s to say, grammar). > > Or perhaps I am confused by your shifting definitions: > > In your first paragraph: For Bakhtin "the utterance is the stretch of > speaking from one change of speaking subjects to another.? > > In your second paragraph, "a turn is pretty much what Bakhtin says it is: > it's the stretch of speaking we find from one change of speaking subjects > to another." > > > Ack! > > Martin > > > > On Apr 14, 2019, at 4:14 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > So the real source of this realist attempt to do away with linguistics is > Bakhtin. Bakhtin it was who argued that the sentence is a fiction, and that > the real, actual, factual unit for understanding text is the utterance. And > the utterance is defined by the changing of speech subjects. So the > utterance is the stretch of speaking from one change of speaking subjects > to another. All this is real, actual, factual (i.e. perceptible with > feline. canine, infant and foreign hears; as the Russians would say, an > effect of rech' [speech] and not jazik [language]).The utterance is a unit > of speech (the real, actual, factual set of things people have uttered), > but the sentence is only a unit of language (the abstract, imaginary system > of virtual and potential utterances). This is all in "The Problem of Speech > Genres" ("Speech Genres and Other Late Essays", U of Texas Press 1986, p. > 71). > > Martin's example (which is an invented one, as we can see from the sudden > change of venue from South Korea to Thailand) manages to confuse things a > very great deal. First, he uses "turn" to mean sentence, and "utterance" to > mean "turn". In CA, which goes for radical empiricism and ontological > realism, a turn is pretty much what Bakhtin says it is: it's the stretch of > speaking we find from one change of speaking subjects to another. It's not > a sentence, and in some data sets less than 11% of the data consists > of grammatical sentences. By this standard, there are exactly three turns > in Martin's invented dialogue, and the last turn consists of two somethings. > > That "something" is the problem. Bakhtin and CA try to get around this > problem by saying that there is a virtual change of speakers (Bakhtin) or a > potential change of speaker (CA) after the question mark. But that doesn't > explain the question mark itself, or the peculiar order of elements we find > in the question as opposted to the statement, or the peculiar fact that we > find the verb before the subject in "Is it Chiang Mai" but the verb after > the subject in "Who knows...". > > The real name of this mysterious "something," the real unit of speech > communication, is not the "word", unless we assume that Vygotsky meant (as > Russian allows) the expansive meaning of word (i.e. "In the beginning was > the word; the word was made flesh; in a word; the last word on this > question'"). The real unit is the wording: the clause. Clauses can be minor > ("Hey! Martin!") or they can be elliptical ("You mean...") or they can be > major clauses like all the examples Martin has invented. But clauses exist, > even though you need to know the language to recognize them (hence > languages too must exist, despite what Roy Harris and the integrationalists > claim). Clauses are just as distinct from the utterances and turns that > compose them as cities are from the heaps of brick and mortar that we find > before cities are built and after they have been destroyed. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 4:15 AM Martin Packer wrote: > >> Hi David, >> >> You write: "the fact that an utterance seems to end in the middle of a >> turn is embarrassing.? >> >> But (for CA) it?s not that an utterance can end in the middle of a turn. >> It?s that a turn can end in the middle of an utterance. That?s to say, an >> utterance can include more than one turn. Consider: >> >> T: Who can tell me the capital of South Korea? >> S: Is it Chiang Mai? >> T: No, it is not! Who knows the capital of Thailand? >> >> Last utterance by T is composed of two turns. And while there are plenty >> of games - chess, tennis - where players must alternate turns, taking only >> one turn at a time, there are plenty of other games where a player can take >> one turn and then take another. >> >> I think you would agree with me that it is not the lack of ?theoretical >> preconceptions? that prevents a dog with headphones from recognizing the >> units of speech. CA treats as unproblematic (or relatively so) the >> understanding and transcribing of the sounds and words of a language. It >> assumes that the researcher has a speaker?s competence in these matters: no >> one expects someone who speaks only Spanish to conduct CA on English >> speech. On the other hand, to a native speaker of English the sounds and >> words are (relatively) ?real, actual, and factual.? >> >> The (relative) absence of ?theoretical preconceptions? in CA refers to a >> preference to look for, to try to identify, the methods that participants >> are actually using to carry out their conversation. Based on concrete >> empirical evidence. Rather than assuming from the outset a theory about how >> speech is generated and how conversations are structured. >> >> So, returning to the larger issue (what the heck is language and how can >> we study it?), CA approaches language as a concrete practical >> accomplishment, achieved collaboratively by people whose acquired >> competence as language speakers amounts to a set of practical skills or >> methods. That approach will not be to everyone?s taste, but in my view it >> has plenty to recommend it. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Mar 20, 2019, at 10:27 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Martin: >> >> From the CA point of view, there isn't anything wrong with it. Like many >> branches of linguistics (and mathematics), CA has its ducks in a row, and >> its system is well designed to prevent internal contradictions. For >> example, CA insists that no theoretical "preconceptions" be brought to the >> data, and in that sense it is "radically empiricist". >> >> I think the problem arises when you try to incorporate concepts from >> abroad, including Bakhtin. If we say that turns are "real, actual, factual" >> units ("in the air", as J.J. Gibson used to say--quite incorrectly, as it >> turns out--of the phoneme), then the fact that an utterance seems to end in >> the middle of a turn is embarrassing. It undoes the attempt by CA to do an >> end run around Saussure's notion that the object of study in linguistics is >> created only by our attitude towards it (that is, we have to understand >> that something is language before we can study it as language and not >> simply noise). >> >> From a Vygotskyan point of view, this radical empiricism will not do: a >> dog with headphones could easily segment the "real, actual, factual" turns >> in data, but not the utterances if we define them by potential turn >> transition points (or TRPs, or whatever). But it's precisely units that >> would escape a dog in headphones that make the sound signal into human >> language, into a meaningful sign, and not simply a signal. >> >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article; >> >> David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S >> ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE >> WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational >> Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >> >> >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Martin Packer >> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 11:06 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>> As soon as you do this, though, you have to admit (and real, actual, >>> practical data will support this) that there are two such transition >>> points--not just one--WITHIN your utterance (in addition to the real, >>> actual, practical turn transition point. . >>> >>> >>> Right: CA refers to this as speaker self-selection. At a TRP (transition >>> relevant place) the person who has been speaking continues to speak. >>> >>> So what?s the problem with that? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190416/91f68b37/attachment.html From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Apr 16 10:21:24 2019 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 10:21:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units, utterances, elements and systems In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <06ec51de-96f0-1c8f-fc59-7f9f8d34f15a@marxists.org> <6E002B60-EF59-4ED5-8ADC-6FC2A01BC32E@cantab.net> Message-ID: <2C5096C0-7437-4FDB-950A-D0E2C27E1DAA@gmail.com> Another reason why an utterance is not a question of grammar (as in a sentence or phrase): https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/the-shallowness-of-google-translate/551570/ Google Translate can translate sentences but not utterances. Helena > On Apr 14, 2019, at 8:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Wow! Nothing like a few weeks off the keyboard to get some thinking time, eh Martin? You've created about a dozen threads here, so I'll help us manage that by renaming this thread, OK? :) I'll make my points in between your paragraphs. > > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 15/04/2019 3:12 am, Martin Packer wrote: >> Hi Andy, >> >> I think I may have hijacked this thread; feel free to put it back on its tracks. >> >> But I was responding to the proposal that "The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself.? (It was Arturo quoting Akhutina.) In terms of your terminology of ?unit? and ?system? it seems to me contradictory: the utterance is a unit, but an utterance is complete. If it?s complete, that means it?s a ?system,? right? I was worried by the suggestion that an utterance ?is complete in itself,? and that?s why I mentioned the assumption in Conversation Analysis that the minimal unit is always a *pair* of utterances (I may be putting the word ?unit? in their mouths). And these pairs are linked one after another, or embedded one within another, so that every conversation has its own unity... >> >> And then a little later in the same quotation we find, "Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness.? And you, Andy, proposed that word and utterance are micro and macro units. Organelles within cells within organs within bodies within ecosystems?? > Yes. It is normal but not necessary for an analysis by units to have two units, like you say: cell and organism, organism and ecosystem, word-meaning and concept (LSV), artefact-mediated action and activity (ANL), commodity and capital (KM). And I see utterance as the unit of dialogue, demarcated by turn-taking, and as I read Bakhtin, this was his view. > I don't know what the units of an utterance would be, given that an utterance can be an entire novel or a single word. I would have to be more familiar with Bakhtin than I am. > A turn in a conversation does not constitute a self-standing whole, but nor would two consecutive utterances; probably only a whole conversation of many utterances would. An utterance might be responding to the previous turn but one, after all. But as I understand this approach, you break the conversation down into utterances and then you figure out what 'move' was being made with each utterance. Utterances form a series that are taken as meaningful in relation to other utterances in the conversation. If you conceive of a conversation as a series of "moves" in that way, then obviously the utterance is the unit, the basic "move." That's why I see conversation analysis as suitable for tracking power relations, a collaborative search, etc. > That is the point: the unit is a concept of the whole (a kind of language game, in this case perhaps). > So a word could be an utterance (e.g. "No!"), but "word" is a different concept from "utterance." And "word" is a very problematic concept. "Word-meaning" on the other hand is not problematic, because in "word-meaning" "word" simply means the sound which is the tool for the act of meaning - it could be a phrase or a single word. Word-meaning or utterance, the difference is conceptual, not the number of sounds, etc. > A commodity is not "complete in itself" either, you need the commodity for which it is exchanged. But you can understand "commodity" viscerally, without the concepts of money or capital. But not vice versa. > System analysis is a fundamentally different approach from analysis by units. Engestrom's idea is an example of systems analysis. A system is made up of qualitatively different elements, whereas analysis by units considers a whole as made up of conceptually equivalent units. So (subject, object/outcome, instruments, rules, community, division-of-labour) constitutes a system. Within well-defined the boundary conditions the system is analysed as a self-standing whole. If more or less the same entity is approached for analysis by units it is an activity - an aggregate of artefact-mediated actions. This is an essentially open-ended approach, because all these actions use cultural artefacts from the wider community and have objects which originate in the wider community as well. > So the difference between 'system' and 'unit' is not whether something is "complete in itself," but the conceptual difference - taking it as made up of elements (H and O) or units (H2O). The contradiction can be resolved by saying that the unit itself is analysed as a system (e.g. a commodity is use-value and exchange-value, word-meaning is sound and meaning, and activity-system is that list of 6 elements); in that sense, the activity system can be a unit of a larger process, such as a social formation. > >> >> Anyhow, looking back over the thread, one persisting issue seems to have been whether we can study language objectively. And that is nested (it seems to me; or perhaps it?s in tension with?) the issue of how best to conceptualize language. As a system? As talk? As conceptualization? It?s intriguing that these issues prove so hard to resolve. I confess that I incline towards Haydi?s point that "Any word can be seen in its state of liquidity and flexibility.? I see this ?liquidity? in the changes in word meaning over time, in the ?flow? of sounds and words within and among communities as they come in contact, and in the ebb and flow of single conversations. But this may simply be my personal taste. > > There is no doubt that there are many ways to conceptualise language-activity - many lenses each revealing different aspects of the whole. To my mind, the concept which get to the heart of what language is, is the relation between concepts and narratives. As I see it, concepts are meaningful only thanks to their place in a meaningful narrative, while narrative is (literally) inconceivable without concepts. Words of course are the tools and common substance which are used to realise both, and the analysis of words is a fascinating discipline in itself, but I do not believe that word-analysis is the best starting point for understanding language. It is just another lens, a side-view, so to speak. I believe that language pre-existed words, or at least, could have. > > BTW, when you talk of "changes in word meaning over time," you have in mind that meaning= what is in the relevant dictionary or look-up table. That is not how I see it. "Word-meaning" in my view is an artefact-mediated action. "Meaning" is an act, realised at a certain time and place in speech. The dictionary, if it is any good, is simply a history of word-meaning, not a look-up table consulted by the speaker and listener. >> >> I also find it helpful to try to step beyond subjective/objective: Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas were just two of the people who pointed out the need for a third category: language is ?intersubjective?; it is (using Taylor?s phrase) "the common property? of a society - even though that property is being continually reproduced and transformed in and through people?s daily talk. > According to my reading, it was Karl Popper who invented the word "intersubjective" in the sense I think you are using it, but later it took on a new meaning, radically opposed to Popper's meaning, viz., the conception of social life in terms one-on-one unmediated interactions. In this latter case, culture (books, libraries, speech, machinery, etc.) is simply a background, whereas for CHAT, units of culture (i.e., artefacts) mediate units of action (behavioral deeds in which the aim differs from the goal). So, in my view, the earlier Popperian meaning of "intersubjectivity," which you ascribe to Taylor and Habermas, is more or less the same as "culture," (which I prefer) but it seems to me a little vague becauise "culture" in the special sense I use it pre-exists the interaction in question, while the more contemporary meaning implicitly excluding the already-existing means as if every communication is an original ab novo act of creation, is fundamentally incompatible with CHAT, and in fact, I believe, our chief protagonist. > > Andy >> >> Martin >> >> >> >>> On Mar 18, 2019, at 8:27 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Yes, all true, Martin, but in my view in saying that a word is a sign for a concept, the real or imagined entity which is deemed to be a instance of the concept is a moment of the concept, as are the practices whereby those instances are subsumed under the universal. I should have made that clear. >>> >>> Andy >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190416/4b6c0454/attachment.html From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed Apr 17 05:12:00 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:12:00 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Units, utterances, elements and systems In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <06ec51de-96f0-1c8f-fc59-7f9f8d34f15a@marxists.org> <6E002B60-EF59-4ED5-8ADC-6FC2A01BC32E@cantab.net> Message-ID: <641994004.1440045.1555503120865@mail.yahoo.com> Deal all, The content of the article Helena sent and the conclusionthey presented to us based on it are very helpful. It sounds very naturalthat I quite agree with the explication Martin offered concerning my statementof the fluidity of the word especially when we stretch the content of thisexplication to his prior statement concerning how knowledge is arisen andcreated. But with the fullrespect I?ve always rendered towards Andy , I usually get confused with hisdiverse nuances in discussion. If it?s my defect , that?s something. Both Martin and I wereopposing him with his fixity of a word for a concept. And then and now heoffers lots of justification: Just two paragraphsverbatim: [Yes, all true,Martin, but in my view in saying that?a word is a sign for a concept, the real or imagined entity which is deemed to be a?instance?of theconcept is a?moment?of the concept, as are the?practices?whereby thoseinstances are subsumed under the universal. I should have made that clear.] [That is the point:the?unit is a concept of the whole?(a kind oflanguage game, in this case perhaps). So a word could be an utterance (e.g. "No!"), but"word" is a different concept from "utterance." And"word" is a very problematic concept. "Word-meaning" on theother hand is not problematic, because in "word-meaning""word" simply means the sound which is the tool for the act ofmeaning - it could be a phrase or a single word. Word-meaning or utterance, thedifference is conceptual, not the number of sounds, etc.] Not intending toinvest in people?s differences of opinion , Martin was firstly clear withconcepts as arising from real circumstances secondly that they saw REAL or IMAGINED*ENTITIES* within the independent ?realmof sciences. Now that Andy wants toimprovise his prior saying to the effect that *a word is NOT necessarily a signfor a concept* again they get us into the trap of fatefully taking entities asinstances of concepts. If they had finished their statement here , we wouldhave been in fairly good position to say : Bravo Andy this is what Hegel reallybelieves. But alas the very accepted idea again turns on its heel to showitself this time as *a moment of the concept*. While Andy is full Hegelian ,therefore he should know that we cannot uplift a word to the rank of a conceptunless we have passed the necessary procedures of taking a primary partial ideaas thesis , the antagonist idea as antithesis and the resolved contradiction inthe form of the synthesis , which in that case we would have reached a trueconcept which is a universal whole which for Hegel seems to be CONCRETE ?not concretein reality on earth but in thought- they take entities once as concepts once asmoments of concepts. Yet they are notfinished with the discussion. This time , they take *practices* in parallelwith the entities as concepts or moments. Whereas we know concepts are ideas ,how can we take *practices* as ideas? What?s the riddlereally? I think It lies in equalizing Hegel with Marx. Or taking each time onefor the other. That?s to be aHegelian Marxist and that?s when %80 of the names in Marxists.Org becomeMarxists (Tons of thanks for the enormous toil and suffering spent on that hugeproject). Yet there are manynumerous books even from the time of the Soviet Union which in their researchesaim industriously and perseveringly at following , adapting , interfacing andlaunching Hegel?s Logic over and upon the structure of the Magnum Opus ,Capital just head overturned on feet (admittance on preface to the secondedition of the first volume). One very old : Mark Moiseevich Rosenthal?s ?Dialecticsof the Marx?s Capital?. Contradictions , quantity to quality conversion ,struggle of the opposites , etc.etc. That?s not the case aresearcher just starts with a *unit*. Then one lets things go of themselvesuntil they reach somewhere they can dub it a *whole*. Nay! Taking a unitnecessitates already having taken or foreseen a *whole* ; it?s the requirementsof that whole which imposes a corresponding *unit* upon you. And it?s Marx whoinstead of taking a partial idea for a thing (a commodity) , an entity in thereal world on earth then as point of departure in the process , manipulateswith it in spiral material practices until he reaches an abstract universal , aconcept , what is concrete for Hegel because one magnifies the IDEA the otherthe OBJECTIVE REALITY. What is the end for Hegel is the beginning for Marx ,ascent from the abstract to the concrete. Smith , Ricardo , Say , Bastia ,Sysmondi , Mill , cultivated in the Land of Capital ; it worked until thecontradictions appeared , Marx began with their generalities , concepts , tookthem into the earth circumstances , promoted prior concepts , reached the variegatedWHOLE , the CAPITAL. And since that time the World have not got tired of stillfinding it true or false within circumstantial conditions. ? I think if Vygotsky?ssubjects had succeeded in resolving the contradictions , they would have reacheda conceptual whole with the right block having passed procedures which showedthemselves in ? , complexes , quasi-concepts , etc. each corresponding to theparticular queues or piles before everybody?s eyes in the light of the day. I apologize for somany details. But now enough. I continue running over this for myself in mealsand portions. Very Best Wishes Haydi ???? On Monday, April 15, 2019, 8:00:51 AM GMT+4:30, Andy Blunden wrote: Wow! Nothing like a few weeks off the keyboard to get some thinking time, eh Martin? You've created about a dozen threads here, so I'll help us manage that by renaming this thread, OK? :) I'll make my points in between your paragraphs. Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 15/04/2019 3:12 am, Martin Packer wrote: Hi Andy, I think I may have hijacked this thread; feel free to put it back on its tracks. But I was responding to the proposal that "The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself.? (It was Arturo quoting Akhutina.) In terms of your terminology of ?unit? and ?system? it seems to me contradictory: the utterance is a unit, but an utterance is complete. If it?s complete, that means it?s a ?system,? right? I was worried by the suggestion that an utterance ?is complete in itself,? and that?s why I mentioned the assumption in Conversation Analysis that the minimal unit is always a *pair* of utterances (I may be putting the word ?unit? in their mouths). And these pairs are linked one after another, or embedded one within another, so that every conversation has its own unity... And then a little later in the same quotation we find, "Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and?consciousness.? ? And you, Andy, proposed that word and utterance are micro and macro units. Organelles within cells within organs within bodies within ecosystems?? Yes. It is normal but not necessary for an analysis by units to have two units, like you say: cell and organism, organism and ecosystem, word-meaning and concept (LSV), artefact-mediated action and activity (ANL), commodity and capital (KM). And I see utterance as the unit of dialogue, demarcated by turn-taking, and as I read Bakhtin, this was his view. I don't know what the units of an utterance would be, given that an utterance can be an entire novel or a single word. I would have to be more familiar with Bakhtin than I am. A turn in a conversation does not constitute a self-standing whole, but nor would two consecutive utterances; probably only a whole conversation of many utterances would. An utterance might be responding to the previous turn but one, after all. But as I understand this approach, you break the conversation down into utterances and then you figure out what 'move' was being made with each utterance. Utterances form a series that are taken as meaningful in relation to other utterances in the conversation. If you conceive of a conversation as a series of "moves" in that way, then obviously the utterance is the unit, the basic "move." That's why I see conversation analysis as suitable for tracking power relations, a collaborative search, etc. That is the point: the unit is a concept of the whole (a kind of language game, in this case perhaps). So a word could be an utterance (e.g. "No!"), but "word" is a different concept from "utterance." And "word" is a very problematic concept. "Word-meaning" on the other hand is not problematic, because in "word-meaning" "word" simply means the sound which is the tool for the act of meaning - it could be a phrase or a single word. Word-meaning or utterance, the difference is conceptual, not the number of sounds, etc. A commodity is not "complete in itself" either, you need the commodity for which it is exchanged. But you can understand "commodity" viscerally, without the concepts of money or capital. But not vice versa. System analysis is a fundamentally different approach from analysis by units. Engestrom's idea is an example of systems analysis. A system is made up of qualitatively different elements, whereas analysis by units considers a whole as made up of conceptually equivalent units. So (subject, object/outcome, instruments,? rules, community, division-of-labour) constitutes a system. Within well-defined the boundary conditions the system is analysed as a self-standing whole. If more or less the same entity is approached for analysis by units it is an activity - an aggregate of artefact-mediated actions. This is an essentially open-ended approach, because all these actions use cultural artefacts from the wider community and have objects which originate in the wider community as well. So the difference between 'system' and 'unit' is not whether something is "complete in itself," but the conceptual difference - taking it as made up of elements (H and O) or units (H2O). The contradiction can be resolved by saying that the unit itself is analysed as a system (e.g. a commodity is use-value and exchange-value, word-meaning is sound and meaning, and activity-system is that list of 6 elements); in that sense, the activity system can be a unit of a larger process, such as a social formation. Anyhow, looking back over the thread, one persisting issue seems to have been whether we can study language objectively. And that is nested (it seems to me; or perhaps it?s in tension with?) the issue of how best to conceptualize language. As a system? As talk? As conceptualization? ?It?s intriguing that these issues prove so hard to resolve. I confess that I incline towards Haydi?s point that "Any word can be seen in its state of liquidity and flexibility.? I see this ?liquidity? in the changes in word meaning over time, in the ?flow? of sounds and words within and among communities as they come in contact, and in the ebb and flow of single conversations. But this may simply be my personal taste. There is no doubt that there are many ways to conceptualise language-activity - many lenses each revealing different aspects of the whole. To my mind, the concept which get to the heart of what language is, is the relation between concepts and narratives. As I see it, concepts are meaningful only thanks to their place in a meaningful narrative, while narrative is (literally) inconceivable without concepts. Words of course are the tools and common substance which are used to realise both, and the analysis of words is a fascinating discipline in itself, but I do not believe that word-analysis is the best starting point for understanding language. It is just another lens, a side-view, so to speak. I believe that language pre-existed words, or at least, could have. BTW, when you talk of "changes in word meaning over time," you have in mind that meaning= what is in the relevant dictionary or look-up table. That is not how I see it. "Word-meaning" in my view is an artefact-mediated action. "Meaning" is an act, realised at a certain time and place in speech. The dictionary, if it is any good, is simply a history of word-meaning, not a look-up table consulted by the speaker and listener. I also find it helpful to try to step beyond subjective/objective: Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas were just two of the people who pointed out the need for a third category: language is ?intersubjective?; it is (using Taylor?s phrase) "the common property? of a society - even though that property is being continually reproduced and transformed in and through people?s daily talk. According to my reading, it was Karl Popper who invented the word "intersubjective" in the sense I think you are using it, but later it took on a new meaning, radically opposed to Popper's meaning, viz., the conception of social life in terms one-on-one unmediated interactions. In this latter case, culture (books, libraries, speech, machinery, etc.) is simply a background, whereas for CHAT, units of culture (i.e., artefacts) mediate units of action (behavioral deeds in which the aim differs from the goal). So, in my view, the earlier Popperian meaning of "intersubjectivity," which you ascribe to Taylor and Habermas, is more or less the same as "culture," (which I prefer) but it seems to me a little vague becauise "culture" in the special sense I use it pre-exists the interaction in question, while the more contemporary meaning implicitly excluding the already-existing means as if every communication is an original ab novo act of creation, is fundamentally incompatible with CHAT, and in fact, I believe, our chief protagonist. Andy Martin On Mar 18, 2019, at 8:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: Yes, all true, Martin, but in my view in saying that a word is a sign for a concept, the real or imagined entity which is deemed to be a instance of the concept is a moment of the concept, as are the practices whereby those instances are subsumed under the universal. I should have made that clear. Andy Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190417/72a554f7/attachment.html From mpacker@cantab.net Wed Apr 17 07:33:29 2019 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 09:33:29 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi Haydi, Some years ago I worked my way as far as possible through Hegel?s Phenomenology of Mind, and I also read a number of commentaries on this book and on Hegel?s larger project. I learned that there are as many interpretations are there are commentators, and that I am no expert on Hegel! Nor on Marx, but I understand the suggestion that Marx turned Hegel on his head to be referring to the idea that the force or phenomenon that brings about historical change is not Geist but human practical activity. Any proposal that concepts unfold all by themselves raises in me the simplistic objection that concepts cannot exist without people. Of course, if humans become extinct the universe will continue to unfold, but presumably without the help of concepts. These are, at least, my ontological assumptions. So yes, I would view a focus on the dance of disembodied concepts as an alienated viewpoint. And I view the laws of nature and society as always human creations, and so always as fallible, as revisable, and as formulated in service of human goals and purposes at a particular moment. These laws are attempts to hold fast in the flux, uncertainly, and mortality of existence. And I agree that it is real people dealing with real circumstances who imagine, who create, and who have flights of fantasy. What I find objectionable in dualism is the reduction of mind to an individual, interior space of representations, ideas, and concepts. With such a conception, *only* fantasy is possible. I prefer to think and talk about ?consciousness? instead of ?mind,? where consciousness is (an aspect of) our life and activity in a world that sustains us but always goes beyond our efforts to understand it. Our thinking, and our formulation of the problems that we think about, involve, yes, ?distinction but not disunity? in our relation to the world. Martin > On Apr 15, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Hi Martin, > > We are all happy you are back safe and healthy. > > The trio , the book , the separate draft , the once message to Huw are all excellent. You understand where to agree where to disagree. > > You say you oppose Positivists because they say they accept things they can touch as tangibles. Right. > > You say you don?t give so much value to Kant because despite the fact that he assumes a world outside the Mind , he terminates as an agnostic. Right. > > Andy?s stance is obvious. Hegel is no idealist and he?s not alone in this. You are one. > > And my problem is how to compromise Hegel with this your brilliant saying: > > THE ALTERNATIVE , IN BRIEF , IS THAT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD ARISES IN AND FROM OUR PRACTICAL ACTIVITY OF LIVING IN THAT WORLD. > > All through Hegel?s work the primacy of the IDEA blinks at you. In one place he stresses that his only concern is with concepts. His world is not YOUR world as stated so succinctly arising in and from ? He of course deals with this world but in alienation. If he were not for the IDEA , he would not have thought of the public and civil rights and social institutions as having been constituted by their relation to an abstract iconic deemed as superior and all competent as the Monarch , the embodiment and realization of the Institution of the Monarchy as something instilled in mentalities. > > What I then take in your phraseology is that you tend to deny the objectivity and necessity of the rules of Nature and Society which always show themselves within the sphere of your activity in objective material circumstances you apparently know yourself committed to in Brilliant expression (Dialectics in Nature reflecting in Logic as well). When we replace interests with Needs we actually part ways with the workings of this world and seek shelter in the subjective world of interests and interested humans not the actual ones. Circumstances do not always dance to the rhythms of our likings. In many times we get entangled in impositions. How can we escape dislikings? Again by the very changing thoughts of the very changing world dressed in rules , categories , concepts , theories according to the tenets of theorization and scientific research , say , paradigms you say. > > Subjectivity is not realized Utilitarian way. > > By the way , know-how is fused , jointed , concomitant to the Practical Activity , long way to be called science. > > From the time our ancestors said farewell to the visual field and the concrete situation , flights of thinking started in unbounded wonderlands. This we also have with ontogenesis. Part of this flight turn back and come to fruition just if they follow and conform to the very said rules of afore-mentioned discussion. By this again one sees an inclination towards unbounded agency. Some flights are mere phantoms. Some are sweet dreamings necessary to a life compensation. Some are strong enough to turn into life-world transformations. Different points of views are visions and if they are not Cartesian as you stress , they ultimately submit themselves to the rules of the Ontology of This World. But in the beginning of your discussion a while ago you stressed you don?t talk of visions but of a world in which real men and real objects and real processes reign. How this could be regarding your Brilliant expression? All sciences in a final count are abstractions from objective reality manipulated and acted upon by human agents. This means distinction does not mean disunity. We should not forget the contiguousness of the objective world with all concomitant to it as forms of its unique existence. Science now exhibits the 6.5 billion times the Sun-size Black Hole with so huge a Mass. Have we been swallowed by the clear Pic? > > All of us claim that we oppose Cartesianism. [I ALSO remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BUT JUST ONE SECONDARILY RELATED TO THE OTHER MEANING ONCE THERE WAS THE WORLD WITHOUT MEN AND THEIR THOUGHTS)]. This is Monism not Dualism. Dualism , nay , Pluralism occurs when we say ?I think it?s clear that EVERY scientific PARADIGM (What?s a Paradigm?) HAS ITS OWN* ontology.? I would say : DERIVED EXISTENCE-implicit ontology- once inquiringly interrogated-meaning without men it?s gone! Derived existences or ontologies are but EPISTEMS! governed by the Mind. > > Haydi > > > > On Sunday, April 14, 2019, 9:42:45 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer wrote: > > > Hi Haydi, > > First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die hard. > > If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, although we can never know it. > > I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s view. Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems. > > There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what it will look like from a different point of view. > > My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every institution has its own ontology. > > Martin > > > > >> On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: >> >> Martin, >> >> This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or imagined?? **concrete entity." >> >> 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between the independent existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? >> >> 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. >> >> And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a concept. >> >> Haydi >> >> On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer > wrote: >> >> >> Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >> >> Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give is a trivial one. In general you need all the numerous utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only because he took the activity system as a system not a unit in the first place. >> >> Andy >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: >> >> Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: >> >> A. How are you? >> B. Fine, thanks, and you? >> A. XXX >> >> One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >>> >>> Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the book and you put it back on the shelf. >>> >>> That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). >>> >>> We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. >>> >>> Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing is true of the way he uses "utterance". >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Sangmyung University >>> >>> New Article; >>> >>> David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >>> >>> Some e-prints available at: >>> >>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen > wrote: >>> I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: >>>> >>>> According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much longer sequence. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two units. >>>>> The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf >>>>> Andy >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>>>> On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: >>>>>> Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: >>>>>> >>>>>> The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best >>>>>> >>>>>> Arturo >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Sent from Gmail Mobile >>>> >>>> >>>> > > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190417/f7fb9549/attachment.html From hhdave15@gmail.com Wed Apr 17 21:26:21 2019 From: hhdave15@gmail.com (Harshad Dave) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 09:56:21 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] Do we find events of exploitation in wild life system? Message-ID: To: All Friends. Hi, Let us analyze the struggle for survival exclusively in wild life system. Do we find cases/events of "Exploitation of one creature by other creature" in day to day life of the *members of the wild life system*?" (In any case..... if the members (exploiter & exploited) are either within the same species or they are from different species)? or You agree that there is no possibility of exploitation of any creature in wild life system by any other creature. with regards, Harshad Dave -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190418/01bd1b4e/attachment.html From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed Apr 17 23:12:12 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 06:12:12 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <323514132.1095337.1555567932802@mail.yahoo.com> Hi Martin, Many thanks for your scholarly co-operation and all clarifications! As in your invaluable books and numerous papers , this piece and previous pieces narrate for me the story of a scholar who so enthusiastically has traversed the path of scientific research , has tried to crystallize his findings on the Campus and in classes during thirty years , in seminars and gatherings (and if I am a bit qualified) has , despite his humble words , strong roots both in philosophy and psychology and maybe in other disciplines. Whoever reads the short piece below must understand the dimensions of competencies you work with and the fluent and smooth and shiny prose by which you crystallize your deep thoughts. Not only have I benefited from your writings but also have my son and daughter who teach classes who have hijacked the said book on their first visit and observation.? Haydi?? On Wednesday, April 17, 2019, 7:07:08 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer wrote: Hi Haydi, Some years ago I worked my way as far as possible through Hegel?s Phenomenology of Mind, and I also read a number of?commentaries on this book and on Hegel?s larger project. I learned that there are as many interpretations are there are commentators,?and that I am no expert on Hegel! Nor on Marx, but I understand the suggestion that Marx turned Hegel on his head to be referring to the idea that the force or?phenomenon that brings about historical change is not Geist but human practical activity. Any proposal that concepts unfold all by?themselves raises in me the simplistic objection that concepts cannot exist without people. Of course, if humans become extinct the?universe will continue to unfold, but presumably without the help of concepts. These are, at least, my ontological assumptions. So yes, I would view a focus on the dance of disembodied concepts as an alienated viewpoint. And I view the laws of nature and?society as always human creations, and so always as fallible, as revisable, and as formulated in service of human goals and purposes?at a particular moment. These laws are attempts to hold fast in the flux, uncertainly, and mortality of existence.? And I agree that it is real people dealing with real circumstances who imagine, who create, and who have flights of fantasy. What I find?objectionable in dualism is the reduction of mind to an individual, interior space of representations, ideas, and concepts. With such a?conception, *only* fantasy is possible. I prefer to think and talk about ?consciousness? instead of ?mind,? where consciousness is (an?aspect of) our life and activity in a world that sustains us but always goes beyond our efforts to understand it.?Our thinking, and our formulation of the problems that we think about, involve, yes, ?distinction but not disunity? in our relation to the world. Martin On Apr 15, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: Hi Martin, We are all happy you are back safe and healthy. The trio , the book , the separate draft , the once messageto Huw are all excellent. You understand where to agree where to disagree. You say you oppose Positivists because they say they acceptthings they can touch as tangibles. Right. You say you don?t give so much value to Kant because despitethe fact that he assumes a world outside the Mind , he terminates as anagnostic. Right. Andy?s stance is obvious. Hegel is no idealist and he?s notalone in this. You are one. And my problem is how to compromise Hegel with this yourbrilliant saying: THE ALTERNATIVE , IN BRIEF , IS THAT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THEWORLD ARISES IN AND FROM OUR PRACTICAL ?ACTIVITYOF LIVING IN THAT WORLD. All through Hegel?s work the primacy of the IDEA blinks atyou. In one place he stresses that his only concern is with concepts. His worldis not YOUR world as stated so succinctly arising in and from ? He of coursedeals with this world but in alienation. If he were not for the IDEA , he wouldnot have thought of the public and civil rights and social institutions ashaving been constituted by their relation to an abstract iconic deemed assuperior and all competent as the Monarch , the embodiment and realization ofthe Institution of the Monarchy as something instilled in mentalities. What I then take in your phraseology is that you tend todeny the objectivity and necessity of the rules of Nature and Society whichalways show themselves within the sphere of your activity in objective materialcircumstances you apparently know yourself committed to in Brilliant expression(Dialectics in Nature reflecting in Logic as well). When we replace interestswith Needs we actually part ways with the workings of this world and seekshelter in the subjective world of interests and interested humans not theactual ones. Circumstances do not always dance to the rhythms of our likings.In many times we get entangled in impositions. How can we escape dislikings?Again by the very changing thoughts of the very changing world dressed in rules, categories , concepts , theories according to the tenets of theorization andscientific research , say , paradigms you say. Subjectivity is not realized Utilitarian way. By the way , know-how is fused , jointed , concomitant tothe Practical Activity , long way to be called science. >From the time our ancestors said farewell to the visualfield and the concrete situation , flights of thinking started in unboundedwonderlands. This we also have with ontogenesis. Part of this flight turn backand come to fruition just if they follow and conform to the very said rules ofafore-mentioned discussion. By this again one sees an inclination towardsunbounded agency. Some flights are mere phantoms. Some are sweet dreamingsnecessary to a life compensation. Some are strong enough to turn intolife-world transformations. Different points of views are visions and if theyare not Cartesian as you stress , they ultimately submit themselves to therules of the Ontology of This World. But in the beginning of your discussion awhile ago you stressed you don?t talk of visions but of a world in which realmen and real objects and real processes reign. How this could be regarding yourBrilliant expression? All sciences in a final count are abstractions fromobjective reality manipulated and acted upon by human agents. This means distinction does not mean disunity. We should notforget the contiguousness of the objective world with all concomitant to it asforms of its unique existence. Science now exhibits the 6.5 billion times theSun-size Black Hole with so huge a Mass. Have we been swallowed by the clearPic? All of us claim that we oppose Cartesianism. [I ALSO remainfervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entityexist: mental entities and material entities IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BUTJUST ONE SECONDARILY RELATED TO THE OTHER MEANING ONCE THERE WAS THE WORLDWITHOUT MEN AND THEIR THOUGHTS)]. This is Monism not Dualism. Dualism , nay ,Pluralism occurs when we say ?I think it?s clear that EVERY scientific PARADIGM(What?s a Paradigm?) HAS ITS OWN* ontology.? I would say :DERIVED EXISTENCE-implicit ontology- once inquiringly interrogated-meaningwithout men it?s gone! Derived existences or ontologies are but EPISTEMS!?governed by the Mind.??????? Haydi? On Sunday, April 14, 2019, 9:42:45 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer wrote: Hi Haydi, First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die hard. If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? ?These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, although we can never know it.? I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s view. Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems.? There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what it will look like from a different point of view. My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every institution has its own ontology.? Martin On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: Martin, This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or imagined?? **concrete entity."? 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between the independent? existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a concept.? Haydi? ? On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer wrote: Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. Martin On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many of them.? That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give is a trivial one. In general you need all the numerous utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth? generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only because he took the activity system as a system not a unit in the first place. Andy Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: A. How are you? B. Fine, thanks, and you? A. XXX One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A.? Martin On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the book and you put it back on the shelf. That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing is true of the way he uses "utterance".? David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article; ?David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200???????????????????????????????? Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen wrote: I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. ? Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer wrote: According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is the adjacency pair:?a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is functionally dependent on the first.? Question-answer; greeting-greeting; request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move within a conversation.? An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much longer sequence. Martin On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: I would? have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two units. The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf Andy Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate.? Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness. Best Arturo -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190418/6d29c46d/attachment.html From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Apr 18 11:27:28 2019 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:27:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: <323514132.1095337.1555567932802@mail.yahoo.com> References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> <323514132.1095337.1555567932802@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hmm. Haydi, would you like to be my publicist? :) Seriously, you are very kind. You are *too* kind! Martin On Apr 18, 2019, at 1:12 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: Hi Martin, Many thanks for your scholarly co-operation and all clarifications! As in your invaluable books and numerous papers , this piece and previous pieces narrate for me the story of a scholar who so enthusiastically has traversed the path of scientific research , has tried to crystallize his findings on the Campus and in classes during thirty years , in seminars and gatherings (and if I am a bit qualified) has , despite his humble words , strong roots both in philosophy and psychology and maybe in other disciplines. Whoever reads the short piece below must understand the dimensions of competencies you work with and the fluent and smooth and shiny prose by which you crystallize your deep thoughts. Not only have I benefited from your writings but also have my son and daughter who teach classes who have hijacked the said book on their first visit and observation. Haydi On Wednesday, April 17, 2019, 7:07:08 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer > wrote: Hi Haydi, Some years ago I worked my way as far as possible through Hegel?s Phenomenology of Mind, and I also read a number of commentaries on this book and on Hegel?s larger project. I learned that there are as many interpretations are there are commentators, and that I am no expert on Hegel! Nor on Marx, but I understand the suggestion that Marx turned Hegel on his head to be referring to the idea that the force or phenomenon that brings about historical change is not Geist but human practical activity. Any proposal that concepts unfold all by themselves raises in me the simplistic objection that concepts cannot exist without people. Of course, if humans become extinct the universe will continue to unfold, but presumably without the help of concepts. These are, at least, my ontological assumptions. So yes, I would view a focus on the dance of disembodied concepts as an alienated viewpoint. And I view the laws of nature and society as always human creations, and so always as fallible, as revisable, and as formulated in service of human goals and purposes at a particular moment. These laws are attempts to hold fast in the flux, uncertainly, and mortality of existence. And I agree that it is real people dealing with real circumstances who imagine, who create, and who have flights of fantasy. What I find objectionable in dualism is the reduction of mind to an individual, interior space of representations, ideas, and concepts. With such a conception, *only* fantasy is possible. I prefer to think and talk about ?consciousness? instead of ?mind,? where consciousness is (an aspect of) our life and activity in a world that sustains us but always goes beyond our efforts to understand it. Our thinking, and our formulation of the problems that we think about, involve, yes, ?distinction but not disunity? in our relation to the world. Martin On Apr 15, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: Hi Martin, We are all happy you are back safe and healthy. The trio , the book , the separate draft , the once message to Huw are all excellent. You understand where to agree where to disagree. You say you oppose Positivists because they say they accept things they can touch as tangibles. Right. You say you don?t give so much value to Kant because despite the fact that he assumes a world outside the Mind , he terminates as an agnostic. Right. Andy?s stance is obvious. Hegel is no idealist and he?s not alone in this. You are one. And my problem is how to compromise Hegel with this your brilliant saying: THE ALTERNATIVE , IN BRIEF , IS THAT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD ARISES IN AND FROM OUR PRACTICAL ACTIVITY OF LIVING IN THAT WORLD. All through Hegel?s work the primacy of the IDEA blinks at you. In one place he stresses that his only concern is with concepts. His world is not YOUR world as stated so succinctly arising in and from ? He of course deals with this world but in alienation. If he were not for the IDEA , he would not have thought of the public and civil rights and social institutions as having been constituted by their relation to an abstract iconic deemed as superior and all competent as the Monarch , the embodiment and realization of the Institution of the Monarchy as something instilled in mentalities. What I then take in your phraseology is that you tend to deny the objectivity and necessity of the rules of Nature and Society which always show themselves within the sphere of your activity in objective material circumstances you apparently know yourself committed to in Brilliant expression (Dialectics in Nature reflecting in Logic as well). When we replace interests with Needs we actually part ways with the workings of this world and seek shelter in the subjective world of interests and interested humans not the actual ones. Circumstances do not always dance to the rhythms of our likings. In many times we get entangled in impositions. How can we escape dislikings? Again by the very changing thoughts of the very changing world dressed in rules , categories , concepts , theories according to the tenets of theorization and scientific research , say , paradigms you say. Subjectivity is not realized Utilitarian way. By the way , know-how is fused , jointed , concomitant to the Practical Activity , long way to be called science. From the time our ancestors said farewell to the visual field and the concrete situation , flights of thinking started in unbounded wonderlands. This we also have with ontogenesis. Part of this flight turn back and come to fruition just if they follow and conform to the very said rules of afore-mentioned discussion. By this again one sees an inclination towards unbounded agency. Some flights are mere phantoms. Some are sweet dreamings necessary to a life compensation. Some are strong enough to turn into life-world transformations. Different points of views are visions and if they are not Cartesian as you stress , they ultimately submit themselves to the rules of the Ontology of This World. But in the beginning of your discussion a while ago you stressed you don?t talk of visions but of a world in which real men and real objects and real processes reign. How this could be regarding your Brilliant expression? All sciences in a final count are abstractions from objective reality manipulated and acted upon by human agents. This means distinction does not mean disunity. We should not forget the contiguousness of the objective world with all concomitant to it as forms of its unique existence. Science now exhibits the 6.5 billion times the Sun-size Black Hole with so huge a Mass. Have we been swallowed by the clear Pic? All of us claim that we oppose Cartesianism. [I ALSO remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BUT JUST ONE SECONDARILY RELATED TO THE OTHER MEANING ONCE THERE WAS THE WORLD WITHOUT MEN AND THEIR THOUGHTS)]. This is Monism not Dualism. Dualism , nay , Pluralism occurs when we say ?I think it?s clear that EVERY scientific PARADIGM (What?s a Paradigm?) HAS ITS OWN* ontology.? I would say : DERIVED EXISTENCE-implicit ontology- once inquiringly interrogated-meaning without men it?s gone! Derived existences or ontologies are but EPISTEMS! governed by the Mind. Haydi On Sunday, April 14, 2019, 9:42:45 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer > wrote: Hi Haydi, First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die hard. If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, although we can never know it. I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s view. Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems. There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what it will look like from a different point of view. My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every institution has its own ontology. Martin On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: Martin, This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or imagined?? **concrete entity." 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between the independent existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a concept. Haydi On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer > wrote: Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. Martin On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give is a trivial one. In general you need all the numerous utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only because he took the activity system as a system not a unit in the first place. Andy ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: A. How are you? B. Fine, thanks, and you? A. XXX One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. Martin On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the book and you put it back on the shelf. That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing is true of the way he uses "utterance". David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article; David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen > wrote: I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much longer sequence. Martin On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two units. The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf Andy ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness. Best Arturo -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190418/1a3152bf/attachment.html From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Apr 18 11:38:07 2019 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 11:38:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> <323514132.1095337.1555567932802@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: He?s being objective On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 11:32 AM Martin John Packer wrote: > Hmm. Haydi, would you like to be my publicist? :) > > Seriously, you are very kind. You are *too* kind! > > Martin > > On Apr 18, 2019, at 1:12 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > Hi Martin, > > Many thanks for your scholarly co-operation and all clarifications! As in > your invaluable books and numerous papers , this piece and previous pieces > narrate for me the story of a scholar who so enthusiastically has traversed > the path of scientific research , has tried to crystallize his findings on > the Campus and in classes during thirty years , in seminars and gatherings > (and if I am a bit qualified) has , despite his humble words , strong roots > both in philosophy and psychology and maybe in other disciplines. Whoever > reads the short piece below must understand the dimensions of competencies > you work with and the fluent and smooth and shiny prose by which you > crystallize your deep thoughts. Not only have I benefited from your > writings but also have my son and daughter who teach classes who have > hijacked the said book on their first visit and observation. > > Haydi > > On Wednesday, April 17, 2019, 7:07:08 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer < > mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: > > > Hi Haydi, > > Some years ago I worked my way as far as possible through Hegel?s > Phenomenology of Mind, and I also read a number of commentaries on this > book and on Hegel?s larger project. I learned that there are as many > interpretations are there are commentators, and that I am no expert on > Hegel! > > Nor on Marx, but I understand the suggestion that Marx turned Hegel on his > head to be referring to the idea that the force or phenomenon that brings > about historical change is not Geist but human practical activity. Any > proposal that concepts unfold all by themselves raises in me the simplistic > objection that concepts cannot exist without people. Of course, if humans > become extinct the universe will continue to unfold, but presumably without > the help of concepts. These are, at least, my ontological assumptions. > > So yes, I would view a focus on the dance of disembodied concepts as an > alienated viewpoint. And I view the laws of nature and society as always > human creations, and so always as fallible, as revisable, and as formulated > in service of human goals and purposes at a particular moment. These laws > are attempts to hold fast in the flux, uncertainly, and mortality of > existence. > > And I agree that it is real people dealing with real circumstances who > imagine, who create, and who have flights of fantasy. What I > find objectionable in dualism is the reduction of mind to an individual, > interior space of representations, ideas, and concepts. With such > a conception, *only* fantasy is possible. I prefer to think and talk about > ?consciousness? instead of ?mind,? where consciousness is (an aspect of) > our life and activity in a world that sustains us but always goes beyond > our efforts to understand it. Our thinking, and our formulation of the > problems that we think about, involve, yes, ?distinction but not disunity? > in our relation to the world. > > Martin > > On Apr 15, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > Hi Martin, > > We are all happy you are back safe and healthy. > > The trio , the book , the separate draft , the once message to Huw are all > excellent. You understand where to agree where to disagree. > > You say you oppose Positivists because they say they accept things they > can touch as tangibles. Right. > > You say you don?t give so much value to Kant because despite the fact that > he assumes a world outside the Mind , he terminates as an agnostic. Right. > > Andy?s stance is obvious. Hegel is no idealist and he?s not alone in this. > You are one. > > And my problem is how to compromise Hegel with this your brilliant saying: > > THE ALTERNATIVE , IN BRIEF , IS THAT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD ARISES > IN AND FROM OUR PRACTICAL ACTIVITY OF LIVING IN THAT WORLD. > > All through Hegel?s work the primacy of the IDEA blinks at you. In one > place he stresses that his only concern is with concepts. His world is not > YOUR world as stated so succinctly arising in and from ? He of course deals > with this world but in alienation. If he were not for the IDEA , he would > not have thought of the public and civil rights and social institutions as > having been constituted by their relation to an abstract iconic deemed as > superior and all competent as the Monarch , the embodiment and realization > of the Institution of the Monarchy as something instilled in mentalities. > > What I then take in your phraseology is that you tend to deny the > objectivity and necessity of the rules of Nature and Society which always > show themselves within the sphere of your activity in objective material > circumstances you apparently know yourself committed to in Brilliant > expression (Dialectics in Nature reflecting in Logic as well). When we > replace interests with Needs we actually part ways with the workings of > this world and seek shelter in the subjective world of interests and > interested humans not the actual ones. Circumstances do not always dance to > the rhythms of our likings. In many times we get entangled in impositions. > How can we escape dislikings? Again by the very changing thoughts of the > very changing world dressed in rules , categories , concepts , theories > according to the tenets of theorization and scientific research , say , > paradigms you say. > > Subjectivity is not realized Utilitarian way. > > By the way , know-how is fused , jointed , concomitant to the Practical > Activity , long way to be called science. > > From the time our ancestors said farewell to the visual field and the > concrete situation , flights of thinking started in unbounded wonderlands. > This we also have with ontogenesis. Part of this flight turn back and come > to fruition just if they follow and conform to the very said rules of > afore-mentioned discussion. By this again one sees an inclination towards > unbounded agency. Some flights are mere phantoms. Some are sweet dreamings > necessary to a life compensation. Some are strong enough to turn into > life-world transformations. Different points of views are visions and if > they are not Cartesian as you stress , they ultimately submit themselves to > the rules of the Ontology of This World. But in the beginning of your > discussion a while ago you stressed you don?t talk of visions but of a > world in which real men and real objects and real processes reign. How this > could be regarding your Brilliant expression? All sciences in a final count > are abstractions from objective reality manipulated and acted upon by human > agents. This means distinction does not mean disunity. We should not forget > the contiguousness of the objective world with all concomitant to it as > forms of its unique existence. Science now exhibits the 6.5 billion times > the Sun-size Black Hole with so huge a Mass. Have we been swallowed by the > clear Pic? > > All of us claim that we oppose Cartesianism. [I ALSO remain fervently > opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: > mental entities and material entities IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BUT JUST > ONE SECONDARILY RELATED TO THE OTHER MEANING ONCE THERE WAS THE WORLD > WITHOUT MEN AND THEIR THOUGHTS)]. This is Monism not Dualism. Dualism , nay > , Pluralism occurs when we say ?I think it?s clear that EVERY scientific > PARADIGM (What?s a Paradigm?) HAS ITS *OWN** ontology.? I would say : > DERIVED EXISTENCE-implicit ontology- once inquiringly interrogated-meaning > without men it?s gone! Derived existences or ontologies are but EPISTEMS!* governed > by the Mind.* > > Haydi > > > On Sunday, April 14, 2019, 9:42:45 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer < > mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: > > > Hi Haydi, > > First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that > writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die > hard. > > If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is > an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one > that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is > our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? > These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in > the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense > ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has > the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant > argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, > although we can never know it. > > I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s view. > Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various > philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy > noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world > arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is > nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises > from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s > not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested > knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems. > > There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions > in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we > are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what > it will look like from a different point of view. > > My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I > remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds > of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer > a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own > ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every > institution has its own ontology. > > Martin > > > > > On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > Martin, > > This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick > (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one > thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is > science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to > make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a > sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, > that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a > concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or > imagined?? **concrete entity." > > 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just > two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean > "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while > you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having > the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I > think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between > the independent existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived > existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an > instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? > > 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete > entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. > > And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts > find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any > concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a > concept. > > Haydi > > On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer < > mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: > > > Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all > the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs > all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so > do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single > word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this > implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To > define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from > its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a > sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real > or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a > tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on > how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. > > Martin > > > > > On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many > of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give > is a trivial one. In general you need * all* the numerous utterances in a > conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom > who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth > generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only > because he took the activity system as a * system *not a * unit *in the > first place. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: > > Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is > precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: > > A. How are you? > B. Fine, thanks, and you? > A. XXX > > One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and > you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might > have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d > suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. > > Martin > > > > > On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is > deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be > considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The > novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the > book and you put it back on the shelf. > > That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that > literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language > stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. > But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full > time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand > how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their > function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has > evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in > "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). > > We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) > with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). > It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how > conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its > their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But > it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when > you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there > seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a > whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the > element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. > > Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many > different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing > is true of the way he uses "utterance". > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article; > > David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S > ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE > WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational > Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 > > > > Some e-prints available at: > > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 > > > > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen > wrote: > > I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, > by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that > responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. > Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream > of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > > According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is > the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is > functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; > request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move > within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is > a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much > longer sequence. > > Martin > > > > > On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer > actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a > compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step > backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind > saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or > something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of > activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: > commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two > units. > > The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin > Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: > > https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: > > Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. > > Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: > > The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, > unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries > within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what > reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from > a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech > to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the > inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that > he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, > evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective > (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building > material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony > is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying > personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and > the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech > acts, communication, and consciousness. > > Best > > Arturo > > > -- > Sent from Gmail Mobile > > > > > > > > > > -- The past is a foreign country. They do things differently there. L.P. Hartley -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190418/6cb1eb86/attachment.html From jamesma320@gmail.com Thu Apr 18 11:53:20 2019 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 19:53:20 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> <323514132.1095337.1555567932802@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Yes, and also using consciousness to figure out consciousness! James mike cole ? 2019?4?18??? 19:41??? > He?s being objective > > On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 11:32 AM Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> Hmm. Haydi, would you like to be my publicist? :) >> >> Seriously, you are very kind. You are *too* kind! >> >> Martin >> >> On Apr 18, 2019, at 1:12 AM, Haydi Zulfei >> wrote: >> >> Hi Martin, >> >> Many thanks for your scholarly co-operation and all clarifications! As in >> your invaluable books and numerous papers , this piece and previous pieces >> narrate for me the story of a scholar who so enthusiastically has traversed >> the path of scientific research , has tried to crystallize his findings on >> the Campus and in classes during thirty years , in seminars and gatherings >> (and if I am a bit qualified) has , despite his humble words , strong roots >> both in philosophy and psychology and maybe in other disciplines. Whoever >> reads the short piece below must understand the dimensions of competencies >> you work with and the fluent and smooth and shiny prose by which you >> crystallize your deep thoughts. Not only have I benefited from your >> writings but also have my son and daughter who teach classes who have >> hijacked the said book on their first visit and observation. >> >> Haydi >> >> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019, 7:07:08 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer < >> mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: >> >> >> Hi Haydi, >> >> Some years ago I worked my way as far as possible through Hegel?s >> Phenomenology of Mind, and I also read a number of commentaries on this >> book and on Hegel?s larger project. I learned that there are as many >> interpretations are there are commentators, and that I am no expert on >> Hegel! >> >> Nor on Marx, but I understand the suggestion that Marx turned Hegel on >> his head to be referring to the idea that the force or phenomenon that >> brings about historical change is not Geist but human practical activity. >> Any proposal that concepts unfold all by themselves raises in me the >> simplistic objection that concepts cannot exist without people. Of course, >> if humans become extinct the universe will continue to unfold, but >> presumably without the help of concepts. These are, at least, my >> ontological assumptions. >> >> So yes, I would view a focus on the dance of disembodied concepts as an >> alienated viewpoint. And I view the laws of nature and society as always >> human creations, and so always as fallible, as revisable, and as formulated >> in service of human goals and purposes at a particular moment. These laws >> are attempts to hold fast in the flux, uncertainly, and mortality of >> existence. >> >> And I agree that it is real people dealing with real circumstances who >> imagine, who create, and who have flights of fantasy. What I >> find objectionable in dualism is the reduction of mind to an individual, >> interior space of representations, ideas, and concepts. With such >> a conception, *only* fantasy is possible. I prefer to think and talk about >> ?consciousness? instead of ?mind,? where consciousness is (an aspect of) >> our life and activity in a world that sustains us but always goes beyond >> our efforts to understand it. Our thinking, and our formulation of the >> problems that we think about, involve, yes, ?distinction but not disunity? >> in our relation to the world. >> >> Martin >> >> On Apr 15, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Haydi Zulfei >> wrote: >> >> Hi Martin, >> >> We are all happy you are back safe and healthy. >> >> The trio , the book , the separate draft , the once message to Huw are >> all excellent. You understand where to agree where to disagree. >> >> You say you oppose Positivists because they say they accept things they >> can touch as tangibles. Right. >> >> You say you don?t give so much value to Kant because despite the fact >> that he assumes a world outside the Mind , he terminates as an agnostic. >> Right. >> >> Andy?s stance is obvious. Hegel is no idealist and he?s not alone in >> this. You are one. >> >> And my problem is how to compromise Hegel with this your brilliant saying: >> >> THE ALTERNATIVE , IN BRIEF , IS THAT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD ARISES >> IN AND FROM OUR PRACTICAL ACTIVITY OF LIVING IN THAT WORLD. >> >> All through Hegel?s work the primacy of the IDEA blinks at you. In one >> place he stresses that his only concern is with concepts. His world is not >> YOUR world as stated so succinctly arising in and from ? He of course deals >> with this world but in alienation. If he were not for the IDEA , he would >> not have thought of the public and civil rights and social institutions as >> having been constituted by their relation to an abstract iconic deemed as >> superior and all competent as the Monarch , the embodiment and realization >> of the Institution of the Monarchy as something instilled in mentalities. >> >> What I then take in your phraseology is that you tend to deny the >> objectivity and necessity of the rules of Nature and Society which always >> show themselves within the sphere of your activity in objective material >> circumstances you apparently know yourself committed to in Brilliant >> expression (Dialectics in Nature reflecting in Logic as well). When we >> replace interests with Needs we actually part ways with the workings of >> this world and seek shelter in the subjective world of interests and >> interested humans not the actual ones. Circumstances do not always dance to >> the rhythms of our likings. In many times we get entangled in impositions. >> How can we escape dislikings? Again by the very changing thoughts of the >> very changing world dressed in rules , categories , concepts , theories >> according to the tenets of theorization and scientific research , say , >> paradigms you say. >> >> Subjectivity is not realized Utilitarian way. >> >> By the way , know-how is fused , jointed , concomitant to the Practical >> Activity , long way to be called science. >> >> From the time our ancestors said farewell to the visual field and the >> concrete situation , flights of thinking started in unbounded wonderlands. >> This we also have with ontogenesis. Part of this flight turn back and come >> to fruition just if they follow and conform to the very said rules of >> afore-mentioned discussion. By this again one sees an inclination towards >> unbounded agency. Some flights are mere phantoms. Some are sweet dreamings >> necessary to a life compensation. Some are strong enough to turn into >> life-world transformations. Different points of views are visions and if >> they are not Cartesian as you stress , they ultimately submit themselves to >> the rules of the Ontology of This World. But in the beginning of your >> discussion a while ago you stressed you don?t talk of visions but of a >> world in which real men and real objects and real processes reign. How this >> could be regarding your Brilliant expression? All sciences in a final count >> are abstractions from objective reality manipulated and acted upon by human >> agents. This means distinction does not mean disunity. We should not forget >> the contiguousness of the objective world with all concomitant to it as >> forms of its unique existence. Science now exhibits the 6.5 billion times >> the Sun-size Black Hole with so huge a Mass. Have we been swallowed by the >> clear Pic? >> >> All of us claim that we oppose Cartesianism. [I ALSO remain fervently >> opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: >> mental entities and material entities IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BUT JUST >> ONE SECONDARILY RELATED TO THE OTHER MEANING ONCE THERE WAS THE WORLD >> WITHOUT MEN AND THEIR THOUGHTS)]. This is Monism not Dualism. Dualism , nay >> , Pluralism occurs when we say ?I think it?s clear that EVERY scientific >> PARADIGM (What?s a Paradigm?) HAS ITS *OWN** ontology.? I would say : >> DERIVED EXISTENCE-implicit ontology- once inquiringly interrogated-meaning >> without men it?s gone! Derived existences or ontologies are but EPISTEMS!* governed >> by the Mind.* >> >> Haydi >> >> >> On Sunday, April 14, 2019, 9:42:45 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer < >> mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: >> >> >> Hi Haydi, >> >> First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that >> writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die >> hard. >> >> If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is >> an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one >> that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is >> our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? >> These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in >> the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense >> ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has >> the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant >> argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, >> although we can never know it. >> >> I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s >> view. Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various >> philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy >> noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world >> arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is >> nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises >> from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s >> not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested >> knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems. >> >> There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions >> in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we >> are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what >> it will look like from a different point of view. >> >> My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I >> remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds >> of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer >> a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own >> ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every >> institution has its own ontology. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei >> wrote: >> >> Martin, >> >> This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick >> (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one >> thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is >> science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to >> make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a >> sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, >> that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a >> concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or >> imagined?? **concrete entity." >> >> 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just >> two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean >> "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while >> you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having >> the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I >> think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between >> the independent existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived >> existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an >> instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? >> >> 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete >> entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. >> >> And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts >> find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any >> concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a >> concept. >> >> Haydi >> >> On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer < >> mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: >> >> >> Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all >> the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs >> all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so >> do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single >> word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this >> implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To >> define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from >> its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a >> sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real >> or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a >> tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on >> how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, >> many of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you >> give is a trivial one. In general you need * all* the numerous >> utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is >> like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a >> new "fourth generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But >> that is only because he took the activity system as a * system *not a * >> unit *in the first place. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: >> >> Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is >> precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: >> >> A. How are you? >> B. Fine, thanks, and you? >> A. XXX >> >> One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and >> you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might >> have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d >> suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is >> deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be >> considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The >> novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the >> book and you put it back on the shelf. >> >> That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that >> literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language >> stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. >> But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full >> time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand >> how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their >> function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has >> evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in >> "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). >> >> We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than >> macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, >> "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of >> understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people >> know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been >> broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel >> that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" >> there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange >> as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the >> element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. >> >> Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many >> different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing >> is true of the way he uses "utterance". >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article; >> >> David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S >> ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE >> WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational >> Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >> >> >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen >> wrote: >> >> I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, >> by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that >> responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. >> Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream >> of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> >> >> On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer wrote: >> >> According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is >> the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is >> functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; >> request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move >> within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is >> a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much >> longer sequence. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer >> actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a >> compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step >> backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind >> saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or >> something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of >> activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: >> commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two >> units. >> >> The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin >> Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: >> >> https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >> On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: >> >> Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. >> >> Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: >> >> The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, >> unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries >> within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what >> reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from >> a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech >> to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the >> inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that >> he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, >> evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective >> (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building >> material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony >> is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying >> personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and >> the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech >> acts, communication, and consciousness. >> >> Best >> >> Arturo >> >> >> -- >> Sent from Gmail Mobile >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- > The past is a foreign country. They do things differently there. > L.P. Hartley > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190418/aa4ce39e/attachment.html From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Apr 18 12:29:44 2019 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 13:29:44 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> <323514132.1095337.1555567932802@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: loved "fluent and smooth and shiny prose". True. -greg On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 12:32 PM Martin John Packer wrote: > Hmm. Haydi, would you like to be my publicist? :) > > Seriously, you are very kind. You are *too* kind! > > Martin > > On Apr 18, 2019, at 1:12 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > Hi Martin, > > Many thanks for your scholarly co-operation and all clarifications! As in > your invaluable books and numerous papers , this piece and previous pieces > narrate for me the story of a scholar who so enthusiastically has traversed > the path of scientific research , has tried to crystallize his findings on > the Campus and in classes during thirty years , in seminars and gatherings > (and if I am a bit qualified) has , despite his humble words , strong roots > both in philosophy and psychology and maybe in other disciplines. Whoever > reads the short piece below must understand the dimensions of competencies > you work with and the fluent and smooth and shiny prose by which you > crystallize your deep thoughts. Not only have I benefited from your > writings but also have my son and daughter who teach classes who have > hijacked the said book on their first visit and observation. > > Haydi > > On Wednesday, April 17, 2019, 7:07:08 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer < > mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: > > > Hi Haydi, > > Some years ago I worked my way as far as possible through Hegel?s > Phenomenology of Mind, and I also read a number of commentaries on this > book and on Hegel?s larger project. I learned that there are as many > interpretations are there are commentators, and that I am no expert on > Hegel! > > Nor on Marx, but I understand the suggestion that Marx turned Hegel on his > head to be referring to the idea that the force or phenomenon that brings > about historical change is not Geist but human practical activity. Any > proposal that concepts unfold all by themselves raises in me the simplistic > objection that concepts cannot exist without people. Of course, if humans > become extinct the universe will continue to unfold, but presumably without > the help of concepts. These are, at least, my ontological assumptions. > > So yes, I would view a focus on the dance of disembodied concepts as an > alienated viewpoint. And I view the laws of nature and society as always > human creations, and so always as fallible, as revisable, and as formulated > in service of human goals and purposes at a particular moment. These laws > are attempts to hold fast in the flux, uncertainly, and mortality of > existence. > > And I agree that it is real people dealing with real circumstances who > imagine, who create, and who have flights of fantasy. What I > find objectionable in dualism is the reduction of mind to an individual, > interior space of representations, ideas, and concepts. With such > a conception, *only* fantasy is possible. I prefer to think and talk about > ?consciousness? instead of ?mind,? where consciousness is (an aspect of) > our life and activity in a world that sustains us but always goes beyond > our efforts to understand it. Our thinking, and our formulation of the > problems that we think about, involve, yes, ?distinction but not disunity? > in our relation to the world. > > Martin > > On Apr 15, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > Hi Martin, > > We are all happy you are back safe and healthy. > > The trio , the book , the separate draft , the once message to Huw are all > excellent. You understand where to agree where to disagree. > > You say you oppose Positivists because they say they accept things they > can touch as tangibles. Right. > > You say you don?t give so much value to Kant because despite the fact that > he assumes a world outside the Mind , he terminates as an agnostic. Right. > > Andy?s stance is obvious. Hegel is no idealist and he?s not alone in this. > You are one. > > And my problem is how to compromise Hegel with this your brilliant saying: > > THE ALTERNATIVE , IN BRIEF , IS THAT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD ARISES > IN AND FROM OUR PRACTICAL ACTIVITY OF LIVING IN THAT WORLD. > > All through Hegel?s work the primacy of the IDEA blinks at you. In one > place he stresses that his only concern is with concepts. His world is not > YOUR world as stated so succinctly arising in and from ? He of course deals > with this world but in alienation. If he were not for the IDEA , he would > not have thought of the public and civil rights and social institutions as > having been constituted by their relation to an abstract iconic deemed as > superior and all competent as the Monarch , the embodiment and realization > of the Institution of the Monarchy as something instilled in mentalities. > > What I then take in your phraseology is that you tend to deny the > objectivity and necessity of the rules of Nature and Society which always > show themselves within the sphere of your activity in objective material > circumstances you apparently know yourself committed to in Brilliant > expression (Dialectics in Nature reflecting in Logic as well). When we > replace interests with Needs we actually part ways with the workings of > this world and seek shelter in the subjective world of interests and > interested humans not the actual ones. Circumstances do not always dance to > the rhythms of our likings. In many times we get entangled in impositions. > How can we escape dislikings? Again by the very changing thoughts of the > very changing world dressed in rules , categories , concepts , theories > according to the tenets of theorization and scientific research , say , > paradigms you say. > > Subjectivity is not realized Utilitarian way. > > By the way , know-how is fused , jointed , concomitant to the Practical > Activity , long way to be called science. > > From the time our ancestors said farewell to the visual field and the > concrete situation , flights of thinking started in unbounded wonderlands. > This we also have with ontogenesis. Part of this flight turn back and come > to fruition just if they follow and conform to the very said rules of > afore-mentioned discussion. By this again one sees an inclination towards > unbounded agency. Some flights are mere phantoms. Some are sweet dreamings > necessary to a life compensation. Some are strong enough to turn into > life-world transformations. Different points of views are visions and if > they are not Cartesian as you stress , they ultimately submit themselves to > the rules of the Ontology of This World. But in the beginning of your > discussion a while ago you stressed you don?t talk of visions but of a > world in which real men and real objects and real processes reign. How this > could be regarding your Brilliant expression? All sciences in a final count > are abstractions from objective reality manipulated and acted upon by human > agents. This means distinction does not mean disunity. We should not forget > the contiguousness of the objective world with all concomitant to it as > forms of its unique existence. Science now exhibits the 6.5 billion times > the Sun-size Black Hole with so huge a Mass. Have we been swallowed by the > clear Pic? > > All of us claim that we oppose Cartesianism. [I ALSO remain fervently > opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: > mental entities and material entities IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BUT JUST > ONE SECONDARILY RELATED TO THE OTHER MEANING ONCE THERE WAS THE WORLD > WITHOUT MEN AND THEIR THOUGHTS)]. This is Monism not Dualism. Dualism , nay > , Pluralism occurs when we say ?I think it?s clear that EVERY scientific > PARADIGM (What?s a Paradigm?) HAS ITS *OWN** ontology.? I would say : > DERIVED EXISTENCE-implicit ontology- once inquiringly interrogated-meaning > without men it?s gone! Derived existences or ontologies are but EPISTEMS!* governed > by the Mind.* > > Haydi > > > On Sunday, April 14, 2019, 9:42:45 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer < > mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: > > > Hi Haydi, > > First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that > writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die > hard. > > If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is > an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one > that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is > our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? > These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in > the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense > ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has > the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant > argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, > although we can never know it. > > I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s view. > Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various > philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy > noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world > arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is > nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises > from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s > not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested > knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems. > > There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions > in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we > are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what > it will look like from a different point of view. > > My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I > remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds > of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer > a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own > ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every > institution has its own ontology. > > Martin > > > > > On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > Martin, > > This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick > (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one > thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is > science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to > make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a > sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, > that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a > concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or > imagined?? **concrete entity." > > 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just > two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean > "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while > you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having > the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I > think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between > the independent existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived > existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an > instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? > > 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete > entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. > > And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts > find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any > concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a > concept. > > Haydi > > On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer < > mpacker@cantab.net> wrote: > > > Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all > the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs > all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so > do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single > word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this > implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To > define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from > its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a > sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real > or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a > tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on > how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. > > Martin > > > > > On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many > of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give > is a trivial one. In general you need * all* the numerous utterances in a > conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom > who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth > generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only > because he took the activity system as a * system *not a * unit *in the > first place. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: > > Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is > precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: > > A. How are you? > B. Fine, thanks, and you? > A. XXX > > One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and > you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might > have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d > suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. > > Martin > > > > > On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is > deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be > considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The > novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the > book and you put it back on the shelf. > > That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that > literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language > stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. > But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full > time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand > how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their > function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has > evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in > "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). > > We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) > with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). > It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how > conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its > their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But > it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when > you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there > seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a > whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the > element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. > > Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many > different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing > is true of the way he uses "utterance". > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article; > > David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S > ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE > WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational > Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 > > > > Some e-prints available at: > > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 > > > > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen > wrote: > > I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, > by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that > responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. > Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream > of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > > According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is > the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is > functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; > request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move > within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is > a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much > longer sequence. > > Martin > > > > > On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer > actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a > compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step > backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind > saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or > something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of > activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: > commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two > units. > > The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin > Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: > > https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: > > Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. > > Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: > > The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, > unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries > within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what > reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from > a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech > to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the > inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that > he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, > evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective > (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building > material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony > is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying > personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and > the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech > acts, communication, and consciousness. > > Best > > Arturo > > > -- > Sent from Gmail Mobile > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190418/2f7b8e0a/attachment.html From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Thu Apr 18 15:11:19 2019 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 22:11:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce In-Reply-To: References: <7773bf30-7526-ea91-fe0d-665d192d9cd5@marxists.org> <4ED8D190-08FC-446C-94C3-8D5497D76AA8@tlu.ee> <63a8104e-782a-bb05-04e6-82c0d33406b2@marxists.org> <0d13dd85-0d87-0542-7846-beaaa07b88ab@marxists.org> <62CEFC32-5F7F-4D61-8E06-DF7E1AC6F2DF@cantab.net> <5D9EC25C-E958-4BC5-A64A-2086436D53F3@gmail.com> <231A47AB-C85C-4E4D-A52C-9AE05F675BC3@cantab.net> <373a5e3a-0578-12c6-b634-dbd958461978@marxists.org> <6A46B6CC-927E-41F3-BCC2-6020CA3CFEBD@cantab.net> <1759812130.11386824.1552926651443@mail.yahoo.com> <6247C40D-450A-420F-8DF8-AEF39C7E01C0@cantab.net> <2009615297.1596009.1555326607142@mail.yahoo.com> <323514132.1095337.1555567932802@mail.yahoo.com> , Message-ID: thank you, Larry. okay, so Bill, John, Vitauts and i will pick up the responsibility for scheduling the additional days. thanks! phillip ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 1:29 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Saussure vs Peirce loved "fluent and smooth and shiny prose". True. -greg On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 12:32 PM Martin John Packer > wrote: Hmm. Haydi, would you like to be my publicist? :) Seriously, you are very kind. You are *too* kind! Martin On Apr 18, 2019, at 1:12 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: Hi Martin, Many thanks for your scholarly co-operation and all clarifications! As in your invaluable books and numerous papers , this piece and previous pieces narrate for me the story of a scholar who so enthusiastically has traversed the path of scientific research , has tried to crystallize his findings on the Campus and in classes during thirty years , in seminars and gatherings (and if I am a bit qualified) has , despite his humble words , strong roots both in philosophy and psychology and maybe in other disciplines. Whoever reads the short piece below must understand the dimensions of competencies you work with and the fluent and smooth and shiny prose by which you crystallize your deep thoughts. Not only have I benefited from your writings but also have my son and daughter who teach classes who have hijacked the said book on their first visit and observation. Haydi On Wednesday, April 17, 2019, 7:07:08 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer > wrote: Hi Haydi, Some years ago I worked my way as far as possible through Hegel?s Phenomenology of Mind, and I also read a number of commentaries on this book and on Hegel?s larger project. I learned that there are as many interpretations are there are commentators, and that I am no expert on Hegel! Nor on Marx, but I understand the suggestion that Marx turned Hegel on his head to be referring to the idea that the force or phenomenon that brings about historical change is not Geist but human practical activity. Any proposal that concepts unfold all by themselves raises in me the simplistic objection that concepts cannot exist without people. Of course, if humans become extinct the universe will continue to unfold, but presumably without the help of concepts. These are, at least, my ontological assumptions. So yes, I would view a focus on the dance of disembodied concepts as an alienated viewpoint. And I view the laws of nature and society as always human creations, and so always as fallible, as revisable, and as formulated in service of human goals and purposes at a particular moment. These laws are attempts to hold fast in the flux, uncertainly, and mortality of existence. And I agree that it is real people dealing with real circumstances who imagine, who create, and who have flights of fantasy. What I find objectionable in dualism is the reduction of mind to an individual, interior space of representations, ideas, and concepts. With such a conception, *only* fantasy is possible. I prefer to think and talk about ?consciousness? instead of ?mind,? where consciousness is (an aspect of) our life and activity in a world that sustains us but always goes beyond our efforts to understand it. Our thinking, and our formulation of the problems that we think about, involve, yes, ?distinction but not disunity? in our relation to the world. Martin On Apr 15, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: Hi Martin, We are all happy you are back safe and healthy. The trio , the book , the separate draft , the once message to Huw are all excellent. You understand where to agree where to disagree. You say you oppose Positivists because they say they accept things they can touch as tangibles. Right. You say you don?t give so much value to Kant because despite the fact that he assumes a world outside the Mind , he terminates as an agnostic. Right. Andy?s stance is obvious. Hegel is no idealist and he?s not alone in this. You are one. And my problem is how to compromise Hegel with this your brilliant saying: THE ALTERNATIVE , IN BRIEF , IS THAT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD ARISES IN AND FROM OUR PRACTICAL ACTIVITY OF LIVING IN THAT WORLD. All through Hegel?s work the primacy of the IDEA blinks at you. In one place he stresses that his only concern is with concepts. His world is not YOUR world as stated so succinctly arising in and from ? He of course deals with this world but in alienation. If he were not for the IDEA , he would not have thought of the public and civil rights and social institutions as having been constituted by their relation to an abstract iconic deemed as superior and all competent as the Monarch , the embodiment and realization of the Institution of the Monarchy as something instilled in mentalities. What I then take in your phraseology is that you tend to deny the objectivity and necessity of the rules of Nature and Society which always show themselves within the sphere of your activity in objective material circumstances you apparently know yourself committed to in Brilliant expression (Dialectics in Nature reflecting in Logic as well). When we replace interests with Needs we actually part ways with the workings of this world and seek shelter in the subjective world of interests and interested humans not the actual ones. Circumstances do not always dance to the rhythms of our likings. In many times we get entangled in impositions. How can we escape dislikings? Again by the very changing thoughts of the very changing world dressed in rules , categories , concepts , theories according to the tenets of theorization and scientific research , say , paradigms you say. Subjectivity is not realized Utilitarian way. By the way , know-how is fused , jointed , concomitant to the Practical Activity , long way to be called science. >From the time our ancestors said farewell to the visual field and the concrete situation , flights of thinking started in unbounded wonderlands. This we also have with ontogenesis. Part of this flight turn back and come to fruition just if they follow and conform to the very said rules of afore-mentioned discussion. By this again one sees an inclination towards unbounded agency. Some flights are mere phantoms. Some are sweet dreamings necessary to a life compensation. Some are strong enough to turn into life-world transformations. Different points of views are visions and if they are not Cartesian as you stress , they ultimately submit themselves to the rules of the Ontology of This World. But in the beginning of your discussion a while ago you stressed you don?t talk of visions but of a world in which real men and real objects and real processes reign. How this could be regarding your Brilliant expression? All sciences in a final count are abstractions from objective reality manipulated and acted upon by human agents. This means distinction does not mean disunity. We should not forget the contiguousness of the objective world with all concomitant to it as forms of its unique existence. Science now exhibits the 6.5 billion times the Sun-size Black Hole with so huge a Mass. Have we been swallowed by the clear Pic? All of us claim that we oppose Cartesianism. [I ALSO remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BUT JUST ONE SECONDARILY RELATED TO THE OTHER MEANING ONCE THERE WAS THE WORLD WITHOUT MEN AND THEIR THOUGHTS)]. This is Monism not Dualism. Dualism , nay , Pluralism occurs when we say ?I think it?s clear that EVERY scientific PARADIGM (What?s a Paradigm?) HAS ITS OWN* ontology.? I would say : DERIVED EXISTENCE-implicit ontology- once inquiringly interrogated-meaning without men it?s gone! Derived existences or ontologies are but EPISTEMS! governed by the Mind. Haydi On Sunday, April 14, 2019, 9:42:45 PM GMT+4:30, Martin Packer > wrote: Hi Haydi, First, let me apologize for the length of the book. I used to think that writers are paid by the word. Sadly that?s rarely true, but old habits die hard. If you have read on, you will have discovered that central to the book is an argument that Kant was responsible for a mistaken view of knowledge, one that continues to dominate today: the view that all that humans can know is our representations of the world, and never the world itself, ?in itself.? These representations may be cognitive or they may be linguistic but, in the Kantian view, the world as we experience it is in some sense ?constituted? (or ?constructed?) by these representations. The world has the appearance of objectivity, but is in fact subjective. Nonetheless, Kant argued, we need to assume that a world exists outside our representations, although we can never know it. I am no philosopher, but I try to argue for an alternative to Kant?s view. Or rather, I review a series of counter arguments made by various philosophers and social scientists (and the first was Hegel, as Andy noted). The alternative, in brief, is that human knowledge of the world arises in and from our practical activity of living in that world. There is nothing that in principle we cannot know, though since our knowledge arises from practical know-how it will always reflect human interests. But that?s not a problem: humans don?t seek, not do we obtain, disinterested knowledge; we seek knowledge that will help us solve practical problems. There is always, don?t you think, an aspect of imagination in our actions in, and knowledge of, the world? When we engage with any concrete entity we are of necessity imagining how it will behave in the future, or simply what it will look like from a different point of view. My views of the ontology of science have shifted a bit over the years. I remain fervently opposed to ontological dualism (the belief that two kinds of entity exist: mental entities and material entities). But I?m no longer a monist. I think it?s clear that every scientific paradigm has its own ontology. I think Latour is convincing when he argues that every institution has its own ontology. Martin On Mar 18, 2019, at 11:30 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: Martin, This sounds very well. And I have to say I've been reading your thick (400+) book and that I should continue to read it to the end but *one thing* : as we've also had it before when you first talked about "What is science?" , sent the separate draft (Now read and pinned to the book to make it just thicker) , yes , one thing : "To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say , **real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a **real or imagined?? **concrete entity." 1. Concrete entity in a REAL world. So far I've spotted and marked just two cases in your book where "real" means "material" as we intend to mean "corporeal". Last time I understood you excepted the Natural World while you tried to give independence to the Qual Science or Research as having the REAL ENTITIES AND BODIES etc. By "implicit ontology" you meant , I think , derived existence. What is your take on the interactions between the independent existences (yet cognizable in themselves#Kant) and derived existences (tied to the existence of a Mind). Taking a science as an instance , how you define its ontology and epistemology? 2. Also here I would like to inquire about the existence of a "concrete entity" in an imagined world if I'm not mistaken. And I seek permission to draw Andy's attention to the fact that concepts find their ways to words not words in a reverse direction to concepts. Any concept could be or is a word but not that ANY word could necessarily be a concept. Haydi On Monday, March 18, 2019, 6:02:14 PM GMT+3:30, Martin Packer > wrote: Yes, it is indeed a trivial example. And yes, I agree that one needs all the utterances in a conversation to understand it. And equally, one needs all the conversation to understand a single utterance. More importantly, so do the speakers. But certainly an utterance can be comprised of a single word (Well; Rubbish; Eureka; or anything else), or even silence. And this implies that one needs all the conversation to understand a single word. To define a word solely as a sign for a concept seem to me to abstract it from its conversational, that's to say real world, context. A word *can* be a sign for a concept, but in practice it will also be a reference to a real or imagined concrete entity. To the extent that a science is a mediator, a tool, and not an abstract system it seems to me important to keep focus on how words are used in ongoing processes of conceptualization. Martin On Mar 17, 2019, at 7:27 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: Martin, I get the point, but any complex process is made up of units, many of them. That's the point of using analysis by units. The excerpt you give is a trivial one. In general you need all the numerous utterances in a conversation to understand an extended interaction. It is like Engestrom who thinks when two activities interact, we have to have a new "fourth generation" unit, i.e., two activity systems interacting. But that is only because he took the activity system as a system not a unit in the first place. Andy ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 18/03/2019 9:14 am, Martin Packer wrote: Seems to me, David, that the notion that the basic unit is the pair is precisely what helps us understand an exchange such as: A. How are you? B. Fine, thanks, and you? A. XXX One pair is constituted by ?How are you? and ?Fine, thanks,? while ?and you?? is the first part of a projected second pair. This is why one might have the intuition that speaker B is doing more than one thing (though I?d suggest 2, not 3), and that something more is expected from speaker A. Martin On Mar 17, 2019, at 4:17 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Well, Bakhtin is full of precisely the kind of sloppiness that Andy is deploring, Helena. So for example Bakhtin says that a whole novel can be considered as an utterance. You take down the book and open it. The novelist has something to say to you. He says it. And then you close the book and you put it back on the shelf. That's all very well, and it's very useful as a way of showing that literature is not some "state within a state": it is also made of language stuff, by people who have a historical existence and not just an afterlife. But it doesn't help Andy (or me, or my wife who studies these things full time) distinguish sub-units within the novel which will help us understand how novels are structured, how this structure has changed with their function, and how the very functions have changed as literature has evolved. And these WERE the problems which Bakhtin set himself (e.g. in "Novel and Epic" and elsewhere). We see the same problem from the other end (micro-rather than macroscopic) with the minimal pair (originally, in the work of Sacks, "adjacency pair"). It's all very well and it's very useful as a way of understanding how conversations get structured as they go along, how people know when its their turn to talk and how they know when the rules have been broken. But it doesn't help us to understand, for example, why we all feel that when you say "How are you?" and somebody says "Fine, thanks, and you?" there seem to be three utterances in the second pair part, and the exchange as a whole doesn't seem finished, even though if we are using turns as the element (pair part) of the minimal pair, it really should be. Craig Brandist remarks that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in so many different ways that he has rendered it meaningless. I think the same thing is true of the way he uses "utterance". David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article; David Kellogg (2019) THE STORYTELLER?S TALE: VYGOTSKY?S ?VRASHCHIVANIYA?, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT AND ?INGROWING? IN THE WEEKEND STORIES OF KOREAN CHILDREN, British Journal of Educational Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/GSS2cTAVAz2jaRdPIkvj/full?target=10.1080/00071005.2019.1569200 On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:47 AM Helena Worthen > wrote: I find it useful to think of an utterance as bounded on two ends: on one, by the utterance to which it responds, on the other, by the utterance that responds to it. Thus you can discern utterances within utterances. Minimally, a two -part exchange, as Martin says; maximally, a whole stream of briefer utterances bounded by their prompt and response. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Mar 17, 2019, at 9:32 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: According to conversation analysts, the minimal unit in conversation is the adjacency pair: a two-part exchange in which the second utterance is functionally dependent on the first. Question-answer; greeting-greeting; request-reply, and so on. An utterance, then, is both a turn and a move within a conversation. An utterance is *not* ?complete in itself? - it is a component in a larger organization: at least a pair, and usually a much longer sequence. Martin On Mar 16, 2019, at 3:11 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: I would have appreciated a definition of some kind of what the writer actually means by "utterance." In absence of that "the word, as a compressed version of the utterance" is nonsense, or at least a step backwards because it obliterates a concept. Otherwise, I wouldn't mind saying that the two are together the micro- and macro-units of dialogue (or something having that meaning). The same as Leontyev has two units of activity: action and activity, and Marx has two units of political economy: commodity and capital. To theorise a complex process you always need two units. The rest of what you have cited reminds me of what Constantin Stanislavskii said about the units of an actor's performance: https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/stanislavskii.pdf Andy ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 16/03/2019 5:42 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote: Thanks for that conceptual jewel, mate. Let me bring here Akhutina to further show their complementariness: The minimal holistic unit of conversation is the utterance. An utterance, unlike a sentence, is complete in itself. The utterance always carries within it the marks and features of who is speaking to whom, for what reason and in what situation; it is polyphonic. An utterance develops from a motivation, ?a volitional objective? and progresses through inner speech to external speech. The prime mover of the semantic progression (from the inner word that is comprehensible to me alone to the external speech that he, the listener, will understand) is the comparison of my subjective, evanescent sense, which I attribute to the given word, and its objective (constant for both me and my listener) meaning.Thus, the major building material for speech production is the living two-voice word. But polyphony is a feature of the utterance as expressed in the word; the word carrying personal sense is an abbreviation of the utterance. Thus, the utterance and the word, as a compressed version of the utterance, are the units of speech acts, communication, and consciousness. Best Arturo -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190418/5085636b/attachment-0001.html From yrjo.engestrom@helsinki.fi Tue Apr 23 09:01:24 2019 From: yrjo.engestrom@helsinki.fi (=?utf-8?B?RW5nZXN0csO2bSwgWXJqw7YgSCBN?=) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 16:01:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Tichaona Pesanayi in memoriam - to the memory of a wonderful scholar, true friend and fighter for justice Message-ID: Dr. Tichaona Pesanayi (born in 1965), a great African environmental and sustainability educator, an exceptional researcher, a colleague who transformed people?s lives and activities, died a few days ago as a victim of an aggressive illness. We write this with tears in our eyes. We have vivid images and memories of Tich in Finland, in South Africa, and in international conferences we attended together. We remember and feel the presence of his penetrating intellect and uncompromising commitment, his generous friendship and deep humanity. This is a tremendous loss to our global activity-theoretical community, and above all to the pioneering group of scholars and practitioners led by Heila Lotz-Sisitka at Rhodes University. To appreciate Tich?s work, we attach a paper he recently co-authored with Heila and other colleagues. You get a vivd glimpse into his creative and powerful use of activity theory and Change Laboratory interventions by watching the video that can be found in this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KeL-kwRKjlA We will never forget Tich. His work will move on and change the world as a living thread of the continuing collective efforts of his colleagues and friends. Yrj? Engestr?m and Annalisa Sannino -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190423/5fa78f82/attachment-0001.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Transgressing the norm.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 820358 bytes Desc: Transgressing the norm.pdf Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190423/5fa78f82/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Apr 23 14:16:32 2019 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 14:16:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Tichaona Pesanayi in memoriam - to the memory of a wonderful scholar, true friend and fighter for justice In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Yrjo & Annalisa Thank you for your note about the passing of Tichaona Pesanayi and the inspirational materials you has shared with us. mike On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:04 AM Engestr?m, Yrj? H M < yrjo.engestrom@helsinki.fi> wrote: > Dr. Tichaona Pesanayi (born in 1965), a great African environmental and > sustainability educator, an exceptional researcher, a colleague who > transformed people?s lives and activities, died a few days ago as a victim > of an aggressive illness. We write this with tears in our eyes. > > We have vivid images and memories of Tich in Finland, in South Africa, and > in international conferences we attended together. We remember and feel the > presence of his penetrating intellect and uncompromising commitment, his > generous friendship and deep humanity. This is a tremendous loss to our > global activity-theoretical community, and above all to the pioneering > group of scholars and practitioners led by Heila Lotz-Sisitka at Rhodes > University. > > To appreciate Tich?s work, we attach a paper he recently co-authored with > Heila and other colleagues. You get a vivd glimpse into his creative and > powerful use of activity theory and Change Laboratory interventions by > watching the video that can be found in this link: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KeL-kwRKjlA > > We will never forget Tich. His work will move on and change the world as a > living thread of the continuing collective efforts of his colleagues and > friends. > > Yrj? Engestr?m and Annalisa Sannino > > > > -- The past is a foreign country. They do things differently there. L.P. Hartley -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190423/a5dafac8/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Apr 24 13:37:26 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 05:37:26 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] From Thinking to Speech Message-ID: In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the Byron name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her scientific work. One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. Take a look at this. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does take a while. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190425/9e191114/attachment-0001.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Dorothy Josephine Del Bourgo Kellogg Stein.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 17586 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190425/9e191114/attachment-0001.bin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Dr Dorothy Stein.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 1972559 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190425/9e191114/attachment-0001.jpg From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Wed Apr 24 14:33:25 2019 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 17:33:25 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David, Please accept my sincere condolences on the passing of your mother. And thanks so much for sharing the enriching highlights of your mother's scientific and literary history and contributions, as well as your own attempt to get the Guardian to publish her obituary - and a more truthful account of the Ada Lovelace story. What a fascinating patchwork of stories! (Shame on the Guardian!) I'm also pleased that you found a brilliant way to weave in the news story from the BBC website that appeared today about the brain implants that can 'read' the articulatory signals that lead to speech production. I became very excited when I saw that piece this morning. It didn't occur to me that it served as a verification of LSV's proposal about the layers that 'thinking' passes through on its way to becoming 'speaking'. Bravo! It's always a treat to hear from you. Best wishes, Peter On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 4:42 PM David Kellogg wrote: > In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first > programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the > Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada > Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first > programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. > There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was > interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother > thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer > in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific > biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). > > But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered that > Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that > Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the Byron > name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the > "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood > a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three > and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first > computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the > Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own > contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they > agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on > xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her > scientific work. > > One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of > Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor > and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by > subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the > geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: > A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the > outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. > He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was > resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. > > Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech > LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the > affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are > separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the > basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but > also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that > wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share > inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung > nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, > then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans > and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully > developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the > actual signals sent to the articulators. > > Take a look at this. > > https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 > > > Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does > take a while. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190424/7494fc8a/attachment.html From andyb@marxists.org Wed Apr 24 18:34:02 2019 From: andyb@marxists.org (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 11:34:02 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11545666-fb5b-11f8-3a01-c7a780dc5dc9@marxists.org> Yes, as ever a riveting story, David. Neuroscience achievements seem to be (1) cataloguing the effects of pathology, (2) observing which regions of the brain which are active in various circumstances (both of which are like studying human psychology with a radio telescope from space) and (3) observing and intervening in the nerves providing input and output to the brain. And yet they remain convinced that as soon as they get the next imaging device they will be able to see thoughts. One of these people should be kidnapped and forced to read Vygotsky for a week before being released. .... not that I really believe that would have any effect. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 25/04/2019 7:33 am, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > David, > > Please accept my sincere condolences on the passing of > your mother. And thanks so much for sharing the enriching > highlights of your mother's scientific and literary > history and contributions, as well as your own attempt to > get the Guardian to publish her obituary - and a more > truthful account of the Ada Lovelace story. What a > fascinating patchwork of stories! (Shame on the Guardian!) > > I'm also pleased that you found a brilliant way to weave > in the news story from the BBC website that appeared today > about the brain implants that can 'read' the articulatory > signals that lead to speech production. I became very > excited when I saw that piece this morning. It didn't > occur to me that it served as a verification of LSV's > proposal about the layers that 'thinking' passes through > on its way to becoming 'speaking'. > > Bravo! > > It's always a treat to hear from you. > > Best wishes, > Peter > > > > On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 4:42 PM David Kellogg > > wrote: > > In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one > of the very first programmers of a computer that has a > compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research > Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of > Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, > and supposedly the first programmer of Charles > Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There > had already been one biography of Ada and the defense > department was interested in naming its programming > language after her, but my mother thought this would > be a good chance to do right by an early female > pioneer in a notoriously male field.?So she got a > contract to?write a scientific biography of Ada for > MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). > > But?research can baffle your book proposal.?My mother > soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the > most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who > was obviously ghost-writing?her papers, was using the > Byron name to make claims he?would never be able to > sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do > algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep > breath, published anyway, and died?almost completely > ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace > is still lauded as the world's first computer > programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother > to the Guardian (attached),?they rewrote it to > downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the > contribution of Ada. When?I objected they agreed to > publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this > obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to > publicly?commemorate her scientific work. > > One of the many, but more minor,?reasons I have for > admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has > always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not > so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS > confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed > no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of > the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A > Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not > only?foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate > but predicted how it would be resolved. He also > shows?how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric > speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. > > Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of > Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently > unverifiable claims that feeling (the > affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and > inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. > He made these claims partly on the basis > of?introspection and partly on the basis of > ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art > (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful > passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty > seem to share inner speech through the children's game > of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument > made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, > then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be > picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: > the only way we could synthesize fully developed > speech in speech impaired individuals would be to > intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. > > Take a look at this. > > https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 > > > Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But > sometimes it does take a while. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without > SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s > construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: > 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: > https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190425/f306d50d/attachment.html From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Apr 25 14:42:48 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 06:42:48 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: <11545666-fb5b-11f8-3a01-c7a780dc5dc9@marxists.org> References: <11545666-fb5b-11f8-3a01-c7a780dc5dc9@marxists.org> Message-ID: Thanks to all who expressed condolences, and especially to all who expressed curiosity about my mother's work. I have a very early memory of my father explaining death to me, from a physicist's point of view (i.e. thermodynamically--one of the first papers he wrote with my mother had to do with the commonalities between entropy of information and entropy of energy). When I was writing yesterday it seemed to me that I was around three years old when it happened, but now it occurs to me that I must have been seven, as it had to do with the suicide of a colleague of my mother's, whose child I used to play with in elementary school. SON: So when we die, we go to heaven and live there forever, like astronauts who can't come home? FATHER: When we die we just become part of something else. SON: What do we become part of? FATHER: The earth. SON: And what happens when the earth dies? FATHER: We become part of the sun. SON: And what happens when the sun dies? FATHER: What's left of the sun and the earth and us--we all go out into space together. SON: So we do go to heaven and live forever! FATHER: Yes, we go to heaven forever. No, we don't live there. Dad is still writing papers on what we can find out about the interstellar medium--our future home!--from the dust that pings on the surface of spacecraft. But to me it still doesn't explain the real mystery. To me, the metamorphosis of my mother from the warm, living, breathing body I came out of sixty years ago into a bag of ashes I scatter into the Thames still does not seem quite as hard to understand as her metamorphosis from the author of "Ada: A life and a legacy" into a person who could only repeat the last three words she heard. (As Vygotsky said that Lenin said: the leap from feeling to thinking is as large--or even larger--than the leap from non-sentience to sentience...) During the twelve years of my mother's double reverse leap into non-sentience, Mike pointed out to me more than once that from a cultural-historical as well as from the linguistic point of view, the subjects of every funeral are the mourners: the "mizpah", in this case the continuing inquiry, is always what is left behind, even if it is just one footprint in indelible ink. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 10:36 AM Andy Blunden wrote: > Yes, as ever a riveting story, David. > > Neuroscience achievements seem to be (1) cataloguing the effects of > pathology, (2) observing which regions of the brain which are active in > various circumstances (both of which are like studying human psychology > with a radio telescope from space) and (3) observing and intervening in the > nerves providing input and output to the brain. And yet they remain > convinced that as soon as they get the next imaging device they will be > able to see thoughts. One of these people should be kidnapped and forced to > read Vygotsky for a week before being released. .... not that I really > believe that would have any effect. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 25/04/2019 7:33 am, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > > David, > > Please accept my sincere condolences on the passing of your mother. And > thanks so much for sharing the enriching highlights of your mother's > scientific and literary history and contributions, as well as your own > attempt to get the Guardian to publish her obituary - and a more truthful > account of the Ada Lovelace story. What a fascinating patchwork of stories! > (Shame on the Guardian!) > > I'm also pleased that you found a brilliant way to weave in the news story > from the BBC website that appeared today about the brain implants that can > 'read' the articulatory signals that lead to speech production. I became > very excited when I saw that piece this morning. It didn't occur to me that > it served as a verification of LSV's proposal about the layers that > 'thinking' passes through on its way to becoming 'speaking'. > > Bravo! > > It's always a treat to hear from you. > > Best wishes, > Peter > > > > On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 4:42 PM David Kellogg > wrote: > >> In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first >> programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the >> Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada >> Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first >> programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. >> There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was >> interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother >> thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer >> in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific >> biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). >> >> But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered >> that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and >> that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the >> Byron name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the >> "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood >> a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three >> and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first >> computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the >> Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own >> contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they >> agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on >> xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her >> scientific work. >> >> One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of >> Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor >> and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by >> subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the >> geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: >> A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the >> outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. >> He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was >> resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. >> >> Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech >> LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the >> affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are >> separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the >> basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but >> also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that >> wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share >> inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung >> nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, >> then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans >> and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully >> developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the >> actual signals sent to the articulators. >> >> Take a look at this. >> >> https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 >> >> >> Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does >> take a while. >> >> David Kellogg >> Sangmyung University >> >> New Article: >> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in >> understanding narratives by >> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: >> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> Some e-prints available at: >> >> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >> >> >> > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190426/a11f210e/attachment.html From arips@optonline.net Thu Apr 25 14:59:05 2019 From: arips@optonline.net (Avram Rips) Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 17:59:05 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: <11545666-fb5b-11f8-3a01-c7a780dc5dc9@marxists.org> Message-ID: <91A71DB5-A72B-4196-AB74-B84A9935E375@optonline.net> David, May the memories of your mother give you comfort. I think the word is Mitzvah. Sent from my iPhone > On Apr 25, 2019, at 5:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Thanks to all who expressed condolences, and especially to all who expressed curiosity about my mother's work. > > I have a very early memory of my father explaining death to me, from a physicist's point of view (i.e. thermodynamically--one of the first papers he wrote with my mother had to do with the commonalities between entropy of information and entropy of energy). When I was writing yesterday it seemed to me that I was around three years old when it happened, but now it occurs to me that I must have been seven, as it had to do with the suicide of a colleague of my mother's, whose child I used to play with in elementary school. > > SON: So when we die, we go to heaven and live there forever, like astronauts who can't come home? > FATHER: When we die we just become part of something else. > SON: What do we become part of? > FATHER: The earth. > SON: And what happens when the earth dies? > FATHER: We become part of the sun. > SON: And what happens when the sun dies? > FATHER: What's left of the sun and the earth and us--we all go out into space together. > SON: So we do go to heaven and live forever! > FATHER: Yes, we go to heaven forever. No, we don't live there. > > Dad is still writing papers on what we can find out about the interstellar medium--our future home!--from the dust that pings on the surface of spacecraft. But to me it still doesn't explain the real mystery. To me, the metamorphosis of my mother from the warm, living, breathing body I came out of sixty years ago into a bag of ashes I scatter into the Thames still does not seem quite as hard to understand as her metamorphosis from the author of "Ada: A life and a legacy" into a person who could only repeat the last three words she heard. (As Vygotsky said that Lenin said: the leap from feeling to thinking is as large--or even larger--than the leap from non-sentience to sentience...) > > During the twelve years of my mother's double reverse leap into non-sentience, Mike pointed out to me more than once that from a cultural-historical as well as from the linguistic point of view, the subjects of every funeral are the mourners: the "mizpah", in this case the continuing inquiry, is always what is left behind, even if it is just one footprint in indelible ink. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > >> On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 10:36 AM Andy Blunden wrote: >> Yes, as ever a riveting story, David. >> >> Neuroscience achievements seem to be (1) cataloguing the effects of pathology, (2) observing which regions of the brain which are active in various circumstances (both of which are like studying human psychology with a radio telescope from space) and (3) observing and intervening in the nerves providing input and output to the brain. And yet they remain convinced that as soon as they get the next imaging device they will be able to see thoughts. One of these people should be kidnapped and forced to read Vygotsky for a week before being released. .... not that I really believe that would have any effect. >> >> Andy >> Andy Blunden >> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >>> On 25/04/2019 7:33 am, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >>> David, >>> >>> Please accept my sincere condolences on the passing of your mother. And thanks so much for sharing the enriching highlights of your mother's scientific and literary history and contributions, as well as your own attempt to get the Guardian to publish her obituary - and a more truthful account of the Ada Lovelace story. What a fascinating patchwork of stories! (Shame on the Guardian!) >>> >>> I'm also pleased that you found a brilliant way to weave in the news story from the BBC website that appeared today about the brain implants that can 'read' the articulatory signals that lead to speech production. I became very excited when I saw that piece this morning. It didn't occur to me that it served as a verification of LSV's proposal about the layers that 'thinking' passes through on its way to becoming 'speaking'. >>> >>> Bravo! >>> >>> It's always a treat to hear from you. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Peter >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 4:42 PM David Kellogg wrote: >>>> In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). >>>> >>>> But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the Byron name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her scientific work. >>>> >>>> One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. >>>> >>>> Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. >>>> >>>> Take a look at this. >>>> >>>> https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 >>>> >>>> Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does take a while. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Sangmyung University >>>> >>>> New Article: >>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>>> Some e-prints available at: >>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190425/ff828f7c/attachment.html From goncu@uic.edu Thu Apr 25 16:20:05 2019 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 23:20:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: <11545666-fb5b-11f8-3a01-c7a780dc5dc9@marxists.org> Message-ID: Dear David, I just learned about the loss of your mother. I wish you strength and patience. With warm regards, ag Artin Goncu, Ph.D Professor, Emeritus University of Illinois at Chicago www.artingoncu.com/ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2019 2:43 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech Thanks to all who expressed condolences, and especially to all who expressed curiosity about my mother's work. I have a very early memory of my father explaining death to me, from a physicist's point of view (i.e. thermodynamically--one of the first papers he wrote with my mother had to do with the commonalities between entropy of information and entropy of energy). When I was writing yesterday it seemed to me that I was around three years old when it happened, but now it occurs to me that I must have been seven, as it had to do with the suicide of a colleague of my mother's, whose child I used to play with in elementary school. SON: So when we die, we go to heaven and live there forever, like astronauts who can't come home? FATHER: When we die we just become part of something else. SON: What do we become part of? FATHER: The earth. SON: And what happens when the earth dies? FATHER: We become part of the sun. SON: And what happens when the sun dies? FATHER: What's left of the sun and the earth and us--we all go out into space together. SON: So we do go to heaven and live forever! FATHER: Yes, we go to heaven forever. No, we don't live there. Dad is still writing papers on what we can find out about the interstellar medium--our future home!--from the dust that pings on the surface of spacecraft. But to me it still doesn't explain the real mystery. To me, the metamorphosis of my mother from the warm, living, breathing body I came out of sixty years ago into a bag of ashes I scatter into the Thames still does not seem quite as hard to understand as her metamorphosis from the author of "Ada: A life and a legacy" into a person who could only repeat the last three words she heard. (As Vygotsky said that Lenin said: the leap from feeling to thinking is as large--or even larger--than the leap from non-sentience to sentience...) During the twelve years of my mother's double reverse leap into non-sentience, Mike pointed out to me more than once that from a cultural-historical as well as from the linguistic point of view, the subjects of every funeral are the mourners: the "mizpah", in this case the continuing inquiry, is always what is left behind, even if it is just one footprint in indelible ink. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 10:36 AM Andy Blunden > wrote: Yes, as ever a riveting story, David. Neuroscience achievements seem to be (1) cataloguing the effects of pathology, (2) observing which regions of the brain which are active in various circumstances (both of which are like studying human psychology with a radio telescope from space) and (3) observing and intervening in the nerves providing input and output to the brain. And yet they remain convinced that as soon as they get the next imaging device they will be able to see thoughts. One of these people should be kidnapped and forced to read Vygotsky for a week before being released. .... not that I really believe that would have any effect. Andy ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 25/04/2019 7:33 am, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: David, Please accept my sincere condolences on the passing of your mother. And thanks so much for sharing the enriching highlights of your mother's scientific and literary history and contributions, as well as your own attempt to get the Guardian to publish her obituary - and a more truthful account of the Ada Lovelace story. What a fascinating patchwork of stories! (Shame on the Guardian!) I'm also pleased that you found a brilliant way to weave in the news story from the BBC website that appeared today about the brain implants that can 'read' the articulatory signals that lead to speech production. I became very excited when I saw that piece this morning. It didn't occur to me that it served as a verification of LSV's proposal about the layers that 'thinking' passes through on its way to becoming 'speaking'. Bravo! It's always a treat to hear from you. Best wishes, Peter On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 4:42 PM David Kellogg > wrote: In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the Byron name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her scientific work. One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. Take a look at this. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does take a while. David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190425/38e998da/attachment.html From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Apr 26 13:25:48 2019 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 13:25:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David ? it was really stupid of the Guardian not to publish this. If anyone disagreed, let them respond! That?s a beautiful picture of your mother. She must have been in her 50s at that point? Not much more. And, does anyone have the manuscript of that science fiction novel? It was probably very good. And I?ll bet that the main concept got laid out right at the start. Helena > On Apr 24, 2019, at 1:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). > > But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the Byron name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her scientific work. > > One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. > > Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. > > Take a look at this. > > https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 > > Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does take a while. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190426/1a45ae93/attachment-0003.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190426/1a45ae93/attachment-0005.html From ewall@umich.edu Fri Apr 26 14:08:45 2019 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 16:08:45 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8DD28F8A-4531-4C59-8696-CDC7786C87D2@umich.edu> David Condolences. Although we never met, your mother and I were roughly in some of the same places at the same time. You?ve probably seen recent such articles titled, more or less, "Scientists develop an AI that can turn brainwaves into speech?; that is, t appears intercepting signals sent to articulators. Ed ?Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom.? ~ Viktor Frankl > On Apr 24, 2019, at 3:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). > > But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the Byron name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her scientific work. > > One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. > > Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. > > Take a look at this. > > https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 > > Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does take a while. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Apr 26 14:37:52 2019 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2019 06:37:52 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Helen-- In 2015, my brother and I sold my mother's flat in London and moved her into Lord Wandsworth's Home for Distressed Jewry in Clapham (which was originally set up as penance for Lord Wandworth abandoning the faith of his fathers, but which n caters to Jews who are mostly quite undistressed, including my mum). I made a very thorough search of her papers and could find no trace of the onion-skin on which she'd typed the science fiction novel, or for that matter of the studies on Robin Dunbar, Alison Wray, and the origins of language. There was also nothing of her long studies of the effect of textiles as an industrialization strategy for poor countries that she was doing when she visited me in China. Dorothy was a perfectionist, and she had that Victorian habit of burning papers every decade or so. But I can tell you this much--she never laid stuff out from the get-go. For example, when she sat down to write "Ada", she knew perfectly well what her endpoint would be and how unpopular it would make her. The first line is this: "Nothing in Lady Byron's life became her like the leaving of her marriage." When we were sitting shiva for Dorothy, I read that passage, and one of her neighbors remarked that although it had nothing to do with computer science, it had a certain Austenian savour to it (and in fact I remember she crafted it along the lines of the opening of "Northanger Abbey"). Avram-- A mitzvah is a blessed ACTION, and it lies on the "environment" end of the pole that connects the subject to the social environment. I had in mind a blessed THOUGHT, which lies on the "subject" end of the same pole "????" . https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mizpah_(emotional_bond) The Hebrew word originally meant "watchtower", but it's a proper noun and a verb too, and it means a convenant or a concern or "to watch over", as when Laban and Jacob come to an agreement (yes, Laban breaks it, but only because he is overconcerned for his family). ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ????? Which means (James will tell me if I got this right...): "These watchtowers are those of the three lands of Qin" (i.e. Shaanxi, then the imperial heartland--DK) "I make out the land of five crossings" (i.e. Sichuan, then a remote area to which dissident intellectuals were sent--DK) "With you I part and with my own feelings" (i.e. to leave you is to leave part of myself, but it is also to "over-live" the grief of parting--DK) "We are both officials who must live far from home" (i.e. we are both dissident intellectuals going into exile but not together--DK) "Yet when there are those who understand us "Though faraway as the four corners of the earth they are neighbors "Why should we, when we reach the fork in the road Soak our handkerchiefs like children and women?" (The story is that Wang Bo, after writing these lines, went to attend his father's funeral in Vietnam, and his ship overturned, drowning him. But school children still recite this poem in China, and the line about "the four corners of the earth" is a kind of byword for far-flung covenants like xmca...) David Kellogg Sangmyung University New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, Apr 27, 2019 at 5:29 AM Helena Worthen wrote: > David ? it was really stupid of the Guardian not to publish this. If > anyone disagreed, let them respond! > > That?s a beautiful picture of your mother. She must have been in her 50s > at that point? Not much more. > > And, does anyone have the manuscript of that science fiction novel? It was > probably very good. And I?ll bet that the main concept got laid out right > at the start. > > Helena > > > On Apr 24, 2019, at 1:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first > programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the > Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada > Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first > programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. > There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was > interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother > thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer > in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific > biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). > > But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered that > Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that > Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the Byron > name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the > "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood > a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three > and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first > computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the > Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own > contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they > agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on > xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her > scientific work. > > One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of > Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor > and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by > subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the > geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: > A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the > outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. > He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was > resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. > > Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech > LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the > affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are > separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the > basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but > also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that > wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share > inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung > nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, > then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans > and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully > developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the > actual signals sent to the articulators. > > Take a look at this. > > https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 > > Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does > take a while. > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in > understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190427/d2047aed/attachment.html From arips@optonline.net Fri Apr 26 18:10:45 2019 From: arips@optonline.net (Avram Rips) Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 21:10:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you very similar words. I'll look it up. Sent from my iPhone > On Apr 26, 2019, at 5:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Helen-- > > In 2015, my brother and I sold my mother's flat in London and moved her into Lord Wandsworth's Home for Distressed Jewry in Clapham (which was originally set up as penance for Lord Wandworth abandoning the faith of his fathers, but which n caters to Jews who are mostly quite undistressed, including my mum). I made a very thorough search of her papers and could find no trace of the onion-skin on which she'd typed the science fiction novel, or for that matter of the studies on Robin Dunbar, Alison Wray, and the origins of language. There was also nothing of her long studies of the effect of textiles as an industrialization strategy for poor countries that she was doing when she visited me in China. Dorothy was a perfectionist, and she had that Victorian habit of burning papers every decade or so. > > But I can tell you this much--she never laid stuff out from the get-go. For example, when she sat down to write "Ada", she knew perfectly well what her endpoint would be and how unpopular it would make her. The first line is this: > > "Nothing in Lady Byron's life became her like the leaving of her marriage." > > When we were sitting shiva for Dorothy, I read that passage, and one of her neighbors remarked that although it had nothing to do with computer science, it had a certain Austenian savour to it (and in fact I remember she crafted it along the lines of the opening of "Northanger Abbey"). > > Avram-- > > A mitzvah is a blessed ACTION, and it lies on the "environment" end of the pole that connects the subject to the social environment. I had in mind a blessed THOUGHT, which lies on the "subject" end of the same pole "????" . > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mizpah_(emotional_bond) > > The Hebrew word originally meant "watchtower", but it's a proper noun and a verb too, and it means a convenant or a concern or "to watch over", as when Laban and Jacob come to an agreement (yes, Laban breaks it, but only because he is overconcerned for his family). > > ?????? > > ?????? > > ?????? > > ?????? > > ?????? > > ?????? > > ?????? > > ????? > > Which means (James will tell me if I got this right...): > > "These watchtowers are those of the three lands of Qin" (i.e. Shaanxi, then the imperial heartland--DK) > > "I make out the land of five crossings" (i.e. Sichuan, then a remote area to which dissident intellectuals were sent--DK) > > "With you I part and with my own feelings" (i.e. to leave you is to leave part of myself, but it is also to "over-live" the grief of parting--DK) > > "We are both officials who must live far from home" (i.e. we are both dissident intellectuals going into exile but not together--DK) > > "Yet when there are those who understand us > > "Though faraway as the four corners of the earth they are neighbors > > "Why should we, when we reach the fork in the road > > Soak our handkerchiefs like children and women?" > > (The story is that Wang Bo, after writing these lines, went to attend his father's funeral in Vietnam, and his ship overturned, drowning him. But school children still recite this poem in China, and the line about "the four corners of the earth" is a kind of byword for far-flung covenants like xmca...) > > David Kellogg > Sangmyung University > > New Article: > Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s > pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by > Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > Some e-prints available at: > https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 > > > >> On Sat, Apr 27, 2019 at 5:29 AM Helena Worthen wrote: >> David ? it was really stupid of the Guardian not to publish this. If anyone disagreed, let them respond! >> >> That?s a beautiful picture of your mother. She must have been in her 50s at that point? Not much more. >> >> And, does anyone have the manuscript of that science fiction novel? It was probably very good. And I?ll bet that the main concept got laid out right at the start. >> >> Helena >> >> >>> On Apr 24, 2019, at 1:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer in a notoriously male field. So she got a contract to write a scientific biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). >>> >>> But research can baffle your book proposal. My mother soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing her papers, was using the Byron name to make claims he would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep breath, published anyway, and died almost completely ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the Guardian (attached), they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When I objected they agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly commemorate her scientific work. >>> >>> One of the many, but more minor, reasons I have for admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. He also shows how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. >>> >>> Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the basis of introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. >>> >>> Take a look at this. >>> >>> https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 >>> >>> Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does take a while. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Sangmyung University >>> >>> New Article: >>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s >>> pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives by >>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >>> Some e-prints available at: >>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 >>> >> >> >> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190426/4494623b/attachment.html From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Fri Apr 26 23:57:15 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2019 06:57:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1342630771.1613910.1556348235999@mail.yahoo.com> On Saturday, April 27, 2019, 5:43:30 AM GMT+4:30, Avram Rips wrote: Thank you very similar words. I'll look it up. Sent from my iPhone On Apr 26, 2019, at 5:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Helen-- In 2015, my brother and I sold my mother's flat in London and moved her into Lord Wandsworth's Home for Distressed Jewry in Clapham (which was originally set up as penance for Lord Wandworth abandoning the faith of his fathers, but which n caters to Jews who are mostly quite undistressed, including my mum). I made a very thorough search of her papers and could find no trace of the onion-skin on which she'd typed the science fiction novel, or for that matter of the studies on Robin Dunbar, Alison Wray, and the origins of language. There was also nothing of her long studies of the effect of textiles as an industrialization strategy for poor countries that she was doing when she visited me in China. Dorothy was a perfectionist, and she had that Victorian habit of burning papers every decade or so. But I can tell you this much--she never laid stuff out from the get-go. For example, when she sat down to write "Ada", she knew perfectly well what her endpoint would be and how unpopular it would make her. The first line is this: "Nothing in Lady Byron's life became her like the leaving of her marriage." When we were sitting shiva for Dorothy, I read that passage, and one of her neighbors remarked that although it had nothing to do with computer science, it?had a certain Austenian savour to it?(and in fact I remember she crafted it along the lines of the opening of "Northanger Abbey"). Avram-- A mitzvah is a blessed ACTION, and it lies on the "environment" end of the pole that connects the subject to the social environment. I had in mind a blessed THOUGHT, which lies on the "subject" end of the same pole "????" . https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mizpah_(emotional_bond) The Hebrew word originally meant "watchtower", but it's a proper noun and a verb?too, and it means?a convenant or a concern or "to watch over", as when Laban and Jacob come to an agreement (yes, Laban breaks it, but only because he is overconcerned for his family). ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ????? Which means (James will tell me if I got this right...): "These watchtowers are those of the?three lands of Qin" (i.e. Shaanxi,?then the imperial heartland--DK) "I make out the land of five crossings" (i.e. Sichuan,?then a remote area to which dissident intellectuals were sent--DK) "With you I part and with my own feelings" (i.e. to leave you is to leave part of myself, but it is also to "over-live" the grief of parting--DK) "We are both officials who must live far from home" (i.e. we are both dissident intellectuals?going into exile but not together--DK) "Yet when there are those who understand us "Though faraway as the four corners of the earth they are neighbors "Why should we, when we reach the fork in the road Soak our?handkerchiefs like children and women?" (The story is that Wang Bo, after writing these lines, went to attend his father's funeral in Vietnam, and his ship overturned, drowning him. But school children still recite this poem in China, and the line about "the four corners of the earth" is a kind of byword for far-flung covenants like xmca...) David KelloggSangmyung University New Article:?Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives byKorean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, Apr 27, 2019 at 5:29 AM Helena Worthen wrote: David ? it was really stupid of the Guardian not to publish this. If anyone disagreed, let them respond! That?s a beautiful picture of your mother. She must have been in her 50s at that point? Not much more. And, does anyone have the manuscript of that science fiction novel? It was probably very good. And I?ll bet that the main concept got laid out right at the start. Helena On Apr 24, 2019, at 1:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer in a notoriously male field.?So she got a contract to?write a scientific biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). But?research can baffle your book proposal.?My mother soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing?her papers, was using the Byron name to make claims he?would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep breath, published anyway, and died?almost completely ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the Guardian (attached),?they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When?I objected they agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly?commemorate her scientific work. One of the many, but more minor,?reasons I have for admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only?foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. He also shows?how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the basis of?introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. Take a look at this. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does take a while.?? David KelloggSangmyung University New Article:?Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives byKorean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190427/9849db19/attachment-0001.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Stein D. - Ada, a life and a legacy-MIT (1985).djvu Type: application/octet-stream Size: 4485762 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190427/9849db19/attachment-0001.obj From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sat Apr 27 00:04:58 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2019 07:04:58 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: From Thinking to Speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1286165692.1618560.1556348698298@mail.yahoo.com> On Saturday, April 27, 2019, 5:43:30 AM GMT+4:30, Avram Rips wrote: Thank you very similar words. I'll look it up. Sent from my iPhone On Apr 26, 2019, at 5:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Helen-- In 2015, my brother and I sold my mother's flat in London and moved her into Lord Wandsworth's Home for Distressed Jewry in Clapham (which was originally set up as penance for Lord Wandworth abandoning the faith of his fathers, but which n caters to Jews who are mostly quite undistressed, including my mum). I made a very thorough search of her papers and could find no trace of the onion-skin on which she'd typed the science fiction novel, or for that matter of the studies on Robin Dunbar, Alison Wray, and the origins of language. There was also nothing of her long studies of the effect of textiles as an industrialization strategy for poor countries that she was doing when she visited me in China. Dorothy was a perfectionist, and she had that Victorian habit of burning papers every decade or so. But I can tell you this much--she never laid stuff out from the get-go. For example, when she sat down to write "Ada", she knew perfectly well what her endpoint would be and how unpopular it would make her. The first line is this: "Nothing in Lady Byron's life became her like the leaving of her marriage." When we were sitting shiva for Dorothy, I read that passage, and one of her neighbors remarked that although it had nothing to do with computer science, it?had a certain Austenian savour to it?(and in fact I remember she crafted it along the lines of the opening of "Northanger Abbey"). Avram-- A mitzvah is a blessed ACTION, and it lies on the "environment" end of the pole that connects the subject to the social environment. I had in mind a blessed THOUGHT, which lies on the "subject" end of the same pole "????" . https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mizpah_(emotional_bond) The Hebrew word originally meant "watchtower", but it's a proper noun and a verb?too, and it means?a convenant or a concern or "to watch over", as when Laban and Jacob come to an agreement (yes, Laban breaks it, but only because he is overconcerned for his family). ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ????? Which means (James will tell me if I got this right...): "These watchtowers are those of the?three lands of Qin" (i.e. Shaanxi,?then the imperial heartland--DK) "I make out the land of five crossings" (i.e. Sichuan,?then a remote area to which dissident intellectuals were sent--DK) "With you I part and with my own feelings" (i.e. to leave you is to leave part of myself, but it is also to "over-live" the grief of parting--DK) "We are both officials who must live far from home" (i.e. we are both dissident intellectuals?going into exile but not together--DK) "Yet when there are those who understand us "Though faraway as the four corners of the earth they are neighbors "Why should we, when we reach the fork in the road Soak our?handkerchiefs like children and women?" (The story is that Wang Bo, after writing these lines, went to attend his father's funeral in Vietnam, and his ship overturned, drowning him. But school children still recite this poem in China, and the line about "the four corners of the earth" is a kind of byword for far-flung covenants like xmca...) David KelloggSangmyung University New Article:?Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives byKorean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 On Sat, Apr 27, 2019 at 5:29 AM Helena Worthen wrote: David ? it was really stupid of the Guardian not to publish this. If anyone disagreed, let them respond! That?s a beautiful picture of your mother. She must have been in her 50s at that point? Not much more. And, does anyone have the manuscript of that science fiction novel? It was probably very good. And I?ll bet that the main concept got laid out right at the start. Helena On Apr 24, 2019, at 1:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: In the early 1970s, my late mother, who had been one of the very first programmers of a computer that has a compiling language (the ORDVAC at the Naval Research Laboratory in Bethesda, Maryland), begain to hear of Ada Lovelace, sole legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, and supposedly the first programmer of Charles Babbage's "analytical engine" back in the 1840s. There had already been one biography of Ada and the defense department was interested in naming its programming language after her, but my mother thought this would be a good chance to do right by an early female pioneer in a notoriously male field.?So she got a contract to?write a scientific biography of Ada for MIT Press ("Ada, a Life and a Legacy", 1986). But?research can baffle your book proposal.?My mother soon discovered that Ada struggled with some of the most basic concepts in algebra, and that Babbage, who was obviously ghost-writing?her papers, was using the Byron name to make claims he?would never be able to sustain (e.g. that the "analytical engine" could do algebra the way computers do today). She tood a deep breath, published anyway, and died?almost completely ignored three and a half decades later: Ada Lovelace is still lauded as the world's first computer programmers, and when I sent an obituary of my mother to the Guardian (attached),?they rewrote it to downplay my mother's own contribution and play up the contribution of Ada. When?I objected they agreed to publish nothing instead, so I am circulating this obituary on xmca partly because I have no other way to publicly?commemorate her scientific work. One of the many, but more minor,?reasons I have for admiring the work of Alex Kozulin is that he has always drawn our attention to the many, minor and not so minor, ways in which Vygotsky's work really WAS confirmed by subsequent research even though it formed no part of it because of the geopolitical isolation of the USSR. For example, in "Vygotsky's Psychology: A Biography of Ideas", Kozulin shows how Vygotsky not only?foresaw the outcome of the ape language debate but predicted how it would be resolved. He also shows?how the dispute with Piaget over egocentric speech was resolved decisively in Vygotsky's favor. Here's another, minor, example. In Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech LSV made the apparently unverifiable claims that feeling (the affective-volitional impulse to speak), thinking, and inner speech are separable "planes" of verbal thought. He made these claims partly on the basis of?introspection and partly on the basis of ontogenetic data, but also on the basis of verbal art (Uspensky, Stanislavsky, and of course that wonderful passage of Anna Karenina where Constantin and Kitty seem to share inner speech through the children's game of "Secretary"). The far flung nature of his argument made it easy to ignore. But if Vygotsky is correct, then there is no ready-made "thought" which can be picked up by brain scans and synthesized into speech: the only way we could synthesize fully developed speech in speech impaired individuals would be to intercept the actual signals sent to the articulators. Take a look at this. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48037592 Sometimes the research DOES support the proposal. But sometimes it does take a while.?? David KelloggSangmyung University New Article:?Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky?s pedology, Bruner?s constructivism and Halliday?s construalism in understanding narratives byKorean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 Some e-prints available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190427/6b1a63d7/attachment.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Dorothy Stein.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 20915 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190427/6b1a63d7/attachment.bin From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sat Apr 27 02:22:54 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2019 09:22:54 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] (no subject) References: <1670754281.1686015.1556356974903.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1670754281.1686015.1556356974903@mail.yahoo.com> Sorry:...to the memory of ... -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20190427/8eeb63b0/attachment.html From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sat Apr 27 05:12:34 2019 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2019 12:12:34 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] correction References: <454553374.1750998.1556367154584.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <454553374.1750998.1556367154584@mail.yahoo.com> Sorry : Twice the post with the following subject returns to me : Offering my full respect and heart-felt condolences to the memory of the great scholar and dear Mum, I'd like to inform the Xmca that there are information on the esteemed figure and the downloadable book (attached) on google. Haydi? The book with the pdf format is about 24 mb. Maybe that was the problem. Now this one is 1.12 mb. I hope this one is sent without any trouble (attached). Haydi -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... 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