[Xmca-l] Re: Rogers day

[Huw Lloyd]

Hi Doug,

At first I thought you were talking about Bernshtein with respect to
embodied expression in action. It is nice to hear of Eisenstein taking a
theoretical interest beyond surface details. This seems quite reasonable
from my position, in which orientation can be considered as a concern for
the pragmatics aspect of semiotic categories.

There is nothing amiss in associative thinking itself, but rather there are
broader and more coherent circuits of thought that may be realised beyond
such. Through employing more sophisticated and layered perspectives, one
can interpret differently, hence re-construe content. A change in the
background -- perspective or orientation -- can change the contents or
meaning of the foreground.

On metaphoric linkage, one would need to be careful to distinguish
association in simple action from linking by outcome and from linking by
process in the contextual extension of a word, phrase or term (to point to
three of potentially many forms of extension). Each form of cognition can
introduce further forms of extension (or displacement). I will send you the
draft which is about these differing perspectives and ideas concerning how
shifts can be realised through "conversation" (Pask's term) and
orientation. In addition to deliberate displacement/extension there is also
the displacements that arise across levels of sophistication, such as the
child's concretised apprehension of abstract phrases. No doubt much more
can be said.

Huw



On Fri, 7 Sep 2018 at 04:36, Douglas Williams <djwdoc@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Hi, Huw--
>
> I'd be interested in hearing more about this. As you may now (probably
> most people on this list have forgotten more than I know), Eisenstein,
> influenced by Mayerhold, was attempting to develop a more scientific
> understanding of Mayerhold's biomechanics in which the embodiment of bodies
> in action within space was capable of communicating thoughts, feelings,
> emotion. Eisenstein seemed to have some research program going on in the
> late 1920s-early 1930s with Vygotsky school researchers, though that fell
> apart (as with much of everything else very early on--in part politics, and
> in part Eisenstein's inability (personally or socially?) to build the kind
> of sustaining research program that would develop it.
>
> Vygotsky's comments about thinking in complexes of objects with factually
> present connections which lack logical unity, but can have consistency over
> time (concrete associations: same colors, movements, sounds, etc--or
> collections: color contrasts, synesthesic associations generally, such as
> purple evoking yellow, a specific car engine associated with specific
> events or people, a smell triggering a narrative sequence of images or
> memories)  puts us very much in the world of metonymy, metaphor, and the
> pre-neocortex world we probably share with mammals generally, in which
> mammalian image-narrative recall, dreams, cinematic imagery, theater, and
> other forms of--let's say--thinking in action in space and time through
> recall or performance--operate.
>
> I know that's a rather dense nest of ideas, so I'll leave it at that. This
> is the kind of thing that, when I pitched it to Lakoff directly, ended up
> closing rather than opening interactions--though I did notice that he later
> turned to preconceptual political narratives as an area of interest, which
> is what my dissertation was about. so I have always counted that as a small
> victory for my chiseling into his worldview. though what he came up with
> had nothing to do with me.
>
> This research project is my Zaigarnik nightmare from academia: my own
> version of unified theory of everything in human culture that I sense is
> there, and see the shadow of in many things, but never quite the thing
> itself...
>
> Regards,
> Doug
>
> On Tuesday, September 4, 2018, 4:59:46 AM PDT, Huw Lloyd <
> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Re "oriented-ness", Ilyenkov, "intelligent movement", as a prelude to some
> technical study on orientation, I formulated a "perspective-based theory of
> cognition". It's in draft form and would probably benefit from a few
> sympathetic reviews. One of the reasons metaphor does not show up in this
> explicitly is that it becomes less meaningful when it is recognised as
> being non-discrete, i.e. as being a process amongst others.
>
> The issue is similar to an issue (or limitation) I had with one of Ruqaiya Hasan's
> books (perhaps an early one) in which she declared that the superficial
> constraint of her topic by formal categories was insufficient, that she was
> interested in expressing meanings that go beyond this, but then turning
> around and declaring that she would only focus upon her (formally
> identified) subject matter, thereby proceeding to paint the world in terms
> of her categories -- like painting the whole world with metaphor.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On Tue, 4 Sep 2018 at 11:44, Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@ils.uio.no>
> wrote:
>
> Annalisa, Doug, all,
>
>
> just to address the issue that seems to linger on "what may Lakoff and
> Johnson be critiqued for", if I may re-phrase the question this way, and
> being clear that I am talking for anyone else than myself. First, I think
> there are way more reasons to praise than to critique their work on
> metaphor, among others, because we ought to them having this and many
> other discussions on such a relevant topic. But I mentioned that one
> objection to their book is that "flesh" was precisely what was missing from
> their account. What this claim refers to is the sense I got, upon reading
> the book and other of their works, that their analyses, while very
> illuminating with respect to the prevalence and form of metaphors in
> conceptual thinking, they seemed to remain with a quite formalistic sphere.
> As Huw seems to be critiquing in prior posts, their accounts speak of
> metaphors we live by, but not of the way they come to be formed as part of
> living. Missing is a genetic account, and that, I think, has to do with an
> account of how flesh, as living matter, is not just another piece of
> matter; that the logic of its explanation is not formal but genetic (which
> was Bateson is talking about too, that "syllogisms in grass", as he refers
> to them, make sense because they the logic of growth and formation). But
> then, as I understood it (and perhaps I am outdated now), Lakoff's and
> Johnson's works rely on notions of "embodied image schemata" as a way to
> account for the formation and prevalence of these metaphors.
>
>
> But if it is the formation of bodily images what makes flesh "flesh,"
> then this formation needs to be accounted for, and also we need to
> understand how such an account would differ from cognitive processing
> theories, besides the observation that now "information" of the world
> is being represented as consistent with bodily actions rather than with
> abstract perceptions.
>
>
> Of course, the critique is not mine, and it has been elaborated by authors
> such as Maxime Sheets-Johnstone, who adresses all forms of "embodied"
> cognition, claiming that it is a problem that we try to understand how our
> bodies are involved in thinking by "forthrightly packaging the subject of
> their concern into a readily available pre-existing and pre-formed
> material container with a readily available linguistic signifier, namely,
> the all-purpose lexical band-aid of embodiment and its lexical derivatives"
> (see attached article, titled "Embodiment on Trial", which I share for
> educational purposes only in this private list). W-M. Roth has drawn on
> these arguments to elaborate a critique and advance a "mathematics in the
> flesh" approach ( https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136732218 ).
>
> More recently, Ilyenkov's Spinozist idea of the "thinking body" has been
> inspiring from a dialectical materialist perspective, according to which it
> is not schemata but rather object-orientedness nature of objective activity
> that would explain intelligent movement. But here, I am not aware of work
> in which the notion of metaphor has been taken up or elaborated along the
> larger framework.
>
>
> Well, to summarize, the problem with schemas is that they take the
> metaphoric relation and read it backwards, so that we can map actions to
> concepts formally. But a further challenge involves reading metaphors
> forward, as means not of conceptualizing already gone realities, but as a
> means of and for intelligently acting in the world. So, I hope this helps
> on the issue of "exceptions" to Lakoff.
>
>
> As per Doug on the central role of image (by the way, thanks for your
> beautiful post on the meaning of cherry blossoms), I wonder what an "image"
> that is "metaphoric and metonymic" (so not simply "visual") is , and
> whether and how that may relate to the notion of object-orientedness that I
> mention above.
>
>
> Cheers,
> Alfredo
> ------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* 04 September 2018 11:02
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Rogers day
>
>
>
> On Tue, 4 Sep 2018 at 01:53, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>
> Huw,
>
>
> One possible argument that I see metaphor readily as a basis, is because
> animals seem to dream, as Douglas has so aptly discussed, and I do plan to
> respond more to his post but I would like to read it one more time and I
> just scanned the thread as of late.
>
>
> If something is lauded, it might be for a reason, and it might be the case
> that you are missing something or you have dismissed something that
> everyone else accepts.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
> What isn't clear to me is what you are rejecting. You have made a
> reference to Shön, but that doesn't really do much unless one has read
> Shön, so why don't you explain it more transparently?
>
>
> If the opinions offered are distinguished from the opinions offered as
> assertion, it may be more apparent that I have done so up to a point.
>
>
>
> What are your 20 exceptions?
>
>
> Dear Annalisa, I have no present wish to enumerate and turn over them all.
> The assertion was about the extent to which an opinion was formed, not an
> invitation to squander more time on it. If you take care with the few
> points I have made then it may be apparent that they stand for more than
> solitary issues. One needn't describe all the ripples if one can identify a
> few stones. But if you are annoyed by this response, then that may be
> usefully applied in looking for yourself.
>
> Huw
>
> [...]
>
> It is possible.
>
>
> Kind regards,
>
>
> Annalisa
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, September 3, 2018 2:44:21 PM
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Rogers day
>
> Yes, the paintbrush example also crops up in the "displacement of
> concepts" text (p.87), which was first published in 1963. From
> recollection, I liked it for the processual perspective and, of course,
> it's tying in with later work. Perhaps Schön's account also helped me get
> over the hump of many over metaphoric accounts, which seemed to miss quite
> a bit and fudge the issue.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On Mon, 3 Sep 2018 at 21:11, Julian Williams <
> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> Huw/Doug
>
>
>
> And ..  I found a citation in an old paper in ESM from … 200? when we
> wrote about metaphor as a sort of abduction between in-and-out of school
> activity … I remember the whole book is great but loved this one in
> particular:
>
> Schon, D.A.: 1995, ’Generative metaphor: A perspective on problem-setting
> in social policy’, in A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought: 2nd Edition,
> Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 137–163.
>
>
>
> Julian
>
>
>
> *From: *<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Julian Williams <
> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk>
> *Reply-To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Date: *Monday, 3 September 2018 at 20:59
> *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Rogers day
>
>
>
> Huw/Doug
>
>
>
> This is the same Schon that wrote about ‘generative metaphor’ – as in his
> analysis of the ‘paintbrush as a pump’ …?– sorry I have not been following
> the conversation and if this is irrelevant please ignore it!
>
>
>
> Julian
>
>
>
> *From: *<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Huw Lloyd <
> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> *Reply-To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Date: *Monday, 3 September 2018 at 20:43
> *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Rogers day
>
>
>
> Doug,
>
>
>
> I found your email in spam -- possibly yahoo are not verifying emails?
>
>
>
> As you note they're opinions. I found that text sloppy, superimposing
> metaphor onto language and concepts rather than actually looking for them
> in their genesis, with many other unwarranted generalisations and poorly
> articulated assertions. No doubt it wouldn't have been such a
> disappointment if it hadn't been so lauded.  Historically I have found Sch
> ön to be a rewarding read, so I was delighted to find his old text on
> "displacement of concepts" which is true to its title. It is a reprint in
> the series "Classics from the Tavistock Press".
>
>
>
> In his chapter(s) on homology, Stafford is not addressing metaphor in its
> development but rather describing the role of analogy in the formation of
> ideas, prior to the formulation of more precise definitions that may be
> isomorphic across domains.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Huw
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, 31 Aug 2018 at 08:59, Douglas Williams <djwdoc@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> Hi, Huw--
>
>
>
> Coincidentally, I spent a term at UCB to study with Lakoff, and he took
> about twenty or so exceptions to my exceptions, though I was thinking they
> were questions. It would be interesting to see you debate, as I was not up
> to the challenge (my main radicalism was to note parallels between things
> in the Cognitive Linguistics model and thinking in complexes (LSV), and
> Whorf/Sapir, GH Mead, Dewey, and so on, and wondering if there could be
> some cross-disciplinary unity that would improve on all of them. Not
> interesting questions for him, at the time, at least.
>
>
>
> Barring the debate, I'd be interested in seeing your take on the flaws of
> the cognitive metaphor approach, or do Schon or Beer happen to address
> themselves to Lakoff in particular?
>
>
>
> I find Cognitive Linguistics quite interesting. Even if some of the
> explanations are wrong (as is certainly true with Freud's hydraulic
> cathexes and repression of the id relating to jokes--seeking, like water,
> the way of least resistance to the sea), the observations are interesting,
> and well worth pursuing deeper. I also looked a bit into Ronald Langacker,
> which is the more austere form of embodied language, relating to an
> embodied basis for grammar, which is also quite interesting, though more
> calculus to Lakoff's algebra, at least to me. But this is an area of study
> that is expanding its adherents,
>
>
>
> Mark Turner's *More Than Cool Reason* and *Death is the Mother of Beauty*
> are the better places to begin from a literary appreciation standpoint.
>
>
>
> And for Alfredo and Annalisa--
>
> I think one needn't go terribly far into anthropology to find that
> embodied imagery clothed and complicated with words is the foundation of
> all kinds of complex interactive imagery and behaviors, from Balinese
> cockfights to "Christian" leopards in Ethiopia, to the *mono no aware*--the
> awareness of the infinite sadness and beauty of the cycle of life--which is
> evoked by the *sakura*, the cherry blossom.
>
>
>
> The Meaning of Cherry Blossoms in Japan: Life, Death and Renewal
>
>
> The Meaning of Cherry Blossoms in Japan: Life, Death and Renewal
>
> Japanese sakura are not only sublime to look at, they're deeply revered
> for their symbolism. Find out the true m...
>
> Cherry blossoms as the image of human life, or autumn leaves, or winter
> snows, or the return of the salmon--very commonly, mixtures of renewal or
> restoral, mixed with death and decay, and other emblems of seasonal
> cycles--is a constant imagistic theme across many cultures, related
> specifically to humans--so that these things *are* humans, unconsciously,
> at least, as we have put off . The rituals in Japan around the sakura are
> in concert with the theme of ancestor worship, another kind of day of the
> dead, and consistent  with much more wordy expressions of something
> embodied in the imagery--this from Stevens' "Sunday Morning:"
>
>
>
> Death is the mother of beauty; hence from her,
> Alone, shall come fulfilment to our dreams
> And our desires.
>
>
>
> a common theme...
>
>
>
> Qui beauté eut trop plus qu'humaine?
> Mais où sont les neiges d'antan! (Villon)
>
>
>
> Each Morn a thousand Roses brings, you say:
> Yes, but where leaves the Rose of Yesterday?
> And this first Summer month that brings the Rose
> Shall take Jamshýd and Kaikobád away.(Khayyam)
>
>
>
> But one step deeper: What really strikes me as the core of metaphor and
> analogy--see, here was my idea of a multidisciplinary research project that
> was always beyond my abilities or means--is the fixation of memory and
> associations and emotional associations in dreams. They are metaphoric and
> metonymic through blending of imagery--for we remake past and present
> memory in dreams--and in dreams, which was a radical idea 25 years ago, but
> emerging as the dominant paradigm now--we form and reshape the past and
> present in sequences that develop through recalling and associating past
> fixed memories with newer ones. All mammals (except the echidna, a very
> primitive group of mammals) dream, emphasizing the essential adaptive
> nature of dreams, which we have known heuristically, and increasingly
> scientifically, are associated with memory. And what do animals dream?
> According to Temple Grandin, mammals think (and dream) predominantly in
> images. They think in pictures. We think in pictures too, but words and
> internalized schemas and phrases overwhelm the imagery. But it is in dreams
> that we come relatively closer to the more common mammalian world of
> imagistic cognition--though even there, we bring in sociocultural schemas.
> Images are less mediated in words, more direct to our own perceptions. Part
> of the appeal to poetry, surely, is in the way that a good poem can reach
> into imagery, and evoke sensations and sounds of the sort that are closer
> to a pre-verbal sensory and narrative world. It is precisely the power of
> imagery that struck people about the early cinema. We have learned to take
> cinematic narratives for granted now, but they continue to have social
> effects that are probably underexamined.
>
>
>
> For narratives to seem most numinous to us, most self-evident or profound,
> it would make sense that they probably typically evoke the imagistic
> thinking our words and socially internalized narratives often convey
> implicitly, concealed behind words, and that we perceive in our own
> embodied world of imagery.
>
>
>
> Which leads us back to the unconscious. One part of it, which I draw from
> Grandin, is that perception of raw sensory data is still what we do, all
> the time. Though it is mediated by words and social narratives, and to some
> extent shaped by them, the extreme perception that enables dogs or cats to
> perceive narratives of the sensory world we don't notice, are still there.
> They tug at us, and we react unconsciously (preconsciously) to them.
> Emotive associations with imagery (the evolutionary benefit of fear, anger,
> pleasure and pain), evoked in the background of our mind through words, and
> schemas that touch on these strings of preconscious perception and memory
> would give a sense of how a cinematic narrative is constructed literally to
> play on common sensory experience, mediated through shared sociocultural
> themes--and how some of these themes that are universal to human
> experience, would be so similar in their imagery in human culture.
>
>
>
> But that's a lot (obviously some bottled-up thought--and probably less
> interesting to you than to me), and it's time for me to sleep, perchance to
> dream...
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Doug
>
>
>
>
>
> On ‎Tuesday‎, ‎August‎ ‎28‎, ‎2018‎ ‎01‎:‎57‎:‎45‎ ‎AM‎ ‎PDT, Huw Lloyd <
> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> After taking twenty or so exceptions to "The now-classic, Metaphors We
> Live By" in the first fifty pages, my copy now resides in a pile of books
> the only use of which is to refer to errors. One of the basic errors seems
> to be Lackoff's assumption that we only have one conceptual system. Rather,
> I would commend Donald Schon's "Displacement of Concepts". The use of
> homology (by Bateson) is also systematically (and simply) presented by
> Stafford Beer in his text on "Decision and Control".
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Huw
>
>
>
> On Tue, 28 Aug 2018 at 07:31, Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@ils.uio.no>
> wrote:
>
> oh yes, the chapter! Here it is :)
>
> Alfredo
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> *Sent:* 28 August 2018 07:05
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Rogers day
>
>
>
> Hi Alfredo and venerable others who continue to peruse the thread,
>
>
>
> Thanks for your verdant post! I must say that in regard to your syllogism:
>
>
>
> Grass dies;
>
> Men die;
>
> Men are grass.
>
>
>
> I would reply:
>
>
>
> Grass dies;
>
> Men die;
>
> Men are grass cut down by the grim reaper;
>
> but grass grows back if watered by mother nature;
>
> A mother who lives forever.
>
> Just to give a feminist twist, though I hope not too essentialist.
>
>
>
> However, I was taken by surprise on your take on Lakoff and Johnson, and I
> had to think a little before I replied, so that I respond more thoughtfully
> (I hope).
>
>
>
> For me, the "flesh" part of the book's content references embodied
> thinking, which I may have already said, and I hope I'm not repeating
> myself. The assertion being, we can't think without a body and also that we
> are not robots with brains for our CPUs. I wish I had the book at my
> fingertips right now to say more on that.
>
>
>
> It took me a little bit to consider what embodied thinking actually meant
> while reading the book, because looking back I see how many Cartesian
> assumptions I had to unlearn when thinking about mind. Also reading David
> Kirsh's work on dancers and how they mark with their bodies when learning
> new sequences of steps helped me to understand. Using a bookmark is a form
> of embodied thinking (real books not digital browsers!)
>
>
>
> The problem with thinking about thinking is that we forget that we have a
> body already in place sitting in a soup of evolution, culture, history,
> etc, and how there is an illusion that we are bubbles of consciousness
> thinking like Rodin's thinker on a stool. That pose has become the
> shorthand for mainstream conceptions of a thinker.
>
>
>
> I'm even remembering how the documentary of Hannah Arendt shows her laying
> on a couch smoking a cigarette while contemplating evil (which might just a
> postmodern cinematic redo of David's Madame Recamier perhaps?).
>
>
>
> Anyway, there was also something Kirsh wrote in another paper about
> metacognition about libraries that I found illuminating, and I'm not
> referencing green-shaded lamps. Recalling from memory... it was something
> like: how if not for size and height of the tables (horizontal) we could
> not read the books stored on the shelves (vertically) because sometimes we
> want to lay many books open at once and compare them, and how we might use
> a finger to keep our place while checking and comparing texts. So
> environment has a lot of power in how we digest our tools for thinking as
> well.
>
>
>
> How could we conceive of vertical and horizontal without bodies (and
> without gravity and a horizon).
>
>
>
> Also, that the way we see, which the eyes only have a small part in, also
> has to do with our bodies, because sometimes we have to walk around things
> to know about them, something the eyes can't do alone. Or how the organs of
> perception work in unison, such as smoke and fire may mean danger when we
> see flames, smell burning wood and our skin feels heat. But when we have
> one of those faux fireplaces with digital flickering flames, we just feel
> coziness (or an aversion to the kitsch)!
>
>
>
> Anyway, Bateson was an inspiration to Hutchins, and his work assisted in
> Hutchins's development of his approach to distributed cognition (Bateson is
> someone on my reading list). I also feel that there is a connection to what
> you offer about Bateson's observation of metaphor as a "primary" language
> to Levi-Straus's Science of the Concrete, as described in the first chapter
> of Le Pensée Sauvage whose connotation, I might add, is lost when
> translated to English's "The Savage Mind" because in the French (as I
> understand) is a double enténdre of savage mind and wild pansy at the same
> time. I take that to be a wonderful reference to the wisdom of the natural
> world inherent in what we used to call "primitive" or "uncivilized"
> cultures. It is a beautiful, embodied metaphor which is far more meaningful
> than the English, which ironically seems more idealized, or Cartesian (who
> was French!)
>
>
>
> I would enjoy to look at that chapter you almost attached if not for want
> of a plane to board.
>
>
>
> With regard to the metaphor and how it fails, is that metaphor is
> aspectual. Just like a tool might have a proper and improper application,
> so does a metaphor.
>
>
>
> In Vedanta, for example, there is a drshtanta (sanskrit for
> "teaching-illustration") for the dehatma-buddhi, which translates roughly
> to the "mind-body-sense complex," (and also references that the
> dehatma-buddhi is the self and the self is the dehatma-buddhi as 1:1
> equivalence and how this equivalence is an illusion), anyway, the drshtanta
> of the red-hot iron ball is a very old metaphor used to explain something
> very hard to explain rationally.
>
>
>
> It is used to show how one might perceive that the attributes of iron
> might associate to the fire and vice versa, because they are indeed at that
> moment in time inseparably presenting in the same loci. It would take for
> one to have prior knowledge of the attributes of fire to know that the
> roundness and heaviness of the ball does not belong to fire but to iron,
> and likewise the knowledge of iron to know that the heat and the redness
> belong actually to fire not to iron. It is impossible to physically
> differentiate the red-hot from the iron ball, say by pulling them apart
> into smaller pieces (which Descartes tries to do: to see a thing in parts
> adding into a whole). It is a beautiful metaphor for explaining how the
> self takes on attributes of the body and the body takes attributes of the
> self. And yet the drshtanta fails if someone from the peanut gallery says,
> "Just dunk it in a pool of water like any old blacksmith and you'll figure
> that one out," and the peanut thrower would be right, but the metaphor, if
> used in a surgical way, is very apt to show the illusion of the location of
> consciousness (self). So the metaphor, when used with precision, is a
> useful tool.
>
>
>
> One doesn't get far with a screwdriver if everything seems a screw,
> especially if the screw is a nail.
>
>
>
> I think with a metaphor (as a cognitive tool) it's the same. Of course
> there is danger if we mix our metaphors inappropriately, which is another
> way they can fail.
>
>
>
> I feel compelled to find an example in which metaphors help
> problem-solving in life situation...perhaps it is a job for Superman or
> some other superhero.
>
>
>
> Kind regards,
>
>
>
> Annalisa
>
>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180907/dd081b68/attachment.html