[Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: What is science?: Where to start doctoral students?

[Greg Thompson]

Andy,
I'm interested in the conversation but have very little time to read or dig
or do anything other than quickly skim. I was just wondering if you could
provide a little bit of the explanation/background for this argument (of
yours):
"Marx's theory of value is sharply at odds with Hegel's (as elaborated in
the *Philosophy of Right*)"
It sounds interesting but it also sounds different from what I would have
thought/said about it. So I suspect that I have something to learn...
If you have no time either, no worries, I'll leave it be.
-greg


On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 5:14 AM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:

> Haydi, you must agree with me that the content, the real significance, of
> what people say often differs from what they say of themselves and their
> protagonists. I am a Marxist, and have been since my first reading of Marx
> in 1967. But you are justified in examining what I do and say, rather than
> taking me at my word. Everyone knows that Marx made the well-known
> criticisms of Hegel that you mention. We also know that he praised Hegel
> and made criticisms of "the materialists." But the point is to examine the
> content of his action and in particular his scientific writing.
>
> "Capital" (particularly its early sections) is modelled on Hegel's Logic.
> Marx tells us this in the famous passage (*Method of Political Economy*)
> where he gives the best explanation of the Logic that I know of. As you
> point out, he went on to make some crucially important criticisms of Hegel
> in that same passage ("the real subject ..." etc). Obviously Marx is not =
> Hegel.
>
> There are elements of Marx's approach which he takes from Hegel and
> elements which are in opposition to Hegel's approach. I tried to make this
> crystal clear in my little article
> https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Hegel-idealist.pdf .
>
> The ontology of "Capital" is sharply at odds with materialist ontology as
> it would have been known in the 1860s and equally at odds with the ontology
> of positivism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries which arose from
> the crisis of natural science at that time which put an end to naive
> realism. Marx's theory of value is sharply at odds with Hegel's (as
> elaborated in the *Philosophy of Right*) and methodologically also at
> odds with Hegel in that it was not speculative but had a significant streak
> of empiricism in it. (I describe this in
> https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Goethe-Hegel-Marx_public.pdf
> ).
>
> If you look at the MIA Library https://www.marxists.org/archive/index.htm
> and run your eye down the first 80% of so of the writers listed there.
> Almost all of these writers declared themselves "Marxists" (not the last
> 20% or so) and yet you will see a very wide spectrum of views here. No-one
> has the last word here. My conviction that Marxists have much to learn from
> Hegel was not lightly arrived at.
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
> On 7/11/2018 10:22 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>
> Nice !! Not to get Marx involved in the discussion!This is the whole thing!
> Because if Marx is involved in his original writing and making the last
> quote easier:
>
> Concepts need Conceptioners and conceptioners are , as said here also ,
> [Material] Human Beings living and Acting in their respective Material
> Surrounding out of which process Social Relations arise which in their turn
> , give birth to Thoughts and Ideas , concepts and categories , ideas of the
> Idea , Logic and the Absolute , cultures (in Bibler's terminology) which
> make Real?? Cosmologies (of course as META-physics beyond Physical Natural
> Hard sciences as these latter sciences deal also with atoms , electrons
> neutrons , positrons , quarks , galaxies , planets , etc. in their abstract
> or Hegelian (concrete as Concept) ontological/existential?? dependencies
> (the World which is outside Mind through Lenin's quote by some esteemed
> scholars and the World/s which need a Mind to claim existence) which is
> O.K. and in full respect.)
>
> This is what Marx meant in the last word of the last quote by "**[[Hence,
> in
> the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in
> mind as
> the presupposition.]]**"
>
> Neither the Social Relations have independent Being nor the sciences which
> arise from them.
>
> Every body has the right to think that "phenomena" of Mind/Thinking have
> the same Ontology as the Ontology of the Substantial/Material/Corporeal
> Universe does but ascribing this to Marx would be problematic. This was the
> beginning of the worry!
>
> In the same vein , no problem with "Any Category" first , but no
> imposition on Marx the more so that one might keep people in waiting for
> just a single evidence to one's Big Claim :-)).
>
> Marx is quite Robust in his Materialism and towards Hegel in full clarity
> and stance with quite indubious remarks:
>
> The best of the very Marx for Hegel:
>
> FROM CAPITAL VOLUME ONE:
>
> My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its
> direct opposite. To Hegel,
> the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which,
> under the name of “the
> Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of
> the [[real]] world, and the
> real world is only the external, [[phenomenal form]] of “the Idea.” With
> me, on the contrary, the
> ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the [[human
> mind]], and translated into
> forms of thought.
> The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years
> ago, at a time when it was
> still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das
> Kapital,” it was the good
> pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Επιγονοι [Epigones – Büchner,
> Dühring and others]
> who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the
> brave Moses
> Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I
> [[therefore]] openly avowed
> myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the
> chapter on the theory of
> value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The
> mystification which dialectic
> suffers in [[Hegel’s hands]], by no means prevents him from being [[the
> first to present its general
> 15 Afterword to the Second German Edition (1873)
> form of working]] in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is
> standing on its head. It
> must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational
> kernel within the mystical
> shell.
>
> FROM GRUDERISSE WHICH INCLUDES ALSO THE METHOD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
>
> But do not these simpler categories also have an independent historical or
> natural existence pre-dating the more concrete ones? That depends. Hegel,
> for
> example, correctly begins the Philosophy of Right with possession, this
> being
> the subject’s simplest juridical relation. But there is no possession
> preceding
> the family or master-servant relations, which are far more concrete
> relations.
>
>
>
> It follows then naturally, too, that all the relationships of men can be
> derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, Man.
> This has been done by the speculative philosophers. Hegel himself confesses
> at the end of the Geschichtsphilosophie that he "has considered the
> progress of the concept only" and has represented in history the "true
> theodicy". (p.446.) Now one can go back again to the producers of the
> "concept", to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes
> then to the conclusion that the philosophers, the thinkers as such, have at
> all times been dominant in history: a conclusion, as we see, already
> expressed by Hegel. The whole trick of proving the hegemony of the spirit
> in history (hierarchy Stirner calls it) is thus confirmed to the following
> three efforts.
>
> Critique: "humans create themselves out of nothing" Far from it being true
> that "out of nothing" I make myself, for example, a "[public] speaker", the
> nothing which forms the basis here is a very manifold something, the real
> individual, his speech organs, a definite stage of physical development, an
> existing language and dialects, ears capable of hearing and a human
> environment from which it is possible to hear something, etc., etc.
> therefore, in the development of a property something is created by
> something out of something, and by no means comes, as in Hegel's Logic ,
> from nothing, through nothing to nothing. [Th. I. Abt. 2 of Hegel] p. 162
> Best
> Haydi
>
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 7, 2018, 5:05:58 AM GMT+3:30, Adam Poole (16517826)
> <Adam.Poole@nottingham.edu.cn> <Adam.Poole@nottingham.edu.cn> wrote:
>
>
>
> An interesting point to add to the discussion is the role that ontology
> plays as a tacit form of gatekeeping in many disciplines and journals
> (though thankfully, from my experience, not MCA). I have started to find
> this out as I have been publishing papers on International education from
> my doctorate (which I am going to defend in December). As part of this
> experience, I have found that:
>
>
> The journal article form does not lend itself to prolonged discussion of
> ontology due to length restrictions. So much of what is fundamental to
> research is left unsaid, but really needs to be said! Qualitative researchers
> need to justify themselves more substantially than quantitive
> researchers because notions of positivism (validity, generalizability, etc)
> are normalized and therefore do not require explication. However, your
> typically journal article does not provide enough room for qualitative
> researches to justify themselves.
>
>
> Reviewers and journals function as gatekeepers (just like funding
> agencies) so it is sometimes necessary to conform to a certain 'house
> ontology' in order to get the work out there. An issue I have found is
> that reviewer's can impose their ontology onto the writer - that is, their
> implicit assumptions about reality function as a framework for
> understanding and most significantly evaluating the work before them. If
> the work does not conform to their framework - if there is ontological
> dissonance - the work is likely to be rejected or heavily critiqued,
> leading to substantial rewrites that change the essential nature of the
> paper. On the other side, writers also impose their ontology onto the
> reader.
>
>
> This is all a roundabout way to say that ontology is also inextricably
> linked to power, and takes on dialogic and discursive dimensions.
> Essentially, ontology can be invoked by either side as a way to demonize or
> legitimize research, depending on where you stand. Ideally, it would be
> possible to transcend dualism, but practically speaking dualism functions
> as a convenient mechanism for gatekeeping and control.
>
>
> So whilst I agree completely with Martin (whose book I started to read
> yesterday and really like) that it is imperative to develop ontologies that
> do not split researchers into partisan camps, actually making this happen
> is problematic, not least of all because the journal article itself (which
> I would argue is the paradigmatic academic form these days) does not lend
> itself to this endeavor. The issue is also an economic one: paywalls,
> limited space in journals, pressure to publish, and suddenly ontological
> idealism is compromised. I do think a new form of academic paper needs to
> be developed that can support greater reflexivity in order to bring out our
> ontological and epistemological assumptions. The standard 6000ish words,
> intro methods, findings, discussion, conclusion structure leaves little
> space for reflective/reflexive writing.
>
>
> Anyway, just a doctoral student's take on ontology in relation to
> publishing.
>
>
> Adam
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Martin Packer
> <mpacker@cantab.net> <mpacker@cantab.net>
> *Sent:* 07 November 2018 04:11:34
> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: What is science?: Where to start
> doctoral students?
>
> Well Huw I’ll take a shot! I’ve never thought that xmca-ers worry too much
> about overcomplicating a thread!  :)
>
> Quantitative research (and I’m talking about the way this is construed in
> the social sciences, not in physics, for example) is generally taught as
> experimental design and hypothesis testing, which is largely the model the
> logical positivists laid out a hundred years ago. They considered
> ontological (metaphysical) claims to be untestable, and so unscientific.
> Consequently, courses in quantitative research pay little or no attention
> to ontology. The result is that the researcher’s ontological assumptions
> are tacitly imposed on the phenomenon. After all, quantitative researchers
> believe (as the logical positivists taught them) that they can
> ‘operationally define’ their variables. That’s to say, *they* get to decide
> what is intelligence, or poverty, or a student, or a woman…
>
> The result is something that Alfred Schutz complained about: "this type of
> social science does not deal directly and immediately with the social
> life-world common to us all, but with skillfully and expediently
> chosen idealizations and formalizations of the social world.” The result is
> "a fictional nonexisting world constructed by the scientific observer.”
>
> Harold Garfinkel made a similar point: he rejected "the worldwide
> social science movement” with its “ubiquitous commitments to the policies
> and methods of formal analysis and general representational theorizing.” He
> saw that the statistical and formal models built by formal analysis “lose
> the very phenomenon that they profess.”
>
> I’ve tried to attach an article by Spencer (1982) that is, in my view,
> making essentially the same point, but the listserv rejects it:
>
> Spencer, M. E. (1982). The ontologies of social science. *Philosophy of
> the Social Sciences*, *12*(2), 121-141.
>
>  Typically, social scientists are completely caught up in the ontology of
> their discipline, and completely ignore the ontology of the phenomenon they
> are studying - that’s to say, its constitution: what its constituents are
> and how they are assembled.
>
> On the other hand, the issue of the implicit ontology of qualitative
> research is the central theme of my book. I argue there that by and large
> Qual has bought into the ontological dualism of mind-matter, so that
> researches assume that the natural sciences study matter (objectivity), and
> so qualitative research must study mind (subjectivity).
>
> The book develops an argument for escaping from this dualistic ontology,
> and actually paying attention to human being - a kind of research that
> Foucault called ‘a historical ontology of ourselves.’ Along the way I try
> to do justice to what has been called the ‘ontological turn’ in
> anthropology, the argument that different cultures have distinct
> cosmologies, rather than distinct cosmovisions - that’s to say, they have
> different ontologies; they live in distinct realities; they don’t simply
> have different ways of conceptualizing a single underlying reality.
> Latour’s most recent work is making a similar argument about the different
> institutions in which all of us live - that each institution has its
> distinct mode of existence (its distinct way of being; its distinct
> ontology).
>
> So if I had my way, or my ideal winter holiday gift, it would be that
> qualitative research provides a way for psychology (and perhaps the other
> social sciences) to move beyond dualism and embrace multiple ontologies.
>
> Martin
>
> *"I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss
> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my
> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with
> the feeling that this also applies to myself” (Malinowski, 1930)*
>
>
>
> On Nov 6, 2018, at 11:22 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Best to leave that for the time being, no point overcomplicating the
> thread.
>
> Huw
>
> On Tue, 6 Nov 2018 at 15:02, Martin Packer <mpacker@cantab.net> wrote:
>
> And what do you take their implicit ontology to be, Huw?
>
> Martin
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 5, 2018, at 6:33 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> The problem that I was responding to before regarding "qualitative and
> quantitative" labels is that the adoption of these labels (and their
> implicit ontology)...
>
>
>
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-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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