From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jan 2 00:56:00 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 08:56:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Thanks bj In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1514883343155.90994@iped.uio.no> Thanks Bruce for fixing this up. And Happy New Year to all! ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ana Marjanovic-Shane Sent: 31 December 2017 00:15 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Thanks bj Dear Mike Bruce and all! Happy New Year! Ana On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 2:39 PM William Blanton wrote: > Thanks Mike. Where is the connection. I don't want to ever leave it. > We should gather a strong group and go to the future. We can design a > 5D that can emerge in schools. > > Bill > > On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 11:56 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Bruce has brought xmca back online. > > Happy New Year All > > Thanks bj > > Mike > > -- > > "The past isn't dead, it isn't even past." > > - William Faulkner > -- *Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Ph.D.* Independent Scholar, Professor of Education Dialogic Pedagogy Journal, deputy Editor-in-Chief (dpj.pitt.edu) e-mail: anamshane@gmail.com Phone: +1 267-334-2905 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jan 2 01:08:19 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 09:08:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Perezhivanie of perezhivanie (Ilyenkov) In-Reply-To: <1514369548765.58663@iped.uio.no> References: , , <1513989449606.21068@iped.uio.no>, <1514369548765.58663@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1514884099641.10315@iped.uio.no> Several posts got caught in the verge of the New Year due to the problem with the server; I start the year here forwarding one that I sent few days before Christmas, taking up on one of the threads deriving from the discussion of Michael's article. Here is the post: Apologies if this takes it a bit away from the article for discussion, but the notion of the "ideal" that Michael brings up below?which I understand is consistent with Ilyenkov's descriptions in Dialectics of the Ideal?seems interesting. Recently, Ilyenkov has been brought up in the list to critique semiotic takes in CHAT, but Michael now uses the term "synecdochical function", where a thing participating in a relation "stands for" the relation as a whole. And so, a question comes up, is this not a semiotic relation, the relation between a sign and the thing it stands for? Ilyenkov notes that although the "meaning" of the words Marx uses when describing "value" as "ideal" is the same the meaning philosophers like Plato or Hegel before him used, the "concept" (which Ilyenkov clarifies is "the ways of understanding this meaning") that Marx proposes is different. The difference is that ideal, or in the specific case of economy, "value," is not the material thing as it appears in the mind, but rather a completely objective relation that exists between two things and that is expressed in that material thing. As such, the ideals not the result of a conscious mind that subjectively projects it, but exists objectively and is established outside consciousness: "According to Marx, of course, the ideality of the value-form consists not in the fact that this form represents a mental phenomenon existing only in the brain of the commodity-owner or theoretician, but in the fact that in this case, as in many others, the corporeally palpable form of the thing (for example, a coat) is only a form of expression of quite a different ?thing? (linen, as a value) with which it has nothing in common. The value of the linen is represented, expressed, ?embodied? in the form of a coat, and the form of the coat is the ?ideal or represented form? of the value of the linen. This is a completely objective relationship (as it is entirely independent of the commodity-owner?s consciousness and will, established outside his consciousness), within which the natural form of commodity B becomes the value-form of commodity A, or the body of commodity B acts as a mirror to the value of commodity A, the authorised representative of its ?value? nature, of the ?substance? which is ?embodied? both here and there" (Ilyenkov, 2012, Dialectics of the Ideal, p. 57) What is "represented" as a thing then is "a form of human activity, a form of life-activity that [people] perform together, developing quite spontaneously, 'out of the sight of consciousness', and materially established in the form of the relationship between things" (p. 58). When I was reading and commenting on James Ma's notes recently, I was attributing to him the kind of ideality that Ilyenkov critiques (the one that is ideal because it's in the mind rather than in the relation between things and part of people's relations). But James defended his position appealing precisely to dialectical materialism; in the same way Sasha (and others) might see in Vygotsky's a notion of sign as involving "randomness" (semiotics as conventionalism), only to lead David K. to argue that "Vygotsky does not accept conventionality as a pervasive principle in language" (cited from many posts ago). But is Ilyenkov here offering a way to move forward without having to reject one (semiotics) to achieve the other (dialectical materialist psychology)? For is not Ilyenkov's description akin to a sign? Of course, here the "concept" of sign needs to be clarified NOT as the ideal/subjective part of anotherwise material/objective reality. Whether doing so means "transcending" (because he had not) or "translating" (because he already had) Vygotsky, is of course debatable, but does not appear as relevant as to actually pursue that path. As Huw also suggested, I read Michael's piece as moving in that direction. And this seems long enough for a Dec 23rd post, Alfredo From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: 19 December 2017 02:00 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Perezhivanie of perezhivanie Hi all, there might be some light on the question of perezhivanie of perezhivanie from the German Ideology. Marx/Engels write: Where there exists a relation, it exists for me, the animal does not "relate" to anything and not at all. For the animal its relation to others does not relate as relation. (((Wo ein Verh?ltnis existiert, da existiert es f?r mich, das Tier ?verh?lt" sich zu Nichts und ?berhaupt nicht. F?r das Tier existiert sein Verh?ltnis zu andern nicht als Verh?ltnis" p.30)))) As I said before, in phenomenological (post-Husserlian) phenomenology, there is Being, but consciousness can be only with beings (things) that allow past being to be made present again. This making present is central to consciousness in the formulations of Husserl and Mead (from whom we can learn a lot). The organism-relation exists in the animal world, but not for the animal and not as relation. Marx, in *Capital* shows how the ideal emerges. It is a human-human relation that reflects itself in human-thing relations, and the human-thing relation reflects itself in human-human relations (that's why we have perezhivanie of perezhivanie). Some thing participating in the relation then has synecdochical function in that it comes to stand for the relation as a whole and especially for anything ideal (use-value for commodities, meanings for words, etc) Or so it makes sense to me Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 4:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > A question for Michael and David concerning consciousness as perezhivanie > of > perezhivanie --- > > I think that in one of the prior discussions of perezhivanie on xmca I gave > the following example of my early encounter with the term, and want to > introduce it again to get some clarity about the current discussion of > Michael's article. > > Back when Russian rockets were heading to Cuba I used to commute from > (Lenin, nee Sparrow Hills) to the main campus of MGU, I would take a bus in > cold > weather to avoid a long walk from the Metro. The bus was so crowded that at > its second stop outside the downtown MGU campus, you would be lucky to be > able to cram into the bus and it only got worse until nearing the campus. > > I seem to remember that if asked about the bus ride, I would either say > that it was a kashmar (the French got to Moscow at an earlier date) or that > I "perezhil" (past tense) the 111 bus. And as I said it, I would re-live, > so to speak, my having lived through that intense, often unpleasant, > experience. I think it would be grammatical and sensible to describe my > recounting and re-membering that "experience" as perezhivanie of > perzhivanie. > > Perhaps this is an inappropriate example. I was not using the term as part > of a set of theoretical terms (Vasilyuk had not written his book on > perezhivanie and I do not recall being present for a discussion, either of > why Leontiev was right and Vygotsky wrong (or vice versa) about > perezhivanie. And I hope I was paying attention and conscious of what I was > doing both times I used the term. > > Perhaps in the early Vygotsky where the perezhivanie of perezhivanie > comment appears he was using the term, perezhivanie in an everyday sense of > the term, but later it was used as a scientific term? > > David -- where does LSV write that consciousness begins at birth? Seems > important to know. > > Thanks for the interesting discussion. > > mike > > > > > > > > > For those like myself who never got past intro chemistry or physics, but > are interested in qualitative research, > this site might be of interest. I notice there is a blog on the topic as > well as a relevant resource page. 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Johns > Hopkins University > - UX Strategist > Strategist-021243a6c381a12c?sjdu=q7IOoCHuISN2aRXq8ScvWSkUEihUKT > ZNws310qnk1vG-0yhZ83fd18V3j_wpQu08VT-ssFnys7qUJ1cV06ahXCRGePqEuSrKv > RIOpc_H_KE&tk=1c1ak28pg18361oi> > -Avalere > Health > > [image: Powerful Tools II 2] > [image: > https://tqr.nova.edu/files/2017/12/TQR-2017-12-MAXQDA2018-2blybdv.png] > 2017_12_max18_small&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tqr_report> > > TQR | Nova Southeastern University | 3301 College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, > Florida 33314 > Lauderdale,+Florida+33314&entry=gmail&source=g> > -7796 > You received this email because you are subscribed to TQR. > To unsubscribe please click here . > > > > > > -- > "The past isn't dead, it isn't even past." > - William Faulkner > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jan 2 01:08:19 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 09:08:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Perezhivanie of perezhivanie (Ilyenkov) In-Reply-To: <1514369548765.58663@iped.uio.no> References: , , <1513989449606.21068@iped.uio.no>, <1514369548765.58663@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1514884099641.10315@iped.uio.no> Several posts got caught in the verge of the New Year due to the problem with the server; I start the year here forwarding one that I sent few days before Christmas, taking up on one of the threads deriving from the discussion of Michael's article. Here is the post: Apologies if this takes it a bit away from the article for discussion, but the notion of the "ideal" that Michael brings up below?which I understand is consistent with Ilyenkov's descriptions in Dialectics of the Ideal?seems interesting. Recently, Ilyenkov has been brought up in the list to critique semiotic takes in CHAT, but Michael now uses the term "synecdochical function", where a thing participating in a relation "stands for" the relation as a whole. And so, a question comes up, is this not a semiotic relation, the relation between a sign and the thing it stands for? Ilyenkov notes that although the "meaning" of the words Marx uses when describing "value" as "ideal" is the same the meaning philosophers like Plato or Hegel before him used, the "concept" (which Ilyenkov clarifies is "the ways of understanding this meaning") that Marx proposes is different. The difference is that ideal, or in the specific case of economy, "value," is not the material thing as it appears in the mind, but rather a completely objective relation that exists between two things and that is expressed in that material thing. As such, the ideals not the result of a conscious mind that subjectively projects it, but exists objectively and is established outside consciousness: "According to Marx, of course, the ideality of the value-form consists not in the fact that this form represents a mental phenomenon existing only in the brain of the commodity-owner or theoretician, but in the fact that in this case, as in many others, the corporeally palpable form of the thing (for example, a coat) is only a form of expression of quite a different ?thing? (linen, as a value) with which it has nothing in common. The value of the linen is represented, expressed, ?embodied? in the form of a coat, and the form of the coat is the ?ideal or represented form? of the value of the linen. This is a completely objective relationship (as it is entirely independent of the commodity-owner?s consciousness and will, established outside his consciousness), within which the natural form of commodity B becomes the value-form of commodity A, or the body of commodity B acts as a mirror to the value of commodity A, the authorised representative of its ?value? nature, of the ?substance? which is ?embodied? both here and there" (Ilyenkov, 2012, Dialectics of the Ideal, p. 57) What is "represented" as a thing then is "a form of human activity, a form of life-activity that [people] perform together, developing quite spontaneously, 'out of the sight of consciousness', and materially established in the form of the relationship between things" (p. 58). When I was reading and commenting on James Ma's notes recently, I was attributing to him the kind of ideality that Ilyenkov critiques (the one that is ideal because it's in the mind rather than in the relation between things and part of people's relations). But James defended his position appealing precisely to dialectical materialism; in the same way Sasha (and others) might see in Vygotsky's a notion of sign as involving "randomness" (semiotics as conventionalism), only to lead David K. to argue that "Vygotsky does not accept conventionality as a pervasive principle in language" (cited from many posts ago). But is Ilyenkov here offering a way to move forward without having to reject one (semiotics) to achieve the other (dialectical materialist psychology)? For is not Ilyenkov's description akin to a sign? Of course, here the "concept" of sign needs to be clarified NOT as the ideal/subjective part of anotherwise material/objective reality. Whether doing so means "transcending" (because he had not) or "translating" (because he already had) Vygotsky, is of course debatable, but does not appear as relevant as to actually pursue that path. As Huw also suggested, I read Michael's piece as moving in that direction. And this seems long enough for a Dec 23rd post, Alfredo From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: 19 December 2017 02:00 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Perezhivanie of perezhivanie Hi all, there might be some light on the question of perezhivanie of perezhivanie from the German Ideology. Marx/Engels write: Where there exists a relation, it exists for me, the animal does not "relate" to anything and not at all. For the animal its relation to others does not relate as relation. (((Wo ein Verh?ltnis existiert, da existiert es f?r mich, das Tier ?verh?lt" sich zu Nichts und ?berhaupt nicht. F?r das Tier existiert sein Verh?ltnis zu andern nicht als Verh?ltnis" p.30)))) As I said before, in phenomenological (post-Husserlian) phenomenology, there is Being, but consciousness can be only with beings (things) that allow past being to be made present again. This making present is central to consciousness in the formulations of Husserl and Mead (from whom we can learn a lot). The organism-relation exists in the animal world, but not for the animal and not as relation. Marx, in *Capital* shows how the ideal emerges. It is a human-human relation that reflects itself in human-thing relations, and the human-thing relation reflects itself in human-human relations (that's why we have perezhivanie of perezhivanie). Some thing participating in the relation then has synecdochical function in that it comes to stand for the relation as a whole and especially for anything ideal (use-value for commodities, meanings for words, etc) Or so it makes sense to me Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 4:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > A question for Michael and David concerning consciousness as perezhivanie > of > perezhivanie --- > > I think that in one of the prior discussions of perezhivanie on xmca I gave > the following example of my early encounter with the term, and want to > introduce it again to get some clarity about the current discussion of > Michael's article. > > Back when Russian rockets were heading to Cuba I used to commute from > (Lenin, nee Sparrow Hills) to the main campus of MGU, I would take a bus in > cold > weather to avoid a long walk from the Metro. The bus was so crowded that at > its second stop outside the downtown MGU campus, you would be lucky to be > able to cram into the bus and it only got worse until nearing the campus. > > I seem to remember that if asked about the bus ride, I would either say > that it was a kashmar (the French got to Moscow at an earlier date) or that > I "perezhil" (past tense) the 111 bus. And as I said it, I would re-live, > so to speak, my having lived through that intense, often unpleasant, > experience. I think it would be grammatical and sensible to describe my > recounting and re-membering that "experience" as perezhivanie of > perzhivanie. > > Perhaps this is an inappropriate example. I was not using the term as part > of a set of theoretical terms (Vasilyuk had not written his book on > perezhivanie and I do not recall being present for a discussion, either of > why Leontiev was right and Vygotsky wrong (or vice versa) about > perezhivanie. And I hope I was paying attention and conscious of what I was > doing both times I used the term. > > Perhaps in the early Vygotsky where the perezhivanie of perezhivanie > comment appears he was using the term, perezhivanie in an everyday sense of > the term, but later it was used as a scientific term? > > David -- where does LSV write that consciousness begins at birth? Seems > important to know. > > Thanks for the interesting discussion. > > mike > > > > > > > > > For those like myself who never got past intro chemistry or physics, but > are interested in qualitative research, > this site might be of interest. I notice there is a blog on the topic as > well as a relevant resource page. Perfect prep for reading Martin's book! > :-) > > mike > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: TQR > Date: Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 6:07 AM > Subject: TQR Weekly 12-18-2017 > To: QUAL@listserv.temple.edu > > > [image: TQR Instagram] [image: > TQR Facebook] [image: TQR > Twitter] > > [image: The Qualitative Report] > > Trouble viewing this email? 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Johns > Hopkins University > - UX Strategist > Strategist-021243a6c381a12c?sjdu=q7IOoCHuISN2aRXq8ScvWSkUEihUKT > ZNws310qnk1vG-0yhZ83fd18V3j_wpQu08VT-ssFnys7qUJ1cV06ahXCRGePqEuSrKv > RIOpc_H_KE&tk=1c1ak28pg18361oi> > -Avalere > Health > > [image: Powerful Tools II 2] > [image: > https://tqr.nova.edu/files/2017/12/TQR-2017-12-MAXQDA2018-2blybdv.png] > 2017_12_max18_small&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tqr_report> > > TQR | Nova Southeastern University | 3301 College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, > Florida 33314 > Lauderdale,+Florida+33314&entry=gmail&source=g> > -7796 > You received this email because you are subscribed to TQR. > To unsubscribe please click here . > > > > > > -- > "The past isn't dead, it isn't even past." > - William Faulkner > From wendy.maples@outlook.com Tue Jan 2 03:06:09 2018 From: wendy.maples@outlook.com (Wendy Maples) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 11:06:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Thanks bj In-Reply-To: <1514883343155.90994@iped.uio.no> References: , , <1514883343155.90994@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Many thanks Bruce! And Happy New Year All! ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: 02 January 2018 08:56 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Thanks bj Thanks Bruce for fixing this up. And Happy New Year to all! ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ana Marjanovic-Shane Sent: 31 December 2017 00:15 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Thanks bj Dear Mike Bruce and all! Happy New Year! Ana On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 2:39 PM William Blanton wrote: > Thanks Mike. Where is the connection. I don't want to ever leave it. > We should gather a strong group and go to the future. We can design a > 5D that can emerge in schools. > > Bill > > On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 11:56 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Bruce has brought xmca back online. > > Happy New Year All > > Thanks bj > > Mike > > -- > > "The past isn't dead, it isn't even past." > > - William Faulkner > -- *Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Ph.D.* Independent Scholar, Professor of Education Dialogic Pedagogy Journal, deputy Editor-in-Chief (dpj.pitt.edu) e-mail: anamshane@gmail.com Phone: +1 267-334-2905 From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jan 2 09:58:00 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 09:58:00 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Postdoctoral Opportunity at Boston U School of Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Great post doc opportunity for the right person. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Warren, Beth Date: Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 4:34 AM Subject: Postdoctoral Opportunity at Boston U School of Education To: "Warren, Beth" Dear Colleagues: I hope you will share the attached announcement widely with your students and within your academic networks. The AACTE Holmes Postdoctoral Program in Education and Human Development is a new initiative aimed at the professional development of early career scholars whose research is centered on issues of equity, justice and diversity in learning and development. Two early career scholars will be chosen for a two-year residency at BU, beginning September 2018. Review of applications will begin on February 15, 2018. I am available to answer any questions or talk with prospective applicants. Thank you very much for sharing the announcement. Warm wishes for the new year, Beth *Beth Warren* Literacy and Language Associate Dean for Research Boston University School of Education bwarren@bu.edu | bu.edu/sed 617-353-9366 Follow Us: Facebook | Twitter | LinkedIn -- "The past isn't dead, it isn't even past." - William Faulkner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Holmes Call_BU Postdoc FINAL.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 378451 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180102/c6b78004/attachment.pdf From mpacker@cantab.net Tue Jan 2 13:47:47 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 16:47:47 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> David, I have struggled various times over how to structure a How To book. I have found that I can teach research methods in the classroom only by means of constant interaction with (and among) students, and I cannot figure out how to replicate or simulate this in a printed book! It?s quite frustrating. Martin > On Dec 20, 2017, at 4:27 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Compare > with Keith Richards, "Qualitative Inquiry in TESOL" (Palgrave Macmillan) or > Johnny Saldana "Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers" (Sage). Richards > begins his collection of piecemeal accounts with horrifying "how not to" > vignettes of how he victimized his students for "misapplying" Conversation > Analysis: this is how not to teach ideas to students. Saldana is a little > better, but the closest he gets to good examples of how to be continent, > object-specific, and concrete is advice like "reflect on analytic codings". > Show me, Professor! From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jan 2 14:56:31 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 07:56:31 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin-- I thought that your solution--presenting concrete cases that were theoretically defensible and yielded practical results for students--was a good approach, and I was contrasting it with the alternatives: a) Theoretically indefensible approaches. I don't think Richards's approach of ragging students for thinking that they might actually get something useful from their analyses as teachers is theoretically defensible. (Actually, I find the question that Piaget disparaged as the "American Question", how teachers can intervene in development, to be absolutely reasonable and even indispensible.) b) Vague pieties. "Reflect on analytical codings" is the qualitative researcher tutor's equivalent of the writing tutor's "write more clearly". Physician, heal thyself! I think I agree still more with your frustration: Is qualitative research ALWAYS a matter of bespoke tailoring? If it is, then everything we have said and thought about the merger and the continuum connecting quantitative and qualitative approaches must fall under the combined heading of theoretically indefensible vague pieties. Vygotsky has what he calls a "working hypothesis". It's not a general methodological theory (of the sort that Wolff-Michael makes from "neoformation" in the article under discussion). It's also not just fact-gathering (the sort of thing I spend too much time doing). He calls it a conjecture, a guess, a kind of mini-theory to be checked against facts. Actually, Chapter Five and Chapter Six (of Thinking and Speech) present two different "working hypotheses" about abstraction and generalization (the five complexes and the measure of generality). I think Chapter Seven is an attempt to synthesize them in a general theory that instead produces a new working hypothesis (the wind, the clouds, the rain, the deluge....). We're working through the "Pedology of the Adolescent"--the real one, not the "greatest hits" comp you see in the Collected Works. So at the end of Chapter Four, LSV points out that adolescent studies present a kind of inversion of the situation in early childhood studies: the former is all big ideas and no facts, while the latter is all facts and no theories. He proposes a "working hypothesis" instead: all of the "lines of development" in adolescence (e.g. dissociations, crushes, concepts) can be linked to the "non-coincidence of three peaks or summits of development": the sexual, the general-organic, and the socio-cultural. The problem I'm having is linking this "working hypothesis" with the ton of linguistic data I've got. That's what I'm doing in 2018. (Oh, and job-hunting. It's kind of interesting, actually--salaries for foreign professors have decreased by nearly forty percent and hours have practically doubled here since I left to do a PhD two years ago. I was a little miffed at the idea of having a job with twice the teaching hours and less than half of what I was making before I left until I looked at the job prospects for my future students. Korea is a very high tech place and that means that teachers have to deal with the "working hypothesis" that the practical skills we are teaching even the adolescents will be obsolete by the time they graduate: the equivalent of teaching teenagers to be typists or telephone operators or typesetters. The curriculum material I've looked at seems to be based on two "working hypotheses"--"coding across the curriculum" on the one hand, and "learning how to learn" on the other. Both of these seem like unworkable hypotheses to me, for different reasons. But what do I know?) David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 6:47 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > David, > > I have struggled various times over how to structure a How To book. I have > found that I can teach research methods in the classroom only by means of > constant interaction with (and among) students, and I cannot figure out how > to replicate or simulate this in a printed book! It?s quite frustrating. > > Martin > > > > On Dec 20, 2017, at 4:27 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Compare > > with Keith Richards, "Qualitative Inquiry in TESOL" (Palgrave Macmillan) > or > > Johnny Saldana "Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers" (Sage). > Richards > > begins his collection of piecemeal accounts with horrifying "how not to" > > vignettes of how he victimized his students for "misapplying" > Conversation > > Analysis: this is how not to teach ideas to students. Saldana is a little > > better, but the closest he gets to good examples of how to be continent, > > object-specific, and concrete is advice like "reflect on analytic > codings". > > Show me, Professor! > > From gingo_matthew@wheatoncollege.edu Wed Jan 3 07:16:24 2018 From: gingo_matthew@wheatoncollege.edu (Matthew Gingo) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 10:16:24 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Job posting - assistant professor of cultural psychology Message-ID: Dear Colleagues, Wheaton College, near Boston, has just opened a search for a new tenure-line position in cultural psychology. Please consider sharing the attached job announcement with your students and networks. Review of applications will begin at the end of this month. Happy new year, Matt Matthew Gingo Assistant Professor of Psychology Wheaton College 330 Knapton Hall Norton MA 02766 508-286-3637 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Job Ad for Cultural Psychologist.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 86399 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180103/4e4f653c/attachment.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jan 3 08:23:17 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 03 Jan 2018 16:23:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Job posting - assistant professor of cultural psychology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Matthew Gingo Date: Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 7:19 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Job posting - assistant professor of cultural psychology To: Dear Colleagues, Wheaton College, near Boston, has just opened a search for a new tenure-line position in cultural psychology. Please consider sharing the attached job announcement with your students and networks. Review of applications will begin at the end of this month. Happy new year, Matt Matthew Gingo Assistant Professor of Psychology Wheaton College 330 Knapton Hall Norton MA 02766 508-286-3637 -- "The past isn't dead, it isn't even past." - William Faulkner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Job Ad for Cultural Psychologist.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 86399 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180103/c6bdb791/attachment.pdf From mpacker@cantab.net Wed Jan 3 17:24:15 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 20:24:15 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> Message-ID: <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> Sorry to be dense, David. Are you referring to my book? Martin > On Jan 2, 2018, at 5:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Martin-- > > I thought that your solution--presenting concrete cases that were > theoretically defensible and yielded practical results for students--was a > good approach, and I was contrasting it with the alternatives: From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jan 3 18:08:01 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 11:08:01 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> Message-ID: I was referring to what you said about the second edition, Martin. Didn't you say there was an ethnographic study of boxing in South Chicago? I remember that the first edition didn't have much by way of concrete studies in it: it was a sustained argument rather than a working hypothesis. But maybe what I'm remembering is Greg's review of it and not my own; I think what happened was that I looked at it and found that there was too much methodology and not enough method for my students. See what you think of this, from Chapter Five of the pedology of the adolescent. Vygotsky has argued that the crisis at adolescence is caused by the non-coincidence of three peaks: general-organic, sexual, and cultural historical development. Then he says: "Blonsky thought, profoundly, that at the end of childhood the child is an anthropological analogue with so called ?childish races?, i.e. with various primitive tribes, lacking that period of development which commences after sexual maturation but passing instead from childhood directly into the state of sexual maturity. In Thurnwald we find some indications that the epoch of sexual maturation is critical for the children of primitive peoples, who in at school age find themselves on a par with enculturated peoples but after maturation frequently cease advancing and manifest a ?relapse into primitivity?, sinking to the general level of the whole tribe." Ugh. Thurnwald was a reviewer for the PhD thesis of Eva Justin, a nurse who learned Romani in order to take part in the extermination of the gypsies. After her PhD work was done, she arranged for the extermination and or vivisection of all 29 of her research subjects. Thurnwald gave her a B. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > Sorry to be dense, David. Are you referring to my book? > > Martin > > > On Jan 2, 2018, at 5:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Martin-- > > > > I thought that your solution--presenting concrete cases that were > > theoretically defensible and yielded practical results for students--was > a > > good approach, and I was contrasting it with the alternatives: > > From mpacker@cantab.net Thu Jan 4 08:06:43 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 11:06:43 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> Message-ID: Okay, yes. The new final chapter of the book uses as an example of research that is focused on constitution the study by Lo?c Wacquant of boxers in a South Chicago gym. It is reported in Wacquant?s book ?Body and Soul? and in various articles. For me it has the advantage that Wacquant conducted ethnography, carried out interviews, and even did some analysis of interactions, and these are the three ?components? of qualitative research that I focus on in the book. One of the articles by Wacquant is titled ?The pugilistic point of view.? Ironically, in it he argues strongly that boxers don?t have ?a point of view,? because that would imply that they are only observers of their own life. In a dense paragraph he manages to call into question statements about the goal of ethnography (and by implication of qualitative research generally) made by Malinowski, Geertz, and Dilthey, and proposes instead, drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Garfinkel, that his aim is to study, to ?reconstruct,? the ?ontological complicity? of the boxers with the form of life of boxing. You can see the value of this in a book that seeks to question the assumption that qualitative research is the ?objective study of subjectivity.? Wacquant rejects ontological dualism (subject-object, subjectivity-objectivity) as much as Vygotsky did! But I?m not at all convinced that a chapter like this actually teaches a reader *how* to conduct research. At best, it can only be one component among several, and I haven?t yet figured out the others! I?m still in a childlike state, I guess. Martin > On Jan 3, 2018, at 9:08 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > I was referring to what you said about the second edition, Martin. Didn't > you say there was an ethnographic study of boxing in South Chicago? I > remember that the first edition didn't have much by way of concrete studies > in it: it was a sustained argument rather than a working hypothesis. But > maybe what I'm remembering is Greg's review of it and not my own; I think > what happened was that I looked at it and found that there was too much > methodology and not enough method for my students. > > See what you think of this, from Chapter Five of the pedology of the > adolescent. Vygotsky has argued that the crisis at adolescence is caused by > the non-coincidence of three peaks: general-organic, sexual, and cultural > historical development. Then he says: > > "Blonsky thought, profoundly, that at the end of childhood the child is an > anthropological analogue with so called ?childish races?, i.e. with various > primitive tribes, lacking that period of development which commences after > sexual maturation but passing instead from childhood directly into the > state of sexual maturity. In Thurnwald we find some indications that the > epoch of sexual maturation is critical for the children of primitive > peoples, who in at school age find themselves on a par with enculturated > peoples but after maturation frequently cease advancing and manifest a > ?relapse into primitivity?, sinking to the general level of the whole > tribe." > > Ugh. Thurnwald was a reviewer for the PhD thesis of Eva Justin, a nurse who > learned Romani in order to take part in the extermination of the gypsies. > After her PhD work was done, she arranged for the extermination and or > vivisection of all 29 of her research subjects. Thurnwald gave her a B. > > > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Sorry to be dense, David. Are you referring to my book? >> >> Martin >> >>> On Jan 2, 2018, at 5:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Martin-- >>> >>> I thought that your solution--presenting concrete cases that were >>> theoretically defensible and yielded practical results for students--was >> a >>> good approach, and I was contrasting it with the alternatives: >> >> From ewall@umich.edu Thu Jan 4 08:54:29 2018 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 10:54:29 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin For various reasons I find this an interesting discussion; however it is your last sentence that catches my attention. A number of years ago, Gary Fenstermacher wrote a short piece on the ontological dependence of teaching on learning. So it strikes me that an interesting additional question is, perhaps, ?how does a person ?learn? from this chapter to conduct research.? An (not ?the?) answer to that question, I suggest , can be found in the work of Garfinkel and Murleau-Ponty (and others). An (not ?the?) answer to the teaching question, I think, can be found in the work of Dewey, Greene, Shulman, and Schwab (and others). Vygotsky, in an interesting way, cuts across teaching/learning somewhat. Speaking for myself, I know that I have struggled with such learning/teaching questions in the area of mathematics for many years (pragmatically and theoretically) including how does one learn how to teach (children and teachers) or even research the teaching or learning of mathematics. I cannot say I see a satisfying end in sight. Anyway, perhaps I can say it this way. While the chapter under discussion might well teach (and I use teach here as Fenstermacher) me how to do research what are termed 'language arts classrooms? it is unlikely that I would easily learn how to do such despite the chapter (I think Garfinkel illustrates this, in part, nicely). Ed > On Jan 4, 2018, at 10:06 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > > Okay, yes. The new final chapter of the book uses as an example of research that is focused on constitution the study by Lo?c Wacquant of boxers in a South Chicago gym. It is reported in Wacquant?s book ?Body and Soul? and in various articles. For me it has the advantage that Wacquant conducted ethnography, carried out interviews, and even did some analysis of interactions, and these are the three ?components? of qualitative research that I focus on in the book. > > One of the articles by Wacquant is titled ?The pugilistic point of view.? Ironically, in it he argues strongly that boxers don?t have ?a point of view,? because that would imply that they are only observers of their own life. In a dense paragraph he manages to call into question statements about the goal of ethnography (and by implication of qualitative research generally) made by Malinowski, Geertz, and Dilthey, and proposes instead, drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Garfinkel, that his aim is to study, to ?reconstruct,? the ?ontological complicity? of the boxers with the form of life of boxing. > > You can see the value of this in a book that seeks to question the assumption that qualitative research is the ?objective study of subjectivity.? Wacquant rejects ontological dualism (subject-object, subjectivity-objectivity) as much as Vygotsky did! > > But I?m not at all convinced that a chapter like this actually teaches a reader *how* to conduct research. At best, it can only be one component among several, and I haven?t yet figured out the others! I?m still in a childlike state, I guess. > > Martin > > >> On Jan 3, 2018, at 9:08 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> I was referring to what you said about the second edition, Martin. Didn't >> you say there was an ethnographic study of boxing in South Chicago? I >> remember that the first edition didn't have much by way of concrete studies >> in it: it was a sustained argument rather than a working hypothesis. But >> maybe what I'm remembering is Greg's review of it and not my own; I think >> what happened was that I looked at it and found that there was too much >> methodology and not enough method for my students. >> >> See what you think of this, from Chapter Five of the pedology of the >> adolescent. Vygotsky has argued that the crisis at adolescence is caused by >> the non-coincidence of three peaks: general-organic, sexual, and cultural >> historical development. Then he says: >> >> "Blonsky thought, profoundly, that at the end of childhood the child is an >> anthropological analogue with so called ?childish races?, i.e. with various >> primitive tribes, lacking that period of development which commences after >> sexual maturation but passing instead from childhood directly into the >> state of sexual maturity. In Thurnwald we find some indications that the >> epoch of sexual maturation is critical for the children of primitive >> peoples, who in at school age find themselves on a par with enculturated >> peoples but after maturation frequently cease advancing and manifest a >> ?relapse into primitivity?, sinking to the general level of the whole >> tribe." >> >> Ugh. Thurnwald was a reviewer for the PhD thesis of Eva Justin, a nurse who >> learned Romani in order to take part in the extermination of the gypsies. >> After her PhD work was done, she arranged for the extermination and or >> vivisection of all 29 of her research subjects. Thurnwald gave her a B. >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> >> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >> >> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Martin Packer wrote: >> >>> Sorry to be dense, David. Are you referring to my book? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>> On Jan 2, 2018, at 5:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Martin-- >>>> >>>> I thought that your solution--presenting concrete cases that were >>>> theoretically defensible and yielded practical results for students--was >>> a >>>> good approach, and I was contrasting it with the alternatives: >>> >>> > > From mpacker@cantab.net Thu Jan 4 12:17:27 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 15:17:27 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> Message-ID: <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> Ed, I think you?re referring to Garfinkel?s distinction between ?instructions? and ?instructed actions.? All instructions are necessarily incomplete, because to interpret and apply them requires background competence which cannot be itself the object of instruction. I think an interpretive approach can grapple with that issue to some degree, because any interpretation of what people say or do rests unavoidably on a prior understanding, as a skilled member of the community. (I cannot analyze an interview conducted in Spanish, for example, because I don?t have the necessary competence.) I don?t need to try to provide that competence; I can (I have to) assume that students already have it. When I struggle with teaching in the classroom, an essential resource for me is a sense (I?m sure it?s incomplete and inaccurate) of what and how the students are learning. I think that I am at times a successful practitioner in the teaching-learning business (so to speak), in the classroom. When writing a book, however, in which the aim is not simply to provide knowledge and argument but practical expertise in conducting an interview, for example, the feedback loop from teaching to learning has been cut. I can?t figure out how to reconnect the loose ends. Martin > On Jan 4, 2018, at 11:54 AM, Edward Wall wrote: > > Martin > > For various reasons I find this an interesting discussion; however it is your last sentence that catches my attention. > > A number of years ago, Gary Fenstermacher wrote a short piece on the ontological dependence of teaching on learning. So it strikes me that an interesting additional question is, perhaps, ?how does a person ?learn? from this chapter to conduct research.? An (not ?the?) answer to that question, I suggest , can be found in the work of Garfinkel and Murleau-Ponty (and others). An (not ?the?) answer to the teaching question, I think, can be found in the work of Dewey, Greene, Shulman, and Schwab (and others). Vygotsky, in an interesting way, cuts across teaching/learning somewhat. > > Speaking for myself, I know that I have struggled with such learning/teaching questions in the area of mathematics for many years (pragmatically and theoretically) including how does one learn how to teach (children and teachers) or even research the teaching or learning of mathematics. I cannot say I see a satisfying end in sight. > > Anyway, perhaps I can say it this way. While the chapter under discussion might well teach (and I use teach here as Fenstermacher) me how to do research what are termed 'language arts classrooms? it is unlikely that I would easily learn how to do such despite the chapter (I think Garfinkel illustrates this, in part, nicely). > > Ed > >> On Jan 4, 2018, at 10:06 AM, Martin Packer wrote: >> >> Okay, yes. The new final chapter of the book uses as an example of research that is focused on constitution the study by Lo?c Wacquant of boxers in a South Chicago gym. It is reported in Wacquant?s book ?Body and Soul? and in various articles. For me it has the advantage that Wacquant conducted ethnography, carried out interviews, and even did some analysis of interactions, and these are the three ?components? of qualitative research that I focus on in the book. >> >> One of the articles by Wacquant is titled ?The pugilistic point of view.? Ironically, in it he argues strongly that boxers don?t have ?a point of view,? because that would imply that they are only observers of their own life. In a dense paragraph he manages to call into question statements about the goal of ethnography (and by implication of qualitative research generally) made by Malinowski, Geertz, and Dilthey, and proposes instead, drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Garfinkel, that his aim is to study, to ?reconstruct,? the ?ontological complicity? of the boxers with the form of life of boxing. >> >> You can see the value of this in a book that seeks to question the assumption that qualitative research is the ?objective study of subjectivity.? Wacquant rejects ontological dualism (subject-object, subjectivity-objectivity) as much as Vygotsky did! >> >> But I?m not at all convinced that a chapter like this actually teaches a reader *how* to conduct research. At best, it can only be one component among several, and I haven?t yet figured out the others! I?m still in a childlike state, I guess. >> >> Martin >> >> >>> On Jan 3, 2018, at 9:08 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> I was referring to what you said about the second edition, Martin. Didn't >>> you say there was an ethnographic study of boxing in South Chicago? I >>> remember that the first edition didn't have much by way of concrete studies >>> in it: it was a sustained argument rather than a working hypothesis. But >>> maybe what I'm remembering is Greg's review of it and not my own; I think >>> what happened was that I looked at it and found that there was too much >>> methodology and not enough method for my students. >>> >>> See what you think of this, from Chapter Five of the pedology of the >>> adolescent. Vygotsky has argued that the crisis at adolescence is caused by >>> the non-coincidence of three peaks: general-organic, sexual, and cultural >>> historical development. Then he says: >>> >>> "Blonsky thought, profoundly, that at the end of childhood the child is an >>> anthropological analogue with so called ?childish races?, i.e. with various >>> primitive tribes, lacking that period of development which commences after >>> sexual maturation but passing instead from childhood directly into the >>> state of sexual maturity. In Thurnwald we find some indications that the >>> epoch of sexual maturation is critical for the children of primitive >>> peoples, who in at school age find themselves on a par with enculturated >>> peoples but after maturation frequently cease advancing and manifest a >>> ?relapse into primitivity?, sinking to the general level of the whole >>> tribe." >>> >>> Ugh. Thurnwald was a reviewer for the PhD thesis of Eva Justin, a nurse who >>> learned Romani in order to take part in the extermination of the gypsies. >>> After her PhD work was done, she arranged for the extermination and or >>> vivisection of all 29 of her research subjects. Thurnwald gave her a B. >>> >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>> >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Martin Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Sorry to be dense, David. Are you referring to my book? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On Jan 2, 2018, at 5:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Martin-- >>>>> >>>>> I thought that your solution--presenting concrete cases that were >>>>> theoretically defensible and yielded practical results for students--was >>>> a >>>>> good approach, and I was contrasting it with the alternatives: >>>> >>>> >> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Jan 4 13:19:58 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 06:19:58 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> Message-ID: Back in 2001, Martin and Mark Tappan published an edited compilation with SUNY press called "Cultural and Critical Perspectives on Human Development". Mark Tappan is a writer I admire as much as Martin himself: he does moral education, and he is one of the few researchers that has tried to take feminist insights from Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings and make them operational in studies, so that we can do more than just deplore or enthuse about our data--we can interpret and even change it. And yet. There is curiously little moral judgment of the studies in the book. So for example Chapter 3, by Usha Menon and Richard Shweder, purports to be a "critique of critique". They do an ethnographic study of women in an Orissa temple town. These women find middle age to be the most satisfying and early adulthood the least satisfying moments of their life trajectories (which is the opposite of most Western women). They explain this by arguing that contrary to feminist anthropology, the women do not deplore their social system nor try to find ways to subvert it, but instead actively support and participate in it. I have three critiques of this critique of critique, and I suppose they all boil down to moral judgment. First of all, there is no mention of rape, of incest, of forced marriage, of dowry, of bride burnings, or of any of the other burning issues which have emerged in the social struggle against this social system. These are all facts of Indian life as well. You can argue that they are not facts that emerge in the data itself, but I think this is not true. So for example one reason the women are willing to put up with the arduous humiliations of early adulthood (e.g. daily washing of the feet of the older women and then drinking the water used to wash them) might be that they are looking forward to being able to humiliate others in turn. Secondly, and relatedly, the religious explanations offered by the women themselves are privileged. There are, I suppose, sound methodological reasons for this, but the overall effect is, not incidentally, to mystify what the women believe (to guard it from critique) and, not coincidentally, to privilege the "emic" insider knowledge of the authors (to guard it as "culture" against the perceived etic-ism of the "Western" Marxists and feminists). If you utterly reject subjects and objects, don't you ALSO have to reject the etic/emic distinction? Thirdly, and also relatedly, "Marxists" and "feminists" are assumed to be "Western". Right now, Marxism and feminism are probably more of a mass phenomenon in India than in the West. So I think this particular move on the part of the authors is particularly open to critique Boxing was abolished in Russia and China as a gladiatorial form of entertainment in which the patricians still preyed on the plebeians. For reasons I never really understood, the German communists felt very differently about it. But I am Chinese, I guess: I don't think boxing or wrestling should be legal, much less legal "entertainment". Shouldn't a critical cultural anthropology be able to look at cultural pathologies and diagnose them? What is the point of an oncologist who interprets the symptoms only in order to celebrate the cancer? I also don' t think that Vygotsky is entirely above criticism in his use of Thurnwald--Mike made some criticisms of this a few years ago when he and I and Paula Towsey did the symposium which is still upon the xmca page. At the time I dismissed them, but I am starting to think again. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:17 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > Ed, > > I think you?re referring to Garfinkel?s distinction between ?instructions? > and ?instructed actions.? All instructions are necessarily incomplete, > because to interpret and apply them requires background competence which > cannot be itself the object of instruction. > > I think an interpretive approach can grapple with that issue to some > degree, because any interpretation of what people say or do rests > unavoidably on a prior understanding, as a skilled member of the community. > (I cannot analyze an interview conducted in Spanish, for example, because I > don?t have the necessary competence.) I don?t need to try to provide that > competence; I can (I have to) assume that students already have it. > > When I struggle with teaching in the classroom, an essential resource for > me is a sense (I?m sure it?s incomplete and inaccurate) of what and how the > students are learning. I think that I am at times a successful practitioner > in the teaching-learning business (so to speak), in the classroom. > > When writing a book, however, in which the aim is not simply to provide > knowledge and argument but practical expertise in conducting an interview, > for example, the feedback loop from teaching to learning has been cut. I > can?t figure out how to reconnect the loose ends. > > Martin > > > > On Jan 4, 2018, at 11:54 AM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > > Martin > > > > For various reasons I find this an interesting discussion; however > it is your last sentence that catches my attention. > > > > A number of years ago, Gary Fenstermacher wrote a short piece on the > ontological dependence of teaching on learning. So it strikes me that an > interesting additional question is, perhaps, ?how does a person ?learn? > from this chapter to conduct research.? An (not ?the?) answer to that > question, I suggest , can be found in the work of Garfinkel and > Murleau-Ponty (and others). An (not ?the?) answer to the teaching question, > I think, can be found in the work of Dewey, Greene, Shulman, and Schwab > (and others). Vygotsky, in an interesting way, cuts across > teaching/learning somewhat. > > > > Speaking for myself, I know that I have struggled with such > learning/teaching questions in the area of mathematics for many years > (pragmatically and theoretically) including how does one learn how to teach > (children and teachers) or even research the teaching or learning of > mathematics. I cannot say I see a satisfying end in sight. > > > > Anyway, perhaps I can say it this way. While the chapter under > discussion might well teach (and I use teach here as Fenstermacher) me how > to do research what are termed 'language arts classrooms? it is unlikely > that I would easily learn how to do such despite the chapter (I think > Garfinkel illustrates this, in part, nicely). > > > > Ed > > > >> On Jan 4, 2018, at 10:06 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> > >> Okay, yes. The new final chapter of the book uses as an example of > research that is focused on constitution the study by Lo?c Wacquant of > boxers in a South Chicago gym. It is reported in Wacquant?s book ?Body and > Soul? and in various articles. For me it has the advantage that Wacquant > conducted ethnography, carried out interviews, and even did some analysis > of interactions, and these are the three ?components? of qualitative > research that I focus on in the book. > >> > >> One of the articles by Wacquant is titled ?The pugilistic point of > view.? Ironically, in it he argues strongly that boxers don?t have ?a point > of view,? because that would imply that they are only observers of their > own life. In a dense paragraph he manages to call into question statements > about the goal of ethnography (and by implication of qualitative research > generally) made by Malinowski, Geertz, and Dilthey, and proposes instead, > drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Garfinkel, that his aim is to study, to > ?reconstruct,? the ?ontological complicity? of the boxers with the form of > life of boxing. > >> > >> You can see the value of this in a book that seeks to question the > assumption that qualitative research is the ?objective study of > subjectivity.? Wacquant rejects ontological dualism (subject-object, > subjectivity-objectivity) as much as Vygotsky did! > >> > >> But I?m not at all convinced that a chapter like this actually teaches > a reader *how* to conduct research. At best, it can only be one component > among several, and I haven?t yet figured out the others! I?m still in a > childlike state, I guess. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 3, 2018, at 9:08 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>> I was referring to what you said about the second edition, Martin. > Didn't > >>> you say there was an ethnographic study of boxing in South Chicago? I > >>> remember that the first edition didn't have much by way of concrete > studies > >>> in it: it was a sustained argument rather than a working hypothesis. > But > >>> maybe what I'm remembering is Greg's review of it and not my own; I > think > >>> what happened was that I looked at it and found that there was too much > >>> methodology and not enough method for my students. > >>> > >>> See what you think of this, from Chapter Five of the pedology of the > >>> adolescent. Vygotsky has argued that the crisis at adolescence is > caused by > >>> the non-coincidence of three peaks: general-organic, sexual, and > cultural > >>> historical development. Then he says: > >>> > >>> "Blonsky thought, profoundly, that at the end of childhood the child > is an > >>> anthropological analogue with so called ?childish races?, i.e. with > various > >>> primitive tribes, lacking that period of development which commences > after > >>> sexual maturation but passing instead from childhood directly into the > >>> state of sexual maturity. In Thurnwald we find some indications that > the > >>> epoch of sexual maturation is critical for the children of primitive > >>> peoples, who in at school age find themselves on a par with > enculturated > >>> peoples but after maturation frequently cease advancing and manifest a > >>> ?relapse into primitivity?, sinking to the general level of the whole > >>> tribe." > >>> > >>> Ugh. Thurnwald was a reviewer for the PhD thesis of Eva Justin, a > nurse who > >>> learned Romani in order to take part in the extermination of the > gypsies. > >>> After her PhD work was done, she arranged for the extermination and or > >>> vivisection of all 29 of her research subjects. Thurnwald gave her a B. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> > >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >>> > >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >>> > >>> > >>> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Sorry to be dense, David. Are you referring to my book? > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>>> On Jan 2, 2018, at 5:56 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin-- > >>>>> > >>>>> I thought that your solution--presenting concrete cases that were > >>>>> theoretically defensible and yielded practical results for > students--was > >>>> a > >>>>> good approach, and I was contrasting it with the alternatives: > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > > > > > > > From mpacker@cantab.net Thu Jan 4 14:11:14 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 17:11:14 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> Message-ID: <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> On Jan 4, 2018, at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Boxing was abolished in Russia and China as a gladiatorial form > of entertainment in which the patricians still preyed on the plebeians. For > reasons I never really understood, the German communists felt very > differently about it. But I am Chinese, I guess: I don't think boxing or > wrestling should be legal, much less legal "entertainment". Shouldn't a > critical cultural anthropology be able to look at cultural pathologies and > diagnose them? What is the point of an oncologist who interprets the > symptoms only in order to celebrate the cancer? Good questions, David. On my reading, Wacquant?s analysis is very much a ?critical? one, in the sense of being sensitive to exploitation and inequity, and also exploring the conditions for the possibility of the phenomenon he is exploring: how someone becomes a boxer - and why? Wacquant rejects the simple view that boxers must be unethical people (men, largely) because they train for a violent sport. His aim is to show that being a boxer (the ontological complicity of a person with that form of life) has an instrumental aspect, an aesthetic aspect, and an ethical aspect. There is an ?ontological transcendence? involved. He bases this analysis on his own experience training to box, and on the ways the boxers talked with him, the things they said - their representations of the boxing life, from the inside, as it were. He concludes that being a boxer makes sense; it is a valid life to which to dedicate oneself. At the same time, he does not simply accept this single side of the way the boxers talk. He describes, in a coda to his ?point of view? article, how their ambivalence and inquietude also became evident. And in another article, titled "A fleshpeddler at work: Power, pain, and profit in the prizefighting economy,? he describes precisely the ways fighters are exploited, and become meat for the prizefighting machinery. His concern, one might say, is not to blame the victims, while at the same time disclosing with excoriating prose the horrifying system in which they are trying to make a living, and striving to make a life. I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! :) Martin From mpacker@cantab.net Thu Jan 4 14:20:58 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 17:20:58 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> Message-ID: > On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:11 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! :) From mpacker@cantab.net Thu Jan 4 14:32:44 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 17:32:44 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> Message-ID: <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> The attachment doesn?t seem to travel well. Here?s a link: Martin > On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > >> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:11 PM, Martin Packer wrote: >> >> I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! :) > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Jan 5 00:04:28 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 08:04:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> , <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> Message-ID: <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> These are really interesting questions, a really good dialogue on what a critical non-dualist approach can be. Thanks for the attachment Martin (which does work in the link you sent last). Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin Packer Sent: 04 January 2018 23:32 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed The attachment doesn?t seem to travel well. Here?s a link: Martin > On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > >> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:11 PM, Martin Packer wrote: >> >> I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! :) > From ewall@umich.edu Fri Jan 5 13:50:28 2018 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 15:50:28 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin In a sense I had Garfinkel in mind although your last paragraph is essentially what I was getting at. One of Garfinkel?s student?s, Eric Livingston, sort of gave this a try in his Ethnographies of Reason. It is interesting, but not entirely convincing. I have tried various textual strategies in things I have written for teacher education students/math teachers so as to get them to ?interact? with chapters I had written and I remain very skeptical about my effectiveness. I, of course, question what I did. However, I also think that students come to me ?knowing' how to read a chapter (on whatever) and that does not necessarily translate into the kind of learning for which I hoped. I am sure about one thing. No matter how well your chapters are written (and I am not at all critiquing what you have written), I would - as a teacher - be very unlikely to sit down and read a chapter to my students. Paraphrase, yes. Act out, yes. Reading (as some forms of listening), can be too passive. That isn?t to say it should be or needs to be. Ed > On Jan 4, 2018, at 2:17 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > Ed, > > I think you?re referring to Garfinkel?s distinction between ?instructions? and ?instructed actions.? All instructions are necessarily incomplete, because to interpret and apply them requires background competence which cannot be itself the object of instruction. > > I think an interpretive approach can grapple with that issue to some degree, because any interpretation of what people say or do rests unavoidably on a prior understanding, as a skilled member of the community. (I cannot analyze an interview conducted in Spanish, for example, because I don?t have the necessary competence.) I don?t need to try to provide that competence; I can (I have to) assume that students already have it. > > When I struggle with teaching in the classroom, an essential resource for me is a sense (I?m sure it?s incomplete and inaccurate) of what and how the students are learning. I think that I am at times a successful practitioner in the teaching-learning business (so to speak), in the classroom. > > When writing a book, however, in which the aim is not simply to provide knowledge and argument but practical expertise in conducting an interview, for example, the feedback loop from teaching to learning has been cut. I can?t figure out how to reconnect the loose ends. > > Martin > > >> On Jan 4, 2018, at 11:54 AM, Edward Wall wrote: >> >> Martin >> >> For various reasons I find this an interesting discussion; however it is your last sentence that catches my attention. >> >> A number of years ago, Gary Fenstermacher wrote a short piece on the ontological dependence of teaching on learning. So it strikes me that an interesting additional question is, perhaps, ?how does a person ?learn? from this chapter to conduct research.? An (not ?the?) answer to that question, I suggest , can be found in the work of Garfinkel and Murleau-Ponty (and others). An (not ?the?) answer to the teaching question, I think, can be found in the work of Dewey, Greene, Shulman, and Schwab (and others). Vygotsky, in an interesting way, cuts across teaching/learning somewhat. >> >> Speaking for myself, I know that I have struggled with such learning/teaching questions in the area of mathematics for many years (pragmatically and theoretically) including how does one learn how to teach (children and teachers) or even research the teaching or learning of mathematics. I cannot say I see a satisfying end in sight. >> >> Anyway, perhaps I can say it this way. While the chapter under discussion might well teach (and I use teach here as Fenstermacher) me how to do research what are termed 'language arts classrooms? it is unlikely that I would easily learn how to do such despite the chapter (I think Garfinkel illustrates this, in part, nicely). >> >> Ed >> >>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 10:06 AM, Martin Packer wrote: >>> >>> Okay, yes. The new final chapter of the book uses as an example of research that is focused on constitution the study by Lo?c Wacquant of boxers in a South Chicago gym. It is reported in Wacquant?s book ?Body and Soul? and in various articles. For me it has the advantage that Wacquant conducted ethnography, carried out interviews, and even did some analysis of interactions, and these are the three ?components? of qualitative research that I focus on in the book. >>> >>> One of the articles by Wacquant is titled ?The pugilistic point of view.? Ironically, in it he argues strongly that boxers don?t have ?a point of view,? because that would imply that they are only observers of their own life. In a dense paragraph he manages to call into question statements about the goal of ethnography (and by implication of qualitative research generally) made by Malinowski, Geertz, and Dilthey, and proposes instead, drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Garfinkel, that his aim is to study, to ?reconstruct,? the ?ontological complicity? of the boxers with the form of life of boxing. >>> >>> You can see the value of this in a book that seeks to question the assumption that qualitative research is the ?objective study of subjectivity.? Wacquant rejects ontological dualism (subject-object, subjectivity-objectivity) as much as Vygotsky did! >>> >>> But I?m not at all convinced that a chapter like this actually teaches a reader *how* to conduct research. At best, it can only be one component among several, and I haven?t yet figured out the others! I?m still in a childlike state, I guess. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>>> On Jan 3, 2018, at 9:08 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> I was referring to what you said about the second edition, Martin. Didn't >>>> you say there was an ethnographic study of boxing in South Chicago? I >>>> remember that the first edition didn't have much by way of concrete studies >>>> in it: it was a sustained argument rather than a working hypothesis. But >>>> maybe what I'm remembering is Greg's review of it and not my own; I think >>>> what happened was that I looked at it and found that there was too much >>>> methodology and not enough method for my students. >>>> >>>> See what you think of this, from Chapter Five of the pedology of the >>>> adolescent. Vygotsky has argued that the crisis at adolescence is caused by >>>> the non-coincidence of three peaks: general-organic, sexual, and cultural >>>> historical development. Then he says: >>>> >>>> "Blonsky thought, profoundly, that at the end of childhood the child is an >>>> anthropological analogue with so called ?childish races?, i.e. with various >>>> primitive tribes, lacking that period of development which commences after >>>> sexual maturation but passing instead from childhood directly into the >>>> state of sexual maturity. In Thurnwald we find some indications that the >>>> epoch of sexual maturation is critical for the children of primitive >>>> peoples, who in at school age find themselves on a par with enculturated >>>> peoples but after maturation frequently cease advancing and manifest a >>>> ?relapse into primitivity?, sinking to the general level of the whole >>>> tribe." >>>> >>>> Ugh. Thurnwald was a reviewer for the PhD thesis of Eva Justin, a nurse who >>>> learned Romani in order to take part in the extermination of the gypsies. >>>> After her PhD work was done, she arranged for the extermination and or >>>> vivisection of all 29 of her research subjects. Thurnwald gave her a B. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>>> >>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>>> >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Martin Packer wrote: >>>> >>>>> Sorry to be dense, David. Are you referring to my book? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>>> On Jan 2, 2018, at 5:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin-- >>>>>> >>>>>> I thought that your solution--presenting concrete cases that were >>>>>> theoretically defensible and yielded practical results for students--was >>>>> a >>>>>> good approach, and I was contrasting it with the alternatives: >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jan 5 13:57:00 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 06:57:00 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Take a look at these clauses from Wacquant's data: a) They ignorant. (489) b) Someon tha' their min's thinkin' real low. (495) c) He real tough. (496) d) He been in jail. (496) e) He aggressive; he's quick. (496) f) (Y)ou not going nowhere. (513) g) We lookin' at it 'cause we spectactors an' stuff (489) h) We on the outsi' lookin' in but *he's* insi' lookin out (489) Now, when I started reading this, I decided that the subject/object stuff was a red herring. It's obvious, even in the epigraph, that subject/object is a real distinction for the people in this article, so unless the author is pulling our legs about trying to reconstruct how people themselves are thinking about "the Sweet Science" and "The Manly Art", the subject/object distinction is not only real, it's a central point of this article. Of course, denying the distinction is a point of honor for academics (just like winning prize-fights for boxers). But as soon as your subjects (sorry--I mean your research objects) start saying things like h) you know that you can't really do without the distinction after all. So instead I was trying to work out the rule for when "to be" can be deleted in the grammar and when it cannot. Labov has already written a lot about this--he says it's phonological (you can delete it whenever you can contract "to be" but not otherwise, so for example you can say "They're ignorant" or "They ignorant" but you can't say "Yeah, it" instead of "Yeah, it is"). The problem with this rule is that tells me what I can do, but it doesn't explain the variation we see in e) and h), where the speaker starts with deletion but ends with completion ("He [is--deleted] aggressive; he's quick"). Another problem is that, as Ruqaiya Hasan pointed out, it assumes that phonology varies but semantics invariant (because I write in standard English the DELETIONS are late appearing in that last sentence, but in Wacquant's data the NON-DELETIONS appear late.) If semantics were invariant, then Saint Augustine's theory of language in the "Confessions" would be all we need to learn a foreign language. My first theory was based on a) through c): it was that when "to be" is ATTRIBUTIVE (that is, when it is used to introduce a nominal attribute in the form of an adjective but not a verbal attribute in the form of an adverb) you can delete it. It's a good theory: it would explain the apparent free variation in e), for example. It would also allow generalization to Chinese and Korean grammar (where adjectives are really verbs and not nominals at all). But as soon as I got to d) and f) it is clear that it won't work. If the speaker is thinking of "been in jail" and "not going nowhere" as nominal attributes then the distinction between attributive and non-attributive is a lot less meaningful to them than the difference between subject and object. So my second theory was an extension of Labov's theory. You delete "to be" when the emphasis is on the lexical verb elements ("ignorant", "real low", "real tough", "jail", "aggressive"). But you supply it for emphasis when you are basically rephrasing for effect ("he's quick", "he's insi' lookin' out". This accounts for the data a lot better, as you can see, and it explains why the non-deletions are always late appearing in the clause complex. But it still leaves open the question of why the speaker is non-deleting. At this point it occurred to me that thiis is an instance of speech accomodation--the speaker is switching in the direction of Wacquant's somewhat precious and precise (non-native) use of English, as a way of showing that they respect him. So I deduced that Wacquant is white. Have a look: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lo%C3%AFc_Wacquant Sure enough. It seems to me that overcoming the distinction between subject and object is actually an interactional accomplishment, and it's not the least of Wacquant's achievements in this article. But it's not something that any researcher can afford to take for granted when they step into the arena. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:04 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > These are really interesting questions, a really good dialogue on what a > critical non-dualist approach can be. Thanks for the attachment Martin > (which does work in the link you sent last). > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin Packer > Sent: 04 January 2018 23:32 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed > > The attachment doesn?t seem to travel well. Here?s a link: > > > > Martin > > > On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > > > > >> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:11 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> > >> I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! :) > > > > > From mpacker@cantab.net Fri Jan 5 14:18:51 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 17:18:51 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: I?m a bit confused, David. (h) is from the epigraph, in which a boxer is describing what it?s like to be *turned into* an object by ?outsiders,? who judge boxing without knowing it. That's, to say, "they lookin' at it from a spectator point of view? (489). (But notice how the speaker invites the audience to tun things around and imagine *being* the critic, the spectator, the fans: that's why in (h) it is ?we? on the *outside* and ?he? (the imagined performer) on the *inside.* So *here* there are objects and subjects. But in the gym? Also, I?m not sure why you are focused on the copula? Didn?t Labov describe the rules for this in NNE? I be forgetful about that. In fact, I?m not sure why you focused on the grammar at all. Wacquant?s analysis is focused on ?tropes.? It?s a weakness of the article that it doesn?t describe or illustrate how he went about this analysis, it only displays his results. But those are very interesting, I think. Wacquant is French and white. He proposes in his book (and in the article too I believe) that it was a combination of luck, hard work, and being French that enabled how to become accepted by the members of the gym. In my opinion, this is yet another example of the ?boundary? myth in fieldwork: the idea that one crosses a frontier and becomes accepted ?as a native.? It?s clear in some of his data that the boxers displayed awareness of Wacquant's difference, and even of the fact that he was a ?teacher? who was writing a book. But yes, in several respects overcoming the distinction between subject and object is indeed an interactional accomplishment, not to be sneezed at. Martin p.s. Here?s Malinowski passing as one of the natives... Or the link in case the image doesn?t travel: > On Jan 5, 2018, at 4:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Take a look at these clauses from Wacquant's data: > > a) They ignorant. (489) > b) Someon tha' their min's thinkin' real low. (495) > c) He real tough. (496) > d) He been in jail. (496) > e) He aggressive; he's quick. (496) > f) (Y)ou not going nowhere. (513) > g) We lookin' at it 'cause we spectactors an' stuff (489) > h) We on the outsi' lookin' in but *he's* insi' lookin out (489) > > Now, when I started reading this, I decided that the subject/object stuff > was a red herring. It's obvious, even in the epigraph, that subject/object > is a real distinction for the people in this article, so unless the author > is pulling our legs about trying to reconstruct how people themselves are > thinking about "the Sweet Science" and "The Manly Art", the subject/object > distinction is not only real, it's a central point of this article. Of > course, denying the distinction is a point of honor for academics (just > like winning prize-fights for boxers). But as soon as your subjects > (sorry--I mean your research objects) start saying things like h) you know > that you can't really do without the distinction after all. > > So instead I was trying to work out the rule for when "to be" can be > deleted in the grammar and when it cannot. Labov has already written a lot > about this--he says it's phonological (you can delete it whenever you can > contract "to be" but not otherwise, so for example you can say "They're > ignorant" or "They ignorant" but you can't say "Yeah, it" instead of "Yeah, > it is"). The problem with this rule is that tells me what I can do, but it > doesn't explain the variation we see in e) and h), where the speaker > starts with deletion but ends with completion ("He [is--deleted] > aggressive; he's quick"). Another problem is that, as Ruqaiya Hasan pointed > out, it assumes that phonology varies but semantics invariant (because I > write in standard English the DELETIONS are late appearing in that last > sentence, but in Wacquant's data the NON-DELETIONS appear late.) If > semantics were invariant, then Saint Augustine's theory of language in the > "Confessions" would be all we need to learn a foreign language. > > My first theory was based on a) through c): it was that when "to be" is > ATTRIBUTIVE (that is, when it is used to introduce a nominal attribute in > the form of an adjective but not a verbal attribute in the form of an > adverb) you can delete it. It's a good theory: it would explain the > apparent free variation in e), for example. It would also allow > generalization to Chinese and Korean grammar (where adjectives are really > verbs and not nominals at all). But as soon as I got to d) and f) it is > clear that it won't work. If the speaker is thinking of "been in jail" and > "not going nowhere" as nominal attributes then the distinction between > attributive and non-attributive is a lot less meaningful to them than the > difference between subject and object. > > So my second theory was an extension of Labov's theory. You delete "to be" > when the emphasis is on the lexical verb elements ("ignorant", "real low", > "real tough", "jail", "aggressive"). But you supply it for emphasis when > you are basically rephrasing for effect ("he's quick", "he's insi' lookin' > out". This accounts for the data a lot better, as you can see, and it > explains why the non-deletions are always late appearing in the clause > complex. But it still leaves open the question of why the speaker is > non-deleting. > > At this point it occurred to me that thiis is an instance of speech > accomodation--the speaker is switching in the direction of Wacquant's > somewhat precious and precise (non-native) use of English, as a way of > showing that they respect him. So I deduced that Wacquant is white. Have a > look: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lo%C3%AFc_Wacquant > > Sure enough. It seems to me that overcoming the distinction between subject > and object is actually an interactional accomplishment, and it's not the > least of Wacquant's achievements in this article. But it's not something > that any researcher can afford to take for granted when they step into the > arena. > > > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:04 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> These are really interesting questions, a really good dialogue on what a >> critical non-dualist approach can be. Thanks for the attachment Martin >> (which does work in the link you sent last). >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Martin Packer >> Sent: 04 January 2018 23:32 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed >> >> The attachment doesn?t seem to travel well. Here?s a link: >> >> >> >> Martin >> >>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Martin Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:11 PM, Martin Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! :) >>> >> >> >> From mpacker@cantab.net Fri Jan 5 14:20:53 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 17:20:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> Message-ID: On Jan 5, 2018, at 4:50 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > No matter how well your chapters are written (and I am not at all critiquing what you have written), I would - as a teacher - be very unlikely to sit down and read a chapter to my students. Oh good god Ed, don?t even suggest such a thing! Unless it?s kindergarten and they?ve heard Run Spot Run too many times. :) Martin From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jan 5 15:21:31 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 08:21:31 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Sorry, Martin. I wasn't very clear. Compare: a) "Phonology is variable but semantics is invariant." b) "Phonology is variable but semantics invariant." c) "Phonology variable, but semantics is invariant." What is the difference between a) and b)? Nothing, you might say, but if you say that you are taking the position that grammar varies without any variation in semantics, which is exactly what Ruqaiya Hasan and William Labov dispute. Labov: "Sentences a) and b) are two lexicogrammatical variants of a single thought. They are both standard English." Hasan: "Sentences a) and b) are two different lexicogrammatical realizations of two slightly different thoughts, because a) stresses the parallelism and therefore asserts that the two propositions are inseparable but b) does not. Now consider a) and b) on the one hand and c) on the other. What's the difference? Well, you might say, a) and b) are standard English, but c) is not. Fine. Now, this does suggest that there is a rule of standard English which says that elision works anaphorically (i.e. referring back). What we see in Wacquant's data is elision that is cataphoric (i.e. the omission refers FORWARDS and not back). That's not explained in any of Labov's articles on AAVE, so far as I know. And that's what interests me in this article, because I find the business of subjects and objects (e.g. Lukacs vs. Heidegger) too abstract and unprogrammatic to be resolvable in any useful way. This seems more like a solution-sized problem. But then, I am a linguist. I also think that the issue of whether AAVE is a phonological variant or a semantic variant is important for education. Vygotsky's account of education is (to my reading) essentially an account of ontogenetic semantic variation,and his account of cultural history is essentially an account of sociogenetic semantic variation. You know that that the question of whether thinking varies the way that speech does is heavily moralized in a lot of critical pedagogy; you commented on this in your 2001 book with Mark Tappan. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 7:18 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > I?m a bit confused, David. (h) is from the epigraph, in which a boxer is > describing what it?s like to be *turned into* an object by ?outsiders,? who > judge boxing without knowing it. That's, to say, "they lookin' at it from a > spectator point of view? (489). (But notice how the speaker invites the > audience to tun things around and imagine *being* the critic, the > spectator, the fans: that's why in (h) it is ?we? on the *outside* and ?he? > (the imagined performer) on the *inside.* So *here* there are objects and > subjects. But in the gym? > > Also, I?m not sure why you are focused on the copula? Didn?t Labov > describe the rules for this in NNE? I be forgetful about that. > > In fact, I?m not sure why you focused on the grammar at all. Wacquant?s > analysis is focused on ?tropes.? It?s a weakness of the article that it > doesn?t describe or illustrate how he went about this analysis, it only > displays his results. But those are very interesting, I think. > > Wacquant is French and white. He proposes in his book (and in the article > too I believe) that it was a combination of luck, hard work, and being > French that enabled how to become accepted by the members of the gym. In my > opinion, this is yet another example of the ?boundary? myth in fieldwork: > the idea that one crosses a frontier and becomes accepted ?as a native.? > It?s clear in some of his data that the boxers displayed awareness of > Wacquant's difference, and even of the fact that he was a ?teacher? who was > writing a book. But yes, in several respects overcoming the distinction > between subject and object is indeed an interactional accomplishment, not > to be sneezed at. > > Martin > > p.s. Here?s Malinowski passing as one of the natives... > > Or the link in case the image doesn?t travel: > malinowski%20trobriands%20aa%20aa_big.jpg> > > > On Jan 5, 2018, at 4:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Take a look at these clauses from Wacquant's data: > > > > a) They ignorant. (489) > > b) Someon tha' their min's thinkin' real low. (495) > > c) He real tough. (496) > > d) He been in jail. (496) > > e) He aggressive; he's quick. (496) > > f) (Y)ou not going nowhere. (513) > > g) We lookin' at it 'cause we spectactors an' stuff (489) > > h) We on the outsi' lookin' in but *he's* insi' lookin out (489) > > > > Now, when I started reading this, I decided that the subject/object stuff > > was a red herring. It's obvious, even in the epigraph, that > subject/object > > is a real distinction for the people in this article, so unless the > author > > is pulling our legs about trying to reconstruct how people themselves are > > thinking about "the Sweet Science" and "The Manly Art", the > subject/object > > distinction is not only real, it's a central point of this article. Of > > course, denying the distinction is a point of honor for academics (just > > like winning prize-fights for boxers). But as soon as your subjects > > (sorry--I mean your research objects) start saying things like h) you > know > > that you can't really do without the distinction after all. > > > > So instead I was trying to work out the rule for when "to be" can be > > deleted in the grammar and when it cannot. Labov has already written a > lot > > about this--he says it's phonological (you can delete it whenever you can > > contract "to be" but not otherwise, so for example you can say "They're > > ignorant" or "They ignorant" but you can't say "Yeah, it" instead of > "Yeah, > > it is"). The problem with this rule is that tells me what I can do, but > it > > doesn't explain the variation we see in e) and h), where the speaker > > starts with deletion but ends with completion ("He [is--deleted] > > aggressive; he's quick"). Another problem is that, as Ruqaiya Hasan > pointed > > out, it assumes that phonology varies but semantics invariant (because I > > write in standard English the DELETIONS are late appearing in that last > > sentence, but in Wacquant's data the NON-DELETIONS appear late.) If > > semantics were invariant, then Saint Augustine's theory of language in > the > > "Confessions" would be all we need to learn a foreign language. > > > > My first theory was based on a) through c): it was that when "to be" is > > ATTRIBUTIVE (that is, when it is used to introduce a nominal attribute in > > the form of an adjective but not a verbal attribute in the form of an > > adverb) you can delete it. It's a good theory: it would explain the > > apparent free variation in e), for example. It would also allow > > generalization to Chinese and Korean grammar (where adjectives are really > > verbs and not nominals at all). But as soon as I got to d) and f) it is > > clear that it won't work. If the speaker is thinking of "been in jail" > and > > "not going nowhere" as nominal attributes then the distinction between > > attributive and non-attributive is a lot less meaningful to them than the > > difference between subject and object. > > > > So my second theory was an extension of Labov's theory. You delete "to > be" > > when the emphasis is on the lexical verb elements ("ignorant", "real > low", > > "real tough", "jail", "aggressive"). But you supply it for emphasis when > > you are basically rephrasing for effect ("he's quick", "he's insi' > lookin' > > out". This accounts for the data a lot better, as you can see, and it > > explains why the non-deletions are always late appearing in the clause > > complex. But it still leaves open the question of why the speaker is > > non-deleting. > > > > At this point it occurred to me that thiis is an instance of speech > > accomodation--the speaker is switching in the direction of Wacquant's > > somewhat precious and precise (non-native) use of English, as a way of > > showing that they respect him. So I deduced that Wacquant is white. Have > a > > look: > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lo%C3%AFc_Wacquant > > > > Sure enough. It seems to me that overcoming the distinction between > subject > > and object is actually an interactional accomplishment, and it's not the > > least of Wacquant's achievements in this article. But it's not something > > that any researcher can afford to take for granted when they step into > the > > arena. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:04 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > >> These are really interesting questions, a really good dialogue on what a > >> critical non-dualist approach can be. Thanks for the attachment Martin > >> (which does work in the link you sent last). > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> on behalf of Martin Packer > >> Sent: 04 January 2018 23:32 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed > >> > >> The attachment doesn?t seem to travel well. Here?s a link: > >> > >> producing/wacquant.pdf> > >> > >> Martin > >> > >>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:11 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>> I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! > :) > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jan 5 15:23:56 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 08:23:56 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> Message-ID: Sorry, erratum: Hasan: "Sentences a) and b) are two different lexicogrammatical realizations of two slightly different thoughts, because a) stresses the parallelism and separability of the two propositions but b) suggests asymmetry and inseparability." dk David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 7:20 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > On Jan 5, 2018, at 4:50 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > > No matter how well your chapters are written (and I am not at all > critiquing what you have written), I would - as a teacher - be very > unlikely to sit down and read a chapter to my students. > > Oh good god Ed, don?t even suggest such a thing! Unless it?s kindergarten > and they?ve heard Run Spot Run too many times. > > :) > > Martin > > From mpacker@cantab.net Fri Jan 5 15:31:56 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 18:31:56 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Fair enough David. Not being a linguist myself, I am not looking for what you see in the data. By the way, it?s not Lukacs vs.Heidegger, it?s Lukacs and Heidegger. For example: Goldmann, L. (1979). Luk?cs and Heidegger: Towards a new philosophy. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Martin > On Jan 5, 2018, at 6:21 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Sorry, Martin. I wasn't very clear. > > Compare: > > a) "Phonology is variable but semantics is invariant." > b) "Phonology is variable but semantics invariant." > c) "Phonology variable, but semantics is invariant." > > What is the difference between a) and b)? Nothing, you might say, but if > you say that you are taking the position that grammar varies without any > variation in semantics, which is exactly what Ruqaiya Hasan and William > Labov dispute. > > Labov: "Sentences a) and b) are two lexicogrammatical variants of a single > thought. They are both standard English." > Hasan: "Sentences a) and b) are two different lexicogrammatical > realizations of two slightly different thoughts, because a) stresses the > parallelism and therefore asserts that the two propositions are inseparable > but b) does not. > > Now consider a) and b) on the one hand and c) on the other. What's the > difference? Well, you might say, a) and b) are standard English, but c) is > not. > > Fine. Now, this does suggest that there is a rule of standard English which > says that elision works anaphorically (i.e. referring back). What we see in > Wacquant's data is elision that is cataphoric (i.e. the omission refers > FORWARDS and not back). That's not explained in any of Labov's articles on > AAVE, so far as I know. And that's what interests me in this article, > because I find the business of subjects and objects (e.g. Lukacs vs. > Heidegger) too abstract and unprogrammatic to be resolvable in any useful > way. This seems more like a solution-sized problem. But then, I am a > linguist. > > I also think that the issue of whether AAVE is a phonological variant or a > semantic variant is important for education. Vygotsky's account of > education is (to my reading) essentially an account of ontogenetic semantic > variation,and his account of cultural history is essentially an account of > sociogenetic semantic variation. You know that that the question of whether > thinking varies the way that speech does is heavily moralized in a lot of > critical pedagogy; you commented on this in your 2001 book with Mark Tappan. > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 7:18 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> I?m a bit confused, David. (h) is from the epigraph, in which a boxer is >> describing what it?s like to be *turned into* an object by ?outsiders,? who >> judge boxing without knowing it. That's, to say, "they lookin' at it from a >> spectator point of view? (489). (But notice how the speaker invites the >> audience to tun things around and imagine *being* the critic, the >> spectator, the fans: that's why in (h) it is ?we? on the *outside* and ?he? >> (the imagined performer) on the *inside.* So *here* there are objects and >> subjects. But in the gym? >> >> Also, I?m not sure why you are focused on the copula? Didn?t Labov >> describe the rules for this in NNE? I be forgetful about that. >> >> In fact, I?m not sure why you focused on the grammar at all. Wacquant?s >> analysis is focused on ?tropes.? It?s a weakness of the article that it >> doesn?t describe or illustrate how he went about this analysis, it only >> displays his results. But those are very interesting, I think. >> >> Wacquant is French and white. He proposes in his book (and in the article >> too I believe) that it was a combination of luck, hard work, and being >> French that enabled how to become accepted by the members of the gym. In my >> opinion, this is yet another example of the ?boundary? myth in fieldwork: >> the idea that one crosses a frontier and becomes accepted ?as a native.? >> It?s clear in some of his data that the boxers displayed awareness of >> Wacquant's difference, and even of the fact that he was a ?teacher? who was >> writing a book. But yes, in several respects overcoming the distinction >> between subject and object is indeed an interactional accomplishment, not >> to be sneezed at. >> >> Martin >> >> p.s. Here?s Malinowski passing as one of the natives... >> >> Or the link in case the image doesn?t travel: >> > malinowski%20trobriands%20aa%20aa_big.jpg> >> >>> On Jan 5, 2018, at 4:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Take a look at these clauses from Wacquant's data: >>> >>> a) They ignorant. (489) >>> b) Someon tha' their min's thinkin' real low. (495) >>> c) He real tough. (496) >>> d) He been in jail. (496) >>> e) He aggressive; he's quick. (496) >>> f) (Y)ou not going nowhere. (513) >>> g) We lookin' at it 'cause we spectactors an' stuff (489) >>> h) We on the outsi' lookin' in but *he's* insi' lookin out (489) >>> >>> Now, when I started reading this, I decided that the subject/object stuff >>> was a red herring. It's obvious, even in the epigraph, that >> subject/object >>> is a real distinction for the people in this article, so unless the >> author >>> is pulling our legs about trying to reconstruct how people themselves are >>> thinking about "the Sweet Science" and "The Manly Art", the >> subject/object >>> distinction is not only real, it's a central point of this article. Of >>> course, denying the distinction is a point of honor for academics (just >>> like winning prize-fights for boxers). But as soon as your subjects >>> (sorry--I mean your research objects) start saying things like h) you >> know >>> that you can't really do without the distinction after all. >>> >>> So instead I was trying to work out the rule for when "to be" can be >>> deleted in the grammar and when it cannot. Labov has already written a >> lot >>> about this--he says it's phonological (you can delete it whenever you can >>> contract "to be" but not otherwise, so for example you can say "They're >>> ignorant" or "They ignorant" but you can't say "Yeah, it" instead of >> "Yeah, >>> it is"). The problem with this rule is that tells me what I can do, but >> it >>> doesn't explain the variation we see in e) and h), where the speaker >>> starts with deletion but ends with completion ("He [is--deleted] >>> aggressive; he's quick"). Another problem is that, as Ruqaiya Hasan >> pointed >>> out, it assumes that phonology varies but semantics invariant (because I >>> write in standard English the DELETIONS are late appearing in that last >>> sentence, but in Wacquant's data the NON-DELETIONS appear late.) If >>> semantics were invariant, then Saint Augustine's theory of language in >> the >>> "Confessions" would be all we need to learn a foreign language. >>> >>> My first theory was based on a) through c): it was that when "to be" is >>> ATTRIBUTIVE (that is, when it is used to introduce a nominal attribute in >>> the form of an adjective but not a verbal attribute in the form of an >>> adverb) you can delete it. It's a good theory: it would explain the >>> apparent free variation in e), for example. It would also allow >>> generalization to Chinese and Korean grammar (where adjectives are really >>> verbs and not nominals at all). But as soon as I got to d) and f) it is >>> clear that it won't work. If the speaker is thinking of "been in jail" >> and >>> "not going nowhere" as nominal attributes then the distinction between >>> attributive and non-attributive is a lot less meaningful to them than the >>> difference between subject and object. >>> >>> So my second theory was an extension of Labov's theory. You delete "to >> be" >>> when the emphasis is on the lexical verb elements ("ignorant", "real >> low", >>> "real tough", "jail", "aggressive"). But you supply it for emphasis when >>> you are basically rephrasing for effect ("he's quick", "he's insi' >> lookin' >>> out". This accounts for the data a lot better, as you can see, and it >>> explains why the non-deletions are always late appearing in the clause >>> complex. But it still leaves open the question of why the speaker is >>> non-deleting. >>> >>> At this point it occurred to me that thiis is an instance of speech >>> accomodation--the speaker is switching in the direction of Wacquant's >>> somewhat precious and precise (non-native) use of English, as a way of >>> showing that they respect him. So I deduced that Wacquant is white. Have >> a >>> look: >>> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lo%C3%AFc_Wacquant >>> >>> Sure enough. It seems to me that overcoming the distinction between >> subject >>> and object is actually an interactional accomplishment, and it's not the >>> least of Wacquant's achievements in this article. But it's not something >>> that any researcher can afford to take for granted when they step into >> the >>> arena. >>> >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>> >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:04 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> wrote: >>> >>>> These are really interesting questions, a really good dialogue on what a >>>> critical non-dualist approach can be. Thanks for the attachment Martin >>>> (which does work in the link you sent last). >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> on behalf of Martin Packer >>>> Sent: 04 January 2018 23:32 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed >>>> >>>> The attachment doesn?t seem to travel well. Here?s a link: >>>> >>>> > producing/wacquant.pdf> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Martin Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:11 PM, Martin Packer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! >> :) >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 00:07:20 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:07:20 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: I read it, Martin. What Goldmann says is that Lukacs accepts subject-object dualism in a way that Heidegger would find unacceptable. He even speculates that Goldmann does this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and not other professors. He also notes that they supported different sides in World War II, and to his credit considers this a difference and not a similarity. But the chiefest difference Goldmann notes is that Heidegger is essentially interested in the fate of the individual and not the social; Dasein is really an individuation of Sein, and "living-for-death" is clearly individualistic. Lukacs is the other way around: he's interested in the individual job only in so far as it is a token of the mass and the class. Let us get back in the ring. I agree that there is very little analysis of the actual language, which to me means that there is very little analysis of the actual data. I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or her own subjective reactions to the data. This is why Vygotsky rejects the "objectivist" accounts of development (e.g. that of his friend Blonsky, based on teething, or accounts based on sexual maturation) as being essentially subjectivist: he says that the choice of this trope or that one is subjectivist. For example. Wacquant doesn't even bother to notice that a huge proportion of his informants are night watchmen or security guards or rent-a-cops. He even says at the outset that out-of-the-boxing-ring jobs in particular and the class status in general are not factors in his study. But I think you can see that boxing is not exactly irrelevant to professions which involve the use of violence in defence of private property. Isn't it subjectivist to simply write this off? David Kellogg On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 8:31 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > Fair enough David. Not being a linguist myself, I am not looking for what > you see in the data. > > By the way, it?s not Lukacs vs.Heidegger, it?s Lukacs and Heidegger. For > example: > > Goldmann, L. (1979). Luk?cs and Heidegger: Towards a new philosophy. > Routledge and Kegan Paul. > > Martin > > > > On Jan 5, 2018, at 6:21 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Sorry, Martin. I wasn't very clear. > > > > Compare: > > > > a) "Phonology is variable but semantics is invariant." > > b) "Phonology is variable but semantics invariant." > > c) "Phonology variable, but semantics is invariant." > > > > What is the difference between a) and b)? Nothing, you might say, but if > > you say that you are taking the position that grammar varies without any > > variation in semantics, which is exactly what Ruqaiya Hasan and William > > Labov dispute. > > > > Labov: "Sentences a) and b) are two lexicogrammatical variants of a > single > > thought. They are both standard English." > > Hasan: "Sentences a) and b) are two different lexicogrammatical > > realizations of two slightly different thoughts, because a) stresses the > > parallelism and therefore asserts that the two propositions are > inseparable > > but b) does not. > > > > Now consider a) and b) on the one hand and c) on the other. What's the > > difference? Well, you might say, a) and b) are standard English, but c) > is > > not. > > > > Fine. Now, this does suggest that there is a rule of standard English > which > > says that elision works anaphorically (i.e. referring back). What we see > in > > Wacquant's data is elision that is cataphoric (i.e. the omission refers > > FORWARDS and not back). That's not explained in any of Labov's articles > on > > AAVE, so far as I know. And that's what interests me in this article, > > because I find the business of subjects and objects (e.g. Lukacs vs. > > Heidegger) too abstract and unprogrammatic to be resolvable in any useful > > way. This seems more like a solution-sized problem. But then, I am a > > linguist. > > > > I also think that the issue of whether AAVE is a phonological variant or > a > > semantic variant is important for education. Vygotsky's account of > > education is (to my reading) essentially an account of ontogenetic > semantic > > variation,and his account of cultural history is essentially an account > of > > sociogenetic semantic variation. You know that that the question of > whether > > thinking varies the way that speech does is heavily moralized in a lot of > > critical pedagogy; you commented on this in your 2001 book with Mark > Tappan. > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 7:18 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> I?m a bit confused, David. (h) is from the epigraph, in which a boxer is > >> describing what it?s like to be *turned into* an object by ?outsiders,? > who > >> judge boxing without knowing it. That's, to say, "they lookin' at it > from a > >> spectator point of view? (489). (But notice how the speaker invites the > >> audience to tun things around and imagine *being* the critic, the > >> spectator, the fans: that's why in (h) it is ?we? on the *outside* and > ?he? > >> (the imagined performer) on the *inside.* So *here* there are objects > and > >> subjects. But in the gym? > >> > >> Also, I?m not sure why you are focused on the copula? Didn?t Labov > >> describe the rules for this in NNE? I be forgetful about that. > >> > >> In fact, I?m not sure why you focused on the grammar at all. Wacquant?s > >> analysis is focused on ?tropes.? It?s a weakness of the article that it > >> doesn?t describe or illustrate how he went about this analysis, it only > >> displays his results. But those are very interesting, I think. > >> > >> Wacquant is French and white. He proposes in his book (and in the > article > >> too I believe) that it was a combination of luck, hard work, and being > >> French that enabled how to become accepted by the members of the gym. > In my > >> opinion, this is yet another example of the ?boundary? myth in > fieldwork: > >> the idea that one crosses a frontier and becomes accepted ?as a native.? > >> It?s clear in some of his data that the boxers displayed awareness of > >> Wacquant's difference, and even of the fact that he was a ?teacher? who > was > >> writing a book. But yes, in several respects overcoming the distinction > >> between subject and object is indeed an interactional accomplishment, > not > >> to be sneezed at. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> p.s. Here?s Malinowski passing as one of the natives... > >> > >> Or the link in case the image doesn?t travel: > >> >> malinowski%20trobriands%20aa%20aa_big.jpg> > >> > >>> On Jan 5, 2018, at 4:57 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>> Take a look at these clauses from Wacquant's data: > >>> > >>> a) They ignorant. (489) > >>> b) Someon tha' their min's thinkin' real low. (495) > >>> c) He real tough. (496) > >>> d) He been in jail. (496) > >>> e) He aggressive; he's quick. (496) > >>> f) (Y)ou not going nowhere. (513) > >>> g) We lookin' at it 'cause we spectactors an' stuff (489) > >>> h) We on the outsi' lookin' in but *he's* insi' lookin out (489) > >>> > >>> Now, when I started reading this, I decided that the subject/object > stuff > >>> was a red herring. It's obvious, even in the epigraph, that > >> subject/object > >>> is a real distinction for the people in this article, so unless the > >> author > >>> is pulling our legs about trying to reconstruct how people themselves > are > >>> thinking about "the Sweet Science" and "The Manly Art", the > >> subject/object > >>> distinction is not only real, it's a central point of this article. Of > >>> course, denying the distinction is a point of honor for academics (just > >>> like winning prize-fights for boxers). But as soon as your subjects > >>> (sorry--I mean your research objects) start saying things like h) you > >> know > >>> that you can't really do without the distinction after all. > >>> > >>> So instead I was trying to work out the rule for when "to be" can be > >>> deleted in the grammar and when it cannot. Labov has already written a > >> lot > >>> about this--he says it's phonological (you can delete it whenever you > can > >>> contract "to be" but not otherwise, so for example you can say "They're > >>> ignorant" or "They ignorant" but you can't say "Yeah, it" instead of > >> "Yeah, > >>> it is"). The problem with this rule is that tells me what I can do, but > >> it > >>> doesn't explain the variation we see in e) and h), where the speaker > >>> starts with deletion but ends with completion ("He [is--deleted] > >>> aggressive; he's quick"). Another problem is that, as Ruqaiya Hasan > >> pointed > >>> out, it assumes that phonology varies but semantics invariant (because > I > >>> write in standard English the DELETIONS are late appearing in that last > >>> sentence, but in Wacquant's data the NON-DELETIONS appear late.) If > >>> semantics were invariant, then Saint Augustine's theory of language in > >> the > >>> "Confessions" would be all we need to learn a foreign language. > >>> > >>> My first theory was based on a) through c): it was that when "to be" is > >>> ATTRIBUTIVE (that is, when it is used to introduce a nominal attribute > in > >>> the form of an adjective but not a verbal attribute in the form of an > >>> adverb) you can delete it. It's a good theory: it would explain the > >>> apparent free variation in e), for example. It would also allow > >>> generalization to Chinese and Korean grammar (where adjectives are > really > >>> verbs and not nominals at all). But as soon as I got to d) and f) it is > >>> clear that it won't work. If the speaker is thinking of "been in jail" > >> and > >>> "not going nowhere" as nominal attributes then the distinction between > >>> attributive and non-attributive is a lot less meaningful to them than > the > >>> difference between subject and object. > >>> > >>> So my second theory was an extension of Labov's theory. You delete "to > >> be" > >>> when the emphasis is on the lexical verb elements ("ignorant", "real > >> low", > >>> "real tough", "jail", "aggressive"). But you supply it for emphasis > when > >>> you are basically rephrasing for effect ("he's quick", "he's insi' > >> lookin' > >>> out". This accounts for the data a lot better, as you can see, and it > >>> explains why the non-deletions are always late appearing in the clause > >>> complex. But it still leaves open the question of why the speaker is > >>> non-deleting. > >>> > >>> At this point it occurred to me that thiis is an instance of speech > >>> accomodation--the speaker is switching in the direction of Wacquant's > >>> somewhat precious and precise (non-native) use of English, as a way of > >>> showing that they respect him. So I deduced that Wacquant is white. > Have > >> a > >>> look: > >>> > >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lo%C3%AFc_Wacquant > >>> > >>> Sure enough. It seems to me that overcoming the distinction between > >> subject > >>> and object is actually an interactional accomplishment, and it's not > the > >>> least of Wacquant's achievements in this article. But it's not > something > >>> that any researcher can afford to take for granted when they step into > >> the > >>> arena. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> > >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >>> > >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >>> > >>> > >>> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:04 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> These are really interesting questions, a really good dialogue on > what a > >>>> critical non-dualist approach can be. Thanks for the attachment Martin > >>>> (which does work in the link you sent last). > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu du> > >>>> on behalf of Martin Packer > >>>> Sent: 04 January 2018 23:32 > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed > >>>> > >>>> The attachment doesn?t seem to travel well. Here?s a link: > >>>> > >>>> >> producing/wacquant.pdf> > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 5:11 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I?ve attached the ?point of view? article: everyone should have it! > >> :) > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > > From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 07:24:33 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 10:24:33 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Well, David! I am once again puzzled. I suppose you might say that that?s just my ?subjective reaction? to what you have written. But even subjective reactions are aspects of the interpretation of a text, are they not? So let me try to explain my confusion. It arises afresh from each of the 4 paragraphs in your message: #1. Yes, Goldmann identifies some differences between Heidegger and Lukacs. That would not be difficult for anyone to do, would it!? The main point of his book, however, is that there are fundamental similarities between existentialism and marxism, and between Heidegger and Lukacs in particular. (Heidegger rejected the label ?existentialist,? but let?s leave that to the side.) Let?s stick close to Goldmann?s actual language. His principal thesis is that "between 1910 and 1925 a true philosophical turning-point occurred, which resulted in the creation of existentialism and contemporary dialectical materialism.? As a consequence, one can find several ?fundamental bond[s] between Lukacs and Heidegger.? Central among these is "the rejection of the transcendental subject, the conception of man as inseparable from the world which he is a part of, the definition of his place in the universe as historicity.? Yes, there are "differences which put the two philosophies in opposition to each other, but on this common foundation.? What is the common foundation, again? It is the recognition that "Man is not opposite the world which he tries to understand and upon which he acts, but within this world which he is a part of, and there is no radical break between the meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the universe and that which he is trying' to find or introduce into his own existence. This meaning, common to both individual and collective human life, common as much to humanity as, ultimately, to the universe, is called history.? This is indeed the rejection of dualism that you have noted. It is also, as I have noted, key to Wacquant?s project, which begins with the assumption that a boxer is not ?opposite? the world of boxing, upon which he acts; he is a part of this world; there is ?ontological complicity? between person and world. And it?s worth noting, I think, that this rejection of dualism must call into question the seemingly self-evident distinction between ?subjective reaction? and ?objective analysis.? #2. Yes, Goldmann proposes that "for Heidegger the historical subject is the individual where?as Lukacs... conceives of history as the action of the transindi?vidual subject and, in particular, of social classes.? But in my opinion this is based on a questionable reading of Heidegger (but that doesn?t make it nothing more than a ?subjective reaction,? does it?). Heidegger?s concept of Dasein - ?being there? - is a general term for human being, whether an individual or a group. Division 2 of Being and Time (with ?living-unto-death?) is about *individualization*: how one can *become* an active individual agent of history. But Vygotsky was also interested in individualization, wasn?t he? This seems a difference in emphasis, not unimportant but possible only on the background of a shared foundation. (Note that this is in no way intended as a defense of Heidegger, whose personal life was deplorable and whose philosophy is fundamentally flawed.) #3. You write that "I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or her own subjective reactions to the data.? First, Wacquant doesn?t ?code? his data at all. What he does do is identify and then interpret the tropes that the boxers use when talking about their occupation. You?ll find an argument against the common assumption that qualitative analysis involves coding in chapter 3 of my book. Second, you seem to be suggesting that paying attention to tropes - metaphors and other figures of speech - is somehow merely a subjective reaction. I assume then, that you don?t have much sympathy for George Lakoff?s analysis of the recurrent metaphors in everyday talk, in Metaphors We Live By? Or for Hayden White?s massive analysis - what he calls ?tropology? - of grand historical narratives - those of Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche and others - in his book Metahistory? #4. You suggest that social class and employment are not of interest to Wacquant. But Wacquant has written widely - and I mean *widely* - on the mechanisms of reproduction of social class, on the intersections of class and race, and on the way class is handled in sociology (he?s a sociologist, not an anthropologist). In this article, for example, he points out ?That boxing is a working-class occupation is reflected not only in the physical nature of the activity but also in the social recruitment of its practitioners and in their continuing dependence on blue-collar or un-skilled service jobs to support their career in the ring? (p. 502). In addition, he insists that his analysis of what the boxers say is necessarily informed by his knowledge, as a researcher, of various aspects of the form of life of boxing that they boxers themselves cannot grasp: "(i) the objective shape of that structure [of the social ?field' of boxing] and the set of constraints and facilitations it harbors; (ii) its location in the wider social spaces of the ghetto and the city; and (iii) the social trajectories and dispositions of those who enter and compete in it? (p. 491). This approach seems to me hardly to ignore class, its inequities, or its economic necessities. I guess we simply have different 'subjective reactions' to this article! :) Or, in a more serious tone: when you ask me to "Compare: a) "Phonology is variable but semantics is invariant." b) "Phonology is variable but semantics invariant." c) "Phonology variable, but semantics is invariant." What is the difference between a) and b)?? are you not asking for my ?subjective reactions?? Or are there ?objective reactions?? Aren?t we talking about consciousness, always an aspect of our being-in-the-world, mediated by material representations? cheers Martin > On Jan 7, 2018, at 3:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > I read it, Martin. What Goldmann says is that Lukacs accepts subject-object > dualism in a way that Heidegger would find unacceptable. He even speculates > that Goldmann does this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and > not other professors. He also notes that they supported different sides in > World War II, and to his credit considers this a difference and not a > similarity. > > But the chiefest difference Goldmann notes is that Heidegger is essentially > interested in the fate of the individual and not the social; Dasein is > really an individuation of Sein, and "living-for-death" is clearly > individualistic. Lukacs is the other way around: he's interested in the > individual job only in so far as it is a token of the mass and the class. > > Let us get back in the ring. I agree that there is very little analysis of > the actual language, which to me means that there is very little analysis > of the actual data. I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes > interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or > her own subjective reactions to the data. This is why Vygotsky rejects the > "objectivist" accounts of development (e.g. that of his friend Blonsky, > based on teething, or accounts based on sexual maturation) as being > essentially subjectivist: he says that the choice of this trope or that one > is subjectivist. > > For example. Wacquant doesn't even bother to notice that a huge proportion > of his informants are night watchmen or security guards or rent-a-cops. He > even says at the outset that out-of-the-boxing-ring jobs in particular and > the class status in general are not factors in his study. But I think you > can see that boxing is not exactly irrelevant to professions which involve > the use of violence in defence of private property. Isn't it subjectivist > to simply write this off? > > David Kellogg > > >> From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 11:59:04 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 14:59:04 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] kinship In-Reply-To: <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, or not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has occurred to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every language. When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( Anyone have an idea? Martin From rakahu@utu.fi Sun Jan 7 12:39:38 2018 From: rakahu@utu.fi (Rauno Huttunen) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 20:39:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> , <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: <11D25E45-CC6A-4875-BC85-448625E119FF@utu.fi> Hello, About convergence between Heidegger and Lukacs. Young Lukacs (Soul and Form; Theory of Romans) writings belongs to the tradition of Lebensphilosophie and as such these writings have many common elements with Heidegger?s middle works (from Being and Time to Kehre). Lukacs?s History and Class-consciousness differs from Heidegger. First of all Heidegger does not use concept of consciousness. Instead he speaks of Dasein (after Kehre Heidegger does not speak on Dasein except in Zolligon seminars). In Sein und Zeit Heidegger wants to destruct so called metaphysics of presence. Although Lukacs does not support transcendental subjectivity, History and Class-consciousness is full of different kinds of ?metaphysics of presences?. Rauno Huttunen L?hetetty iPadista > Martin Packer kirjoitti 7.1.2018 kello 17.26: > > Well, David! I am once again puzzled. I suppose you might say that that?s just my ?subjective reaction? to what you have written. But even subjective reactions are aspects of the interpretation of a text, are they not? So let me try to explain my confusion. It arises afresh from each of the 4 paragraphs in your message: > > #1. Yes, Goldmann identifies some differences between Heidegger and Lukacs. That would not be difficult for anyone to do, would it!? The main point of his book, however, is that there are fundamental similarities between existentialism and marxism, and between Heidegger and Lukacs in particular. (Heidegger rejected the label ?existentialist,? but let?s leave that to the side.) > > Let?s stick close to Goldmann?s actual language. His principal thesis is that "between 1910 and 1925 a true philosophical turning-point occurred, which resulted in the creation of existentialism and contemporary dialectical materialism.? > > As a consequence, one can find several ?fundamental bond[s] between Lukacs and Heidegger.? Central among these is "the rejection of the transcendental subject, the conception of man as inseparable from the world which he is a part of, the definition of his place in the universe as historicity.? > > Yes, there are "differences which put the two philosophies in opposition to each other, but on this common foundation.? What is the common foundation, again? It is the recognition that "Man is not opposite the world which he tries to understand and upon which he acts, but within this world which he is a part of, and there is no radical break between the meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the universe and that which he is trying' to find or introduce into his own existence. This meaning, common to both individual and collective human life, common as much to humanity as, ultimately, to the universe, is called history.? > > This is indeed the rejection of dualism that you have noted. It is also, as I have noted, key to Wacquant?s project, which begins with the assumption that a boxer is not ?opposite? the world of boxing, upon which he acts; he is a part of this world; there is ?ontological complicity? between person and world. And it?s worth noting, I think, that this rejection of dualism must call into question the seemingly self-evident distinction between ?subjective reaction? and ?objective analysis.? > > > #2. Yes, Goldmann proposes that "for Heidegger the historical subject is the individual where?as Lukacs... conceives of history as the action of the transindi?vidual subject and, in particular, of social classes.? But in my opinion this is based on a questionable reading of Heidegger (but that doesn?t make it nothing more than a ?subjective reaction,? does it?). Heidegger?s concept of Dasein - ?being there? - is a general term for human being, whether an individual or a group. Division 2 of Being and Time (with ?living-unto-death?) is about *individualization*: how one can *become* an active individual agent of history. But Vygotsky was also interested in individualization, wasn?t he? This seems a difference in emphasis, not unimportant but possible only on the background of a shared foundation. (Note that this is in no way intended as a defense of Heidegger, whose personal life was deplorable and whose philosophy is fundamentally flawed.) > > > #3. You write that "I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or her own subjective reactions to the data.? > > First, Wacquant doesn?t ?code? his data at all. What he does do is identify and then interpret the tropes that the boxers use when talking about their occupation. You?ll find an argument against the common assumption that qualitative analysis involves coding in chapter 3 of my book. Second, you seem to be suggesting that paying attention to tropes - metaphors and other figures of speech - is somehow merely a subjective reaction. I assume then, that you don?t have much sympathy for George Lakoff?s analysis of the recurrent metaphors in everyday talk, in Metaphors We Live By? Or for Hayden White?s massive analysis - what he calls ?tropology? - of grand historical narratives - those of Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche and others - in his book Metahistory? > > > #4. You suggest that social class and employment are not of interest to Wacquant. But Wacquant has written widely - and I mean *widely* - on the mechanisms of reproduction of social class, on the intersections of class and race, and on the way class is handled in sociology (he?s a sociologist, not an anthropologist). > > In this article, for example, he points out ?That boxing is a working-class occupation is reflected not only in the physical nature of the activity but also in the social recruitment of its practitioners and in their continuing dependence on blue-collar or un-skilled service jobs to support their career in the ring? (p. 502). > > In addition, he insists that his analysis of what the boxers say is necessarily informed by his knowledge, as a researcher, of various aspects of the form of life of boxing that they boxers themselves cannot grasp: "(i) the objective shape of that structure [of the social ?field' of boxing] and the set of constraints and facilitations it harbors; (ii) its location in the wider social spaces of the ghetto and the city; and (iii) the social trajectories and dispositions of those who enter and compete in it? (p. 491). This approach seems to me hardly to ignore class, its inequities, or its economic necessities. > > I guess we simply have different 'subjective reactions' to this article! :) > > Or, in a more serious tone: when you ask me to "Compare: > > a) "Phonology is variable but semantics is invariant." > b) "Phonology is variable but semantics invariant." > c) "Phonology variable, but semantics is invariant." > > What is the difference between a) and b)?? are you not asking for my ?subjective reactions?? Or are there ?objective reactions?? Aren?t we talking about consciousness, always an aspect of our being-in-the-world, mediated by material representations? > > cheers > > Martin > >> On Jan 7, 2018, at 3:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> I read it, Martin. What Goldmann says is that Lukacs accepts subject-object >> dualism in a way that Heidegger would find unacceptable. He even speculates >> that Goldmann does this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and >> not other professors. He also notes that they supported different sides in >> World War II, and to his credit considers this a difference and not a >> similarity. >> >> But the chiefest difference Goldmann notes is that Heidegger is essentially >> interested in the fate of the individual and not the social; Dasein is >> really an individuation of Sein, and "living-for-death" is clearly >> individualistic. Lukacs is the other way around: he's interested in the >> individual job only in so far as it is a token of the mass and the class. >> >> Let us get back in the ring. I agree that there is very little analysis of >> the actual language, which to me means that there is very little analysis >> of the actual data. I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes >> interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or >> her own subjective reactions to the data. This is why Vygotsky rejects the >> "objectivist" accounts of development (e.g. that of his friend Blonsky, >> based on teething, or accounts based on sexual maturation) as being >> essentially subjectivist: he says that the choice of this trope or that one >> is subjectivist. >> >> For example. Wacquant doesn't even bother to notice that a huge proportion >> of his informants are night watchmen or security guards or rent-a-cops. He >> even says at the outset that out-of-the-boxing-ring jobs in particular and >> the class status in general are not factors in his study. But I think you >> can see that boxing is not exactly irrelevant to professions which involve >> the use of violence in defence of private property. Isn't it subjectivist >> to simply write this off? >> >> David Kellogg >> >> >>> > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Sun Jan 7 12:43:19 2018 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 20:43:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net>, Message-ID: Martin, many decades ago while teaching elementary school, i taught a unit on the Native American Crow Nation (Sacajawea was a member of that nation.) at the time i was struck by their kinship system which was described through the lens of western european kinship systems - and i've always wondered how a member of the Crow nation would describe it. i check at Wikipedia, and this is what that site has: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crow_kinship Crow kinship - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Crow kinship is a kinship system used to define family. Identified by Lewis Henry Morgan in his 1871 work Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family ... otherwise, from Encyclopaedia.com i pulled this up: Kin Groups and Descent. The Crow maintain a matrilineal clan structure with thirteen named clans. The clans are grouped into six unnamed and loosely organized phratries as well as into two primary bands, the Mountain and River divisions, along with a third minor band, the Kicked-in-the-Bellies. The bands are composed of all thirteen clans. Within the clans and extending into the phratry and band groups, members recognize mutual obligations to assist one another. Kinship Terminology. A "Crow kinship" system is practiced. Cross-generational equivalence is extended to the males in both the matrilineal clan ("older" and "younger brothers") and the father's mother's clan ("fathers"), while sisters within the matrilineal clan are classified as "mothers. " The aassahke ("fathers" or "clan uncles") continue to provide a pivotal kinship relationship. A clan uncle is any male member of the father's mother's clan. Such individuals are to be respected like "medicine, " with gifts of food and blankets provided to them during give-aways. In turn, aassahke bestow on a child an "Indian name, " sing "praise songs" for one's accomplishments, and offer protective prayers. ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin Packer Sent: Sunday, January 7, 2018 12:59:04 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] kinship I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, or not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has occurred to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every language. When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( Anyone have an idea? Martin From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 13:22:46 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 14:22:46 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin, Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you mean by "family"? What in the world do you mean by "family"? -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, or > not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has occurred > to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every language. > When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > Anyone have an idea? > > Martin > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 13:28:57 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 06:28:57 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin: I'm not sure to what extent your bepuzzlement is genuine misunderstanding and to what extent it is simply a polite form of disagreement. There is always a lot in what I write that is opaque and even obtuse. For example, I always seem to have a lot of trouble writing clauses that have more than one sentient actor in them: I can't get the names and the pronominal reference right (I also have that strange mental disability where when you are driving and your wife tells you to take a left, you turn right, and vice versa). For example, I wrote: "He even speculates that Goldmann does this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and not other professors." I should have written: "He even speculates that Lukacs does this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and not other professors." But of course we politely disagree too. You are an anthropologist and a professor; I am a linguist and a translator. Both callings require a modicum of courtesy and decency towards opponents (as in boxing); both involve "sciences of a natural whole" given by the environment rather than by some act of analysis (unlike boxing); but our two sciences are as different as the methods must inevitably be. As I said, I think I "get" the point of anthropological study, at least to the extent that outsiders usually get it ("Oh, right--he joined a gym in South Chicago to see what boxing felt like...."). You, on the other hand, said you didn't get the point of looking at grammar, and I was trying to explain. I'll try again. I can understand South Chicago English, although my wife cannot, and even has trouble understanding the "eye dialect" which Wacquant uses to quote his data, even though she reads texts in seventeenth century English with great ease. There are interesting historical reasons which explain this difference between me and my wife, but they will only make sense if we understand what exactly the difference is. The fact that the data comes to us AS WRITTEN SPEECH in Wacquant's article means that we are not simply talking about dialect, because dialect is overwhelmingly phonological in its variation. Something else is varying which impedes comprehension for her and facilitates it for me. I think it is not dialect but register, and I think the variations are not simply phonological but grammatical and ultimately semantic. The existence or non-existence of semantic variation is the key issue which divided Hasan and Labov, and without it we cannot really make sense of the debate over "deficit linguistics" which appears briefly in the lchc polyphonic autobiography. But I am happy to discuss what you find interesting instead. In fact, I too find it interesting (and I even find that it is the same issue, because my wife's inability to understand the data and my own ability to understand it is a much more measurable and much more operational way of talking about "point of view"). I just disagree. To me (and to Vygotsky, because I am a linguist and a translator), it's very important to make an analysis replicable; it's what makes analysis understandable, teachable, scientific, and ultimately democratic. I don't think that you can do that by approaching interview data as a literary critic, whose task is to interpret the text for the (non-)layman; I think you can do it by uncovering the regularities that make the data comprehensible to the participants themselves. I don't think you can do it by trying to identify "tropes". For example: what I said about Wacquant dismissing class refers to Wacquant's own text: see p. 494. He may have written otherwise elsewhere (very likely, as the position he takes on p. 494 is utterly incoherent). But we also disagree on what a working class job is: I don't think that a security guard or a rent-a-cop or a night watchman is a working class job, and in the context of South Chicago I see it is as being a lot closer to gang life than the participants seem to. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 12:24 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > Well, David! I am once again puzzled. I suppose you might say that that?s > just my ?subjective reaction? to what you have written. But even subjective > reactions are aspects of the interpretation of a text, are they not? So let > me try to explain my confusion. It arises afresh from each of the 4 > paragraphs in your message: > > #1. Yes, Goldmann identifies some differences between Heidegger and > Lukacs. That would not be difficult for anyone to do, would it!? The main > point of his book, however, is that there are fundamental similarities > between existentialism and marxism, and between Heidegger and Lukacs in > particular. (Heidegger rejected the label ?existentialist,? but let?s leave > that to the side.) > > Let?s stick close to Goldmann?s actual language. His principal thesis is > that "between 1910 and 1925 a true philosophical turning-point occurred, > which resulted in the creation of existentialism and contemporary > dialectical materialism.? > > As a consequence, one can find several ?fundamental bond[s] between Lukacs > and Heidegger.? Central among these is "the rejection of the > transcendental subject, the conception of man as inseparable from the world > which he is a part of, the definition of his place in the universe as > historicity.? > > Yes, there are "differences which put the two philosophies in opposition > to each other, but on this common foundation.? What is the common > foundation, again? It is the recognition that "Man is not opposite the > world which he tries to understand and upon which he acts, but within this > world which he is a part of, and there is no radical break between the > meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the universe and that which > he is trying' to find or introduce into his own existence. This meaning, > common to both individual and collective human life, common as much to > humanity as, ultimately, to the universe, is called history.? > > This is indeed the rejection of dualism that you have noted. It is also, > as I have noted, key to Wacquant?s project, which begins with the > assumption that a boxer is not ?opposite? the world of boxing, upon which > he acts; he is a part of this world; there is ?ontological complicity? > between person and world. And it?s worth noting, I think, that this > rejection of dualism must call into question the seemingly self-evident > distinction between ?subjective reaction? and ?objective analysis.? > > > #2. Yes, Goldmann proposes that "for Heidegger the historical subject is > the individual where?as Lukacs... conceives of history as the action of the > transindi?vidual subject and, in particular, of social classes.? But in my > opinion this is based on a questionable reading of Heidegger (but that > doesn?t make it nothing more than a ?subjective reaction,? does it?). > Heidegger?s concept of Dasein - ?being there? - is a general term for human > being, whether an individual or a group. Division 2 of Being and Time (with > ?living-unto-death?) is about *individualization*: how one can *become* an > active individual agent of history. But Vygotsky was also interested in > individualization, wasn?t he? This seems a difference in emphasis, not > unimportant but possible only on the background of a shared foundation. > (Note that this is in no way intended as a defense of Heidegger, whose > personal life was deplorable and whose philosophy is fundamentally flawed.) > > > #3. You write that "I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes > interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or > her own subjective reactions to the data.? > > First, Wacquant doesn?t ?code? his data at all. What he does do is > identify and then interpret the tropes that the boxers use when talking > about their occupation. You?ll find an argument against the common > assumption that qualitative analysis involves coding in chapter 3 of my > book. Second, you seem to be suggesting that paying attention to tropes - > metaphors and other figures of speech - is somehow merely a subjective > reaction. I assume then, that you don?t have much sympathy for George > Lakoff?s analysis of the recurrent metaphors in everyday talk, in Metaphors > We Live By? Or for Hayden White?s massive analysis - what he calls > ?tropology? - of grand historical narratives - those of Marx, Hegel, > Nietzsche and others - in his book Metahistory? > > > #4. You suggest that social class and employment are not of interest to > Wacquant. But Wacquant has written widely - and I mean *widely* - on the > mechanisms of reproduction of social class, on the intersections of class > and race, and on the way class is handled in sociology (he?s a sociologist, > not an anthropologist). > > In this article, for example, he points out ?That boxing is a > working-class occupation is reflected not only in the physical nature of > the activity but also in the social recruitment of its practitioners and in > their continuing dependence on blue-collar or un-skilled service jobs to > support their career in the ring? (p. 502). > > In addition, he insists that his analysis of what the boxers say is > necessarily informed by his knowledge, as a researcher, of various aspects > of the form of life of boxing that they boxers themselves cannot grasp: > "(i) the objective shape of that structure [of the social ?field' of > boxing] and the set of constraints and facilitations it harbors; (ii) its > location in the wider social spaces of the ghetto and the city; and (iii) > the social trajectories and dispositions of those who enter and compete in > it? (p. 491). This approach seems to me hardly to ignore class, its > inequities, or its economic necessities. > > I guess we simply have different 'subjective reactions' to this article! > :) > > Or, in a more serious tone: when you ask me to "Compare: > > a) "Phonology is variable but semantics is invariant." > b) "Phonology is variable but semantics invariant." > c) "Phonology variable, but semantics is invariant." > > What is the difference between a) and b)?? are you not asking for my > ?subjective reactions?? Or are there ?objective reactions?? Aren?t we > talking about consciousness, always an aspect of our being-in-the-world, > mediated by material representations? > > cheers > > Martin > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 3:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > I read it, Martin. What Goldmann says is that Lukacs accepts > subject-object > > dualism in a way that Heidegger would find unacceptable. He even > speculates > > that Goldmann does this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and > > not other professors. He also notes that they supported different sides > in > > World War II, and to his credit considers this a difference and not a > > similarity. > > > > But the chiefest difference Goldmann notes is that Heidegger is > essentially > > interested in the fate of the individual and not the social; Dasein is > > really an individuation of Sein, and "living-for-death" is clearly > > individualistic. Lukacs is the other way around: he's interested in the > > individual job only in so far as it is a token of the mass and the class. > > > > Let us get back in the ring. I agree that there is very little analysis > of > > the actual language, which to me means that there is very little analysis > > of the actual data. I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes > > interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or > > her own subjective reactions to the data. This is why Vygotsky rejects > the > > "objectivist" accounts of development (e.g. that of his friend Blonsky, > > based on teething, or accounts based on sexual maturation) as being > > essentially subjectivist: he says that the choice of this trope or that > one > > is subjectivist. > > > > For example. Wacquant doesn't even bother to notice that a huge > proportion > > of his informants are night watchmen or security guards or rent-a-cops. > He > > even says at the outset that out-of-the-boxing-ring jobs in particular > and > > the class status in general are not factors in his study. But I think you > > can see that boxing is not exactly irrelevant to professions which > involve > > the use of violence in defence of private property. Isn't it subjectivist > > to simply write this off? > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 13:30:12 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 06:30:12 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing rather than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This does suggest something semantic, no? David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you mean > by "family"? > What in the world do you mean by "family"? > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > > I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, or > > not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > occurred > > to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every language. > > When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > > > Anyone have an idea? > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 13:47:36 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 16:47:36 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Hi Greg, Well, that?s my point! A lot of people in several disciplines are studying families in various cultural contexts, without defining what ?a family? is. I?ve started to wonder if the word/concept/entity even exists in all cultures. Obviously there?s a danger of circularity here, because (see David?s most recent message) a word that gets *translated* into English as ?family? may relate very differently in the original language. For instance, Malinowski wrote of ?the initial situation of kinship,? and he seemed to mean the family, saying that it ?is a compound of biological and cultural elements,? but then shifted to claim ?or rather that it consists of the facts of individual procreation culturally reinterpreted.? All of which seems to add up to the suggestion that family = father + mother + child. But then other investigators say that there is a type of family in the Balkans known as ?zadruga,? which may have one hundred or more members. I?m just confused again! I?m going to adopt as my slogan for this year something else Malinowski wrote: when I talk with a colleague "I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself." Martin > On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:22 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Martin, > Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you mean > by "family"? > What in the world do you mean by "family"? > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, or >> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has occurred >> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every language. >> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( >> >> Anyone have an idea? >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 14:03:07 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:03:07 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Science of Qualitative Research 2ed In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Hi David, I just want to comment on two things. First, what Wacquant writes on page 494 is that *in the current article* he?s not going to address "the broader matrix of class inequality? etcetera. He *does* address these things in other articles and in his book. Second, you write "To me... it's very important to make an analysis replicable; it's what makes analysis understandable, teachable, scientific, and ultimately democratic.? I completely agree. I criticized Wacquant, a few messages back, for conducting his analysis off-stage, so to speak, and only showing us the results. But in how many research reports, qualitative or quantitative, is the analysis actually displayed? The usual format is to state what *kind* of analysis was conducted, then present the results. ?A chi-squared analysis was conducted?.? and ?the p-value was found to?? The actual conduct of the analysis ? the summing of squares, etc. ? is hidden. This is one of the (many) things that makes ?teaching research methods? so difficult. Martin > On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:28 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Martin: > > I'm not sure to what extent your bepuzzlement is genuine misunderstanding > and to what extent it is simply a polite form of disagreement. There is > always a lot in what I write that is opaque and even obtuse. For example, I > always seem to have a lot of trouble writing clauses that have more than > one sentient actor in them: I can't get the names and the pronominal > reference right (I also have that strange mental disability where when you > are driving and your wife tells you to take a left, you turn right, and > vice versa). For example, I wrote: "He even speculates that Goldmann does > this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and not other > professors." I should have written: "He even speculates that Lukacs does > this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and not other professors." > > But of course we politely disagree too. You are an anthropologist and a > professor; I am a linguist and a translator. Both callings require a > modicum of courtesy and decency towards opponents (as in boxing); both > involve "sciences of a natural whole" given by the environment rather than > by some act of analysis (unlike boxing); but our two sciences are as > different as the methods must inevitably be. As I said, I think I "get" the > point of anthropological study, at least to the extent that outsiders > usually get it ("Oh, right--he joined a gym in South Chicago to see what > boxing felt like...."). You, on the other hand, said you didn't get the > point of looking at grammar, and I was trying to explain. > > I'll try again. I can understand South Chicago English, although my wife > cannot, and even has trouble understanding the "eye dialect" which Wacquant > uses to quote his data, even though she reads texts in seventeenth century > English with great ease. There are interesting historical reasons which > explain this difference between me and my wife, but they will only > make sense if we understand what exactly the difference is. The fact that > the data comes to us AS WRITTEN SPEECH in Wacquant's article means that we > are not simply talking about dialect, because dialect is overwhelmingly > phonological in its variation. Something else is varying which impedes > comprehension for her and facilitates it for me. I think it is not dialect > but register, and I think the variations are not simply phonological but > grammatical and ultimately semantic. The existence or non-existence of > semantic variation is the key issue which divided Hasan and Labov, and > without it we cannot really make sense of the debate over "deficit > linguistics" which appears briefly in the lchc polyphonic autobiography. > > But I am happy to discuss what you find interesting instead. In fact, I too > find it interesting (and I even find that it is the same issue, because my > wife's inability to understand the data and my own ability to understand it > is a much more measurable and much more operational way of talking about > "point of view"). I just disagree. To me (and to Vygotsky, because I am a > linguist and a translator), it's very important to make an analysis > replicable; it's what makes analysis understandable, teachable, scientific, > and ultimately democratic. I don't think that you can do that by > approaching interview data as a literary critic, whose task is to interpret > the text for the (non-)layman; I think you can do it by uncovering the > regularities that make the data comprehensible to the participants > themselves. I don't think you can do it by trying to identify "tropes". > > For example: what I said about Wacquant dismissing class refers to > Wacquant's own text: see p. 494. He may have written otherwise elsewhere > (very likely, as the position he takes on p. 494 is utterly incoherent). > But we also disagree on what a working class job is: I don't think that a > security guard or a rent-a-cop or a night watchman is a working class job, > and in the context of South Chicago I see it is as being a lot closer to > gang life than the participants seem to. > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 12:24 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Well, David! I am once again puzzled. I suppose you might say that that?s >> just my ?subjective reaction? to what you have written. But even subjective >> reactions are aspects of the interpretation of a text, are they not? So let >> me try to explain my confusion. It arises afresh from each of the 4 >> paragraphs in your message: >> >> #1. Yes, Goldmann identifies some differences between Heidegger and >> Lukacs. That would not be difficult for anyone to do, would it!? The main >> point of his book, however, is that there are fundamental similarities >> between existentialism and marxism, and between Heidegger and Lukacs in >> particular. (Heidegger rejected the label ?existentialist,? but let?s leave >> that to the side.) >> >> Let?s stick close to Goldmann?s actual language. His principal thesis is >> that "between 1910 and 1925 a true philosophical turning-point occurred, >> which resulted in the creation of existentialism and contemporary >> dialectical materialism.? >> >> As a consequence, one can find several ?fundamental bond[s] between Lukacs >> and Heidegger.? Central among these is "the rejection of the >> transcendental subject, the conception of man as inseparable from the world >> which he is a part of, the definition of his place in the universe as >> historicity.? >> >> Yes, there are "differences which put the two philosophies in opposition >> to each other, but on this common foundation.? What is the common >> foundation, again? It is the recognition that "Man is not opposite the >> world which he tries to understand and upon which he acts, but within this >> world which he is a part of, and there is no radical break between the >> meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the universe and that which >> he is trying' to find or introduce into his own existence. This meaning, >> common to both individual and collective human life, common as much to >> humanity as, ultimately, to the universe, is called history.? >> >> This is indeed the rejection of dualism that you have noted. It is also, >> as I have noted, key to Wacquant?s project, which begins with the >> assumption that a boxer is not ?opposite? the world of boxing, upon which >> he acts; he is a part of this world; there is ?ontological complicity? >> between person and world. And it?s worth noting, I think, that this >> rejection of dualism must call into question the seemingly self-evident >> distinction between ?subjective reaction? and ?objective analysis.? >> >> >> #2. Yes, Goldmann proposes that "for Heidegger the historical subject is >> the individual where?as Lukacs... conceives of history as the action of the >> transindi?vidual subject and, in particular, of social classes.? But in my >> opinion this is based on a questionable reading of Heidegger (but that >> doesn?t make it nothing more than a ?subjective reaction,? does it?). >> Heidegger?s concept of Dasein - ?being there? - is a general term for human >> being, whether an individual or a group. Division 2 of Being and Time (with >> ?living-unto-death?) is about *individualization*: how one can *become* an >> active individual agent of history. But Vygotsky was also interested in >> individualization, wasn?t he? This seems a difference in emphasis, not >> unimportant but possible only on the background of a shared foundation. >> (Note that this is in no way intended as a defense of Heidegger, whose >> personal life was deplorable and whose philosophy is fundamentally flawed.) >> >> >> #3. You write that "I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes >> interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or >> her own subjective reactions to the data.? >> >> First, Wacquant doesn?t ?code? his data at all. What he does do is >> identify and then interpret the tropes that the boxers use when talking >> about their occupation. You?ll find an argument against the common >> assumption that qualitative analysis involves coding in chapter 3 of my >> book. Second, you seem to be suggesting that paying attention to tropes - >> metaphors and other figures of speech - is somehow merely a subjective >> reaction. I assume then, that you don?t have much sympathy for George >> Lakoff?s analysis of the recurrent metaphors in everyday talk, in Metaphors >> We Live By? Or for Hayden White?s massive analysis - what he calls >> ?tropology? - of grand historical narratives - those of Marx, Hegel, >> Nietzsche and others - in his book Metahistory? >> >> >> #4. You suggest that social class and employment are not of interest to >> Wacquant. But Wacquant has written widely - and I mean *widely* - on the >> mechanisms of reproduction of social class, on the intersections of class >> and race, and on the way class is handled in sociology (he?s a sociologist, >> not an anthropologist). >> >> In this article, for example, he points out ?That boxing is a >> working-class occupation is reflected not only in the physical nature of >> the activity but also in the social recruitment of its practitioners and in >> their continuing dependence on blue-collar or un-skilled service jobs to >> support their career in the ring? (p. 502). >> >> In addition, he insists that his analysis of what the boxers say is >> necessarily informed by his knowledge, as a researcher, of various aspects >> of the form of life of boxing that they boxers themselves cannot grasp: >> "(i) the objective shape of that structure [of the social ?field' of >> boxing] and the set of constraints and facilitations it harbors; (ii) its >> location in the wider social spaces of the ghetto and the city; and (iii) >> the social trajectories and dispositions of those who enter and compete in >> it? (p. 491). This approach seems to me hardly to ignore class, its >> inequities, or its economic necessities. >> >> I guess we simply have different 'subjective reactions' to this article! >> :) >> >> Or, in a more serious tone: when you ask me to "Compare: >> >> a) "Phonology is variable but semantics is invariant." >> b) "Phonology is variable but semantics invariant." >> c) "Phonology variable, but semantics is invariant." >> >> What is the difference between a) and b)?? are you not asking for my >> ?subjective reactions?? Or are there ?objective reactions?? Aren?t we >> talking about consciousness, always an aspect of our being-in-the-world, >> mediated by material representations? >> >> cheers >> >> Martin >> >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 3:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> I read it, Martin. What Goldmann says is that Lukacs accepts >> subject-object >>> dualism in a way that Heidegger would find unacceptable. He even >> speculates >>> that Goldmann does this because he is writing for worker autodidacts and >>> not other professors. He also notes that they supported different sides >> in >>> World War II, and to his credit considers this a difference and not a >>> similarity. >>> >>> But the chiefest difference Goldmann notes is that Heidegger is >> essentially >>> interested in the fate of the individual and not the social; Dasein is >>> really an individuation of Sein, and "living-for-death" is clearly >>> individualistic. Lukacs is the other way around: he's interested in the >>> individual job only in so far as it is a token of the mass and the class. >>> >>> Let us get back in the ring. I agree that there is very little analysis >> of >>> the actual language, which to me means that there is very little analysis >>> of the actual data. I don't accept that an anthropologist who codes >>> interviews in terms of "tropes" is doing anything more than coding his or >>> her own subjective reactions to the data. This is why Vygotsky rejects >> the >>> "objectivist" accounts of development (e.g. that of his friend Blonsky, >>> based on teething, or accounts based on sexual maturation) as being >>> essentially subjectivist: he says that the choice of this trope or that >> one >>> is subjectivist. >>> >>> For example. Wacquant doesn't even bother to notice that a huge >> proportion >>> of his informants are night watchmen or security guards or rent-a-cops. >> He >>> even says at the outset that out-of-the-boxing-ring jobs in particular >> and >>> the class status in general are not factors in his study. But I think you >>> can see that boxing is not exactly irrelevant to professions which >> involve >>> the use of violence in defence of private property. Isn't it subjectivist >>> to simply write this off? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> >>>> >> >> From glassman.13@osu.edu Sun Jan 7 14:09:34 2018 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 22:09:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD2D9@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hello Martin, I have recently been reading the recent social evolution work comparing hunter gatherer (which were more distributed) to more agrarian social groups (more focused). "Against the Grain," "Affluence without abundance" and "Guns, Germs and Steel." I wonder if the definition of family across cultures is more transactional (both in the business sense and the Deweyan sense). That is it fills dynamic needs. For instance for hunter gatherers it might be whoever is part of your dinner table at the moment (who you hunt with, gather with, eat with). For societies that are more agrarian and object based it might refer to whoever helps you achieve your focused task (sports teams often refer to themselves as family), or helping to define property ownership (including the passing between generations), knowledge ownership, skill ownership. The definition depends on what is needed at the moment. I think in Europe guilds were much closer to family than blood kinship. The divine right of kinds suggests family is based on blood relations because it is part of their reason for being able to rule. It just seems that family is a word that fulfills needs rather than defines specific types of relationships. This was deeply affected in our society I think by the idea of ownership of children (they have absolutely no rights outside the jurisdiction of the parent from birth to 18 and are not even allowed to have voice (I believe they are referred to as infants in law books - at least that is what somebody who I think read said law books told me once). Maybe this is very tied to our strong agrarian culture where children were expected to work on the farm and support the family. Family is defined by the needs of the farmers. In a more general sense family is defined by the needs of culture/civilization not the other way around. An interesting question anyway. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer Sent: Sunday, January 07, 2018 4:48 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship Hi Greg, Well, that?s my point! A lot of people in several disciplines are studying families in various cultural contexts, without defining what ?a family? is. I?ve started to wonder if the word/concept/entity even exists in all cultures. Obviously there?s a danger of circularity here, because (see David?s most recent message) a word that gets *translated* into English as ?family? may relate very differently in the original language. For instance, Malinowski wrote of ?the initial situation of kinship,? and he seemed to mean the family, saying that it ?is a compound of biological and cultural elements,? but then shifted to claim ?or rather that it consists of the facts of individual procreation culturally reinterpreted.? All of which seems to add up to the suggestion that family = father + mother + child. But then other investigators say that there is a type of family in the Balkans known as ?zadruga,? which may have one hundred or more members. I?m just confused again! I?m going to adopt as my slogan for this year something else Malinowski wrote: when I talk with a colleague "I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself." Martin > On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:22 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Martin, > Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you > mean by "family"? > What in the world do you mean by "family"? > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been >> defined, or not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question >> that has occurred to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every language. >> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( >> >> Anyone have an idea? >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 14:20:23 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:20:23 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD2D9@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD2D9@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Right, Michael, so one approach would be to presume that each society defines ?family? in its own way, and to give up the attempt to find an ahistorical, culture-neutral, scientific definition of family. That line of reasoning was what led me to wonder whether there may be societies that have *no* definition of family. They simply divide up the social world in a different way. Hence my question. Martin > On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:09 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hello Martin, > > I have recently been reading the recent social evolution work comparing hunter gatherer (which were more distributed) to more agrarian social groups (more focused). "Against the Grain," "Affluence without abundance" and "Guns, Germs and Steel." I wonder if the definition of family across cultures is more transactional (both in the business sense and the Deweyan sense). That is it fills dynamic needs. For instance for hunter gatherers it might be whoever is part of your dinner table at the moment (who you hunt with, gather with, eat with). For societies that are more agrarian and object based it might refer to whoever helps you achieve your focused task (sports teams often refer to themselves as family), or helping to define property ownership (including the passing between generations), knowledge ownership, skill ownership. The definition depends on what is needed at the moment. I think in Europe guilds were much closer to family than blood kinship. The divine right of kinds sugges > ts family is based on blood relations because it is part of their reason for being able to rule. It just seems that family is a word that fulfills needs rather than defines specific types of relationships. > > This was deeply affected in our society I think by the idea of ownership of children (they have absolutely no rights outside the jurisdiction of the parent from birth to 18 and are not even allowed to have voice (I believe they are referred to as infants in law books - at least that is what somebody who I think read said law books told me once). Maybe this is very tied to our strong agrarian culture where children were expected to work on the farm and support the family. Family is defined by the needs of the farmers. In a more general sense family is defined by the needs of culture/civilization not the other way around. > > An interesting question anyway. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun Jan 7 14:33:38 2018 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 22:33:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: David, are the Chinese and Korean terms for 'familiar' related to the terms for family? All the best Rod Get Outlook for Android ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Sunday, January 7, 2018 9:30:12 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing rather than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This does suggest something semantic, no? David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you mean > by "family"? > What in the world do you mean by "family"? > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > > I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, or > > not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > occurred > > to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every language. > > When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > > > Anyone have an idea? > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From jamesma320@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 14:45:54 2018 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 22:45:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know (this is because Chines is logographical). According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper part ? refers to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, people raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark of living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. ???? as close as a family. James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg wrote: > In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing rather > than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This > does suggest something semantic, no? > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Martin, > > Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you mean > > by "family"? > > What in the world do you mean by "family"? > > -greg > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > > > I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, > or > > > not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > > occurred > > > to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > language. > > > When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > > > > > Anyone have an idea? > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > Virus-free. www.avast.com <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 14:49:15 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:49:15 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> So James, Could a childless couple in China be called a family? Or would they need to have a pig? :) To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > > Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know > (this is because Chines is logographical). > > According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > part ? refers > to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, people > raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark of > living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. ???? > as close as a family. > > James > > > *_____________________________________* > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > * > > > On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg wrote: > >> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing rather >> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This >> does suggest something semantic, no? >> >> David Kellogg >> >> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >> >> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> Martin, >>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you mean >>> by "family"? >>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? >>> -greg >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer >> wrote: >>> >>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, >> or >>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has >>> occurred >>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every >> language. >>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( >>>> >>>> Anyone have an idea? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >> > > > > Virus-free. > www.avast.com > > <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 15:23:01 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 15:23:01 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: but plants form families, too the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have adopted the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > So James, > > Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > > Or would they need to have a pig? :) > > To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know > > (this is because Chines is logographical). > > > > According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > > part ? refers > > to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, people > > raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark of > > living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. > ???? > > as close as a family. > > > > James > > > > > > *_____________________________________* > > > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > > * > > > > > > On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing rather > >> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This > >> does suggest something semantic, no? > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> > >> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >> > >> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Martin, > >>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you > mean > >>> by "family"? > >>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > >> wrote: > >>> > >>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, > >> or > >>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > >>> occurred > >>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > >> language. > >>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > >>>> > >>>> Anyone have an idea? > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >> > > > > > > source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > Virus-free. > > www.avast.com > > source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 15:28:44 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 18:28:44 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: By your definition or theirs, Michael? Martin > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > > but plants form families, too > > the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have adopted > the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> So James, >> >> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? >> >> Or would they need to have a pig? :) >> >> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? >> >> Martin >> >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >> >> >> >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: >>> >>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know >>> (this is because Chines is logographical). >>> >>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper >>> part ? refers >>> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, people >>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark of >>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. >> ???? >>> as close as a family. >>> >>> James >>> >>> >>> *_____________________________________* >>> >>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa >>> * >>> >>> >>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing rather >>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This >>>> does suggest something semantic, no? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> >>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>>> >>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>>> >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Martin, >>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you >> mean >>>>> by "family"? >>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, >>>> or >>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has >>>>> occurred >>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every >>>> language. >>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyone have an idea? >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> > source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>> Virus-free. >>> www.avast.com >>> > source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> >> >> From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 15:34:50 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 15:34:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin, I looked up the etymologies in English, French and German. All point to the Latin origin of family and familiar and the tie of the latter to the former. The Russian and Polish translation point to different words. Not my definition. If you mean the plants...only humans produce definitions... you then might be interested in Dewey and Bateson on natural situations and human descriptions Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 3:28 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > By your definition or theirs, Michael? > > Martin > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > but plants form families, too > > > > the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have > adopted > > the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> So James, > >> > >> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > >> > >> Or would they need to have a pig? :) > >> > >> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > with > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > >>> > >>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know > >>> (this is because Chines is logographical). > >>> > >>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > >>> part ? refers > >>> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, > people > >>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark > of > >>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. > >> ???? > >>> as close as a family. > >>> > >>> James > >>> > >>> > >>> *_____________________________________* > >>> > >>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > >>> * > >>> > >>> > >>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing > rather > >>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. > This > >>>> does suggest something semantic, no? > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> > >>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >>>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >>>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >>>> > >>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >>>> > >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Martin, > >>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you > >> mean > >>>>> by "family"? > >>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > defined, > >>>> or > >>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > >>>>> occurred > >>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > >>>> language. > >>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Anyone have an idea? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >>> Virus-free. > >>> www.avast.com > >>> >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > >> > >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 15:37:36 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 08:37:36 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: James not only calls the use of the "room" radical and the "pig" in the Chinese character etymology but also refers to the Chinese oracle (yes, the Book of Changes and oracle bones, the very earliest forms of writing on sheep shoulder blades and tortoise shells that are cast in the fire in order to observe their cracking). If James is warning us not to make too much of this historical detail, he's right: it's a little like reminding people that the word "family" in English derives from a Latin term for household servants. I agree that we can't use this as evidence to explain, for example, the fact that when a Korean child comes home from school, the usual response of the mother is something like "You're here" (even when the child is actually returning from years of overseas study!). I can't use the fact that the Chinese word for "family" refers to rooms and livestock to explain why my mother-in-law and even my wife always avoided the kind of mushy talk that constitutes family celebrations in the West and much prefered to complain about housing problems, food and television programming on the rare occasions we reunited at Spring Festival. It's not etymological. It is cultural, though. So for example both Chinese and Korean have family naming systems that make distinctions between maternal and paternal aunts and uncles in a way that is impossible in English, and in Korean the word for an older brother has nothing to do with the word for a younger brother, but the word for younger brother doesn't distinguish gender, as the English word does. In Korean, to say "cousin", you have to say exactly what degree of separation you have ("three degrees"); I don't think anybody but an anthropologist or a literature major can explain exactly what "second cousin twice removed" means in English. Which suggests inattention to kinship--making the relationship between housing and kinship explicit or leaving it implicit? I think that what Rod is really asking about is words like ??? ("familiar", i.e. "easily recognizable") and ?? ("familiar", i.e. "practiced"). They have nothing to do with either housing or kinship, and in fact the idea that there might be some inner connection that has nothing to do with the context of situation seems rather puzzling to my learned (and hence rather feeble) Sino-Korean sensibilities. But maybe James can correct me here. David PS: There is this story on the BBC about a girl baby from Suzhou who was left in the street during the one-child policy with a Chinese poem in her swaddling clothes. She was adopted and brought up as an American, but when she was in her twenties, her parents had the poem translated, and discovered that the parents could not afford the fines and the lack of housing that having an extra child would mean but that they would go and wait in Hangzhou on the child's birthday for the rest of their lives, in the hope that some day she would have the poem translated and come and meet her "family" on the Duanqiao there. Duanqiao is the "broken bridge"; it's actually quite beautiful and completely undamaged, but it is the scene of a heartbreak scene in the opera "The White Snake", and inspired the couplet: "???????????" "The broken bridge is a bridge unbroken, and the lingering snow (i.e. White Snake, who is a snake spirit in love with an unworthy mortal) is snow that won't linger." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHUGHRBmg2o Of course, the BBC made a reality show out of this, insisting on following both the girl and her Chinese parents with a movie camera during their reunion. There was a lot of shrieking and screaming and crying on the Chinese side; on the American side not so much (but the daughter said she felt overwhelmed by the love). What the mother kept saying to her daughter, over and over again, was "You cannot understand what I am saying!" dk David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 7:45 AM, James Ma wrote: > Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know > (this is because Chines is logographical). > > According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > part ? refers > to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, people > raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark of > living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. ???? > as close as a family. > > James > > > *_____________________________________* > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > * > > > On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg wrote: > > > In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing rather > > than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This > > does suggest something semantic, no? > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > Martin, > > > Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you > mean > > > by "family"? > > > What in the world do you mean by "family"? > > > -greg > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > > wrote: > > > > > > > I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > defined, > > or > > > > not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > > > occurred > > > > to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > > language. > > > > When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > > > > > > > Anyone have an idea? > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > Virus-free. > www.avast.com > source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 15:42:09 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 18:42:09 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: <072D8206-4001-46EF-B603-0CFD3A99118A@cantab.net> Hi Michael. Yes, I meant the plants. And I know that only humans produce definition. In my clumsy way, I was trying to ask what definition of ?family? you were employing when you stated that plants form families. Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > > Martin, I looked up the etymologies in English, French and German. All > point to the Latin origin of family and familiar and the tie of the latter > to the former. > > The Russian and Polish translation point to different words. > > Not my definition. > > If you mean the plants...only humans produce definitions... you then might > be interested in Dewey and Bateson on natural situations and human > descriptions > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 3:28 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> By your definition or theirs, Michael? >> >> Martin >> >> >> >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> but plants form families, too >>> >>> the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have >> adopted >>> the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> -------------------- >>> Applied Cognitive Science >>> MacLaurin Building A567 >>> University of Victoria >>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 >>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth >>> >>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics >>> > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer >> wrote: >>> >>>> So James, >>>> >>>> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? >>>> >>>> Or would they need to have a pig? :) >>>> >>>> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually >> with >>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know >>>>> (this is because Chines is logographical). >>>>> >>>>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper >>>>> part ? refers >>>>> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, >> people >>>>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark >> of >>>>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. >>>> ???? >>>>> as close as a family. >>>>> >>>>> James >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *_____________________________________* >>>>> >>>>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa >>>>> * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing >> rather >>>>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. >> This >>>>>> does suggest something semantic, no? >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>>>>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>>>>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>>>>> >>>>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < >>>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin, >>>>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you >>>> mean >>>>>>> by "family"? >>>>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been >> defined, >>>>>> or >>>>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has >>>>>>> occurred >>>>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every >>>>>> language. >>>>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Anyone have an idea? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>>>> Virus-free. >>>>> www.avast.com >>>>> >>> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>>>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> >>>> >>>> >> >> From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 15:45:26 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 18:45:26 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: <64F263C4-05BB-4445-851A-5C17C47A2DC0@cantab.net> David, My question was a serious one: in Chinese (I?m not sure which language we?re discussing) can a childless couple be called a family? Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > James not only calls the use of the "room" radical and the "pig" in the > Chinese character etymology but also refers to the Chinese oracle (yes, the > Book of Changes and oracle bones, the very earliest forms of writing on > sheep shoulder blades and tortoise shells that are cast in the fire in > order to observe their cracking). If James is warning us not to make too > much of this historical detail, he's right: it's a little like reminding > people that the word "family" in English derives from a Latin term for > household servants. > > I agree that we can't use this as evidence to explain, for example, the > fact that when a Korean child comes home from school, the usual response of > the mother is something like "You're here" (even when the child is actually > returning from years of overseas study!). I can't use the fact that the > Chinese word for "family" refers to rooms and livestock to explain why my > mother-in-law and even my wife always avoided the kind of mushy talk that > constitutes family celebrations in the West and much prefered to complain > about housing problems, food and television programming on the rare > occasions we reunited at Spring Festival. It's not etymological. > > It is cultural, though. So for example both Chinese and Korean have family > naming systems that make distinctions between maternal and paternal aunts > and uncles in a way that is impossible in English, and in Korean the word > for an older brother has nothing to do with the word for a younger brother, > but the word for younger brother doesn't distinguish gender, as the English > word does. In Korean, to say "cousin", you have to say exactly what degree > of separation you have ("three degrees"); I don't think anybody but an > anthropologist or a literature major can explain exactly what "second > cousin twice removed" means in English. Which suggests inattention to > kinship--making the relationship between housing and kinship explicit or > leaving it implicit? > > I think that what Rod is really asking about is words like ??? ("familiar", > i.e. "easily recognizable") and ?? ("familiar", i.e. "practiced"). They > have nothing to do with either housing or kinship, and in fact the idea > that there might be some inner connection that has nothing to do with the > context of situation seems rather puzzling to my learned (and hence rather > feeble) Sino-Korean sensibilities. But maybe James can correct me here. > > David > > PS: There is this story on the BBC about a girl baby from Suzhou who was > left in the street during the one-child policy with a Chinese poem in her > swaddling clothes. She was adopted and brought up as an American, but when > she was in her twenties, her parents had the poem translated, and > discovered that the parents could not afford the fines and the lack of > housing that having an extra child would mean but that they would go and > wait in Hangzhou on the child's birthday for the rest of their lives, in > the hope that some day she would have the poem translated and come and meet > her "family" on the Duanqiao there. Duanqiao is the "broken bridge"; it's > actually quite beautiful and completely undamaged, but it is the scene of > a heartbreak scene in the opera "The White Snake", and inspired the couplet: > > "???????????" > > "The broken bridge is a bridge unbroken, and the lingering snow (i.e. White > Snake, who is a snake spirit in love with an unworthy mortal) is snow that > won't linger." > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHUGHRBmg2o > > Of course, the BBC made a reality show out of this, insisting on following > both the girl and her Chinese parents with a movie camera during their > reunion. There was a lot of shrieking and screaming and crying on the > Chinese side; on the American side not so much (but the daughter said she > felt overwhelmed by the love). What the mother kept saying to her daughter, > over and over again, was "You cannot understand what I am saying!" > > dk > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 7:45 AM, James Ma wrote: > >> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know >> (this is because Chines is logographical). >> >> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper >> part ? refers >> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, people >> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark of >> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. ???? >> as close as a family. >> >> James >> >> >> *_____________________________________* >> >> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa >> * >> >> >> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing rather >>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This >>> does suggest something semantic, no? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>> >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Martin, >>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you >> mean >>>> by "family"? >>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been >> defined, >>> or >>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has >>>> occurred >>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every >>> language. >>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( >>>>> >>>>> Anyone have an idea? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>> >> >> >> > source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >> Virus-free. >> www.avast.com >> > source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> >> From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 15:54:43 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 15:54:43 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <072D8206-4001-46EF-B603-0CFD3A99118A@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> <072D8206-4001-46EF-B603-0CFD3A99118A@cantab.net> Message-ID: I guess this is biologists' way of distinguishing the different levels of groupings they make. A plant belongs to a family or subfamily; families group into an order; orders group into clade ... all the way up to kingdom Don't we do something similar in the social world? You can have a family with 2 persons, but it includes a child, such as in "single-parent family"; but two adults living together tend not to be referred to as a family but as a couple Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > Hi Michael. Yes, I meant the plants. And I know that only humans produce > definition. In my clumsy way, I was trying to ask what definition of > ?family? you were employing when you stated that plants form families. > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Martin, I looked up the etymologies in English, French and German. All > > point to the Latin origin of family and familiar and the tie of the > latter > > to the former. > > > > The Russian and Polish translation point to different words. > > > > Not my definition. > > > > If you mean the plants...only humans produce definitions... you then > might > > be interested in Dewey and Bateson on natural situations and human > > descriptions > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 3:28 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> By your definition or theirs, Michael? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > >>> > >>> but plants form families, too > >>> > >>> the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have > >> adopted > >>> the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> > >>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> -------------------- > >>> Applied Cognitive Science > >>> MacLaurin Building A567 > >>> University of Victoria > >>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > >>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > >>> > >>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > >>> >> directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > >>> > >>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer > >> wrote: > >>> > >>>> So James, > >>>> > >>>> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > >>>> > >>>> Or would they need to have a pig? :) > >>>> > >>>> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that > my > >>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > >> with > >>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to > know > >>>>> (this is because Chines is logographical). > >>>>> > >>>>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > >>>>> part ? refers > >>>>> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, > >> people > >>>>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark > >> of > >>>>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. > >>>> ???? > >>>>> as close as a family. > >>>>> > >>>>> James > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> *_____________________________________* > >>>>> > >>>>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > >>>>> * > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg > >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing > >> rather > >>>>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. > >> This > >>>>>> does suggest something semantic, no? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >>>>>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >>>>>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >>>>>> > >>>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > >>>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin, > >>>>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what > you > >>>> mean > >>>>>>> by "family"? > >>>>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > >>>>>>> -greg > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > >> defined, > >>>>>> or > >>>>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > >>>>>>> occurred > >>>>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > >>>>>> language. > >>>>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Anyone have an idea? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > >>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> >>>> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >>>>> Virus-free. > >>>>> www.avast.com > >>>>> >>>> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >>>>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 16:07:38 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:07:38 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, been quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. (other forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central trope of blood relation). Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although Schneider couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that a blood-based notion of "family" does). Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in a relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the concept of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of new kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the Sahlins essay that is attached). New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find lots of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is a key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around the globe. I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? -greg [image: Inline image 1] On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 4:28 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > By your definition or theirs, Michael? > > Martin > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > but plants form families, too > > > > the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have > adopted > > the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> So James, > >> > >> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > >> > >> Or would they need to have a pig? :) > >> > >> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > with > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > >>> > >>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know > >>> (this is because Chines is logographical). > >>> > >>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > >>> part ? refers > >>> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, > people > >>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark > of > >>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. > >> ???? > >>> as close as a family. > >>> > >>> James > >>> > >>> > >>> *_____________________________________* > >>> > >>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > >>> * > >>> > >>> > >>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing > rather > >>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. > This > >>>> does suggest something semantic, no? > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> > >>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >>>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >>>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >>>> > >>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >>>> > >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Martin, > >>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you > >> mean > >>>>> by "family"? > >>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > defined, > >>>> or > >>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > >>>>> occurred > >>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > >>>> language. > >>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Anyone have an idea? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >>> Virus-free. > >>> www.avast.com > >>> >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > >> > >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image.png Type: image/png Size: 143686 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180107/5d4a28c1/attachment.png -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Sahlins, Marshall - What is Kinship.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 167292 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180107/5d4a28c1/attachment.pdf From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 16:14:37 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 09:14:37 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <64F263C4-05BB-4445-851A-5C17C47A2DC0@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <64F263C4-05BB-4445-851A-5C17C47A2DC0@cantab.net> Message-ID: Sure, Martin. But I don't know the answer; I defer to James. Anybody can use "jia", because it refers to a house as well as to the people who live there. So for example if I live alone, I come "home" to my "jia" whether I have a wife and child or a pig or only a potted plant. So...does "jia" mean "family" or not? My question was also a serious one, Martin. If, for example, Eskimos have lots of names for snow, does it suggest that snow is important or not important? Suppose they have NO word for snow at all, but only thousands of different kinds of snow which they see as unrelated to each other? I think that these questions are so serious they cannot be answered by referring to dictionaries, not even etymological dictionaries, because these give us only a lexical analysis. Hence the necessity of grammar and of semantics. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 8:45 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > David, > > My question was a serious one: in Chinese (I?m not sure which language > we?re discussing) can a childless couple be called a family? > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > James not only calls the use of the "room" radical and the "pig" in the > > Chinese character etymology but also refers to the Chinese oracle (yes, > the > > Book of Changes and oracle bones, the very earliest forms of writing on > > sheep shoulder blades and tortoise shells that are cast in the fire in > > order to observe their cracking). If James is warning us not to make too > > much of this historical detail, he's right: it's a little like reminding > > people that the word "family" in English derives from a Latin term for > > household servants. > > > > I agree that we can't use this as evidence to explain, for example, the > > fact that when a Korean child comes home from school, the usual response > of > > the mother is something like "You're here" (even when the child is > actually > > returning from years of overseas study!). I can't use the fact that the > > Chinese word for "family" refers to rooms and livestock to explain why my > > mother-in-law and even my wife always avoided the kind of mushy talk that > > constitutes family celebrations in the West and much prefered to complain > > about housing problems, food and television programming on the rare > > occasions we reunited at Spring Festival. It's not etymological. > > > > It is cultural, though. So for example both Chinese and Korean have > family > > naming systems that make distinctions between maternal and paternal aunts > > and uncles in a way that is impossible in English, and in Korean the word > > for an older brother has nothing to do with the word for a younger > brother, > > but the word for younger brother doesn't distinguish gender, as the > English > > word does. In Korean, to say "cousin", you have to say exactly what > degree > > of separation you have ("three degrees"); I don't think anybody but an > > anthropologist or a literature major can explain exactly what "second > > cousin twice removed" means in English. Which suggests inattention to > > kinship--making the relationship between housing and kinship explicit or > > leaving it implicit? > > > > I think that what Rod is really asking about is words like ??? > ("familiar", > > i.e. "easily recognizable") and ?? ("familiar", i.e. "practiced"). They > > have nothing to do with either housing or kinship, and in fact the idea > > that there might be some inner connection that has nothing to do with the > > context of situation seems rather puzzling to my learned (and hence > rather > > feeble) Sino-Korean sensibilities. But maybe James can correct me here. > > > > David > > > > PS: There is this story on the BBC about a girl baby from Suzhou who was > > left in the street during the one-child policy with a Chinese poem in her > > swaddling clothes. She was adopted and brought up as an American, but > when > > she was in her twenties, her parents had the poem translated, and > > discovered that the parents could not afford the fines and the lack of > > housing that having an extra child would mean but that they would go and > > wait in Hangzhou on the child's birthday for the rest of their lives, in > > the hope that some day she would have the poem translated and come and > meet > > her "family" on the Duanqiao there. Duanqiao is the "broken bridge"; it's > > actually quite beautiful and completely undamaged, but it is the scene of > > a heartbreak scene in the opera "The White Snake", and inspired the > couplet: > > > > "???????????" > > > > "The broken bridge is a bridge unbroken, and the lingering snow (i.e. > White > > Snake, who is a snake spirit in love with an unworthy mortal) is snow > that > > won't linger." > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHUGHRBmg2o > > > > Of course, the BBC made a reality show out of this, insisting on > following > > both the girl and her Chinese parents with a movie camera during their > > reunion. There was a lot of shrieking and screaming and crying on the > > Chinese side; on the American side not so much (but the daughter said she > > felt overwhelmed by the love). What the mother kept saying to her > daughter, > > over and over again, was "You cannot understand what I am saying!" > > > > dk > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 7:45 AM, James Ma wrote: > > > >> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know > >> (this is because Chines is logographical). > >> > >> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > >> part ? refers > >> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, > people > >> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark of > >> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. > ???? > >> as close as a family. > >> > >> James > >> > >> > >> *_____________________________________* > >> > >> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > >> * > >> > >> > >> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing > rather > >>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This > >>> does suggest something semantic, no? > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> > >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >>> > >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >>> > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Martin, > >>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you > >> mean > >>>> by "family"? > >>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > >> defined, > >>> or > >>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has > >>>> occurred > >>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > >>> language. > >>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > >>>>> > >>>>> Anyone have an idea? > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >> Virus-free. > >> www.avast.com > >> >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > >> > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 16:18:24 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 17:18:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> <072D8206-4001-46EF-B603-0CFD3A99118A@cantab.net> Message-ID: And for David's more linguistic sensibilities, there is a classic essay by Maurice Bloch that looks at kinship terms among the Malagasy (Madagascar) entitled "The Moral and Tactical Meaning of Kinship Terms. This essay is particularly interesting because he not only does the synchronic/structural analysis of the extension of given kinship terms which was a central part of most anthropological studies of kinship, but he makes the very Halliday-ian move of looking at how those kinship terms are actually deployed in actual everyday conversation. Turns out that the latter do not map onto (and sometimes directly contradict) the former. I've attached that essay to this email in case anyone (other than David) is interested... -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 4:54 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > I guess this is biologists' way of distinguishing the different levels of > groupings they make. A plant belongs to a family or subfamily; families > group into an order; orders group into clade ... all the way up to kingdom > > Don't we do something similar in the social world? > > You can have a family with 2 persons, but it includes a child, such as in > "single-parent family"; but two adults living together tend not to be > referred to as a family but as a couple > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > > Hi Michael. Yes, I meant the plants. And I know that only humans produce > > definition. In my clumsy way, I was trying to ask what definition of > > ?family? you were employing when you stated that plants form families. > > > > Martin > > > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > with > > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > Martin, I looked up the etymologies in English, French and German. All > > > point to the Latin origin of family and familiar and the tie of the > > latter > > > to the former. > > > > > > The Russian and Polish translation point to different words. > > > > > > Not my definition. > > > > > > If you mean the plants...only humans produce definitions... you then > > might > > > be interested in Dewey and Bateson on natural situations and human > > > descriptions > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > -------------------- > > > Applied Cognitive Science > > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > > University of Victoria > > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 3:28 PM, Martin Packer > > wrote: > > > > > >> By your definition or theirs, Michael? > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > >>> > > >>> but plants form families, too > > >>> > > >>> the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have > > >> adopted > > >>> the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > > >>> > > >>> Michael > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > >>> > > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> -------------------- > > >>> Applied Cognitive Science > > >>> MacLaurin Building A567 > > >>> University of Victoria > > >>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > >>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > >>> > > >>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > >>> > >> directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > >>> > > >>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer > > >> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> So James, > > >>>> > > >>>> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > > >>>> > > >>>> Or would they need to have a pig? :) > > >>>> > > >>>> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > > >>>> > > >>>> Martin > > >>>> > > >>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or > discuss > > >>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that > > my > > >>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end > usually > > >> with > > >>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to > > know > > >>>>> (this is because Chines is logographical). > > >>>>> > > >>>>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > > >>>>> part ? refers > > >>>>> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, > > >> people > > >>>>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a > hallmark > > >> of > > >>>>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", > e.g. > > >>>> ???? > > >>>>> as close as a family. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> James > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> *_____________________________________* > > >>>>> > > >>>>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > > >>>>> * > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg > > >> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing > > >> rather > > >>>>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. > > >> This > > >>>>>> does suggest something semantic, no? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) > 'Metaphoric, > > >>>>>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: > A > > >>>>>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >>>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Martin, > > >>>>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what > > you > > >>>> mean > > >>>>>>> by "family"? > > >>>>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > > >>>>>>> -greg > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer < > mpacker@cantab.net > > > > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > > >> defined, > > >>>>>> or > > >>>>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that > has > > >>>>>>> occurred > > >>>>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > > >>>>>> language. > > >>>>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Anyone have an idea? > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>>>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>>>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>>>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > >>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > >>>> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > >>>>> Virus-free. > > >>>>> www.avast.com > > >>>>> > >>>> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > >>>>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Bloch--The Moral and Tactical Meaning of Kinship Terms.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 957743 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180107/6f0129a9/attachment-0001.pdf From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 16:33:12 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 19:33:12 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, along the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can explain that.. :) But does Sahlins define family? (No!) Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 16:43:20 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 19:43:20 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <64F263C4-05BB-4445-851A-5C17C47A2DC0@cantab.net> Message-ID: <2946BCAD-40B4-4D23-B179-5BB2DBDDF3FB@cantab.net> I don?t think grammar or semantics can enable us to resolve the question of whether snow is important to Eskimos. We have to visit them! It would be very interesting if the Chinese word that gets translated as ?family? could be applied to an childless couple because they have a ?household? even though they don?t have a child. We shall await James? reply. Martin > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:14 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Sure, Martin. But I don't know the answer; I defer to James. Anybody can > use "jia", because it refers to a house as well as to the people who live > there. So for example if I live alone, I come "home" to my "jia" whether I > have a wife and child or a pig or only a potted plant. So...does "jia" mean > "family" or not? > > My question was also a serious one, Martin. If, for example, Eskimos have > lots of names for snow, does it suggest that snow is important or not > important? Suppose they have NO word for snow at all, but only thousands of > different kinds of snow which they see as unrelated to each other? > > I think that these questions are so serious they cannot be answered by > referring to dictionaries, not even etymological dictionaries, because > these give us only a lexical analysis. Hence the necessity of grammar and > of semantics. > > > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 8:45 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> David, >> >> My question was a serious one: in Chinese (I?m not sure which language >> we?re discussing) can a childless couple be called a family? >> >> Martin >> >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >> >> >> >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:37 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> James not only calls the use of the "room" radical and the "pig" in the >>> Chinese character etymology but also refers to the Chinese oracle (yes, >> the >>> Book of Changes and oracle bones, the very earliest forms of writing on >>> sheep shoulder blades and tortoise shells that are cast in the fire in >>> order to observe their cracking). If James is warning us not to make too >>> much of this historical detail, he's right: it's a little like reminding >>> people that the word "family" in English derives from a Latin term for >>> household servants. >>> >>> I agree that we can't use this as evidence to explain, for example, the >>> fact that when a Korean child comes home from school, the usual response >> of >>> the mother is something like "You're here" (even when the child is >> actually >>> returning from years of overseas study!). I can't use the fact that the >>> Chinese word for "family" refers to rooms and livestock to explain why my >>> mother-in-law and even my wife always avoided the kind of mushy talk that >>> constitutes family celebrations in the West and much prefered to complain >>> about housing problems, food and television programming on the rare >>> occasions we reunited at Spring Festival. It's not etymological. >>> >>> It is cultural, though. So for example both Chinese and Korean have >> family >>> naming systems that make distinctions between maternal and paternal aunts >>> and uncles in a way that is impossible in English, and in Korean the word >>> for an older brother has nothing to do with the word for a younger >> brother, >>> but the word for younger brother doesn't distinguish gender, as the >> English >>> word does. In Korean, to say "cousin", you have to say exactly what >> degree >>> of separation you have ("three degrees"); I don't think anybody but an >>> anthropologist or a literature major can explain exactly what "second >>> cousin twice removed" means in English. Which suggests inattention to >>> kinship--making the relationship between housing and kinship explicit or >>> leaving it implicit? >>> >>> I think that what Rod is really asking about is words like ??? >> ("familiar", >>> i.e. "easily recognizable") and ?? ("familiar", i.e. "practiced"). They >>> have nothing to do with either housing or kinship, and in fact the idea >>> that there might be some inner connection that has nothing to do with the >>> context of situation seems rather puzzling to my learned (and hence >> rather >>> feeble) Sino-Korean sensibilities. But maybe James can correct me here. >>> >>> David >>> >>> PS: There is this story on the BBC about a girl baby from Suzhou who was >>> left in the street during the one-child policy with a Chinese poem in her >>> swaddling clothes. She was adopted and brought up as an American, but >> when >>> she was in her twenties, her parents had the poem translated, and >>> discovered that the parents could not afford the fines and the lack of >>> housing that having an extra child would mean but that they would go and >>> wait in Hangzhou on the child's birthday for the rest of their lives, in >>> the hope that some day she would have the poem translated and come and >> meet >>> her "family" on the Duanqiao there. Duanqiao is the "broken bridge"; it's >>> actually quite beautiful and completely undamaged, but it is the scene of >>> a heartbreak scene in the opera "The White Snake", and inspired the >> couplet: >>> >>> "???????????" >>> >>> "The broken bridge is a bridge unbroken, and the lingering snow (i.e. >> White >>> Snake, who is a snake spirit in love with an unworthy mortal) is snow >> that >>> won't linger." >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHUGHRBmg2o >>> >>> Of course, the BBC made a reality show out of this, insisting on >> following >>> both the girl and her Chinese parents with a movie camera during their >>> reunion. There was a lot of shrieking and screaming and crying on the >>> Chinese side; on the American side not so much (but the daughter said she >>> felt overwhelmed by the love). What the mother kept saying to her >> daughter, >>> over and over again, was "You cannot understand what I am saying!" >>> >>> dk >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>> >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 7:45 AM, James Ma wrote: >>> >>>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to know >>>> (this is because Chines is logographical). >>>> >>>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper >>>> part ? refers >>>> to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the ancient times, >> people >>>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a hallmark of >>>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. >> ???? >>>> as close as a family. >>>> >>>> James >>>> >>>> >>>> *_____________________________________* >>>> >>>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa >>>> * >>>> >>>> >>>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing >> rather >>>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. This >>>>> does suggest something semantic, no? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> >>>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>>>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>>>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>>>> >>>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>>>> >>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin, >>>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you >>>> mean >>>>>> by "family"? >>>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been >>>> defined, >>>>> or >>>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has >>>>>> occurred >>>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every >>>>> language. >>>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Anyone have an idea? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>>> Virus-free. >>>> www.avast.com >>>> >>> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> >>>> >> >> Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) From glassman.13@osu.edu Sun Jan 7 17:11:00 2018 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 01:11:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Greg, In response to kinship and Vygotsky, here is a somewhat radical but perhaps not radical at all notion. Kinship is a form of double stimulation (I hope I'm getting this right). That is it is a cultural symbol that help us remember other things about the way the complex, interweaving roles of relationships work in our social groups. I'm supposed to make sure that person gets food because she is my child. I am supposed to maintain ties with that person because I can legitimately call on them for cultural capital because they are my cousin and that's the way we distribute cultural capital in this situation. I need to make sure my mother maintains a relationship with her brother by bringing the brother gifts so he can take care of my mother if she is in trouble. If you are in say a hunter gatherer society I need to maintain contact with that person because they are a good bush beater. I must maintain my relationship with that woman because she knows where the good nuts are. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Sunday, January 07, 2018 7:08 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, been quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. (other forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central trope of blood relation). Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although Schneider couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that a blood-based notion of "family" does). Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in a relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the concept of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of new kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the Sahlins essay that is attached). New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find lots of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is a key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around the globe. I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? -greg [image: Inline image 1] On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 4:28 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > By your definition or theirs, Michael? > > Martin > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > but plants form families, too > > > > the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have > adopted > > the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> So James, > >> > >> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > >> > >> Or would they need to have a pig? :) > >> > >> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or > >> discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once > >> aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, > >> and I end usually > with > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > >>> > >>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to > >>> know (this is because Chines is logographical). > >>> > >>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > >>> part ? refers to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the > >>> ancient times, > people > >>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a > >>> hallmark > of > >>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. > >> ???? > >>> as close as a family. > >>> > >>> James > >>> > >>> > >>> *_____________________________________* > >>> > >>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > >>> * > >>> > >>> > >>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing > rather > >>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. > This > >>>> does suggest something semantic, no? > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> > >>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) > >>>> 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on > >>>> ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >>>> > >>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >>>> > >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Martin, > >>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what > >>>>> you > >> mean > >>>>> by "family"? > >>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > defined, > >>>> or > >>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that > >>>>>> has > >>>>> occurred > >>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > >>>> language. > >>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Anyone have an idea? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >>> Virus-free. > >>> www.avast.com > >>> >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > >>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > >> > >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 7 17:44:45 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 20:44:45 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: <637813B2-C904-4527-B509-73C8B62C0702@cantab.net> Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? Martin > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 18:06:16 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 19:06:16 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael G, Yeah, I understand the impulse for explanations by evolutionary advantage (or sheer, raw personal interest/gain), but I would add that there are reasons to be skeptical of the totalizing nature of such explanations (hint: capitalism). -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:11 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Greg, > > In response to kinship and Vygotsky, here is a somewhat radical but > perhaps not radical at all notion. Kinship is a form of double stimulation > (I hope I'm getting this right). That is it is a cultural symbol that help > us remember other things about the way the complex, interweaving roles of > relationships work in our social groups. I'm supposed to make sure that > person gets food because she is my child. I am supposed to maintain ties > with that person because I can legitimately call on them for cultural > capital because they are my cousin and that's the way we distribute > cultural capital in this situation. I need to make sure my mother > maintains a relationship with her brother by bringing the brother gifts so > he can take care of my mother if she is in trouble. > > If you are in say a hunter gatherer society I need to maintain contact > with that person because they are a good bush beater. I must maintain my > relationship with that woman because she knows where the good nuts are. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Sunday, January 07, 2018 7:08 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the > maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, been > quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. > > Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has > traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. (other > forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central > trope of blood relation). > > Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a > picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although Schneider > couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the > Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that > forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. > Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing > how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based > relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that a > blood-based notion of "family" does). > > Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in a > relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of > kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. > > Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be > known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the concept > of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of new > kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as > "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the > Sahlins essay that is attached). > > New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in > European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book > was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these > cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find lots > of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is a > key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how > technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and > sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). > > One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's > essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful > collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around > the globe. > > I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this > have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? > > -greg > [image: Inline image 1] > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 4:28 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > > By your definition or theirs, Michael? > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > but plants form families, too > > > > > > the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have > > adopted > > > the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > -------------------- > > > Applied Cognitive Science > > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > > University of Victoria > > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer > > wrote: > > > > > >> So James, > > >> > > >> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > > >> > > >> Or would they need to have a pig? :) > > >> > > >> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or > > >> discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once > > >> aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, > > >> and I end usually > > with > > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested to > > >>> know (this is because Chines is logographical). > > >>> > > >>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the upper > > >>> part ? refers to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". In the > > >>> ancient times, > > people > > >>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a > > >>> hallmark > > of > > >>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. > > >> ???? > > >>> as close as a family. > > >>> > > >>> James > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> *_____________________________________* > > >>> > > >>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > > >>> * > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to housing > > rather > > >>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. > > This > > >>>> does suggest something semantic, no? > > >>>> > > >>>> David Kellogg > > >>>> > > >>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) > > >>>> 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on > > >>>> ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > >>>> > > >>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > >>>> > > >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Martin, > > >>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what > > >>>>> you > > >> mean > > >>>>> by "family"? > > >>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > > >>>>> -greg > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > > >>>>> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > > defined, > > >>>> or > > >>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that > > >>>>>> has > > >>>>> occurred > > >>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every > > >>>> language. > > >>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Anyone have an idea? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> -- > > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > >>> Virus-free. > > >>> www.avast.com > > >>> > >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > >>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 18:15:03 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 19:15:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <637813B2-C904-4527-B509-73C8B62C0702@cantab.net> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> <637813B2-C904-4527-B509-73C8B62C0702@cantab.net> Message-ID: ?Martin, Not sure if things got garbled on the way into virtual XMCA-land, but in the end of my message about kinship studies in anthropology that accompanied the Sahlins (and which doesn't seem to appear in your reply - did the message come through with the attachment - usually it is the reverse!), I noted that Sahlins provides a nice summary of the new kinship studies that followed David Schneider. Does that help or were you looking for something else? (and, was the text of the message really missing entirely?) -greg ? On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? > > Martin > > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 18:16:24 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 19:16:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> <637813B2-C904-4527-B509-73C8B62C0702@cantab.net> Message-ID: apologies if this is a re-posting, but here is the text of the message that accompanied the Sahlins text, just in case it didn't go through: Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, been quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. (other forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central trope of blood relation). Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although Schneider couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that a blood-based notion of "family" does). Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in a relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the concept of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of new kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the Sahlins essay that is attached). New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find lots of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is a key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around the globe. I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?Martin, > > Not sure if things got garbled on the way into virtual XMCA-land, but in > the end of my message about kinship studies in anthropology that > accompanied the Sahlins (and which doesn't seem to appear in your reply - > did the message come through with the attachment - usually it is the > reverse!), I noted that Sahlins provides a nice summary of the new kinship > studies that followed David Schneider. > > Does that help or were you looking for something else? (and, was the text > of the message really missing entirely?) > -greg ? > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > > wrote: >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 18:55:27 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 19:55:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin, Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of cross-cultural cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you are so interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the preferred word in some other culture that extends to a different set of relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as "family", e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach that family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would a dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog who refer to their grouping as a "family"?). I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here family?). -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, along > the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can > explain that.. :) > > But does Sahlins define family? (No!) > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From glassman.13@osu.edu Sun Jan 7 19:13:55 2018 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 03:13:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD38F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Oh Greg, Don't ask a question, read a proposed half-baked answer and then say you are generally skeptical of the answer and no more. What were you looking for? Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Sunday, January 07, 2018 9:06 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship Michael G, Yeah, I understand the impulse for explanations by evolutionary advantage (or sheer, raw personal interest/gain), but I would add that there are reasons to be skeptical of the totalizing nature of such explanations (hint: capitalism). -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:11 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Greg, > > In response to kinship and Vygotsky, here is a somewhat radical but > perhaps not radical at all notion. Kinship is a form of double > stimulation (I hope I'm getting this right). That is it is a cultural > symbol that help us remember other things about the way the complex, > interweaving roles of relationships work in our social groups. I'm > supposed to make sure that person gets food because she is my child. I > am supposed to maintain ties with that person because I can > legitimately call on them for cultural capital because they are my > cousin and that's the way we distribute cultural capital in this > situation. I need to make sure my mother maintains a relationship > with her brother by bringing the brother gifts so he can take care of my mother if she is in trouble. > > If you are in say a hunter gatherer society I need to maintain contact > with that person because they are a good bush beater. I must maintain > my relationship with that woman because she knows where the good nuts are. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Sunday, January 07, 2018 7:08 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the > maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, > been quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. > > Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it > has traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on > blood. (other forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as > derivative of the central trope of blood relation). > > Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a > picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although > Schneider couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted > field work on the Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books > on the subject that forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. > Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by > showing how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although > blood based relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the > same sense that a blood-based notion of "family" does). > > Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time > in a relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old > view of kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. > > Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be > known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the > concept of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the > view of new kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch > has put it, as "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" > (mentioned in the Sahlins essay that is attached). > > New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in > European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big > book was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in > these cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can > find lots of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. > Janet Carsten is a key figure in this regard and she looks at, among > other things, how technologies have changed kinship formation (think > test-tube babies and sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). > > One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall > Sahlin's essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a > wonderful collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various > places around the globe. > > I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does > this have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? > > -greg > [image: Inline image 1] > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 4:28 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > > By your definition or theirs, Michael? > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > but plants form families, too > > > > > > the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have > > adopted > > > the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > -------------------- > > > Applied Cognitive Science > > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > > University of Victoria > > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > > > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer > > wrote: > > > > > >> So James, > > >> > > >> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > > >> > > >> Or would they need to have a pig? :) > > >> > > >> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or > > >> discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once > > >> aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, > > >> and I end usually > > with > > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested > > >>> to know (this is because Chines is logographical). > > >>> > > >>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the > > >>> upper part ? refers to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". > > >>> In the ancient times, > > people > > >>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a > > >>> hallmark > > of > > >>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", e.g. > > >> ???? > > >>> as close as a family. > > >>> > > >>> James > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> *_____________________________________* > > >>> > > >>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > > >>> * > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to > > >>>> housing > > rather > > >>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. > > This > > >>>> does suggest something semantic, no? > > >>>> > > >>>> David Kellogg > > >>>> > > >>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) > > >>>> 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on > > >>>> ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > >>>> > > >>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > >>>> > > >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Martin, > > >>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing > > >>>>> what you > > >> mean > > >>>>> by "family"? > > >>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > > >>>>> -greg > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > > >>>>> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > > defined, > > >>>> or > > >>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question > > >>>>>> that has > > >>>>> occurred > > >>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in > > >>>>>> every > > >>>> language. > > >>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Anyone have an idea? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> -- > > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > >>> Virus-free. > > >>> www.avast.com > > >>> > >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > >>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 7 21:15:24 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 22:15:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD38F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD38F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael G, Yeah, I should have added that I find the evolutionary explanation to be a generally useful one, and that, as I thought about it, your explanations actually fit quite well with what Sahlins and others have described. I think also that the idea of thinking of this in terms of double stimulation seems like a very interesting possibility and interesting suggestion (which I glossed over entirely! Seems that your email had two modes of stimulation as well and I was only sharp enough to attend to one of them). It also accords with the way that I like to think of double stimulation as sleight of hand, as misdirection, so it is an interesting proposal to think of symbolism as sleight of hand. So I was obviously much to quickly dismissive in my response. And just to give a little sense for the intellectual terrain that I'm in, I'm arguing against what in anthropology is called a "functionalist" approach - one in which everything (including all forms of semiosis) could be explained in terms of how it is adaptive for the long-term survival of a group of people. And actually I'm normally arguing for the usefulness of a functional approach b.c. I find anthropologists these days to be far too dismissive of what is a very useful approach. Your sleight of hand suggestion appears at least on the surface to be very similar to functionalist approaches that suggest that the ideational stuff is superficial and that what matters is what it does for survival and fitness of the individuals and the group. The trouble that anthropologists have raised more recently is that this doesn't help us to understand the reasons for the vast amount of variation across groups regarding how these things are accomplished. Maybe that helps with what I'm after? But I'm still curious why Martin got us into this mess in the first place! And why he is interested in the concept "family". Still curious. -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 8:13 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Oh Greg, > > Don't ask a question, read a proposed half-baked answer and then say you > are generally skeptical of the answer and no more. > > What were you looking for? > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Sunday, January 07, 2018 9:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > Michael G, > > Yeah, I understand the impulse for explanations by evolutionary advantage > (or sheer, raw personal interest/gain), but I would add that there are > reasons to be skeptical of the totalizing nature of such explanations > (hint: capitalism). > > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:11 PM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > Hi Greg, > > > > In response to kinship and Vygotsky, here is a somewhat radical but > > perhaps not radical at all notion. Kinship is a form of double > > stimulation (I hope I'm getting this right). That is it is a cultural > > symbol that help us remember other things about the way the complex, > > interweaving roles of relationships work in our social groups. I'm > > supposed to make sure that person gets food because she is my child. I > > am supposed to maintain ties with that person because I can > > legitimately call on them for cultural capital because they are my > > cousin and that's the way we distribute cultural capital in this > > situation. I need to make sure my mother maintains a relationship > > with her brother by bringing the brother gifts so he can take care of my > mother if she is in trouble. > > > > If you are in say a hunter gatherer society I need to maintain contact > > with that person because they are a good bush beater. I must maintain > > my relationship with that woman because she knows where the good nuts > are. > > > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > Sent: Sunday, January 07, 2018 7:08 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > > > Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the > > maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, > > been quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. > > > > Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it > > has traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on > > blood. (other forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as > > derivative of the central trope of blood relation). > > > > Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a > > picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although > > Schneider couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted > > field work on the Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books > > on the subject that forever changed the way that anthropologists' think > about kinship. > > Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by > > showing how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although > > blood based relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the > > same sense that a blood-based notion of "family" does). > > > > Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time > > in a relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old > > view of kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. > > > > Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be > > known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the > > concept of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the > > view of new kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch > > has put it, as "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" > > (mentioned in the Sahlins essay that is attached). > > > > New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in > > European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big > > book was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in > > these cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can > > find lots of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. > > Janet Carsten is a key figure in this regard and she looks at, among > > other things, how technologies have changed kinship formation (think > > test-tube babies and sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun > stuff!). > > > > One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall > > Sahlin's essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a > > wonderful collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various > > places around the globe. > > > > I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does > > this have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? > > > > -greg > > [image: Inline image 1] > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 4:28 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > > > By your definition or theirs, Michael? > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 6:23 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > but plants form families, too > > > > > > > > the familiar is linked to family apparently in languages that have > > > adopted > > > > the term from Latin, but not languages as Polish or Russian > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > -------------------- > > > > Applied Cognitive Science > > > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > > > University of Victoria > > > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > > > > > > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Martin Packer > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> So James, > > > >> > > > >> Could a childless couple in China be called a family? > > > >> > > > >> Or would they need to have a pig? :) > > > >> > > > >> To all: In English we don?t call a childless couple a family, do we? > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or > > > >> discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once > > > >> aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, > > > >> and I end usually > > > with > > > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 5:45 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>> Just to add an etymological aspect that you might be interested > > > >>> to know (this is because Chines is logographical). > > > >>> > > > >>> According to the Chinese Oracle, family ? has two parts: the > > > >>> upper part ? refers to "room"; the lower part ? refers to "pig". > > > >>> In the ancient times, > > > people > > > >>> raised pigs in their houses, so having pigs in a house was a > > > >>> hallmark > > > of > > > >>> living. In modern Chinese, family also indicates "relationship", > e.g. > > > >> ???? > > > >>> as close as a family. > > > >>> > > > >>> James > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> *_____________________________________* > > > >>> > > > >>> *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > > > >>> * > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> On 7 January 2018 at 21:30, David Kellogg > > > wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>>> In Chinese and in Korean, the word "family" is related to > > > >>>> housing > > > rather > > > >>>> than to kinship. In European languages it is the other way around. > > > This > > > >>>> does suggest something semantic, no? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) > > > >>>> 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on > > > >>>> ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > >>>> > > > >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Greg Thompson < > > > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > > >>>> wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Martin, > > > >>>>> Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing > > > >>>>> what you > > > >> mean > > > >>>>> by "family"? > > > >>>>> What in the world do you mean by "family"? > > > >>>>> -greg > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been > > > defined, > > > >>>> or > > > >>>>>> not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question > > > >>>>>> that has > > > >>>>> occurred > > > >>>>>> to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in > > > >>>>>> every > > > >>>> language. > > > >>>>>> When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri?? :( > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Anyone have an idea? > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Martin > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> -- > > > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > >>>>> Assistant Professor > > > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > > > >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > >>>>> Brigham Young University > > > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > > >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > > >>> Virus-free. > > > >>> www.avast.com > > > >>> > > >> source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > > >>> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Jan 8 01:18:52 2018 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 09:18:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, I can't pretend to be au fait with the developments in anthropology around kinship and family (but I am interested) - the connection I see between understandings of family/familiarity and the work of Vygotsky is associated with what Sahlins appears to be saying about 'people who are intrinsic to one another?s existence'. If the 'shape' of the refractive lens which forms our perezhivanie is dependent on our interactions with other people (and particularly in our first years) then those people with whom we have most interactions (or perhaps most formative kinds of interactions) will be familiar in the strongest sense - 'mutual persons' who share and even inhabit our ways of interacting with our environment - and particularly our social environment. Our family are 'in our heads' in ways which other people are not. Kinship links clearly matter because there must be some chaining of this mutual influence (My mother's mother is in my head because she is in my mother's head and my mother is in mine). 'Blood-links' or households may provide a convenient shorthand for patterns of proximity and may therefore be built into languages but the way the terms will then be used may get closer to reflecting how speakers feel about the different kinds of relationships they experience. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: 08 January 2018 02:16 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship apologies if this is a re-posting, but here is the text of the message that accompanied the Sahlins text, just in case it didn't go through: Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, been quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. (other forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central trope of blood relation). Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although Schneider couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that a blood-based notion of "family" does). Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in a relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the concept of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of new kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the Sahlins essay that is attached). New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find lots of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is a key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around the globe. I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?Martin, > > Not sure if things got garbled on the way into virtual XMCA-land, but > in the end of my message about kinship studies in anthropology that > accompanied the Sahlins (and which doesn't seem to appear in your > reply - did the message come through with the attachment - usually it > is the reverse!), I noted that Sahlins provides a nice summary of the > new kinship studies that followed David Schneider. > > Does that help or were you looking for something else? (and, was the > text of the message really missing entirely?) -greg ? > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson >> > > > wrote: >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From smago@uga.edu Mon Jan 8 03:28:52 2018 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:28:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I'm no expert here, but recently read Wendy James's The Ceremonial Animal: A New Portrait of Anthropology (https://www.booktopia.com.au/the-ceremonial-animal-wendy-james/prod9780199263349.html) . The ceremonial animal is the human, and this book focuses on ritual in human life, which I would say has a profoundly emotional dimension. I've avoided perezhivanie discussions because it's become all things to all people, so I've retreated to an alt-phrasing, meta-experience (the experiencing of experience as a way to frame new experiences). Rituals/ceremonies re-enact prior rituals in ways that many people find deeply emotional, often comforting. I am not religious, but know that the singing of familiar hymns can be emotionally settling for people experiencing grief, trauma, etc. (I know this from testimonies of such people). Maybe this is perezhivanie, but I've stopped caring whether that's the term for my conception, since I've found one that people don't hold up to their orthodoxies when I use it in writing. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees Sent: Monday, January 08, 2018 4:19 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship Greg, I can't pretend to be au fait with the developments in anthropology around kinship and family (but I am interested) - the connection I see between understandings of family/familiarity and the work of Vygotsky is associated with what Sahlins appears to be saying about 'people who are intrinsic to one another?s existence'. If the 'shape' of the refractive lens which forms our perezhivanie is dependent on our interactions with other people (and particularly in our first years) then those people with whom we have most interactions (or perhaps most formative kinds of interactions) will be familiar in the strongest sense - 'mutual persons' who share and even inhabit our ways of interacting with our environment - and particularly our social environment. Our family are 'in our heads' in ways which other people are not. Kinship links clearly matter because there must be some chaining of this mutual influence (My mother's mother is in my head because she is in my mother's head and my mother is in mine). 'Blood-links' or households may provide a convenient shorthand for patterns of proximity and may therefore be built into languages but the way the terms will then be used may get closer to reflecting how speakers feel about the different kinds of relationships they experience. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: 08 January 2018 02:16 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship apologies if this is a re-posting, but here is the text of the message that accompanied the Sahlins text, just in case it didn't go through: Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, been quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. (other forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central trope of blood relation). Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although Schneider couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that a blood-based notion of "family" does). Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in a relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the concept of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of new kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the Sahlins essay that is attached). New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find lots of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is a key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around the globe. I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?Martin, > > Not sure if things got garbled on the way into virtual XMCA-land, but > in the end of my message about kinship studies in anthropology that > accompanied the Sahlins (and which doesn't seem to appear in your > reply - did the message come through with the attachment - usually it > is the reverse!), I noted that Sahlins provides a nice summary of the > new kinship studies that followed David Schneider. > > Does that help or were you looking for something else? (and, was the > text of the message really missing entirely?) -greg ? > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson >> > > > wrote: >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 06:12:04 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 07:12:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Rod, Yes, I can see the link to "development" in interesting ways here - "family" as a context of development, etc. That's a neat idea, and yes, as Martin has suggested, it matters how "family" is formed - e.g., if as with the Inupiat, family is the group into which you are named rather than one's biological kin, then that will be a critical context of development for that child (and there is a very interesting question here regarding what kinds of feelings one has for one's biological kin in such an arrangement - that's still debated in anthro circles, maybe someone on the list can do some circumpolar ethnography?). So, yes, now that I think about it, this seems that this could have rather profound implications for a Vygotskyian theory that can travel. Perhaps that is what Martin had in mind? -greg On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 4:28 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I'm no expert here, but recently read Wendy James's The Ceremonial Animal: > A New Portrait of Anthropology (https://www.booktopia.com.au/ > the-ceremonial-animal-wendy-james/prod9780199263349.html) . The > ceremonial animal is the human, and this book focuses on ritual in human > life, which I would say has a profoundly emotional dimension. > > I've avoided perezhivanie discussions because it's become all things to > all people, so I've retreated to an alt-phrasing, meta-experience (the > experiencing of experience as a way to frame new experiences). > Rituals/ceremonies re-enact prior rituals in ways that many people find > deeply emotional, often comforting. I am not religious, but know that the > singing of familiar hymns can be emotionally settling for people > experiencing grief, trauma, etc. (I know this from testimonies of such > people). > > Maybe this is perezhivanie, but I've stopped caring whether that's the > term for my conception, since I've found one that people don't hold up to > their orthodoxies when I use it in writing. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees > Sent: Monday, January 08, 2018 4:19 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > Greg, > > I can't pretend to be au fait with the developments in anthropology around > kinship and family (but I am interested) - the connection I see between > understandings of family/familiarity and the work of Vygotsky is associated > with what Sahlins appears to be saying about 'people who are intrinsic to > one another?s existence'. If the 'shape' of the refractive lens which forms > our perezhivanie is dependent on our interactions with other people (and > particularly in our first years) then those people with whom we have most > interactions (or perhaps most formative kinds of interactions) will be > familiar in the strongest sense - 'mutual persons' who share and even > inhabit our ways of interacting with our environment - and particularly our > social environment. Our family are 'in our heads' in ways which other > people are not. Kinship links clearly matter because there must be some > chaining of this mutual influence (My mother's mother is in my head because > she is in my mother's head and my mother is in mine). 'Blood-links' or > households may provide a convenient shorthand for patterns of proximity and > may therefore be built into languages but the way the terms will then be > used may get closer to reflecting how speakers feel about the different > kinds of relationships they experience. > > All the best, > > Rod > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: 08 January 2018 02:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > apologies if this is a re-posting, but here is the text of the message > that accompanied the Sahlins text, just in case it didn't go through: > > Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the > maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, been > quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. > > Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has > traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. (other > forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central > trope of blood relation). > > Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a > picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although Schneider > couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the > Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that > forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. > Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing > how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based > relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that a > blood-based notion of "family" does). > > Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in a > relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of > kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. > > Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be > known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the concept > of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of new > kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as > "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the > Sahlins essay that is attached). > > New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in > European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book > was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these > cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find lots > of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is a > key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how > technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and > sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). > > One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's > essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful > collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around > the globe. > > I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this > have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? > > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > ?Martin, > > > > Not sure if things got garbled on the way into virtual XMCA-land, but > > in the end of my message about kinship studies in anthropology that > > accompanied the Sahlins (and which doesn't seem to appear in your > > reply - did the message come through with the attachment - usually it > > is the reverse!), I noted that Sahlins provides a nice summary of the > > new kinship studies that followed David Schneider. > > > > Does that help or were you looking for something else? (and, was the > > text of the message really missing entirely?) -greg ? > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > >> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] //www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 06:28:14 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 07:28:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Peter, The importance of ritual/ceremony offers another interesting way of linking anthropological/ethnographic research and human development. It seems that this has been done more explicitly in anthropology of children/development than has the family (which, of course, has implicitly been involved). Van Gennep's classic work on rites of passage have thematized this, and many folks through the years have looked at the role of rituals in the development of children. What you point to and which has been less well developed are questions of the experience of the ritual for the participant. That's a concern that people are just now starting to turn towards and so far, the jury is out. Some argue for Durkheimian notions of collective effervescence - something that needs to be wedded to perezhivanie, I think - and some arguing that the experiences are much more diffuse and less coordinated. But I do think this would be a very fruitful site of research for some XMCA-ite out there. -greg On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 4:28 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I'm no expert here, but recently read Wendy James's The Ceremonial Animal: > A New Portrait of Anthropology (https://www.booktopia.com.au/ > the-ceremonial-animal-wendy-james/prod9780199263349.html) . The > ceremonial animal is the human, and this book focuses on ritual in human > life, which I would say has a profoundly emotional dimension. > > I've avoided perezhivanie discussions because it's become all things to > all people, so I've retreated to an alt-phrasing, meta-experience (the > experiencing of experience as a way to frame new experiences). > Rituals/ceremonies re-enact prior rituals in ways that many people find > deeply emotional, often comforting. I am not religious, but know that the > singing of familiar hymns can be emotionally settling for people > experiencing grief, trauma, etc. (I know this from testimonies of such > people). > > Maybe this is perezhivanie, but I've stopped caring whether that's the > term for my conception, since I've found one that people don't hold up to > their orthodoxies when I use it in writing. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees > Sent: Monday, January 08, 2018 4:19 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > Greg, > > I can't pretend to be au fait with the developments in anthropology around > kinship and family (but I am interested) - the connection I see between > understandings of family/familiarity and the work of Vygotsky is associated > with what Sahlins appears to be saying about 'people who are intrinsic to > one another?s existence'. If the 'shape' of the refractive lens which forms > our perezhivanie is dependent on our interactions with other people (and > particularly in our first years) then those people with whom we have most > interactions (or perhaps most formative kinds of interactions) will be > familiar in the strongest sense - 'mutual persons' who share and even > inhabit our ways of interacting with our environment - and particularly our > social environment. Our family are 'in our heads' in ways which other > people are not. Kinship links clearly matter because there must be some > chaining of this mutual influence (My mother's mother is in my head because > she is in my mother's head and my mother is in mine). 'Blood-links' or > households may provide a convenient shorthand for patterns of proximity and > may therefore be built into languages but the way the terms will then be > used may get closer to reflecting how speakers feel about the different > kinds of relationships they experience. > > All the best, > > Rod > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: 08 January 2018 02:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > apologies if this is a re-posting, but here is the text of the message > that accompanied the Sahlins text, just in case it didn't go through: > > Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the > maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, been > quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. > > Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has > traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. (other > forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central > trope of blood relation). > > Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a > picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although Schneider > couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the > Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that > forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. > Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing > how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based > relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that a > blood-based notion of "family" does). > > Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in a > relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of > kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. > > Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be > known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the concept > of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of new > kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as > "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the > Sahlins essay that is attached). > > New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in > European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book > was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these > cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find lots > of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is a > key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how > technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and > sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). > > One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's > essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful > collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around > the globe. > > I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this > have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? > > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > ?Martin, > > > > Not sure if things got garbled on the way into virtual XMCA-land, but > > in the end of my message about kinship studies in anthropology that > > accompanied the Sahlins (and which doesn't seem to appear in your > > reply - did the message come through with the attachment - usually it > > is the reverse!), I noted that Sahlins provides a nice summary of the > > new kinship studies that followed David Schneider. > > > > Does that help or were you looking for something else? (and, was the > > text of the message really missing entirely?) -greg ? > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > >> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] //www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From bferholt@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 07:59:11 2018 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 10:59:11 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This chain has me thinking about an interaction I may have mentioned here before - a visiting Swedish speaking teacher asks an NYC preschool teacher what community means as he can not translate this word into Swedish, and she says ?family,? meaning her classroom is a family. I followed up on this recently and she did not mean this metaphorically, in part because her neighbors have been her family as raised her children with them. I?ve been thinking about this in relation to the thousand plus comments in response to the recent New York Times piece on estrangement. They are another type of discussion about, or really a creative process of making new, families. Beth On Monday, January 8, 2018, Greg Thompson wrote: > Peter, > The importance of ritual/ceremony offers another interesting way of linking > anthropological/ethnographic research and human development. It seems that > this has been done more explicitly in anthropology of children/development > than has the family (which, of course, has implicitly been involved). > Van Gennep's classic work on rites of passage have thematized this, and > many folks through the years have looked at the role of rituals in the > development of children. What you point to and which has been less well > developed are questions of the experience of the ritual for the > participant. That's a concern that people are just now starting to turn > towards and so far, the jury is out. Some argue for Durkheimian notions of > collective effervescence - something that needs to be wedded to > perezhivanie, I think - and some arguing that the experiences are much > more diffuse and less coordinated. But I do think this would be a very > fruitful site of research for some XMCA-ite out there. > -greg > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 4:28 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > > I'm no expert here, but recently read Wendy James's The Ceremonial > Animal: > > A New Portrait of Anthropology (https://www.booktopia.com.au/ > > the-ceremonial-animal-wendy-james/prod9780199263349.html) . The > > ceremonial animal is the human, and this book focuses on ritual in human > > life, which I would say has a profoundly emotional dimension. > > > > I've avoided perezhivanie discussions because it's become all things to > > all people, so I've retreated to an alt-phrasing, meta-experience (the > > experiencing of experience as a way to frame new experiences). > > Rituals/ceremonies re-enact prior rituals in ways that many people find > > deeply emotional, often comforting. I am not religious, but know that the > > singing of familiar hymns can be emotionally settling for people > > experiencing grief, trauma, etc. (I know this from testimonies of such > > people). > > > > Maybe this is perezhivanie, but I've stopped caring whether that's the > > term for my conception, since I've found one that people don't hold up to > > their orthodoxies when I use it in writing. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees > > Sent: Monday, January 08, 2018 4:19 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > > > Greg, > > > > I can't pretend to be au fait with the developments in anthropology > around > > kinship and family (but I am interested) - the connection I see between > > understandings of family/familiarity and the work of Vygotsky is > associated > > with what Sahlins appears to be saying about 'people who are intrinsic to > > one another?s existence'. If the 'shape' of the refractive lens which > forms > > our perezhivanie is dependent on our interactions with other people (and > > particularly in our first years) then those people with whom we have most > > interactions (or perhaps most formative kinds of interactions) will be > > familiar in the strongest sense - 'mutual persons' who share and even > > inhabit our ways of interacting with our environment - and particularly > our > > social environment. Our family are 'in our heads' in ways which other > > people are not. Kinship links clearly matter because there must be some > > chaining of this mutual influence (My mother's mother is in my head > because > > she is in my mother's head and my mother is in mine). 'Blood-links' or > > households may provide a convenient shorthand for patterns of proximity > and > > may therefore be built into languages but the way the terms will then be > > used may get closer to reflecting how speakers feel about the different > > kinds of relationships they experience. > > > > All the best, > > > > Rod > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > Sent: 08 January 2018 02:16 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > > > apologies if this is a re-posting, but here is the text of the message > > that accompanied the Sahlins text, just in case it didn't go through: > > > > Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the > > maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, > been > > quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. > > > > Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it has > > traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on blood. > (other > > forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as derivative of the central > > trope of blood relation). > > > > Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a > > picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although > Schneider > > couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted field work on the > > Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books on the subject that > > forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. > > Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by showing > > how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although blood based > > relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the same sense that > a > > blood-based notion of "family" does). > > > > Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time in > a > > relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old view of > > kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. > > > > Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be > > known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the > concept > > of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the view of > new > > kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch has put it, as > > "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" (mentioned in the > > Sahlins essay that is attached). > > > > New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in > > European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big book > > was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in these > > cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can find > lots > > of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. Janet Carsten is > a > > key figure in this regard and she looks at, among other things, how > > technologies have changed kinship formation (think test-tube babies and > > sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). > > > > One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall Sahlin's > > essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a wonderful > > collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various places around > > the globe. > > > > I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does this > > have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? > > > > -greg > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > ?Martin, > > > > > > Not sure if things got garbled on the way into virtual XMCA-land, but > > > in the end of my message about kinship studies in anthropology that > > > accompanied the Sahlins (and which doesn't seem to appear in your > > > reply - did the message come through with the attachment - usually it > > > is the reverse!), I noted that Sahlins provides a nice summary of the > > > new kinship studies that followed David Schneider. > > > > > > Does that help or were you looking for something else? (and, was the > > > text of the message really missing entirely?) -greg ? > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Martin Packer > > wrote: > > > > > >> Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > > >> > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > ________________________________ > > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > //www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > it. > > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > emails > > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > > by an official order form. > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Beth Ferholt Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From mpacker@cantab.net Mon Jan 8 08:43:58 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:43:58 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Hi Greg, The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would generally be translated as ?family.?) Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be best translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both disciplines there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along the lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski to have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume such a definition. But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a secret illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single parent families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child who is not biologically related to them. There are families who had a surrogate mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological parents (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds of family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that they call family! But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? If so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root mutual relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s existence. In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through xmca. But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual relations of being that constitute a family? These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once again to the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Martin, > > Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of cross-cultural > cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you are so > interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the preferred > word in some other culture that extends to a different set of > relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by > "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as "family", > e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach that > family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a > second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would a > dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog who > refer to their grouping as a "family"?). > > I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" > (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here family?). > > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, along >> the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can >> explain that.. :) >> >> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) >> >> Martin >> >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >> >> >> >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >>> >>> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Mon Jan 8 08:45:10 2018 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 16:45:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks Greg. As I said, I'm less interested in whether or not I'm talking about perezhivanie, and more interested in having a viable understanding of how emotional experiences frame new experiences. Maybe they're the same, but since meta-experience is less ambiguous--it's simply the experience of experience, not necessarily trauma-oriented--it's a more useful way for me to talk about it. In fact, the earliest references came in relation to how positive feelings about writing help to frame new experiences with writing (for one writer) such that obstacles could be simply set aside and returned to later. Smagorinsky, P., Daigle, E. A., O'Donnell-Allen, C., & Bynum, S. (2010). Bullshit in academic writing: A protocol analysis of a high school senior's process of interpreting Much Ado About Nothing. Research in the Teaching of English, 44, 368-405. Available at http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/RTE/RTE2010.pdf That study didn't use either term, but both appear in: Smagorinsky, P., & Daigle, E. A. (2012). The role of affect in students' writing for school. In E. L. Grigorenko, E. Mambrino & D. D. Preiss (Eds.), Writing: A mosaic of new perspectives (pp. 293-307). New York, NY: Psychology Press. Available at http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/Book Chapters/AffectInWriting_Grigorenko_Mambrino_Preiss_Writing.pdf This is a hand-scan so word searches don't work. But here, I'm still in a tussle between perezhivanie and meta-experience, later abandoned. Perhaps all this is of no interest to anyone but me, so apologies if I'm occupying bandwidth unnecessarily. My point is simply that looking for perezhivanie, to me, without agreement on what it is left me wondering why I was so indebted to the term instead of the represented construct, at least the one I was interested in, finally labeled as meta-experience. So I bailed on the term, much to my own satisfaction. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Monday, January 08, 2018 9:28 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship Peter, The importance of ritual/ceremony offers another interesting way of linking anthropological/ethnographic research and human development. It seems that this has been done more explicitly in anthropology of children/development than has the family (which, of course, has implicitly been involved). Van Gennep's classic work on rites of passage have thematized this, and many folks through the years have looked at the role of rituals in the development of children. What you point to and which has been less well developed are questions of the experience of the ritual for the participant. That's a concern that people are just now starting to turn towards and so far, the jury is out. Some argue for Durkheimian notions of collective effervescence - something that needs to be wedded to perezhivanie, I think - and some arguing that the experiences are much more diffuse and less coordinated. But I do think this would be a very fruitful site of research for some XMCA-ite out there. -greg On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 4:28 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I'm no expert here, but recently read Wendy James's The Ceremonial Animal: > A New Portrait of Anthropology (https://www.booktopia.com.au/ > the-ceremonial-animal-wendy-james/prod9780199263349.html) . The > ceremonial animal is the human, and this book focuses on ritual in > human life, which I would say has a profoundly emotional dimension. > > I've avoided perezhivanie discussions because it's become all things > to all people, so I've retreated to an alt-phrasing, meta-experience > (the experiencing of experience as a way to frame new experiences). > Rituals/ceremonies re-enact prior rituals in ways that many people > find deeply emotional, often comforting. I am not religious, but know > that the singing of familiar hymns can be emotionally settling for > people experiencing grief, trauma, etc. (I know this from testimonies > of such people). > > Maybe this is perezhivanie, but I've stopped caring whether that's the > term for my conception, since I've found one that people don't hold up > to their orthodoxies when I use it in writing. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees > Sent: Monday, January 08, 2018 4:19 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > Greg, > > I can't pretend to be au fait with the developments in anthropology > around kinship and family (but I am interested) - the connection I see > between understandings of family/familiarity and the work of Vygotsky > is associated with what Sahlins appears to be saying about 'people who > are intrinsic to one another?s existence'. If the 'shape' of the > refractive lens which forms our perezhivanie is dependent on our > interactions with other people (and particularly in our first years) > then those people with whom we have most interactions (or perhaps most > formative kinds of interactions) will be familiar in the strongest > sense - 'mutual persons' who share and even inhabit our ways of > interacting with our environment - and particularly our social > environment. Our family are 'in our heads' in ways which other people > are not. Kinship links clearly matter because there must be some > chaining of this mutual influence (My mother's mother is in my head > because she is in my mother's head and my mother is in mine). > 'Blood-links' or households may provide a convenient shorthand for > patterns of proximity and may therefore be built into languages but > the way the terms will then be used may get closer to reflecting how speakers feel about the different kinds of relationships they experience. > > All the best, > > Rod > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: 08 January 2018 02:16 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship > > apologies if this is a re-posting, but here is the text of the message > that accompanied the Sahlins text, just in case it didn't go through: > > Apologies if this is another trip round the mulberry bush (or the > maypole?), but this is a conversation that has, as one might imagine, > been quite a big deal in anthropology. Here's a quick and brief summary. > > Initially, "kinship" in anthropology was defined as the way that it > has traditionally been defined in European cultures - as based on > blood. (other forms are kinship, e.g., adoption, were seen as > derivative of the central trope of blood relation). > > Then along came a fellow by the name of David Schneider (I attached a > picture, cf. David and Martin's pictures of Malinowski). Although > Schneider couldn't write his way out of a paper bag, he conducted > field work on the Micronesian island of Yap and published a few books > on the subject that forever changed the way that anthropologists' think about kinship. > Essentially, he challenged this blood-based notion of kinship by > showing how Yapese kinship formation is not blood-based (although > blood based relationships are still recognized, they do not hold the > same sense that a blood-based notion of "family" does). > > Following Schneider, the field of kinship studies spent a bit of time > in a relativistic malaise, shifting between those who stuck to the old > view of kinship and those who refused to use the concept at all. > > Then along came work that would eventually become what has come to be > known as "new kinship studies". This approach sought to recover the > concept of "kinship" without the concept of "kinship-as-blood". In the > view of new kinship studies, "kinship" is understood, as Rupert Stasch > has put it, as "intersubjective belonging" or "mutuality of being" > (mentioned in the Sahlins essay that is attached). > > New kinship studies have also turned their gaze back onto kinship in > European/Western/American culture (and indeed, Schneider's other big > book was titled American Kinship). These folks have noted that even in > these cultures, previously thought to be entirely blood-based, one can > find lots of slippage from a simple model of blood-based kinship. > Janet Carsten is a key figure in this regard and she looks at, among > other things, how technologies have changed kinship formation (think > test-tube babies and sperm extraction from deceased persons - fun stuff!). > > One of the best summaries of the new kinship studies is Marshall > Sahlin's essay What Kinship is? I have attached it here as it has a > wonderful collection of examples of how kinship is formed in various > places around the globe. > > I guess the more interesting question for this group is: what does > this have to do with Vygotsky/XMCA? > > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > ?Martin, > > > > Not sure if things got garbled on the way into virtual XMCA-land, > > but in the end of my message about kinship studies in anthropology > > that accompanied the Sahlins (and which doesn't seem to appear in > > your reply - did the message come through with the attachment - > > usually it is the reverse!), I noted that Sahlins provides a nice > > summary of the new kinship studies that followed David Schneider. > > > > Does that help or were you looking for something else? (and, was the > > text of the message really missing entirely?) -greg ? > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> Greg, could you say a bit about why you sent this? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > >> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] //www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this > email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services > unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Mon Jan 8 08:49:38 2018 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 16:49:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: One thing I learned from Wendy James's book is that "anthropology" is a growing, expanding field. So it's doubtful that anthropology does anything, but anthropologists do all sorts of things, many different from what they used to do. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer Sent: Monday, January 08, 2018 11:44 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship Hi Greg, The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would generally be translated as ?family.?) Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be best translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both disciplines there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along the lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski to have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume such a definition. But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a secret illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single parent families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child who is not biologically related to them. There are families who had a surrogate mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological parents (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds of family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that they call family! But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? If so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root mutual relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s existence. In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through xmca. But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual relations of being that constitute a family? These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once again to the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Martin, > > Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of > cross-cultural cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss > for why you are so interested in this English word (e.g., why not > "kin"? why not the preferred word in some other culture that extends > to a different set of relationships). Without a good working > definition of what you mean by "family". Do the other examples that > people have given "count" as "family", e.g., sports teams, > brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach that > family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a > second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would > a dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog who refer to their grouping as a "family"?). > > I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" > (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here family?). > > -greg > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, >> along the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. >> Greg can explain that.. :) >> >> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) >> >> Martin >> >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that >> my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end >> usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? >> (Malinowski, 1930) >> >> >> >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Mon Jan 8 10:23:20 2018 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 18:23:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Scholactivism: A special issue of Workplace in collaboration with Cultural Logic and Works & Days References: <5657C9EA-0894-473B-ABAD-3D91EF860E34@mail.ubc.ca> Message-ID: <2296465E-0BF4-466E-9A7F-86AD16527734@mail.ubc.ca> I thought some Folks on XMCA may be interested to see this issue; I haven?t read though, just forwarding here in case. Best for the New Year! jen Begin forwarded message: From: "Ross, Wayne (waross)" > Subject: Scholactivism: A special issue of Workplace in collaboration with Cultural Logic and Works & Days Date: January 8, 2018 at 10:13:26 AM PST To: > Reply-To: "Ross, Wayne (waross)" > Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor has just published its latest issue at http://ices.library.ubc.ca/index.php/workplace This special issue of Workplace, "Scholactivism," is a collaboration with Cultural Logic and Works & Days. Works & Days published the print edition of "Scholactivism." Shortly after Cultural Logic published the online version of this issue in the fall of 2017, its web host, eserver.org, was shut down by Iowa State University. ISU's action took nearly 50 journals and websites (and tens of thousands of articles) offline. With Cultural Logic in limbo, Workplace stepped in to make "Scholactivism" freely available online immediately. There is no set timeline for Cultural Logic/eserver.org to reappear, but it is our understanding that the eserver is moving to a new platform and will be back in operation in the future. At that point, Cultural Logic will republish "Scholactivism," but for now the editors of Workplace are pleased to present this massive issue, edited by Joseph G. Ramsey. Thanks for the continuing interest in our work, Stephen Petrina E Wayne Ross Co-Editors, Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor Institute for Critical Education Studies University of British Columbia Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor No 30 (2018): Workplace Presents: Scholactivism Table of Contents http://ices.library.ubc.ca/index.php/workplace/issue/view/No%2030%20%282018%29 Foreword -------- A Short Note on Activism, Solidarity, and Scholarly Publishing (i-iv) E Wayne Ross Here We Come (v) Marc Bousquet Special Issue Editor Introduction -------- Introducing Scholactivism: Reflections on Transforming Praxis in and Beyond the Classroom (1-37) Joseph G. Ramsey Conversations with Activist Scholars -------- The Activist-Scholar: A Responsibility "to Confront and Dismantle": Interview with Ward Churchill (38-45) Edward J. Carvalho Narrative Resistance: A Conversation with Historian Marcus Rediker (54-69) Carl Grey Matrin, Modhumita Roy Scholactivism: A Roundtable Interview with Ricardo Antunes, Pietro Basso, Patrick Bond, Michael L?wy, J?se Paulo Netto, and Leo Panitch (46-53) Babak Amini Defining and Contesting the Terms and Terrain of "Schol-Activism" -------- We Are All Activists Now (70-80) Toby Miller Politically Engaged Scholars: An Analytic of Positions and Norms (81-105) Patrick Colm Hogan Schol?Exodus? Learning Within/Against/Beyond the Institution (106-118) Bennett Carpenter, Laura Goldblatt, Lenora Hanson, Karim Wissa, Andrew Yale Resisting Neoliberalism in the University - Classes, Campuses, Communities -------- Resolving the Contradictions of Academic Unionism (119-134) Jeffrey Noonan Critical Revolutionary Praxis in the Neoliberal University (135-154) Gary Zabel "Better Days Ahead": Teaching Revolutionary Futures and Protesting the Present (155-175) Bradley Freeman Luk?cs, Mari?tegui, and the Dialectical Roots of Edu-Activism (176-190) John Maerhofer Shred of Truth: Antinomy and Synecdoche in the Work of Ta-Nehisi Coates (191-233) Stephen C. Ferguson, Gregory D. Meyerson Student Evaluations, Neoliberal Managerialism, and Networks of Mistrust (234-250) Ian Butcher Learning in the Shadow of State Terror: A Poetic Interlude -------- "I Am Not a Corpse: A Working Praxis for Black Lives Matter" and Other Poems (251-257) Demetrius Noble "Amos D. Squire, Chief Physician of Sing Sing, 1914-1925" and Other Poems (258-268) Jill McDonough Virtual Universities, Digital Activists, and their Discontents -------- The Promise and Peril of the Virtual University (269-282) Ali Shezhad Zaidi Untangling the Scholactivist Web (283-297) Efadul Huq, Xavier Best What's Wrong with Slactivism? Confronting the Neoliberal Assault on Millennials (298-311) Sophia A. McClennen Doing What We Can from Where We Are: Personal Histories and Case Studies -------- Top Cover: On Administrative Activism in the Neoliberal University (312-322) Jeffrey R. Di Leo Complicit: On Being a WGSS Program Director in the Neoliberal University (323-329) Katie Hogan Letter on Scholactivism: To Graduate Students and Young Colleagues (330-333) Vincent B. Leitch Los Intersticios! Or, in Defense of Carbon-Free Unicorns (334-351) Marisol Cortez Fighting to be Different in the Academy (352-359) Tony Van der Meer Rights and Rebellion: The Faculty Role, Revisited (360-373) Kim Emery Learning from Those Who Taught Us: Tributes -------- Richard Levins and Dialectical Thinking (374-378) Victor Wallis On the Ground with David Demarest: Toward a Methodology of Scholar Activism (379-393) Joel Woller, Courtney Maloney, Charles Cunningham John Trudell and the Spirit of Life (394-404) Christopher Craig E. Wayne Ross, PhD Professor Department of Curriculum and Pedagogy University of British Columbia 2125 Main Mall Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4 Canada 604-822-2830 wayne.ross@ubc.ca http://www.ewayneross.net Critical Education: www.criticaleducation.org Cultural Logic: www.eserver.org/clogic Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor: www.workplace-gsc.com ________________________________ To unsubscribe from the EDUC-FACULTY-EXCHANGE list, please click here. 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From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 13:12:42 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 06:12:42 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin: In Chinese (all Chinese, because all Chinese is based on the common written language James was speaking of), a couple without children is a "jia". If you are single, "jia" refers to your parents. If you are married, your spouse is your "jia" whether or not you have children. When my mother-in-law was alive, and my wife and I went home for Spring Festival, it was always "hui jia". Now that she is dead, my wife says "hui guo" (i.e. "return to our country" rather than "return to our family") because "jia" refers to me. Korean is exactly the same, because the word for "family" is taken from Chinese. But even in pure Korean, there is a clear connection with housing (so for example when I humbly refer to my wife in pure, non-Chinese inflected, Korean I say "uri jibsaram", literally, "the person in our house"). Whorf would probably turn your question around: are there ANY languages besides Standard Average European that DO have a cognate for English "family"? The answer in the two articles that Greg sent (Bloch and Sahlins) seems to be no. On the other hand, both Chinese and Korean do have the English distinction between "house" and "home", although it is not grammaticized as it is in English (there is no equivalent for the grammatical distinction between "in the house" and "at home" because Chinese has neither prepositions nor articles). David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:43 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > Hi Greg, > > The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a > language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I > think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would > generally be translated as ?family.?) > > Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be best > translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. > > The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the > anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological > literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both disciplines > there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along the > lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski to > have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume such a > definition. > > But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are > adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a secret > illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single parent > families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child who is > not biologically related to them. There are families who had a surrogate > mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological parents > (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds of > family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. > > So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that they > call family! > > But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For > example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? If > so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for > instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root mutual > relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s existence. > In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through xmca. > But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual > relations of being that constitute a family? > > These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once again to > the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > Martin, > > > > Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of cross-cultural > > cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you are so > > interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the > preferred > > word in some other culture that extends to a different set of > > relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by > > "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as > "family", > > e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach that > > family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a > > second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would a > > dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog > who > > refer to their grouping as a "family"?). > > > > I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" > > (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here > family?). > > > > -greg > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, along > >> the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can > >> explain that.. :) > >> > >> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > with > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 14:19:43 2018 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 15:19:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Great discussion! I?ve been watching episodes with my wife of ?The Crown? and int?s interesting to view the chat discussion on kinship throught the lens of the royal family during the latter half of the 20th century. Beth Fernholt a little while ago cited an article in the NYTimes on estrangement, which certainly would apply to the happenings on "The Crown?. You probably learn as much about the meaning of familly by observing when a family isn?t acting like a family, and when the parts of a family disagree on how a family SHOULD act. Also, prototype theory (Eleanor Rosch): What do people agree on as the prototypical family? I don?t mean a checklist of attributes. Rather, which is the kind of critter you would identify as more dog-like: a chihuaha or a German shepherd. This would vary across culture and time. Might one apply to the meaning of ?family?? My understanding of the term ?cognate? is that it pairs two words in different languages with similar meaning and (phonological) form. From google I get: ?...having the same linguistic derivation as another; from the same original word or root (e.g., English is, German ist, Latin est, from Indo-European esti ). So, that strictly speaking Chinese and English have no cognates? And even if they do, ?family? in English would not likely have a cognate in Chinese, nor the other way round. I guess the more general point is the importance of the historical when talking about meaning and form in language, especially on the cHat. Henry > On Jan 8, 2018, at 2:12 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Martin: > > In Chinese (all Chinese, because all Chinese is based on the common written > language James was speaking of), a couple without children is a "jia". If > you are single, "jia" refers to your parents. If you are married, your > spouse is your "jia" whether or not you have children. When my > mother-in-law was alive, and my wife and I went home for Spring Festival, > it was always "hui jia". Now that she is dead, my wife says "hui guo" (i.e. > "return to our country" rather than "return to our family") because "jia" > refers to me. > > Korean is exactly the same, because the word for "family" is taken from > Chinese. But even in pure Korean, there is a clear connection with housing > (so for example when I humbly refer to my wife in pure, non-Chinese > inflected, Korean I say "uri jibsaram", literally, "the person in our > house"). > > Whorf would probably turn your question around: are there ANY languages > besides Standard Average European that DO have a cognate for > English "family"? The answer in the two articles that Greg sent (Bloch and > Sahlins) seems to be no. On the other hand, both Chinese and Korean do have > the English distinction between "house" and "home", although it is not > grammaticized as it is in English (there is no equivalent for the > grammatical distinction between "in the house" and "at home" because > Chinese has neither prepositions nor articles). > > > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:43 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Hi Greg, >> >> The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a >> language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I >> think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would >> generally be translated as ?family.?) >> >> Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be best >> translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. >> >> The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the >> anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological >> literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both disciplines >> there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along the >> lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski to >> have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume such a >> definition. >> >> But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are >> adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a secret >> illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single parent >> families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child who is >> not biologically related to them. There are families who had a surrogate >> mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological parents >> (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds of >> family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. >> >> So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that they >> call family! >> >> But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For >> example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? If >> so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for >> instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root mutual >> relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s existence. >> In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through xmca. >> But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual >> relations of being that constitute a family? >> >> These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once again to >> the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) >> >> Martin >> >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >> >> >> >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >>> >>> Martin, >>> >>> Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of cross-cultural >>> cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you are so >>> interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the >> preferred >>> word in some other culture that extends to a different set of >>> relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by >>> "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as >> "family", >>> e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach that >>> family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a >>> second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would a >>> dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog >> who >>> refer to their grouping as a "family"?). >>> >>> I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" >>> (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here >> family?). >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer >> wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, along >>>> the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can >>>> explain that.. :) >>>> >>>> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually >> with >>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> From mpacker@cantab.net Mon Jan 8 14:34:59 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 17:34:59 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: > a couple without children is a ?jia" And a couple with children? (And a couple with a pig? tehe) Martin > On Jan 8, 2018, at 4:12 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Martin: > > In Chinese (all Chinese, because all Chinese is based on the common written > language James was speaking of), a couple without children is a "jia". If > you are single, "jia" refers to your parents. If you are married, your > spouse is your "jia" whether or not you have children. When my > mother-in-law was alive, and my wife and I went home for Spring Festival, > it was always "hui jia". Now that she is dead, my wife says "hui guo" (i.e. > "return to our country" rather than "return to our family") because "jia" > refers to me. > > Korean is exactly the same, because the word for "family" is taken from > Chinese. But even in pure Korean, there is a clear connection with housing > (so for example when I humbly refer to my wife in pure, non-Chinese > inflected, Korean I say "uri jibsaram", literally, "the person in our > house"). > > Whorf would probably turn your question around: are there ANY languages > besides Standard Average European that DO have a cognate for > English "family"? The answer in the two articles that Greg sent (Bloch and > Sahlins) seems to be no. On the other hand, both Chinese and Korean do have > the English distinction between "house" and "home", although it is not > grammaticized as it is in English (there is no equivalent for the > grammatical distinction between "in the house" and "at home" because > Chinese has neither prepositions nor articles). > > > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:43 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Hi Greg, >> >> The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a >> language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I >> think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would >> generally be translated as ?family.?) >> >> Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be best >> translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. >> >> The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the >> anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological >> literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both disciplines >> there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along the >> lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski to >> have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume such a >> definition. >> >> But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are >> adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a secret >> illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single parent >> families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child who is >> not biologically related to them. There are families who had a surrogate >> mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological parents >> (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds of >> family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. >> >> So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that they >> call family! >> >> But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For >> example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? If >> so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for >> instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root mutual >> relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s existence. >> In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through xmca. >> But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual >> relations of being that constitute a family? >> >> These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once again to >> the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) >> >> Martin >> >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >> >> >> >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >>> >>> Martin, >>> >>> Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of cross-cultural >>> cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you are so >>> interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the >> preferred >>> word in some other culture that extends to a different set of >>> relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by >>> "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as >> "family", >>> e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach that >>> family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a >>> second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would a >>> dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog >> who >>> refer to their grouping as a "family"?). >>> >>> I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" >>> (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here >> family?). >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer >> wrote: >>> >>>> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, along >>>> the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can >>>> explain that.. :) >>>> >>>> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually >> with >>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 16:57:22 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 09:57:22 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Thanks, Greg. I found Sahlins impatient and intemperate, just as I found him in person. But now that I am older I can see that behind all the poorly motivated ill will and bad faith, it's not simply an enactment of the central motif of the Gold Bough towards his erstwhile teachers, now opponents. There is also a kind of militant idealism that takes the form of an indignant anti-reductionism: nationalism is not reducible to recruitment, and religion is not reducible to institutions of bricks and mortar. And of course Marx could never ever have imagined, when he wrote of how consumption "produces" production, that it might form kinship systems. I wonder if Sahlins actually read Grundrisse, or did he just assume that nobody else had? The Bloch was a much easier read, as you guessed. I briefly thought that he was talking about Halliday's supervisor J.R. Firth, who of course was also a colleague of Malinowski and in his ideas about context very thoroughly Malinowskian. But Bloch meant Raymond Firth. I guess I don't think that emphasis on language use per se is enough to make you a Hallidayan. Certainly I came to linguistics through a very British emphasis on use, and contrary to what you say I was never a water-carrier for SFL: I came to it via the road to Damascus, and in fact my own teacher, H.G. Widdowson, always taught me to be suspicious of Halliday because he supposedly thought that instances of language use could simply be "read off" of the system network. What he meant by that, I learned later, was the emphasis on analyzing grammar rather than on commentating "discourse". Consider "Dong Fang Hong", "The East is Red". https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6qslfjio2vk My wife Fang, with my brother-in-law Dong and my sister in law Hong, was actually named after this movie. It's a national epic: an attempt to "recruit" people to nationalism. But it's not just that: it does create a "nation-hero", and it does that several ways, all of which include kinship, but not in the starring role. For example, in this clip, the word "jia" figures very significantly. My "jia" is in the Northeast, on the Songhua River (i.e. beyond the Great Wall, the first part of China to be occupied by the Japanese--DK) Where there are forests and coal mines And there are mountains and praries full of sorghum and beans (emphasis on house and land) My "jia" is in the Northeast, on the Songhua River That is where my colleagues and comrades are And there are my wrinkled mother and my weary father (emphasis on kith and kin) The subtitles on the clip gets the order of these elements wrong. Interestingly, the chorus (after the disaster of the 18th of September Japanese occupation of Manchuria) emphasizes that they are wandering "zai guannei" (inside the passes of the Great Wall, which are visible in the backgroun). It's not "inside the wall", which would suggest that they are "zai jia". I guess if I were not a linguist (say, if I were teaching film studies) I would draw attention to the elements my teacher called "discourse"--to the lack of a "fourth wall", to the way in which each character addresses the audience and only incidentally other characters, and so on. But I am a linguist, and a grammarian. What strikes me is that, just like a Chinese name, and a Chinese address, the big picture always comes first, whether we are talking about the verse, or the line or the clause--the social, therefore, before the interpersonal, and the interpersonal before the intra-personal. Even at the very end of the song, though, the social is still there in the most intimate and intra-personal. The word "jia" is used in a compound: "jiaxiang", which means something like "jia-county" or "jia-neighborhood". David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 9:07 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 18:38:40 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 19:38:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Henry, Lovely point about cognates! It rather delightfully gets to the point of the new kinship studies since the Latin cognate of "cognate" is cognatus, meaning "blood relative". (and thus you might say that I am using "cognate" in a new kinship kind of way) -greg p.s. a less delightful reading is that I'm simply using "cognates" in the second and less common definition of "related, connected" in the general sense. This happens to be a way that this term has been commonly used in Linguistic Anthropology (as opposed to Linguistics proper). There, I ruined it. On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 3:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Great discussion! > > I?ve been watching episodes with my wife of ?The Crown? and int?s > interesting to view the chat discussion on kinship throught the lens of the > royal family during the latter half of the 20th century. Beth Fernholt a > little while ago cited an article in the NYTimes on estrangement, which > certainly would apply to the happenings on "The Crown?. You probably learn > as much about the meaning of familly by observing when a family isn?t > acting like a family, and when the parts of a family disagree on how a > family SHOULD act. Also, prototype theory (Eleanor Rosch): What do people > agree on as the prototypical family? I don?t mean a checklist of > attributes. Rather, which is the kind of critter you would identify as more > dog-like: a chihuaha or a German shepherd. This would vary across culture > and time. Might one apply to the meaning of ?family?? > > My understanding of the term ?cognate? is that it pairs two words in > different languages with similar meaning and (phonological) form. From > google I get: ?...having the same linguistic derivation as another; from > the same original word or root (e.g., English is, German ist, Latin est, > from Indo-European esti ). So, that strictly speaking Chinese and English > have no cognates? And even if they do, ?family? in English would not likely > have a cognate in Chinese, nor the other way round. > I guess the more general point is the importance of the historical when > talking about meaning and form in language, especially on the cHat. > > Henry > > > > > On Jan 8, 2018, at 2:12 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Martin: > > > > In Chinese (all Chinese, because all Chinese is based on the common > written > > language James was speaking of), a couple without children is a "jia". If > > you are single, "jia" refers to your parents. If you are married, your > > spouse is your "jia" whether or not you have children. When my > > mother-in-law was alive, and my wife and I went home for Spring Festival, > > it was always "hui jia". Now that she is dead, my wife says "hui guo" > (i.e. > > "return to our country" rather than "return to our family") because "jia" > > refers to me. > > > > Korean is exactly the same, because the word for "family" is taken from > > Chinese. But even in pure Korean, there is a clear connection with > housing > > (so for example when I humbly refer to my wife in pure, non-Chinese > > inflected, Korean I say "uri jibsaram", literally, "the person in our > > house"). > > > > Whorf would probably turn your question around: are there ANY languages > > besides Standard Average European that DO have a cognate for > > English "family"? The answer in the two articles that Greg sent (Bloch > and > > Sahlins) seems to be no. On the other hand, both Chinese and Korean do > have > > the English distinction between "house" and "home", although it is not > > grammaticized as it is in English (there is no equivalent for the > > grammatical distinction between "in the house" and "at home" because > > Chinese has neither prepositions nor articles). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:43 AM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> Hi Greg, > >> > >> The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a > >> language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I > >> think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would > >> generally be translated as ?family.?) > >> > >> Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be best > >> translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. > >> > >> The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the > >> anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological > >> literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both disciplines > >> there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along the > >> lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski to > >> have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume > such a > >> definition. > >> > >> But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are > >> adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a > secret > >> illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single > parent > >> families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child who > is > >> not biologically related to them. There are families who had a surrogate > >> mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological parents > >> (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds of > >> family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. > >> > >> So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that > they > >> call family! > >> > >> But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For > >> example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? > If > >> so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for > >> instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root > mutual > >> relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s > existence. > >> In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through > xmca. > >> But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual > >> relations of being that constitute a family? > >> > >> These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once again > to > >> the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > with > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> Martin, > >>> > >>> Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of > cross-cultural > >>> cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you are > so > >>> interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the > >> preferred > >>> word in some other culture that extends to a different set of > >>> relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by > >>> "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as > >> "family", > >>> e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach > that > >>> family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a > >>> second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would > a > >>> dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog > >> who > >>> refer to their grouping as a "family"?). > >>> > >>> I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" > >>> (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here > >> family?). > >>> > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer > >> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, > along > >>>> the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can > >>>> explain that.. :) > >>>> > >>>> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that > my > >>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > >> with > >>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From nihra@utm.my Mon Jan 8 19:30:03 2018 From: nihra@utm.my (MOHD NIHRA HARUZUAN BIN MOHD SAID FP) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 11:30:03 +0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: CALL FOR ABSTRACT SUBMISSION : i-CITE 2018 Conference (24-25 July 2018, Malaysia) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greetings, Call for abstract submission. ? *Senior Lecturer* Department of Educational Science, Mathematics and Creative Multimedia, Faculty of Education, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, UTM Skudai 81310, Johor, Malaysia Office:07-5534434 | Mobile: 012-7127140 Primary Email: nihra@utm.my | Secondary Email: m_nihra@yahoo.com Site: http://educ.utm.my/nihra | ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9103-9530 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: icite2018 Date: Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 8:28 AM Subject: CALL FOR ABSTRACT SUBMISSION : i-CITE 2018 Conference (24-25 July 2018, Malaysia) ? Faculty of Education, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) in collaboration with CITE Research Group invite students, academicians, practitioners and teachers to submit articles for *1st International Conference on Creative and Innovative Technology in Education (i-CITE 2018).* The details as following : *Date : 24th & 25th July 2018* *Venue : Johor Bahru, Malaysia* *Submit your abstract NOW!! *EDAS Paper Submission : http://edas.info/N24266 Double-blind reviews will be conducted by at least two independent reviewers. Authors of accepted paper will be notified by email. *All accepted papers will be published and indexed in Advanced Science Letters, a SCOPUS Indexed Journal. * For further information, you may visit our *official website* at http://educ.utm.my/icite2018/. We welcome submissions in *these topics*: ? Primary Education ? Secondary Education ? Tertiary Education ? Distance Education ? Blended Learning ? M-Learning ? Learning Analytic ? Cloud Computing in Education ? 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Name: icite.png Type: image/png Size: 122801 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180109/4fbbc6d9/attachment.png From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 20:16:33 2018 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 21:16:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: <7638C3B2-F238-4B2A-9B2D-969884ABCD6E@gmail.com> Greg- Would I be wrong in saying that the way linguists use ?cognate? is more Vygotskian, since it captures the historical development of the word, and the term as ?commonly used? does not? And it more reflects what a community of scholars dedicated to language know? Forgive me, but I feel it does touch on the way in which science is under attack these days. Plus, I admit to a feeling that linguistics itself threw the baby out with the bath water when it shifted so radically from philology (historical linguistics) to synchronic linguistics around the turn of the 20th Century and we ended up with Chomsky. Probably a mountain out of a mole hill, but what the hey. Anyway, thanks for taking the time to respond! Happy New Year! Henry > On Jan 8, 2018, at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Henry, > > Lovely point about cognates! > > It rather delightfully gets to the point of the new kinship studies since > the Latin cognate of "cognate" is cognatus, meaning "blood relative". (and > thus you might say that I am using "cognate" in a new kinship kind of way) > > -greg > > p.s. a less delightful reading is that I'm simply using "cognates" in the > second and less common definition of "related, connected" in the general > sense. This happens to be a way that this term has been commonly used in > Linguistic Anthropology (as opposed to Linguistics proper). There, I ruined > it. > > > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 3:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Great discussion! >> >> I?ve been watching episodes with my wife of ?The Crown? and int?s >> interesting to view the chat discussion on kinship throught the lens of the >> royal family during the latter half of the 20th century. Beth Fernholt a >> little while ago cited an article in the NYTimes on estrangement, which >> certainly would apply to the happenings on "The Crown?. You probably learn >> as much about the meaning of familly by observing when a family isn?t >> acting like a family, and when the parts of a family disagree on how a >> family SHOULD act. Also, prototype theory (Eleanor Rosch): What do people >> agree on as the prototypical family? I don?t mean a checklist of >> attributes. Rather, which is the kind of critter you would identify as more >> dog-like: a chihuaha or a German shepherd. This would vary across culture >> and time. Might one apply to the meaning of ?family?? >> >> My understanding of the term ?cognate? is that it pairs two words in >> different languages with similar meaning and (phonological) form. From >> google I get: ?...having the same linguistic derivation as another; from >> the same original word or root (e.g., English is, German ist, Latin est, >> from Indo-European esti ). So, that strictly speaking Chinese and English >> have no cognates? And even if they do, ?family? in English would not likely >> have a cognate in Chinese, nor the other way round. >> I guess the more general point is the importance of the historical when >> talking about meaning and form in language, especially on the cHat. >> >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Jan 8, 2018, at 2:12 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Martin: >>> >>> In Chinese (all Chinese, because all Chinese is based on the common >> written >>> language James was speaking of), a couple without children is a "jia". If >>> you are single, "jia" refers to your parents. If you are married, your >>> spouse is your "jia" whether or not you have children. When my >>> mother-in-law was alive, and my wife and I went home for Spring Festival, >>> it was always "hui jia". Now that she is dead, my wife says "hui guo" >> (i.e. >>> "return to our country" rather than "return to our family") because "jia" >>> refers to me. >>> >>> Korean is exactly the same, because the word for "family" is taken from >>> Chinese. But even in pure Korean, there is a clear connection with >> housing >>> (so for example when I humbly refer to my wife in pure, non-Chinese >>> inflected, Korean I say "uri jibsaram", literally, "the person in our >>> house"). >>> >>> Whorf would probably turn your question around: are there ANY languages >>> besides Standard Average European that DO have a cognate for >>> English "family"? The answer in the two articles that Greg sent (Bloch >> and >>> Sahlins) seems to be no. On the other hand, both Chinese and Korean do >> have >>> the English distinction between "house" and "home", although it is not >>> grammaticized as it is in English (there is no equivalent for the >>> grammatical distinction between "in the house" and "at home" because >>> Chinese has neither prepositions nor articles). >>> >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >>> >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:43 AM, Martin Packer >> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Greg, >>>> >>>> The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a >>>> language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I >>>> think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would >>>> generally be translated as ?family.?) >>>> >>>> Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be best >>>> translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. >>>> >>>> The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the >>>> anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological >>>> literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both disciplines >>>> there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along the >>>> lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski to >>>> have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume >> such a >>>> definition. >>>> >>>> But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are >>>> adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a >> secret >>>> illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single >> parent >>>> families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child who >> is >>>> not biologically related to them. There are families who had a surrogate >>>> mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological parents >>>> (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds of >>>> family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. >>>> >>>> So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that >> they >>>> call family! >>>> >>>> But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For >>>> example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? >> If >>>> so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for >>>> instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root >> mutual >>>> relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s >> existence. >>>> In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through >> xmca. >>>> But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual >>>> relations of being that constitute a family? >>>> >>>> These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once again >> to >>>> the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually >> with >>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Martin, >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of >> cross-cultural >>>>> cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you are >> so >>>>> interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the >>>> preferred >>>>> word in some other culture that extends to a different set of >>>>> relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by >>>>> "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as >>>> "family", >>>>> e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach >> that >>>>> family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a >>>>> second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would >> a >>>>> dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog >>>> who >>>>> refer to their grouping as a "family"?). >>>>> >>>>> I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" >>>>> (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here >>>> family?). >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, >> along >>>>>> the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can >>>>>> explain that.. :) >>>>>> >>>>>> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >>>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that >> my >>>>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually >>>> with >>>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson >> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 20:42:02 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 21:42:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin,? And yes, I think that in the old kinship studies, there was indeed a tendency to define family as child plus biological parents, but this has changed with new kinship studies. But then again, (old) kinship studies (e.g., Malinowski) also recognized that the nuclear family (with all its psychodynamic explosiveness, think Freud's Oedipal Complex, well, not his, but, you know "THE" Oedipal Complex) can sometimes be comprised differently. Wasn't this Malinowski's contention? That the Oedipal Complex in the Trobriand Islands was not between son and father but was between son and mother's brother? There is an emerging literature in anthropology on practices such as "alloparenting", but the anthropology of childhood is a fairly underdeveloped sub-field of anthropology. As an example, here is a brief ethnographic excerpt from one of my (undergraduate) students a few years back who conducted her fieldwork among the Himba in Namibia (under supervision of a colleague, David Crandall): "I was informally interviewing a woman I had never met before named Mukkara as she held her ? [sic]? young baby in her arms. She kissed and cooed at the baby as we spoke to each other. The infant ?about five months old ?laughed as ?Mukkara blew air at his face. Mukkara then proceeded to breastfeed the baby, as I asked her more about when the baby cries and what she did to calm ?him down. She ?listed a number of different things that she did to soothe him . Then, just in the middle of her response, another woman came and swooped up the child Mukkara was cuddling. Mukkara didn?t flinch when ? this happened , rather her attention moved to me as she passed off her baby. I was confused as to why the other woman, now off tending a fire, took the child. Mukkara explained that this baby was not actually her own, but rather she was watching her friend?s child while she was away. I was very interested to see that she knew so much about a child that was not her own, that she breastfed the baby and that the baby did not cry or become upset in the duration of our discussion. This data, along with further investigation, lead me to know that multiple mothers care for Himba children. Each mother knows her birth children, but there is a shared motherly role for the children of another woman." Anthropological research on alloparenting has also extended in other directions such as the book Attachment Reconsidered by Naomi Quinn and J. Mageo, as well as work by researchers interested on the role of alloparenting in evolutionary time (e.g., Sarah Hrdy, Bentley & Meece). For anyone interested in the anthropology of childhood, David Lancy has an excellent book that deals with many of these issues - The Anthropology of Childhood: Cherubs, Chattel, Changelings. And there's also Martin's book - wait aren't I writing to Martin? So I suspect that none of this has answered any of your questions Martin... -greg On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 9:43 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > Hi Greg, > > The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a > language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I > think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would > generally be translated as ?family.?) > > Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be best > translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. > > The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the > anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological > literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both disciplines > there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along the > lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski to > have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume such a > definition. > > But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are > adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a secret > illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single parent > families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child who is > not biologically related to them. There are families who had a surrogate > mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological parents > (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds of > family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. > > So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that they > call family! > > But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For > example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? If > so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for > instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root mutual > relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s existence. > In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through xmca. > But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual > relations of being that constitute a family? > > These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once again to > the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > Martin, > > > > Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of cross-cultural > > cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you are so > > interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the > preferred > > word in some other culture that extends to a different set of > > relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by > > "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as > "family", > > e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach that > > family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about a > > second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, would a > > dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their dog > who > > refer to their grouping as a "family"?). > > > > I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in "family" > > (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here > family?). > > > > -greg > > > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, along > >> the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg can > >> explain that.. :) > >> > >> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > with > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jan 8 20:48:15 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 21:48:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <7638C3B2-F238-4B2A-9B2D-969884ABCD6E@gmail.com> References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> <7834B20D-4DBD-437E-9BC2-9EA047F0DB63@cantab.net> <7638C3B2-F238-4B2A-9B2D-969884ABCD6E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, Yes, that makes sense to me - the part about Vygotsky. And just to be clear, this wasn't so much an attack on scientific usage of terms as it was a matter of clan disputes - as I noted, my usage was marking me as a Linguistic Anthropologist (I wrote "commonly used in Linguistic Anthropology") rather than a Linguist. There's a surprisingly wide gap between those two fields, both are communities of scholars dedicated to building knowledge about language, but both use the word differently. I was simply acknowledging that difference. Happy New Year indeed! -greg On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 9:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Greg- > Would I be wrong in saying that the way linguists use ?cognate? is more > Vygotskian, since it captures the historical development of the word, and > the term as ?commonly used? does not? And it more reflects what a community > of scholars dedicated to language know? Forgive me, but I feel it does > touch on the way in which science is under attack these days. Plus, I admit > to a feeling that linguistics itself threw the baby out with the bath water > when it shifted so radically from philology (historical linguistics) to > synchronic linguistics around the turn of the 20th Century and we ended up > with Chomsky. Probably a mountain out of a mole hill, but what the hey. > Anyway, thanks for taking the time to respond! Happy New Year! > Henry > > > > On Jan 8, 2018, at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > Henry, > > > > Lovely point about cognates! > > > > It rather delightfully gets to the point of the new kinship studies since > > the Latin cognate of "cognate" is cognatus, meaning "blood relative". > (and > > thus you might say that I am using "cognate" in a new kinship kind of > way) > > > > -greg > > > > p.s. a less delightful reading is that I'm simply using "cognates" in the > > second and less common definition of "related, connected" in the general > > sense. This happens to be a way that this term has been commonly used in > > Linguistic Anthropology (as opposed to Linguistics proper). There, I > ruined > > it. > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 3:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> Great discussion! > >> > >> I?ve been watching episodes with my wife of ?The Crown? and int?s > >> interesting to view the chat discussion on kinship throught the lens of > the > >> royal family during the latter half of the 20th century. Beth Fernholt a > >> little while ago cited an article in the NYTimes on estrangement, which > >> certainly would apply to the happenings on "The Crown?. You probably > learn > >> as much about the meaning of familly by observing when a family isn?t > >> acting like a family, and when the parts of a family disagree on how a > >> family SHOULD act. Also, prototype theory (Eleanor Rosch): What do > people > >> agree on as the prototypical family? I don?t mean a checklist of > >> attributes. Rather, which is the kind of critter you would identify as > more > >> dog-like: a chihuaha or a German shepherd. This would vary across > culture > >> and time. Might one apply to the meaning of ?family?? > >> > >> My understanding of the term ?cognate? is that it pairs two words in > >> different languages with similar meaning and (phonological) form. From > >> google I get: ?...having the same linguistic derivation as another; from > >> the same original word or root (e.g., English is, German ist, Latin est, > >> from Indo-European esti ). So, that strictly speaking Chinese and > English > >> have no cognates? And even if they do, ?family? in English would not > likely > >> have a cognate in Chinese, nor the other way round. > >> I guess the more general point is the importance of the historical when > >> talking about meaning and form in language, especially on the cHat. > >> > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 8, 2018, at 2:12 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>> Martin: > >>> > >>> In Chinese (all Chinese, because all Chinese is based on the common > >> written > >>> language James was speaking of), a couple without children is a "jia". > If > >>> you are single, "jia" refers to your parents. If you are married, your > >>> spouse is your "jia" whether or not you have children. When my > >>> mother-in-law was alive, and my wife and I went home for Spring > Festival, > >>> it was always "hui jia". Now that she is dead, my wife says "hui guo" > >> (i.e. > >>> "return to our country" rather than "return to our family") because > "jia" > >>> refers to me. > >>> > >>> Korean is exactly the same, because the word for "family" is taken from > >>> Chinese. But even in pure Korean, there is a clear connection with > >> housing > >>> (so for example when I humbly refer to my wife in pure, non-Chinese > >>> inflected, Korean I say "uri jibsaram", literally, "the person in our > >>> house"). > >>> > >>> Whorf would probably turn your question around: are there ANY languages > >>> besides Standard Average European that DO have a cognate for > >>> English "family"? The answer in the two articles that Greg sent (Bloch > >> and > >>> Sahlins) seems to be no. On the other hand, both Chinese and Korean do > >> have > >>> the English distinction between "house" and "home", although it is not > >>> grammaticized as it is in English (there is no equivalent for the > >>> grammatical distinction between "in the house" and "at home" because > >>> Chinese has neither prepositions nor articles). > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> > >>> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >>> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >>> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >>> > >>> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >>> > >>> > >>> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:43 AM, Martin Packer > >> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Greg, > >>>> > >>>> The question I initially posted was really very simple: is there a > >>>> language that does not have a cognate to the English word ?family?? (I > >>>> think ?cognate? is the correct term; what I mean is a word that would > >>>> generally be translated as ?family.?) > >>>> > >>>> Now I?ve learned that Chinese (Mandarin?) has a word that might be > best > >>>> translated as ?household.? I find that interesting. > >>>> > >>>> The underlying interest? Yes, I?m trying to make sense of the > >>>> anthropological literature on kinship, and also the psychological > >>>> literature on ?contexts of children?s development.? In both > disciplines > >>>> there seems to be a tendency to assume a definition of family along > the > >>>> lines of child plus biological parents. That?s what I take Malinowski > to > >>>> have been proposing. There are psychologists today who still assume > >> such a > >>>> definition. > >>>> > >>>> But of course it doesn?t work! There are families where the kids are > >>>> adopted. There are married couples where the man, for example, has a > >> secret > >>>> illegitimate child, so they do not form a family. There are single > >> parent > >>>> families. There are families in which a same-sex couple has a child > who > >> is > >>>> not biologically related to them. There are families who had a > surrogate > >>>> mother. There are now families where the child has 3 biological > parents > >>>> (one provided mitochondrial dna). Note that in several of these kinds > of > >>>> family, there is no ?blood? (or genes) shared among the members. > >>>> > >>>> So I started to wonder if there are societies that have nothing that > >> they > >>>> call family! > >>>> > >>>> But I am also trying to figure out where anthropology is today. For > >>>> example, is a distinction still drawn between family, clan, and tribe? > >> If > >>>> so, how are these defined? Sahlins moves between family and clan, for > >>>> instance. I understand that his proposal is that kinship is at root > >> mutual > >>>> relations of being, the way people participate in each other?s > >> existence. > >>>> In that sense, you and I are kin, based on our relationship through > >> xmca. > >>>> But I don?t think that we are family. So what distinguishes the mutual > >>>> relations of being that constitute a family? > >>>> > >>>> These are the things I?m confused about. I am rapidly coming once > again > >> to > >>>> the conclusion that understanding nothing of the matter. :) > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that > my > >>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > >> with > >>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 9:55 PM, Greg Thompson > > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin, > >>>>> > >>>>> Yes, I agree that Sahlins didn't offer much in the way of > >> cross-cultural > >>>>> cognates of "family". But I'm still a little at a loss for why you > are > >> so > >>>>> interested in this English word (e.g., why not "kin"? why not the > >>>> preferred > >>>>> word in some other culture that extends to a different set of > >>>>> relationships). Without a good working definition of what you mean by > >>>>> "family". Do the other examples that people have given "count" as > >>>> "family", > >>>>> e.g., sports teams, brothers-in-arms? Or are you taking the approach > >> that > >>>>> family=father(biological?)+mother(again, biological, and what about > a > >>>>> second father? or a second mother?)+child(biological? and today, > would > >> a > >>>>> dog do in place of a child - e.g., a couple at the park with their > dog > >>>> who > >>>>> refer to their grouping as a "family"?). > >>>>> > >>>>> I guess I'm not sure where you are going with this interest in > "family" > >>>>> (and what has it got to do with the kinship relations of this here > >>>> family?). > >>>>> > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:33 PM, Martin Packer > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Yes, I?ve been reading Sahlins. Very interesting take on kinship, > >> along > >>>>>> the lines of the ?ontological turn? in cultural anthropology. Greg > can > >>>>>> explain that.. :) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But does Sahlins define family? (No!) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or > discuss > >>>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that > >> my > >>>>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end > usually > >>>> with > >>>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 7:07 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > >>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@cantab.net Tue Jan 9 06:56:20 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 09:56:20 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD38F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <1E549DEF-9D19-4842-840C-988BB5B9E427@cantab.net> On Jan 8, 2018, at 12:15 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > And just to give a little sense for the intellectual terrain that I'm in, > I'm arguing against what in anthropology is called a "functionalist" > approach - one in which everything (including all forms of semiosis) could > be explained in terms of how it is adaptive for the long-term survival of a > group of people. And actually I'm normally arguing for the usefulness of a > functional approach b.c. I find anthropologists these days to be far too > dismissive of what is a very useful approach. Hi Greg, An alternative to trying to define ?family? (not just the word, but the entity that it is supposed to refer to) in terms of its constituents (X generations, Y persons with ?blood? connections, etc.) is to try to define it in terms of its functions. The function typically attributed to the family is called ?socialization,? which is a term I greatly dislike, so lets call it ?child care? instead. I think this functional approach is not without its problems: for example, today there are other institutions that also function to care for children, and increasingly younger ones, though we wouldn?t want to call them ?family'; and equally, at the other end of human history, in the hunter-gatherer past that Michael was referring to the ?family group? had many others functions in addition to child care. But it seems worthwhile to try a functional approach. For example, the ?two mothers? in a lovely fieldnotes you shared are, presumably, both ?mothers? because they are each caring for the infant, even though only one was involved in procreation. Which side of the fence regarding functional explanations - pro or con - do you come down on? Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Jan 9 07:12:15 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 08:12:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: <1E549DEF-9D19-4842-840C-988BB5B9E427@cantab.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD38F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1E549DEF-9D19-4842-840C-988BB5B9E427@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin, Depends on who I?m talking to. I say yes to functionalism but no to ?just? functionalism. As Henry and others on the list have pointed out, one of the great troubles in academia is the way that intellectual fashions come and go. And they are either in or out. For most Anthropologists today, functionalism is out, way out (so far out it is almost in ? just a matter of time...). So with anthropologists, I generally argue for the utility of a functionalist viewpoint. But in other fields such as evolutionary psychology and evolutionary sociology, the functionalist perspective rules (and rules out everything else). So when I am talking with those folks, I argue against the functionalist perspective. That?s just how I approach this. I?d be curious to hear your approach. Greg Sent from my iPhone > On Jan 9, 2018, at 7:56 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> On Jan 8, 2018, at 12:15 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> And just to give a little sense for the intellectual terrain that I'm in, >> I'm arguing against what in anthropology is called a "functionalist" >> approach - one in which everything (including all forms of semiosis) could >> be explained in terms of how it is adaptive for the long-term survival of a >> group of people. And actually I'm normally arguing for the usefulness of a >> functional approach b.c. I find anthropologists these days to be far too >> dismissive of what is a very useful approach. > > Hi Greg, > > An alternative to trying to define ?family? (not just the word, but the entity that it is supposed to refer to) in terms of its constituents (X generations, Y persons with ?blood? connections, etc.) is to try to define it in terms of its functions. The function typically attributed to the family is called ?socialization,? which is a term I greatly dislike, so lets call it ?child care? instead. I think this functional approach is not without its problems: for example, today there are other institutions that also function to care for children, and increasingly younger ones, though we wouldn?t want to call them ?family'; and equally, at the other end of human history, in the hunter-gatherer past that Michael was referring to the ?family group? had many others functions in addition to child care. But it seems worthwhile to try a functional approach. For example, the ?two mothers? in a lovely fieldnotes you shared are, presumably, both ?mothers? because they are each caring for the infant, even though only one was involved in procreation. > > Which side of the fence regarding functional explanations - pro or con - do you come down on? > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > From mpacker@cantab.net Tue Jan 9 07:19:13 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 10:19:13 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD38F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1E549DEF-9D19-4842-840C-988BB5B9E427@cantab.net> Message-ID: What has come in, to replace functionalism? The ?ontological turn?? (I doubt it!) Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 9, 2018, at 10:12 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > > Martin, > Depends on who I?m talking to. > > I say yes to functionalism but no to ?just? functionalism. > > As Henry and others on the list have pointed out, one of the great troubles in academia is the way that intellectual fashions come and go. And they are either in or out. For most Anthropologists today, functionalism is out, way out (so far out it is almost in ? just a matter of time...). So with anthropologists, I generally argue for the utility of a functionalist viewpoint. > > But in other fields such as evolutionary psychology and evolutionary sociology, the functionalist perspective rules (and rules out everything else). So when I am talking with those folks, I argue against the functionalist perspective. > > That?s just how I approach this. I?d be curious to hear your approach. > > Greg > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On Jan 9, 2018, at 7:56 AM, Martin Packer wrote: >> >>> On Jan 8, 2018, at 12:15 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> And just to give a little sense for the intellectual terrain that I'm in, >>> I'm arguing against what in anthropology is called a "functionalist" >>> approach - one in which everything (including all forms of semiosis) could >>> be explained in terms of how it is adaptive for the long-term survival of a >>> group of people. And actually I'm normally arguing for the usefulness of a >>> functional approach b.c. I find anthropologists these days to be far too >>> dismissive of what is a very useful approach. >> >> Hi Greg, >> >> An alternative to trying to define ?family? (not just the word, but the entity that it is supposed to refer to) in terms of its constituents (X generations, Y persons with ?blood? connections, etc.) is to try to define it in terms of its functions. The function typically attributed to the family is called ?socialization,? which is a term I greatly dislike, so lets call it ?child care? instead. I think this functional approach is not without its problems: for example, today there are other institutions that also function to care for children, and increasingly younger ones, though we wouldn?t want to call them ?family'; and equally, at the other end of human history, in the hunter-gatherer past that Michael was referring to the ?family group? had many others functions in addition to child care. But it seems worthwhile to try a functional approach. For example, the ?two mothers? in a lovely fieldnotes you shared are, presumably, both ?mothers? because > they are each caring for the infant, even though only one was involved in procreation. >> >> Which side of the fence regarding functional explanations - pro or con - do you come down on? >> >> Martin >> >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Jan 9 09:43:49 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 10:43:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD35A@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9388AD38F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> <1E549DEF-9D19-4842-840C-988BB5B9E427@cantab.net> Message-ID: Well, the first response to functionalism was a pre-eminent concern with the symbolic dimension and the matter of "meaning" (e.g., Geertz) and the cheaper form of phenomenology of the sort that Bourdieu describes in Outline of a Theory of Practice (and which he seeks to transcend with his theory of practice - although most like to say that he ended up too far on the side of structure). And, of course, "agency", which now needs to be specified as "human agency", was a central concern of the response to functionalism. The ontological turn seems to be a response to this overemphasis on meaning/interpretation/ideas (the epistemological) to the neglect of materiality/constitution/embodiment (the ontological - as in "the grounds (pluralized!) of being"). -greg On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 8:19 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > What has come in, to replace functionalism? The ?ontological turn?? (I > doubt it!) > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > On Jan 9, 2018, at 10:12 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > > > > Martin, > > Depends on who I?m talking to. > > > > I say yes to functionalism but no to ?just? functionalism. > > > > As Henry and others on the list have pointed out, one of the great > troubles in academia is the way that intellectual fashions come and go. And > they are either in or out. For most Anthropologists today, functionalism is > out, way out (so far out it is almost in ? just a matter of time...). So > with anthropologists, I generally argue for the utility of a functionalist > viewpoint. > > > > But in other fields such as evolutionary psychology and evolutionary > sociology, the functionalist perspective rules (and rules out everything > else). So when I am talking with those folks, I argue against the > functionalist perspective. > > > > That?s just how I approach this. I?d be curious to hear your approach. > > > > Greg > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > >> On Jan 9, 2018, at 7:56 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> > >>> On Jan 8, 2018, at 12:15 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >>> > >>> And just to give a little sense for the intellectual terrain that I'm > in, > >>> I'm arguing against what in anthropology is called a "functionalist" > >>> approach - one in which everything (including all forms of semiosis) > could > >>> be explained in terms of how it is adaptive for the long-term survival > of a > >>> group of people. And actually I'm normally arguing for the usefulness > of a > >>> functional approach b.c. I find anthropologists these days to be far > too > >>> dismissive of what is a very useful approach. > >> > >> Hi Greg, > >> > >> An alternative to trying to define ?family? (not just the word, but the > entity that it is supposed to refer to) in terms of its constituents (X > generations, Y persons with ?blood? connections, etc.) is to try to define > it in terms of its functions. The function typically attributed to the > family is called ?socialization,? which is a term I greatly dislike, so > lets call it ?child care? instead. I think this functional approach is not > without its problems: for example, today there are other institutions that > also function to care for children, and increasingly younger ones, though > we wouldn?t want to call them ?family'; and equally, at the other end of > human history, in the hunter-gatherer past that Michael was referring to > the ?family group? had many others functions in addition to child care. But > it seems worthwhile to try a functional approach. For example, the ?two > mothers? in a lovely fieldnotes you shared are, presumably, both ?mothers? > because > > they are each caring for the infant, even though only one was involved > in procreation. > >> > >> Which side of the fence regarding functional explanations - pro or con > - do you come down on? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >> > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From h2cmng@yahoo.co.uk Tue Jan 9 10:51:31 2018 From: h2cmng@yahoo.co.uk (peter jones) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 18:51:31 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: kinship In-Reply-To: References: <1512671613171.16045@iped.uio.no> <1513414515401.8449@iped.uio.no> <85ABFDF6-C95B-4103-84FD-34F90283D4E4@uniandes.edu.co> <9C8BF5C8-EEA0-4899-85D7-CEEE289C41B2@gmail.com> <04BD0DBB-AC3A-44D3-887B-3EB45C5AC95D@uniandes.edu.co> <3A3B599E-5F57-4425-BE3E-EA52B1C648DE@cantab.net> <43AEE5BC-EDEE-4EB9-9950-49F890C89CC1@cantab.net> <8CC19E71-B214-459C-BD4C-1B661D9B92B2@cantab.net> <9F0024CE-5E9D-45DD-ACD9-D878B654905C@cantab.net> <6215FF5B-7EA0-4D4A-A03B-DE07DDA303C8@cantab.net> <1515139468562.52670@iped.uio.no> <8711F4D0-9D17-4403-849B-86624946726E@cantab.net> Message-ID: <1648019415.5963192.1515523891519@mail.yahoo.com> Could you start with the main root languages? Back to their origins? Europe Asia Africa Americas... the creation of constructed languages e.g. Unish may also provide insights? Need to incorporate 'mother' ... Peter Jones Community Mental Health Nurse & Researcher CMHT Brookside Aughton Street Ormskirk L39 3BH, UK +44 01695 684700 Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ http://twitter.com/h2cm Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android On Sun, 7 Jan 2018 at 21:24, Greg Thompson wrote: Martin, Well that is a difficult question to answer without knowing what you mean by "family"? What in the world do you mean by "family"? -greg On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > I am struggling with the way ?family? and ?kinship? have been defined, or > not defined, in psychology and anthropology. One question that has occurred > to me is whether a word equivalent to ?family? exists in every language. > When I Google this, Google responds ?Ask Siri??? :( > > Anyone have an idea? > > Martin > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Jan 9 11:41:12 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 12:41:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Deficit linguistics Message-ID: David (Kellogg), In a previous post, you wrote: "The existence or non-existence of semantic variation is the key issue which divided Hasan and Labov, and without it we cannot really make sense of the debate over "deficit linguistics" which appears briefly in the lchc polyphonic autobiography." I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this a bit (perhaps in all directions - help us understand its role in the lchc autobio as well as with Hasan and Labov as well as how you make sense of it). I find it to be an important and really complex issue and I'd love to hear others' takes on it. Cheers, Greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jan 9 13:09:23 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 06:09:23 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Deficit linguistics In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Yes, I meant the section here: http://lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/polyphonic-autobiography/section-1/chapter-2/ See "Cultural Difference Not Cognitive Deficit". It's a short section, and the inquiry is broken off at the threshold. Labov's two conclusions are that his findings with Leon apply to the work on IQ testing, and that having the right social situation is key to finding out what children can really do. Of course, if that's really true that implies that there is some fixed semantic "what children can really do" which then varies across social situations. Is there? Labov is treating black English as if it were a dialect--a variant way of saying the same thing. That's why his best work focuses on phonological variation: you go into a range of New York department stores and you ask for men's fashions, and some of the shop assistants say "fourth floor" and some say "for't floor" and some say "fo' floor", and you treat this, quite justifiably, as ways of saying exactly the same thing. That's also why his explanation of the copula deletion problem (when you can say "They ignorant", to return to Wacqant's data) is phonological. You can say it whenever contraction is possible ("They're ignorant") and you can't say it otherwise ("Yes, they are"). But suppose there are three things to explain and not just two? That is, suppose "They ignorant" and "They are ignorant" and "They're ignorant" are not simply three ways of saying exactly the same thing, but actually three ways of saying slightly different things? If you could ask Wacqant's informants for a fuller expansion of "They ignorant" (e.g. "What did you say? They...?" or, more invasively, "Can you give me THREE words and not TWO?") they might say something like "They IS ignorant" or "They's ignorant" rather than "They're ignorant", because in black English (and increasingly in white English, because of the problem of gendered pronouns--"every student must bring their book) "they" often takes the singular. So we don't just have two different ways of saying exactly the same wording. We have different wordings. Now, do these different wordings (different lexico-grammars) have exactly the same meaning? Labov's answer was yes--their meaning was exactly the same, or at least it could be, because meaning exists essentially outside language, in the social context. Ruqaiya's answer was no--their meaning could not be exactly the same, because social context is in its turn construed (understood, constructed of semiotic material) by wordings. So the interpersonal meaning of "They ignorant" is not the same as "They are ignorant", and even "They IS ignorant" is not the same as "They are ignorant". (I even think that the ideational meaning is different, because "they" with a singular verb suggests a kind of monolithic, homogenous "they" rather than a multivariate, heterogeneous one.) Just as Hasan loved Labov's methods but hated his methodological conclusions, Vygotsky loved Piaget's methods, but hated his methodology. He saw Piaget's explanations as functionalist (and Piaget agreed). For Vygotsky, function can explain structure, but function too needs to be explained, and what explains it is not more functions (turtles all the way down!) but rather the way in which functions change through history. Similarly, for Hasan, grammar does explain phonological variation (rather than, as Labov believed, the other way around), but grammatical variation too needs explanation, and what explains it are variations in meaning, understood to include interpersonal and textual meanings, and not just "truth values". I am reading Braudel. On the one hand, he is full of expressions that no anthropologist would ever use, including "savage", "pitiable", "wild", "miserable" and of course "primitive", and he says that "culture" is weaker and inferior to "civilization". On the other, the way he uses these expressions shows us, at almost every turn, that his real goal is to explain how one of these savage, pitiable, and primitive forms of social organization--our own--was able to wipe out others. The "Cultural Difference Not Cognitive Deficit" section breaks off at the threshold, because it doesn't explain how one cultural difference is able to wipe out all the others. I don't think non-linguistic factors are ever irrelevant, but for precisely that reason I don't think they can stay non-linguistic for long, if they ever were in the first place. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > David (Kellogg), > In a previous post, you wrote: > "The existence or non-existence of semantic variation is the key issue > which divided Hasan and Labov, and without it we cannot really make sense > of the debate over "deficit linguistics" which appears briefly in the lchc > polyphonic autobiography." > > I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this a bit (perhaps in all > directions - help us understand its role in the lchc autobio as well as > with Hasan and Labov as well as how you make sense of it). I find it to be > an important and really complex issue and I'd love to hear others' takes on > it. > > Cheers, > Greg > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jan 9 17:40:46 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 17:40:46 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Deficit linguistics In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Re Labov-- In the following chapter of the lchcautobio there is a brief discussion of our own research concerning Labov's conclusions: http://lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/polyphonic-autobiography/section-2/chapter-3/ A more detailed account for those interested is attached. mike On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:09 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Yes, I meant the section here: > > http://lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/polyphonic-autobiography/section-1/chapter-2/ > > See "Cultural Difference Not Cognitive Deficit". > > It's a short section, and the inquiry is broken off at the threshold. > Labov's two conclusions are that his findings with Leon apply to the work > on IQ testing, and that having the right social situation is key to finding > out what children can really do. Of course, if that's really true that > implies that there is some fixed semantic "what children can really do" > which then varies across social situations. Is there? > > Labov is treating black English as if it were a dialect--a variant way of > saying the same thing. That's why his best work focuses on phonological > variation: you go into a range of New York department stores and you ask > for men's fashions, and some of the shop assistants say "fourth floor" and > some say "for't floor" and some say "fo' floor", and you treat this, quite > justifiably, as ways of saying exactly the same thing. That's also why his > explanation of the copula deletion problem (when you can say "They > ignorant", to return to Wacqant's data) is phonological. You can say it > whenever contraction is possible ("They're ignorant") and you can't say it > otherwise ("Yes, they are"). > > But suppose there are three things to explain and not just two? That is, > suppose "They ignorant" and "They are ignorant" and "They're ignorant" are > not simply three ways of saying exactly the same thing, but actually three > ways of saying slightly different things? If you could ask Wacqant's > informants for a fuller expansion of "They ignorant" (e.g. "What did you > say? They...?" or, more invasively, "Can you give me THREE words and not > TWO?") they might say something like "They IS ignorant" or "They's > ignorant" rather than "They're ignorant", because in black English (and > increasingly in white English, because of the problem of gendered > pronouns--"every student must bring their book) "they" often takes the > singular. So we don't just have two different ways of saying exactly the > same wording. We have different wordings. > > Now, do these different wordings (different lexico-grammars) have exactly > the same meaning? Labov's answer was yes--their meaning was exactly the > same, or at least it could be, because meaning exists essentially outside > language, in the social context. Ruqaiya's answer was no--their meaning > could not be exactly the same, because social context is in its turn > construed (understood, constructed of semiotic material) by wordings. So > the interpersonal meaning of "They ignorant" is not the same as "They are > ignorant", and even "They IS ignorant" is not the same as "They are > ignorant". (I even think that the ideational meaning is different, because > "they" with a singular verb suggests a kind of monolithic, > homogenous "they" rather than a multivariate, heterogeneous one.) > > Just as Hasan loved Labov's methods but hated his methodological > conclusions, Vygotsky loved Piaget's methods, but hated his methodology. He > saw Piaget's explanations as functionalist (and Piaget agreed). For > Vygotsky, function can explain structure, but function too needs to be > explained, and what explains it is not more functions (turtles all the way > down!) but rather the way in which functions change through history. > Similarly, for Hasan, grammar does explain phonological variation (rather > than, as Labov believed, the other way around), but grammatical variation > too needs explanation, and what explains it are variations in meaning, > understood to include interpersonal and textual meanings, and not just > "truth values". > > I am reading Braudel. On the one hand, he is full of expressions that no > anthropologist would ever use, including "savage", "pitiable", "wild", > "miserable" and of course "primitive", and he says that "culture" is weaker > and inferior to "civilization". On the other, the way he uses these > expressions shows us, at almost every turn, that his real goal is to > explain how one of these savage, pitiable, and primitive forms of social > organization--our own--was able to wipe out others. The "Cultural > Difference Not Cognitive Deficit" section breaks off at the threshold, > because it doesn't explain how one cultural difference is able to wipe out > all the others. I don't think non-linguistic factors are ever irrelevant, > but for precisely that reason I don't think they can stay non-linguistic > for long, if they ever were in the first place. > > > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > David (Kellogg), > > In a previous post, you wrote: > > "The existence or non-existence of semantic variation is the key issue > > which divided Hasan and Labov, and without it we cannot really make sense > > of the debate over "deficit linguistics" which appears briefly in the > lchc > > polyphonic autobiography." > > > > I wonder if you might be willing to expand on this a bit (perhaps in all > > directions - help us understand its role in the lchc autobio as well as > > with Hasan and Labov as well as how you make sense of it). I find it to > be > > an important and really complex issue and I'd love to hear others' takes > on > > it. > > > > Cheers, > > Greg > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: cole.hall.dowley.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 2417387 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180109/6c1b3494/attachment-0001.pdf From ajrajala@gmail.com Thu Jan 11 04:33:49 2018 From: ajrajala@gmail.com (Antti Rajala) Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 14:33:49 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Conference on educational theory and methods in Cambridge, August 28-29, 2018 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear colleagues, Recently you received the following call for proposals for the EARLI SIG 17 & 25 conference in Cambridge. Please note that the conference date in the previous message is incorrect.* The correct dates are August 27-28, 2018.* In the conference website the date was correct. Apologize for the inconvenience. Best wishes, Antti Rajala (Program Chair) *** On Fri, Dec 22, 2017 at 3:11 PM, Antti Rajala wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > The second call for proposals is just released for a conference *in the > University of Cambridge, UK, on August 28-29, 2018* that I believe is of > interest to readers of this list. The conference is organized by two > special interest groups (Educational Theory and Methods in Learning > Research) of *European Association of Research on Learning and > Instruction (EARLI).* > > We invite you to consider submissions to what promises to be a stimulating > and interesting event at University of Cambridge UK (August 28-29), with > provoking *keynotes (Martyn Hammersley and Susan Robertson)* and varied > activities! Also, follow the developments on the conference Facebook page > > and on Twitter #theoryandmethods. > > The theme of the conference is* ?Dialogue between ontology and > epistemology: New perspectives on theory and methodology in research on > learning and education?*. This conference theme is intended to provoke > discussions about the relationship between the way in which we go about > researching learning and education (epistemology) and how we understand the > nature of learning and education (ontology). The theme also aims to inspire > submissions coming from different traditions of theorizing and from a broad > range of methodological approaches. The conference offers a space for > exploring and discussing theories and methodologies in research on learning > and education, and to promote friendly debate and reflective dialogue > across paradigms of research. > > *Please, find information about the submission types, review criteria and > organization at www.theoryandmethods.com .* > > With best Christmas wishes, on the behalf of the organizers, > > Antti Rajala > > > ? > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Na?ytto?kuva 2017-12-22 kello 12.19.56.png Type: image/png Size: 799575 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180111/24438472/attachment-0001.png From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu Jan 11 06:05:12 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 06:05:12 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] On the difference between the social and the societal Message-ID: Hi, some of you may be interested in this article where I show that English translations of Marx are missing some important distinctions, without which some aspects just do not make any sense. http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-19.1.2988 This has repercussions on such things as the student learning of *universal *concepts rather versus individual (local) "meanings". There are certain nouns that in Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev etc. always are modified by societal but never by social (including personality, consciousness). German and Russian versions of the same works (Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev) will have a strict equivalence of gesellschaftlich = obshchestvenij (En: societal) and sozial = social'nij (En: social), whereas English texts only use the adjective social. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jan 11 06:22:28 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 01:22:28 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: On the difference between the social and the societal In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <36fb1a93-4f35-0cbb-d5f3-14bc2dc034cc@mira.net> Michael, I studied Marx from 1968 on, but I never learnt the word "societal" until the 2000s, on this list actually. I thought it was just an academic pretension, but someone explained to me the distinction intended. 40 years of studying Marx before hearing the word "societal" does *not* mean I never understood Marx. Really! German, like English, has plenty of words which are used with a number of different meanings, with varying degrees of difference. Should I claim that German-speakers do not understand the meaning of "Gestalt" because in German "Gestalt" has the same meaning as "form" in English? "Gestalt" has a clear meaning, not to be confused with "Form" in every language except German. Andy Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 12/01/2018 1:05 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > Hi, some of you may be interested in this article where I show that English > translations of Marx are missing some important distinctions, without which > some aspects just do not make any sense. > > http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-19.1.2988 > > This has repercussions on such things as the student learning of > *universal *concepts rather versus individual (local) "meanings". There are > certain nouns that in Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev etc. always are modified by > societal but never by social (including personality, consciousness). > > German and Russian versions of the same works (Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev) > will have a strict equivalence of gesellschaftlich = obshchestvenij (En: > societal) and sozial = social'nij (En: social), whereas English texts only > use the adjective social. > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu Jan 11 06:33:36 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 06:33:36 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: On the difference between the social and the societal In-Reply-To: <36fb1a93-4f35-0cbb-d5f3-14bc2dc034cc@mira.net> References: <36fb1a93-4f35-0cbb-d5f3-14bc2dc034cc@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy, I appreciate your knowledge of Marx and Hegel, and I am not saying that you do not understand Marx. I am showing that certain things are not thematic in English translations because it does not make a conceptual distinction. The one I am after allows tying the particular and the general-universal to the distinction between the merely social and the societal. In the extreme case that I am referring to: If, as Vygotsky and Leont'ev state, personality is the ensemble of societal relations, then murders, of which there are so many in the US, do not have somehow deviant personalities, but instead reflect the relations of U.S. society. This is for me an interesting way to think, which allows understanding why all the prisons in the US will fail, even if the prison industry will get bigger and bigger. Also, in the article I am saying, let's take the importance of the distinction as a hypothesis, and then test it out in the different fields. If it turns out that the patterns I show are chance occurrences even despite their very low probability, then so be it. But it is more scientific to test and reject hypotheses than to reject them beforehand. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Michael, I studied Marx from 1968 on, but I never learnt the > word "societal" until the 2000s, on this list actually. I > thought it was just an academic pretension, but someone > explained to me the distinction intended. 40 years of > studying Marx before hearing the word "societal" does *not* > mean I never understood Marx. Really! German, like English, > has plenty of words which are used with a number of > different meanings, with varying degrees of difference. > Should I claim that German-speakers do not understand the > meaning of "Gestalt" because in German "Gestalt" has the > same meaning as "form" in English? "Gestalt" has a clear > meaning, not to be confused with "Form" in every language > except German. > > Andy > > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 12/01/2018 1:05 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > > Hi, some of you may be interested in this article where I show that > English > > translations of Marx are missing some important distinctions, without > which > > some aspects just do not make any sense. > > > > http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-19.1.2988 > > > > This has repercussions on such things as the student learning of > > *universal *concepts rather versus individual (local) "meanings". There > are > > certain nouns that in Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev etc. always are modified > by > > societal but never by social (including personality, consciousness). > > > > German and Russian versions of the same works (Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev) > > will have a strict equivalence of gesellschaftlich = obshchestvenij (En: > > societal) and sozial = social'nij (En: social), whereas English texts > only > > use the adjective social. > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jan 11 07:01:37 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 15:01:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: On the difference between the social and the societal In-Reply-To: References: <36fb1a93-4f35-0cbb-d5f3-14bc2dc034cc@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1515682897331.65547@iped.uio.no> Thanks for sharing, Michael. Surely translation is, has been, and will probably continue being an issue in CHAT discussions. I guess that one thing is making absolute statements about the meaning of a word, and another more productive one is to explore what otherwise non-visible differentiations may emerge from following that translation. I was indeed happy to find that about half of the article is devoted to showing the implications that making the distinction may have across a number of issues/fields. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: 11 January 2018 15:33 To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: On the difference between the social and the societal Hi Andy, I appreciate your knowledge of Marx and Hegel, and I am not saying that you do not understand Marx. I am showing that certain things are not thematic in English translations because it does not make a conceptual distinction. The one I am after allows tying the particular and the general-universal to the distinction between the merely social and the societal. In the extreme case that I am referring to: If, as Vygotsky and Leont'ev state, personality is the ensemble of societal relations, then murders, of which there are so many in the US, do not have somehow deviant personalities, but instead reflect the relations of U.S. society. This is for me an interesting way to think, which allows understanding why all the prisons in the US will fail, even if the prison industry will get bigger and bigger. Also, in the article I am saying, let's take the importance of the distinction as a hypothesis, and then test it out in the different fields. If it turns out that the patterns I show are chance occurrences even despite their very low probability, then so be it. But it is more scientific to test and reject hypotheses than to reject them beforehand. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Michael, I studied Marx from 1968 on, but I never learnt the > word "societal" until the 2000s, on this list actually. I > thought it was just an academic pretension, but someone > explained to me the distinction intended. 40 years of > studying Marx before hearing the word "societal" does *not* > mean I never understood Marx. Really! German, like English, > has plenty of words which are used with a number of > different meanings, with varying degrees of difference. > Should I claim that German-speakers do not understand the > meaning of "Gestalt" because in German "Gestalt" has the > same meaning as "form" in English? "Gestalt" has a clear > meaning, not to be confused with "Form" in every language > except German. > > Andy > > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 12/01/2018 1:05 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > > Hi, some of you may be interested in this article where I show that > English > > translations of Marx are missing some important distinctions, without > which > > some aspects just do not make any sense. > > > > http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-19.1.2988 > > > > This has repercussions on such things as the student learning of > > *universal *concepts rather versus individual (local) "meanings". There > are > > certain nouns that in Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev etc. always are modified > by > > societal but never by social (including personality, consciousness). > > > > German and Russian versions of the same works (Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev) > > will have a strict equivalence of gesellschaftlich = obshchestvenij (En: > > societal) and sozial = social'nij (En: social), whereas English texts > only > > use the adjective social. > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu Jan 11 07:15:53 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 07:15:53 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: On the difference between the social and the societal In-Reply-To: <1515682897331.65547@iped.uio.no> References: <36fb1a93-4f35-0cbb-d5f3-14bc2dc034cc@mira.net> <1515682897331.65547@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo, Yea, I think it is more productive to ask, "What if ...?" than to say something in absolute terms, such as "Marx [really] meant ..." You will also note that I am pointing to specific patterns and to the likelihood that those patterns arise by chance are small. So one question would have serious consequences: "What if personality is the ensemble of societal relations?" How would we have to rethink ourselves, our institutions in the context of crime and violence? What would this mean for rethinking education? Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 7:01 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks for sharing, Michael. Surely translation is, has been, and will > probably continue being an issue in CHAT discussions. I guess that one > thing is making absolute statements about the meaning of a word, and > another more productive one is to explore what otherwise non-visible > differentiations may emerge from following that translation. I was indeed > happy to find that about half of the article is devoted to showing the > implications that making the distinction may have across a number of > issues/fields. > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: 11 January 2018 15:33 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: On the difference between the social and the societal > > Hi Andy, > I appreciate your knowledge of Marx and Hegel, and I am not saying that you > do not understand Marx. I am showing that certain things are not thematic > in English translations because it does not make a conceptual distinction. > The one I am after allows tying the particular and the general-universal to > the distinction between the merely social and the societal. > > In the extreme case that I am referring to: If, as Vygotsky and Leont'ev > state, personality is the ensemble of societal relations, then murders, of > which there are so many in the US, do not have somehow deviant > personalities, but instead reflect the relations of U.S. society. This is > for me an interesting way to think, which allows understanding why all the > prisons in the US will fail, even if the prison industry will get bigger > and bigger. > > Also, in the article I am saying, let's take the importance of the > distinction as a hypothesis, and then test it out in the different fields. > If it turns out that the patterns I show are chance occurrences even > despite their very low probability, then so be it. But it is more > scientific to test and reject hypotheses than to reject them beforehand. > > Michael > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 6:22 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Michael, I studied Marx from 1968 on, but I never learnt the > > word "societal" until the 2000s, on this list actually. I > > thought it was just an academic pretension, but someone > > explained to me the distinction intended. 40 years of > > studying Marx before hearing the word "societal" does *not* > > mean I never understood Marx. Really! German, like English, > > has plenty of words which are used with a number of > > different meanings, with varying degrees of difference. > > Should I claim that German-speakers do not understand the > > meaning of "Gestalt" because in German "Gestalt" has the > > same meaning as "form" in English? "Gestalt" has a clear > > meaning, not to be confused with "Form" in every language > > except German. > > > > Andy > > > > Andy Blunden > > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > On 12/01/2018 1:05 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > > > Hi, some of you may be interested in this article where I show that > > English > > > translations of Marx are missing some important distinctions, without > > which > > > some aspects just do not make any sense. > > > > > > http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-19.1.2988 > > > > > > This has repercussions on such things as the student learning of > > > *universal *concepts rather versus individual (local) "meanings". There > > are > > > certain nouns that in Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev etc. always are modified > > by > > > societal but never by social (including personality, consciousness). > > > > > > German and Russian versions of the same works (Marx, Vygotsky, > Leont'ev) > > > will have a strict equivalence of gesellschaftlich = obshchestvenij > (En: > > > societal) and sozial = social'nij (En: social), whereas English texts > > only > > > use the adjective social. > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > -------------------- > > > Applied Cognitive Science > > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > > University of Victoria > > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > > > > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Fri Jan 12 08:24:33 2018 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:24:33 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? Message-ID: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/51323/title/Secret-Eu genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=emai l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6FETda ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& _hsmi=59944918 Peg Griffin, Ph. D. Washington, DC 20003 From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Fri Jan 12 09:27:21 2018 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 17:27:21 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgZXBpZGVtaWMgb3IgZW5kZW1pYz8gd2hpdGUgc3Vw?= =?utf-8?q?rem-racists_international=09science=3F?= In-Reply-To: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> Message-ID: <1795594814.3460264.1515778041979@mail.yahoo.com> Nightmare!However, today at the psychological faculty of Lomonosov Moscow University, at the faculty created by Alexei Leontyev, explicit racist lectures are read by lecturers on psychogenetics. And I did not hear anything about MSU opening an investigation into this shameful incident.Dostoevsky once said: "If there is no God, then everything is allowed."Today this idea is relevant in a slightly different edition of "If there is no truth, then everything is allowed." Well, or almost everything is allowed, with a correction to politically correct hypocrisy. ??: Peg Griffin ????: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ??????????: ???????, 12 ?????? 2018 19:26 ????: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/51323/title/Secret-Eu genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=emai l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6FETda ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& _hsmi=59944918 Peg Griffin, Ph. D. Washington, DC 20003 From smago@uga.edu Fri Jan 12 11:06:06 2018 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 19:06:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? In-Reply-To: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> Message-ID: I believe that this is London's way of making London a more appealing place for Trump to visit. Recently they have said some not-nice things about him, and that makes him turn from orange to red-orange. On the color scale, that's an escalation of tensions. I see this conference as a validation of his world-view, making the UK less of a shithole of a country to him and his followers. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin Sent: Friday, January 12, 2018 11:25 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/51323/title/Secret-Eu genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=emai l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6FETda ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& _hsmi=59944918 Peg Griffin, Ph. D. Washington, DC 20003 From robsub@ariadne.org.uk Fri Jan 12 11:18:16 2018 From: robsub@ariadne.org.uk (robsub@ariadne.org.uk) Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 19:18:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? In-Reply-To: References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> Message-ID: <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> I was going to joke that I bet Toby Young was on the guest list, but I see he was. Truth is becoming really hard to satirise. Rob On 12/01/2018 19:06, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I believe that this is London's way of making London a more appealing place for Trump to visit. Recently they have said some not-nice things about him, and that makes him turn from orange to red-orange. On the color scale, that's an escalation of tensions. I see this conference as a validation of his world-view, making the UK less of a shithole of a country to him and his followers. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin > Sent: Friday, January 12, 2018 11:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? > > https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/51323/title/Secret-Eu > genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ > ugenics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/&utm_campaign=TS_D > AILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=5994 > 4918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6FETdaZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtU > MYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk&_hsmi=59944918> > &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=emai > l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6FETda > ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& > _hsmi=59944918 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Peg Griffin, Ph. D. > > Washington, DC 20003 > > > > > From jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br Sat Jan 13 15:06:16 2018 From: jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br (jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br) Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 21:06:16 -0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Hi In-Reply-To: <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> Message-ID: <1493d48b453166d5aae09893be842e10@sercomtel.com.br> Hi ... I would like to know if you know papers that articules Vygotsky's theory with the aging process thanks Joao Martins From bferholt@gmail.com Sun Jan 14 10:33:03 2018 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 13:33:03 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Live conversation with Mike Cole on the Polyphonic Autobiography Message-ID: Apologies for the short notice: We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole on Culture, Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members of the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller University days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- will join Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how people are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, what?s relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. The live 60-minute conversation will take place Thursday January 25 at 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept their for future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further information including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. Thanks, Beth -- Beth Ferholt Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From bferholt@gmail.com Sun Jan 14 10:33:45 2018 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 13:33:45 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Live conversation with Mike Cole on the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: there On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > Apologies for the short notice: > > > We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole on Culture, > Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic > Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members > of the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller > University days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- > will join Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how > people are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, > what?s relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. > > > > The live 60-minute conversation will take place Thursday January 25 at > 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept their for > future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email > to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further > information including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. > > > > Thanks, > > Beth > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Associate Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Beth Ferholt Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Jan 14 11:15:06 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 19:15:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hi In-Reply-To: <1493d48b453166d5aae09893be842e10@sercomtel.com.br> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk>, <1493d48b453166d5aae09893be842e10@sercomtel.com.br> Message-ID: <1515957306740.38564@iped.uio.no> Hi Joao, I just did a search in Vygotsky's collected works (English) and the keyword "aging" did not give any entry back. Of course, it depends what you mean by "aging". If with it you mean "being already grown up and then getting even older", then I am not sure you will find explicit discussions about this in Vygotsky other than arguments precisely to specify the special nature of child development as compared to adulthood. There is of course the chapter "The Problem of Age" (Collected works, vol. 5), which happens to have been very much discussed lately in relation to the lead article in the 2017 Issue 4 discussion on Neoformation by Roth, and its commentary by Kellogg. A good place to look at if you are interested in "aging" in Vygotsky. The chapter is transcribed and published in Marxists.org, here: https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/problem-age.htm A discussion regarding how/whether to approach adulthood as involving some form of developmental stages has been had recently here in xmca. Actually, in November there is a thread called "adult development". You can find all discussions had in November here: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/2017-November/thread.html Xmca also allows looking for keywords in the conversations and the archive goes back to 1995! You can search here: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/index.html So, I am not sure you can find a direct answer in these resources, but surely you'll come up with food for posing many other good questions. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br Sent: 14 January 2018 00:06 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br Subject: [Xmca-l] Hi Hi ... I would like to know if you know papers that articules Vygotsky's theory with the aging process thanks Joao Martins From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Jan 14 11:29:34 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 19:29:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? In-Reply-To: <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> , <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> Message-ID: <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> Absolutely difficult to satirise, Rob. As if reason was literally being stretched to push what could be considered to be reasonable, so that at every stretch what few years ago would be absolutely unthinkable becomes not only thinkable but normal. Like Spanish police beating people for going to vote to an (illegal, yet peaceful) referendum in Catalonia and politicians being held for months in prison only for "prevention," while a horde of citizens in other parts of the country encouraging the police like they encourage football teams, "A por ellos!!" Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of robsub@ariadne.org.uk Sent: 12 January 2018 20:18 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? I was going to joke that I bet Toby Young was on the guest list, but I see he was. Truth is becoming really hard to satirise. Rob On 12/01/2018 19:06, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I believe that this is London's way of making London a more appealing place for Trump to visit. Recently they have said some not-nice things about him, and that makes him turn from orange to red-orange. On the color scale, that's an escalation of tensions. I see this conference as a validation of his world-view, making the UK less of a shithole of a country to him and his followers. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin > Sent: Friday, January 12, 2018 11:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? > > https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/51323/title/Secret-Eu > genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ > ugenics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/&utm_campaign=TS_D > AILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=5994 > 4918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6FETdaZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtU > MYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk&_hsmi=59944918> > &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=emai > l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6FETda > ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& > _hsmi=59944918 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Peg Griffin, Ph. D. > > Washington, DC 20003 > > > > > From bferholt@gmail.com Sun Jan 14 11:33:07 2018 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 14:33:07 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography Message-ID: We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24. We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole on Culture, Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members of the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller University days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- will join Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how people are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, what?s relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further information including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. Thanks, Beth -- Beth Ferholt Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From bferholt@gmail.com Sun Jan 14 11:40:40 2018 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 14:40:40 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Live conversation with Mike Cole on the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Date just changed to Wednesday, January 24 -- Apologies for the change, Beth On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > Apologies for the short notice: > > > We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole on Culture, > Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic > Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members > of the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller > University days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- > will join Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how > people are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, > what?s relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. > > > > The live 60-minute conversation will take place Thursday January 25 at > 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept their for > future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email > to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further > information including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. > > > > Thanks, > > Beth > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Associate Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Beth Ferholt Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From nataliag@sfu.ca Sun Jan 14 11:50:31 2018 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 11:50:31 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] CHAT and Critical Thinking -request for suggestions In-Reply-To: <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <426881125.314952.1515959431052.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Hi Dear All! I am in the middle of preparing an invited talk on critical thinking, and I need your's, Dear ALL!, help. Could you, please, let me know if there is a publication you know and like re: "Critical Thinking" within CHAT tradition. You can reply to this message or send me an email to nataliag@sfu.ca I really appreciate all your help. Thank you, Natalia. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 14 13:09:58 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 06:09:58 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hi In-Reply-To: <1515957306740.38564@iped.uio.no> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1493d48b453166d5aae09893be842e10@sercomtel.com.br> <1515957306740.38564@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Joao, Alfredo-- We tend to think of Vygotsky as a psychologist, or an educationalist, or even a developmentalist, and of course he was all of those things. But one of the problems with reading Vygotsky is that he saw himself, and others saw him, principally as a practitioner in three professions that no longer exist, and in order to see Vygotsky as he saw hiimself and as others saw him we really have to reinvent them. I think all three of those no longer existing professions have to do with aging. The first is, of course, defectology, which studies not only children with "circuitous and non-direct forms of development" (that was Vygotsky's formulation and main interest) but also geriatrics and dementia. So for example Vygotsky begins his essay on imagination in the adolescent with examples of advanced Parkinson's patients from a clinic that Cassirer visited in Frankfurt. The second is pedology. As Alfredo says, this is concerned with the "Problem of Age", and the limitation of its domain is the main source of the disagreement between Wolff-Michael and myself. Embryos grow and do not learn. Adults learn and don't grow. I think pedology is restricted to human beings who are growing and learning at one and the same time, because development is essentially the interaction between the two. But the third is hardly ever mentioned. Vygotsky was involved, particularly towards the end of his life, with something called "psychotechnics", which doesn't exist for us simply because it cannot. It was the science of providing jobs for young adults. When my wife was going to school, this was a major concern for the Chinese government: the idea was "yi ge luobo, yi ge kang" (that is, one radish sprout for one hole): each person who graduates from college has a lifetime position in a planned economy. Needless to say, this is no longer a concern for the Chinese state. I remember when the dean announced that the "fen pei" system of psychotechnics was being abolished and our graduates were told to look for their own jobs. Not everybody cheered, and for good reason. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:15 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Joao, > > I just did a search in Vygotsky's collected works (English) and the > keyword "aging" did not give any entry back. Of course, it depends what you > mean by "aging". If with it you mean "being already grown up and then > getting even older", then I am not sure you will find explicit discussions > about this in Vygotsky other than arguments precisely to specify the > special nature of child development as compared to adulthood. > > There is of course the chapter "The Problem of Age" (Collected works, vol. > 5), which happens to have been very much discussed lately in relation to > the lead article in the 2017 Issue 4 discussion on Neoformation by Roth, > and its commentary by Kellogg. A good place to look at if you are > interested in "aging" in Vygotsky. > > The chapter is transcribed and published in Marxists.org, here: > https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/problem-age.htm > > A discussion regarding how/whether to approach adulthood as involving some > form of developmental stages has been had recently here in xmca. Actually, > in November there is a thread called "adult development". You can find all > discussions had in November here: > > https://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/2017-November/thread.html > > Xmca also allows looking for keywords in the conversations and the archive > goes back to 1995! You can search here: > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/index.html > > So, I am not sure you can find a direct answer in these resources, but > surely you'll come up with food for posing many other good questions. > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br > Sent: 14 January 2018 00:06 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br > Subject: [Xmca-l] Hi > > Hi ... I would like to know if you know papers that articules Vygotsky's > theory with the aging process > > thanks > > Joao Martins > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Sun Jan 14 13:39:08 2018 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 16:39:08 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Critical Thinking -request for suggestions In-Reply-To: <426881125.314952.1515959431052.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> <426881125.314952.1515959431052.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: Hi Natalia, Here is a piece I appreciate on the distinctions between Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy. *Robert Lake* Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy: Relations, Differences, and Limits Nicholas C. Burbules and Rupert Berk Department of Educational Policy Studies Published in Critical Theories in Education, Thomas S. Popkewitz and Lynn Fendler, eds. (NY: Routledge, 1999). Two literatures have shaped much of the writing in the educational foundations over the past two decades: Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy. Each has its textual reference points, its favored authors, and its desired audiences. Each invokes the term "critical" as a valued educational goal: urging teachers to help students become more skeptical toward commonly accepted truisms. Each says, in its own way, "Do not let yourself be deceived." And each has sought to reach and influence particular groups of educators, at all levels of schooling, through workshops, lectures, and pedagogical texts. They share a passion and sense of urgency about the need for more critically oriented classrooms. Yet with very few exceptions these literatures do not discuss one another. Is this because they propose conflicting visions of what "critical" thought entails? Are their approaches to pedagogy incompatible? Might there be moments of insight that each can offer the other? Do they perhaps share common limitations, which through comparison become more apparent? Are there other ways to think about becoming "critical" that stand outside these traditions, but which hold educational significance? These are the questions motivating this essay. We will begin by contrasting Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy in terms of their conception of what it means to be "critical." We will suggest some important similarities, and differences, in how they frame this topic. Each tradition has to some extent criticized the other; and each has been criticized, sometimes along similar lines, by other perspectives, especially feminist and poststructural perspectives. These lines of reciprocal and external criticism, in turn, lead us to suggest some different ways to think about "criticality." At a broad level, Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy share some common concerns. They both imagine a general population in society who are to some extent deficient in the abilities or dispositions that would allow them to discern certain kinds of inaccuracies, distortions, and even falsehoods. They share a concern with how these inaccuracies, distortions, and falsehoods limit freedom, though this concern is more explicit in the Critical Pedagogy tradition, which sees society as fundamentally divided by relations of unequal power. Critical Pedagogues are specifically concerned with the influences of educational knowledge, and of cultural formations generally, that perpetuate or legitimate an unjust status quo; fostering a critical capacity in citizens is a way of enabling them to resist such power effects. Critical Pedagogues take sides, on behalf of those groups who are disenfranchised from social, economic, and political possibilities. Many Critical Thinking authors would cite similar concerns, but regard them as subsidiary to the more inclusive problem of people basing their life choices on unsubstantiated truth claims ? a problem that is nonpartisan in its nature or effects. For Critical Thinking advocates, all of us need to be better critical thinkers, and there is often an implicit hope that enhanced critical thinking could have a *general* humanizing effect, across all social groups and classes. In this sense, both Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy authors would argue that by helping to make people more critical in thought and action, progressively minded educators can help to free learners to see the world as it is and to act accordingly; critical education can increase freedom and enlarge the scope of human possibilities. Yet, as one zooms in, further differences appear. The Critical Thinking tradition concerns itself primarily with criteria of epistemic adequacy: to be "critical" basically means to be more discerning in recognizing faulty arguments, hasty generalizations, assertions lacking evidence, truth claims based on unreliable authority, ambiguous or obscure concepts, and so forth. For the Critical Thinker, people do not sufficiently analyze the reasons by which they live, do not examine the assumptions, commitments, and logic of daily life. As Richard Paul puts it, the basic problem is irrational, illogical, and unexamined living. He believes that people need to learn how to express and criticize the logic of arguments that underpin our everyday activity: "The art of explicating, analyzing, and assessing these ?arguments? and ?logic? is essential to leading an examined life" (Paul 1990, 66). The prime tools of Critical Thinking are the skills of formal and informal logic, conceptual analysis, and epistemology. The primary preoccupation of Critical Thinking is to supplant sloppy or distorted thinking with thinking based upon reliable procedures of inquiry. Where our beliefs remain unexamined, we are not free; we act without thinking about why we act, and thus do not exercise control over our own destinies. For the Critical Thinking tradition, as Harvey Siegel states, critical thinking aims at self-sufficiency, and "a self-sufficient person is a liberated person...free from the unwarranted and undesirable control of unjustified beliefs" (Siegel, 1988, 58). The Critical Pedagogy tradition begins from a very different starting point. It regards specific belief claims, not primarily as propositions to be assessed for their truth content, but as parts of systems of belief and action that have aggregate effects within the power structures of society. It asks first about these systems of belief and action, *who benefits*? The primary preoccupation of Critical Pedagogy is with social injustice and how to transform inequitable, undemocratic, or oppressive institutions and social relations. At some point, assessments of truth or conceptual slipperiness might come into the discussion (different writers in the Critical Pedagogy tradition differ in this respect), but they are in the service of demonstrating how certain power effects occur, not in the service of pursuing Truth in some dispassioned sense (Burbules 1992/1995). Indeed, a crucial dimension of this approach is that certain claims, even if they might be "true" or substantiated within particular confines and assumptions, might nevertheless be partisan in their effects. Assertions that African-Americans score lower on IQ tests, for example, even if it is a "fact" that this particular population does on average score lower on this particular set of tests, leaves significant larger questions unaddressed, not the least of which is what effect such assertions have on a general population that is not aware of the important limits of these tests or the tenuous relation, at best, between "what IQ tests measure" and "intelligence." Other important questions, from this standpoint, include: Who is making these assertions? Why are they being made at this point in time? Who funds such research? Who promulgates these "findings"? Are they being raised to question African-American intelligence or to demonstrate the bias of IQ tests? Such questions, from the Critical Pedagogy perspective, are not external to, or separable from, the import of also weighing the evidentiary base for such claims. Now, the Critical Thinking response to this approach will be that these are simply two different, perhaps both valuable, endeavors. It is one thing to question the evidentiary base (or logic, or clarity, or coherence) of a particular claim, and to find it wanting. This is one kind of critique, adequate and worthwhile on its own terms. It is something else, something separate, to question the motivation behind those who propound certain views, their group interests, the effects of their claims on society, and so forth. That sort of critique might also be worthwhile (we suspect that most Critical Thinking authors would say that it *is* worthwhile), but it depends on a different sort of analysis, with a different burden of argument ? one that philosophers may have less to contribute to than would historians or sociologists, for example. The response, in turn, from the Critical Pedagogy point of view is that the two levels cannot be kept separate because the standards of epistemic adequacy themselves (valid argument, supporting evidence, conceptual clarity, and so on) *and the particular ways in which these standards are invoked and interpreted in particular settings* inevitably involve the very same considerations of who, where, when, and why that any other social belief claims raise. Moreover, such considerations inevitably blur into and influence epistemic matters in a narrower sense, such as how research questions are defined, the methods of such research, and the qualifications of the researchers and writers who produce such writings for public attention. But neither the Critical Thinking nor the Critical Pedagogy tradition is monolithic or homogeneous, and a closer examination of each reveals further dimensions of these similarities and differences. Critical Thinking A concern with critical thinking in education, in the broad sense of teaching students the rules of logic or how to assess evidence, is hardly new: it is woven throughout the Western tradition of education, from the Greeks to the Scholastics to the present day. Separate segments of the curriculum have often been dedicated to such studies, especially at higher levels of schooling. What the Critical Thinking movement has emphasized is the idea that specific reasoning skills undergird the curriculum as a whole; that the purpose of education generally is to foster critical thinking; and that the skills and dispositions of critical thinking can and should infuse teaching and learning at all levels of schooling. Critical thinking is linked to the idea of rationality itself, and developing rationality is seen as a prime, if not *the *prime, aim of education (see, for example, Siegel 1988). The names most frequently associated with this tradition, at least in the United States, include Robert Ennis, John McPeck, Richard Paul, Israel Scheffler, and Harvey Siegel. While a detailed survey of their respective views, and the significant differences among their outlooks, is outside our scope here, a few key themes and debates have emerged in recent years within this field of inquiry. To Critical Thinking, the critical person is something like a critical consumer of information; he or she is driven to seek reasons and evidence. Part of this is a matter of mastering certain skills of thought: learning to diagnose invalid forms of argument, knowing how to make and defend distinctions, and so on. Much of the literature in this area, especially early on, seemed to be devoted to lists and taxonomies of what a "critical thinker" should know and be able to do (Ennis 1962, 1980). More recently, however, various authors in this tradition have come to recognize that teaching content and skills is of minor import if learners do not also develop the dispositions or inclination to look at the world through a critical lens. By this, Critical Thinking means that the critical person has not only the capacity (the skills) to seek reasons, truth, and evidence, but also that he or she has the drive (disposition) to seek them. For instance, Ennis claims that a critical person not only should seek reasons and try to be well informed, but that he or she should have a tendency to do such things (Ennis 1987, 1996). Siegel criticizes Ennis somewhat for seeing dispositions simply as what animates the skills of critical thinking, because this fails to distinguish sufficiently the critical thinker from critical thinking. For Siegel, a cluster of dispositions (the "critical spirit") is more like a deep-seated character trait, something like Scheffler?s notion of "a love of truth and a contempt of lying" (Siegel 1988; Scheffler 1991). It is part of critical thinking itself. Paul also stresses this distinction between skills and dispositions in his distinction between "weak-sense" and "strong-sense" critical thinking. For Paul, the "weak-sense" means that one has learned the skills and can demonstrate them when asked to do so; the "strong-sense" means that one has incorporated these skills into a way of living in which one?s own assumptions are re-examined and questioned as well. According to Paul, a critical thinker in the "strong sense" has a passionate drive for "clarity, accuracy, and fairmindedness" (Paul 1983, 23; see also Paul 1994). This dispositional view of critical thinking has real advantages over the skills-only view. But in important respects it is still limited. First, it is not clear exactly what is entailed by making such dispositions *part of *critical thinking. In our view it not only broadens the notion of criticality beyond mere "logicality," but it necessarily requires a greater attention to institutional contexts and social relations than Critical Thinking authors have provided. Both the skills-based view and the skills-plus-dispositions view are still focused on the individual person. But it is only in the context of social relations that these dispositions or character traits can be formed or expressed, and for this reason the practices of critical thinking *inherently *involve bringing about certain social conditions. Part of what it is to be a critical thinker is to be engaged in certain kinds of conversations and relations with others; and the kinds of social circumstances that promote or inhibit that must therefore be part of the examination of what Critical Thinking is trying to achieve. A second theme in the Critical Thinking literature has been the extent to which critical thinking can be characterized as a set of generalized abilities and dispositions, as opposed to content-specific abilities and dispositions that are learned and expressed differently in different areas of investigation. Can a general "Critical Thinking" course develop abilities and dispositions that will then be applied in any of a range of fields; or should such material be presented specifically in connection to the questions and content of particular fields of study? Is a scientist who is a critical thinker doing the same things as an historian who is a critical thinker? When each evaluates "good evidence," are they truly thinking about problems in similar ways, or are the differences in interpretation and application dominant? This debate has set John McPeck, the chief advocate of content-specificity, in opposition to a number of other theorists in this area (Norris 1992; Talaska 1992). This issue relates not only to the question of how we might teach critical thinking, but also to how and whether one can test for a general facility in critical thinking (Ennis 1984). A third debate has addressed the question of the degree to which the standards of critical thinking, and the conception of rationality that underlies them, are culturally biased in favor of a particular masculine and/or Western mode of thinking, one that implicitly devalues other "ways of knowing." Theories of education that stress the primary importance of logic, conceptual clarity, and rigorous adherence to scientific evidence have been challenged by various advocates of cultural and gender diversity who emphasize respect for alternative world views and styles of reasoning. Partly in response to such criticisms, Richard Paul has developed a conception of critical thinking that regards "sociocentrism" as itself a sign of flawed thinking (Paul 1994). Paul believes that, because critical thinking allows us to overcome the sway of our egocentric and sociocentric beliefs, it is "essential to our role as moral agents and as potential shapers of our own nature and destiny" (Paul 1990, 67). For Paul, and for some other Critical Thinking authors as well, part of the method of critical thinking involves fostering dialogue, in which thinking from the perspective of others is also relevant to the assessment of truth claims; a too-hasty imposition of one?s own standards of evidence might result not only in a premature rejection of credible alternative points of view, but might also have the effect of silencing the voices of those who (in the present context) need to be encouraged as much as possible to speak for themselves. In this respect, we see Paul introducing into the very definition of critical thinking some of the sorts of social and contextual factors that Critical Pedagogy writers have emphasized. Critical Pedagogy The idea of Critical Pedagogy begins with the neo-Marxian literature on Critical Theory (Stanley 1992). The early Critical Theorists (most of whom were associated with the Frankfurt School) believed that Marxism had underemphasized the importance of cultural and media influences for the persistence of capitalism; that maintaining conditions of ideological hegemony were important for (in fact inseparable from) the legitimacy and smooth working of capitalist economic relations. One obvious example would be in the growth of advertising as both a spur to rising consumption and as a means of creating the image of industries driven only by a desire to serve the needs of their customers. As consumers, as workers, and as winners or losers in the marketplace of employment, citizens in a capitalist society need both to know their "rightful" place in the order of things and to be reconciled to that destiny. Systems of education are among the institutions that foster and reinforce such beliefs, through the rhetoric of meritocracy, through testing, through tracking, through vocational training or college preparatory curricula, and so forth (Bowles & Gintis 1976; Apple 1979; Popkewitz 1991). Critical Pedagogy represents, in a phrase, the reaction of progressive educators against such institutionalized functions. It is an effort to work within educational institutions and other media to raise questions about inequalities of power, about the false myths of opportunity and merit for many students, and about the way belief systems become internalized to the point where individuals and groups abandon the very aspiration to question or change their lot in life. Some of the authors mostly strongly associated with this tradition include Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, and Ira Shor. In the language of Critical Pedagogy, the critical person is one who is empowered to seek justice, to seek emancipation. Not only is the critical person adept at recognizing injustice but, for Critical Pedagogy, that person is also moved to change it. Here Critical Pedagogy wholeheartedly takes up Marx's Thesis XI on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it" (Marx 1845/1977, 158). This emphasis on change, and on collective action to achieve it, moves the central concerns of Critical Pedagogy rather far from those of Critical Thinking: the endeavor to teach others to think critically is less a matter of fostering individual skills and dispositions, and more a consequence of the *pedagogical relations*, between teachers and students and among students, which promote it; furthermore, the object of thinking critically is not only against demonstrably false beliefs, but also those that are misleading, partisan, or implicated in the preservation of an unjust status quo. The author who has articulated these concerns most strongly is Paulo Freire, writing originally within the specific context of promoting adult literacy within Latin American peasant communities, but whose work has taken on an increasingly international interest and appeal in the past three decades (Freire 1970a, 1970b, 1973, 1985; McLaren & Lankshear 1993; McLaren & Leonard 1993). For Freire, Critical Pedagogy is concerned with the development of *conscienticizao*, usually translated as "critical consciousness."Freedom, for Freire, begins with the recognition of a system of oppressive relations, and one?s own place in that system. The task of Critical Pedagogy is to bring members of an oppressed group to a critical consciousness of their situation as a beginning point of their liberatory *praxis*. Change in consciousness and concrete action are linked for Freire; the greatest single barrier against the prospect of liberation is an ingrained, fatalistic belief in the inevitability and necessity of an unjust status quo. One important way in which Giroux develops this idea is in his distinction between a "language of critique" and a "language of possibility" (Giroux 1983, 1988). As he stresses, both are essential to the pursuit of social justice. Giroux points to what he sees as the failure of the radical critics of the new sociology of education because, in his view, they offered a language of critique, but not a language of possibility. They saw schools primarily as instruments for the reproduction of capitalist relations and for the legitimation of dominant ideologies, and thus were unable to construct a discourse for "counterhegemonic" practices in schools (Giroux 1988, 111-112). Giroux stresses the importance of developing a language of possibility as part of what makes a person critical. As he puts it, the aim of the critical educator should be "to raise ambitions, desires, and real hope for those who wish to take seriously the issue of educational struggle and social justice" (Giroux 1988, 177). For both Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy, "criticality" requires that one be moved to do something, whether that something be seeking reasons or seeking social justice. For Critical Thinking, it is not enough to know how to seek reasons, truth, and understanding; one must also be impassioned to pursue them rigorously. For Critical Pedagogy, that one can critically reflect and interpret the world is not sufficient; one must also be willing and able to act to change that world. From the standpoint of Critical Pedagogy the Critical Thinking tradition assumes an overly direct connection between reasons and action. For instance, when Ennis conceives Critical Thinking as "reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or to do," the assumption is that "deciding" usually leads relatively unproblematically to the "doing" (Ennis 1987). The model of practical reasoning on which this view depends assumes a relatively straightforward relation, in most cases, between the force of reasons and action. But for Critical Pedagogy the problems of overcoming oppressed thinking and demoralization are more complex than this: changing thought and practice must occur together; they fuel one another. For Freire, criticality requires *praxis* ? both reflection and action, both interpretation and change. As he puts it, "Critical consciousness is brought about not through intellectual effort alone but through *praxis* ? through the authentic union of action and reflection" (Freire 1970a, 48). Critical Pedagogy would never find it sufficient to reform the habits of thought of thinkers, however effectively, without challenging and transforming the institutions, ideologies, and relations that engender distorted, oppressed thinking in the first place ? not as an additional act beyond the pedagogical one, but as an inseparable part of it. For Critical Thinking, at most, the development of more discerning thinkers might make them *more likely* to undermine discreditable institutions, to challenge misleading authorities, and so on ? but this would be a separate consequence of the attainment of Critical Thinking, not part of it. A second central theme in Freire?s work, which has fundamentally shaped the Critical Pedagogy tradition, is his particular focus on "literacy." At the ground level, what motivated Freire?s original work was the attempt to develop an adult literacy program, one in which developing the capacity to read was tied into developing an enhanced sense of individual and collective self-esteem and confidence. To be illiterate, for Freire, was not only to lack the skills of reading and writing; it was to feel powerless and dependent in a much more general way as well. The challenge to an adult literacy campaign was not only to provide skills, but to address directly the self-contempt and sense of powerlessness that he believed accompanied illiteracy (Freire 1970b). Hence his approach to fostering literacy combined the development of basic skills in reading and writing; the development of a sense of confidence and efficacy, especially in collective thought and action; and the desire to change, not only one?s self, but the circumstances of one?s social group. The pedagogical method that he thinks promote all of these is *dialogue*: "cultural action for freedom is characterized by dialogue, and its preeminent purpose is to conscientize the people" (Freire 1970a, 47). Richard Paul says similarly that "dialogical thinking" is inherent to Critical Thinking (Paul 1990). However, there is more of a social emphasis to dialogue within Critical Pedagogy: dialogue occurs between people, not purely as a form of dialogical thought. Here again Critical Pedagogy focuses more upon institutional settings and relations between individuals, where Critical Thinking?s focus is more on the individuals themselves. In other words, dialogue directly involves others, while one person?s development of "dialogical thinking" may only indirectly involve others. Yet the work of Vygotsky and others would argue that the development of such capacities for individuals necessarily involves social interactions as well. Paul addresses this point, but it does not play the central role in his theory that it does for Freire and other Critical Pedagogues ? still, Paul appears to us to be somewhat of a transitional figure between these two traditions. The method of Critical Pedagogy for Freire involves, to use his phrase, "reading the world" as well as "reading the word" (Freire & Macedo 1987). Part of developing a critical consciousness, as noted above, is critiquing the social relations, social institutions, and social traditions that create and maintain conditions of oppression. For Freire, the teaching of literacy is a primary form of cultural action, and as action it must "relate speaking the word to transforming reality" (Freire 1970a, 4). To do this, Freire uses what he calls *codifications*: representative images that both "illustrate" the words or phrases students are learning to read, and also represent problematic social conditions that become the focus of collective dialogue (and, eventually, the object of strategies for potential change). The process of *decodification* is a kind of "reading" ? a "reading" of social dynamics, of forces of reaction or change, of why the world is as it is, and how it might be made different. Decodification is the attempt to "read the world" with the same kind of perspicacity with which one is learning to "read the word." In this important regard, Critical Pedagogy shares with Critical Thinking the idea that there is something *real* about which they can raise the consciousness of people. Both traditions believe that there is something given, against which mistaken beliefs and distorted perceptions can be tested. In both, there is a drive to bring people to recognize "the way things are" (Freire 1970a, 17). In different words, Critical Pedagogy and Critical Thinking arise from the same sentiment to overcome ignorance, to test the distorted against the true, to ground effective human action in an accurate sense of social reality. Of course, how each movement talks about "the way things are" is quite different. For Critical Thinking, this is about empirically demonstrable facts. For Critical Pedagogy, on the other hand, this is about the intersubjective attempt to formulate and agree upon a common understanding about "structures of oppression" and "relations of domination." As we have discussed, there is more to this process than simply determining the "facts"; but, in the end, for Freire as for any other Marxist tradition, this intersubjective process is thought to be grounded in a set of objective conditions. Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy In the discussion so far, we have tried to emphasize some relations and contrasts between the Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy traditions. To the extent that they have addressed one another, the commentary has often been antagonistic: The most powerful, yet limited, definition of critical thinking comes out of the positivist tradition in the applied sciences and suffers from what I call the Internal Consistency position. According to the adherents of the Internal Consistency position, critical thinking refers primarily to teaching students how to analyze and develop reading and writing assignments from the perspective of formal, logical patterns of consistency....While all of the learning skills are important, their limitations as a whole lie in what is excluded, and it is with respect to what is missing that the ideology of such an approach is revealed (Giroux 1994, 200-201). Although I hesitate to dignify Henry Giroux?s article on citizenship with a reply, I find it hard to contain myself. The article shows respect neither for logic nor for the English language....Giroux?s own bombastic, jargon-ridden rhetoric...is elitist in the worst sense: it is designed to erect a barrier between the author and any reader not already a member of the "critical" cult (Schrag 1988, 143). There are other, more constructive engagements, however. Certain authors within each tradition have seriously tried to engage the concerns of the other ? although, interestingly, the purpose of such investigations has usually been to demonstrate that all of the truly beneficial qualities of the other tradition can be reconciled with the best of one?s own, without any of the purported drawbacks: It should be clear that my aim is not to discredit the ideal of critical thinking. Rather, I question whether the practices of teaching critical thinking...as it has evolved into the practice of teaching informal logic is *sufficient* for actualizing the ideal. I have argued that it is not sufficient, if "critical thinking" includes the ability to decode the political nature of events and institutions, and if it includes the ability to envision alternative events and institutions (Kaplan 1991/1994, 217, emphasis added). Postmodernism, or any other perspective which seriously endorses radical or progressive social and educational change, requires an epistemology which endorses truth and justification as viable theoretical notions. That is to say: Postmodern advocacy of radical pedagogies (and politics) requires Old-Fashioned Epistemology (Siegel 1993, 22). >From the perspective of Critical Thinking, Critical Pedagogy crosses a threshold between teaching criticality and indoctrinating. Teaching students to think critically must include allowing them to come to their own conclusions; yet Critical Pedagogy seems to come dangerously close to prejudging what those conclusions must be. Critical Pedagogy see this threshold problem conversely: indoctrination is the case already; students must be brought to criticality, and this can only be done by alerting them to the social conditions that have brought this about. In short, we can restate the problem as follows: Critical Thinking?s claim is, at heart, to teach how to think critically, not how to think politically; for Critical Pedagogy, this is a false distinction. For Critical Pedagogy, as we have discussed, self-emancipation is contingent upon social emancipation. It is not only a difference between an emphasis on the individual and an emphasis on society as a whole; both Critical Pedagogy and Critical Thinking want "criticality" in both senses (Missimer 1989/1994; Hostetler 1991/1994). It is rather that, for Critical Pedagogy, individual criticality is intimately linked to social criticality, joining, in Giroux?s phrase, "the conditions for social, and hence, self-emancipation" (Giroux 1988, 110). For Critical Thinking, the attainment of individual critical thinking may, with success for enough people, *lead to* an increase in critical thinking socially, but it does not depend upon it. These traditions also explicitly differ from one another in the different problems and contexts they regard as issues. Critical Thinking assumes no set agenda of issues that must be addressed. To try to bring someone to criticality necessarily precludes identifying any fixed set of questions about particular social, moral, political, economic, and cultural issues, let alone a fixed set of answers. As already noted, this is not to say that those involved in the Critical Thinking movement do not think that social justice is an important issue; nor to say that people such as Ennis, Paul, and Siegel do not wish to see those sorts of issues addressed ? in fact, they occasionally assert quite explicitly that they do. It is rather that, as Critical Thinking understands criticality, "impartiality" is a key virtue. They strive not to push their students along certain lines, nor to impose certain values (the fact/value distinction is a central thesis of the analytical tradition that informs much of Critical Thinking). Socially relevant cases might be pedagogically beneficial as the "raw material" on which to practice the skills and dispositions of Critical Thinking, because they are salient for many learners in a classroom. But they are not intrinsically important to Critical Thinking itself; in many cases purely symbolic cases could be used to teach the same elements (as in the use of symbols or empty X?s and Y?s to teach logic). Hence, Critical Thinking tends to address issues in an item-by-item fashion, not within a grand scheme with other issues. The issues themselves may have relations to one another, and they may have connections to broader themes, but those relations and connections are not the focus of investigation. What is crucial to the issue at hand is the interplay of an immediate cluster of evidence, reasons, and arguments. For Critical Thinking, what is important is to describe the issue, give the various reasons for and against, and draw out any assumptions (and only those) that have immediate and direct bearing on the argument. This tends to produce a more analytical and less wholistic mode of critique. When Critical Pedagogy talks about power and the way in which it structures social relations, it inevitably draws from a context, a larger narrative, within which these issues are framed; and typically sees it as part of the artificiality and abstractness of Critical Thinking that it does not treat such matters as central. Critical Pedagogy looks to how an issue relates to "deeper" explanations ? deeper in the sense that they refer to the basic functioning of power on institutional and societal levels. For Critical Pedagogy, it makes no sense to talk about issues on a nonrelational, item-by-item basis. Where Critical Thinking emphasizes the immediate reasons and assumptions of an argument, Critical Pedagogy wants to draw in for consideration factors that may appear at first of less immediate relevance. We do not want to imply merely that Critical Pedagogy wants people to get the "big picture" whereas Critical Thinking does not. Oftentimes, their "big pictures" are simply going to be different. The important point is why they are different, and the difference resides in the fact that whereas Critical Thinking is quite reluctant to prescribe any particular context for a discussion, Critical Pedagogy shows enthusiasm for a particular one ? one that tends to view social matters within a framework of struggles over social justice, the workings of capitalism, and forms of cultural and material oppression. As noted, this favoring of a particular narrative seems to open Critical Pedagogy up to a charge of indoctrination by Critical Thinking: that everything is up for questioning within Critical Pedagogy except the categories and premises of Critical Pedagogy itself. But the Critical Pedagogue?s counter to this is that Critical Thinking?s apparent "openness" and impartiality simply enshrine many conventional assumptions as presented by the popular media, traditional textbooks, etc., in a manner that intentionally or not teaches political conformity; *particular* claims are scrutinized critically, while a less visible set of social norms and practices ? including, notably, many particular to the structure and activities of schooling itself ? continue to operate invisibly in the background. In short, each of these traditions regards the other as *insufficiently* critical; each defines, in terms of its own discourse and priorities, key elements that it believes the other neglects to address. Each wants to acknowledge a certain value in the goals the other aspires to, but argues that its means are inadequate to attain them. What is most interesting, from our standpoint, is not which of these traditions is "better," but the fascinating way in which each wants to claim sovereignty over the other; each claiming to include all the truly beneficial insights of the other, and yet more ? and, as we will see, how each has been subject to criticisms that may make them appear more as related rivals than as polar opposites. Criticisms of Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy It will not have been lost on many readers that when we listed the prime authors in both the Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy traditions, all listed were male. There are certainly significant women writing within each tradition, but the chief spokespersons, and the most visible figures in the debates between these traditions, have been men. Not surprisingly, then, both traditions have been subject to criticisms, often from feminists, that their ostensibly universal categories and issues in fact exclude the voices and concerns of women and other groups. In the case of Critical Thinking, as noted earlier, this has typically taken the form of an attack on the "rationalistic" underpinnings of its epistemology: that its logic is different from "women?s logic," that its reliance on empirical evidence excludes other sources of evidence or forms of verification (experience, emotion, feeling) ? in short, that its masculinist way of knowing is different from "women?s ways of knowing" (for example, Belenky et al. 1986; Thayer-Bacon 1993). Other arguments do not denigrate the concerns of Critical Thinking entirely, but simply want to relegate them to *part* of what we want to accomplish educationally (Arnstine 1991; Garrison & Phelan 1990; Noddings 1984; Warren 1994). Often these criticisms, posed by women with distinctive feminist concerns in mind, also bring in a concern with Critical Thinking?s exclusion or neglect of ways of thought of other racial or ethnic groups as well ? though the problems of "essentializing" such groups, as if they "naturally" thought differently from white men, has made some advocates cautious about overgeneralizing these concerns. Critical Pedagogy has been subject to similar, and occasionally identical, criticisms. Claims that Critical Pedagogy is "rationalistic," that its purported reliance on "open dialogue" in fact masks a closed and paternal conversation, that it excludes issues and voices that other groups bring to educational encounters, have been asserted with some force (Ellsworth 1989; Gore 1993). In this case, the sting of irony is especially strong. After all, advocates of Critical Thinking would hardly feel the accusation of being called "rationalistic" as much of an insult; but for Critical Pedagogy, given its discourse of emancipation, to be accused of being yet another medium of oppression is a sharp rebuke. Are these criticisms justified? Certainly the advocates of these traditions have tried to defend themselves against the accusation of being "exclusionary" (Siegel 1996; Giroux 1992c). The arguments have been long and vigorous, and we cannot recount them all here. But without dodging the matter of taking sides, we would like to suggest a different way of looking at the issue: *Why* is it that significant audiences see themselves as excluded from each of these traditions? Are they simply misled; are they ignorant or ill-willed; are they unwilling to listen to or accept the reasonable case that advocates of Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy put forth in response to their objections ? or is the very existence of disenfranchised and alienated audiences a reason for concern, a sign that Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy do not, and perhaps cannot, achieve the sort of breadth, inclusiveness, and universal liberation they each, in their own way, promise? We find it impossible to avoid such a conclusion: that if the continued and well-intended defense and rearticulation of the reasons for a Critical Thinking or a Critical Pedagogy approach cannot themselves succeed in persuading those who are skeptical toward them, then this is prima facie evidence that *something *stands beyond them ? that their aspirations toward a universal liberation, whether a liberation of the intellect first and foremost, or a liberation of a political consciousness and praxis, patently do not touch all of the felt concerns and needs of certain audiences, and that a renewed call for "more of the same," as if this might eventually win others over, simply pushes such audiences further away. For this reason and others we do not want to see an "erasure" of Critical Thinking by Critical Pedagogy, or vice versa. Though each, from its own perspective, claims sovereignty over the other, and purports to have the more encompassing view, we prefer to regard the tension between them as beneficial. If one values a "critical" perspective at all, then part of that should entail critique from the most challenging points of view. Critical Thinking needs to be questioned from the standpoint of social accountability; it needs to be asked what difference it makes to people?s real lives; it needs to be challenged when it becomes overly artificial and abstract; and it needs to be interrogated about the social and institutional features that promote or inhibit the "critical spirit," for if such dispositions are central to Critical Thinking, then the conditions that suppress them cannot be altered or influenced by the teaching of epistemological rigor alone (Burbules 1992, 1995). At the same time, Critical Pedagogy needs to be questioned from the standpoint of Critical Thinking: about what its implicit standards of truth and evidence are; about the extent to which inquiry, whether individual or collective, should be unbounded by particular political presuppositions; about how far it is and is not willing to go in seeing learners question the authority of their teachers (when the teachers are advocating the correct "critical" positions); about how open-ended and decentered the process of dialogue actually is ? or whether it is simply a more egalitarian and humane way of steering students toward certain foregone conclusions. And finally, both of these traditions need to be challenged by perspectives that can plausibly claim that other voices and concerns are not addressed by their promises. Claims of universalism are especially suspect in a world of increasingly self-conscious diversity; and whether or not one adopts the full range of "postmodern" criticisms of rationality and modernity, it cannot be denied that these are criticisms that must be met, not pushed off by simply reasserting the promise and hope that "you may not be included or feel included *yet*, but our theoretical categories and assumptions can indeed accommodate you without fundamental modification." The responses to such a defense are easily predictable, and understandable. One of the most useful critical angles toward both the Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy traditions has been a poststructural examination of how they exist within a historical context as discursive systems with particular social effects (Cherryholmes 1988: Gore 1993). The contemporary challenge to "metanarratives" is sometimes misunderstood as a simple rejection of any theory at all, a total rejection on anti-epistemological grounds; but this is not the key point. The challenge of such criticisms is to examine the effects of metanarratives as ways of framing the world; in this case, how claims of universality, or impartiality, or inclusiveness, or objectivity, variously characterize different positions within the Critical Thinking or Critical Pedagogy schools of thought. Their very claims to sovereignty, one might say, are more revealing about them (and from this perspective makes them more deeply akin) than any particular positions or claims they put forth. It is partly for this reason that we welcome their unreconciled disputes; it reminds us of something important about their limitations. Here, gradually, we have tried to introduce a different way of thinking about criticality, one that stands outside the traditions of Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy, without taking sides between them, but regarding each as having a range of benefit and a range of limitation. The very tension between them teaches us something, in a way that eliminating either or seeing one gain hegemony would ultimately dissolve. Important feminist, multiculturalist, and generally postmodernist rejections of *both* Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy, which we have only been able to sketch here, are of more recent provenance in educational discourse ? but about them we would say the same. There is something about the preservation of such sustained differences that yields new insights, something that is lost when the tension is erased by one perspective gaining (or claiming) dominance. But the tension is also erased by the pursuit of a liberal "compromise"; or by the dream of an Hegelian "synthesis" that can reconcile the opposites; or by a Deweyan attempt to show that the apparent dichotomy is not real; or by a presumption of incommensurability that makes the sides decide it is no longer worth engaging one another. *All* of these are ways of making the agonistic engagement go away. We prefer to think in terms of a criticality that is *procedural*: What are the conditions that give rise to critical thinking, that promote a sharp reflection on one?s own presuppositions, that allow for a fresh rethinking of the conventional, that foster *thinking in new ways*? Toward an Alternate Criticality The starting point of this alternative is reflecting upon criticality as a *practice* ? what is involved in actually thinking critically, what are the conditions that tend to foster such thinking, and so on. Here we can only draw the outlines of some of these elements, each of which merits extended discussion. First, criticality does involve certain abilities and skills, including but not limited to the skills of Critical Thinking. These skills have a definite domain of usefulness, but learning them should include not only an appreciation for what they can do, but an appreciation for what they cannot do. For example, methods of analysis, across different disciplines from the scientific to the philosophic, involve removing the object of study from its usual context in order (1) to focus study upon it and it only and (2) to be able to parse it into component elements. This is true of all sorts of analysis, whether the analysis of an organism, a chemical analysis, or an analysis of a concept. There is value to doing this, but also a limit, since removing a thing from its usual context changes it by eliminating the network of relations that give rise to it, interact with it, and partly define it. If any amount of wholism is true, then such decontextualizing and/or dissecting into components *loses* something of the original. In addition to these logical and analytical skills, we would emphasize that criticality also involves the ability to think outside a framework of conventional understandings; it means to think anew, *to think differently*. This view of criticality goes far beyond the preoccupation with not being deceived. There might be worse things than being mistaken; there may be greater dangers in being only trivially or banally "true." Ignorance is one kind of impotence; an inability or unwillingness to move beyond or question conventional understandings is another. This is a point that links in some respects with Freire?s desire to move beyond an "intransitive consciousness," and with Giroux?s call for a "language of possibility." But even in these cases there is a givenness to what a "critical" understanding should look like that threatens to become its own kind of constraint. Freire?s metaphor for learning to read is "decodification," a revealing word because it implies a fixed relation of symbol to meaning and reveals an assumption usually latent within Critical Pedagogy: that the purpose of critical thinking is to discern a world, a real world of relations, structures, and social dynamics, that has been obscured by the distortions of ideology. Learning to "decode" means to find the actual, hidden meaning of things. It is a revealing choice of words, as opposed to, say, "interpretation," which also suggests finding a meaning, but which could also mean *creating* a meaning, or seeking out several alternative meanings. This latter view could not assume that "critical" literacy and dialogue would necessarily converge on any single understanding of the world. Yet it is a crucial aspect of Critical Pedagogy that dialogue does converge upon a set of understandings tied to a capacity to act toward social change ? and social change of a particular type. Multiple, unreconciled interpretations, by contrast, might yield *other* sorts of benefits ? those of fecundity and variety over those of solidarity. Much more needs to be said about how it is possible to think anew, to think otherwise. But what we wish to stress here is that this is a kind of criticality, too, a breaking away from convention and cant. Part of what is necessary for this to happen is an openness to, and a comfort with, thinking in the midst of deeply challenging alternatives. One obvious condition here is that such alternatives exist and that they be engaged with sufficient respect to be considered imaginatively ? even when (especially when) they do not fit in neatly with the categories with which one is familiar. This is why, as noted earlier, the *tensions* between radically conflicting views are themselves valuable; and why the etic perspective is as potentially informative as the emic. Difference is a condition of criticality, when it is encountered in a context that allows for translations or communication across differences; when it is taken seriously, and not distanced as exotic or quaint; and when one does not use the excuse of "incommensurability" as a reason to abandon dialogue (Burbules & Rice 1991; Burbules 1993, forthcoming). Rather than the simple epistemic view of "ideology" as distortion or misrepresentation, we find it useful here to reflect on Douglas Kellner?s discussion of the "life cycle" of an ideology (Kellner 1978). An ideology is not a simple proposition, or even a set of propositions, whose truth value can be tested against the world. Ideologies have the appeal and persistence that they do because they actually *do* account for a set of social experiences and concerns. No thorough approach to ideology-critique should deny the very real appeal that ideologies hold for people ? an appeal that is as much affective as cognitive. To deny that appeal is to adopt a very simplistic view of human naivet?, and to assume that it will be easier to displace ideologies than it actually is. Both the Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy traditions often make this mistake, we believe. As Kellner puts it, ideologies often have an original appeal as an "ism," as a radically new, fresh, challenging perspective on social and political concerns. Over time, the selfsame ideologies become "hegemonic," *not because they change, but because circumstances change while the ideology becomes more and more concerned with its own preservation.* What causes this decline into reification and stasis is precisely the absence of reflexiveness within ideological thought, the inability to recognize its own origins and limitations, and the lack of opportunities for thinking differently. In the sense we are discussing it here, criticality is the opposite of the hegemonic. This argument suggests, then, that one important aspect of criticality is an ability to reflect on one?s own views and assumptions as themselves features of a particular cultural and historical formation. Such a reflection does not automatically lead to relativism or a conclusion that all views are equally valid; but it does make it more difficult to imagine universality or finality for any particular set of views. Most important, it regards one?s views as perpetually open to challenge, as choices entailing a responsibility toward the effects of one?s arguments on others. This sort of critical reflection is quite difficult to exercise entirely on one?s own; we are enabled to do it through our conversations with others, especially others not like us. Almost by definition, it is difficult to see the limitations and lacunae in our own understandings; hence maintaining both the social conditions in which such conversations can occur (conditions of plurality, tolerance, and respect) *as well as* the personal and interpersonal capacities, and willingness, to engage in such conversations, becomes a central dimension of criticality ? it is not simply a matter of individual abilities or dispositions. The Critical Pedagogy tradition has stressed some of these same concerns. Yet at a still deeper level, the work of Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Spivak, Judith Butler, and others, challenges us with a further aspect of criticality: the ability to question and doubt even our own presuppositions ? the ones without which we literally do not know how to think and act (Burbules 1995). This seemingly paradoxical sort of questioning is often part of the *process *by which radically new thinking begins: by an aporia; by a doubt that we do not know (yet) how to move beyond; by imagining what it might mean to think without some of the very things that make our (current) thinking meaningful. Here, we have moved into a sense of criticality well beyond the categories of both Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy; to the extent that these traditions of thought and practice have become programmatic, become "movements" of a sort, they may be less able ? and less motivated ? to pull up their own roots for examination. Their very success as influential areas of scholarship and teaching seems to have required a certain insistence about particular ways of thinking and acting. Can a deeper criticality be maintained under such circumstances? Or is it threatened by the desire to win over converts? The perspective of viewing criticality as a practice helps us to see that criticality is a way of being as well as a way of thinking, a relation to others as well as an intellectual capacity. To take one concrete instance, the critical thinker must relish, or at least tolerate, the sense of moving against the grain of convention ? this isn?t separate from criticality or a "motivation" for it; it is part of what it means to *be critical*, and not everyone (even those who can master certain logical or analytical skills) can or will occupy that position. To take another example, in order for fallibilism to mean anything, a person must be willing to *admit* to being wrong. We know that some people possess this virtue and others do not; we also know that certain circumstances and relations encourage the exercise of such virtues and others do not. Once we unravel these mysteries, we will see that fostering such virtues will involve much more than Critical Thinking instruction typically imagines. Here Critical Pedagogy may be closer to the position we are proposing, as it *begins*with the premise of social context, the barriers that inhibit critical thought, and the need to learn through activity. Furthermore, as soon as one starts examining just what the conditions of criticality are, it becomes readily apparent that it is not a purely individual trait. It may involve some individual virtues, but only as they are formed, expressed, and influenced in actual social circumstances. Institutions and social relations may foster criticality or suppress it. Because criticality is a function of collective questioning, criticism, and creativity, it is *always *social in character, partly because relations to others influence the individual, and partly because certain of these activities (particularly thinking in new ways) arise from an interaction with challenging alternative views (Burbules 1993). These conditions, then, of personal character, of challenging and supportive social relations, of communicative opportunities, of contexts of difference that present us with the possibility of thinking otherwise, are interdependent circumstances. They are the conditions that allow the development and exercise of criticality as we have sketched it in this essay. They are, of course, *educational *conditions. Criticality is a practice, a mark of what we do, of who we are, and not only how we think. Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy, and their feminist, multiculturalist, and postmodern critics, apprehend parts of this conception of criticality. Yet, we find, the deepest insights into understanding what criticality is come from the unreconciled tensions amongst them ? because it is in remaining open to such challenges without seeking to dissipate them that criticality reveals its value as a way of life. REFERENCES Alston, Kal (1995). "Begging the question: Is critical thinking biased?" *Educational Theory,* vol. 45 no. 2: 225-233. Apple, Michael W. (1979). *Ideology and Curriculum* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Arnstine, Barbara (1991). "Rational and caring teachers." *Philosophy of Education 1990, *David P. Ericson, ed. (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2-21. Bailin, Sharon (1995). "Is critical thinking biased? Clarifications and implications." *Educational Theory,* vol. 45 no. 2: 191-197. 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Further Dialogues on an Educational Ideal *(New York: Routledge). Stanley, William B. (1992). *Curriculum for Utopia: Social Reconstructionism and Critical Pedagogy in the Postmodern Era* (Albany: SUNY Press). Talaska, Richard A. (1992). *Critical Reasoning in Contemporary Culture* (Albany: SUNY Press). Thayer-Bacon, Barbara (1993). "Caring and its relationship to critical thinking." *Educational Theory*, vol. 43 no. 3: 323-340. Warren, Karen J. (1994). "Critical thinking and feminism." *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press), 155-176. Walters, Kerry S. (1994). "Beyond logicism in critical thinking." *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press), 1-22. Weinstein, Mark (1993). "Rational hopes and utopian visions." *Inquiry* vol. 11 no. 3: 1, 16-22. Wheary, Jennifer and Ennis Robert H. (1995). "Gender bias in critical thinking: Continuing the dialogue." *Educational Theory,*vol. 45 no. 2: 213-224. On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 2:50 PM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > Hi Dear All! > I am in the middle of preparing an invited talk on critical thinking, and > I need your's, Dear ALL!, help. > Could you, please, let me know if there is a publication you know and like > re: "Critical Thinking" within CHAT tradition. > You can reply to this message or send me an email to nataliag@sfu.ca > I really appreciate all your help. > Thank you, > Natalia. > -- Robert Lake Ed.D. Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University P. O. Box 8144, Statesboro, GA 30460 Co-editor of *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies,* vol.39, 2017 Special issue: Maxine Greene and the Pedagogy of Social Imagination: An Intellectual Genealogy. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/gred20/39/1 Webpage: https://georgiasouthern.academia.edu/RobertLake*Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its midwife.* John Dewey-*Democracy and Education*,1916, p. 139 From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 14 13:45:43 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 06:45:43 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists international science? In-Reply-To: <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Like Wolff-Michael (and unlike Andy), I have always found the distinction between social and societal a useful one. Yes, I see that the similarity between the words makes them very confusible: I myself use "interpersonal" vs. "social" when I teach, but this actually makes them too distinct. I think that "social" and "societal"--even MORE than their German equivalents--emphasize how linked they are, and also how tied they are to language. At some point--and it is a point that is just as traumatic as the first year of life, when the child must pass from primary to secondary intersubjectivity--the interpersonal begins to confront us as something more, something alien, something quite beyond our direct control. Instead of speaking language, language begins to articulate us. I think, in some ways, Wolff-Michael's example of crime is a poor one, because I don't think that "crime" actually exists at the social level: "crime" is simply what the ruling class chooses to call certain forms of exploitation, aggression, and violence from which it doesn't directly profit. But Wolff-Michael is right to argue for the link--both social relations and societal phenomena are the result of the ensemble of human relations, although which social relation is foregrounded and which backgrounded must necessarily change as we move from the social to the societal. The feminist slogan "the personal is political" is not a redundancy, but it is usually understood backwards, to mean that everything social is societal, when in fact it should be understood to mean that everything societal is in the final analysis social. But sometimes the news cycle will bat a poor example away and provide a better one. Take, for example, the presidential proposal that US immigration policy distinguish between "shithole countries" and Norway. Now, for many years, racists have been whining that people are being "politically correct" and taking all the fun out of being publically offensive and rude by insisting on some link between social interactions and societal issues. The idea is that if you interact with Omarosa, Kanye West, Ben Carson, and Condoleeza Rice socially you can say what you like about the societies they came from. When liberals insist that someone born in America is one hundred percent American, no matter where their ancestors were born, they also subscribe to this kind of magical disjunction. Trevor Noah is right to say that the truly shocking thing in what the president said wasn't "shithole". It was Norway. This isn't simply ignorant and unrealistic (what Norwegian would give up the generous trust of oil revenues and emigrate to a country like the USA which totally lacks a decent health service or retirement plan?). As in Finland, the Centre-Right government in Norway is in a coalition with a far-right, anti-immigrant party, dedicated to keeping the country Nordically pure. THAT is not just an attack on civility, like using the word "shithole". It's an attack on civil rights. As soon as the US government takes this minority government as a model, it is no longer a social, personal, offense; it's societal now. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:29 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Absolutely difficult to satirise, Rob. As if reason was literally being > stretched to push what could be considered to be reasonable, so that at > every stretch what few years ago would be absolutely unthinkable becomes > not only thinkable but normal. Like Spanish police beating people for going > to vote to an (illegal, yet peaceful) referendum in Catalonia and > politicians being held for months in prison only for "prevention," while a > horde of citizens in other parts of the country encouraging the police like > they encourage football teams, "A por ellos!!" > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of robsub@ariadne.org.uk > Sent: 12 January 2018 20:18 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists > international science? > > I was going to joke that I bet Toby Young was on the guest list, but I > see he was. Truth is becoming really hard to satirise. > > Rob > > On 12/01/2018 19:06, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > I believe that this is London's way of making London a more appealing > place for Trump to visit. Recently they have said some not-nice things > about him, and that makes him turn from orange to red-orange. On the color > scale, that's an escalation of tensions. I see this conference as a > validation of his world-view, making the UK less of a shithole of a country > to him and his followers. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin > > Sent: Friday, January 12, 2018 11:25 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists > international science? > > > > https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/ > 51323/title/Secret-Eu > > genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ > > 51323/title/Secret-E > > ugenics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/& > utm_campaign=TS_D > > AILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium= > email&utm_content=5994 > > 4918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 > FETdaZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtU > > MYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk&_hsmi= > 59944918> > > &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source= > hs_email&utm_medium=emai > > l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 > FETda > > ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmK > Q29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& > > _hsmi=59944918 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Peg Griffin, Ph. D. > > > > Washington, DC 20003 > > > > > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 14 14:00:22 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 07:00:22 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Critical Thinking -request for suggestions In-Reply-To: <426881125.314952.1515959431052.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> <426881125.314952.1515959431052.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: I guess if I were invited to give a talk like this (heaven forfend!) I would talk about two completely different things. a) Critical thinking as critical (crisis-laden) abstraction (thinking). It's what puts the "pere" into our "perezhivanie"--it's the thinking about feeling that mediates an experience into a meaning (and this is probably related, at least in my miserable mind) to the way in which our experience can confront us as something alien, our interpersonal meanings become "societal" ones). David Butt, my supervisor, wrote a really good but almost unreadable paper about this; I tried to make his ideas a little more readable in my own paper "Thinking of feeling". b) Critical thinking about the CHAT tradition itself. We're actually not very good at this, I think; I myself am still in the "Gee whiz!" phase of my reading of Vygotsky, and I need people like Ruqaiya Hasan to remind me that cultural historical psychology was hardly even a prologomena or outline sketch when LSV died. Now that Vygotsky's personality is gone, we are left with his world view, and that is necessarily incomplete. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:50 AM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > Hi Dear All! > I am in the middle of preparing an invited talk on critical thinking, and > I need your's, Dear ALL!, help. > Could you, please, let me know if there is a publication you know and like > re: "Critical Thinking" within CHAT tradition. > You can reply to this message or send me an email to nataliag@sfu.ca > I really appreciate all your help. > Thank you, > Natalia. > From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 14 14:12:47 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 17:12:47 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5A318310-B582-4AD4-8312-82888D7BD4CE@cantab.net> And I understand that the date has been extended for proposals to write commentaries on the Polyphonic Autobiography, to be published in Mind, Culture, and Activity. Proposals should be sent to Here?s the link to the Story of LCHC - the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition: > And here?s the call for papers: Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 14, 2018, at 2:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, > JANUARY 24. > > > We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document > before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. > > > We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole > on Culture, > Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic > Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members of > the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller University > days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- will join > Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how people > are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, what?s > relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. > > > > The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at > 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for > future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email > to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further information > including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. > > > > Thanks, > > Beth > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Associate Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Jan 14 14:29:07 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 22:29:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: <5A318310-B582-4AD4-8312-82888D7BD4CE@cantab.net> References: , <5A318310-B582-4AD4-8312-82888D7BD4CE@cantab.net> Message-ID: <1515968947464.47552@iped.uio.no> Martin, the link for the call for papers was missing in your post. The one circulated before still has the January 1st deadline, but is here: http://explore.tandfonline.com/cfp/ed/jml03430-hmca-cfp-si-lchc?utm_source=CPB&utm_medium=cms&utm_campaign=JML03430 Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin Packer Sent: 14 January 2018 23:12 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography And I understand that the date has been extended for proposals to write commentaries on the Polyphonic Autobiography, to be published in Mind, Culture, and Activity. Proposals should be sent to Here?s the link to the Story of LCHC - the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition: > And here?s the call for papers: Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 14, 2018, at 2:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, > JANUARY 24. > > > We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document > before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. > > > We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole > on Culture, > Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic > Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members of > the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller University > days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- will join > Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how people > are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, what?s > relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. > > > > The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at > 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for > future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email > to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further information > including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. > > > > Thanks, > > Beth > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Associate Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 From nataliag@sfu.ca Sun Jan 14 16:01:00 2018 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 16:01:00 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Critical Thinking -request for suggestions In-Reply-To: References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> <426881125.314952.1515959431052.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: <2066313212.556483.1515974460030.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Thank you, Robert, Best wishes, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Lake" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, January 14, 2018 1:39:08 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Critical Thinking -request for suggestions Hi Natalia, Here is a piece I appreciate on the distinctions between Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy. *Robert Lake* Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy: Relations, Differences, and Limits Nicholas C. Burbules and Rupert Berk Department of Educational Policy Studies Published in Critical Theories in Education, Thomas S. Popkewitz and Lynn Fendler, eds. (NY: Routledge, 1999). Two literatures have shaped much of the writing in the educational foundations over the past two decades: Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy. Each has its textual reference points, its favored authors, and its desired audiences. Each invokes the term "critical" as a valued educational goal: urging teachers to help students become more skeptical toward commonly accepted truisms. Each says, in its own way, "Do not let yourself be deceived." And each has sought to reach and influence particular groups of educators, at all levels of schooling, through workshops, lectures, and pedagogical texts. They share a passion and sense of urgency about the need for more critically oriented classrooms. Yet with very few exceptions these literatures do not discuss one another. Is this because they propose conflicting visions of what "critical" thought entails? Are their approaches to pedagogy incompatible? Might there be moments of insight that each can offer the other? Do they perhaps share common limitations, which through comparison become more apparent? Are there other ways to think about becoming "critical" that stand outside these traditions, but which hold educational significance? These are the questions motivating this essay. We will begin by contrasting Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy in terms of their conception of what it means to be "critical." We will suggest some important similarities, and differences, in how they frame this topic. Each tradition has to some extent criticized the other; and each has been criticized, sometimes along similar lines, by other perspectives, especially feminist and poststructural perspectives. These lines of reciprocal and external criticism, in turn, lead us to suggest some different ways to think about "criticality." At a broad level, Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy share some common concerns. They both imagine a general population in society who are to some extent deficient in the abilities or dispositions that would allow them to discern certain kinds of inaccuracies, distortions, and even falsehoods. They share a concern with how these inaccuracies, distortions, and falsehoods limit freedom, though this concern is more explicit in the Critical Pedagogy tradition, which sees society as fundamentally divided by relations of unequal power. Critical Pedagogues are specifically concerned with the influences of educational knowledge, and of cultural formations generally, that perpetuate or legitimate an unjust status quo; fostering a critical capacity in citizens is a way of enabling them to resist such power effects. Critical Pedagogues take sides, on behalf of those groups who are disenfranchised from social, economic, and political possibilities. Many Critical Thinking authors would cite similar concerns, but regard them as subsidiary to the more inclusive problem of people basing their life choices on unsubstantiated truth claims ? a problem that is nonpartisan in its nature or effects. For Critical Thinking advocates, all of us need to be better critical thinkers, and there is often an implicit hope that enhanced critical thinking could have a *general* humanizing effect, across all social groups and classes. In this sense, both Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy authors would argue that by helping to make people more critical in thought and action, progressively minded educators can help to free learners to see the world as it is and to act accordingly; critical education can increase freedom and enlarge the scope of human possibilities. Yet, as one zooms in, further differences appear. The Critical Thinking tradition concerns itself primarily with criteria of epistemic adequacy: to be "critical" basically means to be more discerning in recognizing faulty arguments, hasty generalizations, assertions lacking evidence, truth claims based on unreliable authority, ambiguous or obscure concepts, and so forth. For the Critical Thinker, people do not sufficiently analyze the reasons by which they live, do not examine the assumptions, commitments, and logic of daily life. As Richard Paul puts it, the basic problem is irrational, illogical, and unexamined living. He believes that people need to learn how to express and criticize the logic of arguments that underpin our everyday activity: "The art of explicating, analyzing, and assessing these ?arguments? and ?logic? is essential to leading an examined life" (Paul 1990, 66). The prime tools of Critical Thinking are the skills of formal and informal logic, conceptual analysis, and epistemology. The primary preoccupation of Critical Thinking is to supplant sloppy or distorted thinking with thinking based upon reliable procedures of inquiry. Where our beliefs remain unexamined, we are not free; we act without thinking about why we act, and thus do not exercise control over our own destinies. For the Critical Thinking tradition, as Harvey Siegel states, critical thinking aims at self-sufficiency, and "a self-sufficient person is a liberated person...free from the unwarranted and undesirable control of unjustified beliefs" (Siegel, 1988, 58). The Critical Pedagogy tradition begins from a very different starting point. It regards specific belief claims, not primarily as propositions to be assessed for their truth content, but as parts of systems of belief and action that have aggregate effects within the power structures of society. It asks first about these systems of belief and action, *who benefits*? The primary preoccupation of Critical Pedagogy is with social injustice and how to transform inequitable, undemocratic, or oppressive institutions and social relations. At some point, assessments of truth or conceptual slipperiness might come into the discussion (different writers in the Critical Pedagogy tradition differ in this respect), but they are in the service of demonstrating how certain power effects occur, not in the service of pursuing Truth in some dispassioned sense (Burbules 1992/1995). Indeed, a crucial dimension of this approach is that certain claims, even if they might be "true" or substantiated within particular confines and assumptions, might nevertheless be partisan in their effects. Assertions that African-Americans score lower on IQ tests, for example, even if it is a "fact" that this particular population does on average score lower on this particular set of tests, leaves significant larger questions unaddressed, not the least of which is what effect such assertions have on a general population that is not aware of the important limits of these tests or the tenuous relation, at best, between "what IQ tests measure" and "intelligence." Other important questions, from this standpoint, include: Who is making these assertions? Why are they being made at this point in time? Who funds such research? Who promulgates these "findings"? Are they being raised to question African-American intelligence or to demonstrate the bias of IQ tests? Such questions, from the Critical Pedagogy perspective, are not external to, or separable from, the import of also weighing the evidentiary base for such claims. Now, the Critical Thinking response to this approach will be that these are simply two different, perhaps both valuable, endeavors. It is one thing to question the evidentiary base (or logic, or clarity, or coherence) of a particular claim, and to find it wanting. This is one kind of critique, adequate and worthwhile on its own terms. It is something else, something separate, to question the motivation behind those who propound certain views, their group interests, the effects of their claims on society, and so forth. That sort of critique might also be worthwhile (we suspect that most Critical Thinking authors would say that it *is* worthwhile), but it depends on a different sort of analysis, with a different burden of argument ? one that philosophers may have less to contribute to than would historians or sociologists, for example. The response, in turn, from the Critical Pedagogy point of view is that the two levels cannot be kept separate because the standards of epistemic adequacy themselves (valid argument, supporting evidence, conceptual clarity, and so on) *and the particular ways in which these standards are invoked and interpreted in particular settings* inevitably involve the very same considerations of who, where, when, and why that any other social belief claims raise. Moreover, such considerations inevitably blur into and influence epistemic matters in a narrower sense, such as how research questions are defined, the methods of such research, and the qualifications of the researchers and writers who produce such writings for public attention. But neither the Critical Thinking nor the Critical Pedagogy tradition is monolithic or homogeneous, and a closer examination of each reveals further dimensions of these similarities and differences. Critical Thinking A concern with critical thinking in education, in the broad sense of teaching students the rules of logic or how to assess evidence, is hardly new: it is woven throughout the Western tradition of education, from the Greeks to the Scholastics to the present day. Separate segments of the curriculum have often been dedicated to such studies, especially at higher levels of schooling. What the Critical Thinking movement has emphasized is the idea that specific reasoning skills undergird the curriculum as a whole; that the purpose of education generally is to foster critical thinking; and that the skills and dispositions of critical thinking can and should infuse teaching and learning at all levels of schooling. Critical thinking is linked to the idea of rationality itself, and developing rationality is seen as a prime, if not *the *prime, aim of education (see, for example, Siegel 1988). The names most frequently associated with this tradition, at least in the United States, include Robert Ennis, John McPeck, Richard Paul, Israel Scheffler, and Harvey Siegel. While a detailed survey of their respective views, and the significant differences among their outlooks, is outside our scope here, a few key themes and debates have emerged in recent years within this field of inquiry. To Critical Thinking, the critical person is something like a critical consumer of information; he or she is driven to seek reasons and evidence. Part of this is a matter of mastering certain skills of thought: learning to diagnose invalid forms of argument, knowing how to make and defend distinctions, and so on. Much of the literature in this area, especially early on, seemed to be devoted to lists and taxonomies of what a "critical thinker" should know and be able to do (Ennis 1962, 1980). More recently, however, various authors in this tradition have come to recognize that teaching content and skills is of minor import if learners do not also develop the dispositions or inclination to look at the world through a critical lens. By this, Critical Thinking means that the critical person has not only the capacity (the skills) to seek reasons, truth, and evidence, but also that he or she has the drive (disposition) to seek them. For instance, Ennis claims that a critical person not only should seek reasons and try to be well informed, but that he or she should have a tendency to do such things (Ennis 1987, 1996). Siegel criticizes Ennis somewhat for seeing dispositions simply as what animates the skills of critical thinking, because this fails to distinguish sufficiently the critical thinker from critical thinking. For Siegel, a cluster of dispositions (the "critical spirit") is more like a deep-seated character trait, something like Scheffler?s notion of "a love of truth and a contempt of lying" (Siegel 1988; Scheffler 1991). It is part of critical thinking itself. Paul also stresses this distinction between skills and dispositions in his distinction between "weak-sense" and "strong-sense" critical thinking. For Paul, the "weak-sense" means that one has learned the skills and can demonstrate them when asked to do so; the "strong-sense" means that one has incorporated these skills into a way of living in which one?s own assumptions are re-examined and questioned as well. According to Paul, a critical thinker in the "strong sense" has a passionate drive for "clarity, accuracy, and fairmindedness" (Paul 1983, 23; see also Paul 1994). This dispositional view of critical thinking has real advantages over the skills-only view. But in important respects it is still limited. First, it is not clear exactly what is entailed by making such dispositions *part of *critical thinking. In our view it not only broadens the notion of criticality beyond mere "logicality," but it necessarily requires a greater attention to institutional contexts and social relations than Critical Thinking authors have provided. Both the skills-based view and the skills-plus-dispositions view are still focused on the individual person. But it is only in the context of social relations that these dispositions or character traits can be formed or expressed, and for this reason the practices of critical thinking *inherently *involve bringing about certain social conditions. Part of what it is to be a critical thinker is to be engaged in certain kinds of conversations and relations with others; and the kinds of social circumstances that promote or inhibit that must therefore be part of the examination of what Critical Thinking is trying to achieve. A second theme in the Critical Thinking literature has been the extent to which critical thinking can be characterized as a set of generalized abilities and dispositions, as opposed to content-specific abilities and dispositions that are learned and expressed differently in different areas of investigation. Can a general "Critical Thinking" course develop abilities and dispositions that will then be applied in any of a range of fields; or should such material be presented specifically in connection to the questions and content of particular fields of study? Is a scientist who is a critical thinker doing the same things as an historian who is a critical thinker? When each evaluates "good evidence," are they truly thinking about problems in similar ways, or are the differences in interpretation and application dominant? This debate has set John McPeck, the chief advocate of content-specificity, in opposition to a number of other theorists in this area (Norris 1992; Talaska 1992). This issue relates not only to the question of how we might teach critical thinking, but also to how and whether one can test for a general facility in critical thinking (Ennis 1984). A third debate has addressed the question of the degree to which the standards of critical thinking, and the conception of rationality that underlies them, are culturally biased in favor of a particular masculine and/or Western mode of thinking, one that implicitly devalues other "ways of knowing." Theories of education that stress the primary importance of logic, conceptual clarity, and rigorous adherence to scientific evidence have been challenged by various advocates of cultural and gender diversity who emphasize respect for alternative world views and styles of reasoning. Partly in response to such criticisms, Richard Paul has developed a conception of critical thinking that regards "sociocentrism" as itself a sign of flawed thinking (Paul 1994). Paul believes that, because critical thinking allows us to overcome the sway of our egocentric and sociocentric beliefs, it is "essential to our role as moral agents and as potential shapers of our own nature and destiny" (Paul 1990, 67). For Paul, and for some other Critical Thinking authors as well, part of the method of critical thinking involves fostering dialogue, in which thinking from the perspective of others is also relevant to the assessment of truth claims; a too-hasty imposition of one?s own standards of evidence might result not only in a premature rejection of credible alternative points of view, but might also have the effect of silencing the voices of those who (in the present context) need to be encouraged as much as possible to speak for themselves. In this respect, we see Paul introducing into the very definition of critical thinking some of the sorts of social and contextual factors that Critical Pedagogy writers have emphasized. Critical Pedagogy The idea of Critical Pedagogy begins with the neo-Marxian literature on Critical Theory (Stanley 1992). The early Critical Theorists (most of whom were associated with the Frankfurt School) believed that Marxism had underemphasized the importance of cultural and media influences for the persistence of capitalism; that maintaining conditions of ideological hegemony were important for (in fact inseparable from) the legitimacy and smooth working of capitalist economic relations. One obvious example would be in the growth of advertising as both a spur to rising consumption and as a means of creating the image of industries driven only by a desire to serve the needs of their customers. As consumers, as workers, and as winners or losers in the marketplace of employment, citizens in a capitalist society need both to know their "rightful" place in the order of things and to be reconciled to that destiny. Systems of education are among the institutions that foster and reinforce such beliefs, through the rhetoric of meritocracy, through testing, through tracking, through vocational training or college preparatory curricula, and so forth (Bowles & Gintis 1976; Apple 1979; Popkewitz 1991). Critical Pedagogy represents, in a phrase, the reaction of progressive educators against such institutionalized functions. It is an effort to work within educational institutions and other media to raise questions about inequalities of power, about the false myths of opportunity and merit for many students, and about the way belief systems become internalized to the point where individuals and groups abandon the very aspiration to question or change their lot in life. Some of the authors mostly strongly associated with this tradition include Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, and Ira Shor. In the language of Critical Pedagogy, the critical person is one who is empowered to seek justice, to seek emancipation. Not only is the critical person adept at recognizing injustice but, for Critical Pedagogy, that person is also moved to change it. Here Critical Pedagogy wholeheartedly takes up Marx's Thesis XI on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it" (Marx 1845/1977, 158). This emphasis on change, and on collective action to achieve it, moves the central concerns of Critical Pedagogy rather far from those of Critical Thinking: the endeavor to teach others to think critically is less a matter of fostering individual skills and dispositions, and more a consequence of the *pedagogical relations*, between teachers and students and among students, which promote it; furthermore, the object of thinking critically is not only against demonstrably false beliefs, but also those that are misleading, partisan, or implicated in the preservation of an unjust status quo. The author who has articulated these concerns most strongly is Paulo Freire, writing originally within the specific context of promoting adult literacy within Latin American peasant communities, but whose work has taken on an increasingly international interest and appeal in the past three decades (Freire 1970a, 1970b, 1973, 1985; McLaren & Lankshear 1993; McLaren & Leonard 1993). For Freire, Critical Pedagogy is concerned with the development of *conscienticizao*, usually translated as "critical consciousness."Freedom, for Freire, begins with the recognition of a system of oppressive relations, and one?s own place in that system. The task of Critical Pedagogy is to bring members of an oppressed group to a critical consciousness of their situation as a beginning point of their liberatory *praxis*. Change in consciousness and concrete action are linked for Freire; the greatest single barrier against the prospect of liberation is an ingrained, fatalistic belief in the inevitability and necessity of an unjust status quo. One important way in which Giroux develops this idea is in his distinction between a "language of critique" and a "language of possibility" (Giroux 1983, 1988). As he stresses, both are essential to the pursuit of social justice. Giroux points to what he sees as the failure of the radical critics of the new sociology of education because, in his view, they offered a language of critique, but not a language of possibility. They saw schools primarily as instruments for the reproduction of capitalist relations and for the legitimation of dominant ideologies, and thus were unable to construct a discourse for "counterhegemonic" practices in schools (Giroux 1988, 111-112). Giroux stresses the importance of developing a language of possibility as part of what makes a person critical. As he puts it, the aim of the critical educator should be "to raise ambitions, desires, and real hope for those who wish to take seriously the issue of educational struggle and social justice" (Giroux 1988, 177). For both Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy, "criticality" requires that one be moved to do something, whether that something be seeking reasons or seeking social justice. For Critical Thinking, it is not enough to know how to seek reasons, truth, and understanding; one must also be impassioned to pursue them rigorously. For Critical Pedagogy, that one can critically reflect and interpret the world is not sufficient; one must also be willing and able to act to change that world. From the standpoint of Critical Pedagogy the Critical Thinking tradition assumes an overly direct connection between reasons and action. For instance, when Ennis conceives Critical Thinking as "reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or to do," the assumption is that "deciding" usually leads relatively unproblematically to the "doing" (Ennis 1987). The model of practical reasoning on which this view depends assumes a relatively straightforward relation, in most cases, between the force of reasons and action. But for Critical Pedagogy the problems of overcoming oppressed thinking and demoralization are more complex than this: changing thought and practice must occur together; they fuel one another. For Freire, criticality requires *praxis* ? both reflection and action, both interpretation and change. As he puts it, "Critical consciousness is brought about not through intellectual effort alone but through *praxis* ? through the authentic union of action and reflection" (Freire 1970a, 48). Critical Pedagogy would never find it sufficient to reform the habits of thought of thinkers, however effectively, without challenging and transforming the institutions, ideologies, and relations that engender distorted, oppressed thinking in the first place ? not as an additional act beyond the pedagogical one, but as an inseparable part of it. For Critical Thinking, at most, the development of more discerning thinkers might make them *more likely* to undermine discreditable institutions, to challenge misleading authorities, and so on ? but this would be a separate consequence of the attainment of Critical Thinking, not part of it. A second central theme in Freire?s work, which has fundamentally shaped the Critical Pedagogy tradition, is his particular focus on "literacy." At the ground level, what motivated Freire?s original work was the attempt to develop an adult literacy program, one in which developing the capacity to read was tied into developing an enhanced sense of individual and collective self-esteem and confidence. To be illiterate, for Freire, was not only to lack the skills of reading and writing; it was to feel powerless and dependent in a much more general way as well. The challenge to an adult literacy campaign was not only to provide skills, but to address directly the self-contempt and sense of powerlessness that he believed accompanied illiteracy (Freire 1970b). Hence his approach to fostering literacy combined the development of basic skills in reading and writing; the development of a sense of confidence and efficacy, especially in collective thought and action; and the desire to change, not only one?s self, but the circumstances of one?s social group. The pedagogical method that he thinks promote all of these is *dialogue*: "cultural action for freedom is characterized by dialogue, and its preeminent purpose is to conscientize the people" (Freire 1970a, 47). Richard Paul says similarly that "dialogical thinking" is inherent to Critical Thinking (Paul 1990). However, there is more of a social emphasis to dialogue within Critical Pedagogy: dialogue occurs between people, not purely as a form of dialogical thought. Here again Critical Pedagogy focuses more upon institutional settings and relations between individuals, where Critical Thinking?s focus is more on the individuals themselves. In other words, dialogue directly involves others, while one person?s development of "dialogical thinking" may only indirectly involve others. Yet the work of Vygotsky and others would argue that the development of such capacities for individuals necessarily involves social interactions as well. Paul addresses this point, but it does not play the central role in his theory that it does for Freire and other Critical Pedagogues ? still, Paul appears to us to be somewhat of a transitional figure between these two traditions. The method of Critical Pedagogy for Freire involves, to use his phrase, "reading the world" as well as "reading the word" (Freire & Macedo 1987). Part of developing a critical consciousness, as noted above, is critiquing the social relations, social institutions, and social traditions that create and maintain conditions of oppression. For Freire, the teaching of literacy is a primary form of cultural action, and as action it must "relate speaking the word to transforming reality" (Freire 1970a, 4). To do this, Freire uses what he calls *codifications*: representative images that both "illustrate" the words or phrases students are learning to read, and also represent problematic social conditions that become the focus of collective dialogue (and, eventually, the object of strategies for potential change). The process of *decodification* is a kind of "reading" ? a "reading" of social dynamics, of forces of reaction or change, of why the world is as it is, and how it might be made different. Decodification is the attempt to "read the world" with the same kind of perspicacity with which one is learning to "read the word." In this important regard, Critical Pedagogy shares with Critical Thinking the idea that there is something *real* about which they can raise the consciousness of people. Both traditions believe that there is something given, against which mistaken beliefs and distorted perceptions can be tested. In both, there is a drive to bring people to recognize "the way things are" (Freire 1970a, 17). In different words, Critical Pedagogy and Critical Thinking arise from the same sentiment to overcome ignorance, to test the distorted against the true, to ground effective human action in an accurate sense of social reality. Of course, how each movement talks about "the way things are" is quite different. For Critical Thinking, this is about empirically demonstrable facts. For Critical Pedagogy, on the other hand, this is about the intersubjective attempt to formulate and agree upon a common understanding about "structures of oppression" and "relations of domination." As we have discussed, there is more to this process than simply determining the "facts"; but, in the end, for Freire as for any other Marxist tradition, this intersubjective process is thought to be grounded in a set of objective conditions. Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy In the discussion so far, we have tried to emphasize some relations and contrasts between the Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy traditions. To the extent that they have addressed one another, the commentary has often been antagonistic: The most powerful, yet limited, definition of critical thinking comes out of the positivist tradition in the applied sciences and suffers from what I call the Internal Consistency position. According to the adherents of the Internal Consistency position, critical thinking refers primarily to teaching students how to analyze and develop reading and writing assignments from the perspective of formal, logical patterns of consistency....While all of the learning skills are important, their limitations as a whole lie in what is excluded, and it is with respect to what is missing that the ideology of such an approach is revealed (Giroux 1994, 200-201). Although I hesitate to dignify Henry Giroux?s article on citizenship with a reply, I find it hard to contain myself. The article shows respect neither for logic nor for the English language....Giroux?s own bombastic, jargon-ridden rhetoric...is elitist in the worst sense: it is designed to erect a barrier between the author and any reader not already a member of the "critical" cult (Schrag 1988, 143). There are other, more constructive engagements, however. Certain authors within each tradition have seriously tried to engage the concerns of the other ? although, interestingly, the purpose of such investigations has usually been to demonstrate that all of the truly beneficial qualities of the other tradition can be reconciled with the best of one?s own, without any of the purported drawbacks: It should be clear that my aim is not to discredit the ideal of critical thinking. Rather, I question whether the practices of teaching critical thinking...as it has evolved into the practice of teaching informal logic is *sufficient* for actualizing the ideal. I have argued that it is not sufficient, if "critical thinking" includes the ability to decode the political nature of events and institutions, and if it includes the ability to envision alternative events and institutions (Kaplan 1991/1994, 217, emphasis added). Postmodernism, or any other perspective which seriously endorses radical or progressive social and educational change, requires an epistemology which endorses truth and justification as viable theoretical notions. That is to say: Postmodern advocacy of radical pedagogies (and politics) requires Old-Fashioned Epistemology (Siegel 1993, 22). >From the perspective of Critical Thinking, Critical Pedagogy crosses a threshold between teaching criticality and indoctrinating. Teaching students to think critically must include allowing them to come to their own conclusions; yet Critical Pedagogy seems to come dangerously close to prejudging what those conclusions must be. Critical Pedagogy see this threshold problem conversely: indoctrination is the case already; students must be brought to criticality, and this can only be done by alerting them to the social conditions that have brought this about. In short, we can restate the problem as follows: Critical Thinking?s claim is, at heart, to teach how to think critically, not how to think politically; for Critical Pedagogy, this is a false distinction. For Critical Pedagogy, as we have discussed, self-emancipation is contingent upon social emancipation. It is not only a difference between an emphasis on the individual and an emphasis on society as a whole; both Critical Pedagogy and Critical Thinking want "criticality" in both senses (Missimer 1989/1994; Hostetler 1991/1994). It is rather that, for Critical Pedagogy, individual criticality is intimately linked to social criticality, joining, in Giroux?s phrase, "the conditions for social, and hence, self-emancipation" (Giroux 1988, 110). For Critical Thinking, the attainment of individual critical thinking may, with success for enough people, *lead to* an increase in critical thinking socially, but it does not depend upon it. These traditions also explicitly differ from one another in the different problems and contexts they regard as issues. Critical Thinking assumes no set agenda of issues that must be addressed. To try to bring someone to criticality necessarily precludes identifying any fixed set of questions about particular social, moral, political, economic, and cultural issues, let alone a fixed set of answers. As already noted, this is not to say that those involved in the Critical Thinking movement do not think that social justice is an important issue; nor to say that people such as Ennis, Paul, and Siegel do not wish to see those sorts of issues addressed ? in fact, they occasionally assert quite explicitly that they do. It is rather that, as Critical Thinking understands criticality, "impartiality" is a key virtue. They strive not to push their students along certain lines, nor to impose certain values (the fact/value distinction is a central thesis of the analytical tradition that informs much of Critical Thinking). Socially relevant cases might be pedagogically beneficial as the "raw material" on which to practice the skills and dispositions of Critical Thinking, because they are salient for many learners in a classroom. But they are not intrinsically important to Critical Thinking itself; in many cases purely symbolic cases could be used to teach the same elements (as in the use of symbols or empty X?s and Y?s to teach logic). Hence, Critical Thinking tends to address issues in an item-by-item fashion, not within a grand scheme with other issues. The issues themselves may have relations to one another, and they may have connections to broader themes, but those relations and connections are not the focus of investigation. What is crucial to the issue at hand is the interplay of an immediate cluster of evidence, reasons, and arguments. For Critical Thinking, what is important is to describe the issue, give the various reasons for and against, and draw out any assumptions (and only those) that have immediate and direct bearing on the argument. This tends to produce a more analytical and less wholistic mode of critique. When Critical Pedagogy talks about power and the way in which it structures social relations, it inevitably draws from a context, a larger narrative, within which these issues are framed; and typically sees it as part of the artificiality and abstractness of Critical Thinking that it does not treat such matters as central. Critical Pedagogy looks to how an issue relates to "deeper" explanations ? deeper in the sense that they refer to the basic functioning of power on institutional and societal levels. For Critical Pedagogy, it makes no sense to talk about issues on a nonrelational, item-by-item basis. Where Critical Thinking emphasizes the immediate reasons and assumptions of an argument, Critical Pedagogy wants to draw in for consideration factors that may appear at first of less immediate relevance. We do not want to imply merely that Critical Pedagogy wants people to get the "big picture" whereas Critical Thinking does not. Oftentimes, their "big pictures" are simply going to be different. The important point is why they are different, and the difference resides in the fact that whereas Critical Thinking is quite reluctant to prescribe any particular context for a discussion, Critical Pedagogy shows enthusiasm for a particular one ? one that tends to view social matters within a framework of struggles over social justice, the workings of capitalism, and forms of cultural and material oppression. As noted, this favoring of a particular narrative seems to open Critical Pedagogy up to a charge of indoctrination by Critical Thinking: that everything is up for questioning within Critical Pedagogy except the categories and premises of Critical Pedagogy itself. But the Critical Pedagogue?s counter to this is that Critical Thinking?s apparent "openness" and impartiality simply enshrine many conventional assumptions as presented by the popular media, traditional textbooks, etc., in a manner that intentionally or not teaches political conformity; *particular* claims are scrutinized critically, while a less visible set of social norms and practices ? including, notably, many particular to the structure and activities of schooling itself ? continue to operate invisibly in the background. In short, each of these traditions regards the other as *insufficiently* critical; each defines, in terms of its own discourse and priorities, key elements that it believes the other neglects to address. Each wants to acknowledge a certain value in the goals the other aspires to, but argues that its means are inadequate to attain them. What is most interesting, from our standpoint, is not which of these traditions is "better," but the fascinating way in which each wants to claim sovereignty over the other; each claiming to include all the truly beneficial insights of the other, and yet more ? and, as we will see, how each has been subject to criticisms that may make them appear more as related rivals than as polar opposites. Criticisms of Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy It will not have been lost on many readers that when we listed the prime authors in both the Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy traditions, all listed were male. There are certainly significant women writing within each tradition, but the chief spokespersons, and the most visible figures in the debates between these traditions, have been men. Not surprisingly, then, both traditions have been subject to criticisms, often from feminists, that their ostensibly universal categories and issues in fact exclude the voices and concerns of women and other groups. In the case of Critical Thinking, as noted earlier, this has typically taken the form of an attack on the "rationalistic" underpinnings of its epistemology: that its logic is different from "women?s logic," that its reliance on empirical evidence excludes other sources of evidence or forms of verification (experience, emotion, feeling) ? in short, that its masculinist way of knowing is different from "women?s ways of knowing" (for example, Belenky et al. 1986; Thayer-Bacon 1993). Other arguments do not denigrate the concerns of Critical Thinking entirely, but simply want to relegate them to *part* of what we want to accomplish educationally (Arnstine 1991; Garrison & Phelan 1990; Noddings 1984; Warren 1994). Often these criticisms, posed by women with distinctive feminist concerns in mind, also bring in a concern with Critical Thinking?s exclusion or neglect of ways of thought of other racial or ethnic groups as well ? though the problems of "essentializing" such groups, as if they "naturally" thought differently from white men, has made some advocates cautious about overgeneralizing these concerns. Critical Pedagogy has been subject to similar, and occasionally identical, criticisms. Claims that Critical Pedagogy is "rationalistic," that its purported reliance on "open dialogue" in fact masks a closed and paternal conversation, that it excludes issues and voices that other groups bring to educational encounters, have been asserted with some force (Ellsworth 1989; Gore 1993). In this case, the sting of irony is especially strong. After all, advocates of Critical Thinking would hardly feel the accusation of being called "rationalistic" as much of an insult; but for Critical Pedagogy, given its discourse of emancipation, to be accused of being yet another medium of oppression is a sharp rebuke. Are these criticisms justified? Certainly the advocates of these traditions have tried to defend themselves against the accusation of being "exclusionary" (Siegel 1996; Giroux 1992c). The arguments have been long and vigorous, and we cannot recount them all here. But without dodging the matter of taking sides, we would like to suggest a different way of looking at the issue: *Why* is it that significant audiences see themselves as excluded from each of these traditions? Are they simply misled; are they ignorant or ill-willed; are they unwilling to listen to or accept the reasonable case that advocates of Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy put forth in response to their objections ? or is the very existence of disenfranchised and alienated audiences a reason for concern, a sign that Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy do not, and perhaps cannot, achieve the sort of breadth, inclusiveness, and universal liberation they each, in their own way, promise? We find it impossible to avoid such a conclusion: that if the continued and well-intended defense and rearticulation of the reasons for a Critical Thinking or a Critical Pedagogy approach cannot themselves succeed in persuading those who are skeptical toward them, then this is prima facie evidence that *something *stands beyond them ? that their aspirations toward a universal liberation, whether a liberation of the intellect first and foremost, or a liberation of a political consciousness and praxis, patently do not touch all of the felt concerns and needs of certain audiences, and that a renewed call for "more of the same," as if this might eventually win others over, simply pushes such audiences further away. For this reason and others we do not want to see an "erasure" of Critical Thinking by Critical Pedagogy, or vice versa. Though each, from its own perspective, claims sovereignty over the other, and purports to have the more encompassing view, we prefer to regard the tension between them as beneficial. If one values a "critical" perspective at all, then part of that should entail critique from the most challenging points of view. Critical Thinking needs to be questioned from the standpoint of social accountability; it needs to be asked what difference it makes to people?s real lives; it needs to be challenged when it becomes overly artificial and abstract; and it needs to be interrogated about the social and institutional features that promote or inhibit the "critical spirit," for if such dispositions are central to Critical Thinking, then the conditions that suppress them cannot be altered or influenced by the teaching of epistemological rigor alone (Burbules 1992, 1995). At the same time, Critical Pedagogy needs to be questioned from the standpoint of Critical Thinking: about what its implicit standards of truth and evidence are; about the extent to which inquiry, whether individual or collective, should be unbounded by particular political presuppositions; about how far it is and is not willing to go in seeing learners question the authority of their teachers (when the teachers are advocating the correct "critical" positions); about how open-ended and decentered the process of dialogue actually is ? or whether it is simply a more egalitarian and humane way of steering students toward certain foregone conclusions. And finally, both of these traditions need to be challenged by perspectives that can plausibly claim that other voices and concerns are not addressed by their promises. Claims of universalism are especially suspect in a world of increasingly self-conscious diversity; and whether or not one adopts the full range of "postmodern" criticisms of rationality and modernity, it cannot be denied that these are criticisms that must be met, not pushed off by simply reasserting the promise and hope that "you may not be included or feel included *yet*, but our theoretical categories and assumptions can indeed accommodate you without fundamental modification." The responses to such a defense are easily predictable, and understandable. One of the most useful critical angles toward both the Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy traditions has been a poststructural examination of how they exist within a historical context as discursive systems with particular social effects (Cherryholmes 1988: Gore 1993). The contemporary challenge to "metanarratives" is sometimes misunderstood as a simple rejection of any theory at all, a total rejection on anti-epistemological grounds; but this is not the key point. The challenge of such criticisms is to examine the effects of metanarratives as ways of framing the world; in this case, how claims of universality, or impartiality, or inclusiveness, or objectivity, variously characterize different positions within the Critical Thinking or Critical Pedagogy schools of thought. Their very claims to sovereignty, one might say, are more revealing about them (and from this perspective makes them more deeply akin) than any particular positions or claims they put forth. It is partly for this reason that we welcome their unreconciled disputes; it reminds us of something important about their limitations. Here, gradually, we have tried to introduce a different way of thinking about criticality, one that stands outside the traditions of Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy, without taking sides between them, but regarding each as having a range of benefit and a range of limitation. The very tension between them teaches us something, in a way that eliminating either or seeing one gain hegemony would ultimately dissolve. Important feminist, multiculturalist, and generally postmodernist rejections of *both* Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy, which we have only been able to sketch here, are of more recent provenance in educational discourse ? but about them we would say the same. There is something about the preservation of such sustained differences that yields new insights, something that is lost when the tension is erased by one perspective gaining (or claiming) dominance. But the tension is also erased by the pursuit of a liberal "compromise"; or by the dream of an Hegelian "synthesis" that can reconcile the opposites; or by a Deweyan attempt to show that the apparent dichotomy is not real; or by a presumption of incommensurability that makes the sides decide it is no longer worth engaging one another. *All* of these are ways of making the agonistic engagement go away. We prefer to think in terms of a criticality that is *procedural*: What are the conditions that give rise to critical thinking, that promote a sharp reflection on one?s own presuppositions, that allow for a fresh rethinking of the conventional, that foster *thinking in new ways*? Toward an Alternate Criticality The starting point of this alternative is reflecting upon criticality as a *practice* ? what is involved in actually thinking critically, what are the conditions that tend to foster such thinking, and so on. Here we can only draw the outlines of some of these elements, each of which merits extended discussion. First, criticality does involve certain abilities and skills, including but not limited to the skills of Critical Thinking. These skills have a definite domain of usefulness, but learning them should include not only an appreciation for what they can do, but an appreciation for what they cannot do. For example, methods of analysis, across different disciplines from the scientific to the philosophic, involve removing the object of study from its usual context in order (1) to focus study upon it and it only and (2) to be able to parse it into component elements. This is true of all sorts of analysis, whether the analysis of an organism, a chemical analysis, or an analysis of a concept. There is value to doing this, but also a limit, since removing a thing from its usual context changes it by eliminating the network of relations that give rise to it, interact with it, and partly define it. If any amount of wholism is true, then such decontextualizing and/or dissecting into components *loses* something of the original. In addition to these logical and analytical skills, we would emphasize that criticality also involves the ability to think outside a framework of conventional understandings; it means to think anew, *to think differently*. This view of criticality goes far beyond the preoccupation with not being deceived. There might be worse things than being mistaken; there may be greater dangers in being only trivially or banally "true." Ignorance is one kind of impotence; an inability or unwillingness to move beyond or question conventional understandings is another. This is a point that links in some respects with Freire?s desire to move beyond an "intransitive consciousness," and with Giroux?s call for a "language of possibility." But even in these cases there is a givenness to what a "critical" understanding should look like that threatens to become its own kind of constraint. Freire?s metaphor for learning to read is "decodification," a revealing word because it implies a fixed relation of symbol to meaning and reveals an assumption usually latent within Critical Pedagogy: that the purpose of critical thinking is to discern a world, a real world of relations, structures, and social dynamics, that has been obscured by the distortions of ideology. Learning to "decode" means to find the actual, hidden meaning of things. It is a revealing choice of words, as opposed to, say, "interpretation," which also suggests finding a meaning, but which could also mean *creating* a meaning, or seeking out several alternative meanings. This latter view could not assume that "critical" literacy and dialogue would necessarily converge on any single understanding of the world. Yet it is a crucial aspect of Critical Pedagogy that dialogue does converge upon a set of understandings tied to a capacity to act toward social change ? and social change of a particular type. Multiple, unreconciled interpretations, by contrast, might yield *other* sorts of benefits ? those of fecundity and variety over those of solidarity. Much more needs to be said about how it is possible to think anew, to think otherwise. But what we wish to stress here is that this is a kind of criticality, too, a breaking away from convention and cant. Part of what is necessary for this to happen is an openness to, and a comfort with, thinking in the midst of deeply challenging alternatives. One obvious condition here is that such alternatives exist and that they be engaged with sufficient respect to be considered imaginatively ? even when (especially when) they do not fit in neatly with the categories with which one is familiar. This is why, as noted earlier, the *tensions* between radically conflicting views are themselves valuable; and why the etic perspective is as potentially informative as the emic. Difference is a condition of criticality, when it is encountered in a context that allows for translations or communication across differences; when it is taken seriously, and not distanced as exotic or quaint; and when one does not use the excuse of "incommensurability" as a reason to abandon dialogue (Burbules & Rice 1991; Burbules 1993, forthcoming). Rather than the simple epistemic view of "ideology" as distortion or misrepresentation, we find it useful here to reflect on Douglas Kellner?s discussion of the "life cycle" of an ideology (Kellner 1978). An ideology is not a simple proposition, or even a set of propositions, whose truth value can be tested against the world. Ideologies have the appeal and persistence that they do because they actually *do* account for a set of social experiences and concerns. No thorough approach to ideology-critique should deny the very real appeal that ideologies hold for people ? an appeal that is as much affective as cognitive. To deny that appeal is to adopt a very simplistic view of human naivet?, and to assume that it will be easier to displace ideologies than it actually is. Both the Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy traditions often make this mistake, we believe. As Kellner puts it, ideologies often have an original appeal as an "ism," as a radically new, fresh, challenging perspective on social and political concerns. Over time, the selfsame ideologies become "hegemonic," *not because they change, but because circumstances change while the ideology becomes more and more concerned with its own preservation.* What causes this decline into reification and stasis is precisely the absence of reflexiveness within ideological thought, the inability to recognize its own origins and limitations, and the lack of opportunities for thinking differently. In the sense we are discussing it here, criticality is the opposite of the hegemonic. This argument suggests, then, that one important aspect of criticality is an ability to reflect on one?s own views and assumptions as themselves features of a particular cultural and historical formation. Such a reflection does not automatically lead to relativism or a conclusion that all views are equally valid; but it does make it more difficult to imagine universality or finality for any particular set of views. Most important, it regards one?s views as perpetually open to challenge, as choices entailing a responsibility toward the effects of one?s arguments on others. This sort of critical reflection is quite difficult to exercise entirely on one?s own; we are enabled to do it through our conversations with others, especially others not like us. Almost by definition, it is difficult to see the limitations and lacunae in our own understandings; hence maintaining both the social conditions in which such conversations can occur (conditions of plurality, tolerance, and respect) *as well as* the personal and interpersonal capacities, and willingness, to engage in such conversations, becomes a central dimension of criticality ? it is not simply a matter of individual abilities or dispositions. The Critical Pedagogy tradition has stressed some of these same concerns. Yet at a still deeper level, the work of Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Spivak, Judith Butler, and others, challenges us with a further aspect of criticality: the ability to question and doubt even our own presuppositions ? the ones without which we literally do not know how to think and act (Burbules 1995). This seemingly paradoxical sort of questioning is often part of the *process *by which radically new thinking begins: by an aporia; by a doubt that we do not know (yet) how to move beyond; by imagining what it might mean to think without some of the very things that make our (current) thinking meaningful. Here, we have moved into a sense of criticality well beyond the categories of both Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy; to the extent that these traditions of thought and practice have become programmatic, become "movements" of a sort, they may be less able ? and less motivated ? to pull up their own roots for examination. Their very success as influential areas of scholarship and teaching seems to have required a certain insistence about particular ways of thinking and acting. Can a deeper criticality be maintained under such circumstances? Or is it threatened by the desire to win over converts? The perspective of viewing criticality as a practice helps us to see that criticality is a way of being as well as a way of thinking, a relation to others as well as an intellectual capacity. To take one concrete instance, the critical thinker must relish, or at least tolerate, the sense of moving against the grain of convention ? this isn?t separate from criticality or a "motivation" for it; it is part of what it means to *be critical*, and not everyone (even those who can master certain logical or analytical skills) can or will occupy that position. To take another example, in order for fallibilism to mean anything, a person must be willing to *admit* to being wrong. We know that some people possess this virtue and others do not; we also know that certain circumstances and relations encourage the exercise of such virtues and others do not. Once we unravel these mysteries, we will see that fostering such virtues will involve much more than Critical Thinking instruction typically imagines. Here Critical Pedagogy may be closer to the position we are proposing, as it *begins*with the premise of social context, the barriers that inhibit critical thought, and the need to learn through activity. Furthermore, as soon as one starts examining just what the conditions of criticality are, it becomes readily apparent that it is not a purely individual trait. It may involve some individual virtues, but only as they are formed, expressed, and influenced in actual social circumstances. Institutions and social relations may foster criticality or suppress it. Because criticality is a function of collective questioning, criticism, and creativity, it is *always *social in character, partly because relations to others influence the individual, and partly because certain of these activities (particularly thinking in new ways) arise from an interaction with challenging alternative views (Burbules 1993). These conditions, then, of personal character, of challenging and supportive social relations, of communicative opportunities, of contexts of difference that present us with the possibility of thinking otherwise, are interdependent circumstances. They are the conditions that allow the development and exercise of criticality as we have sketched it in this essay. They are, of course, *educational *conditions. Criticality is a practice, a mark of what we do, of who we are, and not only how we think. Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy, and their feminist, multiculturalist, and postmodern critics, apprehend parts of this conception of criticality. Yet, we find, the deepest insights into understanding what criticality is come from the unreconciled tensions amongst them ? because it is in remaining open to such challenges without seeking to dissipate them that criticality reveals its value as a way of life. REFERENCES Alston, Kal (1995). "Begging the question: Is critical thinking biased?" *Educational Theory,* vol. 45 no. 2: 225-233. Apple, Michael W. (1979). *Ideology and Curriculum* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Arnstine, Barbara (1991). "Rational and caring teachers." *Philosophy of Education 1990, *David P. Ericson, ed. (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2-21. Bailin, Sharon (1995). "Is critical thinking biased? Clarifications and implications." *Educational Theory,* vol. 45 no. 2: 191-197. Belenky, Mary B., Clinchy, Blythe M., Goldberger, Nancy R., and Tarule, Jill R. (1986). *Women?s Ways of Knowing* (New York: Basic Books). Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert (1976). *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books). Burbules, Nicholas C. (1992). "The virtues of reasonableness." *Philosophy of Education 1991, *Margret Buchmann and Robert Floden, eds. (Normal, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society), 215-224. Burbules, Nicholas C. (1992/1995). "Forms of ideology-critique: A pedagogical perspective."* Qualitative Studies in Education*, vol. 5 no. 1: 7-17. Republished in *Critical Theory and Educational Research*, Peter McLaren and James Giarelli, eds. (New York: SUNY Press), 53-69. Burbules, Nicholas C. (1993). *Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice* (New York: Teachers College). Burbules, Nicholas C. (1995). "Reasonable doubt: Toward a postmodern defense of reason as an educational aim." *Critical Conversations in Philosophy of Education* , Wendy Kohli, ed. (New York: Routledge), 82-102. Burbules, Nicholas C. (1996). "Postmodern doubt and philosophy of education." *Philosophy of Education 1995, *Alven Neiman, ed., (Urbana, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society), 39-48. Burbules, Nicholas C. (forthcoming). "Deconstructing ?difference? and the difference this makes to education." *Philosophy of Education 1996, *Frank Margonis, ed. (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, forthcoming). Burbules, Nicholas C. & Rice, Suzanne (1991). "Dialogue across difference: Continuing the conversation." *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 61: 393-416. Cherryholmes, Cleo (1988). *Power and Criticism* (New York: Teachers College Press). Ellsworth, Elizabeth (1989). "Why doesn?t this feel empowering? Working through the repressive myths of critical pedagogy." *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 59 no. 3: 297-324. Ennis, Robert H. (1962). "A concept of critical thinking." *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 32 no. 1: 161-178. Ennis, Robert H. (1980). "A conception of rational thinking." *Philosophy of Education 1979* , Jerrold R. Coombs, ed. (Bloomington, IL: Philosophy of Education Society), 3-30. Ennis, Robert H. (1984). "Problems in testing informal logic/critical thinking/reasoning ability." *Informal Logic*, vol. 6 no. 1: 3-9. Ennis, Robert H. (1987). "A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities." *Teaching Thinking Skills: Theory and Practice, *Joan Boykoff Brown and Robert J. Sternberg, eds. (New York: W.H. Freeman, 9-26. Ennis, Robert H. (1996). *Critical Thinking* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall). Freire, Paulo (1970a). *Cultural Action for Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Educational Review). Freire, Paulo (1970b). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Seabury Press). Freire, Paulo (1973). *Education for Critical Consciousness* (New York: Seabury). Freire, Paulo (1985). *The Politics of Education: Culture, Power, and Liberation* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin Garvey). Freire, Paulo and Macedo Donaldo (1987). *Literacy: Reading the World and the Word *(South Hadley, MA: Bergin Garvey). Garrison, James W. and Phelan, Anne M. (1990). "Toward a feminist poetic of critical thinking." *Philosophy of Education 1989*, Ralph Page, ed. (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society). Giroux, Henry A. (1983). *Theory and Resistance in Education* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin Garvey). Giroux, Henry A. (1988). *Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin Garvey, 1988). Giroux, Henry A. (1992a). *Border Crossings* (New York: Routledge). Giroux, Henry A. (1992b). "The Habermasian headache: A response to Dieter Misgeld." *Phenomenology + Pedagogy*, vol. 10: 143-149. Giroux, Henry A. (1992c). "Resisting difference: Cultural studies and the discourse of critical pedagogy." *Cultural Studies*, Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler, eds. (New York: Routledge), 199-212. Giroux, Henry A. (1994). "Toward a pedagogy of critical thinking." *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press), 200-201. Giroux, Henry A. and McLaren, Peter (1994). *Between Borders* (New York, Routledge). Gore, Jennifer M. (1993). *The Struggle for Pedagogies* (New York, Routledge). Hostetler, Karl (1991/1994). "Community and neutrality in critical thought." *Educational Theory*, vol. 41 no. 1: 1-12. Republished in *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press), 135-154. Kaplan, Laura Duhan (1991/1994). "Teaching intellectual autonomy: The failure of the critical thinking movement." *Educational Theory*, vol. 41 no. 4: 361-370. Republished in *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press). Kellner, Douglas. (1978). "Ideology, Marxism, and advanced capitalism." *Socialist Review*, no. 42: 37-65. Lakatos, Imre (1970). "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes." *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., (NY: Cambridge University Press), 91-196. Marx, Karl (1845/1977), "Theses on Feuerbach." *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, David McLellan, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press), 158. McLaren, Peter and Hammer, Rhonda (1989). "Critical pedagogy and the postmodern challenge." *Educational Foundations*, vol. 3 no. 3: 29-62. McLaren, Peter and Lankshear, Colin (1993). *Politics of Liberation: Paths from Freire* (New York: Routledge). McLaren, Peter and Leonard, Peter (1993). *Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter* (New York: Routledge). Misgeld, Dieter (1992). "Pedagogy and politics: Some critical reflections on the postmodern turn in critical pedagogy." *Phenomenology + Pedagogy*, vol. 10: 125-142. Missimer, Connie (1989/1994). "Why two heads are better than one." *Philosophy of Education 1988* James M. Giarelli, ed. (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society), 388-402. Republished in *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press), 119-133. Noddings, Nel (1984). *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press). Norris, Stephen P. (1992). *The Generalizability of Critical Thinking* (New York: Teachers College Press). Norris, Stephen P. (1995). "Sustaining and responding to charges of bias in critical thinking." *Educational Theory,* vol. 45 no. 2: 199-211. Paul, Richard (1983). "An agenda item for the informal logic / critical thinking movement." *Informal Logic Newsletter*, vol. 5 no. 2: 23. Paul, Richard (1990). *Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World* (Rohnert Park, CA: Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique). Paul, Richard (1994). "Teaching critical thinking in the strong sense." *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press), 181-198. Popkewitz, Thomas S. (1991). *A Political Sociology of Educational Reform* (New York: Teachers College Press). Scheffler, Israel (1991). "In praise of the cognitive emotions." *In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions* , Israel Scheffler (New York: Routledge), 3-17. Schrag, Francis (1988). "Response to Giroux." *Educational Theory*, vol. 38 no. 1: 143. Siegel, Harvey (1988).*Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education* (New York: Routledge). Siegel, Harvey (1993). "Gimme that Old-Time Enlightenment Meta-Narrative." *Inquiry*, vol. 11 no. 4: 1, 17-22. Siegel, Harvey (1996). "What price inclusion?" *Philosophy of Education 1995*, Alven Neiman, ed. (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1-22. Siegel, Harvey (forthcoming). *Rationality Redeemed? Further Dialogues on an Educational Ideal *(New York: Routledge). Stanley, William B. (1992). *Curriculum for Utopia: Social Reconstructionism and Critical Pedagogy in the Postmodern Era* (Albany: SUNY Press). Talaska, Richard A. (1992). *Critical Reasoning in Contemporary Culture* (Albany: SUNY Press). Thayer-Bacon, Barbara (1993). "Caring and its relationship to critical thinking." *Educational Theory*, vol. 43 no. 3: 323-340. Warren, Karen J. (1994). "Critical thinking and feminism." *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press), 155-176. Walters, Kerry S. (1994). "Beyond logicism in critical thinking." *Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking*, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press), 1-22. Weinstein, Mark (1993). "Rational hopes and utopian visions." *Inquiry* vol. 11 no. 3: 1, 16-22. Wheary, Jennifer and Ennis Robert H. (1995). "Gender bias in critical thinking: Continuing the dialogue." *Educational Theory,*vol. 45 no. 2: 213-224. On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 2:50 PM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > Hi Dear All! > I am in the middle of preparing an invited talk on critical thinking, and > I need your's, Dear ALL!, help. > Could you, please, let me know if there is a publication you know and like > re: "Critical Thinking" within CHAT tradition. > You can reply to this message or send me an email to nataliag@sfu.ca > I really appreciate all your help. > Thank you, > Natalia. > -- Robert Lake Ed.D. Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University P. O. Box 8144, Statesboro, GA 30460 Co-editor of *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies,* vol.39, 2017 Special issue: Maxine Greene and the Pedagogy of Social Imagination: An Intellectual Genealogy. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/gred20/39/1 Webpage: https://georgiasouthern.academia.edu/RobertLake*Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its midwife.* John Dewey-*Democracy and Education*,1916, p. 139 From nataliag@sfu.ca Sun Jan 14 16:05:21 2018 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 16:05:21 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Critical Thinking -request for suggestions In-Reply-To: References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> <426881125.314952.1515959431052.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: <515988586.559522.1515974721619.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Hi David, Thank you, appreciate you imput! Cheers, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Kellogg" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, January 14, 2018 2:00:22 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Critical Thinking -request for suggestions I guess if I were invited to give a talk like this (heaven forfend!) I would talk about two completely different things. a) Critical thinking as critical (crisis-laden) abstraction (thinking). It's what puts the "pere" into our "perezhivanie"--it's the thinking about feeling that mediates an experience into a meaning (and this is probably related, at least in my miserable mind) to the way in which our experience can confront us as something alien, our interpersonal meanings become "societal" ones). David Butt, my supervisor, wrote a really good but almost unreadable paper about this; I tried to make his ideas a little more readable in my own paper "Thinking of feeling". b) Critical thinking about the CHAT tradition itself. We're actually not very good at this, I think; I myself am still in the "Gee whiz!" phase of my reading of Vygotsky, and I need people like Ruqaiya Hasan to remind me that cultural historical psychology was hardly even a prologomena or outline sketch when LSV died. Now that Vygotsky's personality is gone, we are left with his world view, and that is necessarily incomplete. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:50 AM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > Hi Dear All! > I am in the middle of preparing an invited talk on critical thinking, and > I need your's, Dear ALL!, help. > Could you, please, let me know if there is a publication you know and like > re: "Critical Thinking" within CHAT tradition. > You can reply to this message or send me an email to nataliag@sfu.ca > I really appreciate all your help. > Thank you, > Natalia. > From mpacker@cantab.net Sun Jan 14 17:13:10 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 20:13:10 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: <1515968947464.47552@iped.uio.no> References: <5A318310-B582-4AD4-8312-82888D7BD4CE@cantab.net> <1515968947464.47552@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <3D23FCFB-380B-4671-BAD4-8312F6A13A1F@cantab.net> Thanks, Alfredo. For some reason xmca is removing every attachment that I try to send. Martin > On Jan 14, 2018, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Martin, the link for the call for papers was missing in your post. The one circulated before still has the January 1st deadline, but is here: > http://explore.tandfonline.com/cfp/ed/jml03430-hmca-cfp-si-lchc?utm_source=CPB&utm_medium=cms&utm_campaign=JML03430 > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin Packer > Sent: 14 January 2018 23:12 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography > > And I understand that the date has been extended for proposals to write commentaries on the Polyphonic Autobiography, to be published in Mind, Culture, and Activity. > > Proposals should be sent to > > Here?s the link to the Story of LCHC - the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition: > > > > > And here?s the call for papers: > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > >> On Jan 14, 2018, at 2:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >> >> We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, >> JANUARY 24. >> >> >> We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document >> before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. >> >> >> We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole >> on Culture, >> Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic >> Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members of >> the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller University >> days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- will join >> Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how people >> are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, what?s >> relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. >> >> >> >> The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at >> 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for >> future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email >> to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further information >> including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. >> >> >> >> Thanks, >> >> Beth >> >> -- >> Beth Ferholt >> Associate Professor >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >> 2900 Bedford Avenue >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >> >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Jan 14 20:46:57 2018 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 21:46:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: <3D23FCFB-380B-4671-BAD4-8312F6A13A1F@cantab.net> References: <5A318310-B582-4AD4-8312-82888D7BD4CE@cantab.net> <1515968947464.47552@iped.uio.no> <3D23FCFB-380B-4671-BAD4-8312F6A13A1F@cantab.net> Message-ID: Also, Martin, I think that was a link to an older version of the lchc autobiography (or was that intended?). The newer version, which I find much more pleasant to read, can be found here: https://lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/ Cheers, Greg On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 6:13 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > Thanks, Alfredo. For some reason xmca is removing every attachment that I > try to send. > > Martin > > > > > On Jan 14, 2018, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > > Martin, the link for the call for papers was missing in your post. The > one circulated before still has the January 1st deadline, but is here: > > http://explore.tandfonline.com/cfp/ed/jml03430-hmca-cfp- > si-lchc?utm_source=CPB&utm_medium=cms&utm_campaign=JML03430 > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin Packer > > Sent: 14 January 2018 23:12 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live > conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography > > > > And I understand that the date has been extended for proposals to write > commentaries on the Polyphonic Autobiography, to be published in Mind, > Culture, and Activity. > > > > Proposals should be sent to > > > > Here?s the link to the Story of LCHC - the Laboratory of Comparative > Human Cognition: > > > > LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography wikispaces.com/The+Story+of+LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography > >> > > > > And here?s the call for papers: > > > > Martin > > > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > > > >> On Jan 14, 2018, at 2:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > >> > >> We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, > >> JANUARY 24. > >> > >> > >> We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document > >> before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. > >> > >> > >> We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole > >> on Culture, > >> Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic > >> Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two > members of > >> the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller > University > >> days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- will > join > >> Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how people > >> are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, > what?s > >> relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. > >> > >> > >> > >> The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at > >> 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for > >> future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an > email > >> to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further > information > >> including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. > >> > >> > >> > >> Thanks, > >> > >> Beth > >> > >> -- > >> Beth Ferholt > >> Associate Professor > >> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > >> Brooklyn College, City University of New York > >> 2900 Bedford Avenue > >> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > >> > >> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > >> Phone: (718) 951-5205 > >> Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@cantab.net Mon Jan 15 04:17:38 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 07:17:38 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: <5A318310-B582-4AD4-8312-82888D7BD4CE@cantab.net> <1515968947464.47552@iped.uio.no> <3D23FCFB-380B-4671-BAD4-8312F6A13A1F@cantab.net> Message-ID: <91095651-975D-46CC-B170-C9D0865866D0@cantab.net> Thanks, Greg! Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 14, 2018, at 11:46 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Also, Martin, I think that was a link to an older version of the lchc > autobiography (or was that intended?). The newer version, which I find much > more pleasant to read, can be found here: > https://lchcautobio.ucsd.edu/ > > Cheers, > Greg > > > On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 6:13 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Thanks, Alfredo. For some reason xmca is removing every attachment that I >> try to send. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >>> On Jan 14, 2018, at 5:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >>> >>> Martin, the link for the call for papers was missing in your post. The >> one circulated before still has the January 1st deadline, but is here: >>> http://explore.tandfonline.com/cfp/ed/jml03430-hmca-cfp- >> si-lchc?utm_source=CPB&utm_medium=cms&utm_campaign=JML03430 >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Martin Packer >>> Sent: 14 January 2018 23:12 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live >> conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography >>> >>> And I understand that the date has been extended for proposals to write >> commentaries on the Polyphonic Autobiography, to be published in Mind, >> Culture, and Activity. >>> >>> Proposals should be sent to >>> >>> Here?s the link to the Story of LCHC - the Laboratory of Comparative >> Human Cognition: >>> >>> > LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography > wikispaces.com/The+Story+of+LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography >>>> >>> >>> And here?s the call for papers: >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Jan 14, 2018, at 2:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: >>>> >>>> We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, >>>> JANUARY 24. >>>> >>>> >>>> We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document >>>> before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. >>>> >>>> >>>> We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole >>>> on Culture, >>>> Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic >>>> Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two >> members of >>>> the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller >> University >>>> days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- will >> join >>>> Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how people >>>> are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, >> what?s >>>> relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at >>>> 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for >>>> future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an >> email >>>> to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further >> information >>>> including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> Beth >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Beth Ferholt >>>> Associate Professor >>>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education >>>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York >>>> 2900 Bedford Avenue >>>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 >>>> >>>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu >>>> Phone: (718) 951-5205 >>>> Fax: (718) 951-4816 >>> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 15 05:01:12 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 00:01:12 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] social / societal In-Reply-To: References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <19072c0e-5673-38d8-936a-ca93d3400467@mira.net> David I never said social/societal wasn't a useful distinction. I said in 40 years of studying Marxism I had come across the word "societal" - I was not a psychologist, that's all. Consider the opening words of the Grundrisse: "Der vorliegende Gegenstand zun?chst die /materielle Produktion/. In Gesellschaft produzierende Individuen - daher gesellschaftlich bestimmte Produktion der Individuen ist nat?rlich der Ausgangspunkt." Translated into English as "The object before us, to begin with, /material production/. Individuals producing in society ? hence socially determined individual production ? is, of course, the point of departure." Isn't it blindingly obvious that "socially" here means what you might call "societally"? Isn't it obvious that having been introduced to "social" in this sense, there is no need for the word "societal"? Nonetheless, I accept, if your topic is psychology, there is a useful distinction there. But in the context of reading Marx, there is no need for a different word. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 15/01/2018 8:45 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Like Wolff-Michael (and unlike Andy), I have always found the distinction > between social and societal a useful one. Yes, I see that the similarity > between the words makes them very confusible: I myself use "interpersonal" > vs. "social" when I teach, but this actually makes them too distinct. I > think that "social" and "societal"--even MORE than their German > equivalents--emphasize how linked they are, and also how tied they are to > language. At some point--and it is a point that is just as traumatic as the > first year of life, when the child must pass from primary to secondary > intersubjectivity--the interpersonal begins to confront us as something > more, something alien, something quite beyond our direct control. Instead > of speaking language, language begins to articulate us. > > I think, in some ways, Wolff-Michael's example of crime is a poor one, > because I don't think that "crime" actually exists at the social level: > "crime" is simply what the ruling class chooses to call certain forms of > exploitation, aggression, and violence from which it doesn't directly > profit. But Wolff-Michael is right to argue for the link--both social > relations and societal phenomena are the result of the ensemble of human > relations, although which social relation is foregrounded and which > backgrounded must necessarily change as we move from the social to the > societal. The feminist slogan "the personal is political" is not a > redundancy, but it is usually understood backwards, to mean that everything > social is societal, when in fact it should be understood to mean that > everything societal is in the final analysis social. > > But sometimes the news cycle will bat a poor example away and provide a > better one. Take, for example, the presidential proposal that US > immigration policy distinguish between "shithole countries" and Norway. > Now, for many years, racists have been whining that people are > being "politically correct" and taking all the fun out of being publically > offensive and rude by insisting on some link between social interactions > and societal issues. The idea is that if you interact with Omarosa, Kanye > West, Ben Carson, and Condoleeza Rice socially you can say what you like > about the societies they came from. When liberals insist that someone born > in America is one hundred percent American, no matter where their ancestors > were born, they also subscribe to this kind of magical disjunction. > > Trevor Noah is right to say that the truly shocking thing in what the > president said wasn't "shithole". It was Norway. This isn't simply ignorant > and unrealistic (what Norwegian would give up the generous trust of oil > revenues and emigrate to a country like the USA which totally lacks a > decent health service or retirement plan?). As in Finland, the Centre-Right > government in Norway is in a coalition with a far-right, anti-immigrant > party, dedicated to keeping the country Nordically pure. THAT is not > just an attack on civility, like using the word "shithole". It's an attack > on civil rights. As soon as the US government takes this > minority government as a model, it is no longer a social, > personal, offense; it's societal now. > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:29 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> Absolutely difficult to satirise, Rob. As if reason was literally being >> stretched to push what could be considered to be reasonable, so that at >> every stretch what few years ago would be absolutely unthinkable becomes >> not only thinkable but normal. Like Spanish police beating people for going >> to vote to an (illegal, yet peaceful) referendum in Catalonia and >> politicians being held for months in prison only for "prevention," while a >> horde of citizens in other parts of the country encouraging the police like >> they encourage football teams, "A por ellos!!" >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of robsub@ariadne.org.uk >> Sent: 12 January 2018 20:18 >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists >> international science? >> >> I was going to joke that I bet Toby Young was on the guest list, but I >> see he was. Truth is becoming really hard to satirise. >> >> Rob >> >> On 12/01/2018 19:06, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >>> I believe that this is London's way of making London a more appealing >> place for Trump to visit. Recently they have said some not-nice things >> about him, and that makes him turn from orange to red-orange. On the color >> scale, that's an escalation of tensions. I see this conference as a >> validation of his world-view, making the UK less of a shithole of a country >> to him and his followers. >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin >>> Sent: Friday, January 12, 2018 11:25 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists >> international science? >>> https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/ >> 51323/title/Secret-Eu >>> genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ >>> > 51323/title/Secret-E >>> ugenics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/& >> utm_campaign=TS_D >>> AILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium= >> email&utm_content=5994 >>> 4918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 >> FETdaZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtU >>> MYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk&_hsmi= >> 59944918> >>> &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source= >> hs_email&utm_medium=emai >>> l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 >> FETda >>> ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmK >> Q29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& >>> _hsmi=59944918 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Peg Griffin, Ph. D. >>> >>> Washington, DC 20003 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 15 05:50:25 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 00:50:25 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: social / societal In-Reply-To: <19072c0e-5673-38d8-936a-ca93d3400467@mira.net> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> <19072c0e-5673-38d8-936a-ca93d3400467@mira.net> Message-ID: <9d06a4c5-c424-2da3-0fcd-034b7fb5e009@mira.net> Oh, and further down the same document, Marx says: "Ricardo, dem es darum zu tun war, die moderne Produktion in ihrer bestimmten sozialen Gliederung aufzufassen ..." translated as: "Ricardo, whose concern was to grasp the specific social structure of modern production ..." So, even Marx, it seems, occasionally uses "sozial" in the sense of "societal"! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 16/01/2018 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > David I never said social/societal wasn't a useful > distinction. I said in 40 years of studying Marxism I had > come across the word "societal" - I was not a psychologist, > that's all. > > Consider the opening words of the Grundrisse: > > "Der vorliegende Gegenstand zun?chst die /materielle > Produktion/. In Gesellschaft produzierende Individuen - > daher gesellschaftlich bestimmte Produktion der > Individuen ist nat?rlich der Ausgangspunkt." > > Translated into English as "The object before us, to begin > with, /material production/. Individuals producing in > society ? hence socially determined individual production ? > is, of course, the point of departure." > > > Isn't it blindingly obvious that "socially" here means what > you might call "societally"? Isn't it obvious that having > been introduced to "social" in this sense, there is no need > for the word "societal"? Nonetheless, I accept, if your > topic is psychology, there is a useful distinction there. > But in the context of reading Marx, there is no need for a > different word. > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 15/01/2018 8:45 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> Like Wolff-Michael (and unlike Andy), I have always found the distinction >> between social and societal a useful one. Yes, I see that the similarity >> between the words makes them very confusible: I myself use "interpersonal" >> vs. "social" when I teach, but this actually makes them too distinct. I >> think that "social" and "societal"--even MORE than their German >> equivalents--emphasize how linked they are, and also how tied they are to >> language. At some point--and it is a point that is just as traumatic as the >> first year of life, when the child must pass from primary to secondary >> intersubjectivity--the interpersonal begins to confront us as something >> more, something alien, something quite beyond our direct control. Instead >> of speaking language, language begins to articulate us. >> >> I think, in some ways, Wolff-Michael's example of crime is a poor one, >> because I don't think that "crime" actually exists at the social level: >> "crime" is simply what the ruling class chooses to call certain forms of >> exploitation, aggression, and violence from which it doesn't directly >> profit. But Wolff-Michael is right to argue for the link--both social >> relations and societal phenomena are the result of the ensemble of human >> relations, although which social relation is foregrounded and which >> backgrounded must necessarily change as we move from the social to the >> societal. The feminist slogan "the personal is political" is not a >> redundancy, but it is usually understood backwards, to mean that everything >> social is societal, when in fact it should be understood to mean that >> everything societal is in the final analysis social. >> >> But sometimes the news cycle will bat a poor example away and provide a >> better one. Take, for example, the presidential proposal that US >> immigration policy distinguish between "shithole countries" and Norway. >> Now, for many years, racists have been whining that people are >> being "politically correct" and taking all the fun out of being publically >> offensive and rude by insisting on some link between social interactions >> and societal issues. The idea is that if you interact with Omarosa, Kanye >> West, Ben Carson, and Condoleeza Rice socially you can say what you like >> about the societies they came from. When liberals insist that someone born >> in America is one hundred percent American, no matter where their ancestors >> were born, they also subscribe to this kind of magical disjunction. >> >> Trevor Noah is right to say that the truly shocking thing in what the >> president said wasn't "shithole". It was Norway. This isn't simply ignorant >> and unrealistic (what Norwegian would give up the generous trust of oil >> revenues and emigrate to a country like the USA which totally lacks a >> decent health service or retirement plan?). As in Finland, the Centre-Right >> government in Norway is in a coalition with a far-right, anti-immigrant >> party, dedicated to keeping the country Nordically pure. THAT is not >> just an attack on civility, like using the word "shithole". It's an attack >> on civil rights. As soon as the US government takes this >> minority government as a model, it is no longer a social, >> personal, offense; it's societal now. >> >> David Kellogg >> >> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, >> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A >> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' >> >> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:29 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >> >>> Absolutely difficult to satirise, Rob. As if reason was literally being >>> stretched to push what could be considered to be reasonable, so that at >>> every stretch what few years ago would be absolutely unthinkable becomes >>> not only thinkable but normal. Like Spanish police beating people for going >>> to vote to an (illegal, yet peaceful) referendum in Catalonia and >>> politicians being held for months in prison only for "prevention," while a >>> horde of citizens in other parts of the country encouraging the police like >>> they encourage football teams, "A por ellos!!" >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of robsub@ariadne.org.uk >>> Sent: 12 January 2018 20:18 >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists >>> international science? >>> >>> I was going to joke that I bet Toby Young was on the guest list, but I >>> see he was. Truth is becoming really hard to satirise. >>> >>> Rob >>> >>> On 12/01/2018 19:06, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >>>> I believe that this is London's way of making London a more appealing >>> place for Trump to visit. Recently they have said some not-nice things >>> about him, and that makes him turn from orange to red-orange. On the color >>> scale, that's an escalation of tensions. I see this conference as a >>> validation of his world-view, making the UK less of a shithole of a country >>> to him and his followers. >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >>> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin >>>> Sent: Friday, January 12, 2018 11:25 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists >>> international science? >>>> https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/ >>> 51323/title/Secret-Eu >>>> genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ >>>> >> 51323/title/Secret-E >>>> ugenics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/& >>> utm_campaign=TS_D >>>> AILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium= >>> email&utm_content=5994 >>>> 4918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 >>> FETdaZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtU >>>> MYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk&_hsmi= >>> 59944918> >>>> &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source= >>> hs_email&utm_medium=emai >>>> l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 >>> FETda >>>> ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmK >>> Q29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& >>>> _hsmi=59944918 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Peg Griffin, Ph. D. >>>> >>>> Washington, DC 20003 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Mon Jan 15 06:08:52 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 06:08:52 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: social / societal In-Reply-To: <9d06a4c5-c424-2da3-0fcd-034b7fb5e009@mira.net> References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> <19072c0e-5673-38d8-936a-ca93d3400467@mira.net> <9d06a4c5-c424-2da3-0fcd-034b7fb5e009@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, but you can hear this phrase as saying that Ricardo looked at the social structure, not Marx ... Marx is writing how Ricardo approached the problem, not he himself. The paragraph is about distribution (I am looking at the phrase in MEW42), and the preceding one begins with a statement about societies. In the paragraph before, Marx writes about societal law, and societal distribution (MEW42, p.31). So I would not say that Marx writes about structure as social---it is societal, and all the surrounding text makes it such. But of course, you know that we are all struggling with the use of language, especially when we are trying to move to different discursive forms, and when the old ones still show up so that there are inconsistencies in what we articulate. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 5:50 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Oh, and further down the same document, Marx says: > > "Ricardo, dem es darum zu tun war, die moderne Produktion in > ihrer bestimmten sozialen Gliederung aufzufassen ..." > > translated as: "Ricardo, whose concern was to grasp the > specific social structure of modern production ..." > > So, even Marx, it seems, occasionally uses "sozial" in the > sense of "societal"! > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 16/01/2018 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > David I never said social/societal wasn't a useful > > distinction. I said in 40 years of studying Marxism I had > > come across the word "societal" - I was not a psychologist, > > that's all. > > > > Consider the opening words of the Grundrisse: > > > > "Der vorliegende Gegenstand zun?chst die /materielle > > Produktion/. In Gesellschaft produzierende Individuen - > > daher gesellschaftlich bestimmte Produktion der > > Individuen ist nat?rlich der Ausgangspunkt." > > > > Translated into English as "The object before us, to begin > > with, /material production/. Individuals producing in > > society ? hence socially determined individual production ? > > is, of course, the point of departure." > > > > > > Isn't it blindingly obvious that "socially" here means what > > you might call "societally"? Isn't it obvious that having > > been introduced to "social" in this sense, there is no need > > for the word "societal"? Nonetheless, I accept, if your > > topic is psychology, there is a useful distinction there. > > But in the context of reading Marx, there is no need for a > > different word. > > > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > On 15/01/2018 8:45 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Like Wolff-Michael (and unlike Andy), I have always found the > distinction > >> between social and societal a useful one. Yes, I see that the similarity > >> between the words makes them very confusible: I myself use > "interpersonal" > >> vs. "social" when I teach, but this actually makes them too distinct. I > >> think that "social" and "societal"--even MORE than their German > >> equivalents--emphasize how linked they are, and also how tied they are > to > >> language. At some point--and it is a point that is just as traumatic as > the > >> first year of life, when the child must pass from primary to secondary > >> intersubjectivity--the interpersonal begins to confront us as something > >> more, something alien, something quite beyond our direct control. > Instead > >> of speaking language, language begins to articulate us. > >> > >> I think, in some ways, Wolff-Michael's example of crime is a poor one, > >> because I don't think that "crime" actually exists at the social level: > >> "crime" is simply what the ruling class chooses to call certain forms of > >> exploitation, aggression, and violence from which it doesn't directly > >> profit. But Wolff-Michael is right to argue for the link--both social > >> relations and societal phenomena are the result of the ensemble of human > >> relations, although which social relation is foregrounded and which > >> backgrounded must necessarily change as we move from the social to the > >> societal. The feminist slogan "the personal is political" is not a > >> redundancy, but it is usually understood backwards, to mean that > everything > >> social is societal, when in fact it should be understood to mean that > >> everything societal is in the final analysis social. > >> > >> But sometimes the news cycle will bat a poor example away and provide a > >> better one. Take, for example, the presidential proposal that US > >> immigration policy distinguish between "shithole countries" and Norway. > >> Now, for many years, racists have been whining that people are > >> being "politically correct" and taking all the fun out of being > publically > >> offensive and rude by insisting on some link between social interactions > >> and societal issues. The idea is that if you interact with Omarosa, > Kanye > >> West, Ben Carson, and Condoleeza Rice socially you can say what you like > >> about the societies they came from. When liberals insist that someone > born > >> in America is one hundred percent American, no matter where their > ancestors > >> were born, they also subscribe to this kind of magical disjunction. > >> > >> Trevor Noah is right to say that the truly shocking thing in what the > >> president said wasn't "shithole". It was Norway. This isn't simply > ignorant > >> and unrealistic (what Norwegian would give up the generous trust of oil > >> revenues and emigrate to a country like the USA which totally lacks a > >> decent health service or retirement plan?). As in Finland, the > Centre-Right > >> government in Norway is in a coalition with a far-right, anti-immigrant > >> party, dedicated to keeping the country Nordically pure. THAT is not > >> just an attack on civility, like using the word "shithole". It's an > attack > >> on civil rights. As soon as the US government takes this > >> minority government as a model, it is no longer a social, > >> personal, offense; it's societal now. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> > >> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > >> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > >> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >> > >> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:29 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Absolutely difficult to satirise, Rob. As if reason was literally being > >>> stretched to push what could be considered to be reasonable, so that at > >>> every stretch what few years ago would be absolutely unthinkable > becomes > >>> not only thinkable but normal. Like Spanish police beating people for > going > >>> to vote to an (illegal, yet peaceful) referendum in Catalonia and > >>> politicians being held for months in prison only for "prevention," > while a > >>> horde of citizens in other parts of the country encouraging the police > like > >>> they encourage football teams, "A por ellos!!" > >>> Alfredo > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> on behalf of robsub@ariadne.org.uk > >>> Sent: 12 January 2018 20:18 > >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists > >>> international science? > >>> > >>> I was going to joke that I bet Toby Young was on the guest list, but I > >>> see he was. Truth is becoming really hard to satirise. > >>> > >>> Rob > >>> > >>> On 12/01/2018 19:06, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >>>> I believe that this is London's way of making London a more appealing > >>> place for Trump to visit. Recently they have said some not-nice things > >>> about him, and that makes him turn from orange to red-orange. On the > color > >>> scale, that's an escalation of tensions. I see this conference as a > >>> validation of his world-view, making the UK less of a shithole of a > country > >>> to him and his followers. > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > >>> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin > >>>> Sent: Friday, January 12, 2018 11:25 AM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white suprem-racists > >>> international science? > >>>> https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/ > >>> 51323/title/Secret-Eu > >>>> genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ > >>>> >>> 51323/title/Secret-E > >>>> ugenics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/& > >>> utm_campaign=TS_D > >>>> AILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium= > >>> email&utm_content=5994 > >>>> 4918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 > >>> FETdaZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtU > >>>> MYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk&_hsmi= > >>> 59944918> > >>>> &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source= > >>> hs_email&utm_medium=emai > >>>> l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0- > XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 > >>> FETda > >>>> ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmK > >>> Q29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& > >>>> _hsmi=59944918 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Peg Griffin, Ph. D. > >>>> > >>>> Washington, DC 20003 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 15 06:16:51 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 01:16:51 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: social / societal In-Reply-To: References: <003301d38bc1$d5ee9c90$81cbd5b0$@att.net> <52e391b5-676f-a7ff-7693-63f021744451@ariadne.org.uk> <1515958174730.1779@iped.uio.no> <19072c0e-5673-38d8-936a-ca93d3400467@mira.net> <9d06a4c5-c424-2da3-0fcd-034b7fb5e009@mira.net> Message-ID: <80b0a342-db48-1973-7c6e-5e2a847b3e32@mira.net> Exactly, the context of the usage makes the concrete meaning clear, rather than a supposed dictionary meaning. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 16/01/2018 1:08 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > Andy, > but you can hear this phrase as saying that Ricardo looked > at the social structure, not Marx ... Marx is writing how > Ricardo approached the problem, not he himself. The > paragraph is about distribution (I am looking at the > phrase in MEW42), and the preceding one begins with a > statement about societies. In the paragraph before, Marx > writes about societal law, and societal distribution > (MEW42, p.31). So I would not say that Marx writes about > structure as social---it is societal, and all the > surrounding text makes it such. > > But of course, you know that we are all struggling with > the use of language, especially when we are trying to move > to different discursive forms, and when the old ones still > show up so that there are inconsistencies in what we > articulate. > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > New book: */The Mathematics of Mathematics > /* > > On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 5:50 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Oh, and further down the same document, Marx says: > > "Ricardo, dem es darum zu tun war, die moderne > Produktion in > ihrer bestimmten sozialen Gliederung aufzufassen ..." > > translated as: "Ricardo, whose concern was to grasp the > specific social structure of modern production ..." > > So, even Marx, it seems, occasionally uses "sozial" in the > sense of "societal"! > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > On 16/01/2018 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > David I never said social/societal wasn't a useful > > distinction. I said in 40 years of studying Marxism > I had > > come across the word "societal" - I was not a > psychologist, > > that's all. > > > > Consider the opening words of the Grundrisse: > > > > "Der vorliegende Gegenstand zun?chst die /materielle > > Produktion/. In Gesellschaft produzierende > Individuen - > > daher gesellschaftlich bestimmte Produktion der > > Individuen ist nat?rlich der Ausgangspunkt." > > > > Translated into English as "The object before us, to > begin > > with, /material production/. Individuals producing in > > society ? hence socially determined individual > production ? > > is, of course, the point of departure." > > > > > > Isn't it blindingly obvious that "socially" here > means what > > you might call "societally"? Isn't it obvious that > having > > been introduced to "social" in this sense, there is > no need > > for the word "societal"? Nonetheless, I accept, if your > > topic is psychology, there is a useful distinction > there. > > But in the context of reading Marx, there is no need > for a > > different word. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > > On 15/01/2018 8:45 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Like Wolff-Michael (and unlike Andy), I have always > found the distinction > >> between social and societal a useful one. Yes, I > see that the similarity > >> between the words makes them very confusible: I > myself use "interpersonal" > >> vs. "social" when I teach, but this actually makes > them too distinct. I > >> think that "social" and "societal"--even MORE than > their German > >> equivalents--emphasize how linked they are, and > also how tied they are to > >> language. At some point--and it is a point that is > just as traumatic as the > >> first year of life, when the child must pass from > primary to secondary > >> intersubjectivity--the interpersonal begins to > confront us as something > >> more, something alien, something quite beyond our > direct control. Instead > >> of speaking language, language begins to articulate us. > >> > >> I think, in some ways, Wolff-Michael's example of > crime is a poor one, > >> because I don't think that "crime" actually exists > at the social level: > >> "crime" is simply what the ruling class chooses to > call certain forms of > >> exploitation, aggression, and violence from which > it doesn't directly > >> profit. But Wolff-Michael is right to argue for > the link--both social > >> relations and societal phenomena are the result of > the ensemble of human > >> relations, although which social relation is > foregrounded and which > >> backgrounded must necessarily change as we move > from the social to the > >> societal. The feminist slogan "the personal is > political" is not a > >> redundancy, but it is usually understood backwards, > to mean that everything > >> social is societal, when in fact it should be > understood to mean that > >> everything societal is in the final analysis social. > >> > >> But sometimes the news cycle will bat a poor > example away and provide a > >> better one. Take, for example, the presidential > proposal that US > >> immigration policy distinguish between "shithole > countries" and Norway. > >> Now, for many years, racists have been whining that > people are > >> being "politically correct" and taking all the fun > out of being publically > >> offensive and rude by insisting on some link > between social interactions > >> and societal issues. The idea is that if you > interact with Omarosa, Kanye > >> West, Ben Carson, and Condoleeza Rice socially you > can say what you like > >> about the societies they came from. When liberals > insist that someone born > >> in America is one hundred percent American, no > matter where their ancestors > >> were born, they also subscribe to this kind of > magical disjunction. > >> > >> Trevor Noah is right to say that the truly shocking > thing in what the > >> president said wasn't "shithole". It was Norway. > This isn't simply ignorant > >> and unrealistic (what Norwegian would give up the > generous trust of oil > >> revenues and emigrate to a country like the USA > which totally lacks a > >> decent health service or retirement plan?). As in > Finland, the Centre-Right > >> government in Norway is in a coalition with a > far-right, anti-immigrant > >> party, dedicated to keeping the country Nordically > pure. THAT is not > >> just an attack on civility, like using the word > "shithole". It's an attack > >> on civil rights. As soon as the US government takes > this > >> minority government as a model, it is no longer a > social, > >> personal, offense; it's societal now. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> > >> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 > (4) 'Metaphoric, > >> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on > ?Neoformation: A > >> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > >> > >> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > >> > >> > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 4:29 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Absolutely difficult to satirise, Rob. As if > reason was literally being > >>> stretched to push what could be considered to be > reasonable, so that at > >>> every stretch what few years ago would be > absolutely unthinkable becomes > >>> not only thinkable but normal. Like Spanish police > beating people for going > >>> to vote to an (illegal, yet peaceful) referendum > in Catalonia and > >>> politicians being held for months in prison only > for "prevention," while a > >>> horde of citizens in other parts of the country > encouraging the police like > >>> they encourage football teams, "A por ellos!!" > >>> Alfredo > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>> on behalf of robsub@ariadne.org.uk > > > >>> Sent: 12 January 2018 20:18 > >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: epidemic or endemic? white > suprem-racists > >>> international science? > >>> > >>> I was going to joke that I bet Toby Young was on > the guest list, but I > >>> see he was. Truth is becoming really hard to satirise. > >>> > >>> Rob > >>> > >>> On 12/01/2018 19:06, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >>>> I believe that this is London's way of making > London a more appealing > >>> place for Trump to visit. Recently they have said > some not-nice things > >>> about him, and that makes him turn from orange to > red-orange. On the color > >>> scale, that's an escalation of tensions. I see > this conference as a > >>> validation of his world-view, making the UK less > of a shithole of a country > >>> to him and his followers. > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > >>> mailman.ucsd.edu ] On > Behalf Of Peg Griffin > >>>> Sent: Friday, January 12, 2018 11:25 AM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] epidemic or endemic? white > suprem-racists > >>> international science? > >>>> > https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/ > > >>> 51323/title/Secret-Eu > >>>> > genics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/ > >>>> > > >>> 51323/title/Secret-E > >>>> > ugenics-Conference-Uncovered-at-University-College-London/& > >>> utm_campaign=TS_D > >>>> > AILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium= > >>> email&utm_content=5994 > >>>> 4918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 > >>> FETdaZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtU > >>>> > MYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmKQ29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk&_hsmi= > >>> 59944918> > >>>> &utm_campaign=TS_DAILY%20NEWSLETTER_2018&utm_source= > >>> hs_email&utm_medium=emai > >>>> > l&utm_content=59944918&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--0-XeLCUUnDDfuDnseG5HUEF4e07f2Kt6 > >>> FETda > >>>> ZKU-LuNy2l-YYp5OtUMYu_TX7t6Cty6Zf5sNwbX7zL0wBteZ0FmK > >>> Q29FAn7V0wUCfIAPc_PrMXk& > >>>> _hsmi=59944918 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Peg Griffin, Ph. D. > >>>> > >>>> Washington, DC 20003 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Mon Jan 15 09:21:13 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 09:21:13 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] on translation Message-ID: For those interested in the translation issues I raised earlier on this list, you might be interested in this (and David K. might have a lot to say to this point, too): Lost in (mis)translation? English take on Korean novel has critics up in arms https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2018/jan/15/lost-in-mistranslation-english-take-on-korean-novel-has-critics-up-in-arms Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jan 15 13:21:50 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 06:21:50 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: on translation In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: My wife read the Vegetarian and liked it. But I would say that when she reads Korean she inadvertantly mistranslates everything, because Korean has a stock of older, pure Korean words which cluster around every day usage and then a much larger stock of words borrowed from Chinese and adapted in various ways, rather the way that English has a stock of Germanic words like "table" and a much larger stock of words borrowed from Latin and Greek and adapted in various ways for scientific use. To me, Korean words are sui generis, and this means I am a lot slower than she is: I don't look at a Korean word and try to discern a historically distant Chinese soul. On the other hand, I do use a much more "top down" strategy: so for example when I read the Vegetarian I quickly realized it was a kind of rewrite of Kafka's "Metamorphosis" but the heroine is turning into a plant rather than an insect: "You are what you eat". So then the details didn't matter, but the result was that she finished the book and I didn't. The argument we sometimes hear that this or that text is untranslatable is either simply stating the obvious or else it is a claim of linguistic exceptionalism based on national exceptionalism. Obviouisly, all languages are ineffable, because all words are; language evolves to fill semantic niches as efficiently as possible. But precisely because this is true, translation from a semantic niche in one language to a semantic niche in another is not only possible, it's an inevitable part of communication even within the language. So I think that there isn't really any such thing as "mistranslation," there are only more or less successful types of translation for different purposes. The translator has the right to take all kinds of liberties, so long as the translation is replicable and the liberties are undoable. That's why what Alexander Pope and George Chapman did to the Iliad is perfectly valid, and it's also why what the Soviet editors did to Vygotsky, even though they were actually changing Russian to Russian, was not. There is a wonderful French translation of Voloshinov's "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language" which is bilingual--Russian on one page and French on the facing one. When I read it, I find it non-redundant: the whole is more than the multiplication of the part. When we translated "Thinking and Speech" into Korean we read it in French, Italian, two English versions, and Japanese as well as the original Russian. What struck me then--what still strikes me today--is that the key problems have absolutely nothing to do with translation, and with all the kerfuffle over mistranslation they remain entirely unaddressed. Chapter Five, for example, says that true concepts emerge in adolescence and not until; Chapter Six has the tension between the everyday and scientific concept right there in elementary school. Why does Vygotsky treat adolescence before elementary school, and complexes like pseudoconcepts after everyday concepts? You might say--well, he changed his mind, and in the preface he does say that he changed his mind and had to discard a lot of work. But neither chapter was discarded, ergo they must fit together in some way. One way to resolve it does bring us back to issues of translation by a slightly different route. There are two very different models of concept formation being presented. One is based on binaries, like "tall/short", "narrow/wide", and it is a laboratory abstraction. The other is based on what is usually called "expanding horizons" (the measure of generality), and it's a generalization of everyday life. The binary based model is self-contained and "sui generis", the way that I read Korean texts (and it is why I have no trouble with pairs of words like "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft", "coherence and cohesion", "societal and social"). The "expanding horizons" version is more like the way my wife reads (and it is why every word she reads undergoes a slight mistranslation, but she always manages to finish the book). David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 2:21 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > For those interested in the translation issues I raised earlier on this > list, you might be interested in this (and David K. might have a lot to say > to this point, too): > > Lost in (mis)translation? English take on Korean novel has critics up in > arms > https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2018/jan/15/ > lost-in-mistranslation-english-take-on-korean-novel-has-critics-up-in-arms > > Michael > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 15 15:24:08 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 10:24:08 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: on translation In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5a994da8-6e2f-95d6-13a6-49ec2c537fd4@mira.net> I think David expresses the issue very well when he says (with qualifications): "I think that there isn't really any such thing as "mistranslation," there are only more or less successful types of translation for different purposes." I am not familiar with Ricardo, but I find it hard to believe that this fellow who advised the British government on monetary policy did not have the concept of a Gesellschaftsformation in mind when he gave that advice. I do see that Marx's gesellschaftlich is usually translated as "social" which is why, through reading Mar, we acquire the same concept of gesellschaftlich as the indexed by "social" in the English. That is also why German speakers are not misled by the German expression which Marx uses: "sozial Revolution" let alone the meaning of "Sozialismus." Marx rarely uses the word sozial, but when he does, he not suddenly transforming himself into a libertarian individualist social theorist. Contrary to what David said in his earlier message, I do recognise an important distinction between societal and social. I had never heard the word "societal" before reading it in a paper by Steve Billett in 2006 and someone on xmca explained the distinction to me. However, I still do not use the word. It is one thing to recognise a distinction, but quite another to embed in one's language the implication and the social and the societal form a *dichotomy*. Anyone want to draw up a list for me of the phenomena which are social or which are societal? The distinction exists, but there are not "two kinds of questions" here, "social and societal." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 16/01/2018 8:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > My wife read the Vegetarian and liked it. But I would say that when she > reads Korean she inadvertantly mistranslates everything, because Korean has > a stock of older, pure Korean words which cluster around every day usage > and then a much larger stock of words borrowed from Chinese and adapted in > various ways, rather the way that English has a stock of Germanic words > like "table" and a much larger stock of words borrowed from Latin and Greek > and adapted in various ways for scientific use. To me, Korean words are sui > generis, and this means I am a lot slower than she is: I don't look at a > Korean word and try to discern a historically distant Chinese soul. On the > other hand, I do use a much more "top down" strategy: so for example when I > read the Vegetarian I quickly realized it was a kind of rewrite of Kafka's > "Metamorphosis" but the heroine is turning into a plant rather than an > insect: "You are what you eat". So then the details didn't matter, but the > result was that she finished the book and I didn't. > > The argument we sometimes hear that this or that text is untranslatable is > either simply stating the obvious or else it is a claim of linguistic > exceptionalism based on national exceptionalism. Obviouisly, all languages > are ineffable, because all words are; language evolves to fill semantic > niches as efficiently as possible. But precisely because this is true, > translation from a semantic niche in one language to a semantic niche in > another is not only possible, it's an inevitable part of communication even > within the language. So I think that there isn't really any such thing > as "mistranslation," there are only more or less successful types of > translation for different purposes. The translator has the right to take > all kinds of liberties, so long as the translation is replicable and the > liberties are undoable. That's why what Alexander Pope and George Chapman > did to the Iliad is perfectly valid, and it's also why what the Soviet > editors did to Vygotsky, even though they were actually changing Russian to > Russian, was not. There is a wonderful French translation of Voloshinov's > "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language" which is bilingual--Russian on one > page and French on the facing one. When I read it, I find it non-redundant: > the whole is more than the multiplication of the part. > > When we translated "Thinking and Speech" into Korean we read it in French, > Italian, two English versions, and Japanese as well as the original > Russian. What struck me then--what still strikes me today--is that the key > problems have absolutely nothing to do with translation, and with all the > kerfuffle over mistranslation they remain entirely unaddressed. Chapter > Five, for example, says that true concepts emerge in adolescence and not > until; Chapter Six has the tension between the everyday and scientific > concept right there in elementary school. Why does Vygotsky treat > adolescence before elementary school, and complexes like > pseudoconcepts after everyday concepts? You might say--well, he changed his > mind, and in the preface he does say that he changed his mind and had to > discard a lot of work. But neither chapter was discarded, ergo they must > fit together in some way. > > One way to resolve it does bring us back to issues of translation by a > slightly different route. There are two very different models of concept > formation being presented. One is based on binaries, like "tall/short", > "narrow/wide", and it is a laboratory abstraction. The other is based on > what is usually called "expanding horizons" (the measure of generality), > and it's a generalization of everyday life. The binary based model is > self-contained and "sui generis", the way that I read Korean texts (and it > is why I have no trouble with pairs of words like "Gemeinschaft" and > "Gesellschaft", "coherence and cohesion", "societal and social"). The > "expanding horizons" version is more like the way my wife reads (and it is > why every word she reads undergoes a slight mistranslation, but she always > manages to finish the book). > > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 2:21 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > >> For those interested in the translation issues I raised earlier on this >> list, you might be interested in this (and David K. might have a lot to say >> to this point, too): >> >> Lost in (mis)translation? English take on Korean novel has critics up in >> arms >> https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2018/jan/15/ >> lost-in-mistranslation-english-take-on-korean-novel-has-critics-up-in-arms >> >> Michael >> >> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> -------------------- >> Applied Cognitive Science >> MacLaurin Building A567 >> University of Victoria >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth >> >> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics >> > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* >> From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Mon Jan 15 15:35:16 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 15:35:16 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: on translation In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi David, thanks for the extended reflections on the issue. Can you tell us who the publisher is of the Voloshinov text? I have a French translation--published as Bakhtine... And to the whole is more than the parts. I really came to understand Heidegger after reading him in English, the different versions ... but this better understand also may have to do that in the meantime I did a PhD and became an academic. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 1:21 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > My wife read the Vegetarian and liked it. But I would say that when she > reads Korean she inadvertantly mistranslates everything, because Korean has > a stock of older, pure Korean words which cluster around every day usage > and then a much larger stock of words borrowed from Chinese and adapted in > various ways, rather the way that English has a stock of Germanic words > like "table" and a much larger stock of words borrowed from Latin and Greek > and adapted in various ways for scientific use. To me, Korean words are sui > generis, and this means I am a lot slower than she is: I don't look at a > Korean word and try to discern a historically distant Chinese soul. On the > other hand, I do use a much more "top down" strategy: so for example when I > read the Vegetarian I quickly realized it was a kind of rewrite of Kafka's > "Metamorphosis" but the heroine is turning into a plant rather than an > insect: "You are what you eat". So then the details didn't matter, but the > result was that she finished the book and I didn't. > > The argument we sometimes hear that this or that text is untranslatable is > either simply stating the obvious or else it is a claim of linguistic > exceptionalism based on national exceptionalism. Obviouisly, all languages > are ineffable, because all words are; language evolves to fill semantic > niches as efficiently as possible. But precisely because this is true, > translation from a semantic niche in one language to a semantic niche in > another is not only possible, it's an inevitable part of communication even > within the language. So I think that there isn't really any such thing > as "mistranslation," there are only more or less successful types of > translation for different purposes. The translator has the right to take > all kinds of liberties, so long as the translation is replicable and the > liberties are undoable. That's why what Alexander Pope and George Chapman > did to the Iliad is perfectly valid, and it's also why what the Soviet > editors did to Vygotsky, even though they were actually changing Russian to > Russian, was not. There is a wonderful French translation of Voloshinov's > "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language" which is bilingual--Russian on one > page and French on the facing one. When I read it, I find it non-redundant: > the whole is more than the multiplication of the part. > > When we translated "Thinking and Speech" into Korean we read it in French, > Italian, two English versions, and Japanese as well as the original > Russian. What struck me then--what still strikes me today--is that the key > problems have absolutely nothing to do with translation, and with all the > kerfuffle over mistranslation they remain entirely unaddressed. Chapter > Five, for example, says that true concepts emerge in adolescence and not > until; Chapter Six has the tension between the everyday and scientific > concept right there in elementary school. Why does Vygotsky treat > adolescence before elementary school, and complexes like > pseudoconcepts after everyday concepts? You might say--well, he changed his > mind, and in the preface he does say that he changed his mind and had to > discard a lot of work. But neither chapter was discarded, ergo they must > fit together in some way. > > One way to resolve it does bring us back to issues of translation by a > slightly different route. There are two very different models of concept > formation being presented. One is based on binaries, like "tall/short", > "narrow/wide", and it is a laboratory abstraction. The other is based on > what is usually called "expanding horizons" (the measure of generality), > and it's a generalization of everyday life. The binary based model is > self-contained and "sui generis", the way that I read Korean texts (and it > is why I have no trouble with pairs of words like "Gemeinschaft" and > "Gesellschaft", "coherence and cohesion", "societal and social"). The > "expanding horizons" version is more like the way my wife reads (and it is > why every word she reads undergoes a slight mistranslation, but she always > manages to finish the book). > > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 2:21 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > For those interested in the translation issues I raised earlier on this > > list, you might be interested in this (and David K. might have a lot to > say > > to this point, too): > > > > Lost in (mis)translation? English take on Korean novel has critics up in > > arms > > https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2018/jan/15/ > > lost-in-mistranslation-english-take-on-korean-novel- > has-critics-up-in-arms > > > > Michael > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jan 15 15:37:56 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 08:37:56 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: on translation In-Reply-To: <5a994da8-6e2f-95d6-13a6-49ec2c537fd4@mira.net> References: <5a994da8-6e2f-95d6-13a6-49ec2c537fd4@mira.net> Message-ID: My dear Grouch: I think what I actually said was that unlike you I have ALWAYS recognized the distinction between "social" and "societal" as useful. This seems to me completely consistent with what you said about having studied Marx for forty years without recognizing it. It is most certainly consistent with your earlier comment that when you first encountered the distinction you considered it a meaningless bit of academic jargon. My own professor, H.G. Widdowson, was particularly fond of fine distinctions in language, such as "cohesion/coherence", "use/usage", "text/discourse". I am currently using Halliday's work on intonation analysis, and he distinguishes the systems of "tone", "tonality" and "tonicity". Not to mention "sounding", "wording", and "meaning", or "elaboration, extension, enhancement". But now I see that the inevitable confusion is only a byproduct of being able to show that the concepts named are not fully extricable from each other, much less mutually exclusive. That was why I though "societal/social" was actually better than the German original, Gesellschaflicht/sozial, or even Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft, to which it is undoubtedly related. It occurs to me that this is an instance of what Natalia would call critical thinking--an instance when the translation is superior to the original. It is said that when Kurt Koffka visited Moscow he was always surprised that his interpreter--a young fellow by the name of Vygotsky--produced very long translations for even his shortest comments. David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 8:24 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I think David expresses the issue very well when he says > (with qualifications): "I think that there isn't really any > such thing as "mistranslation," there are only more or less > successful types of translation for different purposes." > > I am not familiar with Ricardo, but I find it hard to > believe that this fellow who advised the British government > on monetary policy did not have the concept of a > Gesellschaftsformation in mind when he gave that advice. I > do see that Marx's gesellschaftlich is usually translated as > "social" which is why, through reading Mar, we acquire the > same concept of gesellschaftlich as the indexed by "social" > in the English. That is also why German speakers are not > misled by the German expression which Marx uses: "sozial > Revolution" let alone the meaning of "Sozialismus." Marx > rarely uses the word sozial, but when he does, he not > suddenly transforming himself into a libertarian > individualist social theorist. > > Contrary to what David said in his earlier message, I do > recognise an important distinction between societal and > social. I had never heard the word "societal" before reading > it in a paper by Steve Billett in 2006 and someone on xmca > explained the distinction to me. However, I still do not use > the word. It is one thing to recognise a distinction, but > quite another to embed in one's language the implication and > the social and the societal form a *dichotomy*. Anyone want > to draw up a list for me of the phenomena which are social > or which are societal? The distinction exists, but there are > not "two kinds of questions" here, "social and societal." > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 16/01/2018 8:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > My wife read the Vegetarian and liked it. But I would say that when she > > reads Korean she inadvertantly mistranslates everything, because Korean > has > > a stock of older, pure Korean words which cluster around every day usage > > and then a much larger stock of words borrowed from Chinese and adapted > in > > various ways, rather the way that English has a stock of Germanic words > > like "table" and a much larger stock of words borrowed from Latin and > Greek > > and adapted in various ways for scientific use. To me, Korean words are > sui > > generis, and this means I am a lot slower than she is: I don't look at a > > Korean word and try to discern a historically distant Chinese soul. On > the > > other hand, I do use a much more "top down" strategy: so for example > when I > > read the Vegetarian I quickly realized it was a kind of rewrite of > Kafka's > > "Metamorphosis" but the heroine is turning into a plant rather than an > > insect: "You are what you eat". So then the details didn't matter, but > the > > result was that she finished the book and I didn't. > > > > The argument we sometimes hear that this or that text is untranslatable > is > > either simply stating the obvious or else it is a claim of linguistic > > exceptionalism based on national exceptionalism. Obviouisly, all > languages > > are ineffable, because all words are; language evolves to fill semantic > > niches as efficiently as possible. But precisely because this is true, > > translation from a semantic niche in one language to a semantic niche in > > another is not only possible, it's an inevitable part of communication > even > > within the language. So I think that there isn't really any such thing > > as "mistranslation," there are only more or less successful types of > > translation for different purposes. The translator has the right to take > > all kinds of liberties, so long as the translation is replicable and the > > liberties are undoable. That's why what Alexander Pope and George Chapman > > did to the Iliad is perfectly valid, and it's also why what the Soviet > > editors did to Vygotsky, even though they were actually changing Russian > to > > Russian, was not. There is a wonderful French translation of Voloshinov's > > "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language" which is bilingual--Russian on > one > > page and French on the facing one. When I read it, I find it > non-redundant: > > the whole is more than the multiplication of the part. > > > > When we translated "Thinking and Speech" into Korean we read it in > French, > > Italian, two English versions, and Japanese as well as the original > > Russian. What struck me then--what still strikes me today--is that the > key > > problems have absolutely nothing to do with translation, and with all the > > kerfuffle over mistranslation they remain entirely unaddressed. Chapter > > Five, for example, says that true concepts emerge in adolescence and not > > until; Chapter Six has the tension between the everyday and scientific > > concept right there in elementary school. Why does Vygotsky treat > > adolescence before elementary school, and complexes like > > pseudoconcepts after everyday concepts? You might say--well, he changed > his > > mind, and in the preface he does say that he changed his mind and had to > > discard a lot of work. But neither chapter was discarded, ergo they must > > fit together in some way. > > > > One way to resolve it does bring us back to issues of translation by a > > slightly different route. There are two very different models of concept > > formation being presented. One is based on binaries, like "tall/short", > > "narrow/wide", and it is a laboratory abstraction. The other is based on > > what is usually called "expanding horizons" (the measure of generality), > > and it's a generalization of everyday life. The binary based model is > > self-contained and "sui generis", the way that I read Korean texts (and > it > > is why I have no trouble with pairs of words like "Gemeinschaft" and > > "Gesellschaft", "coherence and cohesion", "societal and social"). The > > "expanding horizons" version is more like the way my wife reads (and it > is > > why every word she reads undergoes a slight mistranslation, but she > always > > manages to finish the book). > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 2:21 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > >> For those interested in the translation issues I raised earlier on this > >> list, you might be interested in this (and David K. might have a lot to > say > >> to this point, too): > >> > >> Lost in (mis)translation? English take on Korean novel has critics up in > >> arms > >> https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2018/jan/15/ > >> lost-in-mistranslation-english-take-on-korean-novel- > has-critics-up-in-arms > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> -------------------- > >> Applied Cognitive Science > >> MacLaurin Building A567 > >> University of Victoria > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > >> > >> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > >> >> directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jan 15 15:43:14 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 08:43:14 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: on translation In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Yes, this is in response to that "Editions de Minuit" edition, which doesn't even get the author correct! http://www.lambert-lucas.com/marxisme-et-philosophie-du-langage dk David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 8:35 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi David, > > thanks for the extended reflections on the issue. > > Can you tell us who the publisher is of the Voloshinov text? I have a > French translation--published as Bakhtine... > > And to the whole is more than the parts. I really came to understand > Heidegger after reading him in English, the different versions ... but this > better understand also may have to do that in the meantime I did a PhD and > became an academic. > > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 1:21 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > My wife read the Vegetarian and liked it. But I would say that when she > > reads Korean she inadvertantly mistranslates everything, because Korean > has > > a stock of older, pure Korean words which cluster around every day usage > > and then a much larger stock of words borrowed from Chinese and adapted > in > > various ways, rather the way that English has a stock of Germanic words > > like "table" and a much larger stock of words borrowed from Latin and > Greek > > and adapted in various ways for scientific use. To me, Korean words are > sui > > generis, and this means I am a lot slower than she is: I don't look at a > > Korean word and try to discern a historically distant Chinese soul. On > the > > other hand, I do use a much more "top down" strategy: so for example > when I > > read the Vegetarian I quickly realized it was a kind of rewrite of > Kafka's > > "Metamorphosis" but the heroine is turning into a plant rather than an > > insect: "You are what you eat". So then the details didn't matter, but > the > > result was that she finished the book and I didn't. > > > > The argument we sometimes hear that this or that text is untranslatable > is > > either simply stating the obvious or else it is a claim of linguistic > > exceptionalism based on national exceptionalism. Obviouisly, all > languages > > are ineffable, because all words are; language evolves to fill semantic > > niches as efficiently as possible. But precisely because this is true, > > translation from a semantic niche in one language to a semantic niche in > > another is not only possible, it's an inevitable part of communication > even > > within the language. So I think that there isn't really any such thing > > as "mistranslation," there are only more or less successful types of > > translation for different purposes. The translator has the right to take > > all kinds of liberties, so long as the translation is replicable and the > > liberties are undoable. That's why what Alexander Pope and George Chapman > > did to the Iliad is perfectly valid, and it's also why what the Soviet > > editors did to Vygotsky, even though they were actually changing Russian > to > > Russian, was not. There is a wonderful French translation of Voloshinov's > > "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language" which is bilingual--Russian on > one > > page and French on the facing one. When I read it, I find it > non-redundant: > > the whole is more than the multiplication of the part. > > > > When we translated "Thinking and Speech" into Korean we read it in > French, > > Italian, two English versions, and Japanese as well as the original > > Russian. What struck me then--what still strikes me today--is that the > key > > problems have absolutely nothing to do with translation, and with all the > > kerfuffle over mistranslation they remain entirely unaddressed. Chapter > > Five, for example, says that true concepts emerge in adolescence and not > > until; Chapter Six has the tension between the everyday and scientific > > concept right there in elementary school. Why does Vygotsky treat > > adolescence before elementary school, and complexes like > > pseudoconcepts after everyday concepts? You might say--well, he changed > his > > mind, and in the preface he does say that he changed his mind and had to > > discard a lot of work. But neither chapter was discarded, ergo they must > > fit together in some way. > > > > One way to resolve it does bring us back to issues of translation by a > > slightly different route. There are two very different models of concept > > formation being presented. One is based on binaries, like "tall/short", > > "narrow/wide", and it is a laboratory abstraction. The other is based on > > what is usually called "expanding horizons" (the measure of generality), > > and it's a generalization of everyday life. The binary based model is > > self-contained and "sui generis", the way that I read Korean texts (and > it > > is why I have no trouble with pairs of words like "Gemeinschaft" and > > "Gesellschaft", "coherence and cohesion", "societal and social"). The > > "expanding horizons" version is more like the way my wife reads (and it > is > > why every word she reads undergoes a slight mistranslation, but she > always > > manages to finish the book). > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 2:21 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > For those interested in the translation issues I raised earlier on this > > > list, you might be interested in this (and David K. might have a lot to > > say > > > to this point, too): > > > > > > Lost in (mis)translation? English take on Korean novel has critics up > in > > > arms > > > https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2018/jan/15/ > > > lost-in-mistranslation-english-take-on-korean-novel- > > has-critics-up-in-arms > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > -------------------- > > > Applied Cognitive Science > > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > > University of Victoria > > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Mon Jan 15 15:50:17 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 15:50:17 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: on translation In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks much. Will try to get this one. As to the name... you know but perhaps not others that there was a debate about the authorship, and I have to look it up again in the office, I think Todorov was involved there as well. m Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 3:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Yes, this is in response to that "Editions de Minuit" edition, which > doesn't even get the author correct! > > http://www.lambert-lucas.com/marxisme-et-philosophie-du-langage > > > dk > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 8:35 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Hi David, > > > > thanks for the extended reflections on the issue. > > > > Can you tell us who the publisher is of the Voloshinov text? I have a > > French translation--published as Bakhtine... > > > > And to the whole is more than the parts. I really came to understand > > Heidegger after reading him in English, the different versions ... but > this > > better understand also may have to do that in the meantime I did a PhD > and > > became an academic. > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 1:21 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > My wife read the Vegetarian and liked it. But I would say that when she > > > reads Korean she inadvertantly mistranslates everything, because Korean > > has > > > a stock of older, pure Korean words which cluster around every day > usage > > > and then a much larger stock of words borrowed from Chinese and adapted > > in > > > various ways, rather the way that English has a stock of Germanic words > > > like "table" and a much larger stock of words borrowed from Latin and > > Greek > > > and adapted in various ways for scientific use. To me, Korean words are > > sui > > > generis, and this means I am a lot slower than she is: I don't look at > a > > > Korean word and try to discern a historically distant Chinese soul. On > > the > > > other hand, I do use a much more "top down" strategy: so for example > > when I > > > read the Vegetarian I quickly realized it was a kind of rewrite of > > Kafka's > > > "Metamorphosis" but the heroine is turning into a plant rather than an > > > insect: "You are what you eat". So then the details didn't matter, but > > the > > > result was that she finished the book and I didn't. > > > > > > The argument we sometimes hear that this or that text is untranslatable > > is > > > either simply stating the obvious or else it is a claim of linguistic > > > exceptionalism based on national exceptionalism. Obviouisly, all > > languages > > > are ineffable, because all words are; language evolves to fill semantic > > > niches as efficiently as possible. But precisely because this is true, > > > translation from a semantic niche in one language to a semantic niche > in > > > another is not only possible, it's an inevitable part of communication > > even > > > within the language. So I think that there isn't really any such thing > > > as "mistranslation," there are only more or less successful types of > > > translation for different purposes. The translator has the right to > take > > > all kinds of liberties, so long as the translation is replicable and > the > > > liberties are undoable. That's why what Alexander Pope and George > Chapman > > > did to the Iliad is perfectly valid, and it's also why what the Soviet > > > editors did to Vygotsky, even though they were actually changing > Russian > > to > > > Russian, was not. There is a wonderful French translation of > Voloshinov's > > > "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language" which is bilingual--Russian on > > one > > > page and French on the facing one. When I read it, I find it > > non-redundant: > > > the whole is more than the multiplication of the part. > > > > > > When we translated "Thinking and Speech" into Korean we read it in > > French, > > > Italian, two English versions, and Japanese as well as the original > > > Russian. What struck me then--what still strikes me today--is that the > > key > > > problems have absolutely nothing to do with translation, and with all > the > > > kerfuffle over mistranslation they remain entirely unaddressed. Chapter > > > Five, for example, says that true concepts emerge in adolescence and > not > > > until; Chapter Six has the tension between the everyday and scientific > > > concept right there in elementary school. Why does Vygotsky treat > > > adolescence before elementary school, and complexes like > > > pseudoconcepts after everyday concepts? You might say--well, he changed > > his > > > mind, and in the preface he does say that he changed his mind and had > to > > > discard a lot of work. But neither chapter was discarded, ergo they > must > > > fit together in some way. > > > > > > One way to resolve it does bring us back to issues of translation by a > > > slightly different route. There are two very different models of > concept > > > formation being presented. One is based on binaries, like "tall/short", > > > "narrow/wide", and it is a laboratory abstraction. The other is based > on > > > what is usually called "expanding horizons" (the measure of > generality), > > > and it's a generalization of everyday life. The binary based model is > > > self-contained and "sui generis", the way that I read Korean texts (and > > it > > > is why I have no trouble with pairs of words like "Gemeinschaft" and > > > "Gesellschaft", "coherence and cohesion", "societal and social"). The > > > "expanding horizons" version is more like the way my wife reads (and it > > is > > > why every word she reads undergoes a slight mistranslation, but she > > always > > > manages to finish the book). > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, > > > Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A > > > Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' > > > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 2:21 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > For those interested in the translation issues I raised earlier on > this > > > > list, you might be interested in this (and David K. might have a lot > to > > > say > > > > to this point, too): > > > > > > > > Lost in (mis)translation? English take on Korean novel has critics up > > in > > > > arms > > > > https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2018/jan/15/ > > > > lost-in-mistranslation-english-take-on-korean-novel- > > > has-critics-up-in-arms > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > -------------------- > > > > Applied Cognitive Science > > > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > > > University of Victoria > > > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > > > > > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > > > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > > > > > > > From feine@duq.edu Tue Jan 16 11:46:30 2018 From: feine@duq.edu (Elizabeth Fein) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 14:46:30 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] **THE DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTING TO SQIP'S 2018 CONFERENCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO FEBRUARY 1ST, 2018** Message-ID: Dear Colleague, Attached, please find the Call for Proposals for the 5th Annual Conference of the Society for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology, *with our extended deadline of February 1st*. The conference is to be held at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh on May 21-22, 2018. SQIP is a section of Division 5 (Quantitative and Qualitative Methods) of the American Psychological Association and as such our mission is to foster researchers who use or teach qualitative research methods. Submissions from multidisciplinary, international, and student scholars are welcomed. Proposals are invited for paper and poster presentations, as well as symposia and conversation hours. Please do not hesitate to contact us at info@qualpsy.org if you have any questions about the organization or the conference. Additional information is also located at the website http://qualpsy.org/2018-conference/ . In any case, we hope to see you in Pittsburgh in May for an exciting meeting of innovative presentations, welcoming collegiality, and rich discussion. Thank you for your time and consideration. Sincerely, Rebecca McHugh, SQIP Conference Communications Officer Heidi Levitt & Linda McMullen, SQIP Conference Program Committee Co-Chairs Elizabeth Fein & Lori Koelsch, SQIP Conference Host Committee Co-Chairs -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Call for SQIP Proposals 2018 - Extended Date.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 315396 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180116/df167d18/attachment.pdf From lemke.jay@gmail.com Tue Jan 16 11:54:44 2018 From: lemke.jay@gmail.com (Jay Lemke) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 11:54:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: IFL2018 In-Reply-To: <33b792cfa2e24df9baa5bf1bd1074cfb@mail-ex04.exprod.uio.no> References: <33b792cfa2e24df9baa5bf1bd1074cfb@mail-ex04.exprod.uio.no> Message-ID: FYI. Conference on Spatial Issues in Informal Education and related matters. Jay Lemke Professor Emeritus City University of New York www.jaylemke.com ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Ola Erstad Date: Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 7:45 AM Subject: IFL2018 Please forward to people you think might be interested. Best wishes Ola In March 2018, the two-day international conference "The Spatial Turn and Its Implications on (In) Formal Learning Contexts" will take place at Ruhr-Universit?yBochum, Germany. Since the conference theme addresses various facets of media science and educational science research (e.g., spaces and places of learning, competence development, digital media), we would be delighted if you would register for the conference. We are also pleased to provide you with further information: For example, the registration phase for the IFL2018 conference has begun. Interested parties can now register via our homepage (http://informal-learning18.de) or directly via the ConfTool (https://www.conftool.net/informal-learning18/). Until 31.01.2018, there are even reduced registration fees. Likewise, our conference program is available online at the homepage ( https://www.conftool.net/informal-learning18/sessions.php). We are pleased to present you national and international exciting, innovative and original contributions. Have a look at our program, it is definitely worth it. From mpacker@cantab.net Tue Jan 16 12:24:41 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 15:24:41 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: **THE DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTING TO SQIP'S 2018 CONFERENCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO FEBRUARY 1ST, 2018** In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Just a warning to all of you: I?ve been invited to give the opening address at this conference! Scary! :) Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 16, 2018, at 2:46 PM, Elizabeth Fein wrote: > > Dear Colleague, > > > > Attached, please find the Call for Proposals for the 5th Annual Conference > of the Society for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology, *with our extended > deadline of February 1st*. The conference is to be held at Duquesne > University in Pittsburgh on May 21-22, 2018. SQIP is a section of Division > 5 (Quantitative and Qualitative Methods) of the American Psychological > Association and as such our mission is to foster researchers who use or > teach qualitative research methods. Submissions from multidisciplinary, > international, and student scholars are welcomed. Proposals are invited for > paper and poster presentations, as well as symposia and conversation hours. > > > > Please do not hesitate to contact us at info@qualpsy.org if you have any > questions about the organization or the conference. Additional information > is also located at the website http://qualpsy.org/2018-conference/ > . > In any case, we hope to see you in Pittsburgh in May for an exciting > meeting of innovative presentations, welcoming collegiality, and rich > discussion. > > > > Thank you for your time and consideration. > > > > Sincerely, > > Rebecca McHugh, SQIP Conference Communications Officer > > Heidi Levitt & Linda McMullen, SQIP Conference Program Committee Co-Chairs > > Elizabeth Fein & Lori Koelsch, SQIP Conference Host Committee Co-Chairs > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Wed Jan 17 04:07:39 2018 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 14:07:39 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Popper In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Any proposal from xmca please? ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Ulvi ??il Date: 17 January 2018 at 14:06 Subject: Popper To: Helena Sheehan Dear Helena, I hope you are well. A friend of mine writes a Marxist critique of Popper. I recommended him your wonderful book. Do uou kindly know any good critique of Popper in capitalist as well as socialist world please? Thank you. Friendly. Ulvi From ablunden@mira.net Wed Jan 17 04:25:25 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 23:25:25 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Popper In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <29440348-4c82-8e9c-122e-8ceff5d71c84@mira.net> https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/callinicos/1994/10/popper.htm https://www.marxists.org/archive/novack/works/history/ch11.htm Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 17/01/2018 11:07 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Any proposal from xmca please? > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Ulvi ??il > Date: 17 January 2018 at 14:06 > Subject: Popper > To: Helena Sheehan > > > Dear Helena, > > I hope you are well. > > A friend of mine writes a Marxist critique of Popper. I recommended him > your wonderful book. > > Do uou kindly know any good critique of Popper in capitalist as well as > socialist world please? > > > > Thank you. > > Friendly. > > Ulvi > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Wed Jan 17 04:37:12 2018 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 14:37:12 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Popper In-Reply-To: <29440348-4c82-8e9c-122e-8ceff5d71c84@mira.net> References: <29440348-4c82-8e9c-122e-8ceff5d71c84@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks! 17 Oca 2018 15:29 tarihinde "Andy Blunden" yazd?: > https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/ > callinicos/1994/10/popper.htm > > https://www.marxists.org/archive/novack/works/history/ch11.htm > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 17/01/2018 11:07 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > Any proposal from xmca please? > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > From: Ulvi ??il > > Date: 17 January 2018 at 14:06 > > Subject: Popper > > To: Helena Sheehan > > > > > > Dear Helena, > > > > I hope you are well. > > > > A friend of mine writes a Marxist critique of Popper. I recommended him > > your wonderful book. > > > > Do uou kindly know any good critique of Popper in capitalist as well as > > socialist world please? > > > > > > > > Thank you. > > > > Friendly. > > > > Ulvi > > > > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Thu Jan 18 11:07:11 2018 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 19:07:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Tell the Senate: Save net neutrality In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to intrude a U.S. political issue into XMCA deliberations, but a free and open internet in the U.S. is likely to have international consequences, not to mention direct implications for listservs like XMCA. David From: Aaron Burgess [mailto:feedback@nextgenamerica.org] Sent: Thursday, January 18, 2018 12:36 PM To: David H Kirshner Subject: Tell the Senate: Save net neutrality a [https://nvlupin.blob.core.windows.net/images/van/TSM/TSMNG/1/56159/images/rebrand%206_17%20testing%20/Logo_National_2_300x.png] Urge your senators to save net neutrality and internet freedom. Call 202-804-0904 The Senate is just one vote away from passing a measure to block Donald Trump?s attack on an open and free internet. Senator Ed Markey recently introduced a bill to overturn the Federal Communications Commission?s (FCC) decision to repeal net neutrality, and it already has the support of half of the Senate. But it needs one more vote to proceed. Your call can flip the 51st senator in support of net neutrality. Call 202-804-0904 and urge your senators to stop Trump?s plan to mess up the internet. [Save net neutrality: call 202-804-0904][Save net neutrality: call 202-804-0904] Donald Trump has packed the FCC full of commissioners with deep ties to corporations like Verizon and AT&T. These commissioners and corporate lobbyists have quickly worked to reverse the net neutrality order issued in 2015 under President Obama. Last month, the FCC voted to overturn net neutrality, opening the door for corporations to block content or make users pay extra just to utilize basic internet services. Now, Senator Markey?s bill is our best chance to reverse Donald Trump?s assault on equal access to the internet. Every Democratic senator has publicly indicated support for this bill, but now Republican senators must decide if they side with corporations like AT&T and Comcast or with the people. Call 202-804-0904 and tell your senators that you will hold them responsible for wrecking the internet if they vote against net neutrality. Thank you, Aaron Burgess Advocacy Manager NextGen America This email was sent to dkirsh@lsu.edu | unsubscribe NextGen America | PO Box 538 | San Francisco CA 94104 [donate] [Facebook] [Twitter] [Instagram] [YouTube] [https://click.everyaction.com/j/4117185?nvep=ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncHZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb25VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNzVmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNzIjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ%3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=] From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jan 18 12:33:36 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 20:33:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Tell the Senate: Save net neutrality In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1516307616361.1689@iped.uio.no> David, no need to apologize. This is important and welcome. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner Sent: 18 January 2018 20:07 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Tell the Senate: Save net neutrality Sorry to intrude a U.S. political issue into XMCA deliberations, but a free and open internet in the U.S. is likely to have international consequences, not to mention direct implications for listservs like XMCA. David From: Aaron Burgess [mailto:feedback@nextgenamerica.org] Sent: Thursday, January 18, 2018 12:36 PM To: David H Kirshner Subject: Tell the Senate: Save net neutrality a [https://nvlupin.blob.core.windows.net/images/van/TSM/TSMNG/1/56159/images/rebrand%206_17%20testing%20/Logo_National_2_300x.png] Urge your senators to save net neutrality and internet freedom. Call 202-804-0904 The Senate is just one vote away from passing a measure to block Donald Trump?s attack on an open and free internet. Senator Ed Markey recently introduced a bill to overturn the Federal Communications Commission?s (FCC) decision to repeal net neutrality, and it already has the support of half of the Senate. But it needs one more vote to proceed. Your call can flip the 51st senator in support of net neutrality. Call 202-804-0904 and urge your senators to stop Trump?s plan to mess up the internet. [Save net neutrality: call 202-804-0904][Save net neutrality: call 202-804-0904] Donald Trump has packed the FCC full of commissioners with deep ties to corporations like Verizon and AT&T. These commissioners and corporate lobbyists have quickly worked to reverse the net neutrality order issued in 2015 under President Obama. Last month, the FCC voted to overturn net neutrality, opening the door for corporations to block content or make users pay extra just to utilize basic internet services. Now, Senator Markey?s bill is our best chance to reverse Donald Trump?s assault on equal access to the internet. Every Democratic senator has publicly indicated support for this bill, but now Republican senators must decide if they side with corporations like AT&T and Comcast or with the people. Call 202-804-0904 and tell your senators that you will hold them responsible for wrecking the internet if they vote against net neutrality. Thank you, Aaron Burgess Advocacy Manager NextGen America This email was sent to dkirsh@lsu.edu | unsubscribe NextGen America | PO Box 538 | San Francisco CA 94104 [donate] [Facebook] [Twitter] [Instagram] [YouTube] [https://click.everyaction.com/j/4117185?nvep=ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncHZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb25VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNzVmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNzIjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ%3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=] From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jan 18 16:05:24 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 16:05:24 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Tell the Senate: Save net neutrality In-Reply-To: <1516307616361.1689@iped.uio.no> References: <1516307616361.1689@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thanks David-- Having the phone number is very helpful. Certainly the issue is central to efforts such as xmca. mike On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 12:33 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David, no need to apologize. This is important and welcome. > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David H Kirshner > Sent: 18 January 2018 20:07 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Tell the Senate: Save net neutrality > > Sorry to intrude a U.S. political issue into XMCA deliberations, but a > free and open internet in the U.S. is likely to have international > consequences, not to mention direct implications for listservs like XMCA. > David > > > From: Aaron Burgess [mailto:feedback@nextgenamerica.org] > Sent: Thursday, January 18, 2018 12:36 PM > To: David H Kirshner > Subject: Tell the Senate: Save net neutrality > > > a > [https://nvlupin.blob.core.windows.net/images/van/TSM/ > TSMNG/1/56159/images/rebrand%206_17%20testing%20/Logo_National_2_300x.png] > Urge your senators to save net neutrality and internet freedom. > > > > Call 202-804-0904 > > > > > > > > > > > > The Senate is just one vote away from passing a measure to block Donald > Trump?s attack on an open and free internet. > > Senator Ed Markey recently introduced a bill to overturn the Federal > Communications Commission?s (FCC) decision to repeal net neutrality, and it > already has the support of half of the Senate. But it needs one more vote > to proceed. > > Your call can flip the 51st senator in support of net neutrality. Call > 202-804-0904 and urge your senators to stop Trump?s plan to mess up the > internet. > [Save net neutrality: call 202-804-0904][Save net > neutrality: call 202-804-0904] > > Donald Trump has packed the FCC full of commissioners with deep ties to > corporations like Verizon and AT&T. These commissioners and corporate > lobbyists have quickly worked to reverse the net neutrality order issued in > 2015 under President Obama. > > Last month, the FCC voted to overturn net neutrality, opening the door for > corporations to block content or make users pay extra just to utilize basic > internet services. Now, Senator Markey?s bill is our best chance to reverse > Donald Trump?s assault on equal access to the internet. > > Every Democratic senator has publicly indicated support for this bill, but > now Republican senators must decide if they side with corporations like > AT&T and Comcast or with the people. > > Call 202-804-0904 and tell your senators that you will hold them > responsible for wrecking the internet if they vote against net > neutrality. > > Thank you, > > Aaron Burgess > Advocacy Manager > NextGen America > > > > This email was sent to dkirsh@lsu.edu | > unsubscribe 77fc-e711-80c2-00155da75f18/be60de28-7efc-e711-80c2-00155da75f18?nvep= > ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncHZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81 > NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb25VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03 > ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNzVmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNz > IjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ%3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_ > uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=&id=101341520&emailAddress=dkirsh%40lsu.edu> > > NextGen America | PO Box 538 | San Francisco CA 94104 > > > [donate] ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncHZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81 > NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb25VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03 > ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNzVmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNz > IjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ%3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_ > uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=&utm_source=email&utm_medium=email&utm_ > content=donate&utm_campaign=180118_Net_Neutrality> > > > > [Facebook] ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncHZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81 > NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb25VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03 > ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNzVmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNz > IjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ%3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_ > uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=> > > [Twitter] ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncHZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81 > NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb25VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03 > ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNzVmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNz > IjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ%3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_ > uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=> > > [Instagram] 4117183/-2013054295?nvep=ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncH > ZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb2 > 5VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNz > VmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNzIjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ > %3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=> > > [YouTube] ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncHZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81 > NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb25VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03 > ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNzVmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNz > IjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ%3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_ > uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=> > > > > > > [https://click.everyaction.com/j/4117185?nvep= > ew0KICAiVGVuYW50VXJpIjogIm5ncHZhbjovL3Zhbi9UU00vVFNNTkcvMS81 > NjE1OSIsDQogICJEaXN0cmlidXRpb25VbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJiZTYwZGUyOC03 > ZWZjLWU3MTEtODBjMi0wMDE1NWRhNzVmMTgiLA0KICAiRW1haWxBZGRyZXNz > IjogImRraXJzaEBsc3UuZWR1Ig0KfQ%3D%3D&hmac=yj1czyC-xfA4CDFJAbSrM-Edi_ > uBiGaJ78R6IqJIOcQ=] > > > > From bferholt@gmail.com Mon Jan 22 10:36:44 2018 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 13:36:44 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: All who responded to Lois for the zoom chat already know this, but we are postponing again. This time we are thinking to try a mid-semester time, not over break (for at least some of the students), as several people responded they were interested but not free / on break still. We'll of course let XMCA know when/if we try again The original idea came because Lois was able to see how many hundreds of people were reading the autobiography on academia.edu! We thought we'd receive scores of responses to the hundreds of invites that Lois sent to these people, but we only received a handful. Just something to think about in terms of new ways of discussing papers with international groups of students, especially considering the relatively new and very strange function on academia.edu, where they send you emails saying how many people are reading your papers ... Hmmm. Beth On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 2:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, > JANUARY 24. > > > We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document > before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. > > > We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole on Culture, > Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic > Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members > of the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller > University days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- > will join Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how > people are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, > what?s relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. > > > > The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at > 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for > future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email > to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further > information including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. > > > > Thanks, > > Beth > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Associate Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Beth Ferholt Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From mpacker@cantab.net Mon Jan 22 12:12:41 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 15:12:41 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Cultural perspective on child and adolescent psychopathology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <71E884C8-300C-4EF6-8AE1-A909DC335A06@cantab.net> I just received this inquiry. Anyone have any suggestions? I've looked and looked, but I just can't find a textbook that takes a cultural perspective as foundational to understanding the phenomena of child and adolescent psychopathology. Any suggestions or recommendations you have would be most welcome. Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Jan 22 13:06:33 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 21:06:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1516655192938.42423@iped.uio.no> Thanks for letting us know, Beth. I am sure that there hundreds of people reading the autobiography, but I must say that since Academia.edu introduced some new features, making chargeable some of the features that before were free, my visits to the site have decreased considerably. I keep receiving notifications of hundreds of papers supposedly having mentioned my named in publications in Academia... but I guess they refer to my first name and last name... separately. In any case, best of lucks with a next attempt, and keep us updated so that people can share the event within their own circles/depts./faculties/etc. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Beth Ferholt Sent: 22 January 2018 19:36 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography All who responded to Lois for the zoom chat already know this, but we are postponing again. This time we are thinking to try a mid-semester time, not over break (for at least some of the students), as several people responded they were interested but not free / on break still. We'll of course let XMCA know when/if we try again The original idea came because Lois was able to see how many hundreds of people were reading the autobiography on academia.edu! We thought we'd receive scores of responses to the hundreds of invites that Lois sent to these people, but we only received a handful. Just something to think about in terms of new ways of discussing papers with international groups of students, especially considering the relatively new and very strange function on academia.edu, where they send you emails saying how many people are reading your papers ... Hmmm. Beth On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 2:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, > JANUARY 24. > > > We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document > before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. > > > We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole on Culture, > Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic > Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members > of the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller > University days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s -- > will join Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn how > people are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s confusing, > what?s relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. > > > > The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at > 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for > future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email > to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further > information including the instructions for entering the Zoom conversation. > > > > Thanks, > > Beth > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Associate Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Beth Ferholt Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From bferholt@gmail.com Mon Jan 22 14:06:08 2018 From: bferholt@gmail.com (Beth Ferholt) Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 17:06:08 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: <1516655192938.42423@iped.uio.no> References: <1516655192938.42423@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: We will try again in the future and keep all up to date! Thank you to those of you who expressed interest. And yes, these are very annoying adjustments to the site and I also am not making much use of their services. Beth On Monday, January 22, 2018, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks for letting us know, Beth. > I am sure that there hundreds of people reading the autobiography, but I > must say that since Academia.edu introduced some new features, making > chargeable some of the features that before were free, my visits to the > site have decreased considerably. I keep receiving notifications of > hundreds of papers supposedly having mentioned my named in publications in > Academia... but I guess they refer to my first name and last name... > separately. > > In any case, best of lucks with a next attempt, and keep us updated so > that people can share the event within their own > circles/depts./faculties/etc. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Beth Ferholt > Sent: 22 January 2018 19:36 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Date change to WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24: Live > conversation for readers of the Polyphonic Autobiography > > All who responded to Lois for the zoom chat already know this, but we are > postponing again. This time we are thinking to try a mid-semester time, > not over break (for at least some of the students), as several people > responded they were interested but not free / on break still. We'll of > course let XMCA know when/if we try again > > The original idea came because Lois was able to see how many hundreds of > people were reading the autobiography on academia.edu! > > We thought we'd receive scores of responses to the hundreds of invites that > Lois sent to these people, but we only received a handful. > > Just something to think about in terms of new ways of discussing papers > with international groups of students, especially considering the > relatively new and very strange function on academia.edu, where they send > you emails saying how many people are reading your papers ... > > Hmmm. > Beth > > > > On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 2:33 PM, Beth Ferholt wrote: > > > We are sorry but we need to change the date of this event to WEDNESDAY, > > JANUARY 24. > > > > > > We also want to remind you that it important to have read the document > > before the conversation, or the conversation will be diluted. > > > > > > We invite you to participate in a live conversation with Michael Cole on > Culture, > > Development, and the Social Creation of Social Inequality: A Polyphonic > > Autobiography, and, more broadly, LCHC?s history and legacy. Two members > > of the lab and different times ?Lois Holzman from the Rockefeller > > University days in the 1970s and Beth Ferholt most recently in the 2000s > -- > > will join Mike on one end of the "phone". We three are wanting to learn > how > > people are responding to the document -- what resonates, what?s > confusing, > > what?s relevant to the current day and to the work that we all do, etc. > > > > > > > > The live 60-minute conversation will take place Wednesday January 24 at > > 8:00 AM PST. It will be uploaded to the MCA website and kept there for > > future use. If you are interested and able to participate, send an email > > to lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org and we will send you further > > information including the instructions for entering the Zoom > conversation. > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > Beth > > > > -- > > Beth Ferholt > > Associate Professor > > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > > 2900 Bedford Avenue > > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > > > > > > -- > Beth Ferholt > Associate Professor > Department of Early Childhood and Art Education > Brooklyn College, City University of New York > 2900 Bedford Avenue > Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 > > Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu > Phone: (718) 951-5205 > Fax: (718) 951-4816 > -- Beth Ferholt Associate Professor Department of Early Childhood and Art Education Brooklyn College, City University of New York 2900 Bedford Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889 Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu Phone: (718) 951-5205 Fax: (718) 951-4816 From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jan 22 15:57:44 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 10:57:44 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Cultural perspective on child and adolescent psychopathology In-Reply-To: <71E884C8-300C-4EF6-8AE1-A909DC335A06@cantab.net> References: <71E884C8-300C-4EF6-8AE1-A909DC335A06@cantab.net> Message-ID: <9bf17e63-29ec-14d5-c2e0-aaa0eef7b0ba@mira.net> This is somewhat specialist but: Cynthia Lightfoot's "The Culture of Adolescent Risk-taking" 1992 may be of interest. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 23/01/2018 7:12 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > I just received this inquiry. Anyone have any suggestions? > > I've looked and looked, but I just can't find a textbook that takes a cultural perspective as foundational to understanding the phenomena of child and adolescent psychopathology. Any suggestions or recommendations you have would be most welcome. > > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Jan 25 09:29:33 2018 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 17:29:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Cultural perspective on child and adolescent psychopathology In-Reply-To: <9bf17e63-29ec-14d5-c2e0-aaa0eef7b0ba@mira.net> References: <71E884C8-300C-4EF6-8AE1-A909DC335A06@cantab.net> <9bf17e63-29ec-14d5-c2e0-aaa0eef7b0ba@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Martin, You could try citations on exemplary papers, such as Bateson's work on schizophrenia. The term "identified patient" will probably draw a large net, however I would imagine that these are more likely lighter on any kind of genetic and cultural analysis, probably using fairly weak systems notions. However, from the perspective of (under) graduate studies, perhaps this is more appropriate. >From a broader social perspective, pathology is everywhere, albeit notionally invisible. POSIWID can help with seeing this. E.g. is it a pathology that institutions encourage people to think they are poor learners? Best, Huw On 22 January 2018 at 23:57, Andy Blunden wrote: > This is somewhat specialist but: > > Cynthia Lightfoot's "The Culture of Adolescent Risk-taking" 1992 > > may be of interest. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 23/01/2018 7:12 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > > I just received this inquiry. Anyone have any suggestions? > > > > I've looked and looked, but I just can't find a textbook that takes a > cultural perspective as foundational to understanding the phenomena of > child and adolescent psychopathology. Any suggestions or recommendations > you have would be most welcome. > > > > > > Martin > > > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > > > > > > > > From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Thu Jan 25 10:53:36 2018 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 18:53:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] position description Message-ID: <2E638FA1-C95F-432A-A7ED-E00158641996@csun.edu> Colleagues, Attached, please find a position description for a new Cluster Hire initiative in which you may be interested: An excerpt from the position description: California State University, Northridge invites applications for three (3) full-time tenure-track appointments at the rank of Assistant Professor in the Departments of Family & Consumer Sciences, Health Sciences, or Psychology. The ideal candidates will have a strong interest and training in a subset of the categories including, but not limited to: health implications of disparities in family resources and outcomes, linkages with community prevention and intervention services for family health and disability, structural influences on health and disability, family-based prevention and intervention approaches, family translational science, and mental health and illness. Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. ------------ Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 Office: ST322 http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan http://www.csun.edu/social-behavioral-sciences/psychology/general-experimental-psychology **check out** Tonyan, H. A. (2017). Opportunities to practice what is locally valued: An ecocultural perspective on quality in family child care. Early Education and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2017.1303304 Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J., Torres, J., & Bridgewater, J. (2017). Engaging with quality improvement initiatives: A descriptive study of learning in the complex and dynamic context of everyday life for family child care providers. Early Education and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2017.1305152 This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 18-51_HHD SBS Cluster_Position Announcement_012318.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 45669 bytes Desc: 18-51_HHD SBS Cluster_Position Announcement_012318.pdf Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180125/adb59d76/attachment.pdf From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jan 25 11:34:42 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 19:34:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: position description In-Reply-To: <2E638FA1-C95F-432A-A7ED-E00158641996@csun.edu> References: <2E638FA1-C95F-432A-A7ED-E00158641996@csun.edu> Message-ID: <1516908882000.31862@iped.uio.no> Thanks a lot for sharing Holli, very relevant topics, interesting positions. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Tonyan, Holli A Sent: 25 January 2018 19:53 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] position description Colleagues, Attached, please find a position description for a new Cluster Hire initiative in which you may be interested: An excerpt from the position description: California State University, Northridge invites applications for three (3) full-time tenure-track appointments at the rank of Assistant Professor in the Departments of Family & Consumer Sciences, Health Sciences, or Psychology. The ideal candidates will have a strong interest and training in a subset of the categories including, but not limited to: health implications of disparities in family resources and outcomes, linkages with community prevention and intervention services for family health and disability, structural influences on health and disability, family-based prevention and intervention approaches, family translational science, and mental health and illness. Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. ------------ Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 Office: ST322 http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan http://www.csun.edu/social-behavioral-sciences/psychology/general-experimental-psychology **check out** Tonyan, H. A. (2017). Opportunities to practice what is locally valued: An ecocultural perspective on quality in family child care. Early Education and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2017.1303304 Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J., Torres, J., & Bridgewater, J. (2017). Engaging with quality improvement initiatives: A descriptive study of learning in the complex and dynamic context of everyday life for family child care providers. Early Education and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2017.1305152 This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) From omarruvalcaba@gmail.com Thu Jan 25 11:53:21 2018 From: omarruvalcaba@gmail.com (Omar R.) Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 11:53:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: position description In-Reply-To: <2E638FA1-C95F-432A-A7ED-E00158641996@csun.edu> References: <2E638FA1-C95F-432A-A7ED-E00158641996@csun.edu> Message-ID: <3A1BB9F0-6197-4C80-B3B2-FF100A7281D7@gmail.com> Thanks Holli, I went ahead and share this with a few people -Omar > On Jan 25, 2018, at 10:53 AM, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > > Colleagues, > > Attached, please find a position description for a new Cluster Hire initiative in which you may be interested: > > An excerpt from the position description: > > California State University, Northridge invites applications for three (3) full-time tenure-track appointments at the rank of Assistant Professor in the Departments of Family & Consumer Sciences, Health Sciences, or Psychology. The ideal candidates will have a strong interest and training in a subset of the categories including, but not limited to: health implications of disparities in family resources and outcomes, linkages with community prevention and intervention services for family health and disability, structural influences on health and disability, family-based prevention and intervention approaches, family translational science, and mental health and illness. > > > Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. > ------------ > Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge > Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 > > Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 > Office: ST322 > > http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan > http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan > http://www.csun.edu/social-behavioral-sciences/psychology/general-experimental-psychology > > **check out** > Tonyan, H. A. (2017). Opportunities to practice what is locally valued: An ecocultural perspective on quality in family child care. Early Education and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2017.1303304 > > Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J., Torres, J., & Bridgewater, J. (2017). Engaging with quality improvement initiatives: A descriptive study of learning in the complex and dynamic context of everyday life for family child care providers. Early Education and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2017.1305152 > > This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. > > Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) > > <18-51_HHD SBS Cluster_Position Announcement_012318.pdf> From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Thu Jan 25 11:55:25 2018 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 19:55:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: position description In-Reply-To: <3A1BB9F0-6197-4C80-B3B2-FF100A7281D7@gmail.com> References: <2E638FA1-C95F-432A-A7ED-E00158641996@csun.edu> <3A1BB9F0-6197-4C80-B3B2-FF100A7281D7@gmail.com> Message-ID: Thanks, Omar! Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. ------------ Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 Office: ST322 http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan http://www.csun.edu/social-behavioral-sciences/psychology/general-experimental-psychology **check out** Tonyan, H. A. (2017). Opportunities to practice what is locally valued: An ecocultural perspective on quality in family child care. Early Education and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2017.1303304 Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J., Torres, J., & Bridgewater, J. (2017). Engaging with quality improvement initiatives: A descriptive study of learning in the complex and dynamic context of everyday life for family child care providers. Early Education and Development. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2017.1305152 This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) On 1/25/18, 11:53 AM, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Omar R." wrote: Thanks Holli, I went ahead and share this with a few people -Omar > On Jan 25, 2018, at 10:53 AM, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > > Colleagues, > > Attached, please find a position description for a new Cluster Hire initiative in which you may be interested: > > An excerpt from the position description: > > California State University, Northridge invites applications for three (3) full-time tenure-track appointments at the rank of Assistant Professor in the Departments of Family & Consumer Sciences, Health Sciences, or Psychology. The ideal candidates will have a strong interest and training in a subset of the categories including, but not limited to: health implications of disparities in family resources and outcomes, linkages with community prevention and intervention services for family health and disability, structural influences on health and disability, family-based prevention and intervention approaches, family translational science, and mental health and illness. > > > Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. > ------------ > Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge > Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 > > Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 > Office: ST322 > > http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__csun.academia.edu_HolliTonyan&d=DwIDAg&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=L_qJouq0i0kF8B4UAqkrhabCtGw8fRpkU6LB9QiXY5E&s=bz0GZamOcJNXvJh5vKvHTx-GwLQ9tzokI9nwu_c4GUk&e= > http://www.csun.edu/social-behavioral-sciences/psychology/general-experimental-psychology > > **check out** > Tonyan, H. A. (2017). Opportunities to practice what is locally valued: An ecocultural perspective on quality in family child care. Early Education and Development. https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__dx.doi.org_10.1080_10409289.2017.1303304&d=DwIDAg&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=L_qJouq0i0kF8B4UAqkrhabCtGw8fRpkU6LB9QiXY5E&s=2UuON498wjHJVG54NijVvuhpbC5HAUIkX4pBdIjkC9I&e= > > Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J., Torres, J., & Bridgewater, J. (2017). Engaging with quality improvement initiatives: A descriptive study of learning in the complex and dynamic context of everyday life for family child care providers. Early Education and Development. https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__dx.doi.org_10.1080_10409289.2017.1305152&d=DwIDAg&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=L_qJouq0i0kF8B4UAqkrhabCtGw8fRpkU6LB9QiXY5E&s=Cj0qR9KPaumnfbGXMQYdtiOqo_HWWl6t-3E1TgkAMCM&e= > > This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. > > Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) > > <18-51_HHD SBS Cluster_Position Announcement_012318.pdf> From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Jan 26 03:31:02 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 11:31:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Art for Trump Message-ID: <1516966262520.13442@iped.uio.no> I am still laughing at this news and had to share it with someone. I thought folks here would laugh too. On relations between's Trump and Art. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/the-white-house-wanted-a-van-gogh-the-guggenheim-offered-a-used-solid-gold-toilet/2018/01/25/38d574fc-0154-11e8-bb03-722769454f82_story.html?utm_term=.2edfafbfe711? Alfredo From carolmacdon@gmail.com Fri Jan 26 04:04:16 2018 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 14:04:16 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Art for Trump In-Reply-To: <1516966262520.13442@iped.uio.no> References: <1516966262520.13442@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: When I first saw that toilet, and before reading any text, I seriously thought that it belonged to Trump. To whom else? Let's see what he says. Carol On 26 January 2018 at 13:31, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > I am still laughing at this news and had to share it with someone. I > thought folks here would laugh too. On relations between's Trump and Art. > > > https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/the- > white-house-wanted-a-van-gogh-the-guggenheim-offered-a-used- > solid-gold-toilet/2018/01/25/38d574fc-0154-11e8-bb03- > 722769454f82_story.html?utm_term=.2edfafbfe711? > > > Alfredo > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) Cultural Historical Activity Theory Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Jan 27 10:49:34 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 10:49:34 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Wikipedia CHAT entry Message-ID: I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of work into that entry. It would be interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so carefully. Check it out. mike ------------------------------------ https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural-historical_activity_theory&action=history From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Jan 27 17:25:23 2018 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 01:25:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd generation AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand what improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd generation"? It doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. Best, Huw On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of work into > that entry. It would be > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so carefully. > > Check it out. > mike > ------------------------------------ > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > historical_activity_theory&action=history > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jan 27 17:37:20 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 12:37:20 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <64913bcb-bdb7-cfd8-0be7-91318787eeda@mira.net> Engestrom's even go the "4th generation" in hand. andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 28/01/2018 12:25 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd generation > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand what > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd generation"? It > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > >> I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of work into >> that entry. It would be >> interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so carefully. >> >> Check it out. >> mike >> ------------------------------------ >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- >> historical_activity_theory&action=history >> > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sat Jan 27 17:56:27 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 17:56:27 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Huw, I had worked on those ideas as well: Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: Prolegomena to the development of third-generation cultural-historical activity theory. International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to third-generation cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, 14, 40-63. Cheers, Michael On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd generation > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand what > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd generation"? It > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of work into > > that entry. It would be > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so carefully. > > > > Check it out. > > mike > > ------------------------------------ > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Jan 28 04:41:35 2018 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 12:41:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which are psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political manoeuvre. Best, Huw On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > Huw, > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: Prolegomena to the > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity theory. > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to third-generation > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, 14, 40-63. > > Cheers, > > Michael > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd generation > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand what > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd generation"? It > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of work > into > > > that entry. It would be > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so carefully. > > > > > > Check it out. > > > mike > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sun Jan 28 04:51:39 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 04:51:39 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Huw, you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive meanings. I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the adjective distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take the stand of Voloshinov. Michael On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which are > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political manoeuvre. > > Best, > Huw > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > wrote: > > > Huw, > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: Prolegomena to > the > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity theory. > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to third-generation > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, 14, > 40-63. > > > > Cheers, > > > > Michael > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > generation > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand what > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd generation"? > It > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of work > > into > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so carefully. > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > mike > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Jan 28 05:17:47 2018 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 13:17:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all." Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the field (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets reduced or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is done and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It is political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for such research-related attention, which is further supported in other ways. Best, Huw On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > Huw, > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive meanings. > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the adjective > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd generation > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take the > stand of Voloshinov. > > Michael > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which are > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political manoeuvre. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: Prolegomena to > > the > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity theory. > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to third-generation > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, 14, > > 40-63. > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > generation > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand what > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd generation"? > > It > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of > work > > > into > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so carefully. > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > mike > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Jan 28 05:44:42 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 13:44:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> There are a couple of related senses in which the term "generation" may be heard here: as in a new major development in the theory, so that this generation is some form of evolution from the previous one; and as it regards to nationality, of being the third, fourth or "n" line of offspring following some original. As a new comer to CHAT, when I went to the ISCAR Summer University in Moscow in 2011, I remember people there complaining that, if someone in Finland was claiming the third generation, who were then they, who had been attending to and learning from the lectures of those who had attended to and learned from the very founder's lectures? It soon comes into issues of legitimacy and authorship that may easily confuse newcomers, I think. But then again, there is a history, there are indeed lineages and developments, and we need categories to mark those up, I guess. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Huw Lloyd Sent: 28 January 2018 14:17 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all." Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the field (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets reduced or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is done and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It is political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for such research-related attention, which is further supported in other ways. Best, Huw On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > Huw, > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive meanings. > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the adjective > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd generation > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take the > stand of Voloshinov. > > Michael > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which are > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political manoeuvre. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: Prolegomena to > > the > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity theory. > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to third-generation > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, 14, > > 40-63. > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > generation > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand what > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd generation"? > > It > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of > work > > > into > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so carefully. > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > mike > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jan 28 10:13:50 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:13:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> References: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues- I am kind of surprised at the response to my query about the authorship of the Wikipedia page. I have always interpreted the 1-2-3 generation characterization of Helsinki's school's as indexing the increasing complexity of the systems of activity that are being described/analyzed, and used for the design of new interventions that seek to address perceived problems of some community/organization. The subject-medium-object unit, the s-m-o unit as a constituent of a collective activity, and the collective activity in relation to other activities with which it interacts. News of the fourth generation has not filtered down here to the periphery. This kind of expansion has been accompanied by a shift in disciplinary identity. CHAT is not a classical psychological approach. The Russians use the term, "non-classical psychology" even for LSV's work. But once one moves to the study of activity, anthropology and sociology come into play.... at least so it seems to me. And of course, the linkage with various flavors of linguistics have been present since before the beginning I felt a strong kinship with the idea of a psychology that took everyday, joint, mediated, activity as a unit of analysis. Perhaps no more than sloppy eclecticism ensued. Many of my Russian and Western European colleague seem to think so. Certainly, my everyday notion of activity did not take on the philosophical heritage of German/Russian discussions of deyatelnost and Tategkeit. Nor was I sensitive to the social/societal distinction, Etc. But I found Yrjo's reconstruction/expansion useful and still do. At the same time, ideas associated with the "3rd generation" formulation have proven useful in thinking about university-community collaborations. I would, of course, prefer even strong intellectual tools, so like Yrjo I look to actor network theory, distributed cognition, and other frameworks that seem to help me understand the processes of learning/development/change that I observe and participate in. Reducing Yrjo's work to self aggrandizement seems to be really unfortunate. If one looks at the iconography of American appropriations of Vygotsky, the cover of Luis Moll's (1990) book on Vygotsky and Education has a triangle inside a circle -- mediated action in context. Yrjo declared that the activity IS the context a couple of years later. Now look at the iconography in the newest edition of that book. No triangle, just circles -- the activity has become the context (a la Bronfenbrener). Doesn't feel like progress to me. Was there politics in the research of LCHC? Of course. It involved agreements over the distribution of resources within the university, the professional community, etc. I would like to think that the work was more than self-aggrandizement, but may that is simply a self aggrandizing illusion. So, I renew my question. Does anyone know who the author of the wikipedia page is/was? A lot of work went in to creating it, and it seems that the best way to block invidious interpretations of "third generation" as new, better, shinier, and truer, is to continue the narrative of the wikipedia entry through inclusion of other variations in the development of Vygotsky's ideas. Of course, that would require labor, but if there is no will, there is no way. In the meantime, a discussion on XMCA that was inviting to our colleagues who think they are participating in the development of 3rd Generation AT theorizing a la Helsinki, and do not think of themselves as self aggrandizing bad people, seems to me as if it might be useful. my two centavos mike On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 5:44 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > There are a couple of related senses in which the term "generation" may be > heard here: as in a new major development in the theory, so that this > generation is some form of evolution from the previous one; and as it > regards to nationality, of being the third, fourth or "n" line of offspring > following some original. > > As a new comer to CHAT, when I went to the ISCAR Summer University in > Moscow in 2011, I remember people there complaining that, if someone in > Finland was claiming the third generation, who were then they, who had been > attending to and learning from the lectures of those who had attended to > and learned from the very founder's lectures? > > It soon comes into issues of legitimacy and authorship that may easily > confuse newcomers, I think. But then again, > there is a history, there are indeed lineages and developments, and we > need categories to mark those up, I guess. > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > Sent: 28 January 2018 14:17 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry > > Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a distinction > with other forms of AT. That's all." > > Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the field > (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets reduced > or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is done > and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It is > political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for > such research-related attention, which is further supported in other ways. > > Best, > Huw > > On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > wrote: > > > Huw, > > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive > meanings. > > > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the adjective > > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd > generation > > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take the > > stand of Voloshinov. > > > > Michael > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which are > > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political manoeuvre. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: Prolegomena > to > > > the > > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity theory. > > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to > third-generation > > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, 14, > > > 40-63. > > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > > generation > > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand > what > > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd > generation"? > > > It > > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of > > work > > > > into > > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so > carefully. > > > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sun Jan 28 10:20:31 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:20:31 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Mike, my understanding is that anyone can author once accepted by wikipedia. So there may be many authors, who author and re-author the text that is seen. Michael On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:13 AM, mike cole wrote: > Dear Colleagues- > > I am kind of surprised at the response to my query about the > authorship of the Wikipedia > page. I have always interpreted the 1-2-3 generation characterization of > Helsinki's school's as > indexing the increasing complexity of the systems of activity that are > being described/analyzed, > and used for the design of new interventions that seek to address perceived > problems of some > community/organization. The subject-medium-object unit, the s-m-o unit as a > constituent of a collective activity, and the collective activity in > relation to other activities with which it interacts. News of the fourth > generation has not filtered down here to the periphery. > > This kind of expansion has been accompanied by a shift in disciplinary > identity. CHAT is not a classical psychological approach. The Russians use > the term, "non-classical psychology" even for LSV's work. But once one > moves to the study of activity, anthropology and sociology come into > play.... at least so it seems to me. And of course, the linkage with > various flavors of linguistics have been present since before the beginning > > I felt a strong kinship with the idea of a psychology that took everyday, > joint, mediated, activity as a unit of analysis. Perhaps no more than > sloppy eclecticism ensued. Many of my Russian and Western European > colleague seem to think so. Certainly, my everyday notion of activity did > not take on the philosophical heritage of German/Russian discussions of > deyatelnost and Tategkeit. Nor was I sensitive to the social/societal > distinction, Etc. But I found Yrjo's reconstruction/expansion > useful and still do. At the same time, ideas associated with the "3rd > generation" formulation have proven useful in thinking about > university-community collaborations. I would, of course, prefer > even strong intellectual tools, so like Yrjo I look to actor network > theory, distributed cognition, and other frameworks that seem to help me > understand the processes of learning/development/change that I observe and > participate in. Reducing Yrjo's work to self aggrandizement seems to be > really > unfortunate. > > If one looks at the iconography of American appropriations of Vygotsky, the > cover of Luis Moll's (1990) book on Vygotsky and Education has a triangle > inside a circle -- mediated action in context. Yrjo declared that the > activity IS the context a couple of years later. Now look at the > iconography in the newest edition of that book. No triangle, just circles > -- the activity has become the context (a la > Bronfenbrener). Doesn't feel like progress to me. > > Was there politics in the research of LCHC? Of course. It involved > agreements over the distribution > of resources within the university, the professional community, etc. I > would like to think that the work > was more than self-aggrandizement, but may that is simply a self > aggrandizing illusion. > > So, I renew my question. Does anyone know who the author of the wikipedia > page is/was? A lot of > work went in to creating it, and it seems that the best way to block > invidious interpretations of > "third generation" as new, better, shinier, and truer, is to continue the > narrative of the wikipedia > entry through inclusion of other variations in the development of > Vygotsky's ideas. Of course, that would > require labor, but if there is no will, there is no way. > > In the meantime, a discussion on XMCA that was inviting to our colleagues > who think they are participating in the development of 3rd Generation AT > theorizing a la Helsinki, and do not think of themselves as self > aggrandizing bad people, seems to me as if it might be useful. > > my two centavos > > mike > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 5:44 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > There are a couple of related senses in which the term "generation" may > be > > heard here: as in a new major development in the theory, so that this > > generation is some form of evolution from the previous one; and as it > > regards to nationality, of being the third, fourth or "n" line of > offspring > > following some original. > > > > As a new comer to CHAT, when I went to the ISCAR Summer University in > > Moscow in 2011, I remember people there complaining that, if someone in > > Finland was claiming the third generation, who were then they, who had > been > > attending to and learning from the lectures of those who had attended to > > and learned from the very founder's lectures? > > > > It soon comes into issues of legitimacy and authorship that may easily > > confuse newcomers, I think. But then again, > > there is a history, there are indeed lineages and developments, and we > > need categories to mark those up, I guess. > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > Sent: 28 January 2018 14:17 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry > > > > Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a distinction > > with other forms of AT. That's all." > > > > Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the field > > (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets reduced > > or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is > done > > and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It > is > > political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for > > such research-related attention, which is further supported in other > ways. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > > > Huw, > > > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive > > meanings. > > > > > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the > adjective > > > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > > > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd > > generation > > > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > > > > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take the > > > stand of Voloshinov. > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which > are > > > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political > manoeuvre. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: > Prolegomena > > to > > > > the > > > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity > theory. > > > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to > > third-generation > > > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, > 14, > > > > 40-63. > > > > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd < > > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > > > generation > > > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand > > what > > > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd > > generation"? > > > > It > > > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of > > > work > > > > > into > > > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so > > carefully. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Sun Jan 28 10:24:07 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:24:07 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: And Mike, the text is an emergent property of the community. The best you can get is multiplication of concurrent views, not the blocking of some over others---unless the community as a whole itself blocks itself. m On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:13 AM, mike cole wrote: > Dear Colleagues- > > I am kind of surprised at the response to my query about the > authorship of the Wikipedia > page. I have always interpreted the 1-2-3 generation characterization of > Helsinki's school's as > indexing the increasing complexity of the systems of activity that are > being described/analyzed, > and used for the design of new interventions that seek to address perceived > problems of some > community/organization. The subject-medium-object unit, the s-m-o unit as a > constituent of a collective activity, and the collective activity in > relation to other activities with which it interacts. News of the fourth > generation has not filtered down here to the periphery. > > This kind of expansion has been accompanied by a shift in disciplinary > identity. CHAT is not a classical psychological approach. The Russians use > the term, "non-classical psychology" even for LSV's work. But once one > moves to the study of activity, anthropology and sociology come into > play.... at least so it seems to me. And of course, the linkage with > various flavors of linguistics have been present since before the beginning > > I felt a strong kinship with the idea of a psychology that took everyday, > joint, mediated, activity as a unit of analysis. Perhaps no more than > sloppy eclecticism ensued. Many of my Russian and Western European > colleague seem to think so. Certainly, my everyday notion of activity did > not take on the philosophical heritage of German/Russian discussions of > deyatelnost and Tategkeit. Nor was I sensitive to the social/societal > distinction, Etc. But I found Yrjo's reconstruction/expansion > useful and still do. At the same time, ideas associated with the "3rd > generation" formulation have proven useful in thinking about > university-community collaborations. I would, of course, prefer > even strong intellectual tools, so like Yrjo I look to actor network > theory, distributed cognition, and other frameworks that seem to help me > understand the processes of learning/development/change that I observe and > participate in. Reducing Yrjo's work to self aggrandizement seems to be > really > unfortunate. > > If one looks at the iconography of American appropriations of Vygotsky, the > cover of Luis Moll's (1990) book on Vygotsky and Education has a triangle > inside a circle -- mediated action in context. Yrjo declared that the > activity IS the context a couple of years later. Now look at the > iconography in the newest edition of that book. No triangle, just circles > -- the activity has become the context (a la > Bronfenbrener). Doesn't feel like progress to me. > > Was there politics in the research of LCHC? Of course. It involved > agreements over the distribution > of resources within the university, the professional community, etc. I > would like to think that the work > was more than self-aggrandizement, but may that is simply a self > aggrandizing illusion. > > So, I renew my question. Does anyone know who the author of the wikipedia > page is/was? A lot of > work went in to creating it, and it seems that the best way to block > invidious interpretations of > "third generation" as new, better, shinier, and truer, is to continue the > narrative of the wikipedia > entry through inclusion of other variations in the development of > Vygotsky's ideas. Of course, that would > require labor, but if there is no will, there is no way. > > In the meantime, a discussion on XMCA that was inviting to our colleagues > who think they are participating in the development of 3rd Generation AT > theorizing a la Helsinki, and do not think of themselves as self > aggrandizing bad people, seems to me as if it might be useful. > > my two centavos > > mike > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 5:44 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > There are a couple of related senses in which the term "generation" may > be > > heard here: as in a new major development in the theory, so that this > > generation is some form of evolution from the previous one; and as it > > regards to nationality, of being the third, fourth or "n" line of > offspring > > following some original. > > > > As a new comer to CHAT, when I went to the ISCAR Summer University in > > Moscow in 2011, I remember people there complaining that, if someone in > > Finland was claiming the third generation, who were then they, who had > been > > attending to and learning from the lectures of those who had attended to > > and learned from the very founder's lectures? > > > > It soon comes into issues of legitimacy and authorship that may easily > > confuse newcomers, I think. But then again, > > there is a history, there are indeed lineages and developments, and we > > need categories to mark those up, I guess. > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > Sent: 28 January 2018 14:17 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry > > > > Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a distinction > > with other forms of AT. That's all." > > > > Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the field > > (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets reduced > > or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is > done > > and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It > is > > political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for > > such research-related attention, which is further supported in other > ways. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > > > Huw, > > > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive > > meanings. > > > > > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the > adjective > > > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > > > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd > > generation > > > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > > > > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take the > > > stand of Voloshinov. > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which > are > > > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political > manoeuvre. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: > Prolegomena > > to > > > > the > > > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity > theory. > > > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to > > third-generation > > > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, > 14, > > > > 40-63. > > > > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd < > > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > > > generation > > > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand > > what > > > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd > > generation"? > > > > It > > > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of > > > work > > > > > into > > > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so > > carefully. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jan 28 10:26:13 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:26:13 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Yes, I understand that about Wikipedia, Michael. Which is why I asked how had been doing it. It seems that if someone wanted to fill out an entry on CHAT to include the multivoicedness of developments in recent decades it would be best to collaborate on additions, or at least know what the others are doing and why. There is your line of work, the line developed by Hedegaard and Fleer, and more. mike On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:20 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > Mike, > my understanding is that anyone can author once accepted by wikipedia. So > there may be many authors, who author and re-author the text that is seen. > Michael > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:13 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Dear Colleagues- > > > > I am kind of surprised at the response to my query about the > > authorship of the Wikipedia > > page. I have always interpreted the 1-2-3 generation characterization of > > Helsinki's school's as > > indexing the increasing complexity of the systems of activity that are > > being described/analyzed, > > and used for the design of new interventions that seek to address > perceived > > problems of some > > community/organization. The subject-medium-object unit, the s-m-o unit > as a > > constituent of a collective activity, and the collective activity in > > relation to other activities with which it interacts. News of the fourth > > generation has not filtered down here to the periphery. > > > > This kind of expansion has been accompanied by a shift in disciplinary > > identity. CHAT is not a classical psychological approach. The Russians > use > > the term, "non-classical psychology" even for LSV's work. But once one > > moves to the study of activity, anthropology and sociology come into > > play.... at least so it seems to me. And of course, the linkage with > > various flavors of linguistics have been present since before the > beginning > > > > I felt a strong kinship with the idea of a psychology that took everyday, > > joint, mediated, activity as a unit of analysis. Perhaps no more than > > sloppy eclecticism ensued. Many of my Russian and Western European > > colleague seem to think so. Certainly, my everyday notion of activity did > > not take on the philosophical heritage of German/Russian discussions of > > deyatelnost and Tategkeit. Nor was I sensitive to the social/societal > > distinction, Etc. But I found Yrjo's reconstruction/expansion > > useful and still do. At the same time, ideas associated with the "3rd > > generation" formulation have proven useful in thinking about > > university-community collaborations. I would, of course, prefer > > even strong intellectual tools, so like Yrjo I look to actor network > > theory, distributed cognition, and other frameworks that seem to help me > > understand the processes of learning/development/change that I observe > and > > participate in. Reducing Yrjo's work to self aggrandizement seems to be > > really > > unfortunate. > > > > If one looks at the iconography of American appropriations of Vygotsky, > the > > cover of Luis Moll's (1990) book on Vygotsky and Education has a triangle > > inside a circle -- mediated action in context. Yrjo declared that the > > activity IS the context a couple of years later. Now look at the > > iconography in the newest edition of that book. No triangle, just circles > > -- the activity has become the context (a la > > Bronfenbrener). Doesn't feel like progress to me. > > > > Was there politics in the research of LCHC? Of course. It involved > > agreements over the distribution > > of resources within the university, the professional community, etc. I > > would like to think that the work > > was more than self-aggrandizement, but may that is simply a self > > aggrandizing illusion. > > > > So, I renew my question. Does anyone know who the author of the wikipedia > > page is/was? A lot of > > work went in to creating it, and it seems that the best way to block > > invidious interpretations of > > "third generation" as new, better, shinier, and truer, is to continue the > > narrative of the wikipedia > > entry through inclusion of other variations in the development of > > Vygotsky's ideas. Of course, that would > > require labor, but if there is no will, there is no way. > > > > In the meantime, a discussion on XMCA that was inviting to our colleagues > > who think they are participating in the development of 3rd Generation AT > > theorizing a la Helsinki, and do not think of themselves as self > > aggrandizing bad people, seems to me as if it might be useful. > > > > my two centavos > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 5:44 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > > There are a couple of related senses in which the term "generation" may > > be > > > heard here: as in a new major development in the theory, so that this > > > generation is some form of evolution from the previous one; and as it > > > regards to nationality, of being the third, fourth or "n" line of > > offspring > > > following some original. > > > > > > As a new comer to CHAT, when I went to the ISCAR Summer University in > > > Moscow in 2011, I remember people there complaining that, if someone in > > > Finland was claiming the third generation, who were then they, who had > > been > > > attending to and learning from the lectures of those who had attended > to > > > and learned from the very founder's lectures? > > > > > > It soon comes into issues of legitimacy and authorship that may easily > > > confuse newcomers, I think. But then again, > > > there is a history, there are indeed lineages and developments, and we > > > need categories to mark those up, I guess. > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > > Sent: 28 January 2018 14:17 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry > > > > > > Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a > distinction > > > with other forms of AT. That's all." > > > > > > Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the > field > > > (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets > reduced > > > or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is > > done > > > and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It > > is > > > political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for > > > such research-related attention, which is further supported in other > > ways. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive > > > meanings. > > > > > > > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the > > adjective > > > > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > > > > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd > > > generation > > > > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > > > > > > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take > the > > > > stand of Voloshinov. > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which > > are > > > > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > > > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political > > manoeuvre. > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: > > Prolegomena > > > to > > > > > the > > > > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity > > theory. > > > > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to > > > third-generation > > > > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, > > 14, > > > > > 40-63. > > > > > > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd < > > > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > > > > generation > > > > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to > understand > > > what > > > > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd > > > generation"? > > > > > It > > > > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot > of > > > > work > > > > > > into > > > > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so > > > carefully. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jan 28 10:27:22 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:27:22 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: did i use the term, block, michael? My short term memory is aging as David suggested it might. I was thinking of adding, not blocking. mike On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > And Mike, the text is an emergent property of the community. The best you > can get is multiplication of concurrent views, not the blocking of some > over others---unless the community as a whole itself blocks itself. m > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:13 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Dear Colleagues- > > > > I am kind of surprised at the response to my query about the > > authorship of the Wikipedia > > page. I have always interpreted the 1-2-3 generation characterization of > > Helsinki's school's as > > indexing the increasing complexity of the systems of activity that are > > being described/analyzed, > > and used for the design of new interventions that seek to address > perceived > > problems of some > > community/organization. The subject-medium-object unit, the s-m-o unit > as a > > constituent of a collective activity, and the collective activity in > > relation to other activities with which it interacts. News of the fourth > > generation has not filtered down here to the periphery. > > > > This kind of expansion has been accompanied by a shift in disciplinary > > identity. CHAT is not a classical psychological approach. The Russians > use > > the term, "non-classical psychology" even for LSV's work. But once one > > moves to the study of activity, anthropology and sociology come into > > play.... at least so it seems to me. And of course, the linkage with > > various flavors of linguistics have been present since before the > beginning > > > > I felt a strong kinship with the idea of a psychology that took everyday, > > joint, mediated, activity as a unit of analysis. Perhaps no more than > > sloppy eclecticism ensued. Many of my Russian and Western European > > colleague seem to think so. Certainly, my everyday notion of activity did > > not take on the philosophical heritage of German/Russian discussions of > > deyatelnost and Tategkeit. Nor was I sensitive to the social/societal > > distinction, Etc. But I found Yrjo's reconstruction/expansion > > useful and still do. At the same time, ideas associated with the "3rd > > generation" formulation have proven useful in thinking about > > university-community collaborations. I would, of course, prefer > > even strong intellectual tools, so like Yrjo I look to actor network > > theory, distributed cognition, and other frameworks that seem to help me > > understand the processes of learning/development/change that I observe > and > > participate in. Reducing Yrjo's work to self aggrandizement seems to be > > really > > unfortunate. > > > > If one looks at the iconography of American appropriations of Vygotsky, > the > > cover of Luis Moll's (1990) book on Vygotsky and Education has a triangle > > inside a circle -- mediated action in context. Yrjo declared that the > > activity IS the context a couple of years later. Now look at the > > iconography in the newest edition of that book. No triangle, just circles > > -- the activity has become the context (a la > > Bronfenbrener). Doesn't feel like progress to me. > > > > Was there politics in the research of LCHC? Of course. It involved > > agreements over the distribution > > of resources within the university, the professional community, etc. I > > would like to think that the work > > was more than self-aggrandizement, but may that is simply a self > > aggrandizing illusion. > > > > So, I renew my question. Does anyone know who the author of the wikipedia > > page is/was? A lot of > > work went in to creating it, and it seems that the best way to block > > invidious interpretations of > > "third generation" as new, better, shinier, and truer, is to continue the > > narrative of the wikipedia > > entry through inclusion of other variations in the development of > > Vygotsky's ideas. Of course, that would > > require labor, but if there is no will, there is no way. > > > > In the meantime, a discussion on XMCA that was inviting to our colleagues > > who think they are participating in the development of 3rd Generation AT > > theorizing a la Helsinki, and do not think of themselves as self > > aggrandizing bad people, seems to me as if it might be useful. > > > > my two centavos > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 5:44 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > > There are a couple of related senses in which the term "generation" may > > be > > > heard here: as in a new major development in the theory, so that this > > > generation is some form of evolution from the previous one; and as it > > > regards to nationality, of being the third, fourth or "n" line of > > offspring > > > following some original. > > > > > > As a new comer to CHAT, when I went to the ISCAR Summer University in > > > Moscow in 2011, I remember people there complaining that, if someone in > > > Finland was claiming the third generation, who were then they, who had > > been > > > attending to and learning from the lectures of those who had attended > to > > > and learned from the very founder's lectures? > > > > > > It soon comes into issues of legitimacy and authorship that may easily > > > confuse newcomers, I think. But then again, > > > there is a history, there are indeed lineages and developments, and we > > > need categories to mark those up, I guess. > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > > Sent: 28 January 2018 14:17 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry > > > > > > Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a > distinction > > > with other forms of AT. That's all." > > > > > > Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the > field > > > (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets > reduced > > > or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is > > done > > > and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It > > is > > > political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for > > > such research-related attention, which is further supported in other > > ways. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive > > > meanings. > > > > > > > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the > > adjective > > > > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > > > > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd > > > generation > > > > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > > > > > > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take > the > > > > stand of Voloshinov. > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which > > are > > > > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > > > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political > > manoeuvre. > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: > > Prolegomena > > > to > > > > > the > > > > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity > > theory. > > > > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to > > > third-generation > > > > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, > > 14, > > > > > 40-63. > > > > > > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd < > > > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > > > > generation > > > > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to > understand > > > what > > > > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd > > > generation"? > > > > > It > > > > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot > of > > > > work > > > > > > into > > > > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so > > > carefully. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From jrtudge@uncg.edu Sun Jan 28 12:52:51 2018 From: jrtudge@uncg.edu (Jonathan Tudge) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 15:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi, Mike, It's been a long time since I felt myself competent to discuss meaningfully activity theory or much related to Vygotsky's theory, although I read some of the discussions with interest. I was curious, however, about this comment: "Now look at the iconography in the newest edition of that book. No triangle, just circles -- the activity has become the context (a la Bronfenbrener). Doesn't feel like progress to me. ?" Apart from the fact that Bronfenbrenner's theory is generally (and incorrectly) presented as a theory of concentric circles of context, I wondered what you meant by this. Do you think that activity = context for Bronfenbrenner? Cheers, Jon? ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jonathan Tudge Professor Office: 155 Stone Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing gratitude in children and adolescents , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge Mailing address: 248 Stone Building Department of Human Development and Family Studies PO Box 26170 The University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 USA phone (336) 223-6181 fax (336) 334-5076 On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 1:13 PM, mike cole wrote: > Dear Colleagues- > > I am kind of surprised at the response to my query about the > authorship of the Wikipedia > page. I have always interpreted the 1-2-3 generation characterization of > Helsinki's school's as > indexing the increasing complexity of the systems of activity that are > being described/analyzed, > and used for the design of new interventions that seek to address perceived > problems of some > community/organization. The subject-medium-object unit, the s-m-o unit as a > constituent of a collective activity, and the collective activity in > relation to other activities with which it interacts. News of the fourth > generation has not filtered down here to the periphery. > > This kind of expansion has been accompanied by a shift in disciplinary > identity. CHAT is not a classical psychological approach. The Russians use > the term, "non-classical psychology" even for LSV's work. But once one > moves to the study of activity, anthropology and sociology come into > play.... at least so it seems to me. And of course, the linkage with > various flavors of linguistics have been present since before the beginning > > I felt a strong kinship with the idea of a psychology that took everyday, > joint, mediated, activity as a unit of analysis. Perhaps no more than > sloppy eclecticism ensued. Many of my Russian and Western European > colleague seem to think so. Certainly, my everyday notion of activity did > not take on the philosophical heritage of German/Russian discussions of > deyatelnost and Tategkeit. Nor was I sensitive to the social/societal > distinction, Etc. But I found Yrjo's reconstruction/expansion > useful and still do. At the same time, ideas associated with the "3rd > generation" formulation have proven useful in thinking about > university-community collaborations. I would, of course, prefer > even strong intellectual tools, so like Yrjo I look to actor network > theory, distributed cognition, and other frameworks that seem to help me > understand the processes of learning/development/change that I observe and > participate in. Reducing Yrjo's work to self aggrandizement seems to be > really > unfortunate. > > If one looks at the iconography of American appropriations of Vygotsky, the > cover of Luis Moll's (1990) book on Vygotsky and Education has a triangle > inside a circle -- mediated action in context. Yrjo declared that the > activity IS the context a couple of years later. Now look at the > iconography in the newest edition of that book. No triangle, just circles > -- the activity has become the context (a la > Bronfenbrener). Doesn't feel like progress to me. > > Was there politics in the research of LCHC? Of course. It involved > agreements over the distribution > of resources within the university, the professional community, etc. I > would like to think that the work > was more than self-aggrandizement, but may that is simply a self > aggrandizing illusion. > > So, I renew my question. Does anyone know who the author of the wikipedia > page is/was? A lot of > work went in to creating it, and it seems that the best way to block > invidious interpretations of > "third generation" as new, better, shinier, and truer, is to continue the > narrative of the wikipedia > entry through inclusion of other variations in the development of > Vygotsky's ideas. Of course, that would > require labor, but if there is no will, there is no way. > > In the meantime, a discussion on XMCA that was inviting to our colleagues > who think they are participating in the development of 3rd Generation AT > theorizing a la Helsinki, and do not think of themselves as self > aggrandizing bad people, seems to me as if it might be useful. > > my two centavos > > mike > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 5:44 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > There are a couple of related senses in which the term "generation" may > be > > heard here: as in a new major development in the theory, so that this > > generation is some form of evolution from the previous one; and as it > > regards to nationality, of being the third, fourth or "n" line of > offspring > > following some original. > > > > As a new comer to CHAT, when I went to the ISCAR Summer University in > > Moscow in 2011, I remember people there complaining that, if someone in > > Finland was claiming the third generation, who were then they, who had > been > > attending to and learning from the lectures of those who had attended to > > and learned from the very founder's lectures? > > > > It soon comes into issues of legitimacy and authorship that may easily > > confuse newcomers, I think. But then again, > > there is a history, there are indeed lineages and developments, and we > > need categories to mark those up, I guess. > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > Sent: 28 January 2018 14:17 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry > > > > Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a distinction > > with other forms of AT. That's all." > > > > Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the field > > (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets reduced > > or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is > done > > and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It > is > > political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for > > such research-related attention, which is further supported in other > ways. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > > > Huw, > > > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive > > meanings. > > > > > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the > adjective > > > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > > > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd > > generation > > > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > > > > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take the > > > stand of Voloshinov. > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which > are > > > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political > manoeuvre. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: > Prolegomena > > to > > > > the > > > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity > theory. > > > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to > > third-generation > > > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, > 14, > > > > 40-63. > > > > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd < > > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > > > generation > > > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to understand > > what > > > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd > > generation"? > > > > It > > > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot of > > > work > > > > > into > > > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so > > carefully. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Jan 28 12:54:43 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 20:54:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry In-Reply-To: References: <1517147082864.57129@iped.uio.no> , Message-ID: <1517172883789.95464@iped.uio.no> Looking at the history of the page, there are several authors, but clearly one that has written most of the (over 500) entries. But I agree with you Mike that the point is not so much to get in touch with who has written the entries but rather to continue contributing by further adding, probably much better way to get in touch with her or him, or rather them or us. Though not a la Helsinki, I do use and refer to Engestr?m's work often, and I find his work one of the finest in recent and current CHAT writing and theorising. I know many who run work a la Helsinki doing a wonderful work at it and neither them nor Engestr?m are about self aggrandizement to me. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 28 January 2018 19:26 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry Yes, I understand that about Wikipedia, Michael. Which is why I asked how had been doing it. It seems that if someone wanted to fill out an entry on CHAT to include the multivoicedness of developments in recent decades it would be best to collaborate on additions, or at least know what the others are doing and why. There is your line of work, the line developed by Hedegaard and Fleer, and more. mike On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:20 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > Mike, > my understanding is that anyone can author once accepted by wikipedia. So > there may be many authors, who author and re-author the text that is seen. > Michael > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:13 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Dear Colleagues- > > > > I am kind of surprised at the response to my query about the > > authorship of the Wikipedia > > page. I have always interpreted the 1-2-3 generation characterization of > > Helsinki's school's as > > indexing the increasing complexity of the systems of activity that are > > being described/analyzed, > > and used for the design of new interventions that seek to address > perceived > > problems of some > > community/organization. The subject-medium-object unit, the s-m-o unit > as a > > constituent of a collective activity, and the collective activity in > > relation to other activities with which it interacts. News of the fourth > > generation has not filtered down here to the periphery. > > > > This kind of expansion has been accompanied by a shift in disciplinary > > identity. CHAT is not a classical psychological approach. The Russians > use > > the term, "non-classical psychology" even for LSV's work. But once one > > moves to the study of activity, anthropology and sociology come into > > play.... at least so it seems to me. And of course, the linkage with > > various flavors of linguistics have been present since before the > beginning > > > > I felt a strong kinship with the idea of a psychology that took everyday, > > joint, mediated, activity as a unit of analysis. Perhaps no more than > > sloppy eclecticism ensued. Many of my Russian and Western European > > colleague seem to think so. Certainly, my everyday notion of activity did > > not take on the philosophical heritage of German/Russian discussions of > > deyatelnost and Tategkeit. Nor was I sensitive to the social/societal > > distinction, Etc. But I found Yrjo's reconstruction/expansion > > useful and still do. At the same time, ideas associated with the "3rd > > generation" formulation have proven useful in thinking about > > university-community collaborations. I would, of course, prefer > > even strong intellectual tools, so like Yrjo I look to actor network > > theory, distributed cognition, and other frameworks that seem to help me > > understand the processes of learning/development/change that I observe > and > > participate in. Reducing Yrjo's work to self aggrandizement seems to be > > really > > unfortunate. > > > > If one looks at the iconography of American appropriations of Vygotsky, > the > > cover of Luis Moll's (1990) book on Vygotsky and Education has a triangle > > inside a circle -- mediated action in context. Yrjo declared that the > > activity IS the context a couple of years later. Now look at the > > iconography in the newest edition of that book. No triangle, just circles > > -- the activity has become the context (a la > > Bronfenbrener). Doesn't feel like progress to me. > > > > Was there politics in the research of LCHC? Of course. It involved > > agreements over the distribution > > of resources within the university, the professional community, etc. I > > would like to think that the work > > was more than self-aggrandizement, but may that is simply a self > > aggrandizing illusion. > > > > So, I renew my question. Does anyone know who the author of the wikipedia > > page is/was? A lot of > > work went in to creating it, and it seems that the best way to block > > invidious interpretations of > > "third generation" as new, better, shinier, and truer, is to continue the > > narrative of the wikipedia > > entry through inclusion of other variations in the development of > > Vygotsky's ideas. Of course, that would > > require labor, but if there is no will, there is no way. > > > > In the meantime, a discussion on XMCA that was inviting to our colleagues > > who think they are participating in the development of 3rd Generation AT > > theorizing a la Helsinki, and do not think of themselves as self > > aggrandizing bad people, seems to me as if it might be useful. > > > > my two centavos > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 5:44 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > > There are a couple of related senses in which the term "generation" may > > be > > > heard here: as in a new major development in the theory, so that this > > > generation is some form of evolution from the previous one; and as it > > > regards to nationality, of being the third, fourth or "n" line of > > offspring > > > following some original. > > > > > > As a new comer to CHAT, when I went to the ISCAR Summer University in > > > Moscow in 2011, I remember people there complaining that, if someone in > > > Finland was claiming the third generation, who were then they, who had > > been > > > attending to and learning from the lectures of those who had attended > to > > > and learned from the very founder's lectures? > > > > > > It soon comes into issues of legitimacy and authorship that may easily > > > confuse newcomers, I think. But then again, > > > there is a history, there are indeed lineages and developments, and we > > > need categories to mark those up, I guess. > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > > Sent: 28 January 2018 14:17 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Wikipedia CHAT entry > > > > > > Re "The work you do by calling it 3rd generation is making a > distinction > > > with other forms of AT. That's all." > > > > > > Of course it isn't all, Michael. It is misleading anyone new to the > field > > > (and who has not had the experience of knowing how knowledge gets > reduced > > > or made superficial) into thinking that this is where the new work is > > done > > > and that this is supposed to represent the leading edge of the work. It > > is > > > political in that this unwarranted status functions as an attractor for > > > such research-related attention, which is further supported in other > > ways. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 12:51, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > you may be hung up with words, perhaps in search of these elusive > > > meanings. > > > > > > > > I am not doing that kind of work anymore, but I think using the > > adjective > > > > distinguishes other forms of theory use from the one that has evolved > > > > around the Helsinki triangle. The work you do by calling it 3rd > > > generation > > > > is making a distinction with other forms of AT. That's all. > > > > > > > > And your comment about politics---this appears a truism if you take > the > > > > stand of Voloshinov. > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:41 AM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Anyone who has carefully studied the historical works of AT, which > > are > > > > > psychological, would know that it is nonsense to call this a "third > > > > > generation". Calling it a "third generation" is a political > > manoeuvre. > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 28 January 2018 at 01:56, Wolff-Michael Roth < > > > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > > > > > > > > > I had worked on those ideas as well: > > > > > > > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). The ethico-moral nature of identity: > > Prolegomena > > > to > > > > > the > > > > > > development of third-generation cultural-historical activity > > theory. > > > > > > International Journal of Educational Research, 46, 83-93 > > > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2007). Emotion at work: A contribution to > > > third-generation > > > > > > cultural historical activity theory. Mind, Culture and Activity, > > 14, > > > > > 40-63. > > > > > > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:25 PM, Huw Lloyd < > > > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Is anyone other than Engestrom claiming that their work is 3rd > > > > > generation > > > > > > > AT? Are there any Russian psychologists clamouring to > understand > > > what > > > > > > > improvements have been made to their system in this "3rd > > > generation"? > > > > > It > > > > > > > doesn't seem like a careful depiction to me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 January 2018 at 18:49, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I just stumbled across the wikipedia page. Someone put a lot > of > > > > work > > > > > > into > > > > > > > > that entry. It would be > > > > > > > > interesting to discuss with whose who put it together so > > > carefully. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Check it out. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cultural- > > > > > > > > historical_activity_theory&action=history > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jan 28 13:51:02 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 06:51:02 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Uses of Memory Loss Message-ID: I'm not sure if I am the David that Mike refers to; I don't remember saying anything about his lapse of memory, but of course that might be MY lapse of memory. Right now, I am working on some wonderful data from seven year olds. Every Monday, they have to tell a story about their weekend to the rest of the class and to their teacher. I record 'em, and then analyze them for various linguistic features that I have mapped onto Vygotsky's "measure of generality" (Chapter 6 of Thinking and Speech and also his last lectures). So I've got this one kid who is trying desperately to retell the story of a movie she saw. As it happens, it is "Finding Dory", which is a movie about short-term memory loss. And her problem is...well, she can't remember it very well. So she ends up describing the irritation of having English subtitles and the distracting motions of the camera: how it "shimmys" around. The teacher is intrigued--did she watch it in a car? No, in a theatre. So what is she talking about? Have a look and see if you can guess. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0tkLUap7oGQ According to a psychologist at Cornell, the average shot length in an English speaking movie has gone from nearly twelve seconds in 1930 to only about two and half today. So in trying to hang onto the child's attention, the film maker has completely given up on the child's short term memory. The kids won't give up though. The older children (eleven or twelve) have developed such a clear sense of "set the scene" (SS), "create the character" (CC), and then "pose the problem" (PP) that I often have to check and make sure they are not copying from some on-line synopsis. They aren't--they have simply learned a useful method for remembering any movie at all. I used to think that schemata like "set the scene", "create the characters" and "pose a problem (which can be resolved by one of the characters in order to restore the original order of the scene) were just products of language. It's true that SS is usually done with adverbs or preposititional phrases ("Long ago", "far away"), CC is a matter of nouns and nominal phrases ("a beautiful little fish named Dory"), and PP is a set of more or less dynamic verbs and processes ("lost her parents"). But that in itself made me suspicious: the explicit knowledge of adverbs, nouns, and verbs tends to come LATER than SS, CC, and PP--not earlier. I guess I thought the same thing was true of AT, Jon. That is, I thought that the triangle is just the product of thinking about normal, canonical word order in English (Subject-Verb-Object). Since this isn't canonical word order in many or even most human languages, I didn't think it had the universal quality that AT attributes to it. Historically the Subject-Verb-Object order is becoming less and less canonical in English too: the fact that most verbs can now be both transitive and intransitive ("Dory sought" or "Dory sought her parents") shows we are moving towards a more ergative model, which is actually much better for describing events and happenings rather than heroic accomplishments and epics of activity. Ruqaiya Hasan's criticism of Activity Theory, by the way, was precisely that context was collapsed into "activity"--but I think if you go back over the thread you will see that Mike attributed that to Yrjo, not that he said it himself. In any case, I now think that for these children language is not so much a tool in an activity of remembering as a way of making clear the need for some way or organizing the mess, which they then cobble together out of categories which only later give rise to categories at the clause level. Does this go for geezers like me and Mike? That is, is one of the uses of memory loss the reconstruction of knowledge in some novel and much more useful form? I dare say! Who knows, maybe these uses of memory loss were the motivation for the Polyphonic Autobiography.... If so, like a stranger, we should bid it welcome... David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Jan 28 15:20:04 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 15:20:04 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Text In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Jon -- Nice to see your voice! I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to hand. I checked it out to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages from the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro level, but perhaps only there? Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person who induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent his perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying to represent the idea and he said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion of context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term "ecological context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that LSV used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I have no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity is the context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the pages attached. Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic could search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious about what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill to carry out the query. And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of interpreting U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. mike -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: IMG_0761.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 1684882 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180128/8ae00993/attachment-0002.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: IMG_0762.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 1695914 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180128/8ae00993/attachment-0003.jpg From jrtudge@uncg.edu Mon Jan 29 07:24:56 2018 From: jrtudge@uncg.edu (Jonathan Tudge) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 10:24:56 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Text In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi, Mike, There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the papers are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any theorist who wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know the date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both excellent examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the different layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem consists of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards (see Rosa and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards "proximal processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. However, what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those of the others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the context, both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him was culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study over time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, and political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects his developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge (2008), on page 69. I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book and in his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his 1998 (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the impact of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s research on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of Bronfenbrenner's theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different in that regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad textbook on human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have said that they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see Tudge et al., 2009, 2016). If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a private message to jrtudge@uncg.edu - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: Cambridge University Press. - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. (2009). Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s theory of human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: Oxford University Press. - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, Y., Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these years? A re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. doi: 10.1111/jftr.12165. Cheers, Jon ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jonathan Tudge Professor Office: 155 Stone Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing gratitude in children and adolescents , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge Mailing address: 248 Stone Building Department of Human Development and Family Studies PO Box 26170 The University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 USA phone (336) 223-6181 fax (336) 334-5076 On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > Hi Jon -- > > Nice to see your voice! > > I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to hand. I > checked it out > to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! > Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages from > the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur > photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro > level, but perhaps only there? > > Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person who > induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. > Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent his > perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first > edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his > rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying to > represent the idea and he > said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. > > In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion of > context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term "ecological > context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that LSV > used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I have > no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity is the > context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the pages > attached. > > Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic could > search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious about > what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill > to carry out the query. > > And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of interpreting > U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? > Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and > Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > > mike > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Jan 29 09:20:42 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 09:20:42 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Text In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks for all the background and additional references, Jon. Is there a particular article/chapter among those that you would recommend we read to get clearer about thinking about context and activity in Bronfenbrenner's final model? It seems from your summary below that at the micro-level, the activity is the context a la Yrjo, and above that level there is a better way to think about it than Bronfenbrenner offers. "proximal processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. Do I have that right? Psychological analysis takes as its units of analysis children engaged in joint activities with other members of their community? One problem for me in thinking about this issue is that context is a relational term, con-text. There is an instructive discussion of this problem by Ray McDermott in the same volume where Yrjo wrote that the activity is the context. I attach the paper. The whole paper may be of interest, but the core idea he puts forth is on pp. 275-277, and particularly, the two figures on p. 276. This exercise seems to help get at the relationality of "the context." A second problem I have when thinking about my research participating in an after school program is the way that the matroyshki metaphor seems particularly well suited for. I habitually have described The Fifth Dimension program as an activity that goes on insider of a boys and girls club. The club is one of many organizations and institutions in the suburban town I live in. That town is north of san diego in the southern california region. Of course you need to combine this with the time scales appropriate to each level of scale (using the concentric circles as proxies for scale and remembering that at each scale people of different ages, all developing). And, of course, I also find it necessary to think about the "weaving together" metaphor of context, which, when combined with the matrochki/circles metaphor suits my intuitions about developmental processes well. These thoughts provoked my mention of the cover of the second edition of Luis' work. Only the concentric circles remained, the triangle had been airbrushed from history. Anyway, thanks for the provocation to think about these matters. Always food for thought. mike On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > Hi, Mike, > > There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the papers > are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this > century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any theorist who > wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know the > date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the > chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. > > As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both excellent > examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are > utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the different > layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem consists > of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're > right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. > > However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards (see Rosa > and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards "proximal > processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) > model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing > people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. However, > what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person > characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those of the > others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the context, > both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those > activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him was > culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society > cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study over > time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, and > political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects his > developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge > (2008), on page 69. > > I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, > unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book and in > his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his 1998 > (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the impact > of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s research > on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > > Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of Bronfenbrenner's > theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different in that > regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad textbook on > human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have said that > they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see Tudge et > al., 2009, 2016). > > If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a private > message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: > Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: > Cambridge University Press. > - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. (2009). > Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s theory of > human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. *Journal of > Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery > (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: > Oxford University Press. > - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, Y., > Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these years? A > re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of > human > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. doi: > 10.1111/jftr.12165. > > Cheers, > > Jon > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > Jonathan Tudge > > Professor > Office: 155 Stone > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > gratitude in children and adolescents > gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > Mailing address: > 248 Stone Building > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > PO Box 26170 > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > USA > > phone (336) 223-6181 > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Hi Jon -- > > > > Nice to see your voice! > > > > I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to > hand. I > > checked it out > > to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! > > Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages from > > the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur > > photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro > > level, but perhaps only there? > > > > Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person who > > induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. > > Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent his > > perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first > > edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his > > rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > > a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying to > > represent the idea and he > > said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. > > > > In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion of > > context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term > "ecological > > context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that > LSV > > used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I > have > > no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity is > the > > context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the > pages > > attached. > > > > Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic > could > > search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious about > > what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill > > to carry out the query. > > > > And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of interpreting > > U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? > > Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and > > Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > > > > mike > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: mcdermott-93.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 3218835 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180129/89f16239/attachment-0001.pdf From jrtudge@uncg.edu Mon Jan 29 11:10:53 2018 From: jrtudge@uncg.edu (Jonathan Tudge) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 14:10:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Text In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greetings, Mike, XMCA folk, Jean, and Ray, I think, Mike, that you captured what I was trying to get at quite well. I'm attaching one paper that probably does the best job of getting at the relation between activity and context, though it of course wasn't our main focus when writing it. Most of the paper can safely be ignored, I think, in that our aim was to assess the extent to which scholars were appropriately using the mature version of Bronfenbrenner's theory, but in the initial part we explain why the theory is contextualist rather than mechanist (using Pepper's [1942] meanings of these two terms). As such, neither person characteristics nor context are separate from activities (proximal processes) but, to use Ray's language, interwoven. Better yet, from my point of view, what results are emergent properties that can't be broken down into "person" or "activity" or "context" elements. I think that it's in large part because of the concentric rings that Bronfenbrenner is still routinely thought of as a mechanist, who believed that context (in its varying layers) determined a person's development. Nothing could be further from the truth. Thinking about the Fifth Dimension (which you must have been just starting when I was with you as a predoctoral intern 35 years ago!!!!!) in terms of Bronfenbrenner's systems, I'd be interested in how the students' participation in it is influenced by their experiences in their school and home contexts (a mesosystem analysis) and by the broader culture (macrosystem) that has a notion of schooling that doesn't involve the types of activities that are encouraged in the Dimension (at least in the US at the given historical period). But to understand the types of activities that routinely occur within the Fifth Dimension (and which I think would get progressively more complex over time) it would be just as important to focus on at least some of the relevant person characteristics (age, gender, motivation, persistence, past experiences with learning, etc. etc.) of both the students and the adults who are working together. Cheers, Jon ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jonathan Tudge Professor Office: 155 Stone Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing gratitude in children and adolescents , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge Mailing address: 248 Stone Building Department of Human Development and Family Studies PO Box 26170 The University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 USA phone (336) 223-6181 fax (336) 334-5076 On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 12:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > Thanks for all the background and additional references, Jon. Is there > a particular article/chapter among those that you would recommend we > read to get clearer about thinking about context and activity in > Bronfenbrenner's > final model? It seems from your summary below that at the micro-level, the > activity > is the context a la Yrjo, and above that level there is a better way to > think about it > than Bronfenbrenner offers. > "proximal processes" were the centerpiece of his > Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) > model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing > people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. > > Do I have that right? Psychological analysis takes as its units of analysis > children engaged in joint activities with other members of their community? > > One problem for me in thinking about this issue is that context is a > relational term, con-text. There is an instructive discussion of this > problem by Ray McDermott in the same volume where Yrjo wrote that the > activity is the context. I attach the paper. The whole paper may be of > interest, but the core idea he puts > forth is on pp. 275-277, and particularly, the two figures on p. 276. This > exercise seems to help get at the relationality of "the context." > > A second problem I have when thinking about my research participating in an > after school program is the way that the matroyshki metaphor seems > particularly well suited for. I habitually have described > The Fifth Dimension program as an activity that goes on insider of a boys > and girls club. The club is > one of many organizations and institutions in the suburban town I live in. > That town is north of san diego in the southern california region. Of > course you need to combine this with the time scales appropriate to each > level of scale (using the concentric circles as proxies for scale and > remembering that at each scale people of different ages, all developing). > > And, of course, I also find it necessary to think about the "weaving > together" metaphor of context, which, when combined with the > matrochki/circles metaphor suits my intuitions about developmental > processes well. > > These thoughts provoked my mention of the cover of the second edition of > Luis' work. Only the concentric circles remained, the triangle had been > airbrushed from history. > > Anyway, thanks for the provocation to think about these matters. Always > food for thought. > mike > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > > > Hi, Mike, > > > > There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the > papers > > are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this > > century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any theorist > who > > wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know the > > date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the > > chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. > > > > As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both excellent > > examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are > > utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the different > > layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem > consists > > of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're > > right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. > > > > However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards (see > Rosa > > and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards "proximal > > processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) > > model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing > > people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. However, > > what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person > > characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those of > the > > others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the context, > > both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those > > activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him was > > culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society > > cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study > over > > time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, and > > political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects his > > developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge > > (2008), on page 69. > > > > I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, > > unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book and > in > > his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his > 1998 > > (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the > impact > > of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s > research > > on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > > > > Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of > Bronfenbrenner's > > theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different in > that > > regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad textbook > on > > human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have said > that > > they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see Tudge et > > al., 2009, 2016). > > > > If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a > private > > message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > > > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: > > Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: > > Cambridge University Press. > > - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. (2009). > > Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > > - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s theory > of > > human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. *Journal > of > > Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery > > (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: > > Oxford University Press. > > - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, > Y., > > Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these years? > A > > re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of > > human > > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. doi: > > 10.1111/jftr.12165. > > > > Cheers, > > > > Jon > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > Jonathan Tudge > > > > Professor > > Office: 155 Stone > > > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > > gratitude in children and adolescents > > > gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > > > Mailing address: > > 248 Stone Building > > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > PO Box 26170 > > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > USA > > > > phone (336) 223-6181 > > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Hi Jon -- > > > > > > Nice to see your voice! > > > > > > I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to > > hand. I > > > checked it out > > > to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! > > > Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages > from > > > the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur > > > photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro > > > level, but perhaps only there? > > > > > > Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person > who > > > induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. > > > Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent > his > > > perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first > > > edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his > > > rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > > > a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying > to > > > represent the idea and he > > > said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. > > > > > > In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion > of > > > context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term > > "ecological > > > context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that > > LSV > > > used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I > > have > > > no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity is > > the > > > context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the > > pages > > > attached. > > > > > > Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic > > could > > > search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious > about > > > what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill > > > to carry out the query. > > > > > > And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of > interpreting > > > U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? > > > Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and > > > Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Tudge_et_al-2016-Journal_of_Family_Theory_&_Review.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 165339 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180129/03230270/attachment.pdf From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Jan 29 13:55:11 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 21:55:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Discussing Bronfrenbrenner's bioecological In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1517262911875.55297@iped.uio.no> Dear Jon, all, this is such a great topic! I have always been interested in and have in fact used the idea of "ecology" as a guiding principle to study human affairs, although I must admit that I never really attended to Bronfenbrenner's work adequately. I've been for a long time all too bewitched by Dewey's, Vygotsky's, and G. Bateson's wonderful ideas, so that it was difficult to make room for more during a good while. I think I may not be alone in my ignorance, and this looks like a great occasion to open up an article-based discussion here in xmca on the topic. The paper you just shared looks like a great start. I really like of it the critique that few studies concern themselves with critically evaluating the theory they are drawing from to generate and make sense of their data. It reminded me of G. Bateson's ruminations around the idea of "explanation" as the "mapping of the pieces of a description onto a tautology" in his "Mind and Nature" book. There, he critiques researchers who satisfy themselves with "dormitive explanations," like the one a doctoral student gives to examiners when, asked "why opium puts people to sleep," answers, "because, learned doctors, it contains a dormitive principle" (Bateson, 1979, p. 85). I am afraid it is all too easy to fall into dormitive (empty) explanations when trying to address questions of context in studies on mind, culture, and activity. As a companion to your article, we could also have one by Mike, precisely applying Bronfenbrenner's person-process-context approach to the 5th Dimension. I am sure Mike is happy we share it here. Not in order to evaluate whether and to what extent Mike's presentation of Bronfenbrenner's theory is "accurate" (although you may as well comment on that), but rather to have one empirical case in which the relevance of the theory to practical, everyday concerns is displayed, and where an aspect is included that seems very important and challenging, that of bringing time into our units of analysis. Personally, as Mike, I always found the metaphor of a rope of interweaving fibers?as Ray McDermott described it, if I do remember properly, citing Birdwhistell?more useful than the concentric circles. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Jonathan Tudge Sent: 29 January 2018 20:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Jean Lave; Ray McDermott Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Text Greetings, Mike, XMCA folk, Jean, and Ray, I think, Mike, that you captured what I was trying to get at quite well. I'm attaching one paper that probably does the best job of getting at the relation between activity and context, though it of course wasn't our main focus when writing it. Most of the paper can safely be ignored, I think, in that our aim was to assess the extent to which scholars were appropriately using the mature version of Bronfenbrenner's theory, but in the initial part we explain why the theory is contextualist rather than mechanist (using Pepper's [1942] meanings of these two terms). As such, neither person characteristics nor context are separate from activities (proximal processes) but, to use Ray's language, interwoven. Better yet, from my point of view, what results are emergent properties that can't be broken down into "person" or "activity" or "context" elements. I think that it's in large part because of the concentric rings that Bronfenbrenner is still routinely thought of as a mechanist, who believed that context (in its varying layers) determined a person's development. Nothing could be further from the truth. Thinking about the Fifth Dimension (which you must have been just starting when I was with you as a predoctoral intern 35 years ago!!!!!) in terms of Bronfenbrenner's systems, I'd be interested in how the students' participation in it is influenced by their experiences in their school and home contexts (a mesosystem analysis) and by the broader culture (macrosystem) that has a notion of schooling that doesn't involve the types of activities that are encouraged in the Dimension (at least in the US at the given historical period). But to understand the types of activities that routinely occur within the Fifth Dimension (and which I think would get progressively more complex over time) it would be just as important to focus on at least some of the relevant person characteristics (age, gender, motivation, persistence, past experiences with learning, etc. etc.) of both the students and the adults who are working together. Cheers, Jon ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jonathan Tudge Professor Office: 155 Stone Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing gratitude in children and adolescents , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge Mailing address: 248 Stone Building Department of Human Development and Family Studies PO Box 26170 The University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 USA phone (336) 223-6181 fax (336) 334-5076 On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 12:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > Thanks for all the background and additional references, Jon. Is there > a particular article/chapter among those that you would recommend we > read to get clearer about thinking about context and activity in > Bronfenbrenner's > final model? It seems from your summary below that at the micro-level, the > activity > is the context a la Yrjo, and above that level there is a better way to > think about it > than Bronfenbrenner offers. > "proximal processes" were the centerpiece of his > Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) > model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing > people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. > > Do I have that right? Psychological analysis takes as its units of analysis > children engaged in joint activities with other members of their community? > > One problem for me in thinking about this issue is that context is a > relational term, con-text. There is an instructive discussion of this > problem by Ray McDermott in the same volume where Yrjo wrote that the > activity is the context. I attach the paper. The whole paper may be of > interest, but the core idea he puts > forth is on pp. 275-277, and particularly, the two figures on p. 276. This > exercise seems to help get at the relationality of "the context." > > A second problem I have when thinking about my research participating in an > after school program is the way that the matroyshki metaphor seems > particularly well suited for. I habitually have described > The Fifth Dimension program as an activity that goes on insider of a boys > and girls club. The club is > one of many organizations and institutions in the suburban town I live in. > That town is north of san diego in the southern california region. Of > course you need to combine this with the time scales appropriate to each > level of scale (using the concentric circles as proxies for scale and > remembering that at each scale people of different ages, all developing). > > And, of course, I also find it necessary to think about the "weaving > together" metaphor of context, which, when combined with the > matrochki/circles metaphor suits my intuitions about developmental > processes well. > > These thoughts provoked my mention of the cover of the second edition of > Luis' work. Only the concentric circles remained, the triangle had been > airbrushed from history. > > Anyway, thanks for the provocation to think about these matters. Always > food for thought. > mike > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > > > Hi, Mike, > > > > There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the > papers > > are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this > > century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any theorist > who > > wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know the > > date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the > > chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. > > > > As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both excellent > > examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are > > utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the different > > layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem > consists > > of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're > > right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. > > > > However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards (see > Rosa > > and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards "proximal > > processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) > > model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing > > people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. However, > > what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person > > characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those of > the > > others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the context, > > both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those > > activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him was > > culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society > > cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study > over > > time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, and > > political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects his > > developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge > > (2008), on page 69. > > > > I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, > > unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book and > in > > his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his > 1998 > > (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the > impact > > of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s > research > > on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > > > > Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of > Bronfenbrenner's > > theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different in > that > > regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad textbook > on > > human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have said > that > > they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see Tudge et > > al., 2009, 2016). > > > > If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a > private > > message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > > > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: > > Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: > > Cambridge University Press. > > - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. (2009). > > Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > > - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s theory > of > > human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. *Journal > of > > Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery > > (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: > > Oxford University Press. > > - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, > Y., > > Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these years? > A > > re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of > > human > > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. doi: > > 10.1111/jftr.12165. > > > > Cheers, > > > > Jon > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > Jonathan Tudge > > > > Professor > > Office: 155 Stone > > > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > > gratitude in children and adolescents > > > gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > > > Mailing address: > > 248 Stone Building > > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > PO Box 26170 > > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > USA > > > > phone (336) 223-6181 > > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Hi Jon -- > > > > > > Nice to see your voice! > > > > > > I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to > > hand. I > > > checked it out > > > to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! > > > Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages > from > > > the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur > > > photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro > > > level, but perhaps only there? > > > > > > Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person > who > > > induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. > > > Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent > his > > > perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first > > > edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his > > > rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > > > a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying > to > > > represent the idea and he > > > said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. > > > > > > In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion > of > > > context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term > > "ecological > > > context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that > > LSV > > > used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I > > have > > > no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity is > > the > > > context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the > > pages > > > attached. > > > > > > Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic > > could > > > search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious > about > > > what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill > > > to carry out the query. > > > > > > And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of > interpreting > > > U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? > > > Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and > > > Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Cole 2016 Designing for Development- Across the Scales of Time.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 334084 bytes Desc: Cole 2016 Designing for Development- Across the Scales of Time.pdf Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180129/e660e050/attachment.pdf From mpacker@cantab.net Mon Jan 29 15:22:51 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 18:22:51 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Text In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4D6811C2-BCB9-44E6-B196-9384FD82DCF4@cantab.net> Hi Jon, Would it be possible for you to post here the figure you mentioned in your message, page 69 of your book? Martin "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > > Hi, Mike, > > There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the papers > are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this > century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any theorist who > wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know the > date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the > chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. > > As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both excellent > examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are > utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the different > layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem consists > of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're > right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. > > However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards (see Rosa > and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards "proximal > processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) > model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing > people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. However, > what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person > characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those of the > others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the context, > both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those > activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him was > culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society > cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study over > time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, and > political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects his > developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge > (2008), on page 69. > > I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, > unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book and in > his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his 1998 > (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the impact > of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s research > on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > > Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of Bronfenbrenner's > theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different in that > regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad textbook on > human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have said that > they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see Tudge et > al., 2009, 2016). > > If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a private > message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: > Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: > Cambridge University Press. > - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. (2009). > Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s theory of > human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. *Journal of > Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery > (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: > Oxford University Press. > - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, Y., > Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these years? A > re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. doi: > 10.1111/jftr.12165. > > Cheers, > > Jon > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > Jonathan Tudge > > Professor > Office: 155 Stone > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > gratitude in children and adolescents > , > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > Mailing address: > 248 Stone Building > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > PO Box 26170 > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > USA > > phone (336) 223-6181 > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> Hi Jon -- >> >> Nice to see your voice! >> >> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to hand. I >> checked it out >> to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! >> Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages from >> the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur >> photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro >> level, but perhaps only there? >> >> Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person who >> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. >> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent his >> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first >> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his >> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites >> a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying to >> represent the idea and he >> said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. >> >> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion of >> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term "ecological >> context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that LSV >> used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I have >> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity is the >> context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the pages >> attached. >> >> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic could >> search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious about >> what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill >> to carry out the query. >> >> And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of interpreting >> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? >> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and >> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. >> >> mike >> From jrtudge@uncg.edu Mon Jan 29 15:34:02 2018 From: jrtudge@uncg.edu (Jonathan Tudge) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 18:34:02 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Text In-Reply-To: <4D6811C2-BCB9-44E6-B196-9384FD82DCF4@cantab.net> References: <4D6811C2-BCB9-44E6-B196-9384FD82DCF4@cantab.net> Message-ID: Greetings, Martin, I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint presentation). Cheers, Jon ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jonathan Tudge Professor Office: 155 Stone Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing gratitude in children and adolescents , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge Mailing address: 248 Stone Building Department of Human Development and Family Studies PO Box 26170 The University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 USA phone (336) 223-6181 fax (336) 334-5076 On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > Hi Jon, > > Would it be possible for you to post here the figure you mentioned in your > message, page 69 of your book? > > Martin > > "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with > the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > > > > On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > > > > Hi, Mike, > > > > There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the > papers > > are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this > > century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any theorist > who > > wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know the > > date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the > > chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. > > > > As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both excellent > > examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are > > utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the different > > layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem > consists > > of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're > > right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. > > > > However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards (see > Rosa > > and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards "proximal > > processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) > > model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing > > people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. However, > > what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person > > characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those of > the > > others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the context, > > both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those > > activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him was > > culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society > > cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study > over > > time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, and > > political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects his > > developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge > > (2008), on page 69. > > > > I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, > > unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book and > in > > his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his > 1998 > > (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the > impact > > of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s > research > > on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > > > > Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of > Bronfenbrenner's > > theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different in > that > > regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad textbook > on > > human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have said > that > > they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see Tudge et > > al., 2009, 2016). > > > > If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a > private > > message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > > > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: > > Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: > > Cambridge University Press. > > - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. (2009). > > Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > > - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s theory > of > > human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. *Journal > of > > Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > > - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery > > (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: > > Oxford University Press. > > - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, Y., > > Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these years? A > > re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of > human > > development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. doi: > > 10.1111/jftr.12165. > > > > Cheers, > > > > Jon > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > Jonathan Tudge > > > > Professor > > Office: 155 Stone > > > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > > gratitude in children and adolescents > > gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > > > Mailing address: > > 248 Stone Building > > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > PO Box 26170 > > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > USA > > > > phone (336) 223-6181 > > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >> Hi Jon -- > >> > >> Nice to see your voice! > >> > >> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to > hand. I > >> checked it out > >> to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! > >> Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages > from > >> the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur > >> photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro > >> level, but perhaps only there? > >> > >> Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person > who > >> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. > >> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent > his > >> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first > >> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his > >> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > >> a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying > to > >> represent the idea and he > >> said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. > >> > >> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion > of > >> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term > "ecological > >> context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that > LSV > >> used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I > have > >> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity is > the > >> context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the > pages > >> attached. > >> > >> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic > could > >> search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious > about > >> what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill > >> to carry out the query. > >> > >> And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of interpreting > >> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? > >> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and > >> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > >> > >> mike > >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: PPCT (Tudge, 2008, p. 69).pptx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation Size: 76744 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180129/df059f8a/attachment.bin From mpacker@cantab.net Mon Jan 29 16:10:05 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 19:10:05 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Text In-Reply-To: References: <4D6811C2-BCB9-44E6-B196-9384FD82DCF4@cantab.net> Message-ID: <1725D033-1BB3-4865-845E-2293891FB027@cantab.net> Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my microsystem had exploded! :) The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, why is culture in the macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now interactions with other people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) Martin > On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > > Greetings, Martin, > > I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint presentation). > > Cheers, > > Jon > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > Jonathan Tudge > > Professor > Office: 155 Stone > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > gratitude in children and adolescents > , > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > Mailing address: > 248 Stone Building > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > PO Box 26170 > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > USA > > phone (336) 223-6181 > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > >> Hi Jon, >> >> Would it be possible for you to post here the figure you mentioned in your >> message, page 69 of your book? >> >> Martin >> >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually with >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >> >> >> >>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: >>> >>> Hi, Mike, >>> >>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the >> papers >>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this >>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any theorist >> who >>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know the >>> date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the >>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. >>> >>> As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both excellent >>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are >>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the different >>> layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem >> consists >>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're >>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. >>> >>> However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards (see >> Rosa >>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards "proximal >>> processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time (PPCT) >>> model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which developing >>> people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. However, >>> what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person >>> characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those of >> the >>> others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the context, >>> both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those >>> activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him was >>> culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society >>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study >> over >>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, and >>> political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects his >>> developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge >>> (2008), on page 69. >>> >>> I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, >>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book and >> in >>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his >> 1998 >>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the >> impact >>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s >> research >>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. >>> >>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of >> Bronfenbrenner's >>> theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different in >> that >>> regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad textbook >> on >>> human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have said >> that >>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see Tudge et >>> al., 2009, 2016). >>> >>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a >> private >>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu >>> >>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: >>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: >>> Cambridge University Press. >>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. (2009). >>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human >>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. >>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s theory >> of >>> human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. *Journal >> of >>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 >>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery >>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: >>> Oxford University Press. >>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, Y., >>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these years? A >>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of >> human >>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. doi: >>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >>> >>> Jonathan Tudge >>> >>> Professor >>> Office: 155 Stone >>> >>> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >>> >>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing >>> gratitude in children and adolescents >>> > gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >>> >>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >>> >>> Mailing address: >>> 248 Stone Building >>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >>> PO Box 26170 >>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >>> USA >>> >>> phone (336) 223-6181 >>> fax (336) 334-5076 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Jon -- >>>> >>>> Nice to see your voice! >>>> >>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to >> hand. I >>>> checked it out >>>> to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! >>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages >> from >>>> the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur >>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro >>>> level, but perhaps only there? >>>> >>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person >> who >>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. >>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent >> his >>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first >>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his >>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites >>>> a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying >> to >>>> represent the idea and he >>>> said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. >>>> >>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion >> of >>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term >> "ecological >>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that >> LSV >>>> used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I >> have >>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity is >> the >>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the >> pages >>>> attached. >>>> >>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic >> could >>>> search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious >> about >>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill >>>> to carry out the query. >>>> >>>> And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of interpreting >>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? >>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and >>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >> >> > From jrtudge@uncg.edu Mon Jan 29 17:17:32 2018 From: jrtudge@uncg.edu (Jonathan Tudge) Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 20:17:32 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Text In-Reply-To: <1725D033-1BB3-4865-845E-2293891FB027@cantab.net> References: <4D6811C2-BCB9-44E6-B196-9384FD82DCF4@cantab.net> <1725D033-1BB3-4865-845E-2293891FB027@cantab.net> Message-ID: Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the microsystem--it's the only place in which culture is experienced. Microsystems are always embedded within culture (I'd add always within multiple cultures, but I don't think that Urie ever wrote that). Cheers, Jon ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jonathan Tudge Professor Office: 155 Stone Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing gratitude in children and adolescents , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge Mailing address: 248 Stone Building Department of Human Development and Family Studies PO Box 26170 The University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 USA phone (336) 223-6181 fax (336) 334-5076 On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my microsystem had exploded! :) > > The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, why is culture in the > macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now interactions with other > people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) > > Martin > > > > > > On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > > > > Greetings, Martin, > > > > I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint presentation). > > > > Cheers, > > > > Jon > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > Jonathan Tudge > > > > Professor > > Office: 155 Stone > > > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > > gratitude in children and adolescents > > gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > > > Mailing address: > > 248 Stone Building > > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > PO Box 26170 > > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > USA > > > > phone (336) 223-6181 > > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > > > >> Hi Jon, > >> > >> Would it be possible for you to post here the figure you mentioned in > your > >> message, page 69 of your book? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that my > >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > with > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > >>> > >>> Hi, Mike, > >>> > >>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the > >> papers > >>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this > >>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any theorist > >> who > >>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know > the > >>> date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the > >>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. > >>> > >>> As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both excellent > >>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are > >>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the > different > >>> layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem > >> consists > >>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're > >>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. > >>> > >>> However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards (see > >> Rosa > >>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards > "proximal > >>> processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time > (PPCT) > >>> model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which > developing > >>> people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. > However, > >>> what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person > >>> characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those of > >> the > >>> others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the context, > >>> both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those > >>> activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him > was > >>> culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society > >>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study > >> over > >>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, and > >>> political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects > his > >>> developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge > >>> (2008), on page 69. > >>> > >>> I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, > >>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book and > >> in > >>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his > >> 1998 > >>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the > >> impact > >>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s > >> research > >>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > >>> > >>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of > >> Bronfenbrenner's > >>> theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different in > >> that > >>> regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad textbook > >> on > >>> human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have said > >> that > >>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see Tudge > et > >>> al., 2009, 2016). > >>> > >>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a > >> private > >>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > >>> > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: > >>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: > >>> Cambridge University Press. > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. (2009). > >>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > >>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > >>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s theory > >> of > >>> human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. *Journal > >> of > >>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery > >>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: > >>> Oxford University Press. > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, > Y., > >>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these years? > A > >>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of > >> human > >>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. doi: > >>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. > >>> > >>> Cheers, > >>> > >>> Jon > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >>> > >>> Jonathan Tudge > >>> > >>> Professor > >>> Office: 155 Stone > >>> > >>> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > >>> > >>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > >>> gratitude in children and adolescents > >>> >> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >>> > >>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > >>> > >>> Mailing address: > >>> 248 Stone Building > >>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >>> PO Box 26170 > >>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >>> USA > >>> > >>> phone (336) 223-6181 > >>> fax (336) 334-5076 > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Jon -- > >>>> > >>>> Nice to see your voice! > >>>> > >>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to > >> hand. I > >>>> checked it out > >>>> to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort of! > >>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages > >> from > >>>> the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur > >>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the micro > >>>> level, but perhaps only there? > >>>> > >>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the person > >> who > >>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was U. > >>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to represent > >> his > >>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the first > >>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his > >>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > >>>> a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of trying > >> to > >>>> represent the idea and he > >>>> said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. > >>>> > >>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian notion > >> of > >>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term > >> "ecological > >>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue that > >> LSV > >>>> used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. I > >> have > >>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity > is > >> the > >>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on the > >> pages > >>>> attached. > >>>> > >>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in cyrillic > >> could > >>>> search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious > >> about > >>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill > >>>> to carry out the query. > >>>> > >>>> And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of > interpreting > >>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn from?? > >>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard and > >>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > >>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >> > >> > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Jan 30 11:05:14 2018 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 19:05:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Drumbeat against teacher unions Message-ID: Hello, Just passing on some news that should be of interest to those on this list. [The Daily 202: Koch network laying groundwork to fundamentally transform America?s education system] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2018/01/30/daily-202-koch-network-laying-groundwork-to-fundamentally-transform-america-s-education-system/5a6feb8530fb041c3c7d74db/ From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jan 30 11:12:29 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 11:12:29 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Drumbeat against teacher unions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks Annalisa. Its an acute concern. mike On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 11:05 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello, > > > Just passing on some news that should be of interest to those on this list. > > > [The Daily 202: Koch network laying groundwork to fundamentally transform > America?s education system] > > > https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/ > daily-202/2018/01/30/daily-202-koch-network-laying- > groundwork-to-fundamentally-transform-america-s-education-system/ > 5a6feb8530fb041c3c7d74db/ > From smago@uga.edu Tue Jan 30 13:13:13 2018 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 21:13:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Cultural Psychology (Stigler, Schweder, & Herdt, Eds.) Message-ID: A bit of a change in subject.....I'm trying to do some reading this year, something that usually gets sacrificed to other obligations. I'm starting with books I've had for many years but have never opened. I just began what will be a long slog through a 600 pager, Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development (Stigler, Schweder, & Herdt, Eds.), Cambridge U. Press, 1990. Publisher's Blurb: This collection of essays from leading scholars in anthropology, psychology, and linguistics is an outgrowth of the internationally known "Chicago Symposia on Culture and Human Development." It raises the idea of a new discipline of cultural psychology through the study of the relationship between psyche and culture, subject and object, person and world, with special reference to core areas of human development: cognition, learning, self, personality dynamics, and gender. The essays critically examine such questions as: Is there an intrinsic psychic unity to humankind? Can cultural traditions transform the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion? Are psychological processes local or specific to the socio-cultural environments in which they are imbedded? First, note the date: 1990, collected from symposia conducted at the U. of Chicago in 1986 and 1987. So please keep that in mind when providing critiques. Interestingly, I was a doctoral student there at the time, but I came out of grad school in 1989 grounded in cognitive psychology/information processing. I had never heard of Vygotsky, thought cognition occurred between the ears, and was completely ignorant about this field, which has grounded my thinking since shortly after starting my first university position in 1990 and got acquainted with the Vygotskian world. In my defense, I was a fulltime high school English teacher for 5 of my 6 years in doctoral studies, and also got married and had 2 kids during my program. So I was not on campus enough to be aware of such things; and there was no internet at the time to expose me to other ways of thinking (or, for me, email); and I was very busy teaching all day, grading papers for my 130 students, and rushing home to see my family at day's end. I mainly write with this little personal narrative to express some surprise at how little this collection from 1990 gets referenced in the cultural psychology I know through Mike Cole and others. Mike gets a little attention here, but surprisingly, as "Platonist," that is, one who seeks an internal cognitive processor, I assume based on the Liberian studies where indigenous people responded to Western sorting tasks (to Shweder, this is cross-cultural psychology, not cultural psychology). Again, keep the year of the symposia in mind; Mike's own Cultural Psychology wasn't out till 1996. I have never understood Mike as a psychologist interested in peeling away layers to get to the fixed psyche, but one very much aligned with the conception laid out in this volume (or at least in the intro, which is as far as I've gotten today), which in nutshell form is expressed in Shweder's intro: "Cultural psychology presumes instead the principle of intentionality, that the life of psyche is the life of intentional persons, responding to, and directing their action at, their own mental objects or representations, and undergoing transformation through participation in an evolving intentional world that is the product of the mental representations that make it up. According to cultural psychology, intentional persons change and are changed by the concrete particularly of their own mental constituted 'forms of life'." Actually I've always understood that to be Mike's position, that "mind" is fluid and relational, not a core thing available by peeling away layers (of an onion, in a common metaphor). Several of the contributors are familiar from my own reading of the field as I know it: D'Andrade, Ochs, Lave, Heath, Gergen; but many are new to me, even 3 decades later. So I assume that eventually, I'll be able to reconcile the introductory claims with the contents of the volume. Maybe. But what I'm really wondering is, how has a volume like this escaped attention in what I read in publications and on this forum? Or has it been there beneath my notice? It seems to be quite relevant to these conversations. It's quite surprising to me that it could be flying so far under the radar, while being published under Cambridge's auspices and while including some people often referenced in the work I read. From feine@duq.edu Tue Jan 30 13:28:39 2018 From: feine@duq.edu (Elizabeth Fein) Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 16:28:39 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Cultural Psychology (Stigler, Schweder, & Herdt, Eds.) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I'm glad you've brought up this volume, Peter, and also sort of delightedly amused by the timing: I just received my own copy in the mail about a month or so ago, after realizing that it was strange, steeped as I am in this branch of Chicago tradition, that I didn't own it and hadn't read many of the pieces in it. So I will be slogging with you! Best, Elizabeth On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 4:13 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > A bit of a change in subject.....I'm trying to do some reading this year, > something that usually gets sacrificed to other obligations. I'm starting > with books I've had for many years but have never opened. I just began what > will be a long slog through a 600 pager, Cultural Psychology: Essays on > Comparative Human Development (Stigler, Schweder, & Herdt, Eds.), Cambridge > U. Press, 1990. > > Publisher's Blurb: This collection of essays from leading scholars in > anthropology, psychology, and linguistics is an outgrowth of the > internationally known "Chicago Symposia on Culture and Human Development." > It raises the idea of a new discipline of cultural psychology through the > study of the relationship between psyche and culture, subject and object, > person and world, with special reference to core areas of human > development: cognition, learning, self, personality dynamics, and gender. > The essays critically examine such questions as: Is there an intrinsic > psychic unity to humankind? Can cultural traditions transform the human > psyche, resulting less in psychic unity than in ethnic divergences in mind, > self, and emotion? Are psychological processes local or specific to the > socio-cultural environments in which they are imbedded? > > First, note the date: 1990, collected from symposia conducted at the U. of > Chicago in 1986 and 1987. So please keep that in mind when providing > critiques. Interestingly, I was a doctoral student there at the time, but I > came out of grad school in 1989 grounded in cognitive > psychology/information processing. I had never heard of Vygotsky, thought > cognition occurred between the ears, and was completely ignorant about this > field, which has grounded my thinking since shortly after starting my first > university position in 1990 and got acquainted with the Vygotskian world. > In my defense, I was a fulltime high school English teacher for 5 of my 6 > years in doctoral studies, and also got married and had 2 kids during my > program. So I was not on campus enough to be aware of such things; and > there was no internet at the time to expose me to other ways of thinking > (or, for me, email); and I was very busy teaching all day, grading papers > for my 130 students, and rushing home to see my family at day's end. > > I mainly write with this little personal narrative to express some > surprise at how little this collection from 1990 gets referenced in the > cultural psychology I know through Mike Cole and others. Mike gets a little > attention here, but surprisingly, as "Platonist," that is, one who seeks > an internal cognitive processor, I assume based on the Liberian studies > where indigenous people responded to Western sorting tasks (to Shweder, > this is cross-cultural psychology, not cultural psychology). Again, keep > the year of the symposia in mind; Mike's own Cultural Psychology wasn't out > till 1996. I have never understood Mike as a psychologist interested in > peeling away layers to get to the fixed psyche, but one very much aligned > with the conception laid out in this volume (or at least in the intro, > which is as far as I've gotten today), which in nutshell form is expressed > in Shweder's intro: "Cultural psychology presumes instead the principle of > intentionality, that the life of psyche is the life of intentional persons, > responding to, and directing their action at, their own mental objects or > representations, and undergoing transformation through participation in an > evolving intentional world that is the product of the mental > representations that make it up. According to cultural psychology, > intentional persons change and are changed by the concrete particularly of > their own mental constituted 'forms of life'." Actually I've always > understood that to be Mike's position, that "mind" is fluid and relational, > not a core thing available by peeling away layers (of an onion, in a common > metaphor). > > Several of the contributors are familiar from my own reading of the field > as I know it: D'Andrade, Ochs, Lave, Heath, Gergen; but many are new to me, > even 3 decades later. So I assume that eventually, I'll be able to > reconcile the introductory claims with the contents of the volume. Maybe. > > But what I'm really wondering is, how has a volume like this escaped > attention in what I read in publications and on this forum? Or has it been > there beneath my notice? It seems to be quite relevant to these > conversations. It's quite surprising to me that it could be flying so far > under the radar, while being published under Cambridge's auspices and while > including some people often referenced in the work I read. > > > -- Elizabeth Fein, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Duquesne University From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jan 30 14:30:03 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:30:03 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Cultural Psychology (Stigler, Schweder, & Herdt, Eds.) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Peter -- I fear I am not capable of engaging the topic of context and development via Jon's article and discussion and engaging an exploration among different streams of cultural psychology at the same time. The same sort of question can be usefully asked about the work of Valsiner and his colleagues. There is a preliminary discussion of these issues in *Cultural Psychology. *And more of relevance in later papers. But presumably the majority of xmca members have neither the Stigler et al essays to hand nor any of my relevant writings. Conversing through selected quotations is almost certain be more-than-extra dicey. Might it be possible to get some texts in front of us and perhaps you and Elizabeth could lead the discussion? There are a lot of Shweder text obtainable through google scholar and probably of others who are especially relevant. If others want to jump topics, I'll try to follow along for the time being. Meantime, I am struggling with Jon's article . More on that shortly. Perhaps the question of Bronfenbrenner's notions of context, activity, and development are not of wide interest, in which case room I'll have room for a next topic and happy to make it flavors of cultural psychology. Who knows, perhaps we could get Rick to take it up. mike On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 1:13 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > A bit of a change in subject.....I'm trying to do some reading this year, > something that usually gets sacrificed to other obligations. I'm starting > with books I've had for many years but have never opened. I just began what > will be a long slog through a 600 pager, Cultural Psychology: Essays on > Comparative Human Development (Stigler, Schweder, & Herdt, Eds.), Cambridge > U. Press, 1990. > > Publisher's Blurb: This collection of essays from leading scholars in > anthropology, psychology, and linguistics is an outgrowth of the > internationally known "Chicago Symposia on Culture and Human Development." > It raises the idea of a new discipline of cultural psychology through the > study of the relationship between psyche and culture, subject and object, > person and world, with special reference to core areas of human > development: cognition, learning, self, personality dynamics, and gender. > The essays critically examine such questions as: Is there an intrinsic > psychic unity to humankind? Can cultural traditions transform the human > psyche, resulting less in psychic unity than in ethnic divergences in mind, > self, and emotion? Are psychological processes local or specific to the > socio-cultural environments in which they are imbedded? > > First, note the date: 1990, collected from symposia conducted at the U. of > Chicago in 1986 and 1987. So please keep that in mind when providing > critiques. Interestingly, I was a doctoral student there at the time, but I > came out of grad school in 1989 grounded in cognitive > psychology/information processing. I had never heard of Vygotsky, thought > cognition occurred between the ears, and was completely ignorant about this > field, which has grounded my thinking since shortly after starting my first > university position in 1990 and got acquainted with the Vygotskian world. > In my defense, I was a fulltime high school English teacher for 5 of my 6 > years in doctoral studies, and also got married and had 2 kids during my > program. So I was not on campus enough to be aware of such things; and > there was no internet at the time to expose me to other ways of thinking > (or, for me, email); and I was very busy teaching all day, grading papers > for my 130 students, and rushing home to see my family at day's end. > > I mainly write with this little personal narrative to express some > surprise at how little this collection from 1990 gets referenced in the > cultural psychology I know through Mike Cole and others. Mike gets a little > attention here, but surprisingly, as "Platonist," that is, one who seeks > an internal cognitive processor, I assume based on the Liberian studies > where indigenous people responded to Western sorting tasks (to Shweder, > this is cross-cultural psychology, not cultural psychology). Again, keep > the year of the symposia in mind; Mike's own Cultural Psychology wasn't out > till 1996. I have never understood Mike as a psychologist interested in > peeling away layers to get to the fixed psyche, but one very much aligned > with the conception laid out in this volume (or at least in the intro, > which is as far as I've gotten today), which in nutshell form is expressed > in Shweder's intro: "Cultural psychology presumes instead the principle of > intentionality, that the life of psyche is the life of intentional persons, > responding to, and directing their action at, their own mental objects or > representations, and undergoing transformation through participation in an > evolving intentional world that is the product of the mental > representations that make it up. According to cultural psychology, > intentional persons change and are changed by the concrete particularly of > their own mental constituted 'forms of life'." Actually I've always > understood that to be Mike's position, that "mind" is fluid and relational, > not a core thing available by peeling away layers (of an onion, in a common > metaphor). > > Several of the contributors are familiar from my own reading of the field > as I know it: D'Andrade, Ochs, Lave, Heath, Gergen; but many are new to me, > even 3 decades later. So I assume that eventually, I'll be able to > reconcile the introductory claims with the contents of the volume. Maybe. > > But what I'm really wondering is, how has a volume like this escaped > attention in what I read in publications and on this forum? Or has it been > there beneath my notice? It seems to be quite relevant to these > conversations. It's quite surprising to me that it could be flying so far > under the radar, while being published under Cambridge's auspices and while > including some people often referenced in the work I read. > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jan 30 14:36:39 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:36:39 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Bronfenbrenner Discussion Message-ID: (New Header to make room for Peter and varieties of cultural psychology discussion) Jon- From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jan 30 14:45:54 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:45:54 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Bronfennbrenner discussion Message-ID: Hi Jon- There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss in your article. I guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of the process of designing activities for kids in university-community partnerships is an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm not sure. If I need a defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood them useful, but I was not testing his formulations in the same way you are concerned to do, but using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and interpretation. While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a couple of observations. On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the microsystem--it's the only > place in which culture is experienced. Microsystems are always embedded > within culture (I'd add always within multiple cultures, but I don't think > that Urie ever wrote that). > > Cheers, > > Jon > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > Jonathan Tudge > > Professor > Office: 155 Stone > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > gratitude in children and adolescents > in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > Mailing address: > 248 Stone Building > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > PO Box 26170 > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > USA > > phone (336) 223-6181 > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer wrote: > > > Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my microsystem had exploded! :) > > > > The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, why is culture in the > > macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now interactions with other > > people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > > > > > > Greetings, Martin, > > > > > > I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint presentation). > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > > Jon > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > > > Jonathan Tudge > > > > > > Professor > > > Office: 155 Stone > > > > > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > > > > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > > > gratitude in children and adolescents > > > > gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > > > > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > > > > > Mailing address: > > > 248 Stone Building > > > Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > > PO Box 26170 > > > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > > USA > > > > > > phone (336) 223-6181 > > > fax (336) 334-5076 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer > > wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Jon, > > >> > > >> Would it be possible for you to post here the figure you mentioned in > > your > > >> message, page 69 of your book? > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > > >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that > my > > >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > > with > > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Hi, Mike, > > >>> > > >>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the > > >> papers > > >>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this > > >>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any > theorist > > >> who > > >>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know > > the > > >>> date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the > > >>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. > > >>> > > >>> As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both > excellent > > >>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are > > >>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the > > different > > >>> layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem > > >> consists > > >>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're > > >>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. > > >>> > > >>> However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards > (see > > >> Rosa > > >>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards > > "proximal > > >>> processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time > > (PPCT) > > >>> model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which > > developing > > >>> people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. > > However, > > >>> what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person > > >>> characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those > of > > >> the > > >>> others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the > context, > > >>> both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those > > >>> activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him > > was > > >>> culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society > > >>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study > > >> over > > >>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, > and > > >>> political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects > > his > > >>> developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge > > >>> (2008), on page 69. > > >>> > > >>> I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, > > >>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book > and > > >> in > > >>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his > > >> 1998 > > >>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the > > >> impact > > >>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s > > >> research > > >>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > > >>> > > >>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of > > >> Bronfenbrenner's > > >>> theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different > in > > >> that > > >>> regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad > textbook > > >> on > > >>> human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have > said > > >> that > > >>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see > Tudge > > et > > >>> al., 2009, 2016). > > >>> > > >>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a > > >> private > > >>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > >>> > > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: > > >>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: > > >>> Cambridge University Press. > > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. > (2009). > > >>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > > >>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > > >>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s > theory > > >> of > > >>> human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. > *Journal > > >> of > > >>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery > > >>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: > > >>> Oxford University Press. > > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, > > Y., > > >>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these > years? > > A > > >>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory > of > > >> human > > >>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. > doi: > > >>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. > > >>> > > >>> Cheers, > > >>> > > >>> Jon > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > >>> > > >>> Jonathan Tudge > > >>> > > >>> Professor > > >>> Office: 155 Stone > > >>> > > >>> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > >>> > > >>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > > >>> gratitude in children and adolescents > > >>> > >> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > >>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > >>> > > >>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > >>> > > >>> Mailing address: > > >>> 248 Stone Building > > >>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > >>> PO Box 26170 > > >>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > >>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > >>> USA > > >>> > > >>> phone (336) 223-6181 > > >>> fax (336) 334-5076 > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Hi Jon -- > > >>>> > > >>>> Nice to see your voice! > > >>>> > > >>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to > > >> hand. I > > >>>> checked it out > > >>>> to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort > of! > > >>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages > > >> from > > >>>> the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur > > >>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the > micro > > >>>> level, but perhaps only there? > > >>>> > > >>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the > person > > >> who > > >>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was > U. > > >>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to > represent > > >> his > > >>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the > first > > >>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his > > >>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > > >>>> a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of > trying > > >> to > > >>>> represent the idea and he > > >>>> said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. > > >>>> > > >>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian > notion > > >> of > > >>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term > > >> "ecological > > >>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue > that > > >> LSV > > >>>> used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. > I > > >> have > > >>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity > > is > > >> the > > >>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on > the > > >> pages > > >>>> attached. > > >>>> > > >>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in > cyrillic > > >> could > > >>>> search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious > > >> about > > >>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill > > >>>> to carry out the query. > > >>>> > > >>>> And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of > > interpreting > > >>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn > from?? > > >>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard > and > > >>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > > >>>> > > >>>> mike > > >>>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jan 30 15:17:50 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 15:17:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bronfennbrenner discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: oops, hit a wrong key. to continue Hi Jon- There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss in your article. I guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of the process of designing activities for kids in university-community partnerships is an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm not sure. If I need a defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood them useful, but I was not testing his formulations in the same way you are concerned to do, but using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and interpretation. While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a couple of observations. The problem of multiple simultaneous "influences" from one presumed level of context to another always ties me in knots because its so hard to put causal sequence into a non-linear process. So at times even you, who are so sensitive to the problem, write (p 429)vis a vis Drillien's work "Third, to understand the way the way context influences proximal processes......... Influence reads here to me like a cause, or a contributing cause. I wrote this in 1996 (referring the version of concentric circles diagram we were using at the time): This image is probably best known in connection with Bronfenbrenner's (1979) monograph on the ecology of human development. He describes embedded systems, starting with the microsystem at the core and proceeding outward through meso- and exosystems, to the macrosystem. In applying the notion of context to issues of education, Cole & Griffin (1987) took as the "unit in the middle" to be a teacher?pupil exchange that was part of a lesson that was part of a classroom that was part of school, that was part of a community. The study of language is an important domain in which the promise and problems of the idea of "layers of context" has been usefully applied (Bateson, 1972; Jackobsen and Halle, 1956). A fundamental property of language is that its levels of organization are mutually constituted; a phoneme exists as such only in combination with other phonemes which make up a word. The word is the context of the phoneme. But the word only exists as such??only "has meaning"??in the larger context of the utterance, which again "has meaning" only in a relationship to a large unit of discourse. Bateson summarizes this way of thinking in his remark that This hierarchy of contexts within contexts is universal for the communicational . . . aspect of phenomena and drives the scientist always to seek explanation in the ever larger units (1972, p. 402). Note that in this description there is no simple, temporal, ordering. "That which surrounds" occurs before, after, and simultaneously with the "act/event" in question. We cannot say sentences before we say words, nor words before synthesizing phonemes in an appropriate way; rather, there is a complex temporal interdependence among levels of context which motivates the notion that levels of context constitute each other. To take our example of the teacher-child exchange, it is easy to see such events as "caused" by higher levels of context: a teacher give a lesson, which is shaped by the classroom it is a part of, which in turn is shaped by the kind of school it is in, which in turn is shaped by the community, etc. While more inclusive levels of context may constrain lower levels, they do not cause them in a uni-linear fashion. For the event "a lesson" to occur, the participants must actively engage in a consensual process of "lesson making." Teachers often vary considerably in the way they interpret the conventions of the school, and school communities participate in the selection of the board of education. Without forgetting for a moment that the power relations among participants ?at different levels of context? are often unequal, it is no less important when using the nested contexts approach to take into account the fact that context creation is an actively achieved, two-sided process (See Durante and Goodwin (1992), Lave (1993), and McDermott (1993) for trenchant criticisms of context treated as the container of objects and behaviors). (p. 134 cultural psych) On p. 358 in the notes (which I do not have a word version of, so can only point here) there is a passage quoting p. 462 of *Steps* where Bateson says that while thinking relationaly is essential, he is incapable of it on a daily basis. "I still think, "Gregory Bateson is cutting down a tree. *I *am cutting down a tree." ...he then goes on to say he can intellectualize it, but not engage in it as a part of everyday practice..... Tough problem. With regard to Pepper and Vygotsky. Firstly, I think it is problematic to categorize Vygotsky as a contextualist as you/Pepper define the concept. Natalia Gajamaschko and I wrote about this and I can send to anyone interested in pursuing that part of the tangle. But more recently, a young Iranian scholar has published on this topic with a commentary by Anna Stetsenko who has been known on xmca for her work on transformative agency and deep knowledge of cultural-historical theorizing. I attach those recent discussions for those for whoever here is interested in this tread. My own view is that LSV's theory is a hybrid of contextualism and organicism (interweaving of phylogeny, cultural history, ontogeny). Pepper identifies such hybridizing as anethema to clear thinking, but I seem to have fallen irretrievably, into that way of thinking. Lots more of potential topics, someone else's turn! Mike On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 2:45 PM, mike cole wrote: > Hi Jon- > > There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss in your article. I > guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of the process of designing > activities for kids in university-community partnerships is > an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm not sure. If I need a > defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood them useful, but I was > not testing his formulations in the same way you are concerned to do, but > using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and interpretation. > > While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a couple of > observations. > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > >> Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the microsystem--it's the only >> place in which culture is experienced. Microsystems are always embedded >> within culture (I'd add always within multiple cultures, but I don't think >> that Urie ever wrote that). >> >> Cheers, >> >> Jon >> >> >> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >> >> Jonathan Tudge >> >> Professor >> Office: 155 Stone >> >> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >> >> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing >> gratitude in children and adolescents >> > in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >> >> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >> >> Mailing address: >> 248 Stone Building >> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >> PO Box 26170 >> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >> USA >> >> phone (336) 223-6181 >> fax (336) 334-5076 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer >> wrote: >> >> > Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my microsystem had exploded! :) >> > >> > The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, why is culture in the >> > macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now interactions with >> other >> > people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) >> > >> > Martin >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: >> > > >> > > Greetings, Martin, >> > > >> > > I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint presentation). >> > > >> > > Cheers, >> > > >> > > Jon >> > > >> > > >> > > ~~~~~~~~~~~ >> > > >> > > Jonathan Tudge >> > > >> > > Professor >> > > Office: 155 Stone >> > > >> > > Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >> > > >> > > A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing >> > > gratitude in children and adolescents >> > > > > gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >> > > Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >> > > >> > > My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >> > > >> > > Mailing address: >> > > 248 Stone Building >> > > Department of Human Development and Family Studies >> > > PO Box 26170 >> > > The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >> > > Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >> > > USA >> > > >> > > phone (336) 223-6181 >> > > fax (336) 334-5076 >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer >> > wrote: >> > > >> > >> Hi Jon, >> > >> >> > >> Would it be possible for you to post here the figure you mentioned in >> > your >> > >> message, page 69 of your book? >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> >> > >> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >> > >> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that >> my >> > >> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually >> > with >> > >> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge >> wrote: >> > >>> >> > >>> Hi, Mike, >> > >>> >> > >>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the >> > >> papers >> > >>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of >> this >> > >>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any >> theorist >> > >> who >> > >>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know >> > the >> > >>> date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the >> > >>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. >> > >>> >> > >>> As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both >> excellent >> > >>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both >> are >> > >>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the >> > different >> > >>> layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem >> > >> consists >> > >>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're >> > >>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. >> > >>> >> > >>> However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards >> (see >> > >> Rosa >> > >>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards >> > "proximal >> > >>> processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time >> > (PPCT) >> > >>> model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which >> > developing >> > >>> people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. >> > However, >> > >>> what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person >> > >>> characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those >> of >> > >> the >> > >>> others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the >> context, >> > >>> both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those >> > >>> activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him >> > was >> > >>> culture, whether considered at the level of society or >> within-society >> > >>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to >> study >> > >> over >> > >>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, >> and >> > >>> political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects >> > his >> > >>> developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge >> > >>> (2008), on page 69. >> > >>> >> > >>> I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, >> > >>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book >> and >> > >> in >> > >>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading >> his >> > >> 1998 >> > >>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the >> > >> impact >> > >>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s >> > >> research >> > >>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. >> > >>> >> > >>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of >> > >> Bronfenbrenner's >> > >>> theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different >> in >> > >> that >> > >>> regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad >> textbook >> > >> on >> > >>> human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have >> said >> > >> that >> > >>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see >> Tudge >> > et >> > >>> al., 2009, 2016). >> > >>> >> > >>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a >> > >> private >> > >>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu >> > >>> >> > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: >> > >>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: >> > >>> Cambridge University Press. >> > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. >> (2009). >> > >>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human >> > >>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. >> > >>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s >> theory >> > >> of >> > >>> human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. >> *Journal >> > >> of >> > >>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 >> > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather >> Montgomery >> > >>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New >> York: >> > >>> Oxford University Press. >> > >>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, >> > Y., >> > >>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these >> years? >> > A >> > >>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory >> of >> > >> human >> > >>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. >> doi: >> > >>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. >> > >>> >> > >>> Cheers, >> > >>> >> > >>> Jon >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >> > >>> >> > >>> Jonathan Tudge >> > >>> >> > >>> Professor >> > >>> Office: 155 Stone >> > >>> >> > >>> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >> > >>> >> > >>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing >> > >>> gratitude in children and adolescents >> > >>> > > >> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >> > >>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >> > >>> >> > >>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >> > >>> >> > >>> Mailing address: >> > >>> 248 Stone Building >> > >>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >> > >>> PO Box 26170 >> > >>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >> > >>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >> > >>> USA >> > >>> >> > >>> phone (336) 223-6181 >> > >>> fax (336) 334-5076 >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: >> > >>> >> > >>>> Hi Jon -- >> > >>>> >> > >>>> Nice to see your voice! >> > >>>> >> > >>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to >> > >> hand. I >> > >>>> checked it out >> > >>>> to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort >> of! >> > >>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two >> pages >> > >> from >> > >>>> the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur >> > >>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the >> micro >> > >>>> level, but perhaps only there? >> > >>>> >> > >>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the >> person >> > >> who >> > >>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was >> U. >> > >>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to >> represent >> > >> his >> > >>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the >> first >> > >>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and >> his >> > >>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites >> > >>>> a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of >> trying >> > >> to >> > >>>> represent the idea and he >> > >>>> said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. >> > >>>> >> > >>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian >> notion >> > >> of >> > >>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term >> > >> "ecological >> > >>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue >> that >> > >> LSV >> > >>>> used the concept of "social situation of development," not >> context. I >> > >> have >> > >>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the >> activity >> > is >> > >> the >> > >>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on >> the >> > >> pages >> > >>>> attached. >> > >>>> >> > >>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in >> cyrillic >> > >> could >> > >>>> search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious >> > >> about >> > >>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill >> > >>>> to carry out the query. >> > >>>> >> > >>>> And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of >> > interpreting >> > >>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn >> from?? >> > >>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard >> and >> > >>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. >> > >>>> >> > >>>> mike >> > >>>> >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > >> > >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: saeed.vygotsky.pepper.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 160125 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180130/47689482/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: saeed.stetsenko.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 78682 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail/xmca-l/attachments/20180130/47689482/attachment-0003.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Tue Jan 30 15:38:08 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 10:38:08 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bronfennbrenner discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> Mike, I have never been a reader of Bronfennbrenner, so my comments may be immaterial here and I am happy if you and others simply let them go through to the 'keeper (i.e., catcher). You will recall that in my "Interdisciplinary" book I appreciated your work, but criticised it for your claim to include "context" in the "unit of analysis" on the basis that "context" was an "open ended totality" and to include it in the "unit of analysis" was to destroy the very idea of a "unit." A point of agreement between us though has been the need for what we both call a "meso-level" unit between the individual action and the world, and that my use of "project" to name this meso-level unit, and that the 5thD project was such a unit, persisting for more than an individual's lifetime and escaping the control of the founder, but yet falling short of macro-level units like the economy, science, the nation, etc. Yjro is quite right when he said "the context is the activity,", or rather "the activities." "The activity" is of course the project. But here Yrjo is being true to analysis by units. He is suggesting that the world is best conceived as being made up of activities (I would say "projects"). To claim to include the "context" (which as you know means "the world") *in* the unit which makes up the world, is the same logical fallacy as asking whether "I always lie" is a lie, and destroy the whole point of analysis by units, which is to approach understanding infinite totalities by means of little things that you can grasp, which none the less characterise the whole. This unit, projects, is mediating between the individual action and the world. The problem is, I think, Yrjo's redefinition of "unit of analysis" as (according to some of his students) "the unit to be analysed," which I characterise as that list you make up, of everything you're going to put in your suitcase, which you might need on your journey. This was *not* Vygotsky's idea, or that of Goethe, Hegel or Marx. Whatever the problem, what happens depends on the context. How do you conceive of the context? by units. The context is a totality not part of a unit. :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 31/01/2018 9:45 AM, mike cole wrote: > Hi Jon- > > There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss in your article. I > guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of the process of designing > activities for kids in university-community partnerships is > an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm not sure. If I need a > defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood them useful, but I was > not testing his formulations in the same way you are concerned to do, but > using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and interpretation. > > While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a couple of observations. > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > >> Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the microsystem--it's the only >> place in which culture is experienced. Microsystems are always embedded >> within culture (I'd add always within multiple cultures, but I don't think >> that Urie ever wrote that). >> >> Cheers, >> >> Jon >> >> >> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >> >> Jonathan Tudge >> >> Professor >> Office: 155 Stone >> >> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >> >> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing >> gratitude in children and adolescents >> > in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >> >> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >> >> Mailing address: >> 248 Stone Building >> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >> PO Box 26170 >> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >> USA >> >> phone (336) 223-6181 >> fax (336) 334-5076 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer wrote: >> >>> Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my microsystem had exploded! :) >>> >>> The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, why is culture in the >>> macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now interactions with other >>> people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: >>>> >>>> Greetings, Martin, >>>> >>>> I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint presentation). >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> >>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >>>> >>>> Jonathan Tudge >>>> >>>> Professor >>>> Office: 155 Stone >>>> >>>> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >>>> >>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing >>>> gratitude in children and adolescents >>>> >> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >>>> >>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >>>> >>>> Mailing address: >>>> 248 Stone Building >>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >>>> PO Box 26170 >>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >>>> USA >>>> >>>> phone (336) 223-6181 >>>> fax (336) 334-5076 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer >>> wrote: >>>>> Hi Jon, >>>>> >>>>> Would it be possible for you to post here the figure you mentioned in >>> your >>>>> message, page 69 of your book? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss >>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that >> my >>>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually >>> with >>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge >> wrote: >>>>>> Hi, Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the >>>>> papers >>>>>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of this >>>>>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any >> theorist >>>>> who >>>>>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know >>> the >>>>>> date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the >>>>>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. >>>>>> >>>>>> As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both >> excellent >>>>>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both are >>>>>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the >>> different >>>>>> layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem >>>>> consists >>>>>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're >>>>>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards >> (see >>>>> Rosa >>>>>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards >>> "proximal >>>>>> processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time >>> (PPCT) >>>>>> model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which >>> developing >>>>>> people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. >>> However, >>>>>> what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person >>>>>> characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those >> of >>>>> the >>>>>> others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the >> context, >>>>>> both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those >>>>>> activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him >>> was >>>>>> culture, whether considered at the level of society or within-society >>>>>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to study >>>>> over >>>>>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, >> and >>>>>> political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects >>> his >>>>>> developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge >>>>>> (2008), on page 69. >>>>>> >>>>>> I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, >>>>>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book >> and >>>>> in >>>>>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading his >>>>> 1998 >>>>>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the >>>>> impact >>>>>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s >>>>> research >>>>>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. >>>>>> >>>>>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of >>>>> Bronfenbrenner's >>>>>> theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different >> in >>>>> that >>>>>> regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad >> textbook >>>>> on >>>>>> human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have >> said >>>>> that >>>>>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see >> Tudge >>> et >>>>>> al., 2009, 2016). >>>>>> >>>>>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a >>>>> private >>>>>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu >>>>>> >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: >>>>>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: >>>>>> Cambridge University Press. >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. >> (2009). >>>>>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. >>>>>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s >> theory >>>>> of >>>>>> human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. >> *Journal >>>>> of >>>>>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather Montgomery >>>>>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New York: >>>>>> Oxford University Press. >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, >>> Y., >>>>>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these >> years? >>> A >>>>>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory >> of >>>>> human >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. >> doi: >>>>>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. >>>>>> >>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >>>>>> >>>>>> Jonathan Tudge >>>>>> >>>>>> Professor >>>>>> Office: 155 Stone >>>>>> >>>>>> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >>>>>> >>>>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing >>>>>> gratitude in children and adolescents >>>>>> >>>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >>>>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >>>>>> >>>>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >>>>>> >>>>>> Mailing address: >>>>>> 248 Stone Building >>>>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >>>>>> PO Box 26170 >>>>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >>>>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >>>>>> USA >>>>>> >>>>>> phone (336) 223-6181 >>>>>> fax (336) 334-5076 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Jon -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Nice to see your voice! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to >>>>> hand. I >>>>>>> checked it out >>>>>>> to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort >> of! >>>>>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two pages >>>>> from >>>>>>> the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur >>>>>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the >> micro >>>>>>> level, but perhaps only there? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the >> person >>>>> who >>>>>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was >> U. >>>>>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to >> represent >>>>> his >>>>>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the >> first >>>>>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and his >>>>>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites >>>>>>> a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of >> trying >>>>> to >>>>>>> represent the idea and he >>>>>>> said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian >> notion >>>>> of >>>>>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term >>>>> "ecological >>>>>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue >> that >>>>> LSV >>>>>>> used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. >> I >>>>> have >>>>>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the activity >>> is >>>>> the >>>>>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on >> the >>>>> pages >>>>>>> attached. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in >> cyrillic >>>>> could >>>>>>> search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious >>>>> about >>>>>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill >>>>>>> to carry out the query. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of >>> interpreting >>>>>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn >> from?? >>>>>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard >> and >>>>>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jan 30 15:52:59 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:52:59 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bronfennbrenner discussion In-Reply-To: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> References: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy--I don't understand how "context" means "the world". That's what Malinowski thought. But I'm a linguist, and for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, and a context of situation is the ensemble of relations in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single text. But even if you are not a linguist, doesn't a "context" always mean something that goes with a text, like chili con carne goes with meat? dk David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mike, I have never been a reader of Bronfennbrenner, so my > comments may be immaterial here and I am happy if you and > others simply let them go through to the 'keeper (i.e., > catcher). > > You will recall that in my "Interdisciplinary" book I > appreciated your work, but criticised it for your claim to > include "context" in the "unit of analysis" on the basis > that "context" was an "open ended totality" and to include > it in the "unit of analysis" was to destroy the very idea of > a "unit." > > A point of agreement between us though has been the need for > what we both call a "meso-level" unit between the individual > action and the world, and that my use of "project" to name > this meso-level unit, and that the 5thD project was such a > unit, persisting for more than an individual's lifetime and > escaping the control of the founder, but yet falling short > of macro-level units like the economy, science, the nation, etc. > > Yjro is quite right when he said "the context is the > activity,", or rather "the activities." "The activity" is of > course the project. But here Yrjo is being true to analysis > by units. He is suggesting that the world is best conceived > as being made up of activities (I would say "projects"). > > To claim to include the "context" (which as you know means > "the world") *in* the unit which makes up the world, is the > same logical fallacy as asking whether "I always lie" is a > lie, and destroy the whole point of analysis by units, which > is to approach understanding infinite totalities by means of > little things that you can grasp, which none the less > characterise the whole. This unit, projects, is mediating > between the individual action and the world. > > The problem is, I think, Yrjo's redefinition of "unit of > analysis" as (according to some of his students) "the unit > to be analysed," which I characterise as that list you make > up, of everything you're going to put in your suitcase, > which you might need on your journey. This was *not* > Vygotsky's idea, or that of Goethe, Hegel or Marx. > > Whatever the problem, what happens depends on the context. > How do you conceive of the context? by units. The context is > a totality not part of a unit. > > :) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 31/01/2018 9:45 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Jon- > > > > There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss in your article. I > > guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of the process of > designing > > activities for kids in university-community partnerships is > > an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm not sure. If I need > a > > defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood them useful, but I > was > > not testing his formulations in the same way you are concerned to do, but > > using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and interpretation. > > > > While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a couple of > observations. > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge > wrote: > > > >> Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the microsystem--it's the > only > >> place in which culture is experienced. Microsystems are always embedded > >> within culture (I'd add always within multiple cultures, but I don't > think > >> that Urie ever wrote that). > >> > >> Cheers, > >> > >> Jon > >> > >> > >> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >> > >> Jonathan Tudge > >> > >> Professor > >> Office: 155 Stone > >> > >> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > >> > >> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > >> gratitude in children and adolescents > >> >> in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >> > >> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > >> > >> Mailing address: > >> 248 Stone Building > >> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >> PO Box 26170 > >> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >> USA > >> > >> phone (336) 223-6181 > >> fax (336) 334-5076 > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer > wrote: > >> > >>> Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my microsystem had exploded! :) > >>> > >>> The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, why is culture in > the > >>> macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now interactions with > other > >>> people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Greetings, Martin, > >>>> > >>>> I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint presentation). > >>>> > >>>> Cheers, > >>>> > >>>> Jon > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >>>> > >>>> Jonathan Tudge > >>>> > >>>> Professor > >>>> Office: 155 Stone > >>>> > >>>> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > >>>> > >>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > >>>> gratitude in children and adolescents > >>>> >>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >>>> > >>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > >>>> > >>>> Mailing address: > >>>> 248 Stone Building > >>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >>>> PO Box 26170 > >>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >>>> USA > >>>> > >>>> phone (336) 223-6181 > >>>> fax (336) 334-5076 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer > >>> wrote: > >>>>> Hi Jon, > >>>>> > >>>>> Would it be possible for you to post here the figure you mentioned in > >>> your > >>>>> message, page 69 of your book? > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or Dr. Lowie or discuss > >>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I become at once aware that > >> my > >>>>> partner does not understand anything in the matter, and I end usually > >>> with > >>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? (Malinowski, 1930) > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge > >> wrote: > >>>>>> Hi, Mike, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 book. One is that the > >>>>> papers > >>>>>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to the early part of > this > >>>>>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings (and probably any > >> theorist > >>>>> who > >>>>>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's really important to know > >>> the > >>>>>> date of publication. The other problem is that at least one of the > >>>>>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in at least one other. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As for the concentric circles or the matrioshka--they're both > >> excellent > >>>>>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go powerfully wrong! Both > are > >>>>>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus attention on the > >>> different > >>>>>> layers of context (and even then don't make sense--the mesosystem > >>>>> consists > >>>>>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). Nonetheless, you're > >>>>>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his final publications. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> However, his theory really developed a lot from the 1970s onwards > >> (see > >>>>> Rosa > >>>>>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the early 1990s onwards > >>> "proximal > >>>>>> processes" were the centerpiece of his Process-Person-Context-Time > >>> (PPCT) > >>>>>> model. These are essentially the everyday activities in which > >>> developing > >>>>>> people engage, and they always and only occur in microsystems. > >>> However, > >>>>>> what goes on in microsystems is always influenced by (a) the person > >>>>>> characteristics of the developing individuals of interest and those > >> of > >>>>> the > >>>>>> others with whom they interact, (b) the characteristics of the > >> context, > >>>>>> both proximal (as in the nature of the microsystem in which those > >>>>>> activities are occurring) and distal (the macrosystem, which for him > >>> was > >>>>>> culture, whether considered at the level of society or > within-society > >>>>>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes both the need to > study > >>>>> over > >>>>>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the prevailing social, economic, > >> and > >>>>>> political climate). A graphic representation that better reflects > >>> his > >>>>>> developed position than the concentric circles can be found in Tudge > >>>>>> (2008), on page 69. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I actually think that he rather dropped the ball on culture, > >>>>>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on this in his 1979 book > >> and > >>>>> in > >>>>>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological systems theory. Reading > his > >>>>> 1998 > >>>>>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find virtually no mention of the > >>>>> impact > >>>>>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on Steinberg et al.'s > >>>>> research > >>>>>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just thought of > >>>>> Bronfenbrenner's > >>>>>> theory as one of concentric circles of context--you're no different > >> in > >>>>> that > >>>>>> regard from just about everyone who has published an undergrad > >> textbook > >>>>> on > >>>>>> human development, not to mention a majority of scholars who have > >> said > >>>>> that > >>>>>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for their research (see > >> Tudge > >>> et > >>>>>> al., 2009, 2016). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these papers, just send me a > >>>>> private > >>>>>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives of young children: > >>>>>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse societies.* New York: > >>>>>> Cambridge University Press. > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., & Karnik, R. B. > >> (2009). > >>>>>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory of human > >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > >>>>>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner?s > >> theory > >>>>> of > >>>>>> human development: Its evolution from ecology to bioecology. > >> *Journal > >>>>> of > >>>>>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. In Heather > Montgomery > >>>>>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: Childhood studies*. New > York: > >>>>>> Oxford University Press. > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, E. A., Cao, H., Liang, > >>> Y., > >>>>>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused after all these > >> years? > >>> A > >>>>>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s bioecological theory > >> of > >>>>> human > >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, *8,* 427?445. > >> doi: > >>>>>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Cheers, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Jon > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Jonathan Tudge > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Professor > >>>>>> Office: 155 Stone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing > >>>>>> gratitude in children and adolescents > >>>>>> >>>>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >>>>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mailing address: > >>>>>> 248 Stone Building > >>>>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >>>>>> PO Box 26170 > >>>>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >>>>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >>>>>> USA > >>>>>> > >>>>>> phone (336) 223-6181 > >>>>>> fax (336) 334-5076 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Jon -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Nice to see your voice! > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making Human Beings Human, *to > >>>>> hand. I > >>>>>>> checked it out > >>>>>>> to see if the terms activity and context appeared there. Only sort > >> of! > >>>>>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not (!). I attach two > pages > >>>>> from > >>>>>>> the book for those interested (and able to read my amateur > >>>>>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and context coincide at the > >> micro > >>>>>>> level, but perhaps only there? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It turns out that the > >> person > >>>>> who > >>>>>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on human development was > >> U. > >>>>>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed with us how to > >> represent > >>>>> his > >>>>>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the task of writing the > >> first > >>>>>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) as a metaphor and > his > >>>>>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > >>>>>>> a concentric circles representation. We discussed other ways of > >> trying > >>>>> to > >>>>>>> represent the idea and he > >>>>>>> said that our representation came as close as he could figure out. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as combining a Vygotskian > >> notion > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), and uses the term > >>>>> "ecological > >>>>>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian colleagues would argue > >> that > >>>>> LSV > >>>>>>> used the concept of "social situation of development," not context. > >> I > >>>>> have > >>>>>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's declaration that the > activity > >>> is > >>>>> the > >>>>>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from what is written on > >> the > >>>>> pages > >>>>>>> attached. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at searching texts in > >> cyrillic > >>>>> could > >>>>>>> search for his use of the term, context. I have always been curious > >>>>> about > >>>>>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the skill > >>>>>>> to carry out the query. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> And perhaps you have written something about the mistake of > >>> interpreting > >>>>>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded circles we could learn > >> from?? > >>>>>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of the work of Hedegaard > >> and > >>>>>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Jan 30 16:09:28 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 11:09:28 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bronfennbrenner discussion In-Reply-To: References: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> Message-ID: You can say that "context" is an "abstraction from the world" if you like. But as Mike has shown, it is an unbounded abstraction. E.G. a new twist in Cold War diplomacy can skittle a 4thD project and/or open a new project for kids in San Diego and Moscow. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 31/01/2018 10:52 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Andy--I don't understand how "context" means "the world". > That's what Malinowski thought. But I'm a linguist, and > for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > and a context of situation is the ensemble of relations > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > text. But even if you are not a linguist, doesn't a > "context" always mean something that goes with a text, > like chili con carne goes with meat? > > dk > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in /Mind, Culture, and Activity/ 24 (4) > 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A > Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to > Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Mike, I have never been a reader of Bronfennbrenner, so my > comments may be immaterial here and I am happy if you and > others simply let them go through to the 'keeper (i.e., > catcher). > > You will recall that in my "Interdisciplinary" book I > appreciated your work, but criticised it for your claim to > include "context" in the "unit of analysis" on the basis > that "context" was an "open ended totality" and to include > it in the "unit of analysis" was to destroy the very > idea of > a "unit." > > A point of agreement between us though has been the > need for > what we both call a "meso-level" unit between the > individual > action and the world, and that my use of "project" to name > this meso-level unit, and that the 5thD project was such a > unit, persisting for more than an individual's > lifetime and > escaping the control of the founder, but yet falling short > of macro-level units like the economy, science, the > nation, etc. > > Yjro is quite right when he said "the context is the > activity,", or rather "the activities." "The activity" > is of > course the project. But here Yrjo is being true to > analysis > by units. He is suggesting that the world is best > conceived > as being made up of activities (I would say "projects"). > > To claim to include the "context" (which as you know means > "the world") *in* the unit which makes up the world, > is the > same logical fallacy as asking whether "I always lie" is a > lie, and destroy the whole point of analysis by units, > which > is to approach understanding infinite totalities by > means of > little things that you can grasp, which none the less > characterise the whole. This unit, projects, is mediating > between the individual action and the world. > > The problem is, I think, Yrjo's redefinition of "unit of > analysis" as (according to some of his students) "the unit > to be analysed," which I characterise as that list you > make > up, of everything you're going to put in your suitcase, > which you might need on your journey. This was *not* > Vygotsky's idea, or that of Goethe, Hegel or Marx. > > Whatever the problem, what happens depends on the context. > How do you conceive of the context? by units. The > context is > a totality not part of a unit. > > :) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > On 31/01/2018 9:45 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Jon- > > > > There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss > in your article. I > > guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of > the process of designing > > activities for kids in university-community > partnerships is > > an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm > not sure. If I need a > > defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood > them useful, but I was > > not testing his formulations in the same way you are > concerned to do, but > > using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and > interpretation. > > > > While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a > couple of observations. > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge > > wrote: > > > >> Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the > microsystem--it's the only > >> place in which culture is experienced. > Microsystems are always embedded > >> within culture (I'd add always within multiple > cultures, but I don't think > >> that Urie ever wrote that). > >> > >> Cheers, > >> > >> Jon > >> > >> > >> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >> > >> Jonathan Tudge > >> > >> Professor > >> Office: 155 Stone > >> > >> Our work on gratitude: > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > >> > >> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. > (Eds.) Developing > >> gratitude in children and adolescents > >> > > >> in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >> > >> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > >> > >> Mailing address: > >> 248 Stone Building > >> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >> PO Box 26170 > >> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >> USA > >> > >> phone (336) 223-6181 > >> fax (336) 334-5076 > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer > > wrote: > >> > >>> Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my > microsystem had exploded! :) > >>> > >>> The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, > why is culture in the > >>> macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now > interactions with other > >>> people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge > > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Greetings, Martin, > >>>> > >>>> I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint > presentation). > >>>> > >>>> Cheers, > >>>> > >>>> Jon > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >>>> > >>>> Jonathan Tudge > >>>> > >>>> Professor > >>>> Office: 155 Stone > >>>> > >>>> Our work on gratitude: > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > >>>> > >>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, > L. (Eds.) Developing > >>>> gratitude in children and adolescents > >>>> > > >>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >>>> > >>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > >>>> > >>>> Mailing address: > >>>> 248 Stone Building > >>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >>>> PO Box 26170 > >>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >>>> USA > >>>> > >>>> phone (336) 223-6181 > >>>> fax (336) 334-5076 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer > > > >>> wrote: > >>>>> Hi Jon, > >>>>> > >>>>> Would it be possible for you to post here the > figure you mentioned in > >>> your > >>>>> message, page 69 of your book? > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or > Dr. Lowie or discuss > >>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I > become at once aware that > >> my > >>>>> partner does not understand anything in the > matter, and I end usually > >>> with > >>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? > (Malinowski, 1930) > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge > > > >> wrote: > >>>>>> Hi, Mike, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 > book. One is that the > >>>>> papers > >>>>>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to > the early part of this > >>>>>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings > (and probably any > >> theorist > >>>>> who > >>>>>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's > really important to know > >>> the > >>>>>> date of publication. The other problem is that > at least one of the > >>>>>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in > at least one other. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As for the concentric circles or the > matrioshka--they're both > >> excellent > >>>>>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go > powerfully wrong! Both are > >>>>>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus > attention on the > >>> different > >>>>>> layers of context (and even then don't make > sense--the mesosystem > >>>>> consists > >>>>>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). > Nonetheless, you're > >>>>>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his > final publications. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> However, his theory really developed a lot from > the 1970s onwards > >> (see > >>>>> Rosa > >>>>>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the > early 1990s onwards > >>> "proximal > >>>>>> processes" were the centerpiece of his > Process-Person-Context-Time > >>> (PPCT) > >>>>>> model. These are essentially the everyday > activities in which > >>> developing > >>>>>> people engage, and they always and only occur > in microsystems. > >>> However, > >>>>>> what goes on in microsystems is always > influenced by (a) the person > >>>>>> characteristics of the developing individuals > of interest and those > >> of > >>>>> the > >>>>>> others with whom they interact, (b) the > characteristics of the > >> context, > >>>>>> both proximal (as in the nature of the > microsystem in which those > >>>>>> activities are occurring) and distal (the > macrosystem, which for him > >>> was > >>>>>> culture, whether considered at the level of > society or within-society > >>>>>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes > both the need to study > >>>>> over > >>>>>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the > prevailing social, economic, > >> and > >>>>>> political climate). A graphic representation > that better reflects > >>> his > >>>>>> developed position than the concentric circles > can be found in Tudge > >>>>>> (2008), on page 69. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I actually think that he rather dropped the > ball on culture, > >>>>>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on > this in his 1979 book > >> and > >>>>> in > >>>>>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological > systems theory. Reading his > >>>>> 1998 > >>>>>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find > virtually no mention of the > >>>>> impact > >>>>>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on > Steinberg et al.'s > >>>>> research > >>>>>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just > thought of > >>>>> Bronfenbrenner's > >>>>>> theory as one of concentric circles of > context--you're no different > >> in > >>>>> that > >>>>>> regard from just about everyone who has > published an undergrad > >> textbook > >>>>> on > >>>>>> human development, not to mention a majority of > scholars who have > >> said > >>>>> that > >>>>>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for > their research (see > >> Tudge > >>> et > >>>>>> al., 2009, 2016). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these > papers, just send me a > >>>>> private > >>>>>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives > of young children: > >>>>>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse > societies.* New York: > >>>>>> Cambridge University Press. > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., > & Karnik, R. B. > >> (2009). > >>>>>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s > bioecological theory of human > >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and > Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > >>>>>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie > Bronfenbrenner?s > >> theory > >>>>> of > >>>>>> human development: Its evolution from ecology > to bioecology. > >> *Journal > >>>>> of > >>>>>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. > DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. > In Heather Montgomery > >>>>>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: > Childhood studies*. New York: > >>>>>> Oxford University Press. > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, > E. A., Cao, H., Liang, > >>> Y., > >>>>>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused > after all these > >> years? > >>> A > >>>>>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s > bioecological theory > >> of > >>>>> human > >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and > Review*, *8,* 427?445. > >> doi: > >>>>>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Cheers, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Jon > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Jonathan Tudge > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Professor > >>>>>> Office: 155 Stone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Our work on gratitude: > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, > L. (Eds.) Developing > >>>>>> gratitude in children and adolescents > >>>>>> > > >>>>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >>>>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My web > site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mailing address: > >>>>>> 248 Stone Building > >>>>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >>>>>> PO Box 26170 > >>>>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >>>>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >>>>>> USA > >>>>>> > >>>>>> phone (336) 223-6181 > >>>>>> fax (336) 334-5076 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole > > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Jon -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Nice to see your voice! > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making > Human Beings Human, *to > >>>>> hand. I > >>>>>>> checked it out > >>>>>>> to see if the terms activity and context > appeared there. Only sort > >> of! > >>>>>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not > (!). I attach two pages > >>>>> from > >>>>>>> the book for those interested (and able to > read my amateur > >>>>>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and > context coincide at the > >> micro > >>>>>>> level, but perhaps only there? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It > turns out that the > >> person > >>>>> who > >>>>>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on > human development was > >> U. > >>>>>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed > with us how to > >> represent > >>>>> his > >>>>>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the > task of writing the > >> first > >>>>>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) > as a metaphor and his > >>>>>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > >>>>>>> a concentric circles representation. We > discussed other ways of > >> trying > >>>>> to > >>>>>>> represent the idea and he > >>>>>>> said that our representation came as close as > he could figure out. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as > combining a Vygotskian > >> notion > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), > and uses the term > >>>>> "ecological > >>>>>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian > colleagues would argue > >> that > >>>>> LSV > >>>>>>> used the concept of "social situation of > development," not context. > >> I > >>>>> have > >>>>>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's > declaration that the activity > >>> is > >>>>> the > >>>>>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from > what is written on > >> the > >>>>> pages > >>>>>>> attached. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at > searching texts in > >> cyrillic > >>>>> could > >>>>>>> search for his use of the term, context. I > have always been curious > >>>>> about > >>>>>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the > skill > >>>>>>> to carry out the query. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> And perhaps you have written something about > the mistake of > >>> interpreting > >>>>>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded > circles we could learn > >> from?? > >>>>>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of > the work of Hedegaard > >> and > >>>>>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > > > > From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Wed Jan 31 03:54:25 2018 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 11:54:25 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] "Context" or Object of activity In-Reply-To: References: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> Message-ID: <1334879954.344775.1517399665156@mail.yahoo.com> ...for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > and a context of situation is the ensemble of? relations > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > text. ? ? ?? You can attribute any meaning to a theoreticallysterile concept of context, as you like "semanticize" it. >From the point of view of Marxism, in the logic ofwhich Vygotsky WANTED to theorize, and Leontiev and Ilyenkov really theorized,the subject does not arbitrarily "semantify" his objects, that is,natural things, things created by human labor and social relations, butactually act with them in accordance with their nature. Context isnot a magical entity that affects the subject "placed in this context" in anincomprehensible magical way. Anything can "influence" the subject ifand only if the subject acts with this object. In other words, to be exposedyou must act yourself. Therefore, from an extremely broad and theoreticallyvague idea of ??the "context" (as something that"surrounds" the passive subject and for some reason affects it), weare forced to isolate what the subject really interacts with, what he isworking on, that is, we must distinguish the concept of the object of activity, the real PREDMET DEYATELNOSTI.Everything that surrounds the subject, but with which he actively does notinteract, any "context" with which the subject is not active does notexist for the subject at all, just as before the discovery of Becquerel theradioactive rays did not exist for human consciousness or "psyche",although, of course really "surrounded" him whenever he hadcarelessness to touch the salts of uranium or radium or to carry their crystalsin his pocket. All thisapplies not only to the "hard things" surrounding us, but also tosuch soft and delicate matter as social relations. Those relationships that thesubject is not able to at least try to somehow change by their own activity inthem, for the subject as it does not exist at all, they, as Spinoza would say,are not adequately realized. Of course, the child is able to remember suchlittle things as words (signs), say that now the president of the United Statesis Donald Trump. But really realizing the beauty of this political (or medical)fact, he will only be able to get involved in real relations with the politicalmachine of the state through participation in elections or other forms ofpolitical activism, when his own activity will face fences erected by anelderly gentleman with an outstanding hairdo not only on the Mexican border,but, say, between him and the health care system. Therefore, practical implications for thepractical teacher and psychologist are not numerous "contexts", theboundaries of which can only be established by the arbitrariness of the authorsof treatises on the context, but the real objects, what our activities reallydeal with, what it stumbles upon and what it comes to. Sasha ??: Andy Blunden ????: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ??????????: ?????, 31 ?????? 2018 3:11 ????: [Xmca-l] Re: Bronfennbrenner discussion You can say that "context" is an "abstraction from the world" if you like. But as Mike has shown, it is an unbounded abstraction. E.G. a new twist in Cold War diplomacy can skittle a 4thD project and/or open a new project for kids in San Diego and Moscow. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 31/01/2018 10:52 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Andy--I don't understand how "context" means "the world". > That's what Malinowski thought. But I'm a linguist, and > for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > and a context of situation is the ensemble of? relations > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > text. But even if you are not a linguist, doesn't a > "context" always mean something that goes with a text, > like chili con carne goes with meat? > > dk > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in /Mind, Culture, and Activity/ 24 (4) > 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A > Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to > Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >? ? Mike, I have never been a reader of Bronfennbrenner, so my >? ? comments may be immaterial here and I am happy if you and >? ? others simply let them go through to the 'keeper (i.e., >? ? catcher). > >? ? You will recall that in my "Interdisciplinary" book I >? ? appreciated your work, but criticised it for your claim to >? ? include "context" in the "unit of analysis" on the basis >? ? that "context" was an "open ended totality" and to include >? ? it in the "unit of analysis" was to destroy the very >? ? idea of >? ? a "unit." > >? ? A point of agreement between us though has been the >? ? need for >? ? what we both call a "meso-level" unit between the >? ? individual >? ? action and the world, and that my use of "project" to name >? ? this meso-level unit, and that the 5thD project was such a >? ? unit, persisting for more than an individual's >? ? lifetime and >? ? escaping the control of the founder, but yet falling short >? ? of macro-level units like the economy, science, the >? ? nation, etc. > >? ? Yjro is quite right when he said "the context is the >? ? activity,", or rather "the activities." "The activity" >? ? is of >? ? course the project. But here Yrjo is being true to >? ? analysis >? ? by units. He is suggesting that the world is best >? ? conceived >? ? as being made up of activities (I would say "projects"). > >? ? To claim to include the "context" (which as you know means >? ? "the world") *in* the unit which makes up the world, >? ? is the >? ? same logical fallacy as asking whether "I always lie" is a >? ? lie, and destroy the whole point of analysis by units, >? ? which >? ? is to approach understanding infinite totalities by >? ? means of >? ? little things that you can grasp, which none the less >? ? characterise the whole. This unit, projects, is mediating >? ? between the individual action and the world. > >? ? The problem is, I think, Yrjo's redefinition of "unit of >? ? analysis" as (according to some of his students) "the unit >? ? to be analysed," which I characterise as that list you >? ? make >? ? up, of everything you're going to put in your suitcase, >? ? which you might need on your journey. This was *not* >? ? Vygotsky's idea, or that of Goethe, Hegel or Marx. > >? ? Whatever the problem, what happens depends on the context. >? ? How do you conceive of the context? by units. The >? ? context is >? ? a totality not part of a unit. > >? ? :) > >? ? Andy > >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? Andy Blunden >? ? http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >? ? >? ? On 31/01/2018 9:45 AM, mike cole wrote: >? ? > Hi Jon- >? ? > >? ? >? ? ? There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss >? ? in your article. I >? ? > guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of >? ? the process of designing >? ? > activities for kids in university-community >? ? partnerships is >? ? > an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm >? ? not sure.? If I need a >? ? > defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood >? ? them useful, but I was >? ? > not testing his formulations in the same way you are >? ? concerned to do, but >? ? > using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and >? ? interpretation. >? ? > >? ? >? ? While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a >? ? couple of observations. >? ? > >? ? > >? ? > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge >? ? > wrote: >? ? > >? ? >> Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the >? ? microsystem--it's the only >? ? >> place in which culture is experienced. >? ? Microsystems are always embedded >? ? >> within culture (I'd add always within multiple >? ? cultures, but I don't think >? ? >> that Urie ever wrote that). >? ? >> >? ? >> Cheers, >? ? >> >? ? >> Jon >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >? ? >> >? ? >> Jonathan Tudge >? ? >> >? ? >> Professor >? ? >> Office: 155 Stone >? ? >> >? ? >> Our work on gratitude: >? ? http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >? ? >? ? >> >? ? >> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. >? ? (Eds.) Developing >? ? >> gratitude in children and adolescents >? ? >> >? ? ? ? >? ? >> in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >? ? >> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >? ? >> >? ? >> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >? ? >? ? >> >? ? >> Mailing address: >? ? >> 248 Stone Building >? ? >> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >? ? >> PO Box 26170 >? ? >> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >? ? >> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >? ? >> USA >? ? >> >? ? >> phone (336) 223-6181 >? ? >> fax? (336) 334-5076 >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer >? ? > wrote: >? ? >> >? ? >>> Wow, very graphic!? At first I thought my >? ? microsystem had exploded!? :) >? ? >>> >? ? >>> The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, >? ? why is culture in the >? ? >>> macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now >? ? interactions with other >? ? >>> people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) >? ? >>> >? ? >>> Martin >? ? >>> >? ? >>> >? ? >>> >? ? >>> >? ? >>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge >? ? > wrote: >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Greetings, Martin, >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint >? ? presentation). >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Cheers, >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Jon >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Jonathan Tudge >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Professor >? ? >>>> Office: 155 Stone >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Our work on gratitude: >? ? http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >? ? >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, >? ? L. (Eds.) Developing >? ? >>>> gratitude in children and adolescents >? ? >>>> >? ? ? ? >? ? >>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >? ? >>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >? ? >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Mailing address: >? ? >>>> 248 Stone Building >? ? >>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >? ? >>>> PO Box 26170 >? ? >>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >? ? >>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >? ? >>>> USA >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> phone (336) 223-6181 >? ? >>>> fax? (336) 334-5076 >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer >? ? > >? ? >>> wrote: >? ? >>>>> Hi Jon, >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> Would it be possible for you to post here the >? ? figure you mentioned in >? ? >>> your >? ? >>>>> message, page 69 of your book? >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> Martin >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or >? ? Dr. Lowie or discuss >? ? >>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I >? ? become at once aware that >? ? >> my >? ? >>>>> partner does not understand anything in the >? ? matter, and I end usually >? ? >>> with >? ? >>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? >? ? (Malinowski, 1930) >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge >? ? > >? ? >> wrote: >? ? >>>>>> Hi, Mike, >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 >? ? book.? One is that the >? ? >>>>> papers >? ? >>>>>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to >? ? the early part of this >? ? >>>>>> century.? As is true of Vygotsky's writings >? ? (and probably any >? ? >> theorist >? ? >>>>> who >? ? >>>>>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's >? ? really important to know >? ? >>> the >? ? >>>>>> date of publication.? The other problem is that >? ? at least one of the >? ? >>>>>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in >? ? at least one other. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> As for the concentric circles or the >? ? matrioshka--they're both >? ? >> excellent >? ? >>>>>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go >? ? powerfully wrong!? Both are >? ? >>>>>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus >? ? attention on the >? ? >>> different >? ? >>>>>> layers of context (and even then don't make >? ? sense--the mesosystem >? ? >>>>> consists >? ? >>>>>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). >? ? Nonetheless, you're >? ? >>>>>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his >? ? final publications. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> However, his theory really developed a lot from >? ? the 1970s onwards >? ? >> (see >? ? >>>>> Rosa >? ? >>>>>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the >? ? early 1990s onwards >? ? >>> "proximal >? ? >>>>>> processes" were the centerpiece of his >? ? Process-Person-Context-Time >? ? >>> (PPCT) >? ? >>>>>> model.? These are essentially the everyday >? ? activities in which >? ? >>> developing >? ? >>>>>> people engage, and they always and only occur >? ? in microsystems. >? ? >>> However, >? ? >>>>>> what goes on in microsystems is always >? ? influenced by (a) the person >? ? >>>>>> characteristics of the developing individuals >? ? of interest and those >? ? >> of >? ? >>>>> the >? ? >>>>>> others with whom they interact, (b) the >? ? characteristics of the >? ? >> context, >? ? >>>>>> both proximal (as in the nature of the >? ? microsystem in which those >? ? >>>>>> activities are occurring) and distal (the >? ? macrosystem, which for him >? ? >>> was >? ? >>>>>> culture, whether considered at the level of >? ? society or within-society >? ? >>>>>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes >? ? both the need to study >? ? >>>>> over >? ? >>>>>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the >? ? prevailing social, economic, >? ? >> and >? ? >>>>>> political climate).? ? A graphic representation >? ? that better reflects >? ? >>> his >? ? >>>>>> developed position than the concentric circles >? ? can be found in Tudge >? ? >>>>>> (2008), on page 69. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> I actually think that he rather dropped the >? ? ball on culture, >? ? >>>>>> unfortunately.? I really like his writings on >? ? this in his 1979 book >? ? >> and >? ? >>>>> in >? ? >>>>>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological >? ? systems theory.? Reading his >? ? >>>>> 1998 >? ? >>>>>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find >? ? virtually no mention of the >? ? >>>>> impact >? ? >>>>>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on >? ? Steinberg et al.'s >? ? >>>>> research >? ? >>>>>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just >? ? thought of >? ? >>>>> Bronfenbrenner's >? ? >>>>>> theory as one of concentric circles of >? ? context--you're no different >? ? >> in >? ? >>>>> that >? ? >>>>>> regard from just about everyone who has >? ? published an undergrad >? ? >> textbook >? ? >>>>> on >? ? >>>>>> human development, not to mention a majority of >? ? scholars who have >? ? >> said >? ? >>>>> that >? ? >>>>>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for >? ? their research (see >? ? >> Tudge >? ? >>> et >? ? >>>>>> al., 2009, 2016). >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these >? ? papers, just send me a >? ? >>>>> private >? ? >>>>>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu >? ? >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>? - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives >? ? of young children: >? ? >>>>>>? Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse >? ? societies.* New York: >? ? >>>>>>? Cambridge University Press. >? ? >>>>>>? - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., >? ? & Karnik, R. B. >? ? >> (2009). >? ? >>>>>>? Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s >? ? bioecological theory of human >? ? >>>>>>? development. *Journal of Family Theory and >? ? Review, 1*(4), 198-210. >? ? >>>>>>? - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie >? ? Bronfenbrenner?s >? ? >> theory >? ? >>>>> of >? ? >>>>>>? human development: Its evolution from ecology >? ? to bioecology. >? ? >> *Journal >? ? >>>>> of >? ? >>>>>>? Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. >? ? DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 >? ? >>>>>>? - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. >? ? In Heather Montgomery >? ? >>>>>>? (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: >? ? Childhood studies*. New York: >? ? >>>>>>? Oxford University Press. >? ? >>>>>>? - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, >? ? E. A., Cao, H., Liang, >? ? >>> Y., >? ? >>>>>>? Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused >? ? after all these >? ? >> years? >? ? >>> A >? ? >>>>>>? re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s >? ? bioecological theory >? ? >> of >? ? >>>>> human >? ? >>>>>>? development. *Journal of Family Theory and >? ? Review*, *8,* 427?445. >? ? >> doi: >? ? >>>>>>? 10.1111/jftr.12165. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Cheers, >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Jon >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Jonathan Tudge >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Professor >? ? >>>>>> Office: 155 Stone >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Our work on gratitude: >? ? http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >? ? >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, >? ? L. (Eds.) Developing >? ? >>>>>> gratitude in children and adolescents >? ? >>>>>> >? ? ? ? >? ? >>>>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >? ? >>>>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> My web >? ? site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >? ? >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Mailing address: >? ? >>>>>> 248 Stone Building >? ? >>>>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >? ? >>>>>> PO Box 26170 >? ? >>>>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >? ? >>>>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >? ? >>>>>> USA >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> phone (336) 223-6181 >? ? >>>>>> fax? (336) 334-5076 >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole >? ? > wrote: >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> Hi Jon -- >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> Nice to see your voice! >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making >? ? Human Beings Human, *to >? ? >>>>> hand. I >? ? >>>>>>> checked it out >? ? >>>>>>> to see if the terms activity and context >? ? appeared there. Only sort >? ? >> of! >? ? >>>>>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not >? ? (!). I attach two pages >? ? >>>>> from >? ? >>>>>>> the book for those interested (and able to >? ? read my amateur >? ? >>>>>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and >? ? context coincide at the >? ? >> micro >? ? >>>>>>> level, but perhaps only there? >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It >? ? turns out that the >? ? >> person >? ? >>>>> who >? ? >>>>>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on >? ? human development was >? ? >> U. >? ? >>>>>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed >? ? with us how to >? ? >> represent >? ? >>>>> his >? ? >>>>>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the >? ? task of writing the >? ? >> first >? ? >>>>>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) >? ? as a metaphor and his >? ? >>>>>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites >? ? >>>>>>> a concentric circles representation. We >? ? discussed other ways of >? ? >> trying >? ? >>>>> to >? ? >>>>>>> represent the idea and he >? ? >>>>>>> said that our representation came as close as >? ? he could figure out. >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as >? ? combining a Vygotskian >? ? >> notion >? ? >>>>> of >? ? >>>>>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), >? ? and uses the term >? ? >>>>> "ecological >? ? >>>>>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian >? ? colleagues would argue >? ? >> that >? ? >>>>> LSV >? ? >>>>>>> used the concept of "social situation of >? ? development," not context. >? ? >> I >? ? >>>>> have >? ? >>>>>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's >? ? declaration that the activity >? ? >>> is >? ? >>>>> the >? ? >>>>>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from >? ? what is written on >? ? >> the >? ? >>>>> pages >? ? >>>>>>> attached. >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at >? ? searching texts in >? ? >> cyrillic >? ? >>>>> could >? ? >>>>>>> search for his use of the term, context. I >? ? have always been curious >? ? >>>>> about >? ? >>>>>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the >? ? skill >? ? >>>>>>> to carry out the query. >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> And perhaps you have written something about >? ? the mistake of >? ? >>> interpreting >? ? >>>>>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded >? ? circles we could learn >? ? >> from?? >? ? >>>>>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of >? ? the work of Hedegaard >? ? >> and >? ? >>>>>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> mike >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>> >? ? > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jan 31 06:38:32 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 06:38:32 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Bateson on thinking relatively Message-ID: Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* mike --------------\ Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in the central nervous system, differences in his different neural messages, differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round that circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human behaviour, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt this epistemology: I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the rest of what I have been calling ?mind?. The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. From mpacker@cantab.net Wed Jan 31 06:55:53 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 09:55:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular process. The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of information processing between the organism and its environment in a sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, which will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and subcortical structures. To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the link too? Martin > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > mike > --------------\ > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies through > the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the side of the > tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we shall be > concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, differences in the > retina of the man, differences in the central nervous system, differences > in his different neural messages, differences in the behaviour of his > muscles, difference in how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe > then makes on the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round > that circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human > behaviour, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt this > epistemology: > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this matter; > but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory Bateson? is cutting > down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? is to me still an > excessively concrete object, different from the rest of what I have been > calling ?mind?. > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking ? so > that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a glass of > water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jan 31 07:06:53 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 07:06:53 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: We could also point to the works of Dewey, e.g., Much subjectivism is only a statement of the logical consequences of the doctrine sponsored by psychological "science" of the monop- olistic possession of mental phenomena by a self; or, after the idea of an underlying spiritual substance became shaky, of the doctrine that mental events as such constitute all there is to selfhood. (Dewey, 1929, Experience & Nature, pp.234?235) m On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 6:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > mike > --------------\ > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies through > the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the side of the > tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we shall be > concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, differences in the > retina of the man, differences in the central nervous system, differences > in his different neural messages, differences in the behaviour of his > muscles, difference in how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe > then makes on the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round > that circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human > behaviour, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt this > epistemology: > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this matter; > but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory Bateson? is cutting > down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? is to me still an > excessively concrete object, different from the rest of what I have been > calling ?mind?. > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking ? so > that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a glass of > water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jan 31 07:00:58 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 07:00:58 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike, but surely you would agree that virtually all of the analyses that we currently see in the literature do this going round and round in a circle. The follow Bateson means to abandon the thought of individuals, of individual conceptions, of "identity" (see e.g. *Mind and Nature* on characteristics, such as "dependency," "aggressiveness," and "pride" as being not internal or characteristic of a person and that "such words have their roots in what happens between persons, not in something-or-other inside a person" (p.133). All the talk about internalization makes little sense if you adopt Bateson's perspective. Those interested, we have a paper in *CoDesign*, where we provide a case study of "Becoming-breezer," a coming-into-correspondence of designer, materials and designed objects (Roth et al., 2017). I am working on similar issues in "Growing-making mathematics...," where "growing-making tangram shapes" also means "becoming-hexagon" (Roth, 2016). For those interested, they should read the easy-to-read books by Tim Ingold. But I think Tim remains a bit abstract, does not provide detailed case studies in actual human relations---which our papers do. Michael Ingold, T. (2011). Being-alive: Essays on movement, knowledge and description. London, UK: Routledge. Ingold, T. (2013). Making: Anthropology, archeology, art and architecture. London, UK: Routledge. Ingold, T. (2015). The life of lines. London, UK: Routledge. Roth, W.-M. (2016). Growing-making mathematics: a dynamic perspective on people, materials, and movement in classrooms. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 93, 87?103. Roth, W.-M., Socha, D., & Tenenberg, J. (2017). Becoming-design in corresponding: re/theorizing the co- in codesigning. CoDesign, 13, 1?17. On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 6:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > mike > --------------\ > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies through > the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the side of the > tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we shall be > concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, differences in the > retina of the man, differences in the central nervous system, differences > in his different neural messages, differences in the behaviour of his > muscles, difference in how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe > then makes on the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round > that circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human > behaviour, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt this > epistemology: > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this matter; > but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory Bateson? is cutting > down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? is to me still an > excessively concrete object, different from the rest of what I have been > calling ?mind?. > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking ? so > that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a glass of > water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > From d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk Wed Jan 31 07:14:08 2018 From: d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk (WEBSTER, DAVID S.) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 15:14:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after Gibson died in 1979 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular process. The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of information processing between the organism and its environment in a sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, which will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and subcortical structures. To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the link too? Martin > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > mike > --------------\ > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies > through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the > side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we > shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, > differences in the retina of the man, differences in the central > nervous system, differences in his different neural messages, > differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in how the axe > flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on the face of the > tree. Our explanation will go round and round that circuit. If you > want to explain or understand anything in human behaviour, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt > this > epistemology: > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the rest > of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking > ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a > glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jan 31 07:26:25 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 07:26:25 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, the human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely the door knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans over other animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much as the individual "samples" the environment... On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote: > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the Gibsonian > literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after Gibson died in 1979 > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the notion > floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? in which > brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular process. > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of information > processing between the organism and its environment in a sequence of > goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an environmental > change that will be processed by sensory systems, which will produce > signals to inform the next action, and so on. The perception-action cycle > is of prime importance for the adaptive success of a temporally extended > gestalt of behavior, where each action is contingent on the effects of the > previous one. The perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the > central nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors > engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for > sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and > subcortical structures. > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the > cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of action can > be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the link > too? > > files/image295.jpg> > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > > > mike > > --------------\ > > > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies > > through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the > > side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we > > shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, > > differences in the retina of the man, differences in the central > > nervous system, differences in his different neural messages, > > differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in how the axe > > flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on the face of the > > tree. Our explanation will go round and round that circuit. If you > > want to explain or understand anything in human behaviour, you are > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt > > this > > epistemology: > > > > > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the rest > > of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking > > ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a > > glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. > > > > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. > > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jan 31 07:29:37 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 07:29:37 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Just to add to the preceding point, and to David W's message. here a quote from Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*: With differentiation of interactions comes the need of maintaining a balance among them; or, in objective terms, a unified environment. The balance has to be maintained by a mechanism that responds both to variations that occur within the organism and in surroundings. (1938: 26) Michael On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:26 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or > Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, the > human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely the door > knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans over other > animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much as the > individual "samples" the environment... > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk> wrote: > >> The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the Gibsonian >> literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after Gibson died in 1979 >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman >> .ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer >> Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively >> >> I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the notion >> floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? in which >> brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular process. >> >> The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of information >> processing between the organism and its environment in a sequence of >> goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an environmental >> change that will be processed by sensory systems, which will produce >> signals to inform the next action, and so on. The perception-action cycle >> is of prime importance for the adaptive success of a temporally extended >> gestalt of behavior, where each action is contingent on the effects of the >> previous one. The perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the >> central nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors >> engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for >> sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and >> subcortical structures. >> >> To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the >> cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of action can >> be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. >> >> Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the link >> too? >> >> > Action%20Cycle_files/image295.jpg> >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: >> > >> > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. >> > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* >> > >> > mike >> > --------------\ >> > >> > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies >> > through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the >> > side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we >> > shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, >> > differences in the retina of the man, differences in the central >> > nervous system, differences in his different neural messages, >> > differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in how the axe >> > flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on the face of the >> > tree. Our explanation will go round and round that circuit. If you >> > want to explain or understand anything in human behaviour, you are >> always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. >> > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) >> > >> > >> > >> > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt >> > this >> > epistemology: >> > >> > >> > >> > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this >> > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory >> > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? >> > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the rest >> > of what I have been calling ?mind?. >> > >> > >> > >> > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking >> > ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a >> > glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. >> > >> > >> > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally >> changes. >> > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and >> > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. >> >> >> > From mpacker@cantab.net Wed Jan 31 07:34:27 2018 From: mpacker@cantab.net (Martin Packer) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 10:34:27 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Interesting point, David. I hadn?t traced its history. Googling around I found this summary by Fuster: Such a cybernetic cycle has been given various names: Weizsacker (1950) called it the Gestaltkreis (?gestalt cycle?) and Neisser (1976) the ?perception cycle?; Arbib (1981) and I (1989) have called it, respectively, the ?action-perception? and the ?perception-action?? cycle. Martin > On Jan 31, 2018, at 10:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote: > > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after Gibson died in 1979 > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular process. > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of information processing between the organism and its environment in a sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, which will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and subcortical structures. > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the link too? > > > > > > Martin > > > > >> On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. >> Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* >> >> mike >> --------------\ >> >> Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies >> through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the >> side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we >> shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, >> differences in the retina of the man, differences in the central >> nervous system, differences in his different neural messages, >> differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in how the axe >> flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on the face of the >> tree. Our explanation will go round and round that circuit. If you >> want to explain or understand anything in human behaviour, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. >> (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) >> >> >> >> Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt >> this >> epistemology: >> >> >> >> I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this >> matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory >> Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? >> is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the rest >> of what I have been calling ?mind?. >> >> >> >> The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking >> ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a >> glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. >> >> >> .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. >> We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and >> secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > From d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk Wed Jan 31 07:41:59 2018 From: d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk (WEBSTER, DAVID S.) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 15:41:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: The problem here is that you feel the need to put selects in scare quotes. I am all for Dewey but I am not sure you are right about Gibson not being transactional but where Gibson had got to when he died was already a hard enough sell. A good topic to pursue through -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: 31 January 2018 15:26 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, the human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely the door knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans over other animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much as the individual "samples" the environment... On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote: > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the > Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after > Gibson died in 1979 > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the > notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? > in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular process. > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of > information processing between the organism and its environment in a > sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an > environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, which > will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The > perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive > success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each > action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The > perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central nervous > system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors engage only > the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for > sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and subcortical structures. > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the > cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of > action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the > link too? > > cle_ > files/image295.jpg> > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > > > mike > > --------------\ > > > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies > > through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in > > the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of > > phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of > > the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in the > > central nervous system, differences in his different neural > > messages, differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in > > how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on > > the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round that > > circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human > > behaviour, you are > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt > > this > > epistemology: > > > > > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the > > rest of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of > > thinking ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches > > out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. > > > > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. > > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jan 31 07:48:57 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 07:48:57 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Martin, I think English translation tend to leave the word *Gestaltkreis*, where the second part is "circle" not "cycle" Also, von Weizs?cker relates perception and movement, but he does not say that there is a cycle or circle of perception and movement. instead, he writes "Perception ... *is *self-movement" (von Weizs?cker, 1973, p. 50) von Weizs?cker, V. (1973). *Der Gestaltkreis*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Michael On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:34 AM, Martin Packer wrote: > Interesting point, David. I hadn?t traced its history. Googling around I > found this summary by Fuster: > > Such a cybernetic cycle has been given various names: Weizsacker (1950) > called it the Gestaltkreis (?gestalt cycle?) and Neisser (1976) the > ?perception cycle?; Arbib (1981) and I (1989) have called it, respectively, > the ?action-perception? and the ?perception-action?? cycle. > > Martin > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 10:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk> wrote: > > > > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the Gibsonian > literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after Gibson died in 1979 > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the > notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? in > which brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular > process. > > > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of information > processing between the organism and its environment in a sequence of > goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an environmental > change that will be processed by sensory systems, which will produce > signals to inform the next action, and so on. The perception-action cycle > is of prime importance for the adaptive success of a temporally extended > gestalt of behavior, where each action is contingent on the effects of the > previous one. The perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the > central nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors > engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for > sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and > subcortical structures. > > > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the > cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of action can > be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the > link too? > > > > Perception--Action%20Cycle_files/image295.jpg> > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > >> On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > >> Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > >> > >> mike > >> --------------\ > >> > >> Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies > >> through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the > >> side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we > >> shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, > >> differences in the retina of the man, differences in the central > >> nervous system, differences in his different neural messages, > >> differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in how the axe > >> flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on the face of the > >> tree. Our explanation will go round and round that circuit. If you > >> want to explain or understand anything in human behaviour, you are > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > >> (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > >> > >> > >> > >> Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt > >> this > >> epistemology: > >> > >> > >> > >> I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > >> matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > >> Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > >> is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the rest > >> of what I have been calling ?mind?. > >> > >> > >> > >> The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking > >> ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a > >> glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. > >> > >> > >> .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally > changes. > >> We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > >> secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jan 31 07:51:56 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 07:51:56 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: David, I do not remember where I recently read about transaction and Gibson, and that essay concluded that the Gibsonian was not transactional. When I remember, I will share. Michael On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:41 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote: > The problem here is that you feel the need to put selects in scare quotes. > I am all for Dewey but I am not sure you are right about Gibson not being > transactional but where Gibson had got to when he died was already a hard > enough sell. A good topic to pursue through > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: 31 January 2018 15:26 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or > Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, the > human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely the door > knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans over other > animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much as the > individual "samples" the environment... > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk > > wrote: > > > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the > > Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after > > Gibson died in 1979 > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the > > notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? > > in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular > process. > > > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of > > information processing between the organism and its environment in a > > sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an > > environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, which > > will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The > > perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive > > success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each > > action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The > > perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central nervous > > system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors engage only > > the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for > > sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and > subcortical structures. > > > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the > > cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of > > action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the > > link too? > > > > > cle_ > > files/image295.jpg> > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > > > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > > > > > mike > > > --------------\ > > > > > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies > > > through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in > > > the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of > > > phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of > > > the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in the > > > central nervous system, differences in his different neural > > > messages, differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in > > > how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on > > > the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round that > > > circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human > > > behaviour, you are > > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > > > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > > > > > > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt > > > this > > > epistemology: > > > > > > > > > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > > > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > > > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > > > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the > > > rest of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > > > > > > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of > > > thinking ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches > > > out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an > easy one. > > > > > > > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally > changes. > > > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > > > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jan 31 08:26:05 2018 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:26:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: Gibson is clearly relevant, but so is Bronfenbrenner. He was struggling to overcome the idea of a one way, top town, Outter?->inner causation in the direction that Jon is urging, I believe. The passage cited in my note with this subject line was part of his unease with concentric circles. This is reflected in UB?s critique of the use of multiple regression. (But multiple regression can be a useful tool. It was one of the methods used in the Scribner/Cole research on Vai literacy) Mike On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:44 AM WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote: > The problem here is that you feel the need to put selects in scare quotes. > I am all for Dewey but I am not sure you are right about Gibson not being > transactional but where Gibson had got to when he died was already a hard > enough sell. A good topic to pursue through > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: 31 January 2018 15:26 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or > Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, the > human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely the door > knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans over other > animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much as the > individual "samples" the environment... > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk > > wrote: > > > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the > > Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after > > Gibson died in 1979 > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the > > notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? > > in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a circular > process. > > > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of > > information processing between the organism and its environment in a > > sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes an > > environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, which > > will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The > > perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive > > success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each > > action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The > > perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central nervous > > system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors engage only > > the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, whereas, for > > sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the spinal cord and > subcortical structures. > > > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of the > > cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of > > action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the > > link too? > > > > > cle_ > > files/image295.jpg> > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > > > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > > > > > mike > > > --------------\ > > > > > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies > > > through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in > > > the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of > > > phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut face of > > > the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in the > > > central nervous system, differences in his different neural > > > messages, differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference in > > > how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe then makes on > > > the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round that > > > circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human > > > behaviour, you are > > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > > > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > > > > > > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt > > > this > > > epistemology: > > > > > > > > > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > > > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > > > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > > > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the > > > rest of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > > > > > > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of > > > thinking ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches > > > out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an > easy one. > > > > > > > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally > changes. > > > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > > > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jan 31 10:44:35 2018 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 18:44:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F953ACDD10@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi all, Just a bit of background on the Bateson quote(s), at least from my subjective perspective. Bateson was in the middle of a big argument at the time between cyberneticists and second order cyberneticists. The big issue from what I have read is that cyberneticists believe that you can locate and manipulate an objective circuit (i.e. continuous feedback loops) that is separate from the person locating it. The second order cyberneticists (Bateson's position) was that you could never remove the individual who was observing the feedback loops from the feedback loop itself. The person observing the loop was also steering it from his own perspective. I'm not sure if this was directly related to the objective, subjective distinction but it definitely fits with it. I think Bateson would have thought the type of neuroscience circuits that Martin describes as first order and might not have been too happy with them. I do think there is a natural affinity between Gibson and his idea of affordances and Bateson and the larger idea of second order cybernetics. This would indeed be a fascinating topic to pursue. Michael I'm not sure what you mean by transactional. Do you mean Dewey's definition (across actions) or a more common definition? Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2018 11:26 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively Gibson is clearly relevant, but so is Bronfenbrenner. He was struggling to overcome the idea of a one way, top town, Outter?->inner causation in the direction that Jon is urging, I believe. The passage cited in my note with this subject line was part of his unease with concentric circles. This is reflected in UB?s critique of the use of multiple regression. (But multiple regression can be a useful tool. It was one of the methods used in the Scribner/Cole research on Vai literacy) Mike On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:44 AM WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote: > The problem here is that you feel the need to put selects in scare quotes. > I am all for Dewey but I am not sure you are right about Gibson not > being transactional but where Gibson had got to when he died was > already a hard enough sell. A good topic to pursue through > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: 31 January 2018 15:26 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or > Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, > the human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely > the door knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans > over other animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much > as the individual "samples" the environment... > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk > > wrote: > > > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the > > Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after > > Gibson died in 1979 > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the > > notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? > > in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a > > circular > process. > > > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of > > information processing between the organism and its environment in a > > sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes > > an environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, > > which will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The > > perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive > > success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each > > action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The > > perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central > > nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors > > engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, > > whereas, for sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the > > spinal cord and > subcortical structures. > > > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of > > the cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of > > action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the > > link too? > > > > > Cy > > cle_ > > files/image295.jpg> > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > > > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > > > > > mike > > > --------------\ > > > > > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe > > > flies through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing > > > cut in the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of > > > phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut face > > > of the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in > > > the central nervous system, differences in his different neural > > > messages, differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference > > > in how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe then makes > > > on the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round > > > that circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in > > > human behaviour, you are > > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > > > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > > > > > > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to > > > adopt this > > > epistemology: > > > > > > > > > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > > > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > > > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > > > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the > > > rest of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > > > > > > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of > > > thinking ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches > > > out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an > easy one. > > > > > > > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally > changes. > > > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; > > > and secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > > > > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jan 31 11:09:15 2018 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 11:09:15 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F953ACDD10@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F953ACDD10@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael, Dewey does not use transaction in lieu of "across action." I take it as Dewey & Bentley, 1949/1999 defined it: *Trans-action*: where systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively detachable or independent ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without isolation of presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements.? (p. 133) and Transaction ... represents that late level in inquiry in which observation and presentation could be carried on without attribution of the aspects and phases of action to independent self-actors, or to independently inter-acting elements or relations. (p.136) Michael On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 10:44 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi all, > > Just a bit of background on the Bateson quote(s), at least from my > subjective perspective. Bateson was in the middle of a big argument at the > time between cyberneticists and second order cyberneticists. The big issue > from what I have read is that cyberneticists believe that you can locate > and manipulate an objective circuit (i.e. continuous feedback loops) that > is separate from the person locating it. The second order cyberneticists > (Bateson's position) was that you could never remove the individual who was > observing the feedback loops from the feedback loop itself. The person > observing the loop was also steering it from his own perspective. I'm not > sure if this was directly related to the objective, subjective distinction > but it definitely fits with it. > > I think Bateson would have thought the type of neuroscience circuits that > Martin describes as first order and might not have been too happy with them. > > I do think there is a natural affinity between Gibson and his idea of > affordances and Bateson and the larger idea of second order cybernetics. > This would indeed be a fascinating topic to pursue. > > Michael I'm not sure what you mean by transactional. Do you mean Dewey's > definition (across actions) or a more common definition? > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2018 11:26 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > Gibson is clearly relevant, but so is Bronfenbrenner. He was struggling to > overcome the idea of a one way, top town, Outter?->inner causation in the > direction that Jon is urging, I believe. > The passage cited in my note with this subject line was part of his unease > with concentric circles. > > This is reflected in UB?s critique of the use of multiple regression. > (But multiple regression can be a useful tool. It was one of the methods > used in the Scribner/Cole research on Vai literacy) > > Mike > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:44 AM WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk> > wrote: > > > The problem here is that you feel the need to put selects in scare > quotes. > > I am all for Dewey but I am not sure you are right about Gibson not > > being transactional but where Gibson had got to when he died was > > already a hard enough sell. A good topic to pursue through > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > > Sent: 31 January 2018 15:26 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or > > Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, > > the human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely > > the door knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans > > over other animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much > > as the individual "samples" the environment... > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk > > > wrote: > > > > > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the > > > Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after > > > Gibson died in 1979 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > > > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the > > > notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? > > > in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a > > > circular > > process. > > > > > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of > > > information processing between the organism and its environment in a > > > sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes > > > an environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, > > > which will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The > > > perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive > > > success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each > > > action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The > > > perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central > > > nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors > > > engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, > > > whereas, for sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the > > > spinal cord and > > subcortical structures. > > > > > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of > > > the cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of > > > action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > > > > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the > > > link too? > > > > > > > > Cy > > > cle_ > > > files/image295.jpg> > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > > > > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > > > > > > > mike > > > > --------------\ > > > > > > > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe > > > > flies through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing > > > > cut in the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of > > > > phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut face > > > > of the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in > > > > the central nervous system, differences in his different neural > > > > messages, differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference > > > > in how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe then makes > > > > on the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round > > > > that circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in > > > > human behaviour, you are > > > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > > > > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to > > > > adopt this > > > > epistemology: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > > > > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > > > > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > > > > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the > > > > rest of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of > > > > thinking ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches > > > > out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an > > easy one. > > > > > > > > > > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally > > changes. > > > > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; > > > > and secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jan 31 11:35:53 2018 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 19:35:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F953ACDD10@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F953ACDD47@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Michael, I'm not quite sure what you're saying Michael. Yes that is Dewey's definition for transactional (he came up with the word in Knowing and the Known but in a footnote I believe suggests it dates back to the Reflex Arc concept - he uses the year but I believe this is the article he meant.) In the example I often refer to that he uses to explain what he means by transactional, the game of pool he discusses all the different actions that are relatable to the actual action of the pool game itself (I'm not sure I want to go back but he discusses actions that occurred outside the purview of the pool hall). This concept I think is central to Pragmatism and goes back to William James idea of the specious present. He actually talks about three types of actions, isolated action, interaction (between two entities) and transactional, then refers to the transactional fields of physics where actions are never considered in isolation but are related to other actions within the field (transactional relationships). He laments that we had not reached that in social sciences. One of the reasons I am so interested in the Internet is because this is possible in cyberspace. But it seems to me, this is exactly what he is saying in the quotes you offer, no detachable independent entities or essences (actions) or realities (interactions). How do you define Dewey's transactional then if not across actions (which makes sense, I believe Dewey was very careful with words). Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2018 2:09 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively Michael, Dewey does not use transaction in lieu of "across action." I take it as Dewey & Bentley, 1949/1999 defined it: *Trans-action*: where systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to ?elements? or other presumptively detachable or independent ?entities,? ?essences,? or ?realities,? and without isolation of presumptively detachable ?relations? from such detachable ?elements.? (p. 133) and Transaction ... represents that late level in inquiry in which observation and presentation could be carried on without attribution of the aspects and phases of action to independent self-actors, or to independently inter-acting elements or relations. (p.136) Michael On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 10:44 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi all, > > Just a bit of background on the Bateson quote(s), at least from my > subjective perspective. Bateson was in the middle of a big argument at > the time between cyberneticists and second order cyberneticists. The > big issue from what I have read is that cyberneticists believe that > you can locate and manipulate an objective circuit (i.e. continuous > feedback loops) that is separate from the person locating it. The > second order cyberneticists (Bateson's position) was that you could > never remove the individual who was observing the feedback loops from > the feedback loop itself. The person observing the loop was also > steering it from his own perspective. I'm not sure if this was > directly related to the objective, subjective distinction but it definitely fits with it. > > I think Bateson would have thought the type of neuroscience circuits > that Martin describes as first order and might not have been too happy with them. > > I do think there is a natural affinity between Gibson and his idea of > affordances and Bateson and the larger idea of second order cybernetics. > This would indeed be a fascinating topic to pursue. > > Michael I'm not sure what you mean by transactional. Do you mean > Dewey's definition (across actions) or a more common definition? > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2018 11:26 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > Gibson is clearly relevant, but so is Bronfenbrenner. He was > struggling to overcome the idea of a one way, top town, Outter?->inner > causation in the direction that Jon is urging, I believe. > The passage cited in my note with this subject line was part of his > unease with concentric circles. > > This is reflected in UB?s critique of the use of multiple regression. > (But multiple regression can be a useful tool. It was one of the > methods used in the Scribner/Cole research on Vai literacy) > > Mike > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:44 AM WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk> > wrote: > > > The problem here is that you feel the need to put selects in scare > quotes. > > I am all for Dewey but I am not sure you are right about Gibson not > > being transactional but where Gibson had got to when he died was > > already a hard enough sell. A good topic to pursue through > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > > Sent: 31 January 2018 15:26 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson > > (or Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other > > words, the human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not > > merely the door knob an affordance to humans. The door knob > > "selects" humans over other animals... The environment "samples" the > > individual as much as the individual "samples" the environment... > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk > > > wrote: > > > > > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the > > > Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after > > > Gibson died in 1979 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > > > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the > > > notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? > > > in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a > > > circular > > process. > > > > > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of > > > information processing between the organism and its environment in > > > a sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism > > > causes an environmental change that will be processed by sensory > > > systems, which will produce signals to inform the next action, and > > > so on. The perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the > > > adaptive success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, > > > where each action is contingent on the effects of the previous > > > one. The perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the > > > central nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed > > > behaviors engage only the lower levels of the perception-action > > > cycle, whereas, for sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs > > > through the spinal cord and > > subcortical structures. > > > > > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of > > > the cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator > > > of action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > > > > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s > > > the link too? > > > > > > > > 20 > > > Cy > > > cle_ > > > files/image295.jpg> > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > > > > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > > > > > > > mike > > > > --------------\ > > > > > > > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe > > > > flies through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing > > > > cut in the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set > > > > of phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut > > > > face of the tree, differences in the retina of the man, > > > > differences in the central nervous system, differences in his > > > > different neural messages, differences in the behaviour of his > > > > muscles, difference in how the axe flies, to the differences > > > > which the axe then makes on the face of the tree. Our > > > > explanation will go round and round that circuit. If you want to > > > > explain or understand anything in human behaviour, you are > > > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > > > > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to > > > > adopt this > > > > epistemology: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of > > > > this matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think > > > > ?Gregory Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > > > > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from > > > > the rest of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of > > > > thinking ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one > > > > reaches out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step > > > > is not an > > easy one. > > > > > > > > > > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally > > changes. > > > > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; > > > > and secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jan 31 13:15:58 2018 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 06:15:58 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "Context" or Object of activity In-Reply-To: <1334879954.344775.1517399665156@mail.yahoo.com> References: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> <1334879954.344775.1517399665156@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Welcome back, Sasha. I missed you! Not A but B. Not this, but that. Not wanting to be a Marxist, but really being one. Not arbitrarily semantifying, but actually acting upon objects. Not a passive envelope of context but a real object of activity. Not the arbitrariness of boundaries set by linguists but the naturalness of limits set by practical actions. It's a very convincing way to argue...but only so long as I can recognize myself in A, and recognize you in B. I can't. I don't think that Vygotsky only wanted to be a Marxist and Leontiev really was one. Nor do I think that people semantify arbitrarily--I think that language is a way of acting on "layers of air" according to the natural properties of the object, and I think that the relationship between wording and meaning is even more natural; I certainly think that human language use is part of nature, since humans themselves are part of nature. I think the way that I defined context, as all the elements of a social situation which may be transformed into meaning, is not at all passive; on the contrary, it presupposes sensuous activity more than an expression like "object of activity" does (and that is why the objectivist interpretation of Activity Theory is so prevalent). Therefore, I don't think that the boundary of abstraction that I want to set between a context and what Ruqaiya Hasan calls "material situational setting" is arbitrary at all: on the contrary, I think that it is a way of solving the problem that Andy raised (assuming that Andy really does want to solve the problem of including the explanans in the explanandum). If we say that a context is an abstraction from the world, and that it is made along lines that are laid down by language in culture and by text in a situation, then we don't have the problem of including the whole world in our representation of the world (which is a problem that is symmetrical to the one which Vygotsky, as a vigilant Marxist, raised--the problem of including the whole child in our representation of the child). To look at it from the other side, I don't think that Leontiev was really a Marxist, because I don't think that a Marxist would ever reject the idea that development has to take place through crises, as Leontiev did (Problems of the Development of Mind, p. 399). I don't think that there is any such thing as "actually acting on objects" that doesn't involve some semantic representation of that object--cutting down a tree, for example, involves knowing what a tree and an axe are, and what they are both used for. Our languages--all human languages--have lexical ways of representing unique objects, but no lexical ways of representing unique processes (that is, we have proper nouns that we capitalize, like Sasha and David and LSV and Moscow, but we have no proper verbs that we capitalize, like "The Way I Struck the Tree With My Axe at Precisely 5:56 in the Morning on February First 2018"). I don't think this is an unbounded abstraction from the world, nor do I think it is arbitrary. It seems perfectly bounded and natural to me, and so I think the fit between context and semantics is a natural one and not an arbitrary one: it is the attempt to say "Just do it!" that makes an arbitrary mess of human activities. Yes, I do recognize that the language used by linguists--including "context"--is not a familiar one for you or for Andy or for other people on this list (that's why I drew your attention to the word "text" in context--I don't normally argue from etymology, as Mike knows!). Yes, I am perfectly reconciled to yelling incomprehensible things into a void as a result. But I am not reconciled to giving up the word "context" or to separating it from language use. When a man wants to cut down a tree, it's very hard to separate him from his axe by simply repeating "not an axe but an object of activity". David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full David Kellogg Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change?' Free e-print available (for a short time only) at http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 8:54 PM, Alexander Surmava < alexander.surmava@yahoo.com> wrote: > ...for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > > and a context of situation is the ensemble of relations > > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > > text. > > > You can attribute any meaning to a theoretically sterile concept of > context, as you like "semanticize" it. > From the point of view of Marxism, in the logic of which Vygotsky WANTED > to theorize, and Leontiev and Ilyenkov really theorized, the subject does > not arbitrarily "semantify" his objects, that is, natural things, things > created by human labor and social relations, but actually act with them in > accordance with their nature. > > Context is not a magical entity that affects the subject "placed in this > context" in an incomprehensible magical way. Anything can "influence" the > subject if and only if the subject acts with this object. In other words, > to be exposed you must act yourself. Therefore, from an extremely broad and > theoretically vague idea of ??the "context" (as something that "surrounds" > the passive subject and for some reason affects it), we are forced to > isolate what the subject really interacts with, what he is working on, that > is, we must distinguish the concept of the object of activity, the real > PREDMET DEYATELNOSTI. Everything that surrounds the subject, but with which > he actively does not interact, any "context" with which the subject is not > active does not exist for the subject at all, just as before the discovery > of Becquerel the radioactive rays did not exist for human consciousness or > "psyche", although, of course really "surrounded" him whenever he had > carelessness to touch the salts of uranium or radium or to carry their > crystals in his pocket. > All this applies not only to the "hard things" surrounding us, but also to > such soft and delicate matter as social relations. Those relationships that > the subject is not able to at least try to somehow change by their own > activity in them, for the subject as it does not exist at all, they, as > Spinoza would say, are not adequately realized. Of course, the child is > able to remember such little things as words (signs), say that now the > president of the United States is Donald Trump. But really realizing the > beauty of this political (or medical) fact, he will only be able to get > involved in real relations with the political machine of the state through > participation in elections or other forms of political activism, when his > own activity will face fences erected by an elderly gentleman with an > outstanding hairdo not only on the Mexican border, but, say, between him > and the health care system. > Therefore, practical implications for the practical teacher and > psychologist are not numerous "contexts", the boundaries of which can only > be established by the arbitrariness of the authors of treatises on the > context, but the real objects, what our activities really deal with, what > it stumbles upon and what it comes to. > > Sasha > > ------------------------------ > *??:* Andy Blunden > *????:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *??????????:* ?????, 31 ?????? 2018 3:11 > *????:* [Xmca-l] Re: Bronfennbrenner discussion > > You can say that "context" is an "abstraction from the > world" if you like. But as Mike has shown, it is an > unbounded abstraction. E.G. a new twist in Cold War > diplomacy can skittle a 4thD project and/or open a new > project for kids in San Diego and Moscow. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > On 31/01/2018 10:52 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Andy--I don't understand how "context" means "the world". > > That's what Malinowski thought. But I'm a linguist, and > > for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > > and a context of situation is the ensemble of relations > > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > > text. But even if you are not a linguist, doesn't a > > "context" always mean something that goes with a text, > > like chili con carne goes with meat? > > > > dk > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Recent Article in /Mind, Culture, and Activity/ 24 (4) > > 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A > > Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to > > Developmental Change?' > > > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > Mike, I have never been a reader of Bronfennbrenner, so my > > comments may be immaterial here and I am happy if you and > > others simply let them go through to the 'keeper (i.e., > > catcher). > > > > You will recall that in my "Interdisciplinary" book I > > appreciated your work, but criticised it for your claim to > > include "context" in the "unit of analysis" on the basis > > that "context" was an "open ended totality" and to include > > it in the "unit of analysis" was to destroy the very > > idea of > > a "unit." > > > > A point of agreement between us though has been the > > need for > > what we both call a "meso-level" unit between the > > individual > > action and the world, and that my use of "project" to name > > this meso-level unit, and that the 5thD project was such a > > unit, persisting for more than an individual's > > lifetime and > > escaping the control of the founder, but yet falling short > > of macro-level units like the economy, science, the > > nation, etc. > > > > Yjro is quite right when he said "the context is the > > activity,", or rather "the activities." "The activity" > > is of > > course the project. But here Yrjo is being true to > > analysis > > by units. He is suggesting that the world is best > > conceived > > as being made up of activities (I would say "projects"). > > > > To claim to include the "context" (which as you know means > > "the world") *in* the unit which makes up the world, > > is the > > same logical fallacy as asking whether "I always lie" is a > > lie, and destroy the whole point of analysis by units, > > which > > is to approach understanding infinite totalities by > > means of > > little things that you can grasp, which none the less > > characterise the whole. This unit, projects, is mediating > > between the individual action and the world. > > > > The problem is, I think, Yrjo's redefinition of "unit of > > analysis" as (according to some of his students) "the unit > > to be analysed," which I characterise as that list you > > make > > up, of everything you're going to put in your suitcase, > > which you might need on your journey. This was *not* > > Vygotsky's idea, or that of Goethe, Hegel or Marx. > > > > Whatever the problem, what happens depends on the context. > > How do you conceive of the context? by units. The > > context is > > a totality not part of a unit. > > > > :) > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > > > On 31/01/2018 9:45 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Hi Jon- > > > > > > There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss > > in your article. I > > > guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of > > the process of designing > > > activities for kids in university-community > > partnerships is > > > an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm > > not sure. If I need a > > > defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood > > them useful, but I was > > > not testing his formulations in the same way you are > > concerned to do, but > > > using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and > > interpretation. > > > > > > While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a > > couple of observations. > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the > > microsystem--it's the only > > >> place in which culture is experienced. > > Microsystems are always embedded > > >> within culture (I'd add always within multiple > > cultures, but I don't think > > >> that Urie ever wrote that). > > >> > > >> Cheers, > > >> > > >> Jon > > >> > > >> > > >> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > >> > > >> Jonathan Tudge > > >> > > >> Professor > > >> Office: 155 Stone > > >> > > >> Our work on gratitude: > > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > > > >> > > >> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. > > (Eds.) Developing > > >> gratitude in children and adolescents > > >> > > > > > >> in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > >> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > >> > > >> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > > > >> > > >> Mailing address: > > >> 248 Stone Building > > >> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > >> PO Box 26170 > > >> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > >> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > >> USA > > >> > > >> phone (336) 223-6181 > > >> fax (336) 334-5076 > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer > > > wrote: > > >> > > >>> Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my > > microsystem had exploded! :) > > >>> > > >>> The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, > > why is culture in the > > >>> macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now > > interactions with other > > >>> people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) > > >>> > > >>> Martin > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge > > > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Greetings, Martin, > > >>>> > > >>>> I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint > > presentation). > > >>>> > > >>>> Cheers, > > >>>> > > >>>> Jon > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > >>>> > > >>>> Jonathan Tudge > > >>>> > > >>>> Professor > > >>>> Office: 155 Stone > > >>>> > > >>>> Our work on gratitude: > > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > > > >>>> > > >>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, > > L. (Eds.) Developing > > >>>> gratitude in children and adolescents > > >>>> > > > > > >>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > >>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > >>>> > > >>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > > > >>>> > > >>>> Mailing address: > > >>>> 248 Stone Building > > >>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > >>>> PO Box 26170 > > >>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > >>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > >>>> USA > > >>>> > > >>>> phone (336) 223-6181 > > >>>> fax (336) 334-5076 > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer > > > > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>> Hi Jon, > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Would it be possible for you to post here the > > figure you mentioned in > > >>> your > > >>>>> message, page 69 of your book? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Martin > > >>>>> > > >>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or > > Dr. Lowie or discuss > > >>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I > > become at once aware that > > >> my > > >>>>> partner does not understand anything in the > > matter, and I end usually > > >>> with > > >>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? > > (Malinowski, 1930) > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge > > > > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>> Hi, Mike, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 > > book. One is that the > > >>>>> papers > > >>>>>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to > > the early part of this > > >>>>>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings > > (and probably any > > >> theorist > > >>>>> who > > >>>>>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's > > really important to know > > >>> the > > >>>>>> date of publication. The other problem is that > > at least one of the > > >>>>>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in > > at least one other. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> As for the concentric circles or the > > matrioshka--they're both > > >> excellent > > >>>>>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go > > powerfully wrong! Both are > > >>>>>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus > > attention on the > > >>> different > > >>>>>> layers of context (and even then don't make > > sense--the mesosystem > > >>>>> consists > > >>>>>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). > > Nonetheless, you're > > >>>>>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his > > final publications. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> However, his theory really developed a lot from > > the 1970s onwards > > >> (see > > >>>>> Rosa > > >>>>>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the > > early 1990s onwards > > >>> "proximal > > >>>>>> processes" were the centerpiece of his > > Process-Person-Context-Time > > >>> (PPCT) > > >>>>>> model. These are essentially the everyday > > activities in which > > >>> developing > > >>>>>> people engage, and they always and only occur > > in microsystems. > > >>> However, > > >>>>>> what goes on in microsystems is always > > influenced by (a) the person > > >>>>>> characteristics of the developing individuals > > of interest and those > > >> of > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>> others with whom they interact, (b) the > > characteristics of the > > >> context, > > >>>>>> both proximal (as in the nature of the > > microsystem in which those > > >>>>>> activities are occurring) and distal (the > > macrosystem, which for him > > >>> was > > >>>>>> culture, whether considered at the level of > > society or within-society > > >>>>>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes > > both the need to study > > >>>>> over > > >>>>>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the > > prevailing social, economic, > > >> and > > >>>>>> political climate). A graphic representation > > that better reflects > > >>> his > > >>>>>> developed position than the concentric circles > > can be found in Tudge > > >>>>>> (2008), on page 69. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> I actually think that he rather dropped the > > ball on culture, > > >>>>>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on > > this in his 1979 book > > >> and > > >>>>> in > > >>>>>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological > > systems theory. Reading his > > >>>>> 1998 > > >>>>>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find > > virtually no mention of the > > >>>>> impact > > >>>>>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on > > Steinberg et al.'s > > >>>>> research > > >>>>>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just > > thought of > > >>>>> Bronfenbrenner's > > >>>>>> theory as one of concentric circles of > > context--you're no different > > >> in > > >>>>> that > > >>>>>> regard from just about everyone who has > > published an undergrad > > >> textbook > > >>>>> on > > >>>>>> human development, not to mention a majority of > > scholars who have > > >> said > > >>>>> that > > >>>>>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for > > their research (see > > >> Tudge > > >>> et > > >>>>>> al., 2009, 2016). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these > > papers, just send me a > > >>>>> private > > >>>>>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives > > of young children: > > >>>>>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse > > societies.* New York: > > >>>>>> Cambridge University Press. > > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., > > & Karnik, R. B. > > >> (2009). > > >>>>>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s > > bioecological theory of human > > >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and > > Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > > >>>>>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie > > Bronfenbrenner?s > > >> theory > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>> human development: Its evolution from ecology > > to bioecology. > > >> *Journal > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. > > DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. > > In Heather Montgomery > > >>>>>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: > > Childhood studies*. New York: > > >>>>>> Oxford University Press. > > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, > > E. A., Cao, H., Liang, > > >>> Y., > > >>>>>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused > > after all these > > >> years? > > >>> A > > >>>>>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s > > bioecological theory > > >> of > > >>>>> human > > >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and > > Review*, *8,* 427?445. > > >> doi: > > >>>>>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Cheers, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Jon > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Jonathan Tudge > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Professor > > >>>>>> Office: 155 Stone > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Our work on gratitude: > > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, > > L. (Eds.) Developing > > >>>>>> gratitude in children and adolescents > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > > >>>>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> My web > > site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Mailing address: > > >>>>>> 248 Stone Building > > >>>>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > > >>>>>> PO Box 26170 > > >>>>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > > >>>>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > > >>>>>> USA > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> phone (336) 223-6181 > > >>>>>> fax (336) 334-5076 > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole > > > wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Hi Jon -- > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Nice to see your voice! > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making > > Human Beings Human, *to > > >>>>> hand. I > > >>>>>>> checked it out > > >>>>>>> to see if the terms activity and context > > appeared there. Only sort > > >> of! > > >>>>>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not > > (!). I attach two pages > > >>>>> from > > >>>>>>> the book for those interested (and able to > > read my amateur > > >>>>>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and > > context coincide at the > > >> micro > > >>>>>>> level, but perhaps only there? > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It > > turns out that the > > >> person > > >>>>> who > > >>>>>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on > > human development was > > >> U. > > >>>>>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed > > with us how to > > >> represent > > >>>>> his > > >>>>>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the > > task of writing the > > >> first > > >>>>>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) > > as a metaphor and his > > >>>>>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > > >>>>>>> a concentric circles representation. We > > discussed other ways of > > >> trying > > >>>>> to > > >>>>>>> represent the idea and he > > >>>>>>> said that our representation came as close as > > he could figure out. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as > > combining a Vygotskian > > >> notion > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), > > and uses the term > > >>>>> "ecological > > >>>>>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian > > colleagues would argue > > >> that > > >>>>> LSV > > >>>>>>> used the concept of "social situation of > > development," not context. > > >> I > > >>>>> have > > >>>>>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's > > declaration that the activity > > >>> is > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from > > what is written on > > >> the > > >>>>> pages > > >>>>>>> attached. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at > > searching texts in > > >> cyrillic > > >>>>> could > > >>>>>>> search for his use of the term, context. I > > have always been curious > > >>>>> about > > >>>>>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the > > skill > > >>>>>>> to carry out the query. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> And perhaps you have written something about > > the mistake of > > >>> interpreting > > >>>>>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded > > circles we could learn > > >> from?? > > >>>>>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of > > the work of Hedegaard > > >> and > > >>>>>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > > > > > > > > > > From alexander.simakin@yahoo.com Wed Jan 31 15:13:45 2018 From: alexander.simakin@yahoo.com (Alexander Simakin) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 23:13:45 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "Context" or Object of activity In-Reply-To: <1334879954.344775.1517399665156@mail.yahoo.com> References: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> <1334879954.344775.1517399665156@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <297459230.708633.1517440425783@mail.yahoo.com> Dear Colleagues, For me as for a person who passed the school of real communication with Il'enkov, it also seems that the concept of the object of activity is much more concrete than the so-called ?context?. And this is not an arbitrary fantasy of the author of the post, who compared the term ?context? with the term ?object? of object-oriented activity. This is a conclusion from the whole history of philosophy (= theoretical psychology). And above all, this is the conclusion from Spinoza and Fichte, the conclusion made by Marx and formulated by him in the theses on Feuerbach. Before real activity, in abstraction from activity there is no thinking subject, nor its object, for the subject-object relationship itself makes sense only as a relation of the two poles of ACTIVITY. And, by the way, the specific "semantization", the acquisition by some external things of some meaning different from their own natural nature, before beginning to occur in the supposedly arbitrary imagination of the subject, should begin to occur in the activity itself. So the value of a spoon (shovel) as a means for carrying liquid or loose bodies does not arise in the arbitrary imagination of the subject, but in the real activity of man, in digging and eating. Similarly, the ax does not acquire its importance as a tool for cutting trees by the blacksmith or the master for the manufacture of stone axes, but in the activities of the woodcutter. Yours faithfully, On Wednesday, January 31, 2018, 2:54:30 PM GMT+3, Alexander Surmava wrote: ...for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > and a context of situation is the ensemble of? relations > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > text. ? ? ?? You can attribute any meaning to a theoreticallysterile concept of context, as you like "semanticize" it. From the point of view of Marxism, in the logic ofwhich Vygotsky WANTED to theorize, and Leontiev and Ilyenkov really theorized,the subject does not arbitrarily "semantify" his objects, that is,natural things, things created by human labor and social relations, butactually act with them in accordance with their nature. Context isnot a magical entity that affects the subject "placed in this context" in anincomprehensible magical way. Anything can "influence" the subject ifand only if the subject acts with this object. In other words, to be exposedyou must act yourself. Therefore, from an extremely broad and theoreticallyvague idea of ??the "context" (as something that"surrounds" the passive subject and for some reason affects it), weare forced to isolate what the subject really interacts with, what he isworking on, that is, we must distinguish the concept of the object of activity, the real PREDMET DEYATELNOSTI.Everything that surrounds the subject, but with which he actively does notinteract, any "context" with which the subject is not active does notexist for the subject at all, just as before the discovery of Becquerel theradioactive rays did not exist for human consciousness or "psyche",although, of course really "surrounded" him whenever he hadcarelessness to touch the salts of uranium or radium or to carry their crystalsin his pocket.All thisapplies not only to the "hard things" surrounding us, but also tosuch soft and delicate matter as social relations. Those relationships that thesubject is not able to at least try to somehow change by their own activity inthem, for the subject as it does not exist at all, they, as Spinoza would say,are not adequately realized. Of course, the child is able to remember suchlittle things as words (signs), say that now the president of the United Statesis Donald Trump. But really realizing the beauty of this political (or medical)fact, he will only be able to get involved in real relations with the politicalmachine of the state through participation in elections or other forms ofpolitical activism, when his own activity will face fences erected by anelderly gentleman with an outstanding hairdo not only on the Mexican border,but, say, between him and the health care system.Therefore, practical implications for thepractical teacher and psychologist are not numerous "contexts", theboundaries of which can only be established by the arbitrariness of the authorsof treatises on the context, but the real objects, what our activities reallydeal with, what it stumbles upon and what it comes to. Sasha ??: Andy Blunden ????: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ??????????: ?????, 31 ?????? 2018 3:11 ????: [Xmca-l] Re: Bronfennbrenner discussion You can say that "context" is an "abstraction from the world" if you like. But as Mike has shown, it is an unbounded abstraction. E.G. a new twist in Cold War diplomacy can skittle a 4thD project and/or open a new project for kids in San Diego and Moscow. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 31/01/2018 10:52 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Andy--I don't understand how "context" means "the world". > That's what Malinowski thought. But I'm a linguist, and > for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > and a context of situation is the ensemble of? relations > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > text. But even if you are not a linguist, doesn't a > "context" always mean something that goes with a text, > like chili con carne goes with meat? > > dk > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in /Mind, Culture, and Activity/ 24 (4) > 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A > Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to > Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >? ? Mike, I have never been a reader of Bronfennbrenner, so my >? ? comments may be immaterial here and I am happy if you and >? ? others simply let them go through to the 'keeper (i.e., >? ? catcher). > >? ? You will recall that in my "Interdisciplinary" book I >? ? appreciated your work, but criticised it for your claim to >? ? include "context" in the "unit of analysis" on the basis >? ? that "context" was an "open ended totality" and to include >? ? it in the "unit of analysis" was to destroy the very >? ? idea of >? ? a "unit." > >? ? A point of agreement between us though has been the >? ? need for >? ? what we both call a "meso-level" unit between the >? ? individual >? ? action and the world, and that my use of "project" to name >? ? this meso-level unit, and that the 5thD project was such a >? ? unit, persisting for more than an individual's >? ? lifetime and >? ? escaping the control of the founder, but yet falling short >? ? of macro-level units like the economy, science, the >? ? nation, etc. > >? ? Yjro is quite right when he said "the context is the >? ? activity,", or rather "the activities." "The activity" >? ? is of >? ? course the project. But here Yrjo is being true to >? ? analysis >? ? by units. He is suggesting that the world is best >? ? conceived >? ? as being made up of activities (I would say "projects"). > >? ? To claim to include the "context" (which as you know means >? ? "the world") *in* the unit which makes up the world, >? ? is the >? ? same logical fallacy as asking whether "I always lie" is a >? ? lie, and destroy the whole point of analysis by units, >? ? which >? ? is to approach understanding infinite totalities by >? ? means of >? ? little things that you can grasp, which none the less >? ? characterise the whole. This unit, projects, is mediating >? ? between the individual action and the world. > >? ? The problem is, I think, Yrjo's redefinition of "unit of >? ? analysis" as (according to some of his students) "the unit >? ? to be analysed," which I characterise as that list you >? ? make >? ? up, of everything you're going to put in your suitcase, >? ? which you might need on your journey. This was *not* >? ? Vygotsky's idea, or that of Goethe, Hegel or Marx. > >? ? Whatever the problem, what happens depends on the context. >? ? How do you conceive of the context? by units. The >? ? context is >? ? a totality not part of a unit. > >? ? :) > >? ? Andy > >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? Andy Blunden >? ? http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm >? ? >? ? On 31/01/2018 9:45 AM, mike cole wrote: >? ? > Hi Jon- >? ? > >? ? >? ? ? There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss >? ? in your article. I >? ? > guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of >? ? the process of designing >? ? > activities for kids in university-community >? ? partnerships is >? ? > an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm >? ? not sure.? If I need a >? ? > defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood >? ? them useful, but I was >? ? > not testing his formulations in the same way you are >? ? concerned to do, but >? ? > using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and >? ? interpretation. >? ? > >? ? >? ? While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a >? ? couple of observations. >? ? > >? ? > >? ? > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge >? ? > wrote: >? ? > >? ? >> Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the >? ? microsystem--it's the only >? ? >> place in which culture is experienced. >? ? Microsystems are always embedded >? ? >> within culture (I'd add always within multiple >? ? cultures, but I don't think >? ? >> that Urie ever wrote that). >? ? >> >? ? >> Cheers, >? ? >> >? ? >> Jon >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >? ? >> >? ? >> Jonathan Tudge >? ? >> >? ? >> Professor >? ? >> Office: 155 Stone >? ? >> >? ? >> Our work on gratitude: >? ? http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >? ? >? ? >> >? ? >> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. >? ? (Eds.) Developing >? ? >> gratitude in children and adolescents >? ? >> >? ? ? ? >? ? >> in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >? ? >> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >? ? >> >? ? >> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >? ? >? ? >> >? ? >> Mailing address: >? ? >> 248 Stone Building >? ? >> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >? ? >> PO Box 26170 >? ? >> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >? ? >> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >? ? >> USA >? ? >> >? ? >> phone (336) 223-6181 >? ? >> fax? (336) 334-5076 >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> >? ? >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer >? ? > wrote: >? ? >> >? ? >>> Wow, very graphic!? At first I thought my >? ? microsystem had exploded!? :) >? ? >>> >? ? >>> The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, >? ? why is culture in the >? ? >>> macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now >? ? interactions with other >? ? >>> people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) >? ? >>> >? ? >>> Martin >? ? >>> >? ? >>> >? ? >>> >? ? >>> >? ? >>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge >? ? > wrote: >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Greetings, Martin, >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint >? ? presentation). >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Cheers, >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Jon >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Jonathan Tudge >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Professor >? ? >>>> Office: 155 Stone >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Our work on gratitude: >? ? http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >? ? >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, >? ? L. (Eds.) Developing >? ? >>>> gratitude in children and adolescents >? ? >>>> >? ? ? ? >? ? >>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >? ? >>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >? ? >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> Mailing address: >? ? >>>> 248 Stone Building >? ? >>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >? ? >>>> PO Box 26170 >? ? >>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >? ? >>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >? ? >>>> USA >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> phone (336) 223-6181 >? ? >>>> fax? (336) 334-5076 >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>>> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer >? ? > >? ? >>> wrote: >? ? >>>>> Hi Jon, >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> Would it be possible for you to post here the >? ? figure you mentioned in >? ? >>> your >? ? >>>>> message, page 69 of your book? >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> Martin >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or >? ? Dr. Lowie or discuss >? ? >>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I >? ? become at once aware that >? ? >> my >? ? >>>>> partner does not understand anything in the >? ? matter, and I end usually >? ? >>> with >? ? >>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? >? ? (Malinowski, 1930) >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge >? ? > >? ? >> wrote: >? ? >>>>>> Hi, Mike, >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 >? ? book.? One is that the >? ? >>>>> papers >? ? >>>>>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to >? ? the early part of this >? ? >>>>>> century.? As is true of Vygotsky's writings >? ? (and probably any >? ? >> theorist >? ? >>>>> who >? ? >>>>>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's >? ? really important to know >? ? >>> the >? ? >>>>>> date of publication.? The other problem is that >? ? at least one of the >? ? >>>>>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in >? ? at least one other. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> As for the concentric circles or the >? ? matrioshka--they're both >? ? >> excellent >? ? >>>>>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go >? ? powerfully wrong!? Both are >? ? >>>>>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus >? ? attention on the >? ? >>> different >? ? >>>>>> layers of context (and even then don't make >? ? sense--the mesosystem >? ? >>>>> consists >? ? >>>>>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). >? ? Nonetheless, you're >? ? >>>>>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his >? ? final publications. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> However, his theory really developed a lot from >? ? the 1970s onwards >? ? >> (see >? ? >>>>> Rosa >? ? >>>>>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the >? ? early 1990s onwards >? ? >>> "proximal >? ? >>>>>> processes" were the centerpiece of his >? ? Process-Person-Context-Time >? ? >>> (PPCT) >? ? >>>>>> model.? These are essentially the everyday >? ? activities in which >? ? >>> developing >? ? >>>>>> people engage, and they always and only occur >? ? in microsystems. >? ? >>> However, >? ? >>>>>> what goes on in microsystems is always >? ? influenced by (a) the person >? ? >>>>>> characteristics of the developing individuals >? ? of interest and those >? ? >> of >? ? >>>>> the >? ? >>>>>> others with whom they interact, (b) the >? ? characteristics of the >? ? >> context, >? ? >>>>>> both proximal (as in the nature of the >? ? microsystem in which those >? ? >>>>>> activities are occurring) and distal (the >? ? macrosystem, which for him >? ? >>> was >? ? >>>>>> culture, whether considered at the level of >? ? society or within-society >? ? >>>>>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes >? ? both the need to study >? ? >>>>> over >? ? >>>>>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the >? ? prevailing social, economic, >? ? >> and >? ? >>>>>> political climate).? ? A graphic representation >? ? that better reflects >? ? >>> his >? ? >>>>>> developed position than the concentric circles >? ? can be found in Tudge >? ? >>>>>> (2008), on page 69. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> I actually think that he rather dropped the >? ? ball on culture, >? ? >>>>>> unfortunately.? I really like his writings on >? ? this in his 1979 book >? ? >> and >? ? >>>>> in >? ? >>>>>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological >? ? systems theory.? Reading his >? ? >>>>> 1998 >? ? >>>>>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find >? ? virtually no mention of the >? ? >>>>> impact >? ? >>>>>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on >? ? Steinberg et al.'s >? ? >>>>> research >? ? >>>>>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just >? ? thought of >? ? >>>>> Bronfenbrenner's >? ? >>>>>> theory as one of concentric circles of >? ? context--you're no different >? ? >> in >? ? >>>>> that >? ? >>>>>> regard from just about everyone who has >? ? published an undergrad >? ? >> textbook >? ? >>>>> on >? ? >>>>>> human development, not to mention a majority of >? ? scholars who have >? ? >> said >? ? >>>>> that >? ? >>>>>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for >? ? their research (see >? ? >> Tudge >? ? >>> et >? ? >>>>>> al., 2009, 2016). >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these >? ? papers, just send me a >? ? >>>>> private >? ? >>>>>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu >? ? >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>? - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives >? ? of young children: >? ? >>>>>>? Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse >? ? societies.* New York: >? ? >>>>>>? Cambridge University Press. >? ? >>>>>>? - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., >? ? & Karnik, R. B. >? ? >> (2009). >? ? >>>>>>? Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s >? ? bioecological theory of human >? ? >>>>>>? development. *Journal of Family Theory and >? ? Review, 1*(4), 198-210. >? ? >>>>>>? - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie >? ? Bronfenbrenner?s >? ? >> theory >? ? >>>>> of >? ? >>>>>>? human development: Its evolution from ecology >? ? to bioecology. >? ? >> *Journal >? ? >>>>> of >? ? >>>>>>? Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. >? ? DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 >? ? >>>>>>? - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. >? ? In Heather Montgomery >? ? >>>>>>? (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: >? ? Childhood studies*. New York: >? ? >>>>>>? Oxford University Press. >? ? >>>>>>? - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, >? ? E. A., Cao, H., Liang, >? ? >>> Y., >? ? >>>>>>? Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused >? ? after all these >? ? >> years? >? ? >>> A >? ? >>>>>>? re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s >? ? bioecological theory >? ? >> of >? ? >>>>> human >? ? >>>>>>? development. *Journal of Family Theory and >? ? Review*, *8,* 427?445. >? ? >> doi: >? ? >>>>>>? 10.1111/jftr.12165. >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Cheers, >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Jon >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Jonathan Tudge >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Professor >? ? >>>>>> Office: 155 Stone >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Our work on gratitude: >? ? http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ >? ? >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, >? ? L. (Eds.) Developing >? ? >>>>>> gratitude in children and adolescents >? ? >>>>>> >? ? ? ? >? ? >>>>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, >? ? >>>>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> My web >? ? site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge >? ? >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> Mailing address: >? ? >>>>>> 248 Stone Building >? ? >>>>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies >? ? >>>>>> PO Box 26170 >? ? >>>>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro >? ? >>>>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 >? ? >>>>>> USA >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> phone (336) 223-6181 >? ? >>>>>> fax? (336) 334-5076 >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole >? ? > wrote: >? ? >>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> Hi Jon -- >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> Nice to see your voice! >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making >? ? Human Beings Human, *to >? ? >>>>> hand. I >? ? >>>>>>> checked it out >? ? >>>>>>> to see if the terms activity and context >? ? appeared there. Only sort >? ? >> of! >? ? >>>>>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not >? ? (!). I attach two pages >? ? >>>>> from >? ? >>>>>>> the book for those interested (and able to >? ? read my amateur >? ? >>>>>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and >? ? context coincide at the >? ? >> micro >? ? >>>>>>> level, but perhaps only there? >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It >? ? turns out that the >? ? >> person >? ? >>>>> who >? ? >>>>>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on >? ? human development was >? ? >> U. >? ? >>>>>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed >? ? with us how to >? ? >> represent >? ? >>>>> his >? ? >>>>>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the >? ? task of writing the >? ? >> first >? ? >>>>>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) >? ? as a metaphor and his >? ? >>>>>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites >? ? >>>>>>> a concentric circles representation. We >? ? discussed other ways of >? ? >> trying >? ? >>>>> to >? ? >>>>>>> represent the idea and he >? ? >>>>>>> said that our representation came as close as >? ? he could figure out. >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as >? ? combining a Vygotskian >? ? >> notion >? ? >>>>> of >? ? >>>>>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), >? ? and uses the term >? ? >>>>> "ecological >? ? >>>>>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian >? ? colleagues would argue >? ? >> that >? ? >>>>> LSV >? ? >>>>>>> used the concept of "social situation of >? ? development," not context. >? ? >> I >? ? >>>>> have >? ? >>>>>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's >? ? declaration that the activity >? ? >>> is >? ? >>>>> the >? ? >>>>>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from >? ? what is written on >? ? >> the >? ? >>>>> pages >? ? >>>>>>> attached. >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at >? ? searching texts in >? ? >> cyrillic >? ? >>>>> could >? ? >>>>>>> search for his use of the term, context. I >? ? have always been curious >? ? >>>>> about >? ? >>>>>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the >? ? skill >? ? >>>>>>> to carry out the query. >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> And perhaps you have written something about >? ? the mistake of >? ? >>> interpreting >? ? >>>>>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded >? ? circles we could learn >? ? >> from?? >? ? >>>>>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of >? ? the work of Hedegaard >? ? >> and >? ? >>>>>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>>>> mike >? ? >>>>>>> >? ? >>>>> >? ? >>>> >? ? >>> >? ? > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed Jan 31 17:09:58 2018 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 01:09:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "Context" or Object of activity In-Reply-To: <297459230.708633.1517440425783@mail.yahoo.com> References: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> <1334879954.344775.1517399665156@mail.yahoo.com>, <297459230.708633.1517440425783@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1517447401909.3673@iped.uio.no> Dear Alexander, thanks for your thoughtful and valuable contribution. I would like to note, however, that everyone contributing here does so out of genuine and real interest, and not out of arbitrary fantasy, even if with that what is meant is to make the point of the necessity and unity of the object (versus the arbitrariness of signs or thoughts outside of real practical activity). The practical activity of typing this or this other idea is as real for one idea as it is for the other one. And in fact, it was Spinoza who noted that "inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas". I am just adding this to make clear that, while we may more or less passionately argue for one or another idea, it is the ideas, and not the authors of the ideas, that are at stake. I am sure you already were in agreement, so apologies if I am just stating what already was obvious to all. That said, I am very sympathetic to the idea that "context", if it is external in the sense of arbitrary, does not add much to our understanding. But Andy, how does your point about "unbounded abstraction" connect to this? Alfredo ________________________________ From: Alexander Simakin Sent: 01 February 2018 00:13 To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ?Haydi Zulfei? ??; Alfredo Jornet Gil; Mike Cole; David Kellogg; Alexander Surmava Cc: Huw Lloyd Subject: Re: "Context" or Object of activity Dear Colleagues, For me as for a person who passed the school of real communication with Il'enkov, it also seems that the concept of the object of activity is much more concrete than the so-called ?context?. And this is not an arbitrary fantasy of the author of the post, who compared the term ?context? with the term ?object? of object-oriented activity. This is a conclusion from the whole history of philosophy (= theoretical psychology). And above all, this is the conclusion from Spinoza and Fichte, the conclusion made by Marx and formulated by him in the theses on Feuerbach. Before real activity, in abstraction from activity there is no thinking subject, nor its object, for the subject-object relationship itself makes sense only as a relation of the two poles of ACTIVITY. And, by the way, the specific "semantization", the acquisition by some external things of some meaning different from their own natural nature, before beginning to occur in the supposedly arbitrary imagination of the subject, should begin to occur in the activity itself. So the value of a spoon (shovel) as a means for carrying liquid or loose bodies does not arise in the arbitrary imagination of the subject, but in the real activity of man, in digging and eating. Similarly, the ax does not acquire its importance as a tool for cutting trees by the blacksmith or the master for the manufacture of stone axes, but in the activities of the woodcutter. Yours faithfully, On Wednesday, January 31, 2018, 2:54:30 PM GMT+3, Alexander Surmava wrote: ...for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > and a context of situation is the ensemble of relations > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > text. You can attribute any meaning to a theoretically sterile concept of context, as you like "semanticize" it. From the point of view of Marxism, in the logic of which Vygotsky WANTED to theorize, and Leontiev and Ilyenkov really theorized, the subject does not arbitrarily "semantify" his objects, that is, natural things, things created by human labor and social relations, but actually act with them in accordance with their nature. Context is not a magical entity that affects the subject "placed in this context" in an incomprehensible magical way. Anything can "influence" the subject if and only if the subject acts with this object. In other words, to be exposed you must act yourself. Therefore, from an extremely broad and theoretically vague idea of ??the "context" (as something that "surrounds" the passive subject and for some reason affects it), we are forced to isolate what the subject really interacts with, what he is working on, that is, we must distinguish the concept of the object of activity, the real PREDMET DEYATELNOSTI. Everything that surrounds the subject, but with which he actively does not interact, any "context" with which the subject is not active does not exist for the subject at all, just as before the discovery of Becquerel the radioactive rays did not exist for human consciousness or "psyche", although, of course really "surrounded" him whenever he had carelessness to touch the salts of uranium or radium or to carry their crystals in his pocket. All this applies not only to the "hard things" surrounding us, but also to such soft and delicate matter as social relations. Those relationships that the subject is not able to at least try to somehow change by their own activity in them, for the subject as it does not exist at all, they, as Spinoza would say, are not adequately realized. Of course, the child is able to remember such little things as words (signs), say that now the president of the United States is Donald Trump. But really realizing the beauty of this political (or medical) fact, he will only be able to get involved in real relations with the political machine of the state through participation in elections or other forms of political activism, when his own activity will face fences erected by an elderly gentleman with an outstanding hairdo not only on the Mexican border, but, say, between him and the health care system. Therefore, practical implications for the practical teacher and psychologist are not numerous "contexts", the boundaries of which can only be established by the arbitrariness of the authors of treatises on the context, but the real objects, what our activities really deal with, what it stumbles upon and what it comes to. Sasha ________________________________ ??: Andy Blunden ????: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ??????????: ?????, 31 ?????? 2018 3:11 ????: [Xmca-l] Re: Bronfennbrenner discussion You can say that "context" is an "abstraction from the world" if you like. But as Mike has shown, it is an unbounded abstraction. E.G. a new twist in Cold War diplomacy can skittle a 4thD project and/or open a new project for kids in San Diego and Moscow. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 31/01/2018 10:52 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Andy--I don't understand how "context" means "the world". > That's what Malinowski thought. But I'm a linguist, and > for me "context" is an abstraction from the world: a > context of culture is the ensemble of relations in the > world which we choose to semanticize in a given language, > and a context of situation is the ensemble of relations > in the world which we choose to semanticize in a single > text. But even if you are not a linguist, doesn't a > "context" always mean something that goes with a text, > like chili con carne goes with meat? > > dk > > David Kellogg > > Recent Article in /Mind, Culture, and Activity/ 24 (4) > 'Metaphoric, Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A > Commentary on ?Neoformation: A Dialectical Approach to > Developmental Change?' > > Free e-print available (for a short time only) at > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full > > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > > Mike, I have never been a reader of Bronfennbrenner, so my > comments may be immaterial here and I am happy if you and > others simply let them go through to the 'keeper (i.e., > catcher). > > You will recall that in my "Interdisciplinary" book I > appreciated your work, but criticised it for your claim to > include "context" in the "unit of analysis" on the basis > that "context" was an "open ended totality" and to include > it in the "unit of analysis" was to destroy the very > idea of > a "unit." > > A point of agreement between us though has been the > need for > what we both call a "meso-level" unit between the > individual > action and the world, and that my use of "project" to name > this meso-level unit, and that the 5thD project was such a > unit, persisting for more than an individual's > lifetime and > escaping the control of the founder, but yet falling short > of macro-level units like the economy, science, the > nation, etc. > > Yjro is quite right when he said "the context is the > activity,", or rather "the activities." "The activity" > is of > course the project. But here Yrjo is being true to > analysis > by units. He is suggesting that the world is best > conceived > as being made up of activities (I would say "projects"). > > To claim to include the "context" (which as you know means > "the world") *in* the unit which makes up the world, > is the > same logical fallacy as asking whether "I always lie" is a > lie, and destroy the whole point of analysis by units, > which > is to approach understanding infinite totalities by > means of > little things that you can grasp, which none the less > characterise the whole. This unit, projects, is mediating > between the individual action and the world. > > The problem is, I think, Yrjo's redefinition of "unit of > analysis" as (according to some of his students) "the unit > to be analysed," which I characterise as that list you > make > up, of everything you're going to put in your suitcase, > which you might need on your journey. This was *not* > Vygotsky's idea, or that of Goethe, Hegel or Marx. > > Whatever the problem, what happens depends on the context. > How do you conceive of the context? by units. The > context is > a totality not part of a unit. > > :) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm > > On 31/01/2018 9:45 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Jon- > > > > There are obviously a ton of issues to discuss > in your article. I > > guess that my paper on using his ideas as part of > the process of designing > > activities for kids in university-community > partnerships is > > an example of inappropriate mis-appropriations. I'm > not sure. If I need a > > defense its that I thought the ideas as I understood > them useful, but I was > > not testing his formulations in the same way you are > concerned to do, but > > using (some of) them for planning, analysis, and > interpretation. > > > > While trying to sort that out, I'll just make a > couple of observations. > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Jonathan Tudge > >> wrote: > > > >> Yes, Martin, there always is culture within the > microsystem--it's the only > >> place in which culture is experienced. > Microsystems are always embedded > >> within culture (I'd add always within multiple > cultures, but I don't think > >> that Urie ever wrote that). > >> > >> Cheers, > >> > >> Jon > >> > >> > >> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >> > >> Jonathan Tudge > >> > >> Professor > >> Office: 155 Stone > >> > >> Our work on gratitude: > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > >> > >> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. > (Eds.) Developing > >> gratitude in children and adolescents > >> > > >> in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >> > >> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > >> > >> Mailing address: > >> 248 Stone Building > >> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >> PO Box 26170 > >> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >> USA > >> > >> phone (336) 223-6181 > >> fax (336) 334-5076 > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Martin Packer > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Wow, very graphic! At first I thought my > microsystem had exploded! :) > >>> > >>> The 20,000 dollar question for me has always been, > why is culture in the > >>> macrosystem? Is there no culture in my here-&-now > interactions with other > >>> people? (Well, perhaps in my case not!) > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 6:34 PM, Jonathan Tudge > >> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Greetings, Martin, > >>>> > >>>> I hope that this works (taken from a powerpoint > presentation). > >>>> > >>>> Cheers, > >>>> > >>>> Jon > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >>>> > >>>> Jonathan Tudge > >>>> > >>>> Professor > >>>> Office: 155 Stone > >>>> > >>>> Our work on gratitude: > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > >>>> > >>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, > L. (Eds.) Developing > >>>> gratitude in children and adolescents > >>>> > > >>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >>>> > >>>> My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > >>>> > >>>> Mailing address: > >>>> 248 Stone Building > >>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >>>> PO Box 26170 > >>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >>>> USA > >>>> > >>>> phone (336) 223-6181 > >>>> fax (336) 334-5076 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Martin Packer > >> > >>> wrote: > >>>>> Hi Jon, > >>>>> > >>>>> Would it be possible for you to post here the > figure you mentioned in > >>> your > >>>>> message, page 69 of your book? > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> "I may say that whenever I meet Mrs. Seligman or > Dr. Lowie or discuss > >>>>> matters with Radcliffe-Brown or Kroeber, I > become at once aware that > >> my > >>>>> partner does not understand anything in the > matter, and I end usually > >>> with > >>>>> the feeling that this also applies to myself? > (Malinowski, 1930) > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Jan 29, 2018, at 10:24 AM, Jonathan Tudge > >> > >> wrote: > >>>>>> Hi, Mike, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> There are a couple of problems with the 2005 > book. One is that the > >>>>> papers > >>>>>> are drawn from UB's writings from the 1970s to > the early part of this > >>>>>> century. As is true of Vygotsky's writings > (and probably any > >> theorist > >>>>> who > >>>>>> wrote over a significant span of time) it's > really important to know > >>> the > >>>>>> date of publication. The other problem is that > at least one of the > >>>>>> chapters is incomplete, and there are errors in > at least one other. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As for the concentric circles or the > matrioshka--they're both > >> excellent > >>>>>> examples of how powerful metaphors can go > powerfully wrong! Both are > >>>>>> utterly misleading, in that they really focus > attention on the > >>> different > >>>>>> layers of context (and even then don't make > sense--the mesosystem > >>>>> consists > >>>>>> of overlapping circles, as in a Venn diagram). > Nonetheless, you're > >>>>>> right--UB continued to use the metaphor in his > final publications. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> However, his theory really developed a lot from > the 1970s onwards > >> (see > >>>>> Rosa > >>>>>> and Tudge, 2013; Tudge, 2013), and from the > early 1990s onwards > >>> "proximal > >>>>>> processes" were the centerpiece of his > Process-Person-Context-Time > >>> (PPCT) > >>>>>> model. These are essentially the everyday > activities in which > >>> developing > >>>>>> people engage, and they always and only occur > in microsystems. > >>> However, > >>>>>> what goes on in microsystems is always > influenced by (a) the person > >>>>>> characteristics of the developing individuals > of interest and those > >> of > >>>>> the > >>>>>> others with whom they interact, (b) the > characteristics of the > >> context, > >>>>>> both proximal (as in the nature of the > microsystem in which those > >>>>>> activities are occurring) and distal (the > macrosystem, which for him > >>> was > >>>>>> culture, whether considered at the level of > society or within-society > >>>>>> cultural groups), and (c) time, which includes > both the need to study > >>>>> over > >>>>>> time (longitudinally) and in time (the > prevailing social, economic, > >> and > >>>>>> political climate). A graphic representation > that better reflects > >>> his > >>>>>> developed position than the concentric circles > can be found in Tudge > >>>>>> (2008), on page 69. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I actually think that he rather dropped the > ball on culture, > >>>>>> unfortunately. I really like his writings on > this in his 1979 book > >> and > >>>>> in > >>>>>> his 1989 (or 1992) chapter on ecological > systems theory. Reading his > >>>>> 1998 > >>>>>> (or 2006) handbook chapters you'll find > virtually no mention of the > >>>>> impact > >>>>>> of culture (or macrosystem) despite drawing on > Steinberg et al.'s > >>>>> research > >>>>>> on adolescents from different racial/ethnic groups. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Don't feel bad, though, if you have always just > thought of > >>>>> Bronfenbrenner's > >>>>>> theory as one of concentric circles of > context--you're no different > >> in > >>>>> that > >>>>>> regard from just about everyone who has > published an undergrad > >> textbook > >>>>> on > >>>>>> human development, not to mention a majority of > scholars who have > >> said > >>>>> that > >>>>>> they've used UB's theory as foundational for > their research (see > >> Tudge > >>> et > >>>>>> al., 2009, 2016). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> If anyone would like a copy of any of these > papers, just send me a > >>>>> private > >>>>>> message to jrtudge@uncg.edu > > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2008). *The everyday lives > of young children: > >>>>>> Culture, class, and child rearing in diverse > societies.* New York: > >>>>>> Cambridge University Press. > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Mokrova, I., Hatfield, B., > & Karnik, R. B. > >> (2009). > >>>>>> Uses and misuses of Bronfenbrenner?s > bioecological theory of human > >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and > Review, 1*(4), 198-210. > >>>>>> - Rosa, E. M., & Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie > Bronfenbrenner?s > >> theory > >>>>> of > >>>>>> human development: Its evolution from ecology > to bioecology. > >> *Journal > >>>>> of > >>>>>> Family Theory and Review, 5*(6), 243?258. > DOI:10.1111/jftr.12022 > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H. (2013). Urie Bronfenbrenner. > In Heather Montgomery > >>>>>> (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies on line: > Childhood studies*. New York: > >>>>>> Oxford University Press. > >>>>>> - Tudge, J. R. H., Payir, A., Mer?on-Vargas, > E. A., Cao, H., Liang, > >>> Y., > >>>>>> Li, J., & O?Brien, L. T. (2016). Still misused > after all these > >> years? > >>> A > >>>>>> re-evaluation of the uses of Bronfenbrenner?s > bioecological theory > >> of > >>>>> human > >>>>>> development. *Journal of Family Theory and > Review*, *8,* 427?445. > >> doi: > >>>>>> 10.1111/jftr.12165. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Cheers, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Jon > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ~~~~~~~~~~~ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Jonathan Tudge > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Professor > >>>>>> Office: 155 Stone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Our work on gratitude: > http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, > L. (Eds.) Developing > >>>>>> gratitude in children and adolescents > >>>>>> > > >>>>> gratitude-in-children-and-adolescents-flyer.pdf>, > >>>>>> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My web > site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mailing address: > >>>>>> 248 Stone Building > >>>>>> Department of Human Development and Family Studies > >>>>>> PO Box 26170 > >>>>>> The University of North Carolina at Greensboro > >>>>>> Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 > >>>>>> USA > >>>>>> > >>>>>> phone (336) 223-6181 > >>>>>> fax (336) 334-5076 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 6:20 PM, mike cole > >> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Jon -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Nice to see your voice! > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I only have Urie's 2005 collection, *Making > Human Beings Human, *to > >>>>> hand. I > >>>>>>> checked it out > >>>>>>> to see if the terms activity and context > appeared there. Only sort > >> of! > >>>>>>> Activity is in the index, but context is not > (!). I attach two pages > >>>>> from > >>>>>>> the book for those interested (and able to > read my amateur > >>>>>>> photos). Here it seems that activity and > context coincide at the > >> micro > >>>>>>> level, but perhaps only there? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Concerning embedded circles and context. It > turns out that the > >> person > >>>>> who > >>>>>>> induced Sheila and me to write a textbook on > human development was > >> U. > >>>>>>> Bronfenbrenner. And this same U.B. discussed > with us how to > >> represent > >>>>> his > >>>>>>> perspective circa 1985, pretty early in the > task of writing the > >> first > >>>>>>> edition. His use of matroshki (embedded dolls) > as a metaphor and his > >>>>>>> rhetoric at the time (and in 2005 as well) invites > >>>>>>> a concentric circles representation. We > discussed other ways of > >> trying > >>>>> to > >>>>>>> represent the idea and he > >>>>>>> said that our representation came as close as > he could figure out. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In the 2005 book he refers to my work as > combining a Vygotskian > >> notion > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> context with an anthropological one (p. 126), > and uses the term > >>>>> "ecological > >>>>>>> context." I assume that most of my Russian > colleagues would argue > >> that > >>>>> LSV > >>>>>>> used the concept of "social situation of > development," not context. > >> I > >>>>> have > >>>>>>> no idea how he would respond to Yrjo's > declaration that the activity > >>> is > >>>>> the > >>>>>>> context, but it does not seem too far off from > what is written on > >> the > >>>>> pages > >>>>>>> attached. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Perhaps someone on xmca who is skilled at > searching texts in > >> cyrillic > >>>>> could > >>>>>>> search for his use of the term, context. I > have always been curious > >>>>> about > >>>>>>> what such a search would turn up, but lack the > skill > >>>>>>> to carry out the query. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> And perhaps you have written something about > the mistake of > >>> interpreting > >>>>>>> U.B.'s notion of contexts using embedded > circles we could learn > >> from?? > >>>>>>> Certainly the passages on p. 46 remind me of > the work of Hedegaard > >> and > >>>>>>> Fleer, who also draw upon U.B. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Jan 31 17:39:05 2018 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 12:39:05 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "Context" or Object of activity In-Reply-To: <1517447401909.3673@iped.uio.no> References: <0dc79f2d-1447-51b1-25f8-efc653d43a46@mira.net> <1334879954.344775.1517399665156@mail.yahoo.com> <297459230.708633.1517440425783@mail.yahoo.com> <1517447401909.3673@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <5ee667fe-a3a6-1291-af34-7a5acadf5669@mira.net> As Mike has pointed out on numerous occasions the "context" of even the most modest project or action by an individual, may turn out to be a geopolitical/historical event. There is no boundary which can be draw such that 'nothing outside this boundary counts as context'. So, when a theorist refers to 'context', either they have privileged God-like prescience or they mean by "context" the entire, unbounded totality of events in the world during or prior to this action. So to refer to this unbounded totality with the term "context" and join it to either the research subject or within the "unit of analysis" is to utilise an "unbounded abstraction." The issue raised here is not whether analysis is impossible of course, but simply, what is the appropriate methodology for researching unbounded totalities? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm On 1/02/2018 12:09 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > .... > > > That said, I am very sympathetic to the idea > that "context", if it is external in the sense of > arbitrary, does not add much to our understanding. But > Andy, how does your point about "unbounded abstraction" > connect to this? > > > Alfredo > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > From jrtudge@uncg.edu Wed Jan 31 18:13:55 2018 From: jrtudge@uncg.edu (Jonathan Tudge) Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 21:13:55 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This is, of course, a great quote, and not for nothing is the word "ecology" found in the title of Bateson's book. True, when trying to explain the phenomenon of the axe cutting the tree, ALL of the things he mentioned are important, and all are interconnected. But that's not very helpful from a developmental point of view. If I want to do a better job cutting trees there are some things that there's not much point me trying to work on (in particular, I don't know what I'd need to do to work on my central nervous system). But I could get a sharper axe (or by a better one), because the sharpness is one thing that influences the cutting. Influences, but clearly doesn't cause. I might also work on my muscles, as they also influence the cutting. Perhaps getting better glasses would help. Practicing my skills would be another useful factor (influence?). In other words, if we want to make some changes it would be worth considering all these as mutually relevant influences, and maybe I work on them separately (going to the gym to increase muscle strength, to the opticians for glasses), even while at the same time realizing that they're all constitutive of the whole process. There again, I'd also better think about the broader influences--am I cutting wood to put into my fireplace to burn for its aesthetic nature, as my heating system at home is fine? Or is this a skill that's really important in my cultural group because without it I'm not going to be able to construct my home, or be able to survive the winter, in which case I'm likely to be learning how to wield the axe in the company of others who are more competent. So, in response to Mike's earlier point in response to me...I don't think that "influence" means "cause." And I think that when considering emergent properties we have to realize both that those properties can never be reduced to the things that brought them into being, but it's worth considering how A might be influencing B even while recognizing that some of that influence has already been in turn influenced by B (and C, D, E, etc.). And getting back to Bronfenbrenner, although he's typically viewed as someone who viewed context (different, though interwoven, layers of context, Andy) as causal, his theory is as ecological (or bioecological) as Bateson's. Cheers, Jon ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jonathan Tudge Professor Office: 155 Stone Our work on gratitude: http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/ A new book just published: Tudge, J. & Freitas, L. (Eds.) Developing gratitude in children and adolescents , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press My web site:http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/faculty/tudge Mailing address: 248 Stone Building Department of Human Development and Family Studies PO Box 26170 The University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC 27402-6170 USA phone (336) 223-6181 fax (336) 334-5076 On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > mike > --------------\ > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies through > the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing cut in the side of the > tree. If we now want to explain this set of phenomena, we shall be > concerned with differences in the cut face of the tree, differences in the > retina of the man, differences in the central nervous system, differences > in his different neural messages, differences in the behaviour of his > muscles, difference in how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe > then makes on the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round > that circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in human > behaviour, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to adopt this > epistemology: > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this matter; > but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory Bateson? is cutting > down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? is to me still an > excessively concrete object, different from the rest of what I have been > calling ?mind?. > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of thinking ? so > that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches out for a glass of > water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an easy one. > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally changes. > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; and > secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > From d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk Wed Jan 31 23:56:44 2018 From: d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk (WEBSTER, DAVID S.) Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 07:56:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F953ACDD10@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <07B013F7-C8CE-4AE3-935C-AF5B04DBC71E@cantab.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F953ACDD10@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Just a thought before bed- >From Knowing and the Known N1: The transactional is in fact that point of view which systematically proceeds upon the ground that knowing is co-operative and as such is integral with communication - In Preface. N2: Our own procedure is the transactional, in which is asserted the right to see together, extensionally and durationally, much that is talked about conventionally as if it were composed of irreconcilable separates. Page 120 The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Gibson 1966): The rat had to behave [act] before he could perceive, but in the course of exploration the utility of the lever became evident: it afforded food?the rat?s attention to the food affordance persisted? Page 272-3. Gloss: the rat?s exploratory behaviour is apiece [extensionally and durationally not separately] with its perception [pick up of stimulus information] of an invariant between the moved lever and the provision of food ?the rat sees together extensionally and durationally [transactionally] the lever and the provided food. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 31 January 2018 18:45 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively Hi all, Just a bit of background on the Bateson quote(s), at least from my subjective perspective. Bateson was in the middle of a big argument at the time between cyberneticists and second order cyberneticists. The big issue from what I have read is that cyberneticists believe that you can locate and manipulate an objective circuit (i.e. continuous feedback loops) that is separate from the person locating it. The second order cyberneticists (Bateson's position) was that you could never remove the individual who was observing the feedback loops from the feedback loop itself. The person observing the loop was also steering it from his own perspective. I'm not sure if this was directly related to the objective, subjective distinction but it definitely fits with it. I think Bateson would have thought the type of neuroscience circuits that Martin describes as first order and might not have been too happy with them. I do think there is a natural affinity between Gibson and his idea of affordances and Bateson and the larger idea of second order cybernetics. This would indeed be a fascinating topic to pursue. Michael I'm not sure what you mean by transactional. Do you mean Dewey's definition (across actions) or a more common definition? Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2018 11:26 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively Gibson is clearly relevant, but so is Bronfenbrenner. He was struggling to overcome the idea of a one way, top town, Outter?->inner causation in the direction that Jon is urging, I believe. The passage cited in my note with this subject line was part of his unease with concentric circles. This is reflected in UB?s critique of the use of multiple regression. (But multiple regression can be a useful tool. It was one of the methods used in the Scribner/Cole research on Vai literacy) Mike On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:44 AM WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote: > The problem here is that you feel the need to put selects in scare quotes. > I am all for Dewey but I am not sure you are right about Gibson not > being transactional but where Gibson had got to when he died was > already a hard enough sell. A good topic to pursue through > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: 31 January 2018 15:26 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > But Gibson is not transactional in the way Bateson is. For Bateson (or > Dewey or others), there is no "natural" affordance. In other words, > the human also would be the affordance to the door knob, not merely > the door knob an affordance to humans. The door knob "selects" humans > over other animals... The environment "samples" the individual as much > as the individual "samples" the environment... > > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 7:14 AM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. < > d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk > > wrote: > > > The perception-action cycle has been a topic of debate in the > > Gibsonian literature since the early -mid 1980s i.e. just after > > Gibson died in 1979 > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Packer > > Sent: 31 January 2018 14:56 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bateson on thinking relatively > > > > I?m struck by the similarity between Bateson?s description and the > > notion floating around in neuroscience of a ?perception-action cycle,? > > in which brain, body, and environment are each components in a > > circular > process. > > > > The perception-action cycle is a circular cybernetic flow of > > information processing between the organism and its environment in a > > sequence of goal-directed actions. An action of the organism causes > > an environmental change that will be processed by sensory systems, > > which will produce signals to inform the next action, and so on. The > > perception-action cycle is of prime importance for the adaptive > > success of a temporally extended gestalt of behavior, where each > > action is contingent on the effects of the previous one. The > > perception-action cycle operates at all levels of the central > > nervous system. Simple, automatic, and well rehearsed behaviors > > engage only the lower levels of the perception-action cycle, > > whereas, for sensorimotor integration, the cycle runs through the > > spinal cord and > subcortical structures. > > > > To the extent that deliberate, reflexive planning becomes part of > > the cycle on its highest levels, the sense of being the initiator of > > action can be hard to resist. But it?s just the walnut on the cupcake. > > > > Here?s a diagram, though it?ll be probably be removed, so here?s the > > link too? > > > > > Cy > > cle_ > > files/image295.jpg> > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > Darned if I did not find that Bateson passage online! Amazing. > > > Here it is from *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* > > > > > > mike > > > --------------\ > > > > > > Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe > > > flies through the air and makes certain gashes in a pre-existing > > > cut in the side of the tree. If we now want to explain this set of > > > phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the cut face > > > of the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in > > > the central nervous system, differences in his different neural > > > messages, differences in the behaviour of his muscles, difference > > > in how the axe flies, to the differences which the axe then makes > > > on the face of the tree. Our explanation will go round and round > > > that circuit. If you want to explain or understand anything in > > > human behaviour, you are > > always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. > > > (Bateson, 1972, p. 433) > > > > > > > > > > > > Later in the same paper he writes about how difficult it is to > > > adopt this > > > epistemology: > > > > > > > > > > > > I can stand here and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this > > > matter; but if I am cutting down a tree, I still think ?Gregory > > > Bateson? is cutting down a tree. I am cutting down the tree. ?Myself? > > > is to me still an excessively concrete object, different from the > > > rest of what I have been calling ?mind?. > > > > > > > > > > > > The step to realizing ? to making habitual ? the other way of > > > thinking ? so that one naturally thinks that way when one reaches > > > out for a glass of water or cuts down a tree ? that step is not an > easy one. > > > > > > > > > .... Once we have made this shift, our perspective fundamentally > changes. > > > We firstly start focusing on relationships, flows and patterns; > > > and secondly realize that we are part of any field we are studying. > > > > > > > >