[Xmca-l] Re: language and music
Andy Blunden
andyb@marxists.org
Tue Dec 11 15:59:54 PST 2018
Yes, Peirce is very powerful. As I understand it, a sign
transforms itself from an utterrer to an interpreter, that's
how he incorporates signalling into the object | sign |
interpretant triad. And he sees human subjectivity as a
process of semiosis which is connected semiotically to all
the other semiotic processes in the universe. If anyone
could adequately represent language as a system of signs, it
would be Peirce. The issue I am raisin is Similar to
Spinoza's representation of God, including human
consciousness as causality. Peirce triadic structure is
superior to Spinioza's diadic structure because it allows
for mediation, but the problem is the same.
Thank you for your observations, David.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
On 12/12/2018 10:27 am, David Kellogg wrote:
> (I wrote this a week ago and didn't post it--we've been
> having the Moscow Summer School down here in Sydney, where
> the summers come around Christmastime and you can lecture
> in your bare feet....there is a little post scriptum to
> try to make it relevant to what Andy's thinking. But right
> now it seems to me the most pressing issue is to come back
> to music....)
>
> Hallidayans would say that "interpretant" is as good as a
> Subject, because we don't really distinguish between
> reception and production of signs. (The model has to be
> kept neutral, in order to be parsimonious.) Is that
> Peircean, or Saussurean?
>
> Peirce says that a pencil line is an icon (because it is a
> sign without an object, since Euclidean lines that have no
> width and infinite extension do not actually exist). Then
> he says that a bullet hole in piece of moulding (he has in
> mind the sort of thing you see on nineteenth century
> buildings) is an index (because it is a sign without an
> interpretant).
>
> I guess that means that music is icon, and not index?
>
> David Kellogg
> Sangmyung University
>
> PS: One difference between scientific concepts and
> everyday ones is that the former develop through
> differentiation rather than just adding once generalized
> representation to another through experience. I don't
> think it's an absolute difference: I think that
> differentiation is often a product of reflection
> (refraction, perezhivanie, rising to the concrete) and
> that is, after all, one kind of representation and one
> kind of experience, but it's a special kind.
>
> Differentiation is finding differences that make a
> difference (Bateson). Both Vygotsky and Peirce
> differentiate signs, but in somewhat different ways, and
> it seems to me that it's a difference that makes a
> difference.
>
> Vygotsky differentiates signs into signals (the red leaves
> are a signal of winter) and symbols (the red light is a
> traffic light symbol). The difference is whether
> consciousness is involved or not. I think that Vygotsky
> would reject the idea that consciousness can be reduced to
> a "second signal system": that was a tactical maneuver to
> try to make his work compatible with vulgar behaviorism in
> the fifties. Note that even the idea that consciousness is
> a "reaction to a reaction" or a "perezhivanie of a
> perezhivanie" is not reducible to a "second signal system"
> so long as you understand that signals do not involve
> consciousness.
>
> Peirce differentiates signs into firstness, secondness,
> and thirdness: icons (where no object is required),
> indexes (where no interpretant is required) and symbols
> (where alll three are present and accounted for in the
> meaning). I think this is a logical rather than a
> psychological distinction, and it needs to be interpreted
> psychologically before we can talk about language. But
> there are a lot of linguists who would disagree with that,
> because there is a strong desire to abolish psychology in
> linguistics (c.f. Jim Martin).
>
> Music education has struggled with this for a long time:
> is music icon, index, or symbol? Orff (the Nazi) believed
> it was an icon, and you teach children to imagine their
> bodies as a drum. Suzuki believed it was an index, and you
> teach it as result of a practice which can be
> interpersonal or individual. Only Kodaly treats music as
> language and taught us to teach music as a literacy. But
> of course then music is meaning, not sounding.
>
> dk
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 12:14 PM Greg Thompson
> <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> (and, to be sure, on this listserve I'm really the one
> playing the "different" game/tune)
>
> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 7:44 PM Greg Thompson
> <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Not "behind" Andy - you're playing a different game!
> (And it happens to be one in which I am terribly
> "behind"!)
>
> And I generally agree with your appraisal, but it
> makes me wonder what you've concluded with regard
> to Colapietro's characterization of Peirce's
> notion of the self? I believe you were the one who
> shared it with me but from your tone here I assume
> that you feel that it falls short in theorizing a
> "subject"/self. Care to expand on that any?
> Particularly with regard to the shortcomings of
> the theory?
>
> -greg
> [p.s. And perhaps instead of "playing games" we
> might turn the metaphor back to the original
> thread by noting(!) that we are simply "playing
> different tunes"?
> Often discordant but occasionally resonant...]
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 6:16 PM Andy Blunden
> <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>>
> wrote:
>
> Thanks Greg. It's good to hear that I am
> thoroughly behind the game! :) Thank you.
>
> I think Peirce's semiotics has the great
> advantage in that it does /not /include the
> category of Subject in its triads (e.g. sign |
> interpretant | object). This means that it can
> be used for the analysis of /objective/
> processes. When used in this way it does not
> imply "thinking" at all. That virtue of
> Peirce's semiotics was the basis of my
> objection to James's observation. Speech and
> gesture has a subject.
>
> The other minor point I would make about your
> very erudite response is that I think we
> should not be too apologetic about using the
> concept of "mind." True, mind is not a
> sensible entity, but in all human interactions
> we deduce the state of minds from the
> observable behaviour, and in fact (scientific
> or everyday) human behaviour is
> incomprehensible without the presumption that
> it is mindful to this or that extent.
> Otherwise, we become Behaviourists, and
> Chomsky would murder us! :)
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
> On 3/12/2018 11:53 am, Greg Thompson wrote:
>> Andy,
>>
>> My short response would depend on whether
>> you'd prefer to be critical or charitable
>> toward linguistic anthropologists.
>>
>> The critical approach would say that with a
>> few exceptions (e.g., Elinor Ochs, Paul
>> Kockelman, Elizabeth Mertz, John Lucy, among
>> others), you are right.
>>
>> The charitable approach would say that
>> linguistic anthropologists are in fact
>> dealing with precisely the things that you
>> are talking about. Most of the ones that I
>> know are anti-Chomskyian, to say the least.
>> Most of them are grappling with issues of
>> practice, not just studying formal structures
>> that exist in someplace called "the mind"
>> (where is that exactly?). In fact, one of the
>> greatest insults to the linguistic
>> anthropologists that I know is to call them a
>> "butterfly collector" - that is to say, a
>> mere documenter of language variation across
>> the globe. Most of the ones I know are in
>> fact very mindful of understanding the
>> practical consequences of semiotic forms. In
>> his book Talking Heads Benjamin Lee makes
>> precisely the point that you are making
>> through his deployment of Peirce to Critique
>> Saussure. Peirce offers a means of grasping
>> semiosis as a lived practice rather than one
>> that exists only in the "mind" (as Saussure's
>> approach to semiotics would suggest).
>>
>> The critical approach is nice because you can
>> just dispense with linguistic anthropology
>> and all their gobbly-gook jargon as
>> irrelevant. The charitable approach might
>> suggest that we should at least acknowledge
>> their project. That's all I was hoping to do.
>> I figured that there might be a few who are
>> interested, but most on the listserve will
>> find that it wasn't worth investing the time
>> - and I don't blame them! (as someone in this
>> goofy world of academia, I'm very sensitive
>> to the fact that learning the language of an
>> entirely new system is a major time
>> commitment and only worth it in rare cases).
>>
>> I think things get a bit more complicated
>> when we get to the issue of the semiosis of
>> non-human agents that you seemed to be poking
>> at (e.g., Eduardo Kohn's book How Forests
>> Think). I understand that you are very much a
>> humanist and don't like this approach for
>> some very fundamental reasons. I'm not
>> entirely committed to this position (Kohn's)
>> and so I'm not the best person to make the
>> case for this position - unless you are
>> really genuinely interested. And besides, I'm
>> already well beyond your one screen rule!
>>
>> Cheers,
>> greg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 5:28 PM Andy Blunden
>> <andyb@marxists.org
>> <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>>
>> So I gather confirmation from your
>> message, Greg: "most of the
>> anthropologists I know, linguistic or
>> otherwise, don't have much interest in
>> talking about such things as
>> psychological functioning" and therefore,
>> it seems to me, little interest in what
>> people do as well as what they think. In
>> other words, the turn to seeing language
>> as a system of Peircean signs is an
>> entirely *formal* project. Yes, the
>> babbling of a brook or the babbling of a
>> band of monkeys can be formally analysed
>> with the same set of concepts as the
>> babbling of a group of humans in
>> conversation. But this is purely formal,
>> superficial and obscures what is
>> expressed and transacted in the human babble.
>>
>> I can understand the fascination in such
>> formal disciplines, I accept that
>> Peircean Semiotics can be a tool of
>> analysis, and often insights come out
>> from such formal disciplines relevant to
>> the real world (mathematics being the
>> supreme example), but ....! One really
>> has to keep in mind that words are not
>> Peircean signs. To answer the question of
>> how it is that humans alone have language
>> by saying that everything has language,
>> even inanimate processes (and this is how
>> I interpret the equation of language with
>> Peircean signs), is somewhat more than
>> missing the point.
>>
>> As an example of how such formal
>> processes lead to grave errors is the
>> Language Acquisition Device "proved" to
>> exist by Chomsky's formal analysis of
>> language. And yet to hold that an actual
>> biological, neuronal formation as a LAD
>> exists in all human beings in quite
>> inconsistent with the foundations of
>> biology, i.e., Darwinian evolution.
>> Either Darwin or Chomsky, but not both.
>> Which tells me that there is a problem
>> with this formal analysis, even though I
>> gasp in wonder every time Google manages
>> to correctly parse an ordinary language
>> question I ask it and deliver very
>> relevant answers.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden
>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>
>> On 2/12/2018 2:51 am, Greg Thompson wrote:
>>> [I hesitate to send a post like this to
>>> this group for precisely the reasons
>>> Helena mentioned previously (the
>>> proliferation of technical languages in
>>> different fields and the time-intensive
>>> labor of translating terms/meanings of
>>> entire systems of thinking from one of
>>> these fields to the next). Add the fact
>>> that there are few who have much
>>> interest in one of the field of
>>> linguistic anthropology (and esp. how
>>> ling anthro has taken up Peicean
>>> semiotics - a tangle of words in its own
>>> right), and this means the following
>>> post will likely remain an orphan (not
>>> at all because of anyone's ill
>>> intentions but simply because this is an
>>> impossible situation for anyone to
>>> commit to learning an entirely new
>>> language for talking about language!).]
>>>
>>> Yes James, as a Peircean, I assume that
>>> you would point to (!) the indexical and
>>> iconic potentials of SPOKEN language
>>> while noting that this flattens the
>>> oft-made distinction between gesture and
>>> the spoken word? Our dominant ideology
>>> of language tends to assume that spoken
>>> language is (only?) symbolic and gesture
>>> is only indexical and iconic. Peirce's
>>> notion of indexical and iconic functions
>>> offers us a way into seeing how spoken
>>> language is also indexical and iconic
>>> (as opposed to Saussure who dismissed
>>> them out of hand - e.g., in the Course
>>> he dismisses onomatopoeia (iconic) and
>>> "shifters" (indexical) as irrelevant to
>>> his project).
>>>
>>> Following Peirce's vision, Roman
>>> Jakobson was one of the first to point
>>> to the problem of this dominant ideology
>>> of language, and Michael Silverstein has
>>> made a rather substantial career off of
>>> this simple point, first elaborated in
>>> his famous 1976 paper on "shifters" and
>>> since then in numerous other works. Many
>>> others working in linguistic
>>> anthropology have spent the last 40
>>> years expanding on this project by
>>> exploring the indexical and iconic
>>> nature of spoken language in the
>>> concepts of "indexicality" and
>>> "iconization". More recently linguistic
>>> anthropologists have considered the
>>> processes by which sign-functions can
>>> shift from one function to another -
>>> e.g., rhematization - from indexical or
>>> symbolic to iconic (see Susan Gal and
>>> Judy Irvine's work), and iconization -
>>> from symbolic or iconic to
>>> indexical (see Webb Keane's and Chris
>>> Ball's work). And others have looked at
>>> more basic features of sign-functioning
>>> such as the realization of qualia (see
>>> Lily Chumley and Nicholas Harkness'
>>> special issue in Anthro theory).
>>>
>>> The relevance of all this for the
>>> present list serve is that the processes
>>> being described by these linguistic
>>> anthropologists are fundamental to
>>> understanding human psychological
>>> functioning and yet most of the
>>> anthropologists I know, linguistic or
>>> otherwise, don't have much interest in
>>> talking about such things as
>>> psychological functioning (one exception
>>> here is Paul Kockelman, e.g., in his
>>> book Person, Agent, Subject, Self -
>>> although beware that his writing is just
>>> as dense as Peirce's!). Anyway, I
>>> suspect that this could be a
>>> particularly productive intersection for
>>> development.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> -greg
>>>
>>> On Fri, Nov 30, 2018 at 8:40 AM HENRY
>>> SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Right on, James!
>>>
>>>> On Nov 30, 2018, at 12:16 AM, James
>>>> Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com
>>>> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Henry, personally I prefer Xmca-I
>>>> discussion to be exploratory and
>>>> free style, allowing for the
>>>> coexistence of subjectness and
>>>> subjectless. When it comes to
>>>> scholarly writing, we know we will
>>>> switch the code.
>>>>
>>>> James
>>>>
>>>> HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>> 于
>>>> 2018年11月29日周四 18:58写道：
>>>>
>>>> James,
>>>> This conversation has been so
>>>> satisfying I don’t want to let
>>>> go of it, so I hope I am not
>>>> tiring you or others with all
>>>> the connections I find. But, in
>>>> the spirit of Alfredo’s post,
>>>> I’ll just keep on talking and
>>>> remark on how the duck tail
>>>> hair cut is a rich gesture, an
>>>> important concept in this
>>>> subject line. Gesture is an
>>>> aspect of communication present
>>>> in many species. Hence, the
>>>> importance of gesture as a
>>>> rudimentary form of language
>>>> with evolutionary results in
>>>> human language. Maybe this is a
>>>> reach, but I see the business
>>>> of quotes in the subject line
>>>> now taking place (Anna
>>>> Stetsenko and Anne-Nelly
>>>> Perret-Clermont, contributing
>>>> right now) on the last chapter
>>>> of Vygotsky’s Speech and
>>>> Language as an issue of
>>>> gesture. Language, written
>>>> language in this case, is
>>>> limited in its ability to
>>>> provide nuance. Writing without
>>>> quotes “gestured”, pointed to
>>>> to author sources familar in
>>>> the day that Vygotsky wrote,
>>>> such that quotes were not
>>>> necessary. Dan Slobin,
>>>> psycholinguist at Univ of Calf,
>>>> wrote that two charges of
>>>> language where in “tension”: 1)
>>>> make yourself clear and 2) get
>>>> it said before losing the
>>>> thread of thinking and talking.
>>>> Gesture, I would like to argue,
>>>> is an aspect of discourse that
>>>> helps to address this tension.
>>>> A turn (in discourse) is a
>>>> gesture, with temporal
>>>> constraints that belie the idea
>>>> that a single turn can ever be
>>>> totally clear in and of itself.
>>>> Writing, as we are doing now,
>>>> is always dialogic, even a
>>>> whole book, is a turn in
>>>> discourse. And we keep on
>>>> posting our turns.
>>>> Henry
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Nov 29, 2018, at 8:56 AM,
>>>>> James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Henry, Elvis Presley is spot
>>>>> on for this subject line!
>>>>>
>>>>> The ducktail hairstyle is
>>>>> fabulous. Funnily
>>>>> enough, it is what my brother
>>>>> would always like his
>>>>> 9-year-old son to have because
>>>>> he has much thicker hair than
>>>>> most boys. Unfortunately last
>>>>> year the boy had
>>>>> a one-day show off in the
>>>>> classroom and was ticked off
>>>>> by the school authority (in
>>>>> China). However, my brother
>>>>> has managed to
>>>>> restore the ducktail twice a
>>>>> year during the boy's long
>>>>> school holiday in winter and
>>>>> summer!
>>>>>
>>>>> I suppose the outlines of
>>>>> conversation are predictable
>>>>> due to participants'
>>>>> intersubjective awareness of
>>>>> the subject. Yet, the nuances
>>>>> of conversation (just like
>>>>> each individual's ducktail
>>>>> unique to himself) are
>>>>> unpredictable because of the
>>>>> waywardness of our mind.
>>>>> What's more,
>>>>> such nuances create the
>>>>> fluidity of conversation which
>>>>> makes it difficult (or
>>>>> even unnecessary)
>>>>> to predict what comes next -
>>>>> this is perhaps the whole
>>>>> point that keeps us talking,
>>>>> as Alfredo pointed out earlier.
>>>>>
>>>>> James
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, 28 Nov 2018 at 22:19,
>>>>> HENRY SHONERD
>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Back at you, James. The
>>>>> images of the mandarin
>>>>> drake reminded me of a
>>>>> hair style popularin the
>>>>> late 50s when I was in
>>>>> high school (grades 9-12):
>>>>> ducktail haircuts images
>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=ducktail+haircuts+images&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8>.
>>>>> One of the photos in the
>>>>> link is of Elvis Presley,
>>>>> an alpha male high school
>>>>> boys sought to emulate.
>>>>> Note that some of the
>>>>> photos are of women,
>>>>> interesting in light of
>>>>> issues of gender fluidity
>>>>> these days. I don’t
>>>>> remember when women
>>>>> started taking on the hair
>>>>> style. Since I mentioned
>>>>> Elvis Presley, this post
>>>>> counts as relevant to the
>>>>> subject line! Ha!
>>>>> Henry
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Nov 28, 2018, at 7:39
>>>>>> AM, James Ma
>>>>>> <jamesma320@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thank you Henry.
>>>>>> More on mandarin duck,
>>>>>> just thought you might
>>>>>> like to see:
>>>>>> https://www.livingwithbirds.com/tweetapedia/21-facts-on-mandarin-duck
>>>>>>
>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD
>>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
>>>>>> 于 2018年11月27日周二
>>>>>> 19:30写道：
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What a beautiful
>>>>>> photo, James, and
>>>>>> providing it is a
>>>>>> move on this subject
>>>>>> line that
>>>>>> instantiates nicely
>>>>>> Gee’s conception of
>>>>>> discourse. Thanks for
>>>>>> your thoughtful and
>>>>>> helpful response.
>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Nov 27, 2018, at
>>>>>>> 11:11 AM, James Ma
>>>>>>> <jamesma320@gmail.com
>>>>>>> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Henry, thanks for
>>>>>>> the info on Derek
>>>>>>> Bickerton. One of
>>>>>>> the interesting
>>>>>>> things is his
>>>>>>> conception of
>>>>>>> displacement as the
>>>>>>> hallmark of
>>>>>>> language, whether
>>>>>>> iconic, indexical or
>>>>>>> symbolic. In the
>>>>>>> case of Chinese
>>>>>>> language, the sounds
>>>>>>> are decontextualised
>>>>>>> or sublimated over
>>>>>>> time to become
>>>>>>> something more
>>>>>>> integrated into the
>>>>>>> words themselves as
>>>>>>> ideographs. Some of
>>>>>>> Bickerton's ideas
>>>>>>> are suggestive of
>>>>>>> the study of
>>>>>>> protolanguage as an
>>>>>>> /a priori /process,
>>>>>>> involving scrupulous
>>>>>>> deduction. This
>>>>>>> reminds me of
>>>>>>> methods used in
>>>>>>> diachronic
>>>>>>> linguistics, which I
>>>>>>> felt are relevant to
>>>>>>> CHAT just as much as
>>>>>>> those used in
>>>>>>> synchronic linguistics.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regarding
>>>>>>> "intermental" and
>>>>>>> "intramental", I can
>>>>>>> see your point. In
>>>>>>> fact I don't take
>>>>>>> Vygotsky's
>>>>>>> "interpsychological"
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> "intrapsychological"
>>>>>>> categories to
>>>>>>> be dichotomies or
>>>>>>> binary opposites.
>>>>>>> Whenever it comes to
>>>>>>> their relationship,
>>>>>>> I tend to have a
>>>>>>> post-structuralism
>>>>>>> imagery present in
>>>>>>> my mind,
>>>>>>> particularly related
>>>>>>> to a Derridean
>>>>>>> stance for the
>>>>>>> conception of ideas
>>>>>>> (i.e.any idea is not
>>>>>>> entirely distinct
>>>>>>> from other ideas in
>>>>>>> terms of the "thing
>>>>>>> itself"; rather, it
>>>>>>> entails a supplement
>>>>>>> of the other idea
>>>>>>> which is already
>>>>>>> embedded in the
>>>>>>> self). Vygotsky's
>>>>>>> two categoriesare
>>>>>>> relational
>>>>>>> (dialectical); they
>>>>>>> are somehow like a
>>>>>>> pair of mandarin
>>>>>>> ducks (see attached
>>>>>>> image). I also like
>>>>>>> to think that each
>>>>>>> of these categories
>>>>>>> is both
>>>>>>> "discourse-in-context"
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> "context-for-discourse"
>>>>>>> (here discourse is
>>>>>>> in tune with James
>>>>>>> Gee's conception of
>>>>>>> discourse as a
>>>>>>> patchwork of
>>>>>>> actions,
>>>>>>> interactions,
>>>>>>> thoughts, feelings
>>>>>>> etc). I recall
>>>>>>> Barbara Rogoff
>>>>>>> talking about there
>>>>>>> being no boundary
>>>>>>> between the external
>>>>>>> and the internal or
>>>>>>> the boundary being
>>>>>>> blurred (during her
>>>>>>> seminar in the
>>>>>>> Graduate School of
>>>>>>> Education at Bristol
>>>>>>> in 2001 while I
>>>>>>> was doing my PhD).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, 21 Nov 2018
>>>>>>> at 23:14, HENRY
>>>>>>> SHONERD
>>>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> James,
>>>>>>> I think it was
>>>>>>> Derek Bickerton
>>>>>>> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derek_Bickerton)
>>>>>>> who argued that
>>>>>>> “formal syntax”
>>>>>>> developed from
>>>>>>> stringing
>>>>>>> together turns
>>>>>>> in verbal
>>>>>>> interaction. The
>>>>>>> wiki on
>>>>>>> Bickerton I have
>>>>>>> linked is short
>>>>>>> and raises
>>>>>>> issues discussed
>>>>>>> in this subject
>>>>>>> line and in the
>>>>>>> subject line on
>>>>>>> Corballis.
>>>>>>> Bickerton brings
>>>>>>> me back to the
>>>>>>> circularity of
>>>>>>> discourse and
>>>>>>> the development
>>>>>>> of discourse
>>>>>>> competence.
>>>>>>> Usage-based
>>>>>>> grammar.
>>>>>>> Bickerton’s idea
>>>>>>> that complex
>>>>>>> grammar
>>>>>>> developed out of
>>>>>>> the pidgins of
>>>>>>> our ancestors is
>>>>>>> interesting. Do
>>>>>>> I see a
>>>>>>> chicken/egg
>>>>>>> problem that for
>>>>>>> Vygotsky, “…the
>>>>>>> intramental
>>>>>>> forms of
>>>>>>> semiotic
>>>>>>> mediation is
>>>>>>> better
>>>>>>> understood by
>>>>>>> examining the
>>>>>>> types of
>>>>>>> intermental
>>>>>>> processes”? I
>>>>>>> don’t know.
>>>>>>> Could one say
>>>>>>> that inner
>>>>>>> speech is the
>>>>>>> vehicle for
>>>>>>> turning
>>>>>>> discourse into
>>>>>>> grammar?
>>>>>>> Bickerton
>>>>>>> claimed a strong
>>>>>>> biological
>>>>>>> component to
>>>>>>> human language,
>>>>>>> though I don’t
>>>>>>> remember if he
>>>>>>> was a Chomskian.
>>>>>>> I hope this is
>>>>>>> coherent
>>>>>>> thinking in the
>>>>>>> context of our
>>>>>>> conversation.
>>>>>>> All that jazz.
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Nov 21,
>>>>>>>> 2018, at 3:22
>>>>>>>> PM, James Ma
>>>>>>>> <jamesma320@gmail.com
>>>>>>>> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Alfredo, I'd
>>>>>>>> agree with Greg
>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>> intersubjectivity
>>>>>>>> is relevant and
>>>>>>>> pertinent here.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As I see it,
>>>>>>>> intersubjectivity
>>>>>>>> transcends
>>>>>>>> "outlines" or
>>>>>>>> perhaps
>>>>>>>> sublimates the
>>>>>>>> "muddledness"
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> "unpredictability"
>>>>>>>> of a
>>>>>>>> conversation
>>>>>>>> (as in
>>>>>>>> Bateson's
>>>>>>>> metalogue) into
>>>>>>>> what Rommetveit
>>>>>>>> termed the
>>>>>>>> "draft of a
>>>>>>>> contract". This
>>>>>>>> is because
>>>>>>>> shared
>>>>>>>> understanding makes
>>>>>>>> explicit and
>>>>>>>> external what
>>>>>>>> would otherwise
>>>>>>>> remain implicit
>>>>>>>> and internal.
>>>>>>>> Rommetveit
>>>>>>>> argues
>>>>>>>> that private
>>>>>>>> worlds can only
>>>>>>>> be transcended
>>>>>>>> up to a certain
>>>>>>>> level and
>>>>>>>> interlocutors
>>>>>>>> need to agree
>>>>>>>> upon the draft
>>>>>>>> of a contract
>>>>>>>> with which the
>>>>>>>> communication
>>>>>>>> can be
>>>>>>>> initiated. In
>>>>>>>> the spirit of
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky, he
>>>>>>>> uses a
>>>>>>>> "pluralistic"
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> "social-cognitive"
>>>>>>>> approach to
>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>> communication -
>>>>>>>> and especially
>>>>>>>> to the problem
>>>>>>>> of linguistic
>>>>>>>> mediation and
>>>>>>>> regulation in
>>>>>>>> interpsychological
>>>>>>>> functioning,
>>>>>>>> with reference
>>>>>>>> to semantics,
>>>>>>>> syntactics and
>>>>>>>> pragmatics. For
>>>>>>>> him,
>>>>>>>> the intramental
>>>>>>>> forms of
>>>>>>>> semiotic
>>>>>>>> mediation is
>>>>>>>> better
>>>>>>>> understood by
>>>>>>>> examining the
>>>>>>>> types of
>>>>>>>> intermental
>>>>>>>> processes.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think these
>>>>>>>> intermental
>>>>>>>> processes
>>>>>>>> (just like
>>>>>>>> intramental
>>>>>>>> ones) can be
>>>>>>>> boiled down or
>>>>>>>> distilled to
>>>>>>>> signs and
>>>>>>>> symbols with
>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>> interlocutors
>>>>>>>> are in harmony
>>>>>>>> during a
>>>>>>>> conversation or
>>>>>>>> any other joint
>>>>>>>> activities.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> */________________________________________________/*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> /*James Ma
>>>>>>>> *Independent
>>>>>>>> Scholar
>>>>>>>> //https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa
>>>>>>>> /
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, 21 Nov
>>>>>>>> 2018 at 08:09,
>>>>>>>> Alfredo Jornet
>>>>>>>> Gil
>>>>>>>> <a.j.gil@ils.uio.no
>>>>>>>> <mailto:a.j.gil@ils.uio.no>>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Henry's
>>>>>>>> remarks
>>>>>>>> about no
>>>>>>>> directors
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> symphonic
>>>>>>>> potential of
>>>>>>>> conversation reminded
>>>>>>>> me of
>>>>>>>> G. Bateson's
>>>>>>>> metalogue
>>>>>>>> "why do
>>>>>>>> things have
>>>>>>>> outlines"
>>>>>>>> (attached). Implicitly,
>>>>>>>> it raises
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> question of
>>>>>>>> units and
>>>>>>>> elements,
>>>>>>>> of how a
>>>>>>>> song, a
>>>>>>>> dance, a
>>>>>>>> poem, a
>>>>>>>> conversation,
>>>>>>>> to make
>>>>>>>> sense, they
>>>>>>>> must have a
>>>>>>>> recognizable
>>>>>>>> outline,
>>>>>>>> even in
>>>>>>>> improvisation;
>>>>>>>> they must
>>>>>>>> be wholes,
>>>>>>>> or suggest
>>>>>>>> wholes.
>>>>>>>> That makes
>>>>>>>> them
>>>>>>>> "predictable". And
>>>>>>>> yet, when
>>>>>>>> you are
>>>>>>>> immersed in
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> conversation,
>>>>>>>> the fact
>>>>>>>> that you
>>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>> never exactly predict
>>>>>>>> what comes
>>>>>>>> next is the
>>>>>>>> whole point
>>>>>>>> that keep
>>>>>>>> us talking,
>>>>>>>> dancing,
>>>>>>>> drawing, etc!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Alfredo
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> *From:*
>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>>>> on behalf
>>>>>>>> of HENRY
>>>>>>>> SHONERD
>>>>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>> <mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
>>>>>>>> *Sent:* 21
>>>>>>>> November
>>>>>>>> 2018 06:22
>>>>>>>> *To:*
>>>>>>>> eXtended
>>>>>>>> Mind,
>>>>>>>> Culture,
>>>>>>>> Activity
>>>>>>>> *Subject:*
>>>>>>>> [Xmca-l]
>>>>>>>> Re:
>>>>>>>> language
>>>>>>>> and music
>>>>>>>> I’d like to
>>>>>>>> add to the
>>>>>>>> call and
>>>>>>>> response
>>>>>>>> conversation
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> discourse,
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>> conversation
>>>>>>>> itself, is
>>>>>>>> staged.
>>>>>>>> There are
>>>>>>>> performers
>>>>>>>> and and an
>>>>>>>> audience
>>>>>>>> made up
>>>>>>>> partly of
>>>>>>>> performers
>>>>>>>> themselves.
>>>>>>>> How many
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>> lurkers, as
>>>>>>>> I am
>>>>>>>> usually?
>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>> conversation
>>>>>>>> has no
>>>>>>>> director,
>>>>>>>> but there
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>> leaders.
>>>>>>>> There is
>>>>>>>> symphonic
>>>>>>>> potential.
>>>>>>>> And even
>>>>>>>> gestural
>>>>>>>> potential,
>>>>>>>> making the
>>>>>>>> chat a
>>>>>>>> dance. All
>>>>>>>> on line.:)
>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Nov 20,
>>>>>>>>> 2018, at
>>>>>>>>> 9:05 PM,
>>>>>>>>> mike cole
>>>>>>>>> <mcole@ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For many
>>>>>>>>> years I
>>>>>>>>> used the
>>>>>>>>> work of
>>>>>>>>> Ellen
>>>>>>>>> Dissenyake
>>>>>>>>> to teach
>>>>>>>>> comm
>>>>>>>>> classes
>>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>> language/music/development.
>>>>>>>>> She is
>>>>>>>>> quite
>>>>>>>>> unusual in
>>>>>>>>> ways that
>>>>>>>>> might find
>>>>>>>>> interest here.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> https://ellendissanayake.com/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sat,
>>>>>>>>> Nov 17,
>>>>>>>>> 2018 at
>>>>>>>>> 2:16 PM
>>>>>>>>> James Ma
>>>>>>>>> <jamesma320@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>> <mailto:jamesma320@gmail.com>>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hello
>>>>>>>>> Simangele,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In
>>>>>>>>> semiotic
>>>>>>>>> terms,
>>>>>>>>> whatever
>>>>>>>>> each
>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>> participants
>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>> constructed
>>>>>>>>> internally
>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>> signified,
>>>>>>>>> i.e.
>>>>>>>>> his or
>>>>>>>>> her
>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> interpretation.
>>>>>>>>> When
>>>>>>>>> it is
>>>>>>>>> vocalised
>>>>>>>>> (spoken
>>>>>>>>> out),
>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>> becomes
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> signifier
>>>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>> listener.
>>>>>>>>> What's
>>>>>>>>> more,
>>>>>>>>> when
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> participants
>>>>>>>>> work
>>>>>>>>> together
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> compose
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> story
>>>>>>>>> impromptu,
>>>>>>>>> each
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>> signifiers
>>>>>>>>> turns
>>>>>>>>> into a
>>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>>> signified
>>>>>>>>> – a
>>>>>>>>> shared,
>>>>>>>>> newly-established
>>>>>>>>> understanding,
>>>>>>>>> woven
>>>>>>>>> into
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> fabric
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>> making.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> By the
>>>>>>>>> way,
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> Chinese
>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>> words
>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> singing
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> dancing
>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>> long
>>>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>>> inseparably.
>>>>>>>>> As I
>>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>>>> it, they
>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>> semiotically
>>>>>>>>> indexed
>>>>>>>>> to, or
>>>>>>>>> adjusted
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> allow
>>>>>>>>> for,
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> feelings,
>>>>>>>>> emotions,
>>>>>>>>> actions
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> interactions
>>>>>>>>> of a
>>>>>>>>> consciousness
>>>>>>>>> who is
>>>>>>>>> experiencing
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> singing
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> dancing.
>>>>>>>>> Here
>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>> idioms:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 酣歌醉舞-
>>>>>>>>> singing
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> dancing
>>>>>>>>> rapturously
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 村歌社舞-
>>>>>>>>> dancingvillage
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> singing
>>>>>>>>> club
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 燕歌赵舞-
>>>>>>>>> citizens
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> ancient
>>>>>>>>>
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