[Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Fri May 12 20:41:21 PDT 2017
The only truly universal is the material world, but insofar
as we are concerned with a specific community (and Hegel
does not take much interest in cross-cultural issues; he's
generally dealing with a single community) the words in the
language (not their meanings, just the material objects
themselves) are universal as are the entire material
infrastructure - the land, its crops and animals, the
buildings, machinery etc. Different particular groups may
have different access to those things, may use them
differently, and they may mean different things, but there
is still something there which is for everyone. But
Universal does not really mean "material" because all these
terms are to be interpreted as norms. The universal is the
norm to which a material artefact is conforming or not. Does
that make sense?
But Universal does not mean Objective (this was A N
Leontyev's main error, he confused the Universal with the
Objective, which is why he comes across as so dogmatic and
has such a thoroughgoing dualism in his thinking). Because
the relation between the Universal and the Individual is
mediated by the particular, that is, by Activity and social
position.
BTW, English translations of Hegel are translating the
German Begriff as "Notion" and Begriff really means
"Concept". Griffen means to grip, or grasp.
Does that help?
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 13/05/2017 1:20 PM, Greg Thompson wrote:
> Well, I have to admit Andy, I didn't get very far with the
> Hegel reading. And actually, I've read some of that
> section before (perhaps at your suggestion some years
> ago?). I had also previously had a look at your review of
> Ikaheimo as well! But couldn't make much sense of either
> text or what to do with what little I could comprehend.
>
> So maybe I can try and paraphrase the little that I can
> squeeze out of Hegel with regard to his notion of the
> notion (or should I say "his notion of the notion of the
> notion"? viz. section 1291).
>
> As I understand it, for Hegel notions are objective
> because they are Universal. By this I assume that he means
> some kind of radical intersubjectivity. I assume that some
> people interpret this as referring to some kind of
> superaddressee like God or some such, but I assume that
> you don't see it this way. So then how do you see it? What
> does Hegel mean by "the Universal"? Is it the
> intersubjectivity of some community? "universal" would
> suggest a global community of all people, but, as an
> anthropologist, that doesn't quite seem to hold muster.
>
> So, what does Hegel mean by "Universal"?
>
> Seems important to understanding the reality of the notion
> but I may be on the wrong track, please feel free to
> correct course if necessary.
>
> -greg
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 8:22 PM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> Not at all, Greg. I just appreciated that you were
> turning to *read Hegel* to get your answers and I was
> giving you time for that. Let me see ...
>
> Q: This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is
> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think,
> remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea here
> seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective
> presupposition" but is rather much more real than that.
> But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be?
>
> Yes, utterly realistic. We live in a world in which
> people share, more or less, a great range of beliefs
> and importantly act according to those beliefs, so,
> objectively, this world is one of activities,
> including the artefacts incorporated in those
> activities. The unit of all that activity is concepts
> rather than things or acts. Each concept is implicit
> in an aggregate of actions functioning as the object
> of the activity. If you think that I am just making
> this up to make it sound like Activity Theory, have a
> look at this paper which includes an extended quote
> from a Finnish Hegelian who knows nothing about
> Activity Theory and hates Marxism.
> https://www.academia.edu/30657582/Response_to_Heikki_Ik%C3%A4heimo_on_Normative_Essentialism_
> <https://www.academia.edu/30657582/Response_to_Heikki_Ik%C3%A4heimo_on_Normative_Essentialism_>
> - the quote begins on the first page.
>
> Q: There are multiple objections, but perhaps the
> biggest objection comes from 20th century social
> science's preoccupation with social construction. In
> this tradition, concepts are things held in the head,
> subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always
> mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel seems
> to be offering a much different take - one in which
> concepts are much more primary. Am I right here?
>
> Yes, Hegel is sometimes called an "objective
> idealist." Ideas or thought is something which exists
> in the world and only as a result of that are thinkers
> able to grasp. The idea of Zeitgeist is well-known and
> I don't see it as problematic, and just broaden that
> to Geist and you have what Hegel is talking about,
> literally.
>
> Q: And, what is this business about the "sublation of
> mediation"?
>
> Everything Hegel says is very general, so it's hard to
> paraphrase him without degrading his idea. But think
> of this. A new practice (or technical tool, or word)
> is invented in response to some situation; it then
> becomes part of the world, and new situations. That's
> what he means. In my answer to Q1 above there is
> obviously a chicken-and-egg situation: activity is
> conscious, but the content of consciousness is
> objective activity. Sublation of mediation responds to
> that chicken-and-egg problem.
>
> Does that help?
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
>
> On 13/05/2017 5:27 AM, Greg Thompson wrote:
>
> Andy,
> So does your response mean that all of my
> questions in my previous post are non-starters?
> -greg
>
> On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>
> Concepts are first of all things which exist;
> because
> they exist, the mind is capable of grasping
> them, in
> fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the
> world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way
> they exist is in human activity and the
> artifacts we
> use in that activity. Since you have made a
> start on
> this Greg, I have to say that I think you need
> this
> and also the section to follow called "The
> Subjective
> Notion" to get a decent picture.
>
> Andy
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
>
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>>
>
> On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote:
>
> Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel
> text that you
> suggested (I don't think you truly
> appreciate how
> slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy
> shared can
> be found here:
> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm
> <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm>
>
> <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm
> <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm>>),
> and I came across this notion of The
> Notion by Hegel
> in Section 1279:
>
> "Now although it is true that the Notion
> is to be
> regarded, not merely as a subjective
> presupposition
> but as the /absolute foundation/, yet it
> can be so
> only in so far as it has /made/ itself the
> foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt
> a /first/;
>
> yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the
> contrary mediated, and therefore if it is
> to be
> grasped in its truth its foundation must
> first be
> sought. Hence this foundation, though
> indeed an
> immediate, must have made itself immediate
> through
> the sublation of mediation."
>
> This seems core to the kind of realism
> that Hegel is
> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I
> think,
> remains a revolutionary conception today.
> The idea
> here seems to be that the Notion is not a
> "subjective
> presupposition" but is rather much more
> real than
> that. But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can
> this be?
>
> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the
> biggest objection comes from 20th century
> social
> science's preoccupation with social
> construction. In
> this tradition, concepts are things held
> in the head,
> subjective and maybe also intersubjective,
> but always
> mediated (and some might say
> "derivative"). Hegel
> seems to be offering a much different take
> - one in
> which concepts are much more primary. Am I
> right here?
>
> And, what is this business about the
> "sublation of
> mediation"? (and where does this last bit
> jibe with
> CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of
> mediation but I
> don't recall anyone speaking of the
> "sublation of
> mediation").
>
> Any help with this text would be appreciated.
>
> (and this is closely related to "the stuff
> of words"
> but I still felt that this needed a new
> thread.).
>
> -greg
>
> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> <http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson>
> <http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> <http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson>>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> <http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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