[Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Thu Jul 27 09:22:58 PDT 2017
I think you are right Peter, that "we control ourselves from
the outside," by signs. And signs are of course not made by
us, but by those who went before us. This was Vygotsky's
view. But I think that bit about the present and future
doesn't work. Where did my will come from? It is a product
of the past (including ideology and social conditions).
Unless of course we are outside of the world.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 28/07/2017 2:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote:
> Dear friends,
>
> I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it
> might be helpful to this discussion to point out the
> difference between determinism and pre-determinism. The
> *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In the
> future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to
> sway the forces that are in play, to bend them to our will.
>
> If this conception is correct, then the problem of free
> will (aimed at the future) becomes one of discovering how
> activities with signs make use of conditional reflexes
> (determination) to forge a different path forward than the
> one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of
> sign use.
>
> Hope this helps.
>
> Cheers,
> Peter
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> If everything is determined, then all that a human
> being can do is whatever is necessary, and if they are
> enlightened, be aware of that. In a determined world
> free will is impossible because there is no choice.
>
>
> At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany
> around the 1790s, there was a lot of debate about the
> seeming impossibility of free will (which is of course
> still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which is
> probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking
> for Spinoza.) In my opinion, Fichte made the decisive
> breakthrough in saying that a person becomes free when
> they were *recognised* as a free being by another free
> being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by
> exercising restraint and recognising the rights of
> others (the child development people will relate to
> this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will
> with the formation of states in which citizens had
> rights; without the basic freedoms enjoyed by citizens
> of a state, we are reduced to the animal condition.
> Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or
> quantum mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just
> social relations.
>
>
> If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh
> obedient to the laws of physics, chemistry and
> biology, have free will - it is a tough problem to solve.
>
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
>
> On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>
>
> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would
> determinism imply the absence of free will* ...
> In any case, thanks for the link; I too am just a
> student, only that with quite more left to read
> yet!
>
>
> Alfredo
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16
> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture,
> Activity
> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov,
> Marx, & Spinoza
>
> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will
> (as everywhere outside of human life) does not
> imply determinism. But Spinoza held both
> positions. It is a long time since I studied
> Spinoza and I don't have notes from that time, so
> I can't source my own recollections on this.
>
> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains
> it thusly:
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.stanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.stanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e=>
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
>
> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>
> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was
> sustained, though I doubt he agreed that this
> was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not
> sound like that when he writes that '[Spinoza
> is] the antithesis to parallelism and,
> consequently to the dualism of Descartes'
> (English collected works, vol. 6, p. 122).
>
> In any case, I know of no one arguing these
> days to try to wholesale 'apply' Spinoza's
> ontology to psychology either.
>
> I am not sure how you are using the notion
> *determinist* or why determinism would be
> involved in ruling out *free will*.
> Understanding this would greatly help me see
> your points.
>
> Alfredo
>
> ________________________________________
> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:From%3Axmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> on
> behalf of Andy Blunden<ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx,
> & Spinoza
>
> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual
> evidence that
> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in
> Spinoza. My guess
> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history
> of philosophy
> as the first person to attempt to overcome
> Descartes'
> dualism by building a monist, material
> philosophy, based on
> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held
> Vygotsky's
> interest and respect. This effort, for which
> Spinoza was
> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite
> Spinoza being
> banned across Europe for more than a century.
>
> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky
> entertained for a
> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single
> substance,
> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you
> want to call it,
> with infinitely many attributes, one being
> extension and
> another being thought and the infinitely many
> others being
> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that
> Vygotsky
> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of
> that one
> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the
> name of "Spirit."
>
> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's
> works are full of
> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic
> project (a monist
> materialism) is right. But his solution is
> hopeless and I
> have not met a single soul who has usefully
> appropriated
> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart
> from its
> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes)
> *determinist* and rules
> out free will, and is a thinly disguised
> dualism: one
> substance with two attributes instead of two
> substances. Any
> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in
> experimental
> Psychology is a charade.
>
> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a
> dead dog, but he
> is a dead end.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
>
> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>
> Hi Alexander,
>
> a very interesting text, written in
> brilliant prose. I very much appreciate
> your observations that 'the psychophysical
> (and not the psychophysiological) ...
> poses a REAL task akin to that which arose
> in the course of the evolution of living
> and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent
> action ... is itself ... congruent with
> the real corporeal form of some other
> body'. These propositions interest me a
> lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did
> last year co-author a book where we
> entertained such propositions with respect
> to educational psychology (front matter
> attached, link here: ).
>
> Like you, in that book, we are critical to
> Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs,
> specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon
> reading your article, on the whole, I
> wondered whether your characterisation was
> fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You
> describe Vygotsky's position as this:
>
> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet
> acquires freedom through overcoming
> natural determination (the SR reaction,
> the mechanical triggering of a response by
> an external stimulus) in the act of
> mediation by a cultural sign'
>
> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the
> term 'sign' in many instances in the
> conventional sense you refer to. But this
> way of writing sharply contrasts with
> other important tenets and arguments in
> his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's
> characterisations of the 'word' in
> Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not
> think he 'understands the word
> unambiguously as an arbitrary,
> conventional sign', as you suggest in your
> article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and
> paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that
> 'the word is what ... is absolutely
> impossible for one person but possible for
> two. The word is the most direct
> manifestation of the historical nature of
> human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p.
> 285). To me, that suggests a very
> different view of words as signs than
> simply conventional, arbitrary (as if
> unconstrained and magic) means.
>
> In other places, he also writes that,
> 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature,
> cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system].
> Freedom may be only an element of that
> nature, not an opposite to natural
> necessity but only one of the forms of
> this necessity' (English Collected works,
> vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who
> would also write that any higher
> psychological function was first a
> societal relation (and what is action if
> not a societal relation?), how could he
> believe that the solution to the problem
> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he
> was committed to social-historical
> necessity, to human needs?
>
> In our book, we try to address these kind
> of contradictions by imagining what a
> Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would
> be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued
> the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I
> think there may be more common ground
> between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your
> article allows, but this is surely not
> very much explored in mainstream uptakes.
> I am only a student on these matters, and
> I can not know in advance how far we will
> come with this integrative program, but it
> seems to me that neither discarding
> semiotics for the primacy of action, nor
> discarding action for the primacy of
> semiotics are promising paths.
>
> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue,
> Alfredo
>
>
>
>
> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:From%3Axmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> on behalf of Alexandre
> Sourmava<avramus@gmail.com
> <mailto:avramus@gmail.com>>
> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27
> To:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:To%3Aablunden@mira.net>; Larry
> Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Отв: Re:
> Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
>
> Hi, Larry!
>
>
>
> Thank you for your attentionto the article.
> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct.
> However, I think it can be useful to add
> my little comment concerning the
> topicunder discussion.
> Bernstein’s position is substantially
> spinozian and thereby antisemiotic.
> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to
> Vygotsky’sattempts to use arbitrary sign
> as a magic key designed to solve the
> problem of freedom (independence from
> mechanical causality).
> Thus Vygotsky insisted that
> ”Looking from the very broad philosophical
> perspective the whole realm ofhistory,
> culture, and language is the realm of
> arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional
> reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a
> natural-historical methodconcerning human,
> of a tie that binds history and evolution
> together.”
> («В самом широком философском смысле этого
> терминавесь мир истории, культуры, языка —
> это царство условности. В этом смысле
> методусловных рефлексов приобретает
> широчайшее значение
> методаприродно-исторического в применении
> к человеку, узла, который связывает
> историюи эволюцию»
>
> ВыготскийЛ. С. Психологическая наука в
> СССР. В кн.: «Общественные науки в
> СССР(1917-1927 гг.)». М., 1928, с. 30.)
>
> There exists a prejudice that so called
> “Cultural-historical theory” withits
> arbitrary signs is a sophisticated
> antithesis to coarse Pavlov’s
> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from
> reality. In fact, these two theories are
> identical.That is the reason why Nicolai
> Bernstein who was Vygotsky’s good friend
> had neverreferred to his ideas.
>
> Sasha Surmava
>
> вторник, 25 июля 2017 4:29 Andy
> Blunden<ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> писал(а):
>
>
> I see.
>
> This is a slightly different context. The
> original meaning
> of "paradigm," before the popularisation
> of Thomas Kuhn's
> work, was a "founding exemplar."
> "Exemplar" presumably has the same
> etymology as "example."
>
> The idea of "an example" as being one of
> numerous instances
> of a process is a different concept, the
> opposite really.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
>
> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
>
> Andy,
> I will reference where I got the
> notion of linking
> [example] and [framework]. If this
> becomes interesting
> will open another thread.
> From David L. Marshall titled :
> "Historical and
> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold
> Fisch, a Paradigm for
> Intellectual Historians" -2009-
>
> PAGE 270:
>
> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative
> to any intellectual
> historical method insisting that
> practiontioners remain
> agnostics about the value of the ideas
> they study. It is
> the chief contention of this essay
> that he is a 'paradigm'
> for intellectual historians, a
> paradigm in the original
> Greek sense of an *example* and in the
> DERIVED
> contemporary sense of a *framework*
> within which the
> community of research can proceed.
> Indeed it is just such
> *doubling* of the philological object
> qua example into a
> carapace for ongoing action and
> thought that Fisch
> explored in a variety of ways during
> his half century of
> creative intellectual work. "
>
>
> Andy, not sure if this is adequate
> context, but the
> relationality of [example : framework]
> through the concept
> *paradigm* seemed generative??
>
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy
> Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>
> "actions" or "an action" ... no
> extra word is needed.
> Extra words like "singular,"
> "individual" or "single"
> only confuse the matter.
> "Examples" is too vague.
>
> Cannot make sense of the rest of
> your message at all,
> Larry.
>
> Andy
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=>
> >
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
>
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
> >
>
> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry
> wrote:
>
> Andy,
>
> Following your lead it may
> be preferable to say
> single (individual) to
> indicate the uniqueness of
> variable social actions.
> This doubling (by
> including both terms) may
> crystallize the intended
> meaning as you mention.
>
> Andy is this vein can we
> also include the term
> (examples)?
>
> Then the moving TRANS
> forming from single
> (individual) social acts
> towards (practices) would
> indicate the movement from
> examples to exemplary
> actions and further movement
> (historicity) toward
> (framework) practices.
>
> (framework) practices being
> another doubling.
>
> So moving (transforming)
> from single social examples
> through exemplary social
> examples crystallizing in
> social framework practices.
>
> Is this reasonable?
>
> Or not
>
> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>
> *From: *Andy
> Blunden<mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM
> *To: *eXtended Mind,
> Culture, Activity
>
> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> *Cc: *Alexander
> Surmava<mailto:monada@netvox.ru
> <mailto:monada@netvox.ru>>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re:
> Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
>
> Larry, when you say "Action
> IS individual," did you
> mention
>
> to say that *actions* - the
> individual units of
> *action* are
>
> individual? In which can it
> is of course a tautology.
>
> But *action* is irreducibly
> *social*, and so is every
>
> "individual" action. Or
> better, so is every
> "singular" action.
>
> A lot of relevant
> differences are coded in the English
>
> language by the use of the
> count-noun or mass noun
> form, but
>
> on the whole the set of
> words (action, actions,
> activity,
>
> activities) and the set of
> words (practice,
> practices) have
>
> no systematic difference
> running across all
> disciplines and
>
> schools of thought. For us
> CHATters, "activities" are
> practices.
>
> If you read Hegel and Marx,
> there is an added issue: the
>
> German words for action
> (Handlung) and activity
> (Tatigkeit)
>
> are more or less inverted
> for Hegel, and he doesn't use
>
> Aktivitat at all.
>
> Andy
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Andy Blunden
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=>
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=>
> >
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
>
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=>
> >
>
>
> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM,
> Larry Purss wrote:
>
> > Alexander, Mike,
>
> > Thanks for the article.
>
> > Moving to page 51 I
> noticed that when referencing
> Bernstein he contrasted
> (action) with (practice) and
> did not REPEAT (identity)
> the thesis about the role
> of practice in knowing).
>
> > Two formulas:
>
> > • Knowing THROUGH ‘action’
>
> > • Verification of knowing
> THROUGH ‘practice’
>
> >
>
> > These two formulas closely
> RESEMBLE each other but
> do not co-incide
>
> >
>
> > Action IS individual
>
> > Practice IS a social category.
>
> >
>
> > Sociohistorical (practice)
> in the final analysis is
> nothing other than the SUM
> total of the actions of
> individual who are separate.
>
> >
>
> > Individual action is LIKE
> a single experiment.
> They are alike in that both
> individual action & a
> single experiment are poorly
> suited to the role of :
>
> >
>
> > A philosophical criterion
> of (truth).
>
> >
>
> > I do not have the
> background to intelligently
> comment, but did register
> this theme as provocative
> FOR further thought and wording.
>
> > And for generating
> intelligent commentary
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10
>
> >
>
> > From: Ivan Uemlianin
>
> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM
>
> > To: eXtended Mind,
> Culture, Activity
>
> > Cc: Alexander Surmava
>
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:
> Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
>
> >
>
> > Yes very interesting thank
> you! (Ilyenkov fan)
>
> >
>
> > Ivan
>
> >
>
> > --
>
> > festina lente
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00,
> mike cole
> <mcole@ucsd.edu
> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu
> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>> wrote:
>
> >>
>
> >> This article might prove
> of interest to those who
> have been discussing
>
> >> LSV's sources in
>
> >> marx and spinoza.
>
> >> mike
>
> >>
> <Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_in_Psycholog.pdf>
>
> >
>
> >
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> Director,
> Office of Institutional Research
> <https://www.fordham.edu/info/24303/institutional_research>
> Fordham University
> Thebaud Hall-202
> Bronx, NY 10458
>
> Phone: (718) 817-2243
> Fax: (718) 817-3817
> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> <mailto:pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu>
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