[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
Lplarry
lpscholar2@gmail.com
Tue Jul 25 17:44:01 PDT 2017
Sasha,
In my reading I was trying to hear the direction you and Bernstein and Spinoza were taking us. Trying to become clearer on our polyphonic autobiography. I mentioned I lack the background to reflect knowledgeably on the relation of semiotic approaches to antisemiotic approaches.
I am also listening carefully to alternative explorations of our human nature that do include phenomenological and narrative approaches to our human nature.
Alfredo Jornet, for example, references Star and Bowker to say:
‘To experience, to undergo is to be certain. To hear of somebody else’s experience is to be uncertain’.
This seems to be an alternative key, opening an alternative threshold to walk through.
What attracted Alfredo’s attention to Star?
Alfredo says :
In Star we found not only a repository of useful analytic concepts, for the study of human activity, but also a passion for understanding the tensions between the sometimes unclassifiable and idiosyncratic lived experience of individual subjects on the one hand and more or less formal social infrastructures that sustain the lived experience of individual subjects on the other hand.’
Sasha, the experience is certain, hearing about the experience is uncertain
I sense the tension and polyphonic autobiography, including this gap you are exploring between Vygotsky and Bernstein..
I am drawn to the gap
Sent from my Windows 10 phone
From: Alexandre Sourmava
Sent: July 25, 2017 4:15 PM
To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Отв: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
Hi, Larry!
Thank you for your attention to the article.
Your retelling of the topic is quite correct.
However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topic under discussion.
Bernstein’s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic.
Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky’s attempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality).
Thus Vygotsky insisted that
”Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm of history, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method of conditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical method concerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.”
(«В самом широком философском смысле этого термина весь мир истории, культуры, языка — это царство условности. В этом смысле метод условных рефлексов приобретает широчайшее значение метода природно-исторического в применении к человеку, узла, который связывает историю и эволюцию»
Выготский Л. С. Психологическая наука в СССР. В кн.: «Общественные науки в СССР (1917-1927 гг.)». М., 1928, с. 30.)
There exists a prejudice that so called “Cultural-historical theory” with its arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov’s mechanical approach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical. That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky’s good friend had never referred to his ideas.
Sasha Surmava
вторник, 25 июля 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> писал(а):
I see.
This is a slightly different context. The original meaning
of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's
work, was a "founding exemplar."
"Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example."
The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances
of a process is a different concept, the opposite really.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
> Andy,
> I will reference where I got the notion of linking
> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting
> will open another thread.
> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and
> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for
> Intellectual Historians" -2009-
>
> PAGE 270:
>
> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual
> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain
> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is
> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm'
> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original
> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED
> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the
> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such
> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a
> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch
> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of
> creative intellectual work. "
>
>
> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the
> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept
> *paradigm* seemed generative??
>
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed.
> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single"
> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague.
>
> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all,
> Larry.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
>
> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote:
>>
>> Andy,
>>
>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say
>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of
>> variable social actions. This doubling (by
>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended
>> meaning as you mention.
>>
>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term
>> (examples)?
>>
>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single
>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would
>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary
>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward
>> (framework) practices.
>>
>> (framework) practices being another doubling.
>>
>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples
>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in
>> social framework practices.
>>
>> Is this reasonable?
>>
>> Or not
>>
>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>
>> *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM
>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava <mailto:monada@netvox.ru>
>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
>>
>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you
>> mention
>>
>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of
>> *action* are
>>
>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology.
>>
>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every
>>
>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every
>> "singular" action.
>>
>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English
>>
>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun
>> form, but
>>
>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions,
>> activity,
>>
>> activities) and the set of words (practice,
>> practices) have
>>
>> no systematic difference running across all
>> disciplines and
>>
>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are
>> practices.
>>
>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the
>>
>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity
>> (Tatigkeit)
>>
>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use
>>
>> Aktivitat at all.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Andy Blunden
>>
>> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
>>
>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
>>
>>
>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
>>
>> > Alexander, Mike,
>>
>> > Thanks for the article.
>>
>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing
>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and
>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role
>> of practice in knowing).
>>
>> > Two formulas:
>>
>> > • Knowing THROUGH ‘action’
>>
>> > • Verification of knowing THROUGH ‘practice’
>>
>> >
>>
>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but
>> do not co-incide
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Action IS individual
>>
>> > Practice IS a social category.
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is
>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of
>> individual who are separate.
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment.
>> They are alike in that both individual action & a
>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of :
>>
>> >
>>
>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth).
>>
>> >
>>
>> > I do not have the background to intelligently
>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative
>> FOR further thought and wording.
>>
>> > And for generating intelligent commentary
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10
>>
>> >
>>
>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin
>>
>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM
>>
>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava
>>
>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan)
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Ivan
>>
>> >
>>
>> > --
>>
>> > festina lente
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole
>> <mcole@ucsd.edu> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>
>> >>
>>
>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who
>> have been discussing
>>
>> >> LSV's sources in
>>
>> >> marx and spinoza.
>>
>> >> mike
>>
>> >> <Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_in_Psycholog.pdf>
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>
>
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