[Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action
Haydi Zulfei
haydizulfei@rocketmail.com
Sun Jul 16 02:55:28 PDT 2017
Larry,
One thing I remember from Ilyenko interpreting Hegel is the high value he attributes to the concrete universals in contrast to abstract generals. Hegel does not consider the latter also as concepts ; he names them 'notions' coming out of contemplation as sensual given in contrast to rational theoretical working-out. Both these terms appear and realize in 'words' 'firstly' and this 'firstly' means that we are still too far from seeing the 'word' pregnant with all the richness of the 'particulars' and specific peculiarities in each individual component which in their aggregation and unity (unity in diversity) bring out a whole as a concrete universal. Superficial similarities in many repeated items do not bring out 'concepts' like saying 'All swans are white' . This is a 'notion' coming from an abstract general based on an inductive inference . The term syllogism , I think , refers to the same idea even literally. For a concept we can give this example : 'All material substances are extensive' . With swans we could think of one more swan in dark colour in Nature or in artificial manipulation disrupting our notion of its generality of content but with material substance (corporeals in general) any disruption equals extermination of the whole thing itself. And this is good for James to ponder on 'sign in the mind' to see firstly if 'mind' itself is 'material' and secondly how one could put a material something within another something which itself is the outcome of material processes in the material brain without any cognized locus in space . We take the mind's eye as a metaphor surely because it is not tangible and is quite different from the visual material eye in the body.
This is Hegel's share in explicating and analyzing 'concepts' just as 'concrete universals'. But as Ilyenko clarifies this is also his doctrine's "Achilles' Heel" because he congeals all other things in them . He accumulates concepts with other concepts to form categories . For him Absolute Spirit is Primary (hence his idealism) therefore earthly occurrences are considered alienated from that spirit hence all the mismatches observed in Andy's article I think accepted by him at times in clear phraseology in comparison with Marx's theorization of these affairs. Hegel's exemplar is like those theologians who assert they accept all that Darwin said but that all that is managed by God . In Marx's and Ilyenko's view the legitimate negative look at some aspects of Hegel's philosophy could prove one's claim to the effect that Hegel in these respects presents nothing more than Berkleyianism , Humism and Machism because all these thinkers prioritize idea to matter or objective reality. A table is the aggregate of our sensations and nothing more.
Ilyenko defines Hegel's concepts as concrete in 'thought' not concrete in 'objective reality' . On Marx's view , it's the reverse order that is , it's working with objective reality (participation in social material production) as practical activity first and then furthering it to the level of rationalization and theorization which ends in providing 'concepts' which at this junction are 'concrete' . Again on the reverse process we begin with a single item or individual thing as 'abstract' . Here the problem manifests itself. If we try to induce similarities in many other things like it and stop at that , we get nothing but an abstract general which is what we find in Formal Logic which does not guarantee our comprehension of essences of things (#accidentals) . If , on the other hand , we seek in that single item something peculiar to it alone which matches its unity with some other peculiarities in other items , then these opposites get aggregated , complement each other in a whole . That whole is then concrete because it contains the whole procedure in its actuality not in its superficial extraction of surface attributes . Then it gets not loose in eruptions and disintegration stuck firmly and tightly in its unification virtually like old enemies who finally get animated in their true consciousnesses .
For a concrete example I always have in mind the discrete pieces of a puzzle which in their mere individuality have nothing in common with the whole shape a puzzle forms but when each is considered to have a crucial and definite role and contribution to the formation of the whole shape , it manifests its importance , necessity and indispensability to the ultimate total.
If I'm not mistaken in understanding Andy , he , on Hegel's lenses , equals 'goal-oriented material activity' with sharing in 'intention' or at times , fusion of intention and activity which is not so productive as to the interests of the exploited and the oppressed . He does say nothing of the corrections made by Marx on Hegel , that is , that Hegel's theory is headlong or upside down ; that it should be switched in a way that it should look upright erected quite firm on its feet. I think you are quite right with your understanding of concept not being activity itself .
Regards
Haydi
From: Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Saturday, 15 July 2017, 18:22:24
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action
Andy,
Thanks for this article ‘Hegel on Action’
The paragraph on (logical concepts) was clarifying in the mutual way we are inclined to take the word itself AS IF the word were the material concept and not take the concept AS activity (itself).
I hope I am representing this (reading this) in the way you intended.
Sent from my Windows 10 phone
From: Andy Blunden
Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action
James, I think you're using "material" in some specific
sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something
to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe
practical consciousness rather than discursive
consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of
matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination".
I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a
"sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than
the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure
what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't
relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which
you raised out of my paper about action.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote:
> Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy.
> Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense
> perception involved in social practice in a social context
> possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign
> in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial
> expression or bodily movement connected with a particular
> feeling.
>
> James
>
> /_____________________________________/
>
> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/
>
>
>
> On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to
> a lesser extent the other words in your message have
> meanings which are extremely context (or discourse)
> dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
> doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it
> only in relation to Form, but their definition of
> Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and
> Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't
> like to use the word, because he took it as too linked
> to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific
> way to do with reproduction of the means of life.)
>
> As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I
> said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If
> it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make
> sense of your last question.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
>
> On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote:
>
> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out
> anything that has material quality but is actually
> associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind,
> as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social
> practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with
> the intrapsychological within oneself?
>
> James
>
> /_____________________________________/
>
> */James
> Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/
> <https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/>
>
>
>
> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>
> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg.
>
> "Matter" in this context is everything outside
> of my
> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is
> human,
> social practice. Moving attention to the
> sub-atomic
> level, a field where we have no common sense,
> sensuous
> knowledge, does not help.
>
> Andy
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
>
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>>
>
> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote:
>
> Andy,
> Just musing here but I'm wondering if
> "matter" is
> anything more than activity, particularly when
> considered at the sub-atomic level.
> At that level, matter seems a lot more
> like the
> holding of relations in some activity (not so
> different from the Notion?).
> Or would that be taking things too far?
> -greg
>
> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
>
> Anyone who got interested in that
> material about
> "Hegel on Action", here is my
> contribution.
>
> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action
> <https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action>
>
> <https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action
> <https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action>>
>
> <https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action
> <https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action>
>
> <https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action
> <https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action>>>
>
> Andy
>
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
>
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>>
>
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
>
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>>>
>
>
>
>
>
> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> <http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson>
> <http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> <http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson>>
>
>
>
>
>
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