From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 1 09:23:40 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 1 Jul 2017 09:23:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg Message-ID: David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to co-ordinate their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that assists setting the "table" before feasting.. David mentioned in passing that whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in 'concert" and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop. I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis] but I hope what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this theme will be revived, after my multiple detours. My particular swerve follows through Greg Thompson and his posting the Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the edited book Andy is reading.. [and this 2nd text includes a 1983 essay by Charles Taylor on the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy]. So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in the format of a book review that explores two intersecting TEXTS written 27 years between their writings] [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text] & [the 2nd text is the 2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983 text as the introductory essay. Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR book review and what this 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught my attention. I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the symbol * can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -] * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached through a particular and specific hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which to *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's SYSTEM of philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts can be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its own right through textual analysis. *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*. The logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other philosophical "sciences": 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983 text also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical Life. This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its materiality and its "spirit/meaning" * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in scope. The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing / extracting"] Hegel's insights on: - freedom, agency, imputability, and responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In this narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic* / the basic grounding text from Taylor's hermeneutical approach & movement] .What else is "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of Religion and meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of attention remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework of a particular discipline - Anthroplogy - AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating in 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by this limitation in 2010. What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is ABSTRACT explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,- read WITHIN this disciplinary WORLD /framework. Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality & spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline. * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this 2010 2nd text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention. The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus *on* disciplinary anthropological action exploration WITHIN discourse / communication [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as textual readings] This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of discourse [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] & [reading textual "workings" within the anthropological disciplinary focus]. The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of [Philosophy of Action]. * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" : The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel the "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and that the basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a particular and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates "other" philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of Spirit] that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic" and "pervasive" qualitative theory of action. NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of the 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered when the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized above. This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell us in this regard From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Jul 1 17:13:53 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2017 09:13:53 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Larry: I'm afraid I sometimes lose the practical thread in my own predilection for decorating. I was trying to make the case that semiosis and sociality have different genetic roots. This is really just a way of saying that speech and (practical) thinking have different genetic roots. So in Antarctica, whales socialize for a definite purpose, and that purpose determines the size of the social group (around twelve whales). But when they migrate past our shores, they are very far from that purpose. They are not feeding, they are not mating, but they are communicating: this is where we find "songs" as distinct from echo-locating clicks. It is also where we find dyads and triads--apparently for engaging in dialogues and trialogues. This is not simply sociality for the sake of reproducing the material conditions of life; it is an exuberant semiosis for the sheer hell of it. Admittedly, ALL sociality and ALL semiosis among humans is a mixture of the transactional and the expressive, but the arc of most conversation, if not of history itself, seems to bend inevitably from the former to the latter. Heidegger's idea that there is an "ur-Life" which has to assent to every instant of living seems to me precisely ass-backwards (as Vygotsky likes to say). It is like the ridiculous notion that in order to create language people called a kind of global congress in which the precise terms of the language contract were hammered out, without, of course, using any language at all. Take (please!) the various accounts that we humans create of the end of the world by flooding. They go all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, where the gods basically turned the taps on mankind because they were making too much noise down there. Then, in Revelation, there is more emphasis on sea monsters; by the time we get to the Middle Ages, the world is going to end in water-born plagues. But it's only since 1945 that there has been an emphasis on volitional apocalypse--that is, the flooding of the earth by humans themselves (Kevin Costner and "Waterworld" and its various derivatives). It's possible, I suppose, to see this as a Hegelian philosophy of history. You know, man unconscious of his ability to end the world as we know it, first ascribing it to arbitrary whims of the gods, then to nature, then to human diseases and sin and only in our own time a "true concept" of global warming. But it is also possible to see the development of concept as the outcome of human practices such as flood-based agriculture, living in proximity to Nile crocodiles, the medieval scourges of the black death, and the premeditated design and thoughtless use of nuclear weapons in World War II. The latter possibility has the advantage of including more tangible data if not always ocular proof. Ruqaiya Hasan says: "Design is not an expression of field alone (that is, it is not simply an expression of "what is going on"--DK). It is associated with the social process as a whole *i.e. as a contextual configuration of the values pertaining to field, tenor ("who is taking part"--DK) and mode ("how is language brought in?"--DK) and is independent of any one individual's desires, intentions, and/or decisions, having been negotiated between at least two interactants. These designs have come about because through the long history of the communal living of life, in every culture there have evolved recognizable ways of being, doing and saying that are communally deemed relevant to those occasions where social subjects have co-acted. The design of a social practice is nothing other than a near ritualization of ways of doing something with others by using such semiotic systems as are at the community's disposal: the more culturally significant a social process, the more ritualized it gets. It is in this sense that specific social processes have become the raison d'etre of specific designs." -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:23 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to co-ordinate > their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that assists > setting the "table" before feasting.. David mentioned in passing that > whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in 'concert" > and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop. > I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis] but I hope > what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this > theme will be revived, after my multiple detours. > > My particular swerve follows through Greg Thompson and his posting the > Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the edited book Andy > is reading.. [and this 2nd text includes a 1983 essay by Charles Taylor on > the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy]. > > So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in the > format of a book review that explores two intersecting TEXTS written 27 > years between their writings] > > [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text] & > [the 2nd text is the 2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983 text > as the introductory essay. > > Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR book review and what this > 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now > echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught my > attention. I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the symbol * > can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -] > > * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached through a > particular and specific hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is > producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which to > *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this > hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's SYSTEM of > philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts can > be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific > movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its own > right through textual analysis. > > *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*. The > logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other > philosophical "sciences": > 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983 text > also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical Life. > This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its > materiality and its "spirit/meaning" > > * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in scope. > The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on Hegel's > "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing / > extracting"] Hegel's insights on: - freedom, agency, imputability, and > responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In this > narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic* / the basic grounding > text from Taylor's hermeneutical approach & movement] .What else is > "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of Religion and > meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of attention > remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework of a > particular discipline - Anthroplogy - > AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating in > 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by this > limitation in 2010. > What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is ABSTRACT > explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,- read WITHIN > this disciplinary WORLD /framework. > Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality & > spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline. > > * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this 2010 2nd > text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention. > The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus *on* > disciplinary anthropological action exploration WITHIN discourse / > communication [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as textual > readings] This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of discourse > [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] & [reading textual "workings" > within the anthropological disciplinary focus]. > The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of [Philosophy > of Action]. > > * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" : > The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel the > "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and that the > basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a particular > and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates "other" > philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of Spirit] > that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic" and > "pervasive" qualitative theory of action. > NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of the > 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered when > the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized above. > > This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between > *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell us > in this regard > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jul 1 19:04:48 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 1 Jul 2017 20:04:48 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <37169434-C530-4E98-8119-5A3A336E512F@gmail.com> David, Lovely quote from Hasan. She really nailed it. But I'm still unclear how your whale example makes the case that semiosis and sociality have different genetic roots. Perhaps you could explain a bit more for a dull skull like me? Greg Sent from my iPhone > On Jul 1, 2017, at 6:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Larry: > > I'm afraid I sometimes lose the practical thread in my own predilection for > decorating. I was trying to make the case that semiosis and sociality have > different genetic roots. This is really just a way of saying that speech > and (practical) thinking have different genetic roots. > > So in Antarctica, whales socialize for a definite purpose, and that purpose > determines the size of the social group (around twelve whales). But when > they migrate past our shores, they are very far from that purpose. They are > not feeding, they are not mating, but they are communicating: this is where > we find "songs" as distinct from echo-locating clicks. It is also where we > find dyads and triads--apparently for engaging in dialogues and trialogues. > This is not simply sociality for the sake of reproducing the material > conditions of life; it is an exuberant semiosis for the sheer hell of it. > Admittedly, ALL sociality and ALL semiosis among humans is a mixture of the > transactional and the expressive, but the arc of most conversation, if not > of history itself, seems to bend inevitably from the former to the latter. > > Heidegger's idea that there is an "ur-Life" which has to assent to every > instant of living seems to me precisely ass-backwards (as Vygotsky likes to > say). It is like the ridiculous notion that in order to create language > people called a kind of global congress in which the precise terms of the > language contract were hammered out, without, of course, using any language > at all. > > Take (please!) the various accounts that we humans create of the end of the > world by flooding. They go all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, where > the gods basically turned the taps on mankind because they were making too > much noise down there. Then, in Revelation, there is more emphasis on sea > monsters; by the time we get to the Middle Ages, the world is going to end > in water-born plagues. But it's only since 1945 that there has been an > emphasis on volitional apocalypse--that is, the flooding of the earth by > humans themselves (Kevin Costner and "Waterworld" and its various > derivatives). > > It's possible, I suppose, to see this as a Hegelian philosophy of history. > You know, man unconscious of his ability to end the world as we know it, > first ascribing it to arbitrary whims of the gods, then to nature, then to > human diseases and sin and only in our own time a "true concept" of global > warming. But it is also possible to see the development of concept as the > outcome of human practices such as flood-based agriculture, living in > proximity to Nile crocodiles, the medieval scourges of the black death, and > the premeditated design and thoughtless use of nuclear weapons in World War > II. The latter possibility has the advantage of including more tangible > data if not always ocular proof. > > Ruqaiya Hasan says: > > "Design is not an expression of field alone (that is, it is not simply an > expression of "what is going on"--DK). It is associated with the social > process as a whole *i.e. as a contextual configuration of the values > pertaining to field, tenor ("who is taking part"--DK) and mode ("how is > language brought in?"--DK) and is independent of any one individual's > desires, intentions, and/or decisions, having been negotiated between at > least two interactants. These designs have come about because through the > long history of the communal living of life, in every culture there have > evolved recognizable ways of being, doing and saying that are communally > deemed relevant to those occasions where social subjects have co-acted. The > design of a social practice is nothing other than a near ritualization of > ways of doing something with others by using such semiotic systems as are > at the community's disposal: the more culturally significant a social > process, the more ritualized it gets. It is in this sense that specific > social processes have become the raison d'etre of specific designs." > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > >> On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:23 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >> David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to co-ordinate >> their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that assists >> setting the "table" before feasting.. David mentioned in passing that >> whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in 'concert" >> and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop. >> I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis] but I hope >> what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this >> theme will be revived, after my multiple detours. >> >> My particular swerve follows through Greg Thompson and his posting the >> Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the edited book Andy >> is reading.. [and this 2nd text includes a 1983 essay by Charles Taylor on >> the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy]. >> >> So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in the >> format of a book review that explores two intersecting TEXTS written 27 >> years between their writings] >> >> [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text] & >> [the 2nd text is the 2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983 text >> as the introductory essay. >> >> Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR book review and what this >> 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now >> echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught my >> attention. I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the symbol * >> can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -] >> >> * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached through a >> particular and specific hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is >> producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which to >> *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this >> hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's SYSTEM of >> philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts can >> be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific >> movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its own >> right through textual analysis. >> >> *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*. The >> logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other >> philosophical "sciences": >> 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983 text >> also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical Life. >> This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its >> materiality and its "spirit/meaning" >> >> * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in scope. >> The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on Hegel's >> "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing / >> extracting"] Hegel's insights on: - freedom, agency, imputability, and >> responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In this >> narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic* / the basic grounding >> text from Taylor's hermeneutical approach & movement] .What else is >> "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of Religion and >> meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of attention >> remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework of a >> particular discipline - Anthroplogy - >> AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating in >> 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by this >> limitation in 2010. >> What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is ABSTRACT >> explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,- read WITHIN >> this disciplinary WORLD /framework. >> Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality & >> spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline. >> >> * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this 2010 2nd >> text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention. >> The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus *on* >> disciplinary anthropological action exploration WITHIN discourse / >> communication [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as textual >> readings] This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of discourse >> [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] & [reading textual "workings" >> within the anthropological disciplinary focus]. >> The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of [Philosophy >> of Action]. >> >> * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" : >> The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel the >> "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and that the >> basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a particular >> and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates "other" >> philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of Spirit] >> that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic" and >> "pervasive" qualitative theory of action. >> NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of the >> 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered when >> the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized above. >> >> This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between >> *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell us >> in this regard >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Jul 2 09:30:37 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2017 10:30:37 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <59BE3ADD-D9A0-4BA9-94F0-A868A5D8EB6D@gmail.com> David, I see play in the whale songs and in the embellishments of your posts. Just for the hell of it sounds like joy enters in. I suppose that some blend of play and seriousness (like ritual) makes discourse better. Some genres of language tend towards more to play (comedy, poetry), some towards more to seriousness (tragedy and Trump?s tweets). It?s the artful blending that knocks the socks off. I am thinking of the final scene in Zorba the Greek when Anthony Quinn?s character and Alan Bates? get up and dance, celebrating the whole disaster. Henry https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fPWU8hy0McY > On Jul 1, 2017, at 6:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Larry: > > I'm afraid I sometimes lose the practical thread in my own predilection for > decorating. I was trying to make the case that semiosis and sociality have > different genetic roots. This is really just a way of saying that speech > and (practical) thinking have different genetic roots. > > So in Antarctica, whales socialize for a definite purpose, and that purpose > determines the size of the social group (around twelve whales). But when > they migrate past our shores, they are very far from that purpose. They are > not feeding, they are not mating, but they are communicating: this is where > we find "songs" as distinct from echo-locating clicks. It is also where we > find dyads and triads--apparently for engaging in dialogues and trialogues. > This is not simply sociality for the sake of reproducing the material > conditions of life; it is an exuberant semiosis for the sheer hell of it. > Admittedly, ALL sociality and ALL semiosis among humans is a mixture of the > transactional and the expressive, but the arc of most conversation, if not > of history itself, seems to bend inevitably from the former to the latter. > > Heidegger's idea that there is an "ur-Life" which has to assent to every > instant of living seems to me precisely ass-backwards (as Vygotsky likes to > say). It is like the ridiculous notion that in order to create language > people called a kind of global congress in which the precise terms of the > language contract were hammered out, without, of course, using any language > at all. > > Take (please!) the various accounts that we humans create of the end of the > world by flooding. They go all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, where > the gods basically turned the taps on mankind because they were making too > much noise down there. Then, in Revelation, there is more emphasis on sea > monsters; by the time we get to the Middle Ages, the world is going to end > in water-born plagues. But it's only since 1945 that there has been an > emphasis on volitional apocalypse--that is, the flooding of the earth by > humans themselves (Kevin Costner and "Waterworld" and its various > derivatives). > > It's possible, I suppose, to see this as a Hegelian philosophy of history. > You know, man unconscious of his ability to end the world as we know it, > first ascribing it to arbitrary whims of the gods, then to nature, then to > human diseases and sin and only in our own time a "true concept" of global > warming. But it is also possible to see the development of concept as the > outcome of human practices such as flood-based agriculture, living in > proximity to Nile crocodiles, the medieval scourges of the black death, and > the premeditated design and thoughtless use of nuclear weapons in World War > II. The latter possibility has the advantage of including more tangible > data if not always ocular proof. > > Ruqaiya Hasan says: > > "Design is not an expression of field alone (that is, it is not simply an > expression of "what is going on"--DK). It is associated with the social > process as a whole *i.e. as a contextual configuration of the values > pertaining to field, tenor ("who is taking part"--DK) and mode ("how is > language brought in?"--DK) and is independent of any one individual's > desires, intentions, and/or decisions, having been negotiated between at > least two interactants. These designs have come about because through the > long history of the communal living of life, in every culture there have > evolved recognizable ways of being, doing and saying that are communally > deemed relevant to those occasions where social subjects have co-acted. The > design of a social practice is nothing other than a near ritualization of > ways of doing something with others by using such semiotic systems as are > at the community's disposal: the more culturally significant a social > process, the more ritualized it gets. It is in this sense that specific > social processes have become the raison d'etre of specific designs." > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:23 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to co-ordinate >> their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that assists >> setting the "table" before feasting.. David mentioned in passing that >> whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in 'concert" >> and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop. >> I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis] but I hope >> what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this >> theme will be revived, after my multiple detours. >> >> My particular swerve follows through Greg Thompson and his posting the >> Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the edited book Andy >> is reading.. [and this 2nd text includes a 1983 essay by Charles Taylor on >> the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy]. >> >> So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in the >> format of a book review that explores two intersecting TEXTS written 27 >> years between their writings] >> >> [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text] & >> [the 2nd text is the 2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983 text >> as the introductory essay. >> >> Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR book review and what this >> 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now >> echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught my >> attention. I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the symbol * >> can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -] >> >> * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached through a >> particular and specific hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is >> producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which to >> *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this >> hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's SYSTEM of >> philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts can >> be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific >> movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its own >> right through textual analysis. >> >> *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*. The >> logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other >> philosophical "sciences": >> 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983 text >> also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical Life. >> This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its >> materiality and its "spirit/meaning" >> >> * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in scope. >> The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on Hegel's >> "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing / >> extracting"] Hegel's insights on: - freedom, agency, imputability, and >> responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In this >> narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic* / the basic grounding >> text from Taylor's hermeneutical approach & movement] .What else is >> "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of Religion and >> meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of attention >> remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework of a >> particular discipline - Anthroplogy - >> AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating in >> 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by this >> limitation in 2010. >> What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is ABSTRACT >> explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,- read WITHIN >> this disciplinary WORLD /framework. >> Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality & >> spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline. >> >> * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this 2010 2nd >> text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention. >> The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus *on* >> disciplinary anthropological action exploration WITHIN discourse / >> communication [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as textual >> readings] This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of discourse >> [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] & [reading textual "workings" >> within the anthropological disciplinary focus]. >> The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of [Philosophy >> of Action]. >> >> * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" : >> The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel the >> "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and that the >> basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a particular >> and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates "other" >> philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of Spirit] >> that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic" and >> "pervasive" qualitative theory of action. >> NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of the >> 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered when >> the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized above. >> >> This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between >> *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell us >> in this regard >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jul 2 11:38:44 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2017 11:38:44 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg In-Reply-To: <59BE3ADD-D9A0-4BA9-94F0-A868A5D8EB6D@gmail.com> References: <59BE3ADD-D9A0-4BA9-94F0-A868A5D8EB6D@gmail.com> Message-ID: <59593d9f.db96620a.4a91.d2b0@mx.google.com> Henry, Here is the introductory chapter to the 2010 edited book that Andy is reading. The outline of the book introduces (is assuming) seven thematic pairs. (14 chapters). The seven themes are: *expression and causation *sociality, constructivism, retrospectives *from questions of agency to those of imputation and responsibility * freedom, right, morality, and the lifeworld *externalising oneself * planning theory and narrative approaches to agency *conscience, ethical life, and agent-neutral reasons I found these seven pairs (two chapters in each pair) helpful for gathering up assumptions into outline form. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: HENRY SHONERD Sent: July 2, 2017 9:32 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg David, I see play in the whale songs and in the embellishments of your posts. Just for the hell of it sounds like joy enters in. I suppose that some blend of play and seriousness (like ritual) makes discourse better. Some genres of language tend towards more to play (comedy, poetry), some towards more to seriousness (tragedy and Trump?s tweets). It?s the artful blending that knocks the socks off. I am thinking of the final scene in Zorba the Greek when Anthony Quinn?s character and Alan Bates? get up and dance, celebrating the whole disaster. Henry https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fPWU8hy0McY > On Jul 1, 2017, at 6:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Larry: > > I'm afraid I sometimes lose the practical thread in my own predilection for > decorating. I was trying to make the case that semiosis and sociality have > different genetic roots. This is really just a way of saying that speech > and (practical) thinking have different genetic roots. > > So in Antarctica, whales socialize for a definite purpose, and that purpose > determines the size of the social group (around twelve whales). But when > they migrate past our shores, they are very far from that purpose. They are > not feeding, they are not mating, but they are communicating: this is where > we find "songs" as distinct from echo-locating clicks. It is also where we > find dyads and triads--apparently for engaging in dialogues and trialogues. > This is not simply sociality for the sake of reproducing the material > conditions of life; it is an exuberant semiosis for the sheer hell of it. > Admittedly, ALL sociality and ALL semiosis among humans is a mixture of the > transactional and the expressive, but the arc of most conversation, if not > of history itself, seems to bend inevitably from the former to the latter. > > Heidegger's idea that there is an "ur-Life" which has to assent to every > instant of living seems to me precisely ass-backwards (as Vygotsky likes to > say). It is like the ridiculous notion that in order to create language > people called a kind of global congress in which the precise terms of the > language contract were hammered out, without, of course, using any language > at all. > > Take (please!) the various accounts that we humans create of the end of the > world by flooding. They go all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, where > the gods basically turned the taps on mankind because they were making too > much noise down there. Then, in Revelation, there is more emphasis on sea > monsters; by the time we get to the Middle Ages, the world is going to end > in water-born plagues. But it's only since 1945 that there has been an > emphasis on volitional apocalypse--that is, the flooding of the earth by > humans themselves (Kevin Costner and "Waterworld" and its various > derivatives). > > It's possible, I suppose, to see this as a Hegelian philosophy of history. > You know, man unconscious of his ability to end the world as we know it, > first ascribing it to arbitrary whims of the gods, then to nature, then to > human diseases and sin and only in our own time a "true concept" of global > warming. But it is also possible to see the development of concept as the > outcome of human practices such as flood-based agriculture, living in > proximity to Nile crocodiles, the medieval scourges of the black death, and > the premeditated design and thoughtless use of nuclear weapons in World War > II. The latter possibility has the advantage of including more tangible > data if not always ocular proof. > > Ruqaiya Hasan says: > > "Design is not an expression of field alone (that is, it is not simply an > expression of "what is going on"--DK). It is associated with the social > process as a whole *i.e. as a contextual configuration of the values > pertaining to field, tenor ("who is taking part"--DK) and mode ("how is > language brought in?"--DK) and is independent of any one individual's > desires, intentions, and/or decisions, having been negotiated between at > least two interactants. These designs have come about because through the > long history of the communal living of life, in every culture there have > evolved recognizable ways of being, doing and saying that are communally > deemed relevant to those occasions where social subjects have co-acted. The > design of a social practice is nothing other than a near ritualization of > ways of doing something with others by using such semiotic systems as are > at the community's disposal: the more culturally significant a social > process, the more ritualized it gets. It is in this sense that specific > social processes have become the raison d'etre of specific designs." > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:23 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to co-ordinate >> their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that assists >> setting the "table" before feasting.. David mentioned in passing that >> whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in 'concert" >> and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop. >> I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis] but I hope >> what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this >> theme will be revived, after my multiple detours. >> >> My particular swerve follows through Greg Thompson and his posting the >> Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the edited book Andy >> is reading.. [and this 2nd text includes a 1983 essay by Charles Taylor on >> the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy]. >> >> So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in the >> format of a book review that explores two intersecting TEXTS written 27 >> years between their writings] >> >> [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text] & >> [the 2nd text is the 2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983 text >> as the introductory essay. >> >> Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR book review and what this >> 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now >> echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught my >> attention. I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the symbol * >> can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -] >> >> * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached through a >> particular and specific hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is >> producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which to >> *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this >> hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's SYSTEM of >> philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts can >> be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific >> movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its own >> right through textual analysis. >> >> *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*. The >> logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other >> philosophical "sciences": >> 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983 text >> also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical Life. >> This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its >> materiality and its "spirit/meaning" >> >> * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in scope. >> The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on Hegel's >> "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing / >> extracting"] Hegel's insights on: - freedom, agency, imputability, and >> responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In this >> narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic* / the basic grounding >> text from Taylor's hermeneutical approach & movement] .What else is >> "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of Religion and >> meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of attention >> remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework of a >> particular discipline - Anthroplogy - >> AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating in >> 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by this >> limitation in 2010. >> What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is ABSTRACT >> explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,- read WITHIN >> this disciplinary WORLD /framework. >> Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality & >> spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline. >> >> * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this 2010 2nd >> text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention. >> The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus *on* >> disciplinary anthropological action exploration WITHIN discourse / >> communication [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as textual >> readings] This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of discourse >> [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] & [reading textual "workings" >> within the anthropological disciplinary focus]. >> The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of [Philosophy >> of Action]. >> >> * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" : >> The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel the >> "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and that the >> basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a particular >> and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates "other" >> philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of Spirit] >> that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic" and >> "pervasive" qualitative theory of action. >> NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of the >> 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered when >> the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized above. >> >> This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between >> *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell us >> in this regard >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: LAITINEN ARTO July 1 2017 Introductory capter Hegel_and_Contemporary_Philosophy_of_Action .pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 110264 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170702/f95a666f/attachment.pdf From jamesma320@gmail.com Sun Jul 2 12:33:29 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2017 20:33:29 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg In-Reply-To: <37169434-C530-4E98-8119-5A3A336E512F@gmail.com> References: <37169434-C530-4E98-8119-5A3A336E512F@gmail.com> Message-ID: For me, semiosis has both an a-priori and an a-posteriori root, whereas sociality has an a-posteriori root only. James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 2 July 2017 at 03:04, wrote: > David, > Lovely quote from Hasan. She really nailed it. > But I'm still unclear how your whale example makes the case that semiosis > and sociality have different genetic roots. Perhaps you could explain a bit > more for a dull skull like me? > Greg > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On Jul 1, 2017, at 6:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Larry: > > > > I'm afraid I sometimes lose the practical thread in my own predilection > for > > decorating. I was trying to make the case that semiosis and sociality > have > > different genetic roots. This is really just a way of saying that speech > > and (practical) thinking have different genetic roots. > > > > So in Antarctica, whales socialize for a definite purpose, and that > purpose > > determines the size of the social group (around twelve whales). But when > > they migrate past our shores, they are very far from that purpose. They > are > > not feeding, they are not mating, but they are communicating: this is > where > > we find "songs" as distinct from echo-locating clicks. It is also where > we > > find dyads and triads--apparently for engaging in dialogues and > trialogues. > > This is not simply sociality for the sake of reproducing the material > > conditions of life; it is an exuberant semiosis for the sheer hell of it. > > Admittedly, ALL sociality and ALL semiosis among humans is a mixture of > the > > transactional and the expressive, but the arc of most conversation, if > not > > of history itself, seems to bend inevitably from the former to the > latter. > > > > Heidegger's idea that there is an "ur-Life" which has to assent to every > > instant of living seems to me precisely ass-backwards (as Vygotsky likes > to > > say). It is like the ridiculous notion that in order to create language > > people called a kind of global congress in which the precise terms of the > > language contract were hammered out, without, of course, using any > language > > at all. > > > > Take (please!) the various accounts that we humans create of the end of > the > > world by flooding. They go all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, > where > > the gods basically turned the taps on mankind because they were making > too > > much noise down there. Then, in Revelation, there is more emphasis on sea > > monsters; by the time we get to the Middle Ages, the world is going to > end > > in water-born plagues. But it's only since 1945 that there has been an > > emphasis on volitional apocalypse--that is, the flooding of the earth by > > humans themselves (Kevin Costner and "Waterworld" and its various > > derivatives). > > > > It's possible, I suppose, to see this as a Hegelian philosophy of > history. > > You know, man unconscious of his ability to end the world as we know it, > > first ascribing it to arbitrary whims of the gods, then to nature, then > to > > human diseases and sin and only in our own time a "true concept" of > global > > warming. But it is also possible to see the development of concept as the > > outcome of human practices such as flood-based agriculture, living in > > proximity to Nile crocodiles, the medieval scourges of the black death, > and > > the premeditated design and thoughtless use of nuclear weapons in World > War > > II. The latter possibility has the advantage of including more tangible > > data if not always ocular proof. > > > > Ruqaiya Hasan says: > > > > "Design is not an expression of field alone (that is, it is not simply an > > expression of "what is going on"--DK). It is associated with the social > > process as a whole *i.e. as a contextual configuration of the values > > pertaining to field, tenor ("who is taking part"--DK) and mode ("how is > > language brought in?"--DK) and is independent of any one individual's > > desires, intentions, and/or decisions, having been negotiated between at > > least two interactants. These designs have come about because through the > > long history of the communal living of life, in every culture there have > > evolved recognizable ways of being, doing and saying that are communally > > deemed relevant to those occasions where social subjects have co-acted. > The > > design of a social practice is nothing other than a near ritualization of > > ways of doing something with others by using such semiotic systems as are > > at the community's disposal: the more culturally significant a social > > process, the more ritualized it gets. It is in this sense that specific > > social processes have become the raison d'etre of specific designs." > > > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > >> On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:23 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > >> > >> David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to > co-ordinate > >> their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that > assists > >> setting the "table" before feasting.. David mentioned in passing that > >> whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in > 'concert" > >> and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop. > >> I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis] but I hope > >> what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this > >> theme will be revived, after my multiple detours. > >> > >> My particular swerve follows through Greg Thompson and his posting the > >> Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the edited book > Andy > >> is reading.. [and this 2nd text includes a 1983 essay by Charles > Taylor on > >> the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy]. > >> > >> So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in the > >> format of a book review that explores two intersecting TEXTS written 27 > >> years between their writings] > >> > >> [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text] & > >> [the 2nd text is the 2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983 > text > >> as the introductory essay. > >> > >> Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR book review and what > this > >> 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now > >> echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught my > >> attention. I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the symbol > * > >> can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -] > >> > >> * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached through a > >> particular and specific hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is > >> producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which > to > >> *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this > >> hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's SYSTEM > of > >> philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts > can > >> be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific > >> movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its > own > >> right through textual analysis. > >> > >> *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*. The > >> logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other > >> philosophical "sciences": > >> 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983 > text > >> also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical Life. > >> This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its > >> materiality and its "spirit/meaning" > >> > >> * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in scope. > >> The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on Hegel's > >> "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing / > >> extracting"] Hegel's insights on: - freedom, agency, imputability, and > >> responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In > this > >> narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic* / the basic > grounding > >> text from Taylor's hermeneutical approach & movement] .What else is > >> "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of Religion > and > >> meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of attention > >> remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework of > a > >> particular discipline - Anthroplogy - > >> AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating > in > >> 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by this > >> limitation in 2010. > >> What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is > ABSTRACT > >> explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,- read > WITHIN > >> this disciplinary WORLD /framework. > >> Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality & > >> spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline. > >> > >> * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this 2010 2nd > >> text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention. > >> The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus *on* > >> disciplinary anthropological action exploration WITHIN discourse / > >> communication [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as > textual > >> readings] This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of > discourse > >> [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] & [reading textual "workings" > >> within the anthropological disciplinary focus]. > >> The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of > [Philosophy > >> of Action]. > >> > >> * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" : > >> The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel the > >> "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and that > the > >> basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a particular > >> and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates > "other" > >> philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of > Spirit] > >> that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic" > and > >> "pervasive" qualitative theory of action. > >> NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of the > >> 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered > when > >> the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized > above. > >> > >> This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between > >> *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell > us > >> in this regard > >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jul 2 13:09:00 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2017 13:09:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg In-Reply-To: References: <37169434-C530-4E98-8119-5A3A336E512F@gmail.com> Message-ID: <595952e2.c39d630a.fbb8f.7540@mx.google.com> James, Could you elaborate further this distinction of semiosis having two roots whereas sociality looks in one direction. Also your focus on the priority of the ethical realm as what motivates may come into play. On this topic, , Sociality is considered On page 8 & 9 of the introduction i just attached within the theme of sociality and retrospectivism. The comment?: ? Only as manifested or expressed can one (even the subject herself) retrospectively determine what must have been intended. And of course it seems a bit paradoxical to claim that we can only know what we intended to do AFTER we have actually acted. But there is little doubt that Hegel holds something like such a position.? So, David K mentioned (if i understood David) two possible genetic roots (one root more playful while the other root is more serious). Images of whales organizing dinner time and whales singing playfully are staying in my (mind?s) eye. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: James Ma Sent: July 2, 2017 12:36 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg For me, semiosis has both an a-priori and an a-posteriori root, whereas sociality has an a-posteriori root only. James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 2 July 2017 at 03:04, wrote: > David, > Lovely quote from Hasan. She really nailed it. > But I'm still unclear how your whale example makes the case that semiosis > and sociality have different genetic roots. Perhaps you could explain a bit > more for a dull skull like me? > Greg > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On Jul 1, 2017, at 6:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Larry: > > > > I'm afraid I sometimes lose the practical thread in my own predilection > for > > decorating. I was trying to make the case that semiosis and sociality > have > > different genetic roots. This is really just a way of saying that speech > > and (practical) thinking have different genetic roots. > > > > So in Antarctica, whales socialize for a definite purpose, and that > purpose > > determines the size of the social group (around twelve whales). But when > > they migrate past our shores, they are very far from that purpose. They > are > > not feeding, they are not mating, but they are communicating: this is > where > > we find "songs" as distinct from echo-locating clicks. It is also where > we > > find dyads and triads--apparently for engaging in dialogues and > trialogues. > > This is not simply sociality for the sake of reproducing the material > > conditions of life; it is an exuberant semiosis for the sheer hell of it. > > Admittedly, ALL sociality and ALL semiosis among humans is a mixture of > the > > transactional and the expressive, but the arc of most conversation, if > not > > of history itself, seems to bend inevitably from the former to the > latter. > > > > Heidegger's idea that there is an "ur-Life" which has to assent to every > > instant of living seems to me precisely ass-backwards (as Vygotsky likes > to > > say). It is like the ridiculous notion that in order to create language > > people called a kind of global congress in which the precise terms of the > > language contract were hammered out, without, of course, using any > language > > at all. > > > > Take (please!) the various accounts that we humans create of the end of > the > > world by flooding. They go all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, > where > > the gods basically turned the taps on mankind because they were making > too > > much noise down there. Then, in Revelation, there is more emphasis on sea > > monsters; by the time we get to the Middle Ages, the world is going to > end > > in water-born plagues. But it's only since 1945 that there has been an > > emphasis on volitional apocalypse--that is, the flooding of the earth by > > humans themselves (Kevin Costner and "Waterworld" and its various > > derivatives). > > > > It's possible, I suppose, to see this as a Hegelian philosophy of > history. > > You know, man unconscious of his ability to end the world as we know it, > > first ascribing it to arbitrary whims of the gods, then to nature, then > to > > human diseases and sin and only in our own time a "true concept" of > global > > warming. But it is also possible to see the development of concept as the > > outcome of human practices such as flood-based agriculture, living in > > proximity to Nile crocodiles, the medieval scourges of the black death, > and > > the premeditated design and thoughtless use of nuclear weapons in World > War > > II. The latter possibility has the advantage of including more tangible > > data if not always ocular proof. > > > > Ruqaiya Hasan says: > > > > "Design is not an expression of field alone (that is, it is not simply an > > expression of "what is going on"--DK). It is associated with the social > > process as a whole *i.e. as a contextual configuration of the values > > pertaining to field, tenor ("who is taking part"--DK) and mode ("how is > > language brought in?"--DK) and is independent of any one individual's > > desires, intentions, and/or decisions, having been negotiated between at > > least two interactants. These designs have come about because through the > > long history of the communal living of life, in every culture there have > > evolved recognizable ways of being, doing and saying that are communally > > deemed relevant to those occasions where social subjects have co-acted. > The > > design of a social practice is nothing other than a near ritualization of > > ways of doing something with others by using such semiotic systems as are > > at the community's disposal: the more culturally significant a social > > process, the more ritualized it gets. It is in this sense that specific > > social processes have become the raison d'etre of specific designs." > > > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > >> On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:23 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > >> > >> David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to > co-ordinate > >> their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that > assists > >> setting the "table" before feasting.. David mentioned in passing that > >> whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in > 'concert" > >> and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop. > >> I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis] but I hope > >> what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this > >> theme will be revived, after my multiple detours. > >> > >> My particular swerve follows through Greg Thompson and his posting the > >> Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the edited book > Andy > >> is reading.. [and this 2nd text includes a 1983 essay by Charles > Taylor on > >> the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy]. > >> > >> So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in the > >> format of a book review that explores two intersecting TEXTS written 27 > >> years between their writings] > >> > >> [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text] & > >> [the 2nd text is the 2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983 > text > >> as the introductory essay. > >> > >> Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR book review and what > this > >> 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now > >> echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught my > >> attention. I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the symbol > * > >> can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -] > >> > >> * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached through a > >> particular and specific hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is > >> producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which > to > >> *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this > >> hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's SYSTEM > of > >> philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts > can > >> be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific > >> movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its > own > >> right through textual analysis. > >> > >> *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*. The > >> logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other > >> philosophical "sciences": > >> 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983 > text > >> also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical Life. > >> This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its > >> materiality and its "spirit/meaning" > >> > >> * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in scope. > >> The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on Hegel's > >> "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing / > >> extracting"] Hegel's insights on: - freedom, agency, imputability, and > >> responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In > this > >> narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic* / the basic > grounding > >> text from Taylor's hermeneutical approach & movement] .What else is > >> "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of Religion > and > >> meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of attention > >> remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework of > a > >> particular discipline - Anthroplogy - > >> AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating > in > >> 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by this > >> limitation in 2010. > >> What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is > ABSTRACT > >> explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,- read > WITHIN > >> this disciplinary WORLD /framework. > >> Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality & > >> spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline. > >> > >> * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this 2010 2nd > >> text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention. > >> The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus *on* > >> disciplinary anthropological action exploration WITHIN discourse / > >> communication [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as > textual > >> readings] This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of > discourse > >> [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] & [reading textual "workings" > >> within the anthropological disciplinary focus]. > >> The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of > [Philosophy > >> of Action]. > >> > >> * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" : > >> The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel the > >> "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and that > the > >> basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a particular > >> and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates > "other" > >> philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of > Spirit] > >> that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic" > and > >> "pervasive" qualitative theory of action. > >> NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of the > >> 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered > when > >> the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized > above. > >> > >> This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between > >> *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell > us > >> in this regard > >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jul 2 13:18:04 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2017 13:18:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Retrotopia Message-ID: <59595502.876f620a.c14ad.2d31@mx.google.com> Retro spectives and sociality are being considered in another thread, so thought this book by Zygmunt Bauman may have some relevance Retrotopia https://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/B06XGQMJ6J/ref=pe_184490_244315560_nrn_si_1_im#productDescription_secondary_view_div_1499026275919 Sent from my Windows 10 phone From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jul 2 14:37:04 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2017 06:37:04 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Message-ID: Greg: Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic route. But after all, that's what whales do. So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University of Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, he would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" instead of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge till spring crept over me window sill!" Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or " The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive a letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": b) She tore up the letter which upset me. Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it is confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS on "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or the grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the clause-complex as a whole. You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, but they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip hop and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, but they may also be inner speech). But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between her graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl and it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to know why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's winter) and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why Grandma sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to the table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University of Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a different "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: looking for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's sitting in the wrong place at the kitchen table. The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of view, it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related to the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not go hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the great ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their migrations. Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting that they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own futures. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From anamshane@gmail.com Sun Jul 2 15:07:29 2017 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Sun, 02 Jul 2017 18:07:29 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] [DPJ] Call for 2017 manuscripts and projects Message-ID: <50D847AE-4EBB-43AD-B883-A69829195FCE@gmail.com> Dear colleagues? Dialogic Pedagogy Journal (DPJ) is happy to announce a call for 2017 submission of manuscripts. DPJ is an international, online, Open Access, free publication, peer-reviewed, academic journal. The targeted audience of the DPJ is educational researchers and innovative educators interested in broadly defined field and practice of Dialogic Pedagogy. Our journal is indexed in many national and international academic databases (e.g. ERIC, Google Scholar, Education Source, etc.). I. Deciding if your work should be published by the Dialogic Pedagogy International Online Journal The purpose of DPJ is to advance international scholarship and pedagogical practice in the area of dialogic pedagogy and education. The journal is multidisciplinary, international, multi-paradigmatic, and multicultural in scope, accepting manuscripts from all scholars and practitioners interested in the dialogic nature of education, teaching, and learning in various formal institutional and informal settings. We encourage research scholars and practitioners with an interest in dialogue and pedagogy to submit articles for editorial consideration. We loosely define 'dialogic pedagogy' as any scholarship and pedagogical practice, from educational researchers and practitioners, which values and gives priority to 'dialogue' in learning/teaching across a wide range of institutional and non-institutional learning settings". To make a decision about publishing with DPJ, please take your time to evaluate whether or not your manuscript is suitable for the DPJ and the community behind the journal based on the description of the journal?s Focus and Scope . If you are not sure and have questions regarding the journal's aims and scope, we urge you to write to the Main Journal Editors with your questions. II. Genres of publications DPJ welcomes submissions of manuscripts and multimedia of diverse genres, formats, lengths, and styles. The main peer-reviewed genres of publications are the following: The main peer-reviewed genres involve conceptual, empirical, and/or methodological papers (Including any combination of these foci). a) Ethnographic and empirical research with conceptual analysis and "thick descriptions"; b) Description of and reflection on innovative dialogic educational practices; c) ?Special issue? ? collection of thematically related papers; d) Theoretical papers; The main non-peer reviewed genres of publication are the following: a) Video/audio recorded or transcripts of innovative dialogic educational practices with possibility of fragment-by-fragment analysis of records and their discussions; b) Invited commentaries on published articles (both impressionistic and focused); c) Critical book reviews (invited or volunteered); d) Manuscript work in progress for critical, supportive, non-judgmental peer feedback; e) Reports about relevant projects and conferences; f) Announcements relevant to the field of Dialogic Pedagogy or DPJ; g) Translations of work published in other than English languages; h) Interviews. III. Your next steps If you plan to submit your manuscript(s) in 2017, please reply to this email and provide to us with the following information: 1) Tentative title of your paper; 2) Genre (as listed above or proposed new one); 3) Tentative list of the authors; 4) Tentative date of submission. For more info about submission, please, see Author Guidelines . If you want to submit your manuscript(s) immediately, please go to http://dpj.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/dpj1/information/authors (it requires registration). Also, please, contact us if you have ideas for a special issue or a special project. Let us know if you have questions, concerns, suggestions, and/or proposals. Please pass this email to your colleagues who may be interested. Sincerely, DPJ Main Editors Eugene Matusov Ana Marjanovic-Shane Sue Brindley Jim Cresswell PS: Sorry if you are getting the same e-mail twice! From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sun Jul 2 21:30:06 2017 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2017 00:30:06 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim McCawley in the message this replies to. I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the impression given by the characterization provided. As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open man, an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of many languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. He died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there is a memorial: Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of trustees -- 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as part of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation between universities and politics in the US in general.) PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Greg: Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic route. But after all, that's what whales do. So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University of Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, he would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" instead of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge till spring crept over me window sill!" Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or " The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive a letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": b) She tore up the letter which upset me. Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it is confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS on "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or the grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the clause-complex as a whole. You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, but they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip hop and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, but they may also be inner speech). But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between her graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl and it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to know why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's winter) and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why Grandma sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to the table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University of Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a different "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: looking for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's sitting in the wrong place at the kitchen table. The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of view, it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related to the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not go hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the great ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their migrations. Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting that they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own futures. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From jamesma320@gmail.com Mon Jul 3 12:37:57 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2017 20:37:57 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg In-Reply-To: <595952e2.c39d630a.fbb8f.7540@mx.google.com> References: <37169434-C530-4E98-8119-5A3A336E512F@gmail.com> <595952e2.c39d630a.fbb8f.7540@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, for me, semiosis as a sign action has two distinct genetic roots: the a-priori root (in a sense that sign action exists before and independent of an organism's experience); the a-posteriori root (in a sense that sign action is associated with or influence by an organism's prior experience). The former is exemplified in the organism's intrinsic behaviour due to instinctual impulses or IRM (instinctual releasing mechanism, as triggered by the environment) - this may account for whales' singing. The latter appears to be in a social context, bearing out an organism acting upon prior knowledge and experience (whether consciously or unconsciously, voluntarily or involuntarily) - this may explain whales' social gathering. Re retrospectivism, all knowledge and understanding involves retrospection or recollection, whether deliberately or in an intuitive manner. However, such retrospection or recollection is not simply based on prior experience but also affected by present situation and experience. I think semiogenesis is relevant to, and takes place in, all four domains of human development (phylogenesis, ontogenesis, sociogenesis and microgenesis) and the interaction of these domains. James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 2 July 2017 at 21:09, Lplarry wrote: > James, > Could you elaborate further this distinction of semiosis having two > roots whereas sociality looks in one direction. > Also your focus on the priority of the ethical realm as what motivates may > come into play. > > On this topic, , Sociality is considered On page 8 & 9 of the introduction > i just attached within the theme of sociality and retrospectivism. > The comment : > ? Only as manifested or expressed can one (even the subject herself) > retrospectively determine what must have been intended. And of course it > seems a bit paradoxical to claim that we can only know what we intended to > do AFTER we have actually acted. But there is little doubt that Hegel > holds something like such a position.? > > So, David K mentioned (if i understood David) two possible genetic roots > (one root more playful while the other root is more serious). > Images of whales organizing dinner time and whales singing playfully are > staying in my (mind?s) eye. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: James Ma > Sent: July 2, 2017 12:36 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Continue with Hegle, and the Social through Greg > > For me, semiosis has both an a-priori and an a-posteriori root, whereas > sociality has an a-posteriori root only. > > James > > *_____________________________________* > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > * > > > > On 2 July 2017 at 03:04, wrote: > > > David, > > Lovely quote from Hasan. She really nailed it. > > But I'm still unclear how your whale example makes the case that semiosis > > and sociality have different genetic roots. Perhaps you could explain a > bit > > more for a dull skull like me? > > Greg > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > > > On Jul 1, 2017, at 6:13 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > > Larry: > > > > > > I'm afraid I sometimes lose the practical thread in my own predilection > > for > > > decorating. I was trying to make the case that semiosis and sociality > > have > > > different genetic roots. This is really just a way of saying that > speech > > > and (practical) thinking have different genetic roots. > > > > > > So in Antarctica, whales socialize for a definite purpose, and that > > purpose > > > determines the size of the social group (around twelve whales). But > when > > > they migrate past our shores, they are very far from that purpose. They > > are > > > not feeding, they are not mating, but they are communicating: this is > > where > > > we find "songs" as distinct from echo-locating clicks. It is also where > > we > > > find dyads and triads--apparently for engaging in dialogues and > > trialogues. > > > This is not simply sociality for the sake of reproducing the material > > > conditions of life; it is an exuberant semiosis for the sheer hell of > it. > > > Admittedly, ALL sociality and ALL semiosis among humans is a mixture of > > the > > > transactional and the expressive, but the arc of most conversation, if > > not > > > of history itself, seems to bend inevitably from the former to the > > latter. > > > > > > Heidegger's idea that there is an "ur-Life" which has to assent to > every > > > instant of living seems to me precisely ass-backwards (as Vygotsky > likes > > to > > > say). It is like the ridiculous notion that in order to create language > > > people called a kind of global congress in which the precise terms of > the > > > language contract were hammered out, without, of course, using any > > language > > > at all. > > > > > > Take (please!) the various accounts that we humans create of the end of > > the > > > world by flooding. They go all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, > > where > > > the gods basically turned the taps on mankind because they were making > > too > > > much noise down there. Then, in Revelation, there is more emphasis on > sea > > > monsters; by the time we get to the Middle Ages, the world is going to > > end > > > in water-born plagues. But it's only since 1945 that there has been an > > > emphasis on volitional apocalypse--that is, the flooding of the earth > by > > > humans themselves (Kevin Costner and "Waterworld" and its various > > > derivatives). > > > > > > It's possible, I suppose, to see this as a Hegelian philosophy of > > history. > > > You know, man unconscious of his ability to end the world as we know > it, > > > first ascribing it to arbitrary whims of the gods, then to nature, then > > to > > > human diseases and sin and only in our own time a "true concept" of > > global > > > warming. But it is also possible to see the development of concept as > the > > > outcome of human practices such as flood-based agriculture, living in > > > proximity to Nile crocodiles, the medieval scourges of the black death, > > and > > > the premeditated design and thoughtless use of nuclear weapons in World > > War > > > II. The latter possibility has the advantage of including more tangible > > > data if not always ocular proof. > > > > > > Ruqaiya Hasan says: > > > > > > "Design is not an expression of field alone (that is, it is not simply > an > > > expression of "what is going on"--DK). It is associated with the social > > > process as a whole *i.e. as a contextual configuration of the values > > > pertaining to field, tenor ("who is taking part"--DK) and mode ("how is > > > language brought in?"--DK) and is independent of any one individual's > > > desires, intentions, and/or decisions, having been negotiated between > at > > > least two interactants. These designs have come about because through > the > > > long history of the communal living of life, in every culture there > have > > > evolved recognizable ways of being, doing and saying that are > communally > > > deemed relevant to those occasions where social subjects have co-acted. > > The > > > design of a social practice is nothing other than a near ritualization > of > > > ways of doing something with others by using such semiotic systems as > are > > > at the community's disposal: the more culturally significant a social > > > process, the more ritualized it gets. It is in this sense that specific > > > social processes have become the raison d'etre of specific designs." > > > > > > -- > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:23 AM, Larry Purss > > wrote: > > >> > > >> David opened with exploration of whales and how they learn to > > co-ordinate > > >> their movements in order to herd schools of fish into a shape that > > assists > > >> setting the "table" before feasting.. David mentioned in passing that > > >> whales must *learn* to create this shared small group working in > > 'concert" > > >> and added that this learning takes 27 years to develop. > > >> I will not add to this line of inquiry [whales and semiosis] but I > hope > > >> what I add will at some point return to [semiosis and whales] and this > > >> theme will be revived, after my multiple detours. > > >> > > >> My particular swerve follows through Greg Thompson and his posting > the > > >> Notre Dame Philosophical Review [NDPR} book review of the edited book > > Andy > > >> is reading.. [and this 2nd text includes a 1983 essay by Charles > > Taylor on > > >> the basic premise of Hegel's Philosophy]. > > >> > > >> So my comments will be focused upon this Notre Dame text written in > the > > >> format of a book review that explores two intersecting TEXTS written > 27 > > >> years between their writings] > > >> > > >> [Taylor wrote the 1983 essay & also was the editor of the 1st text] & > > >> [the 2nd text is the 2010 edited text which republishes Taylor's 1983 > > text > > >> as the introductory essay. > > >> > > >> Now to focus attention specifically on the NDPR book review and what > > this > > >> 3rd text is contributing to the 1st and 2nd text. My comments are now > > >> echoing the "insights" of the book review by highlighting what caught > my > > >> attention. I will list some *insights* in point form. [note the > symbol > > * > > >> can be read AS -insight- or -point of view -] > > >> > > >> * For Taylor - Hegel's concept of action is approached through a > > >> particular and specific hermeneutical lens [or lenses] and Taylor is > > >> producing or projecting a particular [paradigm or model] through which > > to > > >> *read* Hegel's Theory of Action. Taylor writes that through this > > >> hermeneutical lens that it becomes possible to *open up* Hegel's > SYSTEM > > of > > >> philosophy. In particular Hegel's "architecture" and Hegel's concepts > > can > > >> be *revealed* within Taylor's hermeneutical movements. This specific > > >> movement/orientation/approach can be considered a [discipline] in its > > own > > >> right through textual analysis. > > >> > > >> *The "basic" or "grounding" aspect of Hegel's [system] is *logic*. > The > > >> logic articulates [as text] the patterns showing up in the other > > >> philosophical "sciences": > > >> 1) philosophy of Nature 2) Philosophy of Religion. Essays in the 1983 > > text > > >> also covered 3) theory of Poltical Action and 4) Theory of Ethical > Life. > > >> This "insight" [point of view] outlines the 1983 texts's "intent" [its > > >> materiality and its "spirit/meaning" > > >> > > >> * the 2nd text [2010 text] is both narrower in scope and wider in > scope. > > >> The 2010 text is narrower in the sense that this text focuses on > Hegel's > > >> "Philosophy of Right" and the intended "[revealing / unearthing / > > >> extracting"] Hegel's insights on: - freedom, agency, imputability, > and > > >> responsibility - This intent of the text is outlined in 8 essays. In > > this > > >> narrowed scope there is NO essays on Hegel's "Logic* / the basic > > grounding > > >> text from Taylor's hermeneutical approach & movement] .What else is > > >> "excluded" [concealed] is the text exploring the Philosophy of > Religion > > and > > >> meta-physical themes. In the 2010 narrowed scope the focus of > attention > > >> remains reading texts on *action* WITHIN the broad WORLD / framework > of > > a > > >> particular discipline - Anthroplogy - > > >> AS a discipline. Notice that this narrowing focus is now concentrating > > in > > >> 2010 on one particular [disciplinary practice] and is "bounded" by > this > > >> limitation in 2010. > > >> What is still included within this narrowed disciplinary focus is > > ABSTRACT > > >> explorations of: - right, morality, ethical life in groups,- read > > WITHIN > > >> this disciplinary WORLD /framework. > > >> Notice this narrowed focus is occurring within textual materiality & > > >> spirituality narrowed to a specific discipline. > > >> > > >> * At the same time as this narrowing in the sense above , this 2010 > 2nd > > >> text has a "wider" focus" than Taylor's 1983 intention. > > >> The 2010 edited book of "essays" is Promoting or Projecting a focus > *on* > > >> disciplinary anthropological action exploration WITHIN discourse / > > >> communication [discourse as face to face dialogue & discourse as > > textual > > >> readings] This 2010 edited text is encouraging both aspects of > > discourse > > >> [disciplinary face to face dialogicality] & [reading textual > "workings" > > >> within the anthropological disciplinary focus]. > > >> The particular aspect of anthropology is the sub-discipline of > > [Philosophy > > >> of Action]. > > >> > > >> * So to weave together the above insights from the NDPR "text" : > > >> The 1st volume supports Taylor's hermeneutical claim that for Hegel > the > > >> "qualitative" theory of action is BOTH 'basic" and "pervasive" and > that > > the > > >> basic disciplinary focus is "LOGIC" o f Hegel's "SYSTEM" as a > particular > > >> and specific "discipline". This basic discipline then articulates > > "other" > > >> philosophical "systems" [i.e philosophy of Nature / philosophy of > > Spirit] > > >> that are dependent upon Hegel successfully unfolding the more "basic" > > and > > >> "pervasive" qualitative theory of action. > > >> NOTE: This focus of Taylor's 1983 text is not the intended focus of > the > > >> 2010 edited text. Therefore the *insights* generated will be altered > > when > > >> the intent becomes both narrowed and widened in the ways summarized > > above. > > >> > > >> This leaves open a further line of inquiry: The difference between > > >> *situations* and *worlds* of being. Paul Ricouer has something to tell > > us > > >> in this regard > > >> > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jul 3 13:44:44 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 05:44:44 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> Message-ID: That was untimely. I didn't actually realize Professor McCawley had died; he wasn't that old when I heard him, maybe his late thirties. So maybe today I would say that Professor McCawley was the underappreciated, distinguished founder of generative semantics, an attempt to extend Chomsky's theory of syntax to pragmatics, logic, and meaning generally, betrayed by his own professor (who worked very hard to deny the generative semanticists a hearing). But at the time I myself was still in my late teens, and saw him through the callow eyes of a college freshman, newly recruited to revolutionary socialism. Being a right wing nut job was part of Professor McCawley's persona (during the war he had written faux linguistics papers making fun of Chomsky by an imaginary NLF linguist called Phuc Dong who hailed from SHIT). So I rather suspect he would have preferred the way I thought of him then. But I also suspect he also would have taken the linguistics a lot more seriously than any attempt to characterize his person one way or the other. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jul 3, 2017 at 1:30 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim > McCawley in the message this replies to. > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the impression > given by the characterization provided. > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open man, > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of many > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. He > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the New > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there is a > memorial: > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of trustees -- > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as part > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation between > universities and politics in the US in general.) > PG > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > Greg: > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University of > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, he > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" instead > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or " > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive a > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it is > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS on > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or the > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > clause-complex as a whole. > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, but > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip hop > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, but > they may also be inner speech). > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between her > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl and > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to know > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's winter) > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why Grandma > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to the > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University of > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a different > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: looking > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's sitting > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of view, > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related to > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not go > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the great > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their > migrations. > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting that > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own futures. > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Jul 3 17:13:55 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 00:13:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> References: , <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> Message-ID: <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of another scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems to have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a search on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a couple of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does not appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. Sociogenesis, by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned in a previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social and the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, who are concerned with the production of signs all across the biological spectrum. Alfredo. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peg Griffin Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim McCawley in the message this replies to. I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the impression given by the characterization provided. As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open man, an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of many languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. He died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there is a memorial: Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of trustees -- 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as part of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation between universities and politics in the US in general.) PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Greg: Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic route. But after all, that's what whales do. So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University of Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, he would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" instead of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge till spring crept over me window sill!" Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or " The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive a letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": b) She tore up the letter which upset me. Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it is confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS on "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or the grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the clause-complex as a whole. You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, but they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip hop and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, but they may also be inner speech). But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between her graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl and it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to know why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's winter) and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why Grandma sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to the table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University of Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a different "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: looking for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's sitting in the wrong place at the kitchen table. The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of view, it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related to the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not go hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the great ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their migrations. Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting that they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own futures. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 4 00:15:20 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 00:15:20 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> References: , <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <595b4092.cc46620a.cd5e0.8432@mx.google.com> Alfredo, Your question concerning biosemiotics affecting all life forms producing signs has an affinity with James referring generally to organisms and more specifically (human) organisms. If we follow David?s whale speculation we are considering either the triad semiosis- sociality or the triad sociality-semiosis. Here the (-) mark as interval seems a key third aspect in this relationship. Considering whale sociality and whale semiosis as contrasting themes is certainly opening a place for further play. The word (playworld) comes to mind when listening to David explore whale practices. Then i notice the question arising of what is meant by the notion of (worldS) (and worlds-of-being). What do worlds express that are not included in the notion of ( situations)? Here for help I turn towards Paul Ricouer who focused on two questions while exploring the contrasts between (situations) and (worlds) The two questions?: 1)To what extent may we consider the notion of text as a good paradigm for the so-called object of the social sciences? 2) To what extent may we use the methodology of text interpretation as a paradigm for interpretation in general in the field of the human sciences? Paul answers these two questions in his essay? titled, ? The Model of the Text?: Meaningful Action Considered As a Text? So Ricouer is presenting and exploring meaningful action as a text analogue in order to contrast (situations) and (worlds). Alfredo, I am sending out a probe but am not sure if my comment is throwing too many balls in the air to juggle. Not sure how far to probe into and follow Ricouer when he says that social scientists often confound world & situation. In his words; ?we are confounding reference and monstration?. (cited page 78 in his essay in the edited book?: ?Interpretive Social Science A Reader?. For Ricouer the key to texts and text analogues is that in one way or another they speak about (worlds). Paul states?: ?I will now say without paradox that only man HAS A WORLD and not just a situation?. (page 79). Where would Ricouer place whale practices as he explores text analogues? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: July 3, 2017 5:17 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of another scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems to have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a search on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a couple of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does not appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. Sociogenesis, by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned in a previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social and the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, who are concerned with the production of signs all across the biological spectrum. Alfredo. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peg Griffin Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim McCawley in the message this replies to. I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the impression given by the characterization provided. As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open man, an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of many languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. He died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there is a memorial: Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of trustees -- 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as part of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation between universities and politics in the US in general.) PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Greg: Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic route. But after all, that's what whales do. So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University of Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, he would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" instead of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge till spring crept over me window sill!" Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or " The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive a letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": b) She tore up the letter which upset me. Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it is confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS on "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or the grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the clause-complex as a whole. You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, but they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip hop and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, but they may also be inner speech). But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between her graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl and it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to know why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's winter) and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why Grandma sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to the table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University of Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a different "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: looking for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's sitting in the wrong place at the kitchen table. The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of view, it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related to the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not go hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the great ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their migrations. Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting that they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own futures. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From jamesma320@gmail.com Tue Jul 4 02:05:07 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 10:05:07 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but can't remember who coined it. To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, they would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and microsemiosis? James On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of another > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems to > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a search > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a couple > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does not > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. Sociogenesis, > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned in a > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social and > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, who are > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological spectrum. > > Alfredo. > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Peg Griffin > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim > McCawley in the message this replies to. > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the impression > given by the characterization provided. > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open man, > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of many > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. He > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the New > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there is a > memorial: > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of trustees -- > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as part > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation between > universities and politics in the US in general.) > PG > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > Greg: > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University of > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, he > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" instead > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or " > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive a > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it is > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS on > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or the > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > clause-complex as a whole. > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, but > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip hop > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, but > they may also be inner speech). > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between her > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl and > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to know > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's winter) > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why Grandma > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to the > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University of > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a different > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: looking > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's sitting > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of view, > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related to > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not go > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the great > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their > migrations. > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting that > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own futures. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jul 4 05:31:01 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 21:31:01 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo: I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a good reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think most of us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it was a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a bit of his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should not deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of Ayn Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance system that the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been dispelled. Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were current in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or "microgenesis", because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all levels: just as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow us to raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between "Dada?" ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this immediately turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into six. Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and DOWN intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. That's semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms of semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning potential through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper nouns). The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through polarity (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through the internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives into dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important aspects of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for subconcepts. But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and just as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if you are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its own in adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving it" is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what "perezhivanie" means: Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, How hot the scent is of the summer rose, How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. But we have speech, to chill the angry day, And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. We spell away the overhanging night, We spell away the soldiers and the fright. There's a cool web of language winds us in, Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: We grow sea-green at last and coldly die In brininess and volubility. But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, Throwing off language and its watery clasp Before our death, instead of when death comes, Facing the wide glare of the children's day, Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma wrote: > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but can't > remember who coined it. > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, they > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > microsemiosis? > > James > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of another > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems to > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a > search > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a > couple > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does not > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > Sociogenesis, > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned in > a > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social and > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, who > are > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > spectrum. > > > > Alfredo. > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > impression > > given by the characterization provided. > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open man, > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of many > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. He > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the New > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there is > a > > memorial: > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of trustees > -- > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as > part > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation > between > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > PG > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > Greg: > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University > of > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, > he > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > instead > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or > " > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive > a > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it > is > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS > on > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or > the > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, > but > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip > hop > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, > but > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between > her > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl > and > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to > know > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's > winter) > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why > Grandma > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to > the > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University > of > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > different > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: > looking > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's > sitting > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of > view, > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related > to > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not > go > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the > great > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their > > migrations. > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting > that > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > futures. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > > Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > From jamesma320@gmail.com Tue Jul 4 06:14:51 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 14:14:51 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thanks David for pointing to us that "semiogenesis" is from Halliday. But I seem to remember "semogenesis" in his functional grammar - are they the same? James On 4 July 2017 at 13:31, David Kellogg wrote: > Alfredo: > > I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to > involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a good > reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think most of > us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely > fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it was > a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a bit of > his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should not > deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of Ayn > Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance system that > the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been dispelled. > > Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were current > in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or "microgenesis", > because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the > Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the > horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". > > Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all levels: just > as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start > building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow us to > raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. > Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between "Dada?" > ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this immediately > turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into six. > Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and DOWN > intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, > combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. That's > semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. > > So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms of > semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning potential > through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper nouns). > The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through polarity > (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through > imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through the > internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve > semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives into > dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is > semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis > through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important aspects > of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and > embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for subconcepts. > > But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and just > as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if you > are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its own in > adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying > experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving it" > is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what > "perezhivanie" means: > > Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, > How hot the scent is of the summer rose, > How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, > How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. > > But we have speech, to chill the angry day, > And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. > We spell away the overhanging night, > We spell away the soldiers and the fright. > > There's a cool web of language winds us in, > Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: > We grow sea-green at last and coldly die > In brininess and volubility. > > But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, > Throwing off language and its watery clasp > Before our death, instead of when death comes, > Facing the wide glare of the children's day, > Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, > We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but > can't > > remember who coined it. > > > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are > > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, they > > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > > microsemiosis? > > > > James > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of > another > > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems > to > > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a > > search > > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a > > couple > > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such > > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does not > > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > > Sociogenesis, > > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do > > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned > in > > a > > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social > and > > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, who > > are > > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > > spectrum. > > > > > > Alfredo. > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim > > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make > > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > > impression > > > given by the characterization provided. > > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open > man, > > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of > many > > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. > He > > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the > New > > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there > is > > a > > > memorial: > > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of > trustees > > -- > > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as > > part > > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation > > between > > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > > PG > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > Greg: > > > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the > scenic > > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University > > of > > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't > > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the > LIbertarian > > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a > nut, > > he > > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > > instead > > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: > > > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge > > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of > alliteration) > > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? > or > > " > > > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs > on > > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I > receive > > a > > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. > > > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to > be a > > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" > is > > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). > It > > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" > for > > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it > > is > > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND > STRESS > > on > > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or > > the > > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all > about > > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not > just > > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, > > but > > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip > > hop > > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical > > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is > realized > > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, > > but > > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must > ascend > > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between > > her > > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she > > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl > > and > > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to > > know > > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's > > winter) > > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and > not > > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why > > Grandma > > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not > > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to > > the > > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the > University > > of > > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > > different > > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the > context > > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others > it > > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: > > looking > > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's > > sitting > > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of > > view, > > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related > > to > > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will > not > > go > > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the > > great > > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on > their > > > migrations. > > > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development > for > > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in > both > > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the > material > > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and > are > > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting > > that > > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > > futures. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > > > Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jul 4 11:12:30 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 18:12:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> , Message-ID: <1499191949903.92633@iped.uio.no> David, I never thought you were not doing justice to anyone's work, but I could appreciate that others did feel that way and tried to remediate it, something I praise them for. In any case, I thank both of you for bringing McCawley to bear, I did not know about his work before. I thank you too for the clarifying example on semiogenesis, and yours and James notes that semiogenesis traverses across levels. After reading your examples, it helps me thinking of semogenesis in Batesonian terms, as emergent patterns of 'differences that make difference' across linguistic strata but also across levels of development. Reading Vygotsky's pedology in terms of semiogenesis makes sense too, specially if the inquiry is not limited to patterns within language but deals with patterns of language-in-use. I read Halliday and find antecedents of the argument unfolding here in this thread in his notion of 'mode', which is one of three features of 'social situations' (field, tenor and mode). Mode concerns 'the division of labour between semiotic activities and social ones (ranging from semiotic activities as constitutive air the situation to semiotic activities as facilitating)' (Halliday & Matthiesen 2014, p. 33). I read you saying in previous posts something like this when you bring up the example of teachers teaching rules for long division, where semiotic aspects are not just ancillary to the activity. That semiogenetic issues 'as such' become the leading subject/object of activity at certain stages of (phylo, socio, and ontogenetic) development makes good sense too; it is only scary that a semiotic account may become very logocentric and intellectualising (this is scary specially when it comes from linguists, which perhaps are an extreme instance of the semiogenetic tendency). The example of the whales singing, and the playfulness that Larry finds in them for us brings with it an appeal to affective and aesthetic aspects. Re-reading the posts where you bring the example on the passionfruit conversation, I see now that you (along Halliday and Hasan) are talking about social cohesion as it connects to linguistic cohesion, and that you are connecting this to a genetic, developmental Vygotskian approach. Big challenge you've got there! I found Larry's bringing Ricoeur on the text to bear relevant too, specially being someone so concerned as he is with turning dichotomies (text-reading; explanation-comprehension) into dialectic relations. I see people here is trying to build not a dichotomy but a social-semiotic dialectic. You say that Vygotsky does not use sociogenetic or sociogenesis, but the term appears in volumes 5 and 6 of the English collected works. What is Vygotsky's writing then? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 04 July 2017 14:31 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Alfredo: I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a good reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think most of us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it was a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a bit of his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should not deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of Ayn Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance system that the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been dispelled. Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were current in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or "microgenesis", because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all levels: just as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow us to raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between "Dada?" ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this immediately turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into six. Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and DOWN intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. That's semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms of semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning potential through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper nouns). The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through polarity (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through the internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives into dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important aspects of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for subconcepts. But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and just as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if you are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its own in adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving it" is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what "perezhivanie" means: Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, How hot the scent is of the summer rose, How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. But we have speech, to chill the angry day, And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. We spell away the overhanging night, We spell away the soldiers and the fright. There's a cool web of language winds us in, Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: We grow sea-green at last and coldly die In brininess and volubility. But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, Throwing off language and its watery clasp Before our death, instead of when death comes, Facing the wide glare of the children's day, Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma wrote: > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but can't > remember who coined it. > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, they > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > microsemiosis? > > James > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of another > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems to > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a > search > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a > couple > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does not > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > Sociogenesis, > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned in > a > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social and > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, who > are > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > spectrum. > > > > Alfredo. > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > impression > > given by the characterization provided. > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open man, > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of many > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. He > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the New > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there is > a > > memorial: > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of trustees > -- > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as > part > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation > between > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > PG > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > Greg: > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University > of > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, > he > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > instead > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or > " > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive > a > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it > is > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS > on > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or > the > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, > but > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip > hop > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, > but > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between > her > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl > and > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to > know > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's > winter) > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why > Grandma > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to > the > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University > of > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > different > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: > looking > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's > sitting > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of > view, > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related > to > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not > go > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the > great > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their > > migrations. > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting > that > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > futures. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > > Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 4 12:13:12 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 12:13:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <1499191949903.92633@iped.uio.no> References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> , <1499191949903.92633@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <595be8d0.4a04630a.ccb4a.4549@mx.google.com> Alfredo, The phrase describing what people here, hear ( also what people hear, here) as polyindicality (i.e. patterns of language & patterns of language-n-use) as playing within a social-semiotic relationality. Various intervals or gaps within notions and their diacritical marks. For example David mentioning process-product may b clearer as process -> product. I also notice the symbol :: Indicates analogue. Now if relations can also be transversal we need to express a relation of moving across or crossing over an intersection involving polyindicality. The invented diacritical mark -:- may express both vertical and horizontal relational actions but also express transversal relations. As an example the notational pair dialectical -:- dialogical or the pair (regression, progression) PLAY out as and through (regression -:- progression) as a triad. Alfredo, this may be our human form of play focusing our attention on the inevitable ?gap? or ?interval? between terms and their polyindicative sense and meaning Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: July 4, 2017 11:16 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation David, I never thought you were not doing justice to anyone's work, but I could appreciate that others did feel that way and tried to remediate it, something I praise them for. In any case, I thank both of you for bringing McCawley to bear, I did not know about his work before. I thank you too for the clarifying example on semiogenesis, and yours and James notes that semiogenesis traverses across levels. After reading your examples, it helps me thinking of semogenesis in Batesonian terms, as emergent patterns of 'differences that make difference' across linguistic strata but also across levels of development. Reading Vygotsky's pedology in terms of semiogenesis makes sense too, specially if the inquiry is not limited to patterns within language but deals with patterns of language-in-use. I read Halliday and find antecedents of the argument unfolding here in this thread in his notion of 'mode', which is one of three features of 'social situations' (field, tenor and mode). Mode concerns 'the division of labour between semiotic activities and social ones (ranging from semiotic activities as constitutive air the situation to semiotic activities as facilitating)' (Halliday & Matthiesen 2014, p. 33). I read you saying in previous posts something like this when you bring up the example of teachers teaching rules for long division, where semiotic aspects are not just ancillary to the activity. That semiogenetic issues 'as such' become the leading subject/object of activity at certain stages of (phylo, socio, and ontogenetic) development makes good sense too; it is only scary that a semiotic account may become very logocentric and intellectualising (this is scary specially when it comes from linguists, which perhaps are an extreme instance of the semiogenetic tendency). The example of the whales singing, and the playfulness that Larry finds in them for us brings with it an appeal to affective and aesthetic aspects. Re-reading the posts where you bring the example on the passionfruit conversation, I see now that you (along Halliday and Hasan) are talking about social cohesion as it connects to linguistic cohesion, and that you are connecting this to a genetic, developmental Vygotskian approach. Big challenge you've got there! I found Larry's bringing Ricoeur on the text to bear relevant too, specially being someone so concerned as he is with turning dichotomies (text-reading; explanation-comprehension) into dialectic relations. I see people here is trying to build not a dichotomy but a social-semiotic dialectic. You say that Vygotsky does not use sociogenetic or sociogenesis, but the term appears in volumes 5 and 6 of the English collected works. What is Vygotsky's writing then? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 04 July 2017 14:31 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Alfredo: I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a good reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think most of us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it was a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a bit of his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should not deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of Ayn Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance system that the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been dispelled. Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were current in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or "microgenesis", because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all levels: just as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow us to raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between "Dada?" ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this immediately turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into six. Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and DOWN intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. That's semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms of semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning potential through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper nouns). The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through polarity (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through the internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives into dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important aspects of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for subconcepts. But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and just as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if you are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its own in adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving it" is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what "perezhivanie" means: Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, How hot the scent is of the summer rose, How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. But we have speech, to chill the angry day, And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. We spell away the overhanging night, We spell away the soldiers and the fright. There's a cool web of language winds us in, Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: We grow sea-green at last and coldly die In brininess and volubility. But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, Throwing off language and its watery clasp Before our death, instead of when death comes, Facing the wide glare of the children's day, Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma wrote: > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but can't > remember who coined it. > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, they > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > microsemiosis? > > James > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of another > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems to > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a > search > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a > couple > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does not > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > Sociogenesis, > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned in > a > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social and > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, who > are > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > spectrum. > > > > Alfredo. > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > impression > > given by the characterization provided. > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open man, > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of many > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. He > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the New > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there is > a > > memorial: > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of trustees > -- > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as > part > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation > between > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > PG > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > Greg: > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the scenic > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University > of > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the LIbertarian > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a nut, > he > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > instead > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of alliteration) > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? or > " > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs on > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I receive > a > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to be a > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" is > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). It > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" for > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it > is > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND STRESS > on > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or > the > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all about > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not just > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, > but > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip > hop > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is realized > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, > but > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must ascend > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between > her > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl > and > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to > know > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's > winter) > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and not > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why > Grandma > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to > the > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the University > of > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > different > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the context > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others it > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: > looking > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's > sitting > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of > view, > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related > to > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will not > go > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the > great > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on their > > migrations. > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development for > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in both > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the material > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and are > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting > that > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > futures. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > > Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Jul 4 12:46:22 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 12:46:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Retrotopia In-Reply-To: <59595502.876f620a.c14ad.2d31@mx.google.com> References: <59595502.876f620a.c14ad.2d31@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Bauman is always interesting, thanks Larry. Here is a description of the book that is at the website mike -------------- We have long since lost our faith in the idea that human beings could achieve human happiness in some future ideal state ? a state that Thomas More, writing five centuries ago, tied to a *topos*, a fixed place, a land, an island, a sovereign state under a wise and benevolent ruler. But while we have lost our faith in utopias of all hues, the human aspiration that made this vision so compelling has not died. Instead it is re-emerging today as a vision focused not on the future but on the past, not on a future-to-be-created but on an abandoned and undead past that we could call retrotopia. The emergence of retrotopia is interwoven with the deepening gulf between power and politics that is a defining feature of our contemporary liquid-modern world ? the gulf between the ability to get things done and the capability of deciding what things need to be done, a capability once vested with the territorially sovereign state. This deepening gulf has rendered nation-states unable to deliver on their promises, giving rise to a widespread disenchantment with the idea that the future will improve the human condition and a mistrust in the ability of nation-states to make this happen. True to the utopian spirit, retrotopia derives its stimulus from the urge to rectify the failings of the present human condition ? though now by resurrecting the failed and forgotten potentials of the past. Imagined aspects of the past, genuine or putative, serve as the main landmarks today in drawing the road-map to a better world. Having lost all faith in the idea of building an alternative society of the future, many turn instead to the grand ideas of the past, buried but not yet dead. Such is retrotopia, the contours of which are examined by Zygmunt Bauman in this sharp dissection of our contemporary romance with the past. On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:18 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Retro spectives and sociality are being considered in another thread, so > thought this book by Zygmunt Bauman may have some relevance > > Retrotopia > > > https://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/B06XGQMJ6J/ref=pe_ > 184490_244315560_nrn_si_1_im#productDescription_secondary_ > view_div_1499026275919 > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jul 4 13:58:16 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 05:58:16 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <1499191949903.92633@iped.uio.no> References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <1499191949903.92633@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: You are right, Alfredo. He also uses it in Volume Three (that's Volume Four in English, the History of the Development of the Higher Mental Functions, Chapter Five, Paragraph 60). ?? ??????? ????? ?? ?????????? ???????? ?????????, ? ???????? ???????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ???????? ???????, ??? ?????????? ?????? ???? ?????????. "We can therefore identify the main result to which brings us the history of the cultural development of the child, as the sociogenesis of higher forms of behavior." Sorry! David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 3:12 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David, I never thought you were not doing justice to anyone's work, but I > could appreciate that others did feel that way and tried to remediate it, > something I praise them for. In any case, I thank both of you for bringing > McCawley to bear, I did not know about his work before. > > I thank you too for the clarifying example on semiogenesis, and yours and > James notes that semiogenesis traverses across levels. After reading your > examples, it helps me thinking of semogenesis in Batesonian terms, as > emergent patterns of 'differences that make difference' across linguistic > strata but also across levels of development. Reading Vygotsky's pedology > in terms of semiogenesis makes sense too, specially if the inquiry is not > limited to patterns within language but deals with patterns of > language-in-use. > > I read Halliday and find antecedents of the argument unfolding here in > this thread in his notion of 'mode', which is one of three features of > 'social situations' (field, tenor and mode). Mode concerns 'the division of > labour between semiotic activities and social ones (ranging from semiotic > activities as constitutive air the situation to semiotic activities as > facilitating)' (Halliday & Matthiesen 2014, p. 33). I read you saying in > previous posts something like this when you bring up the example of > teachers teaching rules for long division, where semiotic aspects are not > just ancillary to the activity. That semiogenetic issues 'as such' become > the leading subject/object of activity at certain stages of (phylo, socio, > and ontogenetic) development makes good sense too; it is only scary that a > semiotic account may become very logocentric and intellectualising (this is > scary specially when it comes from linguists, which perhaps are an extreme > instance of the semiogenetic tendency). The example of the whales singing, > and the playfulness that Larry finds in them for us brings with it an > appeal to affective and aesthetic aspects. Re-reading the posts where you > bring the example on the passionfruit conversation, I see now that you > (along Halliday and Hasan) are talking about social cohesion as it connects > to linguistic cohesion, and that you are connecting this to a genetic, > developmental Vygotskian approach. Big challenge you've got there! > > I found Larry's bringing Ricoeur on the text to bear relevant too, > specially being someone so concerned as he is with turning dichotomies > (text-reading; explanation-comprehension) into dialectic relations. I see > people here is trying to build not a dichotomy but a social-semiotic > dialectic. > > You say that Vygotsky does not use sociogenetic or sociogenesis, but the > term appears in volumes 5 and 6 of the English collected works. What is > Vygotsky's writing then? > > Alfredo > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 04 July 2017 14:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > Alfredo: > > I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to > involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a good > reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think most of > us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely > fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it was > a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a bit of > his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should not > deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of Ayn > Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance system that > the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been dispelled. > > Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were current > in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or "microgenesis", > because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the > Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the > horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". > > Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all levels: just > as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start > building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow us to > raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. > Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between "Dada?" > ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this immediately > turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into six. > Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and DOWN > intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, > combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. That's > semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. > > So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms of > semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning potential > through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper nouns). > The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through polarity > (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through > imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through the > internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve > semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives into > dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is > semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis > through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important aspects > of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and > embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for subconcepts. > > But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and just > as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if you > are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its own in > adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying > experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving it" > is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what > "perezhivanie" means: > > Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, > How hot the scent is of the summer rose, > How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, > How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. > > But we have speech, to chill the angry day, > And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. > We spell away the overhanging night, > We spell away the soldiers and the fright. > > There's a cool web of language winds us in, > Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: > We grow sea-green at last and coldly die > In brininess and volubility. > > But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, > Throwing off language and its watery clasp > Before our death, instead of when death comes, > Facing the wide glare of the children's day, > Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, > We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but > can't > > remember who coined it. > > > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are > > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, they > > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > > microsemiosis? > > > > James > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of > another > > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems > to > > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a > > search > > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a > > couple > > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such > > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does not > > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > > Sociogenesis, > > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do > > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned > in > > a > > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social > and > > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, who > > are > > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > > spectrum. > > > > > > Alfredo. > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of Jim > > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to make > > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > > impression > > > given by the characterization provided. > > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open > man, > > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of > many > > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. > He > > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the > New > > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there > is > > a > > > memorial: > > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of > trustees > > -- > > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois as > > part > > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation > > between > > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > > PG > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > Greg: > > > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the > scenic > > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the University > > of > > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he wasn't > > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the > LIbertarian > > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a > nut, > > he > > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > > instead > > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn sings: > > > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never budge > > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of > alliteration) > > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? > or > > " > > > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that occurs > on > > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I > receive > > a > > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my wife. > > > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to > be a > > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" > is > > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you Chomskyans). > It > > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" > for > > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and it > > is > > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND > STRESS > > on > > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" or > > the > > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all > about > > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not > just > > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about meaning, > > but > > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, hip > > hop > > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of lexicogrammatical > > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is > realized > > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as soundings, > > but > > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must > ascend > > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation between > > her > > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: she > > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit bowl > > and > > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to > > know > > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's > > winter) > > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and > not > > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why > > Grandma > > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's not > > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit to > > the > > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the > University > > of > > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > > different > > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the > context > > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in others > it > > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: > > looking > > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's > > sitting > > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of > > view, > > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much related > > to > > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will > not > > go > > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the > > great > > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on > their > > > migrations. > > > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development > for > > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in > both > > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the > material > > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and > are > > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves admitting > > that > > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > > futures. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > > > Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jul 4 15:02:19 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 07:02:19 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: I don't really know, James. I always thought "semiogenesis" and "semogenesis" were the same. Halliday seems to use them interchangeably. But now that you point it out, it occurs to me that "semantics" and "semiotics" are really quite different. Halliday uses "semiotic" or less the way Saussure uses it: everything that has to do with signs, of which language is simply the most developed. So as you say semiotics is part of everything: it's the way matter is organized to "mean" stars and galaxies, the way in which DNA is organized to "mean" proteins; the way in which people are organized to mean colonies and cultures, and the way in which sounds and graphics are organized to mean lexicogrammatical strings. Halliday uses "semantic" much more narrowly, to describe the last of these. Semantics is a stratum of language: "meaning" as opposed to "wording" or "context". Semantics is everything we need to get from context to wording, and for that reason it includes what Vygotsky calls the volitional impulse to speak (the feeling that one has something to say), the thought (the choice of a meaning), the formulation of a design in inner speech (the choice of a theme), none of which are fully grammatized. As this account suggests, "semogenesis" is not coextensive with semiogenesis (which is a property of matter generally) or logogenesis (which is a property of lexicogrammar). But the child does have a semantics before the child has a lexicogrammar; proto-speech (what Vygotsky calls "autonomous speech") is really a direct connection between context and phonology, one which doesn't require wording. Semantics is also a more conservative layer of language than lexicogrammar (though not as stable as context); one way to theorize a crisis is that the lexicogrammar is superproductive and creates far more meaning than the child knows what to do with. I guess I am not as scared as Alfredo of "overliving" into language. It seems to me that when you live under capitalism, the tendency is the other way: to package up our bodily sensations for mass market in horror movies, fast food, terrorist propaganda, porn and other forms of get-rich-fast sensationalism (e.g. the performance art movement that so many of my art school friends went into instead of painting). It seems to me that the nineteenth century novels that my wife loves so much have a much more realistic view of hunger and food, sex and love, and even fear and death, precisely because they are shareable through language. In any case, from the historico-cultural point of view, it's not through the atoms of their bodies or even the DNA of their children that people like Professor McCawley live on after death. Semogenesis is the only kind of immortality that any of us really get. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 10:14 PM, James Ma wrote: > Thanks David for pointing to us that "semiogenesis" is from Halliday. But I > seem to remember "semogenesis" in his functional grammar - are they the > same? > > James > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 13:31, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Alfredo: > > > > I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to > > involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a good > > reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think most of > > us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely > > fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it was > > a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a bit of > > his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should not > > deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of Ayn > > Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance system > that > > the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been dispelled. > > > > Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were > current > > in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or > "microgenesis", > > because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the > > Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the > > horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". > > > > Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all levels: > just > > as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start > > building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow us to > > raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. > > Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between > "Dada?" > > ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this immediately > > turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into six. > > Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and DOWN > > intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, > > combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. That's > > semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. > > > > So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms of > > semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning > potential > > through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper > nouns). > > The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through polarity > > (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through > > imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through the > > internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve > > semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives into > > dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is > > semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis > > through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important > aspects > > of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and > > embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for subconcepts. > > > > But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and > just > > as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if you > > are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its own > in > > adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying > > experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving it" > > is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what > > "perezhivanie" means: > > > > Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, > > How hot the scent is of the summer rose, > > How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, > > How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. > > > > But we have speech, to chill the angry day, > > And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. > > We spell away the overhanging night, > > We spell away the soldiers and the fright. > > > > There's a cool web of language winds us in, > > Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: > > We grow sea-green at last and coldly die > > In brininess and volubility. > > > > But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, > > Throwing off language and its watery clasp > > Before our death, instead of when death comes, > > Facing the wide glare of the children's day, > > Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, > > We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but > > can't > > > remember who coined it. > > > > > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are > > > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > > > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, > they > > > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > > > microsemiosis? > > > > > > James > > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > > > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of > > another > > > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems > > to > > > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a > > > search > > > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a > > > couple > > > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such > > > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does > not > > > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > > > Sociogenesis, > > > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do > > > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned > > in > > > a > > > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social > > and > > > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, > who > > > are > > > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > > > spectrum. > > > > > > > > Alfredo. > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu > > > > > > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of > Jim > > > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to > make > > > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > > > impression > > > > given by the characterization provided. > > > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open > > man, > > > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > > > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of > > many > > > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. > > He > > > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the > > New > > > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there > > is > > > a > > > > memorial: > > > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of > > trustees > > > -- > > > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois > as > > > part > > > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation > > > between > > > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > > > PG > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > Greg: > > > > > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the > > scenic > > > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the > University > > > of > > > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he > wasn't > > > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the > > LIbertarian > > > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a > > nut, > > > he > > > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > > > instead > > > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn > sings: > > > > > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never > budge > > > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of > > alliteration) > > > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? > > or > > > " > > > > > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that > occurs > > on > > > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > > > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I > > receive > > > a > > > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my > wife. > > > > > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to > > be a > > > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" > > is > > > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you > Chomskyans). > > It > > > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" > > for > > > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and > it > > > is > > > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND > > STRESS > > > on > > > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > > > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > > > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" > or > > > the > > > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all > > about > > > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not > > just > > > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about > meaning, > > > but > > > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > > > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, > hip > > > hop > > > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of > lexicogrammatical > > > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is > > realized > > > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as > soundings, > > > but > > > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must > > ascend > > > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > > > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation > between > > > her > > > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > > > > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: > she > > > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit > bowl > > > and > > > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to > > > know > > > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's > > > winter) > > > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and > > not > > > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why > > > Grandma > > > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's > not > > > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit > to > > > the > > > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > > > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the > > University > > > of > > > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > > > different > > > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the > > context > > > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in > others > > it > > > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: > > > looking > > > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > > > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > > > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's > > > sitting > > > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > > > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of > > > view, > > > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > > > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > > > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much > related > > > to > > > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > > > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will > > not > > > go > > > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the > > > great > > > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on > > their > > > > migrations. > > > > > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > > > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development > > for > > > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in > > both > > > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the > > material > > > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and > > are > > > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves > admitting > > > that > > > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > > > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > > > futures. > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 4 15:14:36 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 15:14:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Retrotopia In-Reply-To: References: <59595502.876f620a.c14ad.2d31@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <595c1353.d0a76b0a.17f36.9f4c@mx.google.com> Thanks Mike for adding this. What seems relevant is this notion of landmarks and what they generate. Zygmunt comments on landmarks that have the capacity to generate imaginative scapes. Whether future or past oriented, what is generated are imaginal topos. A secondary question then occurs when we notice in which direction our imaginative scapes direct our action. Are we moving laterally or vertically? Are we progressing or regressing? Are we traversing heights or depths? When traversing imaginal places that become actual places through our practical actions do we continually remain within imaginal places or do we leave the imaginal realm as we actualize and live within our shared worlds? The assumption I am playing with is that imaginal realms are actualized through our shared mutual actions (sociality as practices). As this occurs we are creating human (worlds)-of-being. What Zygmunt is noticing in this book is that when we can no longer trust the dream of progressing (futuricity) we activate the imaginal through regressive moves in order to create retro imaginal places What remains key is this imaginal aspect of sociality for both Zygmunt and Paul. Practical action as text analogue. Therefore, imaginal places are not only private realms occurring between our ears. Imaginal places are places that call us into sociality and call us to action and call us to live within shared (worlds). Zygmunt?s profession was sociology which is usually assumed to be a social science. Ricouer asks if the appropriate way to approach social sciences is through recognizing that they share the attributes of text-analogues. Ricouer assumes a radical shift occurs when we move from face to face dialogues (situations) towards trans formations which create shared (worlds) that we socially call into existence. Note that 5 centuries ago, Thomas More when describing Utopia, was writing texts. Today we have lost faith in progressing, and turn to imaginal regressing. There continues a progressing-regressing dance of unfolding that continues our imaginal ways. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: mike cole Sent: July 4, 2017 12:48 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Retrotopia Bauman is always interesting, thanks Larry. Here is a description of the book that is at the website mike -------------- We have long since lost our faith in the idea that human beings could achieve human happiness in some future ideal state ? a state that Thomas More, writing five centuries ago, tied to a *topos*, a fixed place, a land, an island, a sovereign state under a wise and benevolent ruler. But while we have lost our faith in utopias of all hues, the human aspiration that made this vision so compelling has not died. Instead it is re-emerging today as a vision focused not on the future but on the past, not on a future-to-be-created but on an abandoned and undead past that we could call retrotopia. The emergence of retrotopia is interwoven with the deepening gulf between power and politics that is a defining feature of our contemporary liquid-modern world ? the gulf between the ability to get things done and the capability of deciding what things need to be done, a capability once vested with the territorially sovereign state. This deepening gulf has rendered nation-states unable to deliver on their promises, giving rise to a widespread disenchantment with the idea that the future will improve the human condition and a mistrust in the ability of nation-states to make this happen. True to the utopian spirit, retrotopia derives its stimulus from the urge to rectify the failings of the present human condition ? though now by resurrecting the failed and forgotten potentials of the past. Imagined aspects of the past, genuine or putative, serve as the main landmarks today in drawing the road-map to a better world. Having lost all faith in the idea of building an alternative society of the future, many turn instead to the grand ideas of the past, buried but not yet dead. Such is retrotopia, the contours of which are examined by Zygmunt Bauman in this sharp dissection of our contemporary romance with the past. On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 1:18 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Retro spectives and sociality are being considered in another thread, so > thought this book by Zygmunt Bauman may have some relevance > > Retrotopia > > > https://www.amazon.ca/gp/product/B06XGQMJ6J/ref=pe_ > 184490_244315560_nrn_si_1_im#productDescription_secondary_ > view_div_1499026275919 > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jul 4 15:31:33 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 22:31:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> , Message-ID: <1499207492916.71531@iped.uio.no> To appreciate the importance and value of language as the most central genetic force in human development and freedom, on the one hand, and to be concerned that our theories about such force (and their practical implications in education) may be biased towards intellectualism on the other hand, are two very different realisations. I share both. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 05 July 2017 00:02 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation I don't really know, James. I always thought "semiogenesis" and "semogenesis" were the same. Halliday seems to use them interchangeably. But now that you point it out, it occurs to me that "semantics" and "semiotics" are really quite different. Halliday uses "semiotic" or less the way Saussure uses it: everything that has to do with signs, of which language is simply the most developed. So as you say semiotics is part of everything: it's the way matter is organized to "mean" stars and galaxies, the way in which DNA is organized to "mean" proteins; the way in which people are organized to mean colonies and cultures, and the way in which sounds and graphics are organized to mean lexicogrammatical strings. Halliday uses "semantic" much more narrowly, to describe the last of these. Semantics is a stratum of language: "meaning" as opposed to "wording" or "context". Semantics is everything we need to get from context to wording, and for that reason it includes what Vygotsky calls the volitional impulse to speak (the feeling that one has something to say), the thought (the choice of a meaning), the formulation of a design in inner speech (the choice of a theme), none of which are fully grammatized. As this account suggests, "semogenesis" is not coextensive with semiogenesis (which is a property of matter generally) or logogenesis (which is a property of lexicogrammar). But the child does have a semantics before the child has a lexicogrammar; proto-speech (what Vygotsky calls "autonomous speech") is really a direct connection between context and phonology, one which doesn't require wording. Semantics is also a more conservative layer of language than lexicogrammar (though not as stable as context); one way to theorize a crisis is that the lexicogrammar is superproductive and creates far more meaning than the child knows what to do with. I guess I am not as scared as Alfredo of "overliving" into language. It seems to me that when you live under capitalism, the tendency is the other way: to package up our bodily sensations for mass market in horror movies, fast food, terrorist propaganda, porn and other forms of get-rich-fast sensationalism (e.g. the performance art movement that so many of my art school friends went into instead of painting). It seems to me that the nineteenth century novels that my wife loves so much have a much more realistic view of hunger and food, sex and love, and even fear and death, precisely because they are shareable through language. In any case, from the historico-cultural point of view, it's not through the atoms of their bodies or even the DNA of their children that people like Professor McCawley live on after death. Semogenesis is the only kind of immortality that any of us really get. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 10:14 PM, James Ma wrote: > Thanks David for pointing to us that "semiogenesis" is from Halliday. But I > seem to remember "semogenesis" in his functional grammar - are they the > same? > > James > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 13:31, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Alfredo: > > > > I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to > > involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a good > > reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think most of > > us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely > > fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it was > > a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a bit of > > his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should not > > deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of Ayn > > Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance system > that > > the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been dispelled. > > > > Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were > current > > in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or > "microgenesis", > > because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the > > Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the > > horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". > > > > Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all levels: > just > > as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start > > building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow us to > > raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. > > Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between > "Dada?" > > ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this immediately > > turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into six. > > Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and DOWN > > intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, > > combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. That's > > semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. > > > > So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms of > > semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning > potential > > through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper > nouns). > > The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through polarity > > (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through > > imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through the > > internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve > > semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives into > > dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is > > semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis > > through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important > aspects > > of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and > > embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for subconcepts. > > > > But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and > just > > as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if you > > are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its own > in > > adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying > > experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving it" > > is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what > > "perezhivanie" means: > > > > Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, > > How hot the scent is of the summer rose, > > How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, > > How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. > > > > But we have speech, to chill the angry day, > > And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. > > We spell away the overhanging night, > > We spell away the soldiers and the fright. > > > > There's a cool web of language winds us in, > > Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: > > We grow sea-green at last and coldly die > > In brininess and volubility. > > > > But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, > > Throwing off language and its watery clasp > > Before our death, instead of when death comes, > > Facing the wide glare of the children's day, > > Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, > > We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but > > can't > > > remember who coined it. > > > > > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are > > > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > > > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, > they > > > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > > > microsemiosis? > > > > > > James > > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > > > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of > > another > > > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which seems > > to > > > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a > > > search > > > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a > > > couple > > > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with such > > > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does > not > > > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > > > Sociogenesis, > > > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as do > > > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was mentioned > > in > > > a > > > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the social > > and > > > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, > who > > > are > > > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > > > spectrum. > > > > > > > > Alfredo. > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu > > > > > > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of > Jim > > > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to > make > > > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > > > impression > > > > given by the characterization provided. > > > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and open > > man, > > > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply thoughtful > > > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student of > > many > > > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and musician. > > He > > > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and the > > New > > > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, there > > is > > > a > > > > memorial: > > > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of > > trustees > > > -- > > > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois > as > > > part > > > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation > > > between > > > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > > > PG > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > Greg: > > > > > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the > > scenic > > > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the > University > > > of > > > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he > wasn't > > > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the > > LIbertarian > > > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a > > nut, > > > he > > > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > > > instead > > > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn > sings: > > > > > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never > budge > > > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of > > alliteration) > > > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological sense)? > > or > > > " > > > > > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that > occurs > > on > > > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > > > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I > > receive > > > a > > > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my > wife. > > > > > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out to > > be a > > > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset me" > > is > > > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you > Chomskyans). > > It > > > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the "sentence" > > for > > > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", and > it > > > is > > > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND > > STRESS > > > on > > > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > > > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the prosodic > > > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" > or > > > the > > > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all > > about > > > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and not > > just > > > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about > meaning, > > > but > > > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking about > > > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, > hip > > > hop > > > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of > lexicogrammatical > > > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is > > realized > > > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as > soundings, > > > but > > > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must > > ascend > > > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of her > > > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation > between > > > her > > > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, Stephen. > > > > > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: > she > > > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit > bowl > > > and > > > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants to > > > know > > > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's > > > winter) > > > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table and > > not > > > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why > > > Grandma > > > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's > not > > > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit > to > > > the > > > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python show--a > > > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the > > University > > > of > > > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > > > different > > > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the > > context > > > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in > others > > it > > > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: > > > looking > > > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request for > > > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > > > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's > > > sitting > > > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now for > > > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point of > > > view, > > > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is the > > > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but asymmetrical > > > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much > related > > > to > > > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and from > > > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they will > > not > > > go > > > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms the > > > great > > > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on > > their > > > > migrations. > > > > > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon the > > > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of development > > for > > > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in > > both > > > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the > > material > > > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link and > > are > > > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves > admitting > > > that > > > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry us > > > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > > > futures. > From jamesma320@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 02:07:41 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 10:07:41 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thank you David for such thoughtful elucidation - I enjoyed reading it. I've been mulling over your take on semogenesis as "the only kind of immortality that any of us really get", as well as your distinction between semantics and semiotics. It's clear that semantics is what we get from context to wording. To what extent are "context" and "wording" to be defined if there is something existing beyond "context" and "wording"? Would that something be Dasein as entire human existence in the context of cosmos? Would that wording be eventually something like "semiotising"? To me, Dasein expresses itself semiotically in such a way that it mediates and is mediated through and through ad infinitum. James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 4 July 2017 at 23:02, David Kellogg wrote: > I don't really know, James. I always thought "semiogenesis" and > "semogenesis" were the same. Halliday seems to use them interchangeably. > But now that you point it out, it occurs to me that "semantics" and > "semiotics" are really quite different. > > Halliday uses "semiotic" or less the way Saussure uses it: everything that > has to do with signs, of which language is simply the most developed. So as > you say semiotics is part of everything: it's the way matter is organized > to "mean" stars and galaxies, the way in which DNA is organized to "mean" > proteins; the way in which people are organized to mean colonies and > cultures, and the way in which sounds and graphics are organized to mean > lexicogrammatical strings. > > Halliday uses "semantic" much more narrowly, to describe the last of these. > Semantics is a stratum of language: "meaning" as opposed to "wording" or > "context". Semantics is everything we need to get from context to wording, > and for that reason it includes what Vygotsky calls the volitional impulse > to speak (the feeling that one has something to say), the thought (the > choice of a meaning), the formulation of a design in inner speech (the > choice of a theme), none of which are fully grammatized. > > As this account suggests, "semogenesis" is not coextensive with > semiogenesis (which is a property of matter generally) or logogenesis > (which is a property of lexicogrammar). But the child does have a semantics > before the child has a lexicogrammar; proto-speech (what Vygotsky calls > "autonomous speech") is really a direct connection between context and > phonology, one which doesn't require wording. Semantics is also a more > conservative layer of language than lexicogrammar (though not as stable as > context); one way to theorize a crisis is that the lexicogrammar is > superproductive and creates far more meaning than the child knows what to > do with. > > I guess I am not as scared as Alfredo of "overliving" into language. It > seems to me that when you live under capitalism, the tendency is the other > way: to package up our bodily sensations for mass market in horror movies, > fast food, terrorist propaganda, porn and other forms of get-rich-fast > sensationalism (e.g. the performance art movement that so many of my art > school friends went into instead of painting). It seems to me that the > nineteenth century novels that my wife loves so much have a much more > realistic view of hunger and food, sex and love, and even fear and death, > precisely because they are shareable through language. In any case, from > the historico-cultural point of view, it's not through the atoms of their > bodies or even the DNA of their children that people like Professor > McCawley live on after death. Semogenesis is the only kind of immortality > that any of us really get. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 10:14 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > Thanks David for pointing to us that "semiogenesis" is from Halliday. > But I > > seem to remember "semogenesis" in his functional grammar - are they the > > same? > > > > James > > > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 13:31, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Alfredo: > > > > > > I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to > > > involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a good > > > reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think most > of > > > us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely > > > fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it was > > > a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a bit > of > > > his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should > not > > > deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of Ayn > > > Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance system > > that > > > the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been dispelled. > > > > > > Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were > > current > > > in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or > > "microgenesis", > > > because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the > > > Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the > > > horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". > > > > > > Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all levels: > > just > > > as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start > > > building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow us > to > > > raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. > > > Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between > > "Dada?" > > > ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this immediately > > > turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into > six. > > > Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and > DOWN > > > intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, > > > combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. That's > > > semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. > > > > > > So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms > of > > > semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning > > potential > > > through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper > > nouns). > > > The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through > polarity > > > (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through > > > imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through > the > > > internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve > > > semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives into > > > dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is > > > semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis > > > through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important > > aspects > > > of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and > > > embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for subconcepts. > > > > > > But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and > > just > > > as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if > you > > > are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its own > > in > > > adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying > > > experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving > it" > > > is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what > > > "perezhivanie" means: > > > > > > Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, > > > How hot the scent is of the summer rose, > > > How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, > > > How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. > > > > > > But we have speech, to chill the angry day, > > > And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. > > > We spell away the overhanging night, > > > We spell away the soldiers and the fright. > > > > > > There's a cool web of language winds us in, > > > Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: > > > We grow sea-green at last and coldly die > > > In brininess and volubility. > > > > > > But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, > > > Throwing off language and its watery clasp > > > Before our death, instead of when death comes, > > > Facing the wide glare of the children's day, > > > Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, > > > We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > > > > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past but > > > can't > > > > remember who coined it. > > > > > > > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier are > > > > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > > > > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these domains, > > they > > > > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > > > > microsemiosis? > > > > > > > > James > > > > > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of > > > another > > > > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > > > > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which > seems > > > to > > > > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I made a > > > > search > > > > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared only a > > > > couple > > > > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with > such > > > > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' does > > not > > > > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > > > > Sociogenesis, > > > > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, as > do > > > > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > > > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > > > > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was > mentioned > > > in > > > > a > > > > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the > social > > > and > > > > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of biosemiotics, > > who > > > > are > > > > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > > > > spectrum. > > > > > > > > > > Alfredo. > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > edu > > > > > > > > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > > > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > > > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization of > > Jim > > > > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > > > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed to > > make > > > > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > > > > impression > > > > > given by the characterization provided. > > > > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and > open > > > man, > > > > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply > thoughtful > > > > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student > of > > > many > > > > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and > musician. > > > He > > > > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and > the > > > New > > > > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, > there > > > is > > > > a > > > > > memorial: > > > > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > > > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > > > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > > > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of > > > trustees > > > > -- > > > > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and Illinois > > as > > > > part > > > > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the relation > > > > between > > > > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > > > > PG > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > > > Greg: > > > > > > > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking the > > > scenic > > > > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > > > > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the > > University > > > > of > > > > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he > > wasn't > > > > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the > > > LIbertarian > > > > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit of a > > > nut, > > > > he > > > > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > > > > instead > > > > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn > > sings: > > > > > > > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never > > budge > > > > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > > > > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of > > > alliteration) > > > > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological > sense)? > > > or > > > > " > > > > > > > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that > > occurs > > > on > > > > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of course > > > > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I > > > receive > > > > a > > > > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my > > wife. > > > > > > > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > > > > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out > to > > > be a > > > > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > > > > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > > > > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset > me" > > > is > > > > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you > > Chomskyans). > > > It > > > > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the > "sentence" > > > for > > > > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", > and > > it > > > > is > > > > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND > > > STRESS > > > > on > > > > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the more > > > > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the > prosodic > > > > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of "absolute" > > or > > > > the > > > > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a all > > > about > > > > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and > not > > > just > > > > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > > > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > > > > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about > > meaning, > > > > but > > > > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking > about > > > > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, jingles, > > hip > > > > hop > > > > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of > > lexicogrammatical > > > > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is > > > realized > > > > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as > > soundings, > > > > but > > > > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > > > > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you must > > > ascend > > > > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of > her > > > > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation > > between > > > > her > > > > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, > Stephen. > > > > > > > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with preschoolers: > > she > > > > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > > > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit > > bowl > > > > and > > > > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen wants > to > > > > know > > > > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year (it's > > > > winter) > > > > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table > and > > > not > > > > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know why > > > > Grandma > > > > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when she's > > not > > > > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared fruit > > to > > > > the > > > > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > > > > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python > show--a > > > > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > > > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the > > > University > > > > of > > > > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > > > > different > > > > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the > > > context > > > > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in > > others > > > it > > > > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > > > > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in others: > > > > looking > > > > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request > for > > > > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of a > > > > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to Stephen's > > > > sitting > > > > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > > > > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now > for > > > > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie point > of > > > > view, > > > > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is > the > > > > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but > asymmetrical > > > > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much > > related > > > > to > > > > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and > from > > > > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they > will > > > not > > > > go > > > > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms > the > > > > great > > > > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals on > > > their > > > > > migrations. > > > > > > > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > > > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon > the > > > > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of > development > > > for > > > > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link in > > > both > > > > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the > > > material > > > > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link > and > > > are > > > > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves > > admitting > > > > that > > > > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes carry > us > > > > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > > > > futures. > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 07:52:30 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 08:52:30 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Retrotopia In-Reply-To: References: <59595502.876f620a.c14ad.2d31@mx.google.com> Message-ID: I come a bit late to the thread, but I thought the linked series of photographs of a celebration of July 4th in Oregon in 1941 is evocative of retrotopia. Note especially the 6th photo in the series with a young boy sporting an ?America First? sign. https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/07/celebrating-the-fourth-of-july-in-1941-in-vale-oregon/532647/?utm_source=nl-atlantic-photo-070417 Go to google maps (or some such) and you can cruise through the Oregon town (Vale) of today. It is still less than two thousand people and looks frozen in time. Modernity just passed it by. Henry > On Jul 4, 2017, at 1:46 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Zygmunt Bauman From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 10:35:51 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 10:35:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] LIVING IN PLACE -:- generating utopia retrotopias and LIVING In innovative clusters - How We can Help Create ... Message-ID: <595d2382.4c8e630a.b1e7c.454c@mx.google.com> Alfredo, thanks for posting these photos of Vale in 1941. I started a new post to further our exploration of the meaning and sense of place within our living places. I am sending a link from CITYLAB that is intended to be juxtaposed with the 1941 photos sent. Notice this article mentions collaboration among various institutional structures including (mayors) as change agents. Notice that in St. Louis the mayor empowered a non-profit in one specific neighbourhood as the catalyst for am innovation cluster. I will also briefly mention that Macron, whose teacher was Paul Ricouer believes in innovation cluster. He refers to Lyon, Frances 3rd largest city as the crest of a new wave of transforming cityscapes. I recognize that three quarters of humanity will be living in place in urban metropolitan places. Can cities be designed for livability where the common realm catches common fire. Juxtaposed with Vale 1941. How to Build an Innovation District That Really Works. A playbook for mayors. https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/07/how-mayors-can-drive-inclusive-growth/532569/?utm_source=nl__link2_070517 Sent from my Windows 10 phone From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 13:53:17 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 13:53:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: James, This something more may also be concerned with what you refer to as intellectual "virtures": In the first section of the article I am attaching you outline what you are indicating by the term -virtues. On page 3 you focus on the topic of "intellectual well-being" perceived as a "cultivation of virtues and ideals" through advanced learning. You then mention we are living through the "diversity" of socially, institutionally, mediated human development. What does this diversity call on us to "do". Your answer is that human development INTENSIFIES our need for such cultivation at both individual and collective "levels". You reference this need as "omnipotent" when you say: "The omnipotence of one's morality, freewill, and self-interest PERVADES contingencies and uncertainties in human actions with *THE* world. I will mention that Paul Ricouer refers not to *THE* world but rather to *A* world -of-being]. You then go on to say that the above "factors" problematize the mastery of cultural "systems" that *signify" human actions. You then qualify this statement by adding, "the enactment of one's understanding of THE world subsequently affects what comes about." Here I would replace *THE world* with *A world* James, you mention your intent for publishing this essay is to move away from an "instrumental' view" of higher education and cultivate a focus on "intellectual well-being" through fostering "virtues". You proceed to follow your intent by "semiotising" students perceptions of learning outcomes that implicate students engagement with learning and development. James, you also question the relation to "dasein" and I will mention that the word "mitsein" [being-WITH] is a better term for promoting intellectual well-being. Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and that Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 2:07 AM, James Ma wrote: > Thank you David for such thoughtful elucidation - I enjoyed reading it. > > I've been mulling over your take on semogenesis as "the only kind of > immortality that any of us really get", as well as your distinction between > semantics and semiotics. It's clear that semantics is what we get from > context to wording. To what extent are "context" and "wording" to be > defined if there is something existing beyond "context" and "wording"? > Would that something be Dasein as entire human existence in the context of > cosmos? Would that wording be eventually something like "semiotising"? To > me, Dasein expresses itself semiotically in such a way that it mediates and > is mediated through and through ad infinitum. > > James > > *_____________________________________* > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > * > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 23:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > I don't really know, James. I always thought "semiogenesis" and > > "semogenesis" were the same. Halliday seems to use them interchangeably. > > But now that you point it out, it occurs to me that "semantics" and > > "semiotics" are really quite different. > > > > Halliday uses "semiotic" or less the way Saussure uses it: everything > that > > has to do with signs, of which language is simply the most developed. So > as > > you say semiotics is part of everything: it's the way matter is organized > > to "mean" stars and galaxies, the way in which DNA is organized to "mean" > > proteins; the way in which people are organized to mean colonies and > > cultures, and the way in which sounds and graphics are organized to mean > > lexicogrammatical strings. > > > > Halliday uses "semantic" much more narrowly, to describe the last of > these. > > Semantics is a stratum of language: "meaning" as opposed to "wording" or > > "context". Semantics is everything we need to get from context to > wording, > > and for that reason it includes what Vygotsky calls the volitional > impulse > > to speak (the feeling that one has something to say), the thought (the > > choice of a meaning), the formulation of a design in inner speech (the > > choice of a theme), none of which are fully grammatized. > > > > As this account suggests, "semogenesis" is not coextensive with > > semiogenesis (which is a property of matter generally) or logogenesis > > (which is a property of lexicogrammar). But the child does have a > semantics > > before the child has a lexicogrammar; proto-speech (what Vygotsky calls > > "autonomous speech") is really a direct connection between context and > > phonology, one which doesn't require wording. Semantics is also a more > > conservative layer of language than lexicogrammar (though not as stable > as > > context); one way to theorize a crisis is that the lexicogrammar is > > superproductive and creates far more meaning than the child knows what to > > do with. > > > > I guess I am not as scared as Alfredo of "overliving" into language. It > > seems to me that when you live under capitalism, the tendency is the > other > > way: to package up our bodily sensations for mass market in horror > movies, > > fast food, terrorist propaganda, porn and other forms of get-rich-fast > > sensationalism (e.g. the performance art movement that so many of my art > > school friends went into instead of painting). It seems to me that the > > nineteenth century novels that my wife loves so much have a much more > > realistic view of hunger and food, sex and love, and even fear and death, > > precisely because they are shareable through language. In any case, from > > the historico-cultural point of view, it's not through the atoms of their > > bodies or even the DNA of their children that people like Professor > > McCawley live on after death. Semogenesis is the only kind of immortality > > that any of us really get. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 10:14 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > > Thanks David for pointing to us that "semiogenesis" is from Halliday. > > But I > > > seem to remember "semogenesis" in his functional grammar - are they the > > > same? > > > > > > James > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 13:31, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > Alfredo: > > > > > > > > I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has to > > > > involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a > good > > > > reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think > most > > of > > > > us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely > > > > fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it > was > > > > a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a > bit > > of > > > > his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice should > > not > > > > deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of > Ayn > > > > Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance > system > > > that > > > > the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been > dispelled. > > > > > > > > Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were > > > current > > > > in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or > > > "microgenesis", > > > > because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the > > > > Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the > > > > horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". > > > > > > > > Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all > levels: > > > just > > > > as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we start > > > > building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow > us > > to > > > > raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to talk. > > > > Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between > > > "Dada?" > > > > ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this > immediately > > > > turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") into > > six. > > > > Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and > > DOWN > > > > intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms eventually, > > > > combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. > That's > > > > semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. > > > > > > > > So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in terms > > of > > > > semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning > > > potential > > > > through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper > > > nouns). > > > > The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through > > polarity > > > > (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through > > > > imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis through > > the > > > > internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to involve > > > > semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives > into > > > > dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is > > > > semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is semiogenesis > > > > through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important > > > aspects > > > > of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, and > > > > embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for > subconcepts. > > > > > > > > But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis (and > > > just > > > > as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least if > > you > > > > are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its > own > > > in > > > > adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much embodying > > > > experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps "overliving > > it" > > > > is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what > > > > "perezhivanie" means: > > > > > > > > Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, > > > > How hot the scent is of the summer rose, > > > > How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, > > > > How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. > > > > > > > > But we have speech, to chill the angry day, > > > > And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. > > > > We spell away the overhanging night, > > > > We spell away the soldiers and the fright. > > > > > > > > There's a cool web of language winds us in, > > > > Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: > > > > We grow sea-green at last and coldly die > > > > In brininess and volubility. > > > > > > > > But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, > > > > Throwing off language and its watery clasp > > > > Before our death, instead of when death comes, > > > > Facing the wide glare of the children's day, > > > > Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, > > > > We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past > but > > > > can't > > > > > remember who coined it. > > > > > > > > > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier > are > > > > > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest more > > > > > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these > domains, > > > they > > > > > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > > > > > microsemiosis? > > > > > > > > > > James > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment of > > > > another > > > > > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > > > > > > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which > > seems > > > > to > > > > > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I > made a > > > > > search > > > > > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared > only a > > > > > couple > > > > > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with > > such > > > > > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' > does > > > not > > > > > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > > > > > Sociogenesis, > > > > > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, > as > > do > > > > > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > > > > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > > > > > > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was > > mentioned > > > > in > > > > > a > > > > > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the > > social > > > > and > > > > > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of > biosemiotics, > > > who > > > > > are > > > > > > concerned with the production of signs all across the biological > > > > > spectrum. > > > > > > > > > > > > Alfredo. > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > edu > > > > > > > > > > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > > > > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > > > > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the characterization > of > > > Jim > > > > > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > > > > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed > to > > > make > > > > > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > > > > > impression > > > > > > given by the characterization provided. > > > > > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and > > open > > > > man, > > > > > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply > > thoughtful > > > > > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a student > > of > > > > many > > > > > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and > > musician. > > > > He > > > > > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune and > > the > > > > New > > > > > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, > > there > > > > is > > > > > a > > > > > > memorial: > > > > > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > > > > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > > > > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not for > > > > > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of > > > > trustees > > > > > -- > > > > > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and > Illinois > > > as > > > > > part > > > > > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the > relation > > > > > between > > > > > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > > > > > PG > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > > > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg: > > > > > > > > > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking > the > > > > scenic > > > > > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > > > > > > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the > > > University > > > > > of > > > > > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when he > > > wasn't > > > > > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the > > > > LIbertarian > > > > > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit > of a > > > > nut, > > > > > he > > > > > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say > "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > > > > > instead > > > > > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey Hepburn > > > sings: > > > > > > > > > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would never > > > budge > > > > > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > > > > > > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of > > > > alliteration) > > > > > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological > > sense)? > > > > or > > > > > " > > > > > > > > > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that > > > occurs > > > > on > > > > > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of > course > > > > > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that I > > > > receive > > > > > a > > > > > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by my > > > wife. > > > > > > > > > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns out > > to > > > > be a > > > > > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives Matter": > > > > > > > > > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > > > > > > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which upset > > me" > > > > is > > > > > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you > > > Chomskyans). > > > > It > > > > > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the > > "sentence" > > > > for > > > > > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the "she", > > and > > > it > > > > > is > > > > > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the SOUND > > > > STRESS > > > > > on > > > > > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the > more > > > > > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the > > prosodic > > > > > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of > "absolute" > > > or > > > > > the > > > > > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a > all > > > > about > > > > > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" and > > not > > > > just > > > > > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of the > > > > > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > > > > > > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about > > > meaning, > > > > > but > > > > > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking > > about > > > > > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, > jingles, > > > hip > > > > > hop > > > > > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of > > > lexicogrammatical > > > > > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) is > > > > realized > > > > > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as > > > soundings, > > > > > but > > > > > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > > > > > > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you > must > > > > ascend > > > > > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume of > > her > > > > > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation > > > between > > > > > her > > > > > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, > > Stephen. > > > > > > > > > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with > preschoolers: > > > she > > > > > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut butter > > > > > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the fruit > > > bowl > > > > > and > > > > > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen > wants > > to > > > > > know > > > > > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year > (it's > > > > > winter) > > > > > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the table > > and > > > > not > > > > > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know > why > > > > > Grandma > > > > > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when > she's > > > not > > > > > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared > fruit > > > to > > > > > the > > > > > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > > > > > > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python > > show--a > > > > > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something completely > > > > > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the > > > > University > > > > > of > > > > > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to a > > > > > different > > > > > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts the > > > > context > > > > > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in > > > others > > > > it > > > > > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > > > > > > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in > others: > > > > > looking > > > > > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's request > > for > > > > > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function of > a > > > > > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to > Stephen's > > > > > sitting > > > > > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > > > > > > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and now > > for > > > > > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie > point > > of > > > > > view, > > > > > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up is > > the > > > > > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but > > asymmetrical > > > > > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much > > > related > > > > > to > > > > > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and > > from > > > > > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they > > will > > > > not > > > > > go > > > > > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that forms > > the > > > > > great > > > > > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded animals > on > > > > their > > > > > > migrations. > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just as > > > > > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one upon > > the > > > > > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of > > development > > > > for > > > > > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner link > in > > > > both > > > > > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of the > > > > material > > > > > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner link > > and > > > > are > > > > > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves > > > admitting > > > > > that > > > > > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes > carry > > us > > > > > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our own > > > > > futures. > > > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: MA JAMES JUNE 26 2017 Semiotizing the student perception of learning outcomes in British Higher Education.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1985211 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170705/dd71d43e/attachment-0001.pdf From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Jul 5 14:55:05 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 21:55:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> Larry, Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one another, in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire cosmos! :) There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for Heidegger, is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human being) can be. Martin On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and that Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 15:52:48 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 15:52:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> Martin, Thanks for this clarification. So mitsein is a particular mode of being- there in the here-and-now situation. mitsein being a mode that (could be) in the realm of possibility in the here and now situation. Does this mode of mitsein express an affinity with James Ma?s focus on intellectual virtues? The focus on higher academic teaching and learning as a process of cultivation of the mode of mitsein as a could be possible dasein? In contrast to the dominant mode of instrumental mastery Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Martin John Packer Sent: July 5, 2017 2:57 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Larry, Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one another, in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire cosmos! :) There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for Heidegger, is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human being) can be. Martin On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and that Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Jul 5 16:07:11 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 23:07:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <22107944-DC91-4537-AD5F-24478022A728@uniandes.edu.co> Larry, The principal exploration of mitsein (being-with) that I know of is with regard to therapy. Existential therapy in particular, for example? Martin On Jul 5, 2017, at 5:52 PM, Lplarry > wrote: Martin, Thanks for this clarification. So mitsein is a particular mode of being- there in the here-and-now situation. mitsein being a mode that (could be) in the realm of possibility in the here and now situation. Does this mode of mitsein express an affinity with James Ma?s focus on intellectual virtues? The focus on higher academic teaching and learning as a process of cultivation of the mode of mitsein as a could be possible dasein? In contrast to the dominant mode of instrumental mastery Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Martin John Packer Sent: July 5, 2017 2:57 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Larry, Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one another, in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire cosmos! :) There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for Heidegger, is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human being) can be. Martin On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and that Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 16:30:14 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 16:30:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <22107944-DC91-4537-AD5F-24478022A728@uniandes.edu.co> References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> <22107944-DC91-4537-AD5F-24478022A728@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi, I think the most extended meditation on being-with in recent years is that by Jean-Luc Nancy. It is an integral part of *Being Singular Plural*, and he also deals with it in an essay "The being-with of being there" in the *Continental Philosophy Review*, 2008. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:07 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Larry, > > The principal exploration of mitsein (being-with) that I know of is with > regard to therapy. Existential therapy in particular, for example? > > > > Martin > > On Jul 5, 2017, at 5:52 PM, Lplarry pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Martin, > Thanks for this clarification. > So mitsein is a particular mode of being- there in the here-and-now > situation. > mitsein being a mode that (could be) in the realm of possibility in the > here and now situation. > Does this mode of mitsein express an affinity with James Ma?s focus on > intellectual virtues? > The focus on higher academic teaching and learning as a process of > cultivation of the mode of mitsein as a could be possible dasein? > In contrast to the dominant mode of instrumental mastery > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Martin John Packer > Sent: July 5, 2017 2:57 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > Larry, > > Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that > Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one another, > in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire > cosmos! :) > > There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer > certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for Heidegger, > is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human being) > can be. > > Martin > > > > On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer > points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and that > Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Jul 5 16:52:07 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 23:52:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> <22107944-DC91-4537-AD5F-24478022A728@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <2462B830-04CC-46D8-B69B-5C555178B6CE@uniandes.edu.co> Right, Michael. But Nancy is extending the philosophical project of a Dasein analytic. I took Larry to be asking about applications, so to speak, in psychology or education. Martin > On Jul 5, 2017, at 6:30 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > > Hi, > I think the most extended meditation on being-with in recent years is that > by Jean-Luc Nancy. It is an integral part of *Being Singular Plural*, and > he also deals with it in an essay "The being-with of being there" in > the *Continental > Philosophy Review*, 2008. > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:07 PM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Larry, >> >> The principal exploration of mitsein (being-with) that I know of is with >> regard to therapy. Existential therapy in particular, for example? >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 5:52 PM, Lplarry > pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> Martin, >> Thanks for this clarification. >> So mitsein is a particular mode of being- there in the here-and-now >> situation. >> mitsein being a mode that (could be) in the realm of possibility in the >> here and now situation. >> Does this mode of mitsein express an affinity with James Ma?s focus on >> intellectual virtues? >> The focus on higher academic teaching and learning as a process of >> cultivation of the mode of mitsein as a could be possible dasein? >> In contrast to the dominant mode of instrumental mastery >> >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> From: Martin John Packer >> Sent: July 5, 2017 2:57 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation >> >> Larry, >> >> Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that >> Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one another, >> in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire >> cosmos! :) >> >> There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer >> certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for Heidegger, >> is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human being) >> can be. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss > pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer >> points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and that >> Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein >> >> >> >> From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 17:14:55 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 17:14:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: <2462B830-04CC-46D8-B69B-5C555178B6CE@uniandes.edu.co> References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> <22107944-DC91-4537-AD5F-24478022A728@uniandes.edu.co> <2462B830-04CC-46D8-B69B-5C555178B6CE@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: In that case, Larry may be interested in the relevant chapter in Roth, W.-M. (2002). Being and becoming in the classroom. Westport, CT: Ablex/Greenwood. I think it is chapter 2 that is entitled "Being-in and Being-with". The work in the book arises out of my classroom work, as a teacher (not as a university professional going back to the classroom, though this is described in the book, too, but as a resident classroom teacher---who eventually becomes a university professor). Cheers, Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:52 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Right, Michael. But Nancy is extending the philosophical project of a > Dasein analytic. I took Larry to be asking about applications, so to speak, > in psychology or education. > > Martin > > > > On Jul 5, 2017, at 6:30 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Hi, > > I think the most extended meditation on being-with in recent years is > that > > by Jean-Luc Nancy. It is an integral part of *Being Singular Plural*, and > > he also deals with it in an essay "The being-with of being there" in > > the *Continental > > Philosophy Review*, 2008. > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:07 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > >> Larry, > >> > >> The principal exploration of mitsein (being-with) that I know of is with > >> regard to therapy. Existential therapy in particular, for example? > >> > >> > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 5:52 PM, Lplarry >> pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> > >> Martin, > >> Thanks for this clarification. > >> So mitsein is a particular mode of being- there in the here-and-now > >> situation. > >> mitsein being a mode that (could be) in the realm of possibility in the > >> here and now situation. > >> Does this mode of mitsein express an affinity with James Ma?s focus on > >> intellectual virtues? > >> The focus on higher academic teaching and learning as a process of > >> cultivation of the mode of mitsein as a could be possible dasein? > >> In contrast to the dominant mode of instrumental mastery > >> > >> > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >> > >> From: Martin John Packer > >> Sent: July 5, 2017 2:57 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > >> > >> Larry, > >> > >> Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that > >> Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one > another, > >> in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire > >> cosmos! :) > >> > >> There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer > >> certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for > Heidegger, > >> is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human being) > >> can be. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss >> pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> > >> Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer > >> points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and > that > >> Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 17:16:22 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 17:16:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> <22107944-DC91-4537-AD5F-24478022A728@uniandes.edu.co> <2462B830-04CC-46D8-B69B-5C555178B6CE@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I just looked and I see the introduction and the first chapter can be read on Google: https://books.google.ca/books?id=0SWWAOazlRUC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 5:14 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > In that case, Larry may be interested in the relevant chapter in > > Roth, W.-M. (2002). Being and becoming in the classroom. Westport, CT: > Ablex/Greenwood. > > I think it is chapter 2 that is entitled "Being-in and Being-with". > > The work in the book arises out of my classroom work, as a teacher (not as > a university professional going back to the classroom, though this is > described in the book, too, but as a resident classroom teacher---who > eventually becomes a university professor). > > Cheers, > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:52 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> Right, Michael. But Nancy is extending the philosophical project of a >> Dasein analytic. I took Larry to be asking about applications, so to speak, >> in psychology or education. >> >> Martin >> >> >> > On Jul 5, 2017, at 6:30 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: >> > >> > Hi, >> > I think the most extended meditation on being-with in recent years is >> that >> > by Jean-Luc Nancy. It is an integral part of *Being Singular Plural*, >> and >> > he also deals with it in an essay "The being-with of being there" in >> > the *Continental >> > Philosophy Review*, 2008. >> > Michael >> > >> > >> > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> -------------------- >> > Applied Cognitive Science >> > MacLaurin Building A567 >> > University of Victoria >> > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 >> > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth >> > >> > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics >> > > ections-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics >> -of-mathematics/>* >> > >> > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:07 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> > wrote: >> > >> >> Larry, >> >> >> >> The principal exploration of mitsein (being-with) that I know of is >> with >> >> regard to therapy. Existential therapy in particular, for example? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 5:52 PM, Lplarry > >> pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> >> Martin, >> >> Thanks for this clarification. >> >> So mitsein is a particular mode of being- there in the here-and-now >> >> situation. >> >> mitsein being a mode that (could be) in the realm of possibility in >> the >> >> here and now situation. >> >> Does this mode of mitsein express an affinity with James Ma?s focus on >> >> intellectual virtues? >> >> The focus on higher academic teaching and learning as a process of >> >> cultivation of the mode of mitsein as a could be possible dasein? >> >> In contrast to the dominant mode of instrumental mastery >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> >> >> From: Martin John Packer >> >> Sent: July 5, 2017 2:57 PM >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation >> >> >> >> Larry, >> >> >> >> Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that >> >> Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one >> another, >> >> in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire >> >> cosmos! :) >> >> >> >> There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer >> >> certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for >> Heidegger, >> >> is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human >> being) >> >> can be. >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss > >> pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> >> Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer >> >> points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and >> that >> >> Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 5 19:53:51 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 19:53:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> <22107944-DC91-4537-AD5F-24478022A728@uniandes.edu.co> <2462B830-04CC-46D8-B69B-5C555178B6CE@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Thanks for the links, Michael. Seeing these ideas embodied in research practices that yield what appears to be useful empirical grounding is very helpful in dealing with the high level abstractions. mike On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 5:16 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > I just looked and I see the introduction and the first chapter can be read > on Google: > https://books.google.ca/books?id=0SWWAOazlRUC&printsec= > frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 5:14 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > In that case, Larry may be interested in the relevant chapter in > > > > Roth, W.-M. (2002). Being and becoming in the classroom. Westport, CT: > > Ablex/Greenwood. > > > > I think it is chapter 2 that is entitled "Being-in and Being-with". > > > > The work in the book arises out of my classroom work, as a teacher (not > as > > a university professional going back to the classroom, though this is > > described in the book, too, but as a resident classroom teacher---who > > eventually becomes a university professor). > > > > Cheers, > > > > Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:52 PM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > >> Right, Michael. But Nancy is extending the philosophical project of a > >> Dasein analytic. I took Larry to be asking about applications, so to > speak, > >> in psychology or education. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > On Jul 5, 2017, at 6:30 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > > >> > Hi, > >> > I think the most extended meditation on being-with in recent years is > >> that > >> > by Jean-Luc Nancy. It is an integral part of *Being Singular Plural*, > >> and > >> > he also deals with it in an essay "The being-with of being there" in > >> > the *Continental > >> > Philosophy Review*, 2008. > >> > Michael > >> > > >> > > >> > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > >> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> -------------------- > >> > Applied Cognitive Science > >> > MacLaurin Building A567 > >> > University of Victoria > >> > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > >> > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > >> > > >> > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > >> > >> ections-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics > >> -of-mathematics/>* > >> > > >> > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:07 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> >> Larry, > >> >> > >> >> The principal exploration of mitsein (being-with) that I know of is > >> with > >> >> regard to therapy. Existential therapy in particular, for example? > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Martin > >> >> > >> >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 5:52 PM, Lplarry >> >> pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> >> > >> >> Martin, > >> >> Thanks for this clarification. > >> >> So mitsein is a particular mode of being- there in the here-and-now > >> >> situation. > >> >> mitsein being a mode that (could be) in the realm of possibility in > >> the > >> >> here and now situation. > >> >> Does this mode of mitsein express an affinity with James Ma?s focus > on > >> >> intellectual virtues? > >> >> The focus on higher academic teaching and learning as a process of > >> >> cultivation of the mode of mitsein as a could be possible dasein? > >> >> In contrast to the dominant mode of instrumental mastery > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >> >> > >> >> From: Martin John Packer > >> >> Sent: July 5, 2017 2:57 PM > >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > >> >> > >> >> Larry, > >> >> > >> >> Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that > >> >> Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one > >> another, > >> >> in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire > >> >> cosmos! :) > >> >> > >> >> There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer > >> >> certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for > >> Heidegger, > >> >> is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human > >> being) > >> >> can be. > >> >> > >> >> Martin > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss >> >> pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> >> > >> >> Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer > >> >> points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and > >> that > >> >> Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > >> > >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 5 19:57:41 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 19:57:41 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> <93C6403B-875F-47BE-8609-06C13912D48C@uniandes.edu.co> <595d6dc7.1276240a.13db9.3263@mx.google.com> <22107944-DC91-4537-AD5F-24478022A728@uniandes.edu.co> <2462B830-04CC-46D8-B69B-5C555178B6CE@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <595da73b.c648650a.a3bb7.2d01@mx.google.com> Martin, Michael, Thank you for both responding with directions to explore to develop the meaning of mitsein. I appreciate Martin recommending the book that clarifies the contrast with Heiddeger. This seems basic as a first step to be able to use the notion of mitsein as being with ?being-with? I was fascinated when I read Gadamer discussing his relation to Heiddeger and pointing out his path was to expand through philosophical hermeneutics the notion of mitsein. . So my first interest is in tracing the development of the term mitsein as it moves through Binswanger and Existential phenomenology. With that grounding I will then turn to Nancy?s further elaboration that extends mitsein into a wider cultural context as a mode of being there. Michael, I hear you have taken this wider scope through moving beyond the psychotherapeutic setting and bringing the notion of mitsein into classroom contexts. This is my growing edge. Then with more clarity I hope the opportunity arises open to link mitsein more fully into themes such as James Ma is exploring through ?intellectual well-being? as a mode of being there. This mode James considers as a ?virtue? of the relation ?teaching-learning? that moves beyond ?instrumental mastery? James, Martin, Michael, thank you for your generosity which I find so exciting and inspiring and hopeful. Now to follow these leads Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: Wednesday, July 5, 2017 5:18 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation I just looked and I see the introduction and the first chapter can be read on Google: https://books.google.ca/books?id=0SWWAOazlRUC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 5:14 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > In that case, Larry may be interested in the relevant chapter in > > Roth, W.-M. (2002). Being and becoming in the classroom. Westport, CT: > Ablex/Greenwood. > > I think it is chapter 2 that is entitled "Being-in and Being-with". > > The work in the book arises out of my classroom work, as a teacher (not as > a university professional going back to the classroom, though this is > described in the book, too, but as a resident classroom teacher---who > eventually becomes a university professor). > > Cheers, > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:52 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> Right, Michael. But Nancy is extending the philosophical project of a >> Dasein analytic. I took Larry to be asking about applications, so to speak, >> in psychology or education. >> >> Martin >> >> >> > On Jul 5, 2017, at 6:30 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: >> > >> > Hi, >> > I think the most extended meditation on being-with in recent years is >> that >> > by Jean-Luc Nancy. It is an integral part of *Being Singular Plural*, >> and >> > he also deals with it in an essay "The being-with of being there" in >> > the *Continental >> > Philosophy Review*, 2008. >> > Michael >> > >> > >> > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> -------------------- >> > Applied Cognitive Science >> > MacLaurin Building A567 >> > University of Victoria >> > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 >> > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth >> > >> > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics >> > > ections-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics >> -of-mathematics/>* >> > >> > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 4:07 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> > wrote: >> > >> >> Larry, >> >> >> >> The principal exploration of mitsein (being-with) that I know of is >> with >> >> regard to therapy. Existential therapy in particular, for example? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 5:52 PM, Lplarry > >> pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> >> Martin, >> >> Thanks for this clarification. >> >> So mitsein is a particular mode of being- there in the here-and-now >> >> situation. >> >> mitsein being a mode that (could be) in the realm of possibility in >> the >> >> here and now situation. >> >> Does this mode of mitsein express an affinity with James Ma?s focus on >> >> intellectual virtues? >> >> The focus on higher academic teaching and learning as a process of >> >> cultivation of the mode of mitsein as a could be possible dasein? >> >> In contrast to the dominant mode of instrumental mastery >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> >> >> From: Martin John Packer >> >> Sent: July 5, 2017 2:57 PM >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation >> >> >> >> Larry, >> >> >> >> Dasein is usually unpacked as ?Being-there,? and it is said that >> >> Heidegger?s point was that humans understand themselves, and one >> another, >> >> in terms of their situatedness. In the here-&-now, not in the entire >> >> cosmos! :) >> >> >> >> There is a discussion of mitsein in Being & Time, too. But Gadamer >> >> certainly gave it more emphasis than Heidegger did. Mitsein, for >> Heidegger, >> >> is a mode or aspect of Dasein. It is a way in which Dasein (human >> being) >> >> can be. >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jul 5, 2017, at 3:53 PM, Larry Purss > >> pscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> >> Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer >> >> points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and >> that >> >> Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From jamesma320@gmail.com Thu Jul 6 10:16:17 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 18:16:17 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation In-Reply-To: References: <001b01d2f3b5$0ccd7fb0$26687f10$@att.net> <1499127235482.139@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Thank you for the massage, Larry - you gave me food for thought! I'm still reading Heidergger and pondering his ideas. Heidergger took phenomenology to a direction different to what Husserl would have liked (the latter had a focus on pure consciousness). His notion of understanding as involving interpretation alongside the idea of "thrown-ness" is very revealing to me. In fact his existentialist phenomenology is hermeneutic phenomenology. By the way, another genius who combined Husserl and Heidergger was Jean-Paul Sartre. So many interesting things to read and digest! James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 5 July 2017 at 21:53, Larry Purss wrote: > James, > This something more may also be concerned with what you refer to as > intellectual "virtures": In the first section of the article I am attaching > you outline what you are indicating by the term -virtues. On page 3 you > focus on the topic of "intellectual well-being" perceived as a "cultivation > of virtues and ideals" through advanced learning. > > You then mention we are living through the "diversity" of socially, > institutionally, mediated human development. What does this diversity call > on us to "do". Your answer is that human development INTENSIFIES our need > for such cultivation at both individual and collective "levels". > > You reference this need as "omnipotent" when you say: > "The omnipotence of one's morality, freewill, and self-interest PERVADES > contingencies and uncertainties in human actions with *THE* world. I will > mention that Paul Ricouer refers not to *THE* world but rather to *A* world > -of-being]. > > You then go on to say that the above "factors" problematize the mastery of > cultural "systems" that *signify" human actions. > You then qualify this statement by adding, > > "the enactment of one's understanding of THE world subsequently affects > what comes about." > > Here I would replace *THE world* with *A world* > James, you mention your intent for publishing this essay is to move away > from an "instrumental' view" of higher education and cultivate a focus on > "intellectual well-being" through fostering "virtues". You proceed to > follow your intent by "semiotising" students perceptions of learning > outcomes that implicate students engagement with learning and development. > > James, you also question the relation to "dasein" and I will mention that > the word "mitsein" [being-WITH] is a better term for promoting intellectual > well-being. Less a protesting intent than da-sein [being-THAT] . Gadamer > points out that Heiddeger's focus on da-sein pervades his project and that > Gadamer intende to shift towards the centrality of mit-sein > > > > On Wed, Jul 5, 2017 at 2:07 AM, James Ma wrote: > > > Thank you David for such thoughtful elucidation - I enjoyed reading it. > > > > I've been mulling over your take on semogenesis as "the only kind of > > immortality that any of us really get", as well as your distinction > between > > semantics and semiotics. It's clear that semantics is what we get from > > context to wording. To what extent are "context" and "wording" to be > > defined if there is something existing beyond "context" and "wording"? > > Would that something be Dasein as entire human existence in the context > of > > cosmos? Would that wording be eventually something like "semiotising"? To > > me, Dasein expresses itself semiotically in such a way that it mediates > and > > is mediated through and through ad infinitum. > > > > James > > > > *_____________________________________* > > > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > > * > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 23:02, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > I don't really know, James. I always thought "semiogenesis" and > > > "semogenesis" were the same. Halliday seems to use them > interchangeably. > > > But now that you point it out, it occurs to me that "semantics" and > > > "semiotics" are really quite different. > > > > > > Halliday uses "semiotic" or less the way Saussure uses it: everything > > that > > > has to do with signs, of which language is simply the most developed. > So > > as > > > you say semiotics is part of everything: it's the way matter is > organized > > > to "mean" stars and galaxies, the way in which DNA is organized to > "mean" > > > proteins; the way in which people are organized to mean colonies and > > > cultures, and the way in which sounds and graphics are organized to > mean > > > lexicogrammatical strings. > > > > > > Halliday uses "semantic" much more narrowly, to describe the last of > > these. > > > Semantics is a stratum of language: "meaning" as opposed to "wording" > or > > > "context". Semantics is everything we need to get from context to > > wording, > > > and for that reason it includes what Vygotsky calls the volitional > > impulse > > > to speak (the feeling that one has something to say), the thought (the > > > choice of a meaning), the formulation of a design in inner speech (the > > > choice of a theme), none of which are fully grammatized. > > > > > > As this account suggests, "semogenesis" is not coextensive with > > > semiogenesis (which is a property of matter generally) or logogenesis > > > (which is a property of lexicogrammar). But the child does have a > > semantics > > > before the child has a lexicogrammar; proto-speech (what Vygotsky calls > > > "autonomous speech") is really a direct connection between context and > > > phonology, one which doesn't require wording. Semantics is also a more > > > conservative layer of language than lexicogrammar (though not as stable > > as > > > context); one way to theorize a crisis is that the lexicogrammar is > > > superproductive and creates far more meaning than the child knows what > to > > > do with. > > > > > > I guess I am not as scared as Alfredo of "overliving" into language. It > > > seems to me that when you live under capitalism, the tendency is the > > other > > > way: to package up our bodily sensations for mass market in horror > > movies, > > > fast food, terrorist propaganda, porn and other forms of get-rich-fast > > > sensationalism (e.g. the performance art movement that so many of my > art > > > school friends went into instead of painting). It seems to me that the > > > nineteenth century novels that my wife loves so much have a much more > > > realistic view of hunger and food, sex and love, and even fear and > death, > > > precisely because they are shareable through language. In any case, > from > > > the historico-cultural point of view, it's not through the atoms of > their > > > bodies or even the DNA of their children that people like Professor > > > McCawley live on after death. Semogenesis is the only kind of > immortality > > > that any of us really get. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 10:14 PM, James Ma > wrote: > > > > > > > Thanks David for pointing to us that "semiogenesis" is from Halliday. > > > But I > > > > seem to remember "semogenesis" in his functional grammar - are they > the > > > > same? > > > > > > > > James > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 13:31, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > Alfredo: > > > > > > > > > > I don't see why doing justice to the memory of James McCawley has > to > > > > > involve revising history. I was a freshman radical, and there is a > > good > > > > > reason why nobody asks a freshman to write a Festschrift. I think > > most > > > of > > > > > us would have just said that it was abso-blooming-lutely > > > > > fan-fucking-tastic, and I probably would have tried to say that it > > was > > > > > a-blooming-solutely fantas-fucking-tic). I have since read quite a > > bit > > > of > > > > > his work (a pleasure anyone who really wants to do him justice > should > > > not > > > > > deny themselves) but that first impression--that he was the kind of > > Ayn > > > > > Rand libertarian currently laying waste to the health insurance > > system > > > > that > > > > > the Obama administration left behind--has certainly not been > > dispelled. > > > > > > > > > > Vygotsky uses "phylogenesis" and "ontogenesis", because these were > > > > current > > > > > in the nineteenth century. He doesn't use "sociogenesis" or > > > > "microgenesis", > > > > > because these were not. The term "Aktualgenese" was used by the > > > > > Gestaltists, but it meant percepts in a tachioscope, or dots on the > > > > > horizon. Vygotsky prefers to speak of "teaching-learning". > > > > > > > > > > Semiogenesis is from Halliday. As James says, it exists at all > > levels: > > > > just > > > > > as the phylogenesis of the brain doesn't come to a halt when we > start > > > > > building societies, and sociogenesis doesn't stop in order to allow > > us > > > to > > > > > raise children, ontogenesis doesn't stop when children learn to > talk. > > > > > Halliday describes how Nigel at one is able to distinguish between > > > > "Dada?" > > > > > ("Where's Daddy?") and "Dada!" ("There you are!") and this > > immediately > > > > > turns his repertoire of three words *"Dada", "Ama", and "Anna") > into > > > six. > > > > > Later, Nigel uses UP intonation to mean "somebody do something" and > > > DOWN > > > > > intonation to mean "I see!", and these intonational forms > eventually, > > > > > combining with wording, become interrogatives and declaratives. > > That's > > > > > semiogenesis--the genesis of meaning potential. > > > > > > > > > > So I think it's possible to see a lot of Vygotsky's pedology in > terms > > > of > > > > > semiogenesis. Early childhood is the gradual increase of meaning > > > > potential > > > > > through class generalizations (e.g. common nouns instead of proper > > > > nouns). > > > > > The Crisis at Three is the increase of meaning potential through > > > polarity > > > > > (e.g. negation and "negativism"). Preschool is semiogenesis through > > > > > imaginary situations, and the Crisis at Seven is semiogenesis > through > > > the > > > > > internalization of perizhivanie. School age seems (to me) to > involve > > > > > semiogenesis through turning (instructional and other) narratives > > into > > > > > dialogues, or "communication" into "generalizations", Thirteen is > > > > > semiogenesis through "dissociation", and adolescence is > semiogenesis > > > > > through conceptualization. Taxis and embedding seem to be important > > > > aspects > > > > > of this: taxis allows us to create hierarchies of superconcepts, > and > > > > > embedding allows unlimited recursiveness and delicacy for > > subconcepts. > > > > > > > > > > But just as ontogenesis becomes a leading factor in sociogenesis > (and > > > > just > > > > > as sociogenesis becomes a leading factor in phylogenesis, at least > if > > > you > > > > > are human) I think that semiogenesis takes on a significance of its > > own > > > > in > > > > > adulthood. It seems to me that significance is not so much > embodying > > > > > experience as, in childhood, but disembodying it. Perhaps > "overliving > > > it" > > > > > is a better way to think of it: that is, after all, literally what > > > > > "perezhivanie" means: > > > > > > > > > > Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, > > > > > How hot the scent is of the summer rose, > > > > > How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, > > > > > How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by. > > > > > > > > > > But we have speech, to chill the angry day, > > > > > And speech, to dull the rose's cruel scent. > > > > > We spell away the overhanging night, > > > > > We spell away the soldiers and the fright. > > > > > > > > > > There's a cool web of language winds us in, > > > > > Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: > > > > > We grow sea-green at last and coldly die > > > > > In brininess and volubility. > > > > > > > > > > But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, > > > > > Throwing off language and its watery clasp > > > > > Before our death, instead of when death comes, > > > > > Facing the wide glare of the children's day, > > > > > Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, > > > > > We shall go mad no doubt and die that way. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 4, 2017 at 6:05 PM, James Ma > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Alfredo, I came across the term "semiogenesis" in the past > > but > > > > > can't > > > > > > remember who coined it. > > > > > > > > > > > > To me, the four domains of human development I mentioned earlier > > are > > > > > > invariably imbued with signs and symbols. If I were to suggest > more > > > > > > appropriate terms for describing the semiotic aura in these > > domains, > > > > they > > > > > > would probably be phylosemiosis, ontosemiosis, sociosemiosis and > > > > > > microsemiosis? > > > > > > > > > > > > James > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 4 July 2017 at 01:13, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Pegg, thanks for making sure justice is made in the treatment > of > > > > > another > > > > > > > scholar; I am sure many in the list appreciate it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David, James, you both have used the term 'semiogenesis,' which > > > seems > > > > > to > > > > > > > have gone unremarked but it certainly called my attention. I > > made a > > > > > > search > > > > > > > on the xmca archive and the term 'semiogenesis' had appeared > > only a > > > > > > couple > > > > > > > of times before. And, unless the term is just a synonymous with > > > such > > > > > > > expressions as 'genesis of symbolic activity', 'semiogenesis' > > does > > > > not > > > > > > > appear in the English versions of Vygotsky's collected works. > > > > > > Sociogenesis, > > > > > > > by contrast, appears often and is elaborated in several places, > > as > > > do > > > > > > > ontogenesis and phylogenesis. What is the history of the term > > > > > > > 'semiogenesis' in CHAT? Why did not Vygotsky and others use it? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Reading about the contrast between ants and whales that was > > > mentioned > > > > > in > > > > > > a > > > > > > > previous post, I also wondered what a distinction between the > > > social > > > > > and > > > > > > > the semiotic would be for researchers in the field of > > biosemiotics, > > > > who > > > > > > are > > > > > > > concerned with the production of signs all across the > biological > > > > > > spectrum. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Alfredo. > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > edu > > > > > > > > > > > > > on behalf of Peg Griffin > > > > > > > Sent: 03 July 2017 06:30 > > > > > > > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For anyone who is interested, this is about the > characterization > > of > > > > Jim > > > > > > > McCawley in the message this replies to. > > > > > > > I found it inappropriate, unacceptable, not true and not needed > > to > > > > make > > > > > > > any point in the message. Perhaps the writer is unaware of the > > > > > > impression > > > > > > > given by the characterization provided. > > > > > > > As repair, I will point out that many admired Jim as a kind and > > > open > > > > > man, > > > > > > > an activist for causes seen in the US as leftist, a deeply > > > thoughtful > > > > > > > linguist who data grubbed (he said "data fetishist") as a > student > > > of > > > > > many > > > > > > > languages and colleague of many linguists, a fine cook and > > > musician. > > > > > He > > > > > > > died in 1999. You can find obituaries in the Chicago Tribune > and > > > the > > > > > New > > > > > > > York Times, and in the Linguistic Society of America's journal, > > > there > > > > > is > > > > > > a > > > > > > > memorial: > > > > > > > Lawler, John (2003). James D. McCawley. Language. 79:614?625. > > > > > > > doi:10.1353/lan.2003.0173 > > > > > > > (His candidacy on the Libertarian ticket, by the way, was not > for > > > > > > > Governor, but for a seat on the University of Illinois Board of > > > > > trustees > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > 3 times in the 70's in the complex politics of Chicago and > > Illinois > > > > as > > > > > > part > > > > > > > of intentional moves concerning power, corruption, and the > > relation > > > > > > between > > > > > > > universities and politics in the US in general.) > > > > > > > PG > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > > > > > Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2017 5:37 PM > > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Taxis and Embedding in Conversation > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Bear with me for a linguistic excursus. It will involve taking > > the > > > > > scenic > > > > > > > route. But after all, that's what whales do. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So one of the first linguistics professors I ever had at the > > > > University > > > > > > of > > > > > > > Chicago was James McCawley. He was a right wing nut job: when > he > > > > wasn't > > > > > > > professsoring, he was running for governor of Illinois on the > > > > > LIbertarian > > > > > > > ticket. Because he was a libertarian, and because he was a bit > > of a > > > > > nut, > > > > > > he > > > > > > > would lecture on why we freshmen like to say > > "Fan-fucking-tastic!" > > > > > > instead > > > > > > > of, say, "Fantas-fucking-tic!" In "My Fair Lady", Audrey > Hepburn > > > > sings: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Oh, so lover-ly singing abso-blooming-lutely still Ah would > never > > > > budge > > > > > > > till spring crept over me window sill!" > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why not "ab-blooming-solutely" (which has the advantage of > > > > > alliteration) > > > > > > > or "absolute-bloomingly" (which would make more morphological > > > sense)? > > > > > or > > > > > > " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The answer has to do with embedding, which is a phenomenon that > > > > occurs > > > > > on > > > > > > > virtually every level of language: sounding, wording, and of > > course > > > > > > > meaning. So for example, at the level of wording, imagine that > I > > > > > receive > > > > > > a > > > > > > > letter from a elementary school crush, and it is discovered by > my > > > > wife. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > a) She tore up the letter, which upset me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Now imagine that this long-lost elementary school crush turns > out > > > to > > > > > be a > > > > > > > loathsome right winger soliciting funds for "Blue Lives > Matter": > > > > > > > > > > > > > > b) She tore up the letter which upset me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Oh, what a difference a little comma can make! In b) "which > upset > > > me" > > > > > is > > > > > > > embedded in the nominal group (the "noun phrase", for you > > > > Chomskyans). > > > > > It > > > > > > > plays no part in the structure of the clause-complex (the > > > "sentence" > > > > > for > > > > > > > Chomskyans). So it has no effect on the tearing or on the > "she", > > > and > > > > it > > > > > > is > > > > > > > confined to "the letter", just as "fucking" intensifies the > SOUND > > > > > STRESS > > > > > > on > > > > > > > "TAST-ic" rather than the lexical meaning of "fantasy" or the > > more > > > > > > > grammatical meaning of "ic", and "blooming" intensifies the > > > prosodic > > > > > > > emphasis of "LUTE-ly" rather than the lexical meaning of > > "absolute" > > > > or > > > > > > the > > > > > > > grammatical meaning of "~ly". But in a) "which upset me" is a > > all > > > > > about > > > > > > > her tearing up the letter and it impacts "she" and "tore up" > and > > > not > > > > > just > > > > > > > the letter: it is abso-bloomingly-lutely part of the story of > the > > > > > > > clause-complex as a whole. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You can see that both McCawley's example and my own are about > > > > meaning, > > > > > > but > > > > > > > they are about different kinds of meaning. McCawley is talking > > > about > > > > > > > prosodic meaning: the kind of meaning we get from rhymes, > > jingles, > > > > hip > > > > > > hop > > > > > > > and Homeric hexameters. I am giving you an example of > > > > lexicogrammatical > > > > > > > meaning, the kind of meaning we get when semantics (thinking) > is > > > > > realized > > > > > > > as lexicogrammar (wordings, which may be in turn realized as > > > > soundings, > > > > > > but > > > > > > > they may also be inner speech). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But, as the poet says, if you would see the Yangzi River, you > > must > > > > > ascend > > > > > > > another storey of the Yellow Crane Tower. In the latest volume > of > > > her > > > > > > > Collected Works, Ruqaiya Hasan is talking about a conversation > > > > between > > > > > > her > > > > > > > graduate student, Carmel Cloran, and Carmel's preschool son, > > > Stephen. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It's the kind of rangey conversation we all have with > > preschoolers: > > > > she > > > > > > > asks him what he wants for lunch, and he decides on peanut > butter > > > > > > > sandwiches and passionfruit. The passionfruit is not in the > fruit > > > > bowl > > > > > > and > > > > > > > it has to be retrieved from under the kitchen table, Stephen > > wants > > > to > > > > > > know > > > > > > > why there are no passionfruit in Sydney at this time of year > > (it's > > > > > > winter) > > > > > > > and Carmel wants him to sit at his designated place at the > table > > > and > > > > > not > > > > > > > the place where his Grandma usually sits, Stephen wants to know > > why > > > > > > Grandma > > > > > > > sits there and not elsewhere, and why he can't sit there when > > she's > > > > not > > > > > > > around, and then as Carmel brings the sandwiches and prepared > > fruit > > > > to > > > > > > the > > > > > > > table she talks about taking him shopping to Chatswood. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > One way to see this conversation is as a kind of Monty Python > > > show--a > > > > > > > sequence of texts separated by "and now for something > completely > > > > > > > different". This is, actually, the way they see things at the > > > > > University > > > > > > of > > > > > > > Sydney, where each "text" in the conversation is attributed to > a > > > > > > different > > > > > > > "genre" and even a different "register". In some of the texts > the > > > > > context > > > > > > > is present, in others it is present but under the table, and in > > > > others > > > > > it > > > > > > > is in distant Chatswood and far in the future. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But another way is to see some of the texts as embedded in > > others: > > > > > > looking > > > > > > > for the passionfruit is a kind of qualifier of Stephen's > request > > > for > > > > > > > passionfruit, and the explanation of seating has the function > of > > a > > > > > > > "because..." or "since..." hypotactic. clause attached to > > Stephen's > > > > > > sitting > > > > > > > in the wrong place at the kitchen table. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The trip to Chatswood? On the face of it, this is really "and > now > > > for > > > > > > > something completely different". And yet, from the Macquarie > > point > > > of > > > > > > view, > > > > > > > it too is linked, but "paratactically". What is being kept up > is > > > the > > > > > > > interpersonal flow of meaning--the intimate, loving, but > > > asymmetrical > > > > > > > relationship between care-giver and cared-for. This is not much > > > > related > > > > > > to > > > > > > > the social reproduction of the material conditions of life (and > > > from > > > > > > > Stephen's view not at all): if they do not go to Chatswood they > > > will > > > > > not > > > > > > go > > > > > > > hungry tonight. But it is part of the flow of semiosis that > forms > > > the > > > > > > great > > > > > > > ocean current that carries humans and other warm-blooded > animals > > on > > > > > their > > > > > > > migrations. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes, of course: semiogenesis and sociogenesis are linked, just > as > > > > > > > phylogenesis and sociogenesis are not simply stacked the one > upon > > > the > > > > > > > other, and learning is not simply the "domestication" of > > > development > > > > > for > > > > > > > purpose of Aktualgenese or microgenesis: there is an inner > link > > in > > > > > both > > > > > > > cases. But as soon as we say that the social reproduction of > the > > > > > material > > > > > > > conditions of life and the flow of semiosis have this inner > link > > > and > > > > > are > > > > > > > not simply stacked like geological layers, we find ourselves > > > > admitting > > > > > > that > > > > > > > they can also be distinct, that eddies of semiosis sometimes > > carry > > > us > > > > > > > backwards in sociogenesis and sometimes fling us far into our > own > > > > > > futures. > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 6 10:28:36 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 10:28:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Being and belonging from identity to experience Message-ID: <595e7322.8949620a.c6497.36e9@mx.google.com> Michael, I have been wandering around the internet exploring links to ?mitsein? and came across this PDF that you composed and published in 2015. I thought others may also enjoy this mode of being and belonging as meaningful. The phrase that Heidegger expressed saying that ?explanations? that focus upon ?intrapsychic processes? are (capsule-like) representations seems to capture the felt sense of why being-in-the-world often feels so encapsulated. Roth_111r.pdf https://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/PREPRINTS/Roth_111r.pdf Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu Jul 6 12:11:19 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 12:11:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Being and belonging from identity to experience In-Reply-To: <595e7322.8949620a.c6497.36e9@mx.google.com> References: <595e7322.8949620a.c6497.36e9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Larry, can you tell us where you read what you paraphrase Heidegger to have said? Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 10:28 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Michael, > I have been wandering around the internet exploring links to ?mitsein? and > came across this PDF that you composed and published in 2015. I thought > others may also enjoy this mode of being and belonging as meaningful. > > The phrase that Heidegger expressed saying that ?explanations? that focus > upon ?intrapsychic processes? are (capsule-like) representations seems to > capture the felt sense of why being-in-the-world often feels so > encapsulated. > > > > > Roth_111r.pdf > > > https://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/PREPRINTS/Roth_111r.pdf > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 6 12:33:24 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 12:33:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Being and belonging from identity to experience In-Reply-To: References: <595e7322.8949620a.c6497.36e9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <595e9062.cb6f630a.2f513.30d8@mx.google.com> Doctor Michel Weber (institute superieur de philosophies, Louvain-la-Neuve) wrote a book review of Hans W. Cohn?s ?Heidegger and the Roots of Existential Therapy that I found in my wandering ways. The image or symbol of ?capsule? registered as significant. Here is Michael Weber?s phrase situated in further context: Like all survivors of to the imperious Freudian figure, Cohn is eager to contrast his own position to the classical psychoanalytic school. He repeatedly emphasises the necessity to shift from ?explanation? based on intra-psychic processes (Heidegger spoke of ?capsule-like representations?) to ?understanding? based on intersubjectivity. Human beings are not isolated entities carrying the burden of an unconscious past, they are ?ek-static? individuals always already standing outside themselves among their peers. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: July 6, 2017 12:14 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Being and belonging from identity to experience Hi Larry, can you tell us where you read what you paraphrase Heidegger to have said? Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 10:28 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Michael, > I have been wandering around the internet exploring links to ?mitsein? and > came across this PDF that you composed and published in 2015. I thought > others may also enjoy this mode of being and belonging as meaningful. > > The phrase that Heidegger expressed saying that ?explanations? that focus > upon ?intrapsychic processes? are (capsule-like) representations seems to > capture the felt sense of why being-in-the-world often feels so > encapsulated. > > > > > Roth_111r.pdf > > > https://web.uvic.ca/~mroth/PREPRINTS/Roth_111r.pdf > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 6 12:40:20 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 12:40:20 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books Message-ID: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> Michael, Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation Heidegger? Beyond Postmodernism Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many of the leading authorities?on psychoanalytic theory and practice?to provide a broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing interdisciplinary discourse?between?psychoanalysis, continental philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg=PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger&source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v=onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu Jul 6 12:47:21 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 12:47:21 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, thanks. I find that Heidegger often gets distorted when read in English, and so I do not recognize where he might have written this in order to be able to check it. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > Michael, > Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in > this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation > Heidegger? > > > > Beyond Postmodernism > Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved > beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to > contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many of > the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to provide a > broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing > interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental > philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? > > > https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg= > PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger& > source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo& > hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v= > onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Jul 6 13:24:47 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 20:24:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <8021CA17-99EC-4E1A-9213-67792C3DABA6@uniandes.edu.co> I think I?ve mentioned this before on xmca: my two-page summary of Being & Time: Martin On Jul 6, 2017, at 2:47 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth > wrote: Larry, thanks. I find that Heidegger often gets distorted when read in English, and so I do not recognize where he might have written this in order to be able to check it. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: Michael, Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation Heidegger? Beyond Postmodernism Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many of the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to provide a broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg= PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger& source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo& hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v= onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From ddirlam@changingwisdoms.com Thu Jul 6 14:15:17 2017 From: ddirlam@changingwisdoms.com (ddirlam@changingwisdoms.com) Date: Thu, 06 Jul 2017 14:15:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Taxis and Embedding in Conversation Message-ID: <20170706141517.8baa08539fb3f284c5d64728aac1124e.f0ec039276.wbe@email02.godaddy.com> From ewall@umich.edu Thu Jul 6 18:41:27 2017 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 20:41:27 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <854B522E-6206-49D9-AD4F-2AEA780F02DF@umich.edu> It appears to be from the Zollikon Seminars > On Jul 6, 2017, at 2:47 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote: > > Larry, thanks. I find that Heidegger often gets distorted when read in > English, and so I do not recognize where he might have written this in > order to be able to check it. Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> Michael, >> Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in >> this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation >> Heidegger? >> >> >> >> Beyond Postmodernism >> Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved >> beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to >> contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many of >> the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to provide a >> broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing >> interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental >> philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? >> >> >> https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg= >> PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger& >> source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo& >> hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v= >> onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jul 6 22:31:06 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 22:31:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: <854B522E-6206-49D9-AD4F-2AEA780F02DF@umich.edu> References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> <854B522E-6206-49D9-AD4F-2AEA780F02DF@umich.edu> Message-ID: What are the Zollikon seminars, Ed, and how do interested mortals access them? Colmparative analysis of such international/language/culture discussions of such fundamental ideas are often reflexivity-generating. And a lot of work! mike On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 6:41 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > It appears to be from the Zollikon Seminars > > > > On Jul 6, 2017, at 2:47 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Larry, thanks. I find that Heidegger often gets distorted when read in > > English, and so I do not recognize where he might have written this in > > order to be able to check it. Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Michael, > >> Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in > >> this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation > >> Heidegger? > >> > >> > >> > >> Beyond Postmodernism > >> Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved > >> beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to > >> contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many > of > >> the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to > provide a > >> broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing > >> interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental > >> philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? > >> > >> > >> https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg= > >> PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger& > >> source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo& > >> hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v= > >> onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false > >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 6 23:12:05 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 23:12:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: <854B522E-6206-49D9-AD4F-2AEA780F02DF@umich.edu> References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> <854B522E-6206-49D9-AD4F-2AEA780F02DF@umich.edu> Message-ID: Martin, This resource is a gift for further inquiry. The suggested additional readings I have printed out as a reference for the multiple topics developing philosophical grounding for interpretive research. Ed, I would agree that the theme of "capsulated representations" is from the Zolliken Lectures. The chapter by Frederickson in Roger Frie and Donna Orange edited book is an extended contextual reading giving meaning to this phrase in relation to exploring "mitsein". I realize for some Heidegger is non-sense while for others Heidegger is meaningful. Mitsein as a "mode" of dasein [being there] clarifies the relation, and in this sense the focus on "care" is a "virtue" to be cultivated through our "moods" which generate "under" standing on "this" philosophical grounding. Frederickson makes clear the relation of the "ontic" and "ontological" in Heidegger's approach to human being and the mode of mitsein as being radically open to presence. Michael, your personal narrative exemplifying moving beyond "identity" I found compelling. Juxtaposing your article with the Frederickson article leaves me uncertain and open to experiencing this extended conversation as radically opening towards "modes" of being-with. James, As I try to listen and stay open to these various narrative modes I also hear your focus on "intellectual well-being" [in contrast to instrumental mastery] as cultivation of virtue. I have no felt need to get closure or find a particular standpoint and appreciate being able to play within the "field" where these conversations are occurring. Mike, As I followed up and read about the book that Martin recommended by Hans Cohn, I learned that the Zolliken lectures are an extended dialogue that Heidegger explored between his "Being and Time" and this new work. Heidegger then gave voice to [shared dialogue] with psychotherapists. Hans Cohn's mode of engagement was to carefully listen to Heidegger's meaning expressed [and shared] in these Zolliken lectures, that extended over years. Medrad {SP?} Boss convened the gatherings.. Google Books gives free access to the Frederickson Chapter on Heidegger informed by the Zolliken Lectures. Within this activity grouping are scholars engaged with Heidegger's learning [continuous] and development [discontinuity] in the way Michael expresses quantitative & qualitative. Gives new meaning to the notion of always being open to beginning within being a "community of learners" that I find hopeful and imaginative. On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 6:41 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > It appears to be from the Zollikon Seminars > > > > On Jul 6, 2017, at 2:47 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Larry, thanks. I find that Heidegger often gets distorted when read in > > English, and so I do not recognize where he might have written this in > > order to be able to check it. Michael > > > > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > Applied Cognitive Science > > MacLaurin Building A567 > > University of Victoria > > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > > > On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Michael, > >> Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in > >> this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation > >> Heidegger? > >> > >> > >> > >> Beyond Postmodernism > >> Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved > >> beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to > >> contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many > of > >> the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to > provide a > >> broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing > >> interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental > >> philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? > >> > >> > >> https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg= > >> PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger& > >> source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo& > >> hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v= > >> onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false > >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > >> > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Fri Jul 7 02:11:52 2017 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Fri, 07 Jul 2017 05:11:52 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] A structurationists theory of human action Message-ID: Fyi Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: SIJ-01-00005-2.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 438110 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170707/b436a519/attachment.pdf From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Fri Jul 7 04:34:39 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 14:34:39 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Novel by Nazim Hikmet Message-ID: https://www.amazon.fr/Lifes-Good-Brother-Hikmet-Paperback/dp/B010MZGBPA/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1499426741&sr=8-1&keywords=life%27s+good+nazim+hikmet Could anyone have an opportunity to read this novel earlier? And does anyone have it in her/his library please? Ulvi From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Jul 7 07:27:56 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 14:27:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: <8021CA17-99EC-4E1A-9213-67792C3DABA6@uniandes.edu.co> References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> , <8021CA17-99EC-4E1A-9213-67792C3DABA6@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1499437676514.90046@iped.uio.no> Nice pages, Martin! thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: 06 July 2017 22:24 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books I think I?ve mentioned this before on xmca: my two-page summary of Being & Time: Martin On Jul 6, 2017, at 2:47 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth > wrote: Larry, thanks. I find that Heidegger often gets distorted when read in English, and so I do not recognize where he might have written this in order to be able to check it. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: Michael, Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation Heidegger? Beyond Postmodernism Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many of the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to provide a broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg= PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger& source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo& hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v= onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Jul 7 08:27:51 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 15:27:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: <1499441230458.81149@iped.uio.no> References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com>, <1499441230458.81149@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1499441271794.50590@iped.uio.no> Auto-correct spelled Zillion, but I meant to write Zollikon, of course. A ________________________________________ From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: 07 July 2017 17:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books I send attached an extract from the original text from the Zillion seminars where the 'capsule-like representations' mention is made. The sentence is this: "In the perspective of the Analytic of Da-sein, all conventional, objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favor of an entirely different understanding" Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 06 July 2017 21:40 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books Michael, Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation Heidegger? Beyond Postmodernism Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many of the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to provide a broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg=PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger&source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v=onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Jul 7 08:27:10 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 15:27:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1499441230458.81149@iped.uio.no> I send attached an extract from the original text from the Zillion seminars where the 'capsule-like representations' mention is made. The sentence is this: "In the perspective of the Analytic of Da-sein, all conventional, objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favor of an entirely different understanding" Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 06 July 2017 21:40 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books Michael, Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation Heidegger? Beyond Postmodernism Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many of the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to provide a broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg=PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger&source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v=onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Heidegger Zollikon 1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 491657 bytes Desc: Heidegger Zollikon 1.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170707/d7e191b6/attachment-0001.pdf From ewall@umich.edu Fri Jul 7 10:04:10 2017 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 12:04:10 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> <854B522E-6206-49D9-AD4F-2AEA780F02DF@umich.edu> Message-ID: <1CE7E541-ED86-4C53-8175-7195CBB24FED@umich.edu> Mike It is, in a sense, a transcript/book of a series of seminars (some private - between Medard Boss and Heidegger) with students/colleagues of Boss at Boss?s home in Zollikon and the University of Zurich. As time passed - Heidegger was a bit old - Boss and he communicated by letter and some of these are also included. It is an interesting book. Heidegger was, by all reports, a charismatic teacher and the book - as opposed to his published lectures - gives some indications of what this may have been like. I admit to being moderately excited when it was published (smile). People on this list tend to mention Being and Time (which Heidegger felt, in many ways, was a failed study) and that is fine. He wrote more than a few things which are important in their own right (depending on your interests). I find reading Heidegger a chore - and I?m not talking about Being and Time - because he says so many thought provoking things and I tend to bog down in retrospection (smile). Martin says some important things about Heidegger the person in that Being and Time summary that need to be remembered when reading or quoting. As far as his summary goes, it is nice (Dreyfus has something similar, but less graphic). However, unless I am missing something, it seems to be a summary of, for the most part, Division I (which most people quote/read, by the way). So the simple answer to your questions is that you can originally access the Zollikon seminars in the book of that title. They are fairly readable. Ed > On Jul 7, 2017, at 12:31 AM, mike cole wrote: > > What are the Zollikon seminars, Ed, and how do interested mortals access > them? > > Colmparative analysis of such international/language/culture discussions of > such fundamental ideas are often reflexivity-generating. > > And a lot of work! > mike > > On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 6:41 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > >> It appears to be from the Zollikon Seminars >> >> >>> On Jul 6, 2017, at 2:47 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Larry, thanks. I find that Heidegger often gets distorted when read in >>> English, and so I do not recognize where he might have written this in >>> order to be able to check it. Michael >>> >>> >>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> -------------------- >>> Applied Cognitive Science >>> MacLaurin Building A567 >>> University of Victoria >>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 >>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth >>> >>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics >>> > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Michael, >>>> Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in >>>> this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation >>>> Heidegger? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Beyond Postmodernism >>>> Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved >>>> beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to >>>> contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many >> of >>>> the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to >> provide a >>>> broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing >>>> interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental >>>> philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? >>>> >>>> >>>> https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg= >>>> PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger& >>>> source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo& >>>> hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v= >>>> onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jul 7 10:12:52 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 10:12:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: <1CE7E541-ED86-4C53-8175-7195CBB24FED@umich.edu> References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> <854B522E-6206-49D9-AD4F-2AEA780F02DF@umich.edu> <1CE7E541-ED86-4C53-8175-7195CBB24FED@umich.edu> Message-ID: Thanks for the explanation of the Zillikon exchange, Ed. And thanks for forwarding text, Alfredo. I am a rank beginner in these matters and I am find the translation challenges, never mind the ideas, daunting. mike On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 10:04 AM, Edward Wall wrote: > Mike > > It is, in a sense, a transcript/book of a series of seminars (some > private - between Medard Boss and Heidegger) with students/colleagues of > Boss at Boss?s home in Zollikon and the University of Zurich. As time > passed - Heidegger was a bit old - Boss and he communicated by letter and > some of these are also included. It is an interesting book. Heidegger was, > by all reports, a charismatic teacher and the book - as opposed to his > published lectures - gives some indications of what this may have been > like. I admit to being moderately excited when it was published (smile). > > People on this list tend to mention Being and Time (which Heidegger > felt, in many ways, was a failed study) and that is fine. He wrote more > than a few things which are important in their own right (depending on your > interests). I find reading Heidegger a chore - and I?m not talking about > Being and Time - because he says so many thought provoking things and I > tend to bog down in retrospection (smile). > > Martin says some important things about Heidegger the person in that > Being and Time summary that need to be remembered when reading or quoting. > As far as his summary goes, it is nice (Dreyfus has something similar, but > less graphic). However, unless I am missing something, it seems to be a > summary of, for the most part, Division I (which most people quote/read, by > the way). > > So the simple answer to your questions is that you can originally > access the Zollikon seminars in the book of that title. They are fairly > readable. > > Ed > > > On Jul 7, 2017, at 12:31 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > What are the Zollikon seminars, Ed, and how do interested mortals access > > them? > > > > Colmparative analysis of such international/language/culture discussions > of > > such fundamental ideas are often reflexivity-generating. > > > > And a lot of work! > > mike > > > > On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 6:41 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > >> It appears to be from the Zollikon Seminars > >> > >> > >>> On Jul 6, 2017, at 2:47 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth < > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > >>> > >>> Larry, thanks. I find that Heidegger often gets distorted when read in > >>> English, and so I do not recognize where he might have written this in > >>> order to be able to check it. Michael > >>> > >>> > >>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> -------------------- > >>> Applied Cognitive Science > >>> MacLaurin Building A567 > >>> University of Victoria > >>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > >>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > >>> > >>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > >>> >> directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > >>> > >>> On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Michael, > >>>> Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found > in > >>>> this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation > >>>> Heidegger? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Beyond Postmodernism > >>>> Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved > >>>> beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to > >>>> contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many > >> of > >>>> the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to > >> provide a > >>>> broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the > growing > >>>> interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental > >>>> philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two > part? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg= > >>>> PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger& > >>>> source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo& > >>>> hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v= > >>>> onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false > >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Jul 8 02:40:54 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 09:40:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] a linguist and a child on D. Trump Message-ID: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist-studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she-found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 8 02:43:51 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 19:43:51 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a Regent? andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! > > > https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist-studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she-found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 8 07:42:35 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 07:42:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theoryand Practice - Google Books In-Reply-To: <1499441230458.81149@iped.uio.no> References: <595e9202.d83b620a.dc8c7.4fb5@mx.google.com> <1499441230458.81149@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <5960ef63.5600620a.c6486.eb94@mx.google.com> Alfredo, thanks for the excerpt. I am curious how Heidegger?s differentiating the ?ontic? (capsule-like representations) as a mode & this ontic mode?s relation to the ontological ground that for Heidegger is primary. Other theorists posit the notice as primordial. For example Charles Horton Cooley in 1902 wrote? ? Persons and society must be studied primarily by imagination. It is true, prima facie, that the best way of observing things is that which is most direct; and I do not see how we can hold that we know persons directly except as imaginative ideas in the mind.? >From my reading of the Zolliken Seminars Heidegger?s I get a sense of the ?ontic? as (capsule-like representations). I am assuming that Heidegger would understand Cooley as expressing secondary ontic imaginal ?facts? in the ?representational? mind. Heidegger, in the Zolliken seminars would challenge Cooley as staying stuck in ontic derivative relations and not being ?open? to primordial ontological being-with (mitsein). Is this a reasonable assumption ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: July 7, 2017 8:30 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theoryand Practice - Google Books I send attached an extract from the original text from the Zillion seminars where the 'capsule-like representations' mention is made. The sentence is this: "In the perspective of the Analytic of Da-sein, all conventional, objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favor of an entirely different understanding" Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 06 July 2017 21:40 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice - Google Books Michael, Further context for the phrase (capsule-like representation) is found in this book which appeared when I googled ?Capsule-like representation Heidegger? Beyond Postmodernism Beyond Postmodernism identifies ways in which psychoanalysis has moved beyond the postmodern debate and discusses how this can be applied to contemporary practice. Roger Frie and Donna Orange bring together many of the leading authorities on psychoanalytic theory and practice to provide a broad scope of psychoanalytic viewpoints and perspectives on the growing interdisciplinary discourse between psychoanalysis, continental philosophy, social theory and philosophy of mind. Divided into two part? https://books.google.ca/books?id=HdpcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56&lpg=PA56&dq=capsule-like+representations+Heidegger&source=bl&ots=cwGLCyju3-&sig=8cKhq1Tw9cnEEQ-fongAspl8pBo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU3OeVs_XUAhVCwmMKHWHTA8UQ6AEIGzAA#v=onepage&q=capsule-like%20representations%20Heidegger&f=false Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Jul 10 03:56:15 2017 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 12:56:15 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> Message-ID: That would be the vice-President! I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. Carol On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a > Regent? > > andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in this >> list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the Washington >> post (see link below) comments on this and notes how Trump's speech sounds >> like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could be a family member or a >> friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by and saw >> Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' ('angry' in >> Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family members or friends >> sound like that, even the American ones! >> >> >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >> >> >> >> >> > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) Cultural Historical Activity Theory Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From Peg.Griffin@att.net Mon Jul 10 07:51:21 2017 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 10:51:21 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> Message-ID: <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> About regency? There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. Here's the link to his bill: https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-establish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump That would be the vice-President! I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. Carol On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a > Regent? > > andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the >> Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could >> be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >> >> >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >> >> >> >> >> > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) Cultural Historical Activity Theory Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 10 08:50:13 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 01:50:13 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> Message-ID: <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > About regency? > There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. > Here's the link to his bill: > https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-establish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity > A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) > shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." > > Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. > > Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. > > These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? > PG > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald > Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > That would be the vice-President! > > I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... > offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. > > Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. > > Carol > > On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >> Regent? >> >> andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the >>> Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could >>> be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>> >>> >>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) > Cultural Historical Activity Theory > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 10 10:40:45 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 11:40:45 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> Message-ID: I'm in red country here in Utah. Although Trump receives mostly tepid support here, anti-Clinton and anti-Democrat voices are very strong here. I'm also familiar with the Trumpista rhetoric because, well, as an anthropologist seeking understanding of those who are different from me, I find it fascinating to follow these threads of how people make sense of something that I find to be entirely nonsensical. One trouble in this is that it is very difficult to tell exactly what the numbers are like here in the U.S. as far as just how many Trumpistas there are. Polls can give a general idea (e.g., 538's tracking: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings/), and they still show approval ratings holding around 40%. Yes, he's the first president whose disapproval ratings have consistently remained above his approval ratings, but that still means that 40% have remained true to DJT (and his approval trendline seems to be downward - 45% at the original high, 38% at the recent low). I think that there is probably a bit of social psychology that could help explain those 40% or so who still support him - they are the ones who voted for him and have made a major commitment and feel a particular investment to that commitment. As for what people are saying about him and why they continue to support him, it seems that he is seen as an anti-establishment figure (notwithstanding substantial evidence to the contrary). And I think that people really strongly believe that this is the case. Their evidence for this is that he opposes the establishments that they see as problematic. These include a myriad array of different sorts of things, most of which could be seen as politically left: political correctness ("grab 'em by the..."), mainstream media (esp. CNN), big government (his department secretaries all have harshly criticized the departments that they are heading, save for perhaps Secretary of the Interior - I think). The mainstream media provides a case in point where the medium is the message, and the carrier is the content. Check out DJT's recent tweet: https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/881503147168071680 (btw, if you want to better understand the Trumpista position, you can see posts in response to his tweets that provide a decent sense of the Trumpistas' arguments). In case you would rather not see it firsthand, it is a tweet of a WWE wrestling match with DJT's face superimposed on one wrestler and the CNN logo superimposed on the other, and, predictably, the Trump wrestler is beating up the CNN wrestler. Trump's team here is very effectively playing to their base not just by the Trump attack on CNN, but by the very nature of the attack - a tweet using "professional" wrestling to tell his story (I assume that everyone knows who watches professional wrestling). I should add that in response to the bi-partisan outrage about this, his son recently posted a tweet where DJT is in a fighter jet and he shoots down a fighter jet with the CNN logo on it (images from Top Gun - a movie that is American machismo incarnate) . This is the kind of blustery machismo that will play to his base very well. (But, I fear, this is a sideshow distraction, a tempest in a teacup while a storm is brewing elsewhere). The critique of mainstream media also provides one of the great bulwarks of the Trumpista camp - the notion that Trump is the little guy fighting against the powerful forces of Washington. My fear is that if he gets pushed out in a way that appears that the Washington insiders forced him to leave, rather than that the American people wanted him to leave. There will always be some who think this, but just how many will depend on how he is removed. (and, actually, my greatest fear is that Trump will start a war in order to get his numbers turned around - if you look at the 538 poll numbers for past presidents (further down on the page that I linked to above), you'll see that the biggest jump of any president's approval ratings happened 237 days into his term when they jumped from around 51% to over 80% - I imagine that DJT and his people are looking at that and wishing for, well, the worst). My hope is that some kind of solidarity can form in the U.S. (and elsewhere) that is neither left nor right. But right now, I see little possibility of that - Trumpistas are dedicated to him and unwilling to criticize him just as Obamaistas remain entirely dedicated and unwilling to criticize him. But Andy, I like your hopeful spin. -greg On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity > and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump > can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. > But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more > likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the > time the next elections come along. True, all sorts of evil laws are > slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but > these measures are reversible. > > It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would > generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid > - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't > "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of > Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 > years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what > the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some > activism round the country, hasn't he? > > How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? Do flag-waving > Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes > of the world? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >> About regency? >> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The >> 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the >> need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to >> "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief >> sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, >> Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about >> presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, >> knowledgeable and thorough. >> Here's the link to his bill: >> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introdu >> ces-bill-establish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the 25th >> amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would >> be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija >> boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other >> body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has >> already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an >> impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The >> amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as >> Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro >> tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their >> written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers >> and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to >> the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the >> president resumes power and duties) >> shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the >> President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >> >> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to >> remove a sitting president. >> >> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and >> the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will >> provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are >> not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of >> Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' >> approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the >> discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of >> co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and >> votes. >> >> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given >> up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the >> constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation >> of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But >> Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a >> bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more >> active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong >> with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >> PG >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman >> .ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >> >> That would be the vice-President! >> >> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear >> that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had >> some damaging information on Clinton. >> >> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless >> with it too. >> >> Carol >> >> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>> Regent? >>> >>> andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>> >>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the >>>> Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could >>>> be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic >>>> verbal and gestural devices. >>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >> >> >> >> >> > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From Peg.Griffin@att.net Mon Jul 10 11:10:46 2017 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 14:10:46 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> Message-ID: <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. Peg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > About regency? > There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. > Here's the link to his bill: > https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e > stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity > A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the > 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." > > Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. > > Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. > > These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? > PG > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald > Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > That would be the vice-President! > > I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... > offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. > > Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. > > Carol > > On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >> Regent? >> >> andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>> >>> >>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) > Cultural Historical Activity Theory > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative > email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Jul 10 12:07:52 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 19:07:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1499713683834.29331@iped.uio.no> Carol, interesting that you mention feeling 'helpless' as a best way to describe how many of us feel. This, along with Andy's mention of the type of perezhivanija that he was expecting would have emerged among trumpists but didn't, made me wonder if one good way to try to make sense of this non-sense (as Greg describes it) would be to analyse the situation in terms of the 'types of affects' that relate to the present economico, environmental and political situation. This sort of analysis is what Bruno Latour has done with respect to capitalism. The article can be downloaded here: http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/136-AFFECTS-OF-K-COPENHAGUE.pdf In the article, he writes, 'I will take *capitalism* to mean not a thing in the world, but a certain way of being affected'. So, could we try to analyse what the current politico-economical situation is that surrounds 'trumpism' in terms of the affects it generates. Helplessness was indeed one of the affects Latour identifies with respect to capitalism. He starts with the idea that 'one of the *affects of capitalism*, that is, of *thinking* in terms of capitalism, is to generate for most of people who don't benefit from its wealth a feeling of helplessness and for a few people who benefits from it an immense enthusiasm together with a dumbness of the senses' Which definition of this sort would be appropriate for the situation today? Perhaps this one would actually work? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Carol Macdonald Sent: 10 July 2017 12:56 To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump That would be the vice-President! I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. Carol On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a > Regent? > > andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in this >> list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the Washington >> post (see link below) comments on this and notes how Trump's speech sounds >> like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could be a family member or a >> friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by and saw >> Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' ('angry' in >> Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family members or friends >> sound like that, even the American ones! >> >> >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >> >> >> >> >> > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) Cultural Historical Activity Theory Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 10 13:03:19 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 14:03:19 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <1499713683834.29331@iped.uio.no> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <1499713683834.29331@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo, I wonder if Latour isn't missing something in between the helplessness of those who don't benefit from it and the immense enthusiasm of those who do, particularly in the U.S. I'm thinking in particular of the Joe The Plumber types. For those who don't recall, Joe the Plumber was a side-show of the McCain-Obama election, he was a partly out of work plumber who was vehemently opposed to Obama's proposal to increase taxes on those making more than $200,000 because even though, at that point, he was only making $40,000 or so, he imagined that some day he'd be making lots more and that he didn't want the government taking his money. This is to say that in the U.S., there is a kind of affect that attaches to "capitalism" itself. A fetish of sorts. Not sure if any other U.S.-based folks see this interplay of ideology and affect? -greg On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 1:07 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Carol, interesting that you mention feeling 'helpless' as a best way to > describe how many of us feel. This, along with Andy's mention of the type > of perezhivanija that he was expecting would have emerged among trumpists > but didn't, made me wonder if one good way to try to make sense of this > non-sense (as Greg describes it) would be to analyse the situation in terms > of the 'types of affects' that relate to the present economico, > environmental and political situation. This sort of analysis is what Bruno > Latour has done with respect to capitalism. The article can be downloaded > here: > http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/136- > AFFECTS-OF-K-COPENHAGUE.pdf > > In the article, he writes, 'I will take *capitalism* to mean not a thing > in the world, but a certain way of being affected'. So, could we try to > analyse what the current politico-economical situation is that surrounds > 'trumpism' in terms of the affects it generates. Helplessness was indeed > one of the affects Latour identifies with respect to capitalism. He starts > with the idea that > > 'one of the *affects of capitalism*, that is, of *thinking* in terms of > capitalism, is to generate for most of people who don't benefit from its > wealth a feeling of helplessness and for a few people who benefits from it > an immense enthusiasm together with a dumbness of the senses' > > Which definition of this sort would be appropriate for the situation > today? Perhaps this one would actually work? > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Carol Macdonald > Sent: 10 July 2017 12:56 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > That would be the vice-President! > > I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... > offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that > his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some > damaging information on Clinton. > > Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless > with it too. > > Carol > > On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a > > Regent? > > > > andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > >> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in this > >> list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the > Washington > >> post (see link below) comments on this and notes how Trump's speech > sounds > >> like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could be a family member or a > >> friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural > devices. > >> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by and > saw > >> Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' ('angry' in > >> Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family members or > friends > >> sound like that, even the American ones! > >> > >> > >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- > >> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- > >> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) > Cultural Historical Activity Theory > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 10 13:28:29 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 13:28:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <1499713683834.29331@iped.uio.no> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net>, <1499713683834.29331@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <5963e377.988a620a.da789.68e2@mx.google.com> Alfredo, Taking (types of affective) realization as an organizing principle, I will return to Z. Bauman (sociologist) who suggests we no longer ?trust? projecting our (selves) into the future. I do not mean merely that we no longer trust ?planning? for a future. On an imaginal level, we are not pro-jecting into the future and therefore the types of affective directions we can imagine taking are atrophied, or dissipated. Where do our inter-affective affects go in this situation? It seems when the future cannot be pro-jected and then lived into (as an affective type) we generate alternative retro spective imaginal realms and try to realize idealized past glories. This is similar to what Latour says when he takes (capitalism) to mean NOT A THING in the world, but a certain way of BEING AFFECTED. I will just suggest that the phrase (being affected) indicates (being moved by ...) which indicates ?passivity? not ?activity?. To ?be affected? in a certain way is neither (a thing) nor is active intentionality assumed. The situation or (surround), if generating a certain way of (being affected) indicates somehow what is occuring is occuring passively in a way in which we are being affected. Another way of considering trumpists and the mutually shared imaginal dwelling places that keep them loyal to Trump. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: July 10, 2017 12:10 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump Carol, interesting that you mention feeling 'helpless' as a best way to describe how many of us feel. This, along with Andy's mention of the type of perezhivanija that he was expecting would have emerged among trumpists but didn't, made me wonder if one good way to try to make sense of this non-sense (as Greg describes it) would be to analyse the situation in terms of the 'types of affects' that relate to the present economico, environmental and political situation. This sort of analysis is what Bruno Latour has done with respect to capitalism. The article can be downloaded here: http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/136-AFFECTS-OF-K-COPENHAGUE.pdf In the article, he writes, 'I will take *capitalism* to mean not a thing in the world, but a certain way of being affected'. So, could we try to analyse what the current politico-economical situation is that surrounds 'trumpism' in terms of the affects it generates. Helplessness was indeed one of the affects Latour identifies with respect to capitalism. He starts with the idea that 'one of the *affects of capitalism*, that is, of *thinking* in terms of capitalism, is to generate for most of people who don't benefit from its wealth a feeling of helplessness and for a few people who benefits from it an immense enthusiasm together with a dumbness of the senses' Which definition of this sort would be appropriate for the situation today? Perhaps this one would actually work? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Carol Macdonald Sent: 10 July 2017 12:56 To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump That would be the vice-President! I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. Carol On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a > Regent? > > andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in this >> list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the Washington >> post (see link below) comments on this and notes how Trump's speech sounds >> like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could be a family member or a >> friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by and saw >> Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' ('angry' in >> Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family members or friends >> sound like that, even the American ones! >> >> >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >> >> >> >> >> > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) Cultural Historical Activity Theory Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 10 17:53:30 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 10:53:30 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> Message-ID: Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). > Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. > But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. > Peg > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. > True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. > > It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? > > How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? > Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >> About regency? >> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >> Here's the link to his bill: >> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >> >> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >> >> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >> >> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >> PG >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >> >> That would be the vice-President! >> >> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >> >> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >> >> Carol >> >> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>> Regent? >>> >>> andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>> >>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >> >> >> >> > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Jul 11 06:42:45 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 09:42:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> Message-ID: A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? > > Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? > > Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >> Peg >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >> >> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >> >> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >> >> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> About regency? >>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>> Here's the link to his bill: >>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>> >>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>> >>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>> >>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>> PG >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>> >>> That would be the vice-President! >>> >>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>> >>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>> Regent? >>>> >>>> andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>> >>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 11 08:17:47 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 08:17:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> Message-ID: <5964ebf4.5157620a.b3f89.0f62@mx.google.com> Helena, Thank you for putting this book in an alternative con/text. You are offering us such clear (sense). I will add the French word (sens) which has a differing connotation from the English term j (sense). In General *sens* has 3 aspects: ? Sense ? Direction ? A meaning ? in particular a vague, ambiguous, undeterminate meaning intuitively grasped. The word (perhaps) is in this realm or field or mode or motif of meaning that our practices further disambiguate. Helena, in this sens you are offering us insight into Vance and his particular way of realizing our current historical moment. Why does Vince *resonate* and capture shared social imaginary. Why is his voice being heard and listened to? Your highlighting various words and phrases (and Hilary?s deplorable) holds lessons for (us). . I would also suggest you are expressing particular *virtues* ( social solidarity) and reclaiming the ( public) *commons* as expressing our deepest desire as particular *sens* Thanks for your extended post ? a gift Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Helena Worthen Sent: July 11, 2017 6:44 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Peg Griffin Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? > > Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? > > Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >> Peg >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >> >> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >> >> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >> >> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> About regency? >>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>> Here's the link to his bill: >>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>> >>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>> >>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>> >>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>> PG >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>> >>> That would be the vice-President! >>> >>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>> >>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>> Regent? >>>> >>>> andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>> >>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 11 08:31:20 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 08:31:20 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> Message-ID: <5964ef21.5273630a.b2b80.1497@mx.google.com> Andy, A question in the same vein. When refugees are coming to places orienting within fundamentally biblical virtues often these church members organize to offer food and shelter to refugees (as a form of Christian care.) However, when voting, these same Church folk overwhelmingly vote for Trump and his rhetoric. Seems to be a disconnect from these folks face-to-face care AND concern with actual folks within their communities? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 10, 2017 5:56 PM To: Peg Griffin; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). > Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. > But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. > Peg > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. > True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. > > It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? > > How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? > Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >> About regency? >> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >> Here's the link to his bill: >> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >> >> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >> >> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >> >> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >> PG >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >> >> That would be the vice-President! >> >> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >> >> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >> >> Carol >> >> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>> Regent? >>> >>> andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>> >>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >> >> >> >> > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Jul 11 09:16:41 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 10:16:41 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> Message-ID: <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> Helena, Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? (E.g., New York Times...). I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. Greg Sent from my iPhone > On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. > > It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. > > He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. > > His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." > > His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. > > The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. > > In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. > > When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). > > However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. > > In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. > > Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. > > Helena > > > > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? >> >> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? >> >> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >>> Peg >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>> >>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >>> >>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >>> >>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> About regency? >>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>>> Here's the link to his bill: >>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>>> >>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>>> >>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>>> >>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>>> PG >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>> >>>> That would be the vice-President! >>>> >>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>>> >>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>>> Regent? >>>>> >>>>> andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > From rbeach@umn.edu Tue Jul 11 09:40:03 2017 From: rbeach@umn.edu (Richard Beach) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:40:03 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu> Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy more widely. In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right . One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their failures in their school experiences. Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota rbeach@umn.edu Websites: Digital writing , Media?literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core?State Standards , Apps for literacy?learning , Teaching about climate change > On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > > Helena, > Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? (E.g., New York Times...). > I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. > Greg > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: >> >> A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. >> >> It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. >> >> He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. >> >> His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." >> >> His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. >> >> The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. >> >> In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. >> >> When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). >> >> However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. >> >> In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. >> >> Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. >> >> Helena >> >> >> >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >> >>> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? >>> >>> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? >>> >>> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >>>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >>>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >>>> Peg >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>> >>>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >>>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >>>> >>>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >>>> >>>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >>>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> >>>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> About regency? >>>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>>>> Here's the link to his bill: >>>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherw > ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>>>> >>>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>>>> >>>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>>>> >>>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>>>> PG >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>> >>>>> That would be the vice-President! >>>>> >>>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>>>> Regent? >>>>>> >>>>>> andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Tue Jul 11 11:36:12 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 21:36:12 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Inner thought in theater pieces Message-ID: Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work to convey the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. Especially inner thought. The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is Legend of love. Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, characters in a struggle in a triangle of love. It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. My questions are: Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater work? i.e. in terms of the inner thought. Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in terms of human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings possess. Ulvi From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Jul 11 17:05:24 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 20:05:24 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu> Message-ID: Richard, and Greg and Larry, Thanks for the reading. I totally agree with Richard's suggestion about Arlie Hochschild's excellent book -- the two make a stark contrast. My point, which you probably accept, is that Vance's weak book is serving a political agenda that has a lot of muscle and money behind it right now. I wrote my anti-blurb in the hope of finding others on this list who had read the book and had insights into it and how it is being used. In order to distribute it widely (like to the NY Times, where it would probably be submitted int he form of a letter) I'd have to make sure that all my quotes are impeccable, etc -- in other words, write defensively. WHile I don't think I made any mistakes in my summary, it would be a different task to send my critique into the fray. Might be worth doing anyway, though. Has anyone else read the book? H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 11, 2017, at 12:40 PM, Richard Beach wrote: > Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy more widely. > > In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right . > > One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their failures in their school experiences. > > Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota > rbeach@umn.edu > Websites: Digital writing , Media literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core State Standards , Apps for literacy learning , Teaching about climate change > > > > > > >> On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >> >> Helena, >> Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? (E.g., New York Times...). >> I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. >> Greg >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>> >>> A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. >>> >>> It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. >>> >>> He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. >>> >>> His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." >>> >>> His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. >>> >>> The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. >>> >>> In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. >>> >>> When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). >>> >>> However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. >>> >>> In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. >>> >>> Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>> >>>> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? >>>> >>>> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? >>>> >>>> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >>>>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >>>>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >>>>> Peg >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>> >>>>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >>>>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >>>>> >>>>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >>>>> >>>>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >>>>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> >>>>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>> About regency? >>>>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>>>>> Here's the link to his bill: >>>>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>>>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>>>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>>>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherw >> ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>>>>> >>>>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>>>>> >>>>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>>>>> >>>>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>>>>> PG >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>>> >>>>>> That would be the vice-President! >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>>>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>>>>> >>>>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>>>>> Regent? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>>>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>>>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Jul 11 17:49:26 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 00:49:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu> Message-ID: Found this very interesting, from an interview with Arlie Hochschild about her book: "A lot of people I talked to love Bernie Sanders. They said, "Oh, Uncle Bernie. Oh, well, he?s pie-in-the-sky socialist, but good ol? Uncle Bernie." It?s Hillary they couldn?t?didn?t feel represented by. So, there are possibilities?that?s what I?m saying?long-term possibilities, that I think the shoe is on our foot to reach across." Martin On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:40 AM, Richard Beach > wrote: Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy more widely. In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right . One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their failures in their school experiences. Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota rbeach@umn.edu Websites: Digital writing , Media literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core State Standards , Apps for literacy learning , Teaching about climate change On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: Helena, Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? (E.g., New York Times...). I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. Greg Sent from my iPhone On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. Peg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: About regency? There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. Here's the link to his bill: https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherw ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump That would be the vice-President! I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. Carol On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a Regent? andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html -- Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) Cultural Historical Activity Theory Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Wed Jul 12 07:33:04 2017 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 10:33:04 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ulvi, Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its use in the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal richness of ?the ? emotion ? and thought ?? ?of characters ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who works with Vygotsky's theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes in the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear voices - both normal and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of theatrical characters, he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into the creative writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner voices play in their work and thought. I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which Fernyhough manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a phenomenon that is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage in the development of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to study private speech because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic and sociolinguistic analysis. https://www.amazon.com/Voices-Within-History-Science-Ourselves/dp/0465096808 Peter On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work to convey > the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. Especially > inner thought. > > The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is Legend of > love. > > Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, characters in a > struggle in a triangle of love. > > > It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > My questions are: > > Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater work? i.e. in > terms of the inner thought. > > Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in terms of > human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings possess. > > Ulvi > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Wed Jul 12 07:50:19 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 17:50:19 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you Peter. Ulvi 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > Ulvi, > > Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its use in > the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal richness of > ?the ? > emotion > ? > and thought > ?? > ?of > characters > ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who works with > Vygotsky's > theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes in > the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear voices - > both normal > and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > theatrical characters, > he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into the > creative > writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner voices play > in their > work and thought. > > I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > Fernyhough > manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a phenomenon that > is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage in the > development > of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to study > private speech > because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic and > sociolinguistic > analysis. > > https://www.amazon.com/Voices-Within-History-Science- > Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > > Peter > > > > On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work to convey > > the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > Especially > > inner thought. > > > > The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is Legend of > > love. > > > > Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, characters in a > > struggle in a triangle of love. > > > > > > It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > > > My questions are: > > > > Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater work? i.e. > in > > terms of the inner thought. > > > > Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in terms of > > human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings possess. > > > > Ulvi > > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Wed Jul 12 07:56:01 2017 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 14:56:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu>, Message-ID: good morning, Helen - i read Vance's book a few months ago. as a person who has been involved in literacy instruction all of my professional life, in contrasting your response to Hillbilly Elegy and my response i am reminded again that reading comprehension is grounded in the individual's background knowledge. so, much of the background knowledge i brought to Elegy is situated in decades of working with children in poverty, second-language learners, Shirley Brice Heath's, Deborah Hick's, Jose Limon's, Shiela Valesquez's, Annick Prieur's and John Rechy's work. so that Vance's personal narrative ran true for me. yes, i was taken aback by his political beliefs, occasional word choice's, and especially his personal struggle with internalized violence. i had also noticed that those on the political right and left were hailing his book as an explanatory principle that supported their political values and beliefs. people do that. i found your understanding of the book being grounded in labor rights to be very illuminating. i have found his web site a disappointment. http://www.jdvance.com Official website of JD Vance - Home www.jdvance.com Welcome to my site! I'm the author of Hillbilly Elegy, and I do other stuff, too. and i thought that he gained a great deal of support from a yale professor - though i don't remember her name and i've not got a copy of the book. i didn't think it was valuable enough to buy. just like taxes and death, we can't avoid political power-plays. and in truth, i find your professional activities as a model to appreciate and emulate. so, many thanks for your continuing coherent voice on this list. phillip ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 6:05:24 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump Richard, and Greg and Larry, Thanks for the reading. I totally agree with Richard's suggestion about Arlie Hochschild's excellent book -- the two make a stark contrast. My point, which you probably accept, is that Vance's weak book is serving a political agenda that has a lot of muscle and money behind it right now. I wrote my anti-blurb in the hope of finding others on this list who had read the book and had insights into it and how it is being used. In order to distribute it widely (like to the NY Times, where it would probably be submitted int he form of a letter) I'd have to make sure that all my quotes are impeccable, etc -- in other words, write defensively. WHile I don't think I made any mistakes in my summary, it would be a different task to send my critique into the fray. Might be worth doing anyway, though. Has anyone else read the book? H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 11, 2017, at 12:40 PM, Richard Beach wrote: > Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy more widely. > > In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right . > > One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their failures in their school experiences. > > Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota > rbeach@umn.edu > Websites: Digital writing , Media literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core State Standards , Apps for literacy learning , Teaching about climate change > > > > > > >> On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >> >> Helena, >> Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? (E.g., New York Times...). >> I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. >> Greg >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>> >>> A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. >>> >>> It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. >>> >>> He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. >>> >>> His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." >>> >>> His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. >>> >>> The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. >>> >>> In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. >>> >>> When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). >>> >>> However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. >>> >>> In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. >>> >>> Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>> >>>> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? >>>> >>>> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? >>>> >>>> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >>>>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >>>>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >>>>> Peg >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>> >>>>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >>>>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >>>>> >>>>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >>>>> >>>>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >>>>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> >>>>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>> About regency? >>>>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>>>>> Here's the link to his bill: >>>>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>>>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>>>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>>>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherw >> ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>>>>> >>>>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>>>>> >>>>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>>>>> >>>>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>>>>> PG >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>>> >>>>>> That would be the vice-President! >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>>>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>>>>> >>>>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>>>>> Regent? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>>>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>>>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > From daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com Wed Jul 12 09:33:50 2017 From: daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com (Daniel Hyman) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:33:50 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal speech, its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a musician, they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced at in The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the contexts of psychology or neurobiology: - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be more specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most extreme cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who lost their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, practice toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate what they are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. Need one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this ability? - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with events (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the quickened pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of feelings that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these alike, and different? - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart and da Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others internal to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? How does parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate to a live composer setting words from a past poet? - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested to be the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening but not heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, reflection, or other factors alter it? I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology offer (or promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, ability, and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or recommend readings. Daniel On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Thank you Peter. > > Ulvi > > 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > > > Ulvi, > > > > Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its use in > > the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal richness of > > ?the ? > > emotion > > ? > > and thought > > ?? > > ?of > > characters > > ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > > in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who works > with > > Vygotsky's > > theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes in > > the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear voices > - > > both normal > > and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > > theatrical characters, > > he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into the > > creative > > writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner voices > play > > in their > > work and thought. > > > > I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > > Fernyhough > > manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a phenomenon > that > > is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage in the > > development > > of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to study > > private speech > > because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic and > > sociolinguistic > > analysis. > > > > https://www.amazon.com/Voices-Within-History-Science- > > Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > > > > Peter > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work to > convey > > > the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > > Especially > > > inner thought. > > > > > > The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is Legend of > > > love. > > > > > > Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, characters in > a > > > struggle in a triangle of love. > > > > > > > > > It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > > > > > My questions are: > > > > > > Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater work? i.e. > > in > > > terms of the inner thought. > > > > > > Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in terms > of > > > human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings possess. > > > > > > Ulvi > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > Director, > > Office of Institutional Research > > > > Fordham University > > Thebaud Hall-202 > > Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > From smago@uga.edu Wed Jul 12 12:24:04 2017 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:24:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: new book by Igor Arievitch - Beyond the Brain In-Reply-To: <1499886979869.31679@gc.cuny.edu> References: <1499886979869.31679@gc.cuny.edu> Message-ID: From: Stetsenko, Anna [mailto:AStetsenko@gc.cuny.edu] Dear colleagues. I am glad to share that a new book by Igor M. Arievitch just came out (the flyer is attached): Beyond the Brain: An Agentive Activity Perspective on Mind, Development, and Learning The book outlines a fundamental alternative to the rising wave of aggressive biological reductionism and brainism in contemporary psychology and education. It offers steps to achieving a daunting and elusive goal: constructing a coherently non-reductionist account of the mind. The main obstacle to such a construction is identified as the centuries-old contemplative fallacy that leads to entrenched dualisms and shackles major theoretical frameworks. The alternative agentive activity perspective overcomes this fallacy by advancing the core principles of the cultural-historical activity theory. This innovative perspective charts a consistently non-mentalist and non-individualist view of psychological processes without discarding the individual mind. A vast body of research and theories, from Piaget and Dewey to sociocultural and embodied cognition approaches are critically engaged, with a special focus on Piotr Galperin?s contribution. The notion of the embodied agent?s object-directed activity serves as a pivotal point for re-conceptualizing the mind and its role in behavior. In a radical departure from both the traditional mentalist and biologically reductionist frameworks, psychological processes are understood as taking place ?beyond the brain? ? as constituted by the agent?s activities in the world. From this standpoint, many of Vygotsky?s key insights, including semiotic mediation, internalization, and cognitive tools are given a fresh scrutiny and substantially revised. The agentive activity perspective opens ways to offer a bold vision for education: developmental teaching and learning built on the premise that real knowledge is not ?information storage and retrieval? and that education is not about ?knowledge transmission? but instead it is about developing students? minds. https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/9463511024[amazon.com] Best regards, Anna??? Anna Stetsenko, PhD Professor Ph.D. Programs in Psychology/Human Development and in Urban Education The Graduate Center of The City University of New York 365 5th Avenue, New York, NY 10016 http://annastetsenko.ws.gc.cuny.edu/ visit www.academia.edu for my recent publications -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Arievitch-Beyond the Brain_flyer.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1028098 bytes Desc: Arievitch-Beyond the Brain_flyer.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170712/290261d8/attachment-0001.pdf From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Wed Jul 12 12:42:53 2017 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 15:42:53 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi, Daniel. Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's *inner ear*, but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound without words, the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and internal voices that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that hearing voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it is the surface level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a *person*, who has an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces of this inner person may come to be experienced consciously. Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner voices-- yes, deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the experience of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical experiences that you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered about those musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that ability, but I have absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: my inner (and outer) ear is all I need. Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd like to take this opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of Ira Gershwin and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's Rainbow, and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg gave a lot of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: Music makes you feel a feeling; Words make you think a thought; Songs make you feel a thought. The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier conversation on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the unity of thinking and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I have trouble conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty experiencing emotions when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking about feelings than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a cultural experience that many men excel at, I suspect. My two cents. Peter On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman wrote: > Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal speech, > its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a musician, > they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced at in > The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > > - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be more > specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most extreme > cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who lost > their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, practice > toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate what they > are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. Need > one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this ability? > > - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with events > (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the quickened > pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of feelings > that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these alike, > and different? > > - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart and da > Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others internal > to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? How does > parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate to a > live composer setting words from a past poet? > > - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested to be > the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening but not > heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, reflection, or > other factors alter it? > > I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology offer (or > promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, ability, > and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or recommend > readings. > > Daniel > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > Thank you Peter. > > > > Ulvi > > > > 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > > > > > Ulvi, > > > > > > Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its use > in > > > the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal richness > of > > > ?the ? > > > emotion > > > ? > > > and thought > > > ?? > > > ?of > > > characters > > > ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > > > in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who works > > with > > > Vygotsky's > > > theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes in > > > the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > voices > > - > > > both normal > > > and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > > > theatrical characters, > > > he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into the > > > creative > > > writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner voices > > play > > > in their > > > work and thought. > > > > > > I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > > > Fernyhough > > > manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a phenomenon > > that > > > is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage in > the > > > development > > > of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to study > > > private speech > > > because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic and > > > sociolinguistic > > > analysis. > > > > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > > > Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > > > > > > Peter > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > wrote: > > > > > > > Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work to > > convey > > > > the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > > > Especially > > > > inner thought. > > > > > > > > The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is Legend > of > > > > love. > > > > > > > > Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, characters > in > > a > > > > struggle in a triangle of love. > > > > > > > > > > > > It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > > > > > > > My questions are: > > > > > > > > Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater work? > i.e. > > > in > > > > terms of the inner thought. > > > > > > > > Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in terms > > of > > > > human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > possess. > > > > > > > > Ulvi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > > Director, > > > Office of Institutional Research > > > > > > Fordham University > > > Thebaud Hall-202 > > > Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > > > > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com Wed Jul 12 16:57:16 2017 From: daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com (Daniel Hyman) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 23:57:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm scoping up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions for you over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years ago about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, which I would also like to take a closer look at. Kind regards and many thanks, Daniel On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > Hi, Daniel. > > Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's *inner > ear*, > but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound without > words, > the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and internal > voices > that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > hearing > voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it is the > surface > level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a *person*, who > has > an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces of this > inner > person may come to be experienced consciously. > > Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner voices-- > yes, > deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > experience > of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical experiences > that > you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > > As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered about > those > musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that ability, > but I have > absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: my > inner > (and outer) ear is all I need. > > Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd like to > take this > opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of Ira > Gershwin > and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > Rainbow, > and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg gave a > lot > of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > > Music makes you feel a feeling; > Words make you think a thought; > Songs make you feel a thought. > > The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > conversation > on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the unity > of thinking > and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I have > trouble > conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty experiencing > emotions > when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking about > feelings > than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a cultural > experience > that many men excel at, I suspect. > > My two cents. > > Peter > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman > > wrote: > > > Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal speech, > > its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > musician, > > they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced at > in > > The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > > contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > > > > - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be more > > specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > > melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > > instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most extreme > > cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who lost > > their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, practice > > toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate what > they > > are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. Need > > one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this ability? > > > > - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with events > > (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the quickened > > pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of feelings > > that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > alike, > > and different? > > > > - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart and da > > Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others internal > > to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? How > does > > parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate to a > > live composer setting words from a past poet? > > > > - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested to > be > > the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening but > not > > heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, reflection, > or > > other factors alter it? > > > > I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology offer > (or > > promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > ability, > > and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > recommend > > readings. > > > > Daniel > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > > Thank you Peter. > > > > > > Ulvi > > > > > > 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > > > > > > > Ulvi, > > > > > > > > Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > use > > in > > > > the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal richness > > of > > > > ?the ? > > > > emotion > > > > ? > > > > and thought > > > > ?? > > > > ?of > > > > characters > > > > ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > > > > in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > works > > > with > > > > Vygotsky's > > > > theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes > in > > > > the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > > voices > > > - > > > > both normal > > > > and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > > > > theatrical characters, > > > > he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into the > > > > creative > > > > writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner voices > > > play > > > > in their > > > > work and thought. > > > > > > > > I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > > > > Fernyhough > > > > manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a phenomenon > > > that > > > > is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage in > > the > > > > development > > > > of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to study > > > > private speech > > > > because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > and > > > > sociolinguistic > > > > analysis. > > > > > > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > > amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > > aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > > mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > > iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > > DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > > > > Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > > > > > > > > Peter > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work to > > > convey > > > > > the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > > > > Especially > > > > > inner thought. > > > > > > > > > > The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > Legend > > of > > > > > love. > > > > > > > > > > Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, characters > > in > > > a > > > > > struggle in a triangle of love. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > > > > > > > > > My questions are: > > > > > > > > > > Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater work? > > i.e. > > > > in > > > > > terms of the inner thought. > > > > > > > > > > Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > terms > > > of > > > > > human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > > possess. > > > > > > > > > > Ulvi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > > > Director, > > > > Office of Institutional Research > > > > > > > > Fordham University > > > > Thebaud Hall-202 > > > > Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 12 17:34:52 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 17:34:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip Harberg and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The book appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen to Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) :-) Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great resource. Thanks Peter and Daniel. mike On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman wrote: > Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm scoping > up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions for you > over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years ago > about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, which I > would also like to take a closer look at. > > Kind regards and many thanks, > > Daniel > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > > > Hi, Daniel. > > > > Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > *inner > > ear*, > > but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound without > > words, > > the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and internal > > voices > > that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > > hearing > > voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it is > the > > surface > > level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a *person*, > who > > has > > an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces of > this > > inner > > person may come to be experienced consciously. > > > > Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner voices-- > > yes, > > deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > > experience > > of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical experiences > > that > > you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > > > > As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered about > > those > > musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that ability, > > but I have > > absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: my > > inner > > (and outer) ear is all I need. > > > > Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd like > to > > take this > > opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of Ira > > Gershwin > > and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > > Rainbow, > > and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg gave > a > > lot > > of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > > > > Music makes you feel a feeling; > > Words make you think a thought; > > Songs make you feel a thought. > > > > The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > > conversation > > on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the unity > > of thinking > > and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > have > > trouble > > conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > experiencing > > emotions > > when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking about > > feelings > > than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > cultural > > experience > > that many men excel at, I suspect. > > > > My two cents. > > > > Peter > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > > > > > wrote: > > > > > Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > speech, > > > its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > > musician, > > > they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced at > > in > > > The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > > > contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > > > > > > - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > more > > > specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > > > melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > > > instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > extreme > > > cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who lost > > > their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, practice > > > toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate what > > they > > > are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > Need > > > one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > ability? > > > > > > - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > events > > > (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the quickened > > > pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of feelings > > > that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > > alike, > > > and different? > > > > > > - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart and > da > > > Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > internal > > > to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? How > > does > > > parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate to a > > > live composer setting words from a past poet? > > > > > > - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested to > > be > > > the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening but > > not > > > heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > reflection, > > or > > > other factors alter it? > > > > > > I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology offer > > (or > > > promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > > ability, > > > and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > > recommend > > > readings. > > > > > > Daniel > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Peter. > > > > > > > > Ulvi > > > > > > > > 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > > > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > > > > > > > > > Ulvi, > > > > > > > > > > Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > > use > > > in > > > > > the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > richness > > > of > > > > > ?the ? > > > > > emotion > > > > > ? > > > > > and thought > > > > > ?? > > > > > ?of > > > > > characters > > > > > ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > > > > > in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > > works > > > > with > > > > > Vygotsky's > > > > > theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes > > in > > > > > the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > > > voices > > > > - > > > > > both normal > > > > > and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > > > > > theatrical characters, > > > > > he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > the > > > > > creative > > > > > writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > voices > > > > play > > > > > in their > > > > > work and thought. > > > > > > > > > > I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > > > > > Fernyhough > > > > > manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > phenomenon > > > > that > > > > > is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > in > > > the > > > > > development > > > > > of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > study > > > > > private speech > > > > > because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > > and > > > > > sociolinguistic > > > > > analysis. > > > > > > > > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > > > amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > > > aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > > > mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > > > iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > > > DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > > > > > Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > > > > > > > > > > Peter > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > to > > > > convey > > > > > > the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > > > > > Especially > > > > > > inner thought. > > > > > > > > > > > > The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > > Legend > > > of > > > > > > love. > > > > > > > > > > > > Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > characters > > > in > > > > a > > > > > > struggle in a triangle of love. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > > > > > > > > > > > My questions are: > > > > > > > > > > > > Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > work? > > > i.e. > > > > > in > > > > > > terms of the inner thought. > > > > > > > > > > > > Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > > terms > > > > of > > > > > > human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > > > possess. > > > > > > > > > > > > Ulvi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > > > > Director, > > > > > Office of Institutional Research > > > > > > > > > > Fordham University > > > > > Thebaud Hall-202 > > > > > Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > > > > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > Director, > > Office of Institutional Research > > > > Fordham University > > Thebaud Hall-202 > > Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > From ewall@umich.edu Wed Jul 12 19:01:04 2017 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 21:01:04 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one can feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like (there is some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, says ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. Ed Wall > On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip Harberg > and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The book > appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen to > Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > :-) > > Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > resource. > > Thanks Peter and Daniel. > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman > wrote: > >> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm scoping >> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions for you >> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years ago >> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - >> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, which I >> would also like to take a closer look at. >> >> Kind regards and many thanks, >> >> Daniel >> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >> >>> Hi, Daniel. >>> >>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's >> *inner >>> ear*, >>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound without >>> words, >>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and internal >>> voices >>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that >>> hearing >>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it is >> the >>> surface >>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a *person*, >> who >>> has >>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces of >> this >>> inner >>> person may come to be experienced consciously. >>> >>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner voices-- >>> yes, >>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the >>> experience >>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical experiences >>> that >>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. >>> >>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered about >>> those >>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that ability, >>> but I have >>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: my >>> inner >>> (and outer) ear is all I need. >>> >>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd like >> to >>> take this >>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of Ira >>> Gershwin >>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's >>> Rainbow, >>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg gave >> a >>> lot >>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: >>> >>> Music makes you feel a feeling; >>> Words make you think a thought; >>> Songs make you feel a thought. >>> >>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier >>> conversation >>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the unity >>> of thinking >>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I >> have >>> trouble >>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty >> experiencing >>> emotions >>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking about >>> feelings >>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a >> cultural >>> experience >>> that many men excel at, I suspect. >>> >>> My two cents. >>> >>> Peter >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal >> speech, >>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a >>> musician, >>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced at >>> in >>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the >>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: >>>> >>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be >> more >>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" >>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) >>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most >> extreme >>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who lost >>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, practice >>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate what >>> they >>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. >> Need >>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this >> ability? >>>> >>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with >> events >>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the quickened >>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of feelings >>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these >>> alike, >>>> and different? >>>> >>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart and >> da >>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others >> internal >>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? How >>> does >>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate to a >>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? >>>> >>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested to >>> be >>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening but >>> not >>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, >> reflection, >>> or >>>> other factors alter it? >>>> >>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology offer >>> (or >>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, >>> ability, >>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or >>> recommend >>>> readings. >>>> >>>> Daniel >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il >> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thank you Peter. >>>>> >>>>> Ulvi >>>>> >>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < >>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: >>>>> >>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>> >>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its >>> use >>>> in >>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal >> richness >>>> of >>>>>> ?the ? >>>>>> emotion >>>>>> ? >>>>>> and thought >>>>>> ?? >>>>>> ?of >>>>>> characters >>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough >>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who >>> works >>>>> with >>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes >>> in >>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear >>>> voices >>>>> - >>>>>> both normal >>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of >>>>>> theatrical characters, >>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into >> the >>>>>> creative >>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner >> voices >>>>> play >>>>>> in their >>>>>> work and thought. >>>>>> >>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which >>>>>> Fernyhough >>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a >> phenomenon >>>>> that >>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage >> in >>>> the >>>>>> development >>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to >> study >>>>>> private speech >>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic >>> and >>>>>> sociolinguistic >>>>>> analysis. >>>>>> >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. >>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= >>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= >>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= >>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= >>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= >>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 >>>>>> >>>>>> Peter >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work >> to >>>>> convey >>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. >>>>>> Especially >>>>>>> inner thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is >>> Legend >>>> of >>>>>>> love. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, >> characters >>>> in >>>>> a >>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My questions are: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater >> work? >>>> i.e. >>>>>> in >>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in >>> terms >>>>> of >>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings >>>> possess. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>> Director, >>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>> >>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>> >>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research >>> >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 12 20:19:53 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 20:19:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you won the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what you like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology (!) I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will be able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful daughter, Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun Og (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. Siding with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a blustering, bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will become mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) mike On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one can > feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like (there is > some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, says > ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > > Ed Wall > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip Harberg > > and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > book > > appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen > to > > Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > > :-) > > > > Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > > resource. > > > > Thanks Peter and Daniel. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > scoping > >> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions for > you > >> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years > ago > >> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > >> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, which > I > >> would also like to take a closer look at. > >> > >> Kind regards and many thanks, > >> > >> Daniel > >> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >> > >>> Hi, Daniel. > >>> > >>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > >> *inner > >>> ear*, > >>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound without > >>> words, > >>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > internal > >>> voices > >>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > >>> hearing > >>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it is > >> the > >>> surface > >>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a *person*, > >> who > >>> has > >>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces of > >> this > >>> inner > >>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > >>> > >>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > voices-- > >>> yes, > >>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > >>> experience > >>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > experiences > >>> that > >>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > >>> > >>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered about > >>> those > >>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > ability, > >>> but I have > >>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: > my > >>> inner > >>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > >>> > >>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd like > >> to > >>> take this > >>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of > Ira > >>> Gershwin > >>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > >>> Rainbow, > >>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > gave > >> a > >>> lot > >>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > >>> > >>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > >>> Words make you think a thought; > >>> Songs make you feel a thought. > >>> > >>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > >>> conversation > >>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > unity > >>> of thinking > >>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > >> have > >>> trouble > >>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > >> experiencing > >>> emotions > >>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > about > >>> feelings > >>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > >> cultural > >>> experience > >>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > >>> > >>> My two cents. > >>> > >>> Peter > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > >>>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > >> speech, > >>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > >>> musician, > >>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced > at > >>> in > >>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > >>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > >>>> > >>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > >> more > >>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > >>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > >>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > >> extreme > >>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who lost > >>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, practice > >>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate what > >>> they > >>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > >> Need > >>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > >> ability? > >>>> > >>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > >> events > >>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the quickened > >>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > feelings > >>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > >>> alike, > >>>> and different? > >>>> > >>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart and > >> da > >>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > >> internal > >>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? How > >>> does > >>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate to > a > >>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > >>>> > >>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested > to > >>> be > >>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening but > >>> not > >>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > >> reflection, > >>> or > >>>> other factors alter it? > >>>> > >>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > offer > >>> (or > >>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > >>> ability, > >>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > >>> recommend > >>>> readings. > >>>> > >>>> Daniel > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > >> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Thank you Peter. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ulvi > >>>>> > >>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > >>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > >>> use > >>>> in > >>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > >> richness > >>>> of > >>>>>> ?the ? > >>>>>> emotion > >>>>>> ? > >>>>>> and thought > >>>>>> ?? > >>>>>> ?of > >>>>>> characters > >>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > >>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > >>> works > >>>>> with > >>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes > >>> in > >>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > >>>> voices > >>>>> - > >>>>>> both normal > >>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > >>>>>> theatrical characters, > >>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > >> the > >>>>>> creative > >>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > >> voices > >>>>> play > >>>>>> in their > >>>>>> work and thought. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > >>>>>> Fernyhough > >>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > >> phenomenon > >>>>> that > >>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > >> in > >>>> the > >>>>>> development > >>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > >> study > >>>>>> private speech > >>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > >>> and > >>>>>> sociolinguistic > >>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > >>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > >>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > >>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > >>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > >>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > >>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Peter > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > >> to > >>>>> convey > >>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > >>>>>> Especially > >>>>>>> inner thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > >>> Legend > >>>> of > >>>>>>> love. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > >> characters > >>>> in > >>>>> a > >>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> My questions are: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > >> work? > >>>> i.e. > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > >>> terms > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > >>>> possess. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>> Director, > >>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>> Director, > >>> Office of Institutional Research > >>> > >>> Fordham University > >>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>> > >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>> > >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 12 20:47:22 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 20:47:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> Message-ID: <5966ed56.0a59650a.7d900.182a@mx.google.com> Imagine that ;- ) Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: mike cole Sent: July 12, 2017 8:22 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you won the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what you like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology (!) I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will be able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful daughter, Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun Og (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. Siding with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a blustering, bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will become mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) mike On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one can > feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like (there is > some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, says > ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > > Ed Wall > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip Harberg > > and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > book > > appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen > to > > Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > > :-) > > > > Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > > resource. > > > > Thanks Peter and Daniel. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > scoping > >> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions for > you > >> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years > ago > >> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > >> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, which > I > >> would also like to take a closer look at. > >> > >> Kind regards and many thanks, > >> > >> Daniel > >> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >> > >>> Hi, Daniel. > >>> > >>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > >> *inner > >>> ear*, > >>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound without > >>> words, > >>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > internal > >>> voices > >>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > >>> hearing > >>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it is > >> the > >>> surface > >>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a *person*, > >> who > >>> has > >>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces of > >> this > >>> inner > >>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > >>> > >>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > voices-- > >>> yes, > >>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > >>> experience > >>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > experiences > >>> that > >>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > >>> > >>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered about > >>> those > >>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > ability, > >>> but I have > >>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: > my > >>> inner > >>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > >>> > >>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd like > >> to > >>> take this > >>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of > Ira > >>> Gershwin > >>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > >>> Rainbow, > >>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > gave > >> a > >>> lot > >>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > >>> > >>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > >>> Words make you think a thought; > >>> Songs make you feel a thought. > >>> > >>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > >>> conversation > >>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > unity > >>> of thinking > >>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > >> have > >>> trouble > >>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > >> experiencing > >>> emotions > >>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > about > >>> feelings > >>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > >> cultural > >>> experience > >>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > >>> > >>> My two cents. > >>> > >>> Peter > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > >>>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > >> speech, > >>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > >>> musician, > >>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced > at > >>> in > >>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > >>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > >>>> > >>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > >> more > >>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > >>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > >>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > >> extreme > >>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who lost > >>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, practice > >>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate what > >>> they > >>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > >> Need > >>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > >> ability? > >>>> > >>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > >> events > >>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the quickened > >>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > feelings > >>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > >>> alike, > >>>> and different? > >>>> > >>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart and > >> da > >>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > >> internal > >>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? How > >>> does > >>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate to > a > >>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > >>>> > >>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested > to > >>> be > >>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening but > >>> not > >>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > >> reflection, > >>> or > >>>> other factors alter it? > >>>> > >>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > offer > >>> (or > >>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > >>> ability, > >>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > >>> recommend > >>>> readings. > >>>> > >>>> Daniel > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > >> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Thank you Peter. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ulvi > >>>>> > >>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > >>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > >>> use > >>>> in > >>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > >> richness > >>>> of > >>>>>> ?the ? > >>>>>> emotion > >>>>>> ? > >>>>>> and thought > >>>>>> ?? > >>>>>> ?of > >>>>>> characters > >>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > >>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > >>> works > >>>>> with > >>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes > >>> in > >>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > >>>> voices > >>>>> - > >>>>>> both normal > >>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > >>>>>> theatrical characters, > >>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > >> the > >>>>>> creative > >>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > >> voices > >>>>> play > >>>>>> in their > >>>>>> work and thought. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > >>>>>> Fernyhough > >>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > >> phenomenon > >>>>> that > >>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > >> in > >>>> the > >>>>>> development > >>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > >> study > >>>>>> private speech > >>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > >>> and > >>>>>> sociolinguistic > >>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > >>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > >>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > >>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > >>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > >>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > >>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Peter > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > >> to > >>>>> convey > >>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > >>>>>> Especially > >>>>>>> inner thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > >>> Legend > >>>> of > >>>>>>> love. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > >> characters > >>>> in > >>>>> a > >>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> My questions are: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > >> work? > >>>> i.e. > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > >>> terms > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > >>>> possess. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>> Director, > >>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>> Director, > >>> Office of Institutional Research > >>> > >>> Fordham University > >>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>> > >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>> > >> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 12 21:47:22 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 21:47:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: <5966ed56.0a59650a.7d900.182a@mx.google.com> References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> <5966ed56.0a59650a.7d900.182a@mx.google.com> Message-ID: A free bottle of Irish Whiskey to the first person who can identify,without googling, the director of the film of Finian's Rainbow. mike On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 8:47 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Imagine that ;- ) > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: mike cole > Sent: July 12, 2017 8:22 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you won > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what you > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology > (!) > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will be > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful daughter, > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun Og > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. Siding > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > blustering, > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will become > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > mike > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one can > > feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like (there > is > > some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, says > > ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > > > > Ed Wall > > > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > Harberg > > > and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > > book > > > appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen > > to > > > Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > > > :-) > > > > > > Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > > > resource. > > > > > > Thanks Peter and Daniel. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > > scoping > > >> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions > for > > you > > >> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years > > ago > > >> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > > >> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > which > > I > > >> would also like to take a closer look at. > > >> > > >> Kind regards and many thanks, > > >> > > >> Daniel > > >> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > > >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > > >> > > >>> Hi, Daniel. > > >>> > > >>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > > >> *inner > > >>> ear*, > > >>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > without > > >>> words, > > >>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > > internal > > >>> voices > > >>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > > >>> hearing > > >>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it > is > > >> the > > >>> surface > > >>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > *person*, > > >> who > > >>> has > > >>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces > of > > >> this > > >>> inner > > >>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > > >>> > > >>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > > voices-- > > >>> yes, > > >>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > > >>> experience > > >>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > > experiences > > >>> that > > >>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > > >>> > > >>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > about > > >>> those > > >>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > > ability, > > >>> but I have > > >>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: > > my > > >>> inner > > >>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > > >>> > > >>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd > like > > >> to > > >>> take this > > >>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of > > Ira > > >>> Gershwin > > >>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > > >>> Rainbow, > > >>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > > gave > > >> a > > >>> lot > > >>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > > >>> > > >>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > > >>> Words make you think a thought; > > >>> Songs make you feel a thought. > > >>> > > >>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > > >>> conversation > > >>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > > unity > > >>> of thinking > > >>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > > >> have > > >>> trouble > > >>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > > >> experiencing > > >>> emotions > > >>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > > about > > >>> feelings > > >>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > > >> cultural > > >>> experience > > >>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > > >>> > > >>> My two cents. > > >>> > > >>> Peter > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > > >>>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > > >> speech, > > >>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > > >>> musician, > > >>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced > > at > > >>> in > > >>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > > >>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > > >>>> > > >>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > > >> more > > >>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > > >>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > > >>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > > >> extreme > > >>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who > lost > > >>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > practice > > >>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate > what > > >>> they > > >>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > > >> Need > > >>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > > >> ability? > > >>>> > > >>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > > >> events > > >>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > quickened > > >>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > > feelings > > >>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > > >>> alike, > > >>>> and different? > > >>>> > > >>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart > and > > >> da > > >>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > > >> internal > > >>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? > How > > >>> does > > >>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate > to > > a > > >>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > > >>>> > > >>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested > > to > > >>> be > > >>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening > but > > >>> not > > >>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > > >> reflection, > > >>> or > > >>>> other factors alter it? > > >>>> > > >>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > > offer > > >>> (or > > >>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > > >>> ability, > > >>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > > >>> recommend > > >>>> readings. > > >>>> > > >>>> Daniel > > >>>> > > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > > >> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Thank you Peter. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Ulvi > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > > >>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Ulvi, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > > >>> use > > >>>> in > > >>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > > >> richness > > >>>> of > > >>>>>> ?the ? > > >>>>>> emotion > > >>>>>> ? > > >>>>>> and thought > > >>>>>> ?? > > >>>>>> ?of > > >>>>>> characters > > >>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > > >>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > > >>> works > > >>>>> with > > >>>>>> Vygotsky's > > >>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > specializes > > >>> in > > >>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > > >>>> voices > > >>>>> - > > >>>>>> both normal > > >>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > > >>>>>> theatrical characters, > > >>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > > >> the > > >>>>>> creative > > >>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > > >> voices > > >>>>> play > > >>>>>> in their > > >>>>>> work and thought. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > > >>>>>> Fernyhough > > >>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > > >> phenomenon > > >>>>> that > > >>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > > >> in > > >>>> the > > >>>>>> development > > >>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > > >> study > > >>>>>> private speech > > >>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > > >>> and > > >>>>>> sociolinguistic > > >>>>>> analysis. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > > >>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > > >>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > > >>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > > >>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > > >>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > > >>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Peter > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > > >> to > > >>>>> convey > > >>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > > >>>>>> Especially > > >>>>>>> inner thought. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > > >>> Legend > > >>>> of > > >>>>>>> love. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > > >> characters > > >>>> in > > >>>>> a > > >>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> My questions are: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > > >> work? > > >>>> i.e. > > >>>>>> in > > >>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > > >>> terms > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > > >>>> possess. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Ulvi > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> -- > > >>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > >>>>>> Director, > > >>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Fordham University > > >>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > > >>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > >>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > >>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -- > > >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > >>> Director, > > >>> Office of Institutional Research > > >>> > > >>> Fordham University > > >>> Thebaud Hall-202 > > >>> Bronx, NY 10458 > > >>> > > >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > >>> > > >> > > > > > > > > From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Thu Jul 13 06:15:42 2017 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 09:15:42 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> <5966ed56.0a59650a.7d900.182a@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Darn! Because of my failing recall memory, I'm not gonna be the proud owner of a free bottle of Irish whiskey! But I can tell you all a little more about Yip Harberg's work: For one thing, underlying Finnian's Rainbow - like most of Harberg's creations - is a serious progressive political message, in this case one about immigration to America (and also racism in America). The quote from Harberg that I provided in my earlier email was one that I tripped over on the way to recovering this, more humorous,one: *My whole family has had trouble with immigrants ever since we first came to this country.* The Wizard of Oz was a political story about the loss of small farms in America (represented by the Scarecrow), the rise of manufacturing (represented by the Tin Man), and the timidity of the US government (represented by the Cowardly Lion) in regulating the growing banking industry which was pulling all the strings (represented by the Wizard behind the curtain). Harberg makes particular mention of the difficulty he had with the song Somewhere Over the Rainbow: For weeks he couldn't figure out a way to get an emotional lift out of the opening line - until he introduced an octave shift in the first word (Some - where). The meaning of the word was there, but it needed an emotional infusion from the music to make it do its job of *feeling a thought*. One final quote: *Music gives wings to words.* Glad to know there are Yip Harberg fans out there! Peter On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 12:47 AM, mike cole wrote: > A free bottle of Irish Whiskey to the first person who can identify,without > googling, the director of the film of Finian's Rainbow. > > mike > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 8:47 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > > Imagine that ;- ) > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: mike cole > > Sent: July 12, 2017 8:22 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces > > > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you > won > > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what > you > > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology > > (!) > > > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will > be > > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful > daughter, > > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun > Og > > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. > Siding > > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > > blustering, > > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number > > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will > become > > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > > > Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one > can > > > feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like > (there > > is > > > some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, > says > > > ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > > > > > > Ed Wall > > > > > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > > Harberg > > > > and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > > > book > > > > appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to > listen > > > to > > > > Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > > > > :-) > > > > > > > > Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a > great > > > > resource. > > > > > > > > Thanks Peter and Daniel. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > > > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > > > scoping > > > >> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions > > for > > > you > > > >> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few > years > > > ago > > > >> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make > decisions - > > > >> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > > which > > > I > > > >> would also like to take a closer look at. > > > >> > > > >> Kind regards and many thanks, > > > >> > > > >> Daniel > > > >> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > > > >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Hi, Daniel. > > > >>> > > > >>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a > musician's > > > >> *inner > > > >>> ear*, > > > >>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > > without > > > >>> words, > > > >>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > > > internal > > > >>> voices > > > >>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests > that > > > >>> hearing > > > >>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: > it > > is > > > >> the > > > >>> surface > > > >>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > > *person*, > > > >> who > > > >>> has > > > >>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces > > of > > > >> this > > > >>> inner > > > >>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > > > >>> > > > >>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > > > voices-- > > > >>> yes, > > > >>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > > > >>> experience > > > >>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > > > experiences > > > >>> that > > > >>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he > presents. > > > >>> > > > >>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > > about > > > >>> those > > > >>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > > > ability, > > > >>> but I have > > > >>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar > strings: > > > my > > > >>> inner > > > >>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > > > >>> > > > >>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd > > like > > > >> to > > > >>> take this > > > >>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate > of > > > Ira > > > >>> Gershwin > > > >>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > > > >>> Rainbow, > > > >>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > > > gave > > > >> a > > > >>> lot > > > >>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > > > >>> > > > >>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > > > >>> Words make you think a thought; > > > >>> Songs make you feel a thought. > > > >>> > > > >>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > > > >>> conversation > > > >>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > > > unity > > > >>> of thinking > > > >>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. > Personally, I > > > >> have > > > >>> trouble > > > >>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > > > >> experiencing > > > >>> emotions > > > >>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > > > about > > > >>> feelings > > > >>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > > > >> cultural > > > >>> experience > > > >>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > > > >>> > > > >>> My two cents. > > > >>> > > > >>> Peter > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > > > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > > > >>>> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > > > >> speech, > > > >>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > > > >>> musician, > > > >>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently > glanced > > > at > > > >>> in > > > >>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in > the > > > >>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might > be > > > >> more > > > >>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively > "hear" > > > >>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups > of) > > > >>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > > > >> extreme > > > >>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who > > lost > > > >>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > > practice > > > >>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate > > what > > > >>> they > > > >>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does > this. > > > >> Need > > > >>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > > > >> ability? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > > > >> events > > > >>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > > quickened > > > >>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > > > feelings > > > >>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are > these > > > >>> alike, > > > >>>> and different? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart > > and > > > >> da > > > >>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > > > >> internal > > > >>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? > > How > > > >>> does > > > >>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate > > to > > > a > > > >>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now > suggested > > > to > > > >>> be > > > >>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening > > but > > > >>> not > > > >>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > > > >> reflection, > > > >>> or > > > >>>> other factors alter it? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > > > offer > > > >>> (or > > > >>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > > > >>> ability, > > > >>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > > > >>> recommend > > > >>>> readings. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Daniel > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Thank you Peter. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Ulvi > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > > > >>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Ulvi, > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and > its > > > >>> use > > > >>>> in > > > >>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > > > >> richness > > > >>>> of > > > >>>>>> ?the ? > > > >>>>>> emotion > > > >>>>>> ? > > > >>>>>> and thought > > > >>>>>> ?? > > > >>>>>> ?of > > > >>>>>> characters > > > >>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > > > >>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > > > >>> works > > > >>>>> with > > > >>>>>> Vygotsky's > > > >>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > > specializes > > > >>> in > > > >>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who > hear > > > >>>> voices > > > >>>>> - > > > >>>>>> both normal > > > >>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue > of > > > >>>>>> theatrical characters, > > > >>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > > > >> the > > > >>>>>> creative > > > >>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > > > >> voices > > > >>>>> play > > > >>>>>> in their > > > >>>>>> work and thought. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in > which > > > >>>>>> Fernyhough > > > >>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > > > >> phenomenon > > > >>>>> that > > > >>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest > stage > > > >> in > > > >>>> the > > > >>>>>> development > > > >>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > > > >> study > > > >>>>>> private speech > > > >>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to > linguistic > > > >>> and > > > >>>>>> sociolinguistic > > > >>>>>> analysis. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > > > >>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > > > >>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > > > >>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > > > >>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > > > >>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > > > >>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Peter > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > > > >> to > > > >>>>> convey > > > >>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > > > >>>>>> Especially > > > >>>>>>> inner thought. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > > > >>> Legend > > > >>>> of > > > >>>>>>> love. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > > > >> characters > > > >>>> in > > > >>>>> a > > > >>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> My questions are: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > > > >> work? > > > >>>> i.e. > > > >>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > > > >>> terms > > > >>>>> of > > > >>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > > > >>>> possess. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Ulvi > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > > >>>>>> Director, > > > >>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Fordham University > > > >>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > > > >>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > > >>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > > >>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> -- > > > >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > > >>> Director, > > > >>> Office of Institutional Research > > > >>> > > > >>> Fordham University > > > >>> Thebaud Hall-202 > > > >>> Bronx, NY 10458 > > > >>> > > > >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > > >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > > >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > >>> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jul 13 06:30:18 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 13:30:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> <5966ed56.0a59650a.7d900.182a@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Good morning, Peter The immediate winner was Kris Gutierrez! Kris does not drink Irish whiskey, so the prize will be held over until the next appropriate occasion. :-) The director? Francis Ford Coppola. !! Mike On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 6:19 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > Darn! Because of my failing recall memory, I'm not gonna be the proud > owner of a free bottle of Irish whiskey! > > But I can tell you all a little more about Yip Harberg's work: For one > thing, underlying Finnian's Rainbow - like most of Harberg's creations - is > a serious progressive political message, in this case one about immigration > to America (and also racism in America). The quote from Harberg that I > provided in my earlier email was one that I tripped over on the way to > recovering this, more humorous,one: *My whole family has had trouble with > immigrants ever since we first came to this country.* > > The Wizard of Oz was a political story about the loss of small farms in > America (represented by the Scarecrow), the rise of manufacturing > (represented by the Tin Man), and the timidity of the US government > (represented by the Cowardly Lion) in regulating the growing banking > industry which was pulling all the strings (represented by the Wizard > behind the curtain). Harberg makes particular mention of the difficulty he > had with the song Somewhere Over the Rainbow: For weeks he couldn't figure > out a way to get an emotional lift out of the opening line - until he > introduced an octave shift in the first word (Some - where). The meaning of > the word was there, but it needed an emotional infusion from the music to > make it do its job of *feeling a thought*. > > One final quote: *Music gives wings to words.* > > Glad to know there are Yip Harberg fans out there! > > Peter > > On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 12:47 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > A free bottle of Irish Whiskey to the first person who can > identify,without > > googling, the director of the film of Finian's Rainbow. > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 8:47 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > Imagine that ;- ) > > > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > > > From: mike cole > > > Sent: July 12, 2017 8:22 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces > > > > > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you > > won > > > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what > > you > > > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a > pathology > > > (!) > > > > > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > > > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > > > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will > > be > > > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > > > > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful > > daughter, > > > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun > > Og > > > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. > > Siding > > > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > > > blustering, > > > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a > number > > > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will > > become > > > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > > > > > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > > > > > Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one > > can > > > > feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like > > (there > > > is > > > > some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, > > says > > > > ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > > > > > > > > Ed Wall > > > > > > > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > > > Harberg > > > > > and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! > The > > > > book > > > > > appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to > > listen > > > > to > > > > > Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > > > > > :-) > > > > > > > > > > Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a > > great > > > > > resource. > > > > > > > > > > Thanks Peter and Daniel. > > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > > > > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > > > > scoping > > > > >> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or > questions > > > for > > > > you > > > > >> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few > > years > > > > ago > > > > >> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make > > decisions - > > > > >> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > > > which > > > > I > > > > >> would also like to take a closer look at. > > > > >> > > > > >> Kind regards and many thanks, > > > > >> > > > > >> Daniel > > > > >> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > > > > >> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> Hi, Daniel. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a > > musician's > > > > >> *inner > > > > >>> ear*, > > > > >>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > > > without > > > > >>> words, > > > > >>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > > > > internal > > > > >>> voices > > > > >>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests > > that > > > > >>> hearing > > > > >>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: > > it > > > is > > > > >> the > > > > >>> surface > > > > >>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > > > *person*, > > > > >> who > > > > >>> has > > > > >>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only > pieces > > > of > > > > >> this > > > > >>> inner > > > > >>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > > > > voices-- > > > > >>> yes, > > > > >>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > > > > >>> experience > > > > >>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > > > > experiences > > > > >>> that > > > > >>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he > > presents. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > > > about > > > > >>> those > > > > >>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > > > > ability, > > > > >>> but I have > > > > >>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar > > strings: > > > > my > > > > >>> inner > > > > >>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, > I'd > > > like > > > > >> to > > > > >>> take this > > > > >>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate > > of > > > > Ira > > > > >>> Gershwin > > > > >>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, > Finnian's > > > > >>> Rainbow, > > > > >>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? > Harberg > > > > gave > > > > >> a > > > > >>> lot > > > > >>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > > > > >>> Words make you think a thought; > > > > >>> Songs make you feel a thought. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > > > > >>> conversation > > > > >>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of > the > > > > unity > > > > >>> of thinking > > > > >>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. > > Personally, I > > > > >> have > > > > >>> trouble > > > > >>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > > > > >> experiencing > > > > >>> emotions > > > > >>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable > thinking > > > > about > > > > >>> feelings > > > > >>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > > > > >> cultural > > > > >>> experience > > > > >>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> My two cents. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Peter > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > > > > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > > > > >> speech, > > > > >>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm > a > > > > >>> musician, > > > > >>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently > > glanced > > > > at > > > > >>> in > > > > >>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in > > the > > > > >>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might > > be > > > > >> more > > > > >>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively > > "hear" > > > > >>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups > > of) > > > > >>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > > > > >> extreme > > > > >>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? > who > > > lost > > > > >>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > > > practice > > > > >>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, > audiate > > > what > > > > >>> they > > > > >>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does > > this. > > > > >> Need > > > > >>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > > > > >> ability? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others > with > > > > >> events > > > > >>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > > > quickened > > > > >>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > > > > feelings > > > > >>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are > > these > > > > >>> alike, > > > > >>>> and different? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized > (Mozart > > > and > > > > >> da > > > > >>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > > > > >> internal > > > > >>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and > different? > > > How > > > > >>> does > > > > >>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) > relate > > > to > > > > a > > > > >>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now > > suggested > > > > to > > > > >>> be > > > > >>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are > happening > > > but > > > > >>> not > > > > >>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > > > > >> reflection, > > > > >>> or > > > > >>>> other factors alter it? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and > neurobiology > > > > offer > > > > >>> (or > > > > >>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical > experience, > > > > >>> ability, > > > > >>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, > or > > > > >>> recommend > > > > >>>> readings. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Daniel > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il < > ulvi.icil@gmail.com> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> Thank you Peter. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Ulvi > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > > > > >>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Ulvi, > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and > > its > > > > >>> use > > > > >>>> in > > > > >>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > > > > >> richness > > > > >>>> of > > > > >>>>>> ?the ? > > > > >>>>>> emotion > > > > >>>>>> ? > > > > >>>>>> and thought > > > > >>>>>> ?? > > > > >>>>>> ?of > > > > >>>>>> characters > > > > >>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > > > > >>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague > who > > > > >>> works > > > > >>>>> with > > > > >>>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > >>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > > > specializes > > > > >>> in > > > > >>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who > > hear > > > > >>>> voices > > > > >>>>> - > > > > >>>>>> both normal > > > > >>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue > > of > > > > >>>>>> theatrical characters, > > > > >>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - > into > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>> creative > > > > >>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > > > > >> voices > > > > >>>>> play > > > > >>>>>> in their > > > > >>>>>> work and thought. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in > > which > > > > >>>>>> Fernyhough > > > > >>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > > > > >> phenomenon > > > > >>>>> that > > > > >>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest > > stage > > > > >> in > > > > >>>> the > > > > >>>>>> development > > > > >>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose > to > > > > >> study > > > > >>>>>> private speech > > > > >>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to > > linguistic > > > > >>> and > > > > >>>>>> sociolinguistic > > > > >>>>>> analysis. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > > > > >>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > > > > >>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > > > > >>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > > > > >>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > > > > >>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > > > > >>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Peter > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il < > ulvi.icil@gmail.com > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a > work > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>> convey > > > > >>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his > characters. > > > > >>>>>> Especially > > > > >>>>>>> inner thought. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > > > > >>> Legend > > > > >>>> of > > > > >>>>>>> love. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > > > > >> characters > > > > >>>> in > > > > >>>>> a > > > > >>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> My questions are: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > > > > >> work? > > > > >>>> i.e. > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work > in > > > > >>> terms > > > > >>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human > beings > > > > >>>> possess. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Ulvi > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > > > >>>>>> Director, > > > > >>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Fordham University > > > > >>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > > > > >>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > > > >>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > > > >>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> -- > > > > >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > > > >>> Director, > > > > >>> Office of Institutional Research > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Fordham University > > > > >>> Thebaud Hall-202 > > > > >>> Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > > > >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > > > >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Jul 13 06:32:16 2017 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 09:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A structurationists theory of human action Message-ID: Sounds good... Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: "Showunmi, Victoria" Date: 7/12/17 9:54 PM (GMT-05:00) To: carol tomlin , "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Cc: info@caroltomlin.com, v.showunmi@ioe.ac.uk, cecile.wright@nottingham.ac.uk, "eXtended Mind Culture, Activity" , "National Council for Black Studies (NCBS)" Subject: Re: A structurationists theory of human action great stuff Paul I look forward to working with you soon on our book From: carol tomlin Sent: 07 July 2017 09:30:16 To: Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Cc: info@caroltomlin.com; v.showunmi@ioe.ac.uk; cecile.wright@nottingham.ac.uk; eXtended Mind Culture, Activity; National Council for Black Studies (NCBS) Subject: Re: A structurationists theory of human action ? Congrats Paul Sent from my iPad On 7 Jul 2017, at 10:14, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: Fyi Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone From helenaworthen@gmail.com Thu Jul 13 07:45:04 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 10:45:04 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> <5966ed56.0a59650a.7d900.182a@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <44C5A01D-6640-4CB9-AE34-38DD25B6D2FD@gmail.com> Yip Harburg was the topic of a Fresh Air interview (Terry Gross, NPR) back in 1999: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1110695 You can still hear it! H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 13, 2017, at 9:30 AM, mike cole wrote: > Good morning, Peter > > The immediate winner was Kris Gutierrez! > Kris does not drink Irish whiskey, so the prize will be held over until the > next appropriate occasion. :-) > > The director? Francis Ford Coppola. > !! > > Mike > > On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 6:19 AM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >> Darn! Because of my failing recall memory, I'm not gonna be the proud >> owner of a free bottle of Irish whiskey! >> >> But I can tell you all a little more about Yip Harberg's work: For one >> thing, underlying Finnian's Rainbow - like most of Harberg's creations - is >> a serious progressive political message, in this case one about immigration >> to America (and also racism in America). The quote from Harberg that I >> provided in my earlier email was one that I tripped over on the way to >> recovering this, more humorous,one: *My whole family has had trouble with >> immigrants ever since we first came to this country.* >> >> The Wizard of Oz was a political story about the loss of small farms in >> America (represented by the Scarecrow), the rise of manufacturing >> (represented by the Tin Man), and the timidity of the US government >> (represented by the Cowardly Lion) in regulating the growing banking >> industry which was pulling all the strings (represented by the Wizard >> behind the curtain). Harberg makes particular mention of the difficulty he >> had with the song Somewhere Over the Rainbow: For weeks he couldn't figure >> out a way to get an emotional lift out of the opening line - until he >> introduced an octave shift in the first word (Some - where). The meaning of >> the word was there, but it needed an emotional infusion from the music to >> make it do its job of *feeling a thought*. >> >> One final quote: *Music gives wings to words.* >> >> Glad to know there are Yip Harberg fans out there! >> >> Peter >> >> On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 12:47 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> A free bottle of Irish Whiskey to the first person who can >> identify,without >>> googling, the director of the film of Finian's Rainbow. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 8:47 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>>> Imagine that ;- ) >>>> >>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>>> >>>> From: mike cole >>>> Sent: July 12, 2017 8:22 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces >>>> >>>> Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you >>> won >>>> the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what >>> you >>>> like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a >> pathology >>>> (!) >>>> >>>> I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely >>>> accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in >>>> wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will >>> be >>>> able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: >>>> >>>> Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful >>> daughter, >>>> Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun >>> Og >>>> (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. >>> Siding >>>> with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a >>>> blustering, >>>> bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a >> number >>>> of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will >>> become >>>> mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. >>>> >>>> >>>> Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) >>>> >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: >>>> >>>>> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one >>> can >>>>> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like >>> (there >>>> is >>>>> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, >>> says >>>>> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. >>>>> >>>>> Ed Wall >>>>> >>>>>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip >>>> Harberg >>>>>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! >> The >>>>> book >>>>>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to >>> listen >>>>> to >>>>>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) >>>>>> :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a >>> great >>>>>> resource. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm >>>>> scoping >>>>>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or >> questions >>>> for >>>>> you >>>>>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few >>> years >>>>> ago >>>>>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make >>> decisions - >>>>>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, >>>> which >>>>> I >>>>>>> would also like to take a closer look at. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards and many thanks, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Daniel >>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi, Daniel. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a >>> musician's >>>>>>> *inner >>>>>>>> ear*, >>>>>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound >>>> without >>>>>>>> words, >>>>>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and >>>>> internal >>>>>>>> voices >>>>>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests >>> that >>>>>>>> hearing >>>>>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: >>> it >>>> is >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> surface >>>>>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a >>>> *person*, >>>>>>> who >>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only >> pieces >>>> of >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> inner >>>>>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner >>>>> voices-- >>>>>>>> yes, >>>>>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the >>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical >>>>> experiences >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he >>> presents. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered >>>> about >>>>>>>> those >>>>>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that >>>>> ability, >>>>>>>> but I have >>>>>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar >>> strings: >>>>> my >>>>>>>> inner >>>>>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, >> I'd >>>> like >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> take this >>>>>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate >>> of >>>>> Ira >>>>>>>> Gershwin >>>>>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, >> Finnian's >>>>>>>> Rainbow, >>>>>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? >> Harberg >>>>> gave >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> lot >>>>>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; >>>>>>>> Words make you think a thought; >>>>>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier >>>>>>>> conversation >>>>>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of >> the >>>>> unity >>>>>>>> of thinking >>>>>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. >>> Personally, I >>>>>>> have >>>>>>>> trouble >>>>>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty >>>>>>> experiencing >>>>>>>> emotions >>>>>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable >> thinking >>>>> about >>>>>>>> feelings >>>>>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a >>>>>>> cultural >>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My two cents. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>>>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal >>>>>>> speech, >>>>>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm >> a >>>>>>>> musician, >>>>>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently >>> glanced >>>>> at >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in >>> the >>>>>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might >>> be >>>>>>> more >>>>>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively >>> "hear" >>>>>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups >>> of) >>>>>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most >>>>>>> extreme >>>>>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? >> who >>>> lost >>>>>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, >>>> practice >>>>>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, >> audiate >>>> what >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does >>> this. >>>>>>> Need >>>>>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this >>>>>>> ability? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others >> with >>>>>>> events >>>>>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the >>>> quickened >>>>>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of >>>>> feelings >>>>>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are >>> these >>>>>>>> alike, >>>>>>>>> and different? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized >> (Mozart >>>> and >>>>>>> da >>>>>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others >>>>>>> internal >>>>>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and >> different? >>>> How >>>>>>>> does >>>>>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) >> relate >>>> to >>>>> a >>>>>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now >>> suggested >>>>> to >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are >> happening >>>> but >>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, >>>>>>> reflection, >>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>> other factors alter it? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and >> neurobiology >>>>> offer >>>>>>>> (or >>>>>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical >> experience, >>>>>>>> ability, >>>>>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, >> or >>>>>>>> recommend >>>>>>>>> readings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Daniel >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il < >> ulvi.icil@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thank you Peter. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < >>>>>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and >>> its >>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal >>>>>>> richness >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> ?the ? >>>>>>>>>>> emotion >>>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>>> and thought >>>>>>>>>>> ?? >>>>>>>>>>> ?of >>>>>>>>>>> characters >>>>>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough >>>>>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague >> who >>>>>>>> works >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who >>>> specializes >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who >>> hear >>>>>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>> both normal >>>>>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue >>> of >>>>>>>>>>> theatrical characters, >>>>>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - >> into >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> creative >>>>>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner >>>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>>> play >>>>>>>>>>> in their >>>>>>>>>>> work and thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in >>> which >>>>>>>>>>> Fernyhough >>>>>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a >>>>>>> phenomenon >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest >>> stage >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose >> to >>>>>>> study >>>>>>>>>>> private speech >>>>>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to >>> linguistic >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> sociolinguistic >>>>>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. >>>>>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= >>>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= >>>>>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= >>>>>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= >>>>>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= >>>>>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il < >> ulvi.icil@gmail.com >>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a >> work >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> convey >>>>>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his >> characters. >>>>>>>>>>> Especially >>>>>>>>>>>> inner thought. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is >>>>>>>> Legend >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> love. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, >>>>>>> characters >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> My questions are: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater >>>>>>> work? >>>>>>>>> i.e. >>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work >> in >>>>>>>> terms >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human >> beings >>>>>>>>> possess. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 13 11:28:22 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 11:28:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle Message-ID: <5967bbd2.475e630a.cecc9.20ae@mx.google.com> I CAME ACROSS THIS PAGE Exploring a cultural (mode) of practice Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88 Sent from my Windows 10 phone From ewall@umich.edu Thu Jul 13 11:57:53 2017 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 13:57:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> Message-ID: Mike What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not that of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can imagine that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). It may quite well be a lack in me and others. Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? Ed > On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you won > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what you > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology (!) > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will be > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful daughter, > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun Og > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. Siding > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a blustering, > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will become > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > mike > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > >> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one can >> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like (there is >> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, says >> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. >> >> Ed Wall >> >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip Harberg >>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The >> book >>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen >> to >>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) >>> :-) >>> >>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great >>> resource. >>> >>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm >> scoping >>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions for >> you >>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years >> ago >>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - >>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, which >> I >>>> would also like to take a closer look at. >>>> >>>> Kind regards and many thanks, >>>> >>>> Daniel >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi, Daniel. >>>>> >>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's >>>> *inner >>>>> ear*, >>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound without >>>>> words, >>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and >> internal >>>>> voices >>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that >>>>> hearing >>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it is >>>> the >>>>> surface >>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a *person*, >>>> who >>>>> has >>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces of >>>> this >>>>> inner >>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. >>>>> >>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner >> voices-- >>>>> yes, >>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the >>>>> experience >>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical >> experiences >>>>> that >>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. >>>>> >>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered about >>>>> those >>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that >> ability, >>>>> but I have >>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: >> my >>>>> inner >>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. >>>>> >>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd like >>>> to >>>>> take this >>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of >> Ira >>>>> Gershwin >>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's >>>>> Rainbow, >>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg >> gave >>>> a >>>>> lot >>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: >>>>> >>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; >>>>> Words make you think a thought; >>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. >>>>> >>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier >>>>> conversation >>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the >> unity >>>>> of thinking >>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I >>>> have >>>>> trouble >>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty >>>> experiencing >>>>> emotions >>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking >> about >>>>> feelings >>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a >>>> cultural >>>>> experience >>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. >>>>> >>>>> My two cents. >>>>> >>>>> Peter >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal >>>> speech, >>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a >>>>> musician, >>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced >> at >>>>> in >>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the >>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: >>>>>> >>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be >>>> more >>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" >>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) >>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most >>>> extreme >>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who lost >>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, practice >>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate what >>>>> they >>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. >>>> Need >>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this >>>> ability? >>>>>> >>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with >>>> events >>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the quickened >>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of >> feelings >>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these >>>>> alike, >>>>>> and different? >>>>>> >>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart and >>>> da >>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others >>>> internal >>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? How >>>>> does >>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate to >> a >>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? >>>>>> >>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested >> to >>>>> be >>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening but >>>>> not >>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, >>>> reflection, >>>>> or >>>>>> other factors alter it? >>>>>> >>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology >> offer >>>>> (or >>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, >>>>> ability, >>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or >>>>> recommend >>>>>> readings. >>>>>> >>>>>> Daniel >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you Peter. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < >>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its >>>>> use >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal >>>> richness >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> ?the ? >>>>>>>> emotion >>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>> and thought >>>>>>>> ?? >>>>>>>> ?of >>>>>>>> characters >>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough >>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who >>>>> works >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who specializes >>>>> in >>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear >>>>>> voices >>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> both normal >>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of >>>>>>>> theatrical characters, >>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into >>>> the >>>>>>>> creative >>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner >>>> voices >>>>>>> play >>>>>>>> in their >>>>>>>> work and thought. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which >>>>>>>> Fernyhough >>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a >>>> phenomenon >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage >>>> in >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> development >>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to >>>> study >>>>>>>> private speech >>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic >>>>> and >>>>>>>> sociolinguistic >>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. >>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= >>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= >>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= >>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= >>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work >>>> to >>>>>>> convey >>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. >>>>>>>> Especially >>>>>>>>> inner thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is >>>>> Legend >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> love. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, >>>> characters >>>>>> in >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My questions are: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater >>>> work? >>>>>> i.e. >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in >>>>> terms >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings >>>>>> possess. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>> Director, >>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>> >>>>> Fordham University >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>> >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>> >>>> >> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jul 13 12:04:06 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 12:04:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> Message-ID: Ed- I think I am saying that you cannot imagine coming home after a long day of work or winning the lottery without simultaneously imagining how you feel about it. I probably misunderstood you. Slippery stuff, imagining. mike On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:57 AM, Edward Wall wrote: > Mike > > What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not that > of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, > imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a > feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel > those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the > way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can imagine > that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even > though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). It > may quite well be a lack in me and others. > Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I > misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find > yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your > body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? > > Ed > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you > won > > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what > you > > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology > (!) > > > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will > be > > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful > daughter, > > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun > Og > > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. > Siding > > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > blustering, > > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number > > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will > become > > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > >> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one > can > >> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like > (there is > >> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, > says > >> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> > >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > Harberg > >>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > >> book > >>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen > >> to > >>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > >>> :-) > >>> > >>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > >>> resource. > >>> > >>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > >> scoping > >>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions > for > >> you > >>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years > >> ago > >>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > >>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > which > >> I > >>>> would also like to take a closer look at. > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards and many thanks, > >>>> > >>>> Daniel > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > >>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi, Daniel. > >>>>> > >>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > >>>> *inner > >>>>> ear*, > >>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > without > >>>>> words, > >>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > >> internal > >>>>> voices > >>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > >>>>> hearing > >>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it > is > >>>> the > >>>>> surface > >>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > *person*, > >>>> who > >>>>> has > >>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces > of > >>>> this > >>>>> inner > >>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > >>>>> > >>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > >> voices-- > >>>>> yes, > >>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > >>>>> experience > >>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > >> experiences > >>>>> that > >>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > >>>>> > >>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > about > >>>>> those > >>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > >> ability, > >>>>> but I have > >>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: > >> my > >>>>> inner > >>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > >>>>> > >>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd > like > >>>> to > >>>>> take this > >>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of > >> Ira > >>>>> Gershwin > >>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > >>>>> Rainbow, > >>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > >> gave > >>>> a > >>>>> lot > >>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > >>>>> > >>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > >>>>> Words make you think a thought; > >>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. > >>>>> > >>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > >>>>> conversation > >>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > >> unity > >>>>> of thinking > >>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > >>>> have > >>>>> trouble > >>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > >>>> experiencing > >>>>> emotions > >>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > >> about > >>>>> feelings > >>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > >>>> cultural > >>>>> experience > >>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > >>>>> > >>>>> My two cents. > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > >>>> speech, > >>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > >>>>> musician, > >>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced > >> at > >>>>> in > >>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > >>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > >>>> more > >>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > >>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > >>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > >>>> extreme > >>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who > lost > >>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > practice > >>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate > what > >>>>> they > >>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > >>>> Need > >>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > >>>> ability? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > >>>> events > >>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > quickened > >>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > >> feelings > >>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > >>>>> alike, > >>>>>> and different? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart > and > >>>> da > >>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > >>>> internal > >>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? > How > >>>>> does > >>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate > to > >> a > >>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested > >> to > >>>>> be > >>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening > but > >>>>> not > >>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > >>>> reflection, > >>>>> or > >>>>>> other factors alter it? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > >> offer > >>>>> (or > >>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > >>>>> ability, > >>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > >>>>> recommend > >>>>>> readings. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Daniel > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thank you Peter. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > >>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > >>>>> use > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > >>>> richness > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> ?the ? > >>>>>>>> emotion > >>>>>>>> ? > >>>>>>>> and thought > >>>>>>>> ?? > >>>>>>>> ?of > >>>>>>>> characters > >>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > >>>>> works > >>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > specializes > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > >>>>>> voices > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>> both normal > >>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > >>>>>>>> theatrical characters, > >>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > >>>> the > >>>>>>>> creative > >>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > >>>> voices > >>>>>>> play > >>>>>>>> in their > >>>>>>>> work and thought. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > >>>>>>>> Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > >>>> phenomenon > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > >>>> in > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> development > >>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > >>>> study > >>>>>>>> private speech > >>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>> sociolinguistic > >>>>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > >>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > >>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > >>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > >>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > >>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Peter > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > >>>> to > >>>>>>> convey > >>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > >>>>>>>> Especially > >>>>>>>>> inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > >>>>> Legend > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > >>>> characters > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My questions are: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > >>>> work? > >>>>>> i.e. > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > >>>>> terms > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > >>>>>> possess. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>> Director, > >>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>> Director, > >>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>> > >>>>> Fordham University > >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>> > >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Jul 13 12:07:19 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 13:07:19 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> Message-ID: And I think I posted this a few months back, but here is a Democracy Now tribute to Yip Harburg that includes an interview with his son (apologies if someone else posted this and I missed it): https://www.democracynow.org/2008/12/25/a_tribute_to_yip_harburg_the Interesting to think about the the octave jump in "Some-where" and how it adds emotional resonance. Seems to resonate with what is being taken up in other threads here regarding perezhivanie, now? Two-part harmony? -greg On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 12:57 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > Mike > > What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not that > of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, > imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a > feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel > those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the > way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can imagine > that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even > though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). It > may quite well be a lack in me and others. > Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I > misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find > yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your > body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? > > Ed > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you > won > > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what > you > > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology > (!) > > > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will > be > > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful > daughter, > > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun > Og > > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. > Siding > > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > blustering, > > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number > > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will > become > > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > >> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one > can > >> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like > (there is > >> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, > says > >> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> > >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > Harberg > >>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > >> book > >>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen > >> to > >>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > >>> :-) > >>> > >>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > >>> resource. > >>> > >>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > >> scoping > >>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions > for > >> you > >>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years > >> ago > >>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > >>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > which > >> I > >>>> would also like to take a closer look at. > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards and many thanks, > >>>> > >>>> Daniel > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > >>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi, Daniel. > >>>>> > >>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > >>>> *inner > >>>>> ear*, > >>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > without > >>>>> words, > >>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > >> internal > >>>>> voices > >>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > >>>>> hearing > >>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it > is > >>>> the > >>>>> surface > >>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > *person*, > >>>> who > >>>>> has > >>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces > of > >>>> this > >>>>> inner > >>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > >>>>> > >>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > >> voices-- > >>>>> yes, > >>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > >>>>> experience > >>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > >> experiences > >>>>> that > >>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > >>>>> > >>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > about > >>>>> those > >>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > >> ability, > >>>>> but I have > >>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: > >> my > >>>>> inner > >>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > >>>>> > >>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd > like > >>>> to > >>>>> take this > >>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of > >> Ira > >>>>> Gershwin > >>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > >>>>> Rainbow, > >>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > >> gave > >>>> a > >>>>> lot > >>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > >>>>> > >>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > >>>>> Words make you think a thought; > >>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. > >>>>> > >>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > >>>>> conversation > >>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > >> unity > >>>>> of thinking > >>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > >>>> have > >>>>> trouble > >>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > >>>> experiencing > >>>>> emotions > >>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > >> about > >>>>> feelings > >>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > >>>> cultural > >>>>> experience > >>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > >>>>> > >>>>> My two cents. > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > >>>> speech, > >>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > >>>>> musician, > >>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced > >> at > >>>>> in > >>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > >>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > >>>> more > >>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > >>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > >>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > >>>> extreme > >>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who > lost > >>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > practice > >>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate > what > >>>>> they > >>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > >>>> Need > >>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > >>>> ability? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > >>>> events > >>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > quickened > >>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > >> feelings > >>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > >>>>> alike, > >>>>>> and different? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart > and > >>>> da > >>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > >>>> internal > >>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? > How > >>>>> does > >>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate > to > >> a > >>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested > >> to > >>>>> be > >>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening > but > >>>>> not > >>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > >>>> reflection, > >>>>> or > >>>>>> other factors alter it? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > >> offer > >>>>> (or > >>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > >>>>> ability, > >>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > >>>>> recommend > >>>>>> readings. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Daniel > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thank you Peter. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > >>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > >>>>> use > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > >>>> richness > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> ?the ? > >>>>>>>> emotion > >>>>>>>> ? > >>>>>>>> and thought > >>>>>>>> ?? > >>>>>>>> ?of > >>>>>>>> characters > >>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > >>>>> works > >>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > specializes > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > >>>>>> voices > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>> both normal > >>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > >>>>>>>> theatrical characters, > >>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > >>>> the > >>>>>>>> creative > >>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > >>>> voices > >>>>>>> play > >>>>>>>> in their > >>>>>>>> work and thought. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > >>>>>>>> Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > >>>> phenomenon > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > >>>> in > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> development > >>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > >>>> study > >>>>>>>> private speech > >>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>> sociolinguistic > >>>>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > >>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > >>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > >>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > >>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > >>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Peter > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > >>>> to > >>>>>>> convey > >>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > >>>>>>>> Especially > >>>>>>>>> inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > >>>>> Legend > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > >>>> characters > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My questions are: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > >>>> work? > >>>>>> i.e. > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > >>>>> terms > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > >>>>>> possess. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>> Director, > >>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>> Director, > >>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>> > >>>>> Fordham University > >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>> > >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ewall@umich.edu Thu Jul 13 13:25:25 2017 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 15:25:25 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> Message-ID: Mike That, as you, is my experience. The interesting question raised is that if I, for example, sang the lyrics to Summer Time Blues (I know this dates me), while doing the relevant imaging could I feel those blues. Oddly, it seems, the answer is almost yes. Definitely slippery. Ed > On Jul 13, 2017, at 2:04 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Ed- > I think I am saying that you cannot imagine coming home after a long day of > work or > winning the lottery without simultaneously imagining how you feel about it. > I probably misunderstood you. > > Slippery stuff, imagining. > > mike > > On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:57 AM, Edward Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not that >> of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, >> imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a >> feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel >> those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the >> way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can imagine >> that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even >> though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). It >> may quite well be a lack in me and others. >> Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I >> misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find >> yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your >> body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? >> >> Ed >> >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you >> won >>> the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what >> you >>> like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology >> (!) >>> >>> I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely >>> accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in >>> wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will >> be >>> able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: >>> >>> Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful >> daughter, >>> Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun >> Og >>> (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. >> Siding >>> with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a >> blustering, >>> bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number >>> of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will >> become >>> mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. >>> >>> >>> Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) >>> >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one >> can >>>> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like >> (there is >>>> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, >> says >>>> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. >>>> >>>> Ed Wall >>>> >>>>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip >> Harberg >>>>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The >>>> book >>>>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen >>>> to >>>>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great >>>>> resource. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm >>>> scoping >>>>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions >> for >>>> you >>>>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years >>>> ago >>>>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - >>>>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, >> which >>>> I >>>>>> would also like to take a closer look at. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards and many thanks, >>>>>> >>>>>> Daniel >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi, Daniel. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's >>>>>> *inner >>>>>>> ear*, >>>>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound >> without >>>>>>> words, >>>>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and >>>> internal >>>>>>> voices >>>>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that >>>>>>> hearing >>>>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it >> is >>>>>> the >>>>>>> surface >>>>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a >> *person*, >>>>>> who >>>>>>> has >>>>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces >> of >>>>>> this >>>>>>> inner >>>>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner >>>> voices-- >>>>>>> yes, >>>>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the >>>>>>> experience >>>>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical >>>> experiences >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered >> about >>>>>>> those >>>>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that >>>> ability, >>>>>>> but I have >>>>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: >>>> my >>>>>>> inner >>>>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd >> like >>>>>> to >>>>>>> take this >>>>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of >>>> Ira >>>>>>> Gershwin >>>>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's >>>>>>> Rainbow, >>>>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg >>>> gave >>>>>> a >>>>>>> lot >>>>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; >>>>>>> Words make you think a thought; >>>>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier >>>>>>> conversation >>>>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the >>>> unity >>>>>>> of thinking >>>>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I >>>>>> have >>>>>>> trouble >>>>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty >>>>>> experiencing >>>>>>> emotions >>>>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking >>>> about >>>>>>> feelings >>>>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a >>>>>> cultural >>>>>>> experience >>>>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My two cents. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal >>>>>> speech, >>>>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a >>>>>>> musician, >>>>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced >>>> at >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the >>>>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be >>>>>> more >>>>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" >>>>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) >>>>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most >>>>>> extreme >>>>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who >> lost >>>>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, >> practice >>>>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate >> what >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. >>>>>> Need >>>>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this >>>>>> ability? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with >>>>>> events >>>>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the >> quickened >>>>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of >>>> feelings >>>>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these >>>>>>> alike, >>>>>>>> and different? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart >> and >>>>>> da >>>>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others >>>>>> internal >>>>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? >> How >>>>>>> does >>>>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate >> to >>>> a >>>>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested >>>> to >>>>>>> be >>>>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening >> but >>>>>>> not >>>>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, >>>>>> reflection, >>>>>>> or >>>>>>>> other factors alter it? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology >>>> offer >>>>>>> (or >>>>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, >>>>>>> ability, >>>>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or >>>>>>> recommend >>>>>>>> readings. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Daniel >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you Peter. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < >>>>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal >>>>>> richness >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> ?the ? >>>>>>>>>> emotion >>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>> and thought >>>>>>>>>> ?? >>>>>>>>>> ?of >>>>>>>>>> characters >>>>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough >>>>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who >>>>>>> works >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who >> specializes >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear >>>>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>> both normal >>>>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of >>>>>>>>>> theatrical characters, >>>>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> creative >>>>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner >>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>> play >>>>>>>>>> in their >>>>>>>>>> work and thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which >>>>>>>>>> Fernyhough >>>>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a >>>>>> phenomenon >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to >>>>>> study >>>>>>>>>> private speech >>>>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> sociolinguistic >>>>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. >>>>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= >>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= >>>>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= >>>>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= >>>>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= >>>>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> convey >>>>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. >>>>>>>>>> Especially >>>>>>>>>>> inner thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is >>>>>>> Legend >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> love. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, >>>>>> characters >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My questions are: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater >>>>>> work? >>>>>>>> i.e. >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in >>>>>>> terms >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings >>>>>>>> possess. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 13 17:32:49 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 17:32:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> Message-ID: <5968113d.c999620a.1c491.0e7d@mx.google.com> Another slant on this theme of song and image. Is it possible for the singer to sing (summer time blues) - without the accompanying image? . Then, shifting mode, (from sound to image) the listener being moved (by the sound of the singing) does experience a FELT image - personally being moved within this emerging image generated through sound. If this is perhaps possible, then the notion of (degrees) of felt experience as variable modes occurs as feasible. Felt experience moving (us) sometimes personally, sometimes within small groups, and sometimes within larger arenas. Asking us consider how central is the song itself that moves us, in contrast to how central is the individual person who is creating this song? Then to consider the difference when a soloist sings summer time blues, in contrast to a chorus singing this song, in contrast to link-syncing this song in a pretense performance, in contrast to hearing the song through the medium of the radio. Is there identity in these changes or ? Is each shifting experience generating a differing felt mood /presence or is there some overlapping experience that we can say shares a particular ?identity?? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Edward Wall Sent: July 13, 2017 1:29 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces Mike That, as you, is my experience. The interesting question raised is that if I, for example, sang the lyrics to Summer Time Blues (I know this dates me), while doing the relevant imaging could I feel those blues. Oddly, it seems, the answer is almost yes. Definitely slippery. Ed > On Jul 13, 2017, at 2:04 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Ed- > I think I am saying that you cannot imagine coming home after a long day of > work or > winning the lottery without simultaneously imagining how you feel about it. > I probably misunderstood you. > > Slippery stuff, imagining. > > mike > > On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:57 AM, Edward Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not that >> of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, >> imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a >> feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel >> those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the >> way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can imagine >> that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even >> though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). It >> may quite well be a lack in me and others. >> Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I >> misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find >> yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your >> body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? >> >> Ed >> >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you >> won >>> the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what >> you >>> like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology >> (!) >>> >>> I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely >>> accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in >>> wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will >> be >>> able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: >>> >>> Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful >> daughter, >>> Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun >> Og >>> (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. >> Siding >>> with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a >> blustering, >>> bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number >>> of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will >> become >>> mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. >>> >>> >>> Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) >>> >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one >> can >>>> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like >> (there is >>>> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, >> says >>>> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. >>>> >>>> Ed Wall >>>> >>>>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip >> Harberg >>>>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The >>>> book >>>>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen >>>> to >>>>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great >>>>> resource. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm >>>> scoping >>>>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions >> for >>>> you >>>>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years >>>> ago >>>>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - >>>>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, >> which >>>> I >>>>>> would also like to take a closer look at. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards and many thanks, >>>>>> >>>>>> Daniel >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi, Daniel. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's >>>>>> *inner >>>>>>> ear*, >>>>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound >> without >>>>>>> words, >>>>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and >>>> internal >>>>>>> voices >>>>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that >>>>>>> hearing >>>>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it >> is >>>>>> the >>>>>>> surface >>>>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a >> *person*, >>>>>> who >>>>>>> has >>>>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces >> of >>>>>> this >>>>>>> inner >>>>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner >>>> voices-- >>>>>>> yes, >>>>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the >>>>>>> experience >>>>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical >>>> experiences >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered >> about >>>>>>> those >>>>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that >>>> ability, >>>>>>> but I have >>>>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: >>>> my >>>>>>> inner >>>>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd >> like >>>>>> to >>>>>>> take this >>>>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of >>>> Ira >>>>>>> Gershwin >>>>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's >>>>>>> Rainbow, >>>>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg >>>> gave >>>>>> a >>>>>>> lot >>>>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; >>>>>>> Words make you think a thought; >>>>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier >>>>>>> conversation >>>>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the >>>> unity >>>>>>> of thinking >>>>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I >>>>>> have >>>>>>> trouble >>>>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty >>>>>> experiencing >>>>>>> emotions >>>>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking >>>> about >>>>>>> feelings >>>>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a >>>>>> cultural >>>>>>> experience >>>>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My two cents. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal >>>>>> speech, >>>>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a >>>>>>> musician, >>>>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced >>>> at >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the >>>>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be >>>>>> more >>>>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" >>>>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) >>>>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most >>>>>> extreme >>>>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who >> lost >>>>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, >> practice >>>>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate >> what >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. >>>>>> Need >>>>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this >>>>>> ability? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with >>>>>> events >>>>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the >> quickened >>>>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of >>>> feelings >>>>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these >>>>>>> alike, >>>>>>>> and different? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart >> and >>>>>> da >>>>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others >>>>>> internal >>>>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? >> How >>>>>>> does >>>>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate >> to >>>> a >>>>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested >>>> to >>>>>>> be >>>>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening >> but >>>>>>> not >>>>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, >>>>>> reflection, >>>>>>> or >>>>>>>> other factors alter it? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology >>>> offer >>>>>>> (or >>>>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, >>>>>>> ability, >>>>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or >>>>>>> recommend >>>>>>>> readings. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Daniel >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you Peter. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < >>>>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal >>>>>> richness >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> ?the ? >>>>>>>>>> emotion >>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>> and thought >>>>>>>>>> ?? >>>>>>>>>> ?of >>>>>>>>>> characters >>>>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough >>>>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who >>>>>>> works >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who >> specializes >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear >>>>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>> both normal >>>>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of >>>>>>>>>> theatrical characters, >>>>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> creative >>>>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner >>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>> play >>>>>>>>>> in their >>>>>>>>>> work and thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which >>>>>>>>>> Fernyhough >>>>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a >>>>>> phenomenon >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to >>>>>> study >>>>>>>>>> private speech >>>>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> sociolinguistic >>>>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. >>>>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= >>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= >>>>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= >>>>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= >>>>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= >>>>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> convey >>>>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. >>>>>>>>>> Especially >>>>>>>>>>> inner thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is >>>>>>> Legend >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> love. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, >>>>>> characters >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My questions are: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater >>>>>> work? >>>>>>>> i.e. >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in >>>>>>> terms >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings >>>>>>>> possess. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com Thu Jul 13 18:03:19 2017 From: daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com (Daniel Hyman) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 21:03:19 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: <5968113d.c999620a.1c491.0e7d@mx.google.com> References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> <5968113d.c999620a.1c491.0e7d@mx.google.com> Message-ID: All these questions sound valid to me. They also intertwine with at least a couple of other factors: - Favorite songs/musical works are recognized with somewhat the same inner glow as the face of a dear friend or close relative. Unfamiliar works or styles can seem strange or alien. - Works I've played or sung, like distinctive aromas or tastes, call up memories of events where I have heard or performed them, the friends involved, the moods we shared, the scenes and places. The question of the identity of a classical piece can seem trivial ("why that's Beethoven's Op. 59 No. 2 quartet in E minor, can't you tell"?) but actually runs a good deal deeper as Larry implies. Musicians go to great lengths to unearth original (Urtext) editions and contemporaneous performance practices, only to find at times that composers willingly altered, trimmed, and extended works to suit. On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 8:32 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Another slant on this theme of song and image. > Is it possible for the singer to sing (summer time blues) - without the > accompanying image? . Then, shifting mode, (from sound to image) the > listener being moved (by the sound of the singing) does experience a > FELT image - personally being moved within this emerging image generated > through sound. > > If this is perhaps possible, then the notion of (degrees) of felt > experience as variable modes occurs as feasible. > > Felt experience moving (us) sometimes personally, sometimes within small > groups, and sometimes within larger arenas. > > Asking us consider how central is the song itself that moves us, in > contrast to how central is the individual person who is creating this song? > > Then to consider the difference when a soloist sings summer time blues, in > contrast to a chorus singing this song, in contrast to link-syncing this > song in a pretense performance, in contrast to hearing the song through the > medium of the radio. Is there identity in these changes or ? > Is each shifting experience generating a differing felt mood /presence or > is there some overlapping experience that we can say shares a particular > ?identity?? > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Edward Wall > Sent: July 13, 2017 1:29 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces > > Mike > > That, as you, is my experience. The interesting question raised is > that if I, for example, sang the lyrics to Summer Time Blues (I know this > dates me), while doing the relevant imaging could I feel those blues. > Oddly, it seems, the answer is almost yes. Definitely slippery. > > Ed > > > On Jul 13, 2017, at 2:04 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Ed- > > I think I am saying that you cannot imagine coming home after a long day > of > > work or > > winning the lottery without simultaneously imagining how you feel about > it. > > I probably misunderstood you. > > > > Slippery stuff, imagining. > > > > mike > > > > On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:57 AM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > >> Mike > >> > >> What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not > that > >> of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, > >> imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a > >> feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel > >> those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the > >> way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can > imagine > >> that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even > >> though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). > It > >> may quite well be a lack in me and others. > >> Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I > >> misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find > >> yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your > >> body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? > >> > >> Ed > >> > >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you > >> won > >>> the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what > >> you > >>> like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a > pathology > >> (!) > >>> > >>> I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > >>> accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > >>> wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will > >> be > >>> able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > >>> > >>> Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful > >> daughter, > >>> Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun > >> Og > >>> (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. > >> Siding > >>> with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > >> blustering, > >>> bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a > number > >>> of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will > >> become > >>> mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > >>> > >>> > >>> Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > >>> > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > >>> > >>>> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one > >> can > >>>> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like > >> (there is > >>>> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, > >> says > >>>> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > >>>> > >>>> Ed Wall > >>>> > >>>>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > >> Harberg > >>>>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > >>>> book > >>>>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to > listen > >>>> to > >>>>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > >>>>> :-) > >>>>> > >>>>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a > great > >>>>> resource. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. > >>>>> > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > >>>> scoping > >>>>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions > >> for > >>>> you > >>>>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few > years > >>>> ago > >>>>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make > decisions - > >>>>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > >> which > >>>> I > >>>>>> would also like to take a closer look at. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Kind regards and many thanks, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Daniel > >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > >>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi, Daniel. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a > musician's > >>>>>> *inner > >>>>>>> ear*, > >>>>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > >> without > >>>>>>> words, > >>>>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > >>>> internal > >>>>>>> voices > >>>>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests > that > >>>>>>> hearing > >>>>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: > it > >> is > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>> surface > >>>>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > >> *person*, > >>>>>> who > >>>>>>> has > >>>>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces > >> of > >>>>>> this > >>>>>>> inner > >>>>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > >>>> voices-- > >>>>>>> yes, > >>>>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > >>>>>>> experience > >>>>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > >>>> experiences > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he > presents. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > >> about > >>>>>>> those > >>>>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > >>>> ability, > >>>>>>> but I have > >>>>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar > strings: > >>>> my > >>>>>>> inner > >>>>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd > >> like > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>> take this > >>>>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate > of > >>>> Ira > >>>>>>> Gershwin > >>>>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > >>>>>>> Rainbow, > >>>>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > >>>> gave > >>>>>> a > >>>>>>> lot > >>>>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > >>>>>>> Words make you think a thought; > >>>>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > >>>>>>> conversation > >>>>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > >>>> unity > >>>>>>> of thinking > >>>>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. > Personally, I > >>>>>> have > >>>>>>> trouble > >>>>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > >>>>>> experiencing > >>>>>>> emotions > >>>>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > >>>> about > >>>>>>> feelings > >>>>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > >>>>>> cultural > >>>>>>> experience > >>>>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> My two cents. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Peter > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >>>>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > >>>>>> speech, > >>>>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > >>>>>>> musician, > >>>>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently > glanced > >>>> at > >>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in > the > >>>>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might > be > >>>>>> more > >>>>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively > "hear" > >>>>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups > of) > >>>>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > >>>>>> extreme > >>>>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who > >> lost > >>>>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > >> practice > >>>>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate > >> what > >>>>>>> they > >>>>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does > this. > >>>>>> Need > >>>>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > >>>>>> ability? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > >>>>>> events > >>>>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > >> quickened > >>>>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > >>>> feelings > >>>>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are > these > >>>>>>> alike, > >>>>>>>> and different? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart > >> and > >>>>>> da > >>>>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > >>>>>> internal > >>>>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? > >> How > >>>>>>> does > >>>>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate > >> to > >>>> a > >>>>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now > suggested > >>>> to > >>>>>>> be > >>>>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening > >> but > >>>>>>> not > >>>>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > >>>>>> reflection, > >>>>>>> or > >>>>>>>> other factors alter it? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > >>>> offer > >>>>>>> (or > >>>>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > >>>>>>> ability, > >>>>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > >>>>>>> recommend > >>>>>>>> readings. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Daniel > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Thank you Peter. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > >>>>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and > its > >>>>>>> use > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > >>>>>> richness > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> ?the ? > >>>>>>>>>> emotion > >>>>>>>>>> ? > >>>>>>>>>> and thought > >>>>>>>>>> ?? > >>>>>>>>>> ?of > >>>>>>>>>> characters > >>>>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > >>>>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > >>>>>>> works > >>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > >> specializes > >>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who > hear > >>>>>>>> voices > >>>>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>>> both normal > >>>>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue > of > >>>>>>>>>> theatrical characters, > >>>>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> creative > >>>>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > >>>>>> voices > >>>>>>>>> play > >>>>>>>>>> in their > >>>>>>>>>> work and thought. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in > which > >>>>>>>>>> Fernyhough > >>>>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > >>>>>> phenomenon > >>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest > stage > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> development > >>>>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > >>>>>> study > >>>>>>>>>> private speech > >>>>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to > linguistic > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> sociolinguistic > >>>>>>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > >>>>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > >>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > >>>>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > >>>>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > >>>>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > >>>>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Peter > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> convey > >>>>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > >>>>>>>>>> Especially > >>>>>>>>>>> inner thought. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > >>>>>>> Legend > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> love. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > >>>>>> characters > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> My questions are: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > >>>>>> work? > >>>>>>>> i.e. > >>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > >>>>>>> terms > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > >>>>>>>> possess. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>>>> Director, > >>>>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>>> Director, > >>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Fri Jul 14 11:26:10 2017 From: ewall@umich.edu (Edward Wall) Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 13:26:10 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> <5968113d.c999620a.1c491.0e7d@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Daniel My original question grows out of some reading of a book by Elaine Scarry titled Dreaming by the Book in which she challenges a number of ?authoritative? descriptions of the phenomena of imagination. She does this by looking at how various authors have attempted, with various literary stratagems, to induce imagined images that, for example, move (philosophic wisdom to the contrary). Reading what you have written below, I am wondering if musicians don?t do somewhat the same. That is, are there ways, to induce listeners to imagine what might otherwise be unimaginable? Ed > On Jul 13, 2017, at 8:03 PM, Daniel Hyman wrote: > > All these questions sound valid to me. They also intertwine with at least a > couple of other factors: > > - Favorite songs/musical works are recognized with somewhat the same inner > glow as the face of a dear friend or close relative. Unfamiliar works or > styles can seem strange or alien. > > - Works I've played or sung, like distinctive aromas or tastes, call up > memories of events where I have heard or performed them, the friends > involved, the moods we shared, the scenes and places. > > The question of the identity of a classical piece can seem trivial ("why > that's Beethoven's Op. 59 No. 2 quartet in E minor, can't you tell"?) but > actually runs a good deal deeper as Larry implies. Musicians go to great > lengths to unearth original (Urtext) editions and contemporaneous > performance practices, only to find at times that composers willingly > altered, trimmed, and extended works to suit. > > On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 8:32 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Another slant on this theme of song and image. >> Is it possible for the singer to sing (summer time blues) - without the >> accompanying image? . Then, shifting mode, (from sound to image) the >> listener being moved (by the sound of the singing) does experience a >> FELT image - personally being moved within this emerging image generated >> through sound. >> >> If this is perhaps possible, then the notion of (degrees) of felt >> experience as variable modes occurs as feasible. >> >> Felt experience moving (us) sometimes personally, sometimes within small >> groups, and sometimes within larger arenas. >> >> Asking us consider how central is the song itself that moves us, in >> contrast to how central is the individual person who is creating this song? >> >> Then to consider the difference when a soloist sings summer time blues, in >> contrast to a chorus singing this song, in contrast to link-syncing this >> song in a pretense performance, in contrast to hearing the song through the >> medium of the radio. Is there identity in these changes or ? >> Is each shifting experience generating a differing felt mood /presence or >> is there some overlapping experience that we can say shares a particular >> ?identity?? >> >> >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> From: Edward Wall >> Sent: July 13, 2017 1:29 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces >> >> Mike >> >> That, as you, is my experience. The interesting question raised is >> that if I, for example, sang the lyrics to Summer Time Blues (I know this >> dates me), while doing the relevant imaging could I feel those blues. >> Oddly, it seems, the answer is almost yes. Definitely slippery. >> >> Ed >> >>> On Jul 13, 2017, at 2:04 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Ed- >>> I think I am saying that you cannot imagine coming home after a long day >> of >>> work or >>> winning the lottery without simultaneously imagining how you feel about >> it. >>> I probably misunderstood you. >>> >>> Slippery stuff, imagining. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:57 AM, Edward Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not >> that >>>> of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, >>>> imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a >>>> feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel >>>> those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the >>>> way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can >> imagine >>>> that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even >>>> though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). >> It >>>> may quite well be a lack in me and others. >>>> Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I >>>> misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find >>>> yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your >>>> body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you >>>> won >>>>> the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what >>>> you >>>>> like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a >> pathology >>>> (!) >>>>> >>>>> I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely >>>>> accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in >>>>> wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will >>>> be >>>>> able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: >>>>> >>>>> Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful >>>> daughter, >>>>> Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun >>>> Og >>>>> (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. >>>> Siding >>>>> with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a >>>> blustering, >>>>> bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a >> number >>>>> of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will >>>> become >>>>> mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one >>>> can >>>>>> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like >>>> (there is >>>>>> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, >>>> says >>>>>> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed Wall >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip >>>> Harberg >>>>>>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The >>>>>> book >>>>>>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to >> listen >>>>>> to >>>>>>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) >>>>>>> :-) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a >> great >>>>>>> resource. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm >>>>>> scoping >>>>>>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions >>>> for >>>>>> you >>>>>>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few >> years >>>>>> ago >>>>>>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make >> decisions - >>>>>>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, >>>> which >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> would also like to take a closer look at. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards and many thanks, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Daniel >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi, Daniel. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a >> musician's >>>>>>>> *inner >>>>>>>>> ear*, >>>>>>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound >>>> without >>>>>>>>> words, >>>>>>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and >>>>>> internal >>>>>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests >> that >>>>>>>>> hearing >>>>>>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: >> it >>>> is >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> surface >>>>>>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a >>>> *person*, >>>>>>>> who >>>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces >>>> of >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> inner >>>>>>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner >>>>>> voices-- >>>>>>>>> yes, >>>>>>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the >>>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical >>>>>> experiences >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he >> presents. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered >>>> about >>>>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that >>>>>> ability, >>>>>>>>> but I have >>>>>>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar >> strings: >>>>>> my >>>>>>>>> inner >>>>>>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd >>>> like >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> take this >>>>>>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate >> of >>>>>> Ira >>>>>>>>> Gershwin >>>>>>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's >>>>>>>>> Rainbow, >>>>>>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg >>>>>> gave >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> lot >>>>>>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; >>>>>>>>> Words make you think a thought; >>>>>>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier >>>>>>>>> conversation >>>>>>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the >>>>>> unity >>>>>>>>> of thinking >>>>>>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. >> Personally, I >>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> trouble >>>>>>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty >>>>>>>> experiencing >>>>>>>>> emotions >>>>>>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking >>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> feelings >>>>>>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a >>>>>>>> cultural >>>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My two cents. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < >>>>>>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal >>>>>>>> speech, >>>>>>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a >>>>>>>>> musician, >>>>>>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently >> glanced >>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in >> the >>>>>>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might >> be >>>>>>>> more >>>>>>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively >> "hear" >>>>>>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups >> of) >>>>>>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most >>>>>>>> extreme >>>>>>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who >>>> lost >>>>>>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, >>>> practice >>>>>>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate >>>> what >>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does >> this. >>>>>>>> Need >>>>>>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this >>>>>>>> ability? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with >>>>>>>> events >>>>>>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the >>>> quickened >>>>>>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of >>>>>> feelings >>>>>>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are >> these >>>>>>>>> alike, >>>>>>>>>> and different? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart >>>> and >>>>>>>> da >>>>>>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others >>>>>>>> internal >>>>>>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? >>>> How >>>>>>>>> does >>>>>>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate >>>> to >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now >> suggested >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening >>>> but >>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, >>>>>>>> reflection, >>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>> other factors alter it? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology >>>>>> offer >>>>>>>>> (or >>>>>>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, >>>>>>>>> ability, >>>>>>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or >>>>>>>>> recommend >>>>>>>>>> readings. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Daniel >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you Peter. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < >>>>>>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and >> its >>>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal >>>>>>>> richness >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> ?the ? >>>>>>>>>>>> emotion >>>>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>>>> and thought >>>>>>>>>>>> ?? >>>>>>>>>>>> ?of >>>>>>>>>>>> characters >>>>>>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough >>>>>>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who >>>>>>>>> works >>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who >>>> specializes >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who >> hear >>>>>>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>> both normal >>>>>>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue >> of >>>>>>>>>>>> theatrical characters, >>>>>>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> creative >>>>>>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner >>>>>>>> voices >>>>>>>>>>> play >>>>>>>>>>>> in their >>>>>>>>>>>> work and thought. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in >> which >>>>>>>>>>>> Fernyhough >>>>>>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a >>>>>>>> phenomenon >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest >> stage >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to >>>>>>>> study >>>>>>>>>>>> private speech >>>>>>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to >> linguistic >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> sociolinguistic >>>>>>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. >>>>>>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= >>>>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= >>>>>>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= >>>>>>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= >>>>>>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= >>>>>>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il >> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> convey >>>>>>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. >>>>>>>>>>>> Especially >>>>>>>>>>>>> inner thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is >>>>>>>>> Legend >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> love. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, >>>>>>>> characters >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> My questions are: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater >>>>>>>> work? >>>>>>>>>> i.e. >>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in >>>>>>>>> terms >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings >>>>>>>>>> possess. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>>>>> Director, >>>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jul 14 17:31:09 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 17:31:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle In-Reply-To: <5967bbd2.475e630a.cecc9.20ae@mx.google.com> References: <5967bbd2.475e630a.cecc9.20ae@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry-- Thanks for sending the paper about Monozukuri. Points of overlap and non-overlap where Japanes and American social scientists seek to understand each other are always fascinating fountains of interesting thoughts. In this case, it struck me as especially interesting that Monozukuri is an historically recent word, a neologism represented by a cluster of Japanese kana that is similar to, but not co-extensive with, making. Making is a topic of broad interest on MCA I believe. So a rich source of insight about the concepts and its domains of practice. mike Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88< http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88 On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:28 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > I CAME ACROSS THIS PAGE > Exploring a cultural (mode) of practice > > > > Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle > > > http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88 > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 14 21:12:16 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 14:12:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Hegel on Action Message-ID: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> Anyone who got interested in that material about "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Jul 14 21:31:13 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 22:31:13 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is anything more than activity, particularly when considered at the sub-atomic level. At that level, matter seems a lot more like the holding of relations in some activity (not so different from the Notion?). Or would that be taking things too far? -greg On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Anyone who got interested in that material about "Hegel on Action", here > is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From jamesma320@gmail.com Fri Jul 14 21:40:24 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 05:40:24 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> Message-ID: Excellent, thank you Andy! James 2017?7?15? ??5:15?"Andy Blunden" ??? > Anyone who got interested in that material about "Hegel on Action", here > is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 14 23:11:39 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 16:11:39 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> Message-ID: <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous knowledge, does not help. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is anything > more than activity, particularly when considered at the > sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the holding of > relations in some activity (not so different from the > Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch Sat Jul 15 00:05:18 2017 From: Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch (PERRET-CLERMONT Anne-Nelly) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 07:05:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> Message-ID: Thank you Andy for this very useful text. What is the reference to be used when citing it? Anne-Nelly Prof.em. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont Institut de psychologie et ?ducation Facult? des lettres et sciences humaines Universit? de Neuch?tel Espace L. Agassiz 1, CH- 2000 Neuch?tel (Switzerland) Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont Prof. hon. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont Institut de psychologie et ?ducation Facult? des lettres et sciences humaines Universit? de Neuch?tel Espace L. Agassiz 1, CH- 2000 Neuch?tel (Switzerland) http://www.unine.ch/ipe/publications/anne_nelly_perret_clermont -----Message d'origine----- De : on behalf of Andy Blunden R?pondre ? : "ablunden@mira.net" , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date : samedi, 15 juillet 2017 06:12 ? : "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Objet : [Xmca-l] Hegel on Action Anyone who got interested in that material about "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 00:08:16 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 17:08:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> Message-ID: <1d5c310a-1b94-7054-40f6-365c1b86b9cd@mira.net> Just cite the URL and the date accessed. I have given up trying to submit to Hegelian journals. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 15/07/2017 5:05 PM, PERRET-CLERMONT Anne-Nelly wrote: > Thank you Andy for this very useful text. > What is the reference to be used when citing it? > Anne-Nelly > > > Prof.em. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont > Institut de psychologie et ?ducation Facult? des lettres et sciences > humaines > Universit? de Neuch?tel > Espace L. Agassiz 1, CH- 2000 Neuch?tel (Switzerland) > > Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont > > Prof. hon. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont > Institut de psychologie et ?ducation Facult? des lettres et sciences > humaines > Universit? de Neuch?tel > Espace L. Agassiz 1, CH- 2000 Neuch?tel (Switzerland) > http://www.unine.ch/ipe/publications/anne_nelly_perret_clermont > > > > > > > > > > > -----Message d'origine----- > De : on behalf of Andy Blunden > > R?pondre ? : "ablunden@mira.net" , "eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity" > Date : samedi, 15 juillet 2017 06:12 > ? : "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Objet : [Xmca-l] Hegel on Action > > Anyone who got interested in that material about "Hegel on > Action", here is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > Andy > > From Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch Sat Jul 15 00:17:44 2017 From: Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch (PERRET-CLERMONT Anne-Nelly) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 07:17:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <1d5c310a-1b94-7054-40f6-365c1b86b9cd@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <1d5c310a-1b94-7054-40f6-365c1b86b9cd@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks! Anne-Nelly -----Message d'origine----- De : on behalf of Andy Blunden R?pondre ? : "ablunden@mira.net" , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date : samedi, 15 juillet 2017 09:08 ? : "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Objet : [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action Just cite the URL and the date accessed. I have given up trying to submit to Hegelian journals. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 15/07/2017 5:05 PM, PERRET-CLERMONT Anne-Nelly wrote: > Thank you Andy for this very useful text. > What is the reference to be used when citing it? > Anne-Nelly > > > Prof.em. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont > Institut de psychologie et ?ducation Facult? des lettres et sciences > humaines > Universit? de Neuch?tel > Espace L. Agassiz 1, CH- 2000 Neuch?tel (Switzerland) > > Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont > > Prof. hon. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont > Institut de psychologie et ?ducation Facult? des lettres et sciences > humaines > Universit? de Neuch?tel > Espace L. Agassiz 1, CH- 2000 Neuch?tel (Switzerland) > http://www.unine.ch/ipe/publications/anne_nelly_perret_clermont > > > > > > > > > > > -----Message d'origine----- > De : on behalf of Andy Blunden > > R?pondre ? : "ablunden@mira.net" , "eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity" > Date : samedi, 15 juillet 2017 06:12 > ? : "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Objet : [Xmca-l] Hegel on Action > > Anyone who got interested in that material about "Hegel on > Action", here is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > Andy > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Jul 15 01:26:45 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 08:26:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu>, , Message-ID: <1500107215796.53455@iped.uio.no> Helena, although a bit late (took some holidays in between moving back to Europe), I would like to join the others in thanking you for your insightful and complete comment on Vance's book. With regard to the hopelessness affect that first sparkled this thread, I wonder whether, whereas the hopelessness of the white working-class bringing Trump to power may have been part of a myth, is it hopelessness what the majority of multi-ethnic American society is feeling now concerning the political situation in the US? And if so, how is that collective affect relating to an increase or decrease in the collectives' capacity to act? In the press we see some institutional movements (judges, commissions, hearings), but we read very little on citizens' movement (at least reading the first pages of the Washington Post, the New York Times. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of White, Phillip Sent: 12 July 2017 16:56 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump good morning, Helen - i read Vance's book a few months ago. as a person who has been involved in literacy instruction all of my professional life, in contrasting your response to Hillbilly Elegy and my response i am reminded again that reading comprehension is grounded in the individual's background knowledge. so, much of the background knowledge i brought to Elegy is situated in decades of working with children in poverty, second-language learners, Shirley Brice Heath's, Deborah Hick's, Jose Limon's, Shiela Valesquez's, Annick Prieur's and John Rechy's work. so that Vance's personal narrative ran true for me. yes, i was taken aback by his political beliefs, occasional word choice's, and especially his personal struggle with internalized violence. i had also noticed that those on the political right and left were hailing his book as an explanatory principle that supported their political values and beliefs. people do that. i found your understanding of the book being grounded in labor rights to be very illuminating. i have found his web site a disappointment. http://www.jdvance.com Official website of JD Vance - Home www.jdvance.com Welcome to my site! I'm the author of Hillbilly Elegy, and I do other stuff, too. and i thought that he gained a great deal of support from a yale professor - though i don't remember her name and i've not got a copy of the book. i didn't think it was valuable enough to buy. just like taxes and death, we can't avoid political power-plays. and in truth, i find your professional activities as a model to appreciate and emulate. so, many thanks for your continuing coherent voice on this list. phillip ________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 6:05:24 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump Richard, and Greg and Larry, Thanks for the reading. I totally agree with Richard's suggestion about Arlie Hochschild's excellent book -- the two make a stark contrast. My point, which you probably accept, is that Vance's weak book is serving a political agenda that has a lot of muscle and money behind it right now. I wrote my anti-blurb in the hope of finding others on this list who had read the book and had insights into it and how it is being used. In order to distribute it widely (like to the NY Times, where it would probably be submitted int he form of a letter) I'd have to make sure that all my quotes are impeccable, etc -- in other words, write defensively. WHile I don't think I made any mistakes in my summary, it would be a different task to send my critique into the fray. Might be worth doing anyway, though. Has anyone else read the book? H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 11, 2017, at 12:40 PM, Richard Beach wrote: > Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy more widely. > > In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right . > > One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their failures in their school experiences. > > Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota > rbeach@umn.edu > Websites: Digital writing , Media literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core State Standards , Apps for literacy learning , Teaching about climate change > > > > > > >> On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >> >> Helena, >> Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? (E.g., New York Times...). >> I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. >> Greg >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>> >>> A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. >>> >>> It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. >>> >>> He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. >>> >>> His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." >>> >>> His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. >>> >>> The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. >>> >>> In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. >>> >>> When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). >>> >>> However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. >>> >>> In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. >>> >>> Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>> >>>> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? >>>> >>>> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? >>>> >>>> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >>>>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >>>>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >>>>> Peg >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>> >>>>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >>>>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >>>>> >>>>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >>>>> >>>>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >>>>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> >>>>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>> About regency? >>>>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>>>>> Here's the link to his bill: >>>>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>>>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>>>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>>>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherw >> ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>>>>> >>>>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>>>>> >>>>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>>>>> >>>>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>>>>> PG >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>>> >>>>>> That would be the vice-President! >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>>>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>>>>> >>>>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>>>>> Regent? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>>>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>>>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > From jamesma320@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 01:28:38 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 09:28:38 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out anything that has material quality but is actually associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with the intrapsychological within oneself? James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my consciousness. > "Activity" in this context is human, social practice. Moving attention to > the sub-atomic level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is anything more than >> activity, particularly when considered at the sub-atomic level. >> At that level, matter seems a lot more like the holding of relations in >> some activity (not so different from the Notion?). >> Or would that be taking things too far? >> -greg >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Anyone who got interested in that material about >> "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. >> >> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >> >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 01:42:11 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 18:42:11 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to a lesser extent the other words in your message have meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it only in relation to Form, but their definition of Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't like to use the word, because he took it as too linked to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make sense of your last question. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out anything > that has material quality but is actually associated with > a mental sign (a sign in the mind, as Peirce would say)? > Do you consider social practice (you mentioned earlier) to > be tinted with the intrapsychological within oneself? > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, > social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is > anything more than activity, particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the > holding of relations in some activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sat Jul 15 01:48:54 2017 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 08:48:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle Message-ID: Thanks for sharing this piece on monozukuri, Larry. When I read it I was reminded of what I understand of the Russian concept of obuchenie. I know many others in this group will have more detailed and situated understandings of obuchenie but what I associate with it is the idea that learning and teaching are richly contextualised social processes - teacher and learner learn each other and wider cultural expectations not separately or 'in addition to' the 'content' of what is being taught/learned but in an indivisible cultural whole. The article about monozukuri offers a fascinating glimpse of the Japanese 'apprenticeship' model, suggesting that learners are expected to find their OWN ways of achieving what they see their master doing. I think this stands in strong contrast to 'teaching' approaches which are based on the idea that 'skills' or 'techniques' or 'ideas' can be 'worked out' or abstracted from the cultural situations in which they are employed, so they can be packaged and delivered in 'teacher proof' programmes. I think our ways of making sense continue to be informed by, and grounded in, what we learn from making things. And especially making things together with other people. I suspect that the idea of the 'craftsman' is rather solitary- someone who works alone to solve problems and make lovely things but, as I understand it, monozukuri points to a more connected, distributed understanding of how things (and sense) are made. All the best, Rod On 15 Jul 2017 1:32 am, mike cole wrote: Larry-- Thanks for sending the paper about Monozukuri. Points of overlap and non-overlap where Japanes and American social scientists seek to understand each other are always fascinating fountains of interesting thoughts. In this case, it struck me as especially interesting that Monozukuri is an historically recent word, a neologism represented by a cluster of Japanese kana that is similar to, but not co-extensive with, making. Making is a topic of broad interest on MCA I believe. So a rich source of insight about the concepts and its domains of practice. mike Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88< http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88 On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:28 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > I CAME ACROSS THIS PAGE > Exploring a cultural (mode) of practice > > > > Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle > > > http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88 > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. 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From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Jul 15 02:39:11 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 09:39:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> , Message-ID: <1500111561459.45209@iped.uio.no> Yes, Greg, I also thought of the connection with Perezhivanie when it comes to Peter's very interesting comment on the octave jump in "Some-where," and your comment on the two-part harmony. Definitely must have to do with difference, cause it is difference what we 'feel,' even if in some cases it may be a difference that achieves 'sameness'. Yet, I was also thinking that I can very well 'feel' moved reading a text where there is not sound, no shift in pitch... My two-years daughter, in hearing Trump, was also catching on all those non-verbal (she does not understand much English yet) signals when she called Trump 'enfadado' (angry). But then again, the same can be achieved by only words. I can get very very upset everyday reading the world's news ... So, yes, words can give thoughts, but not just thoughts. I also grew up listening to lots of English-speaking music when I was a child (e.g., my older sister's Suzanne Vega and also Supertramp albums were my favourites). I could not understand much of what they said, but they definitively made me feel. And I would say those were not 'thought-less' feelings. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: 13 July 2017 21:07 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces And I think I posted this a few months back, but here is a Democracy Now tribute to Yip Harburg that includes an interview with his son (apologies if someone else posted this and I missed it): https://www.democracynow.org/2008/12/25/a_tribute_to_yip_harburg_the Interesting to think about the the octave jump in "Some-where" and how it adds emotional resonance. Seems to resonate with what is being taken up in other threads here regarding perezhivanie, now? Two-part harmony? -greg On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 12:57 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > Mike > > What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not that > of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, > imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a > feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel > those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the > way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can imagine > that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even > though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). It > may quite well be a lack in me and others. > Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I > misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find > yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your > body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? > > Ed > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you > won > > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what > you > > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology > (!) > > > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will > be > > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful > daughter, > > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun > Og > > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. > Siding > > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > blustering, > > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number > > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will > become > > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > >> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one > can > >> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like > (there is > >> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, > says > >> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> > >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > Harberg > >>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > >> book > >>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen > >> to > >>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > >>> :-) > >>> > >>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > >>> resource. > >>> > >>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > >> scoping > >>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions > for > >> you > >>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years > >> ago > >>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > >>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > which > >> I > >>>> would also like to take a closer look at. > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards and many thanks, > >>>> > >>>> Daniel > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > >>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi, Daniel. > >>>>> > >>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > >>>> *inner > >>>>> ear*, > >>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > without > >>>>> words, > >>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > >> internal > >>>>> voices > >>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > >>>>> hearing > >>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it > is > >>>> the > >>>>> surface > >>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > *person*, > >>>> who > >>>>> has > >>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces > of > >>>> this > >>>>> inner > >>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > >>>>> > >>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > >> voices-- > >>>>> yes, > >>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > >>>>> experience > >>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > >> experiences > >>>>> that > >>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > >>>>> > >>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > about > >>>>> those > >>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > >> ability, > >>>>> but I have > >>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: > >> my > >>>>> inner > >>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > >>>>> > >>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd > like > >>>> to > >>>>> take this > >>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of > >> Ira > >>>>> Gershwin > >>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > >>>>> Rainbow, > >>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > >> gave > >>>> a > >>>>> lot > >>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > >>>>> > >>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > >>>>> Words make you think a thought; > >>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. > >>>>> > >>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > >>>>> conversation > >>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > >> unity > >>>>> of thinking > >>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > >>>> have > >>>>> trouble > >>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > >>>> experiencing > >>>>> emotions > >>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > >> about > >>>>> feelings > >>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > >>>> cultural > >>>>> experience > >>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > >>>>> > >>>>> My two cents. > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > >>>> speech, > >>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > >>>>> musician, > >>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced > >> at > >>>>> in > >>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > >>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > >>>> more > >>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > >>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > >>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > >>>> extreme > >>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who > lost > >>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > practice > >>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate > what > >>>>> they > >>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > >>>> Need > >>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > >>>> ability? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > >>>> events > >>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > quickened > >>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > >> feelings > >>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > >>>>> alike, > >>>>>> and different? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart > and > >>>> da > >>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > >>>> internal > >>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? > How > >>>>> does > >>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate > to > >> a > >>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested > >> to > >>>>> be > >>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening > but > >>>>> not > >>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > >>>> reflection, > >>>>> or > >>>>>> other factors alter it? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > >> offer > >>>>> (or > >>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > >>>>> ability, > >>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > >>>>> recommend > >>>>>> readings. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Daniel > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thank you Peter. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > >>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > >>>>> use > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > >>>> richness > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> ?the ? > >>>>>>>> emotion > >>>>>>>> ? > >>>>>>>> and thought > >>>>>>>> ?? > >>>>>>>> ?of > >>>>>>>> characters > >>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > >>>>> works > >>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > specializes > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > >>>>>> voices > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>> both normal > >>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > >>>>>>>> theatrical characters, > >>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > >>>> the > >>>>>>>> creative > >>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > >>>> voices > >>>>>>> play > >>>>>>>> in their > >>>>>>>> work and thought. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > >>>>>>>> Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > >>>> phenomenon > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > >>>> in > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> development > >>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > >>>> study > >>>>>>>> private speech > >>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>> sociolinguistic > >>>>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > >>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > >>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > >>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > >>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > >>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Peter > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > >>>> to > >>>>>>> convey > >>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > >>>>>>>> Especially > >>>>>>>>> inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > >>>>> Legend > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > >>>> characters > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My questions are: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > >>>> work? > >>>>>> i.e. > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > >>>>> terms > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > >>>>>> possess. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>> Director, > >>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>> Director, > >>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>> > >>>>> Fordham University > >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>> > >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From jamesma320@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 03:15:05 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 11:15:05 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense perception involved in social practice in a social context possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial expression or bodily movement connected with a particular feeling. James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden wrote: > James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to a lesser extent the > other words in your message have meanings which are extremely context (or > discourse) dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy doesn't have > a definition of Matter, considering it only in relation to Form, but their > definition of Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and Vygotsky in > my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't like to use the word, because he > took it as too linked to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I said it in the paper > as succinctly as possible. If it's in the mind then it is not material. I > can't make sense of your last question. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > >> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out anything that has >> material quality but is actually associated with a mental sign (a sign in >> the mind, as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social practice (you >> mentioned earlier) to be tinted with the intrapsychological within oneself? >> >> James >> >> /_____________________________________/ >> >> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >> >> >> >> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. >> >> "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my >> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, >> social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic >> level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous >> knowledge, does not help. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Andy, >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is >> anything more than activity, particularly when >> considered at the sub-atomic level. >> At that level, matter seems a lot more like the >> holding of relations in some activity (not so >> different from the Notion?). >> Or would that be taking things too far? >> -greg >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> wrote: >> >> Anyone who got interested in that material about >> "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. >> >> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >> >> > > >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi >> on-making >> > decision-making> >> > s/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making>> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 05:28:15 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 22:28:15 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: James, I think you're using "material" in some specific sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than discursive consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which you raised out of my paper about action. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense > perception involved in social practice in a social context > possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign > in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial > expression or bodily movement connected with a particular > feeling. > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > a lesser extent the other words in your message have > meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > only in relation to Form, but their definition of > Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > sense of your last question. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > anything that has material quality but is actually > associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > the intrapsychological within oneself? > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside > of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > human, > social practice. Moving attention to the > sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common sense, > sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > "matter" is > anything more than activity, particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more > like the > holding of relations in some activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that > material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my > contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > >> > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 06:22:01 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 06:22:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <596a1705.065b650a.3a6c6.e78f@mx.google.com> Rod, Mike, Yes, the Japanese (sens) that each finds their OWN ways of doing, But also notice how monozukuri de-emphasizes OWN as indicating personal identity within monozukuri. The mutuality of this concept is emphasized. For a Japanese (reading) of finding one?s OWN way, is felt radically differently than our Western taken for granted normal reading of finding one?s OWN way. Our Reading is more inclined towards an encapsulated sens of OWN. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Rod Parker-Rees Sent: July 15, 2017 1:50 AM To: Culture Activity eXtended Mind Cc: Larry Purss Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle Thanks for sharing this piece on monozukuri, Larry. When I read it I was reminded of what I understand of the Russian concept of obuchenie. I know many others in this group will have more detailed and situated understandings of obuchenie but what I associate with it is the idea that learning and teaching are richly contextualised social processes - teacher and learner learn each other and wider cultural expectations not separately or 'in addition to' the 'content' of what is being taught/learned but in an indivisible cultural whole. The article about monozukuri offers a fascinating glimpse of the Japanese 'apprenticeship' model, suggesting that learners are expected to find their OWN ways of achieving what they see their master doing. I think this stands in strong contrast to 'teaching' approaches which are based on the idea that 'skills' or 'techniques' or 'ideas' can be 'worked out' or abstracted from the cultural situations in which they are employed, so they can be packaged and delivered in 'teacher proof' programmes. I think our ways of making sense continue to be informed by, and grounded in, what we learn from making things. And especially making things together with other people. I suspect that the idea of the 'craftsman' is rather solitary- someone who works alone to solve problems and make lovely things but, as I understand it, monozukuri points to a more connected, distributed understanding of how things (and sense) are made. All the best, Rod On 15 Jul 2017 1:32 am, mike cole wrote: Larry-- Thanks for sending the paper about Monozukuri. Points of overlap and non-overlap where Japanes and American social scientists seek to understand each other are always fascinating fountains of interesting thoughts. In this case, it struck me as especially interesting that Monozukuri is an historically recent word, a neologism represented by a cluster of Japanese kana that is similar to, but not co-extensive with, making. Making is a topic of broad interest on MCA I believe. So a rich source of insight about the concepts and its domains of practice. mike Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88< http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88 On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 11:28 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > I CAME ACROSS THIS PAGE > Exploring a cultural (mode) of practice > > > > Monozukuri -- another look at a key Japanese principle > > > http://www.japanintercultural.com/en/news/default.aspx?newsid=88 > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. 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From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 06:30:12 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 06:30:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: <1500111561459.45209@iped.uio.no> References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> , <1500111561459.45209@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <596a18f0.8356620a.390d7.8142@mx.google.com> Alfredo, To echo (and therefore amplify) this phrase: ?I can very well (feel) moved by?... This way of saying what is occurring (to be moved by) is i believe what Merleau-Ponty discursively explores AS PASSIVITY. So when exploring (activity) and (action) as moving phenomena we also are exploring (passivity) Moving & being moved by Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: July 15, 2017 2:40 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces Yes, Greg, I also thought of the connection with Perezhivanie when it comes to Peter's very interesting comment on the octave jump in "Some-where," and your comment on the two-part harmony. Definitely must have to do with difference, cause it is difference what we 'feel,' even if in some cases it may be a difference that achieves 'sameness'. Yet, I was also thinking that I can very well 'feel' moved reading a text where there is not sound, no shift in pitch... My two-years daughter, in hearing Trump, was also catching on all those non-verbal (she does not understand much English yet) signals when she called Trump 'enfadado' (angry). But then again, the same can be achieved by only words. I can get very very upset everyday reading the world's news ... So, yes, words can give thoughts, but not just thoughts. I also grew up listening to lots of English-speaking music when I was a child (e.g., my older sister's Suzanne Vega and also Supertramp albums were my favourites). I could not understand much of what they said, but they definitively made me feel. And I would say those were not 'thought-less' feelings. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: 13 July 2017 21:07 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces And I think I posted this a few months back, but here is a Democracy Now tribute to Yip Harburg that includes an interview with his son (apologies if someone else posted this and I missed it): https://www.democracynow.org/2008/12/25/a_tribute_to_yip_harburg_the Interesting to think about the the octave jump in "Some-where" and how it adds emotional resonance. Seems to resonate with what is being taken up in other threads here regarding perezhivanie, now? Two-part harmony? -greg On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 12:57 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > Mike > > What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not that > of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, > imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a > feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel > those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the > way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can imagine > that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even > though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). It > may quite well be a lack in me and others. > Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I > misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find > yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your > body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? > > Ed > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you > won > > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what > you > > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology > (!) > > > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will > be > > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful > daughter, > > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun > Og > > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. > Siding > > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > blustering, > > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number > > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will > become > > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > >> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one > can > >> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like > (there is > >> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, > says > >> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> > >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > Harberg > >>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > >> book > >>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen > >> to > >>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > >>> :-) > >>> > >>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > >>> resource. > >>> > >>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > >> scoping > >>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions > for > >> you > >>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years > >> ago > >>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > >>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > which > >> I > >>>> would also like to take a closer look at. > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards and many thanks, > >>>> > >>>> Daniel > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > >>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi, Daniel. > >>>>> > >>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > >>>> *inner > >>>>> ear*, > >>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > without > >>>>> words, > >>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > >> internal > >>>>> voices > >>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > >>>>> hearing > >>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it > is > >>>> the > >>>>> surface > >>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > *person*, > >>>> who > >>>>> has > >>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces > of > >>>> this > >>>>> inner > >>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > >>>>> > >>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > >> voices-- > >>>>> yes, > >>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > >>>>> experience > >>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > >> experiences > >>>>> that > >>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > >>>>> > >>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > about > >>>>> those > >>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > >> ability, > >>>>> but I have > >>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: > >> my > >>>>> inner > >>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > >>>>> > >>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd > like > >>>> to > >>>>> take this > >>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of > >> Ira > >>>>> Gershwin > >>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > >>>>> Rainbow, > >>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > >> gave > >>>> a > >>>>> lot > >>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > >>>>> > >>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > >>>>> Words make you think a thought; > >>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. > >>>>> > >>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > >>>>> conversation > >>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > >> unity > >>>>> of thinking > >>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > >>>> have > >>>>> trouble > >>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > >>>> experiencing > >>>>> emotions > >>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > >> about > >>>>> feelings > >>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > >>>> cultural > >>>>> experience > >>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > >>>>> > >>>>> My two cents. > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > >>>> speech, > >>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > >>>>> musician, > >>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced > >> at > >>>>> in > >>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > >>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > >>>> more > >>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > >>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > >>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > >>>> extreme > >>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who > lost > >>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > practice > >>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate > what > >>>>> they > >>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > >>>> Need > >>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > >>>> ability? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > >>>> events > >>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > quickened > >>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > >> feelings > >>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > >>>>> alike, > >>>>>> and different? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart > and > >>>> da > >>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > >>>> internal > >>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? > How > >>>>> does > >>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate > to > >> a > >>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested > >> to > >>>>> be > >>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening > but > >>>>> not > >>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > >>>> reflection, > >>>>> or > >>>>>> other factors alter it? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > >> offer > >>>>> (or > >>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > >>>>> ability, > >>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > >>>>> recommend > >>>>>> readings. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Daniel > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thank you Peter. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > >>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > >>>>> use > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > >>>> richness > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> ?the ? > >>>>>>>> emotion > >>>>>>>> ? > >>>>>>>> and thought > >>>>>>>> ?? > >>>>>>>> ?of > >>>>>>>> characters > >>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > >>>>> works > >>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > specializes > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > >>>>>> voices > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>> both normal > >>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > >>>>>>>> theatrical characters, > >>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > >>>> the > >>>>>>>> creative > >>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > >>>> voices > >>>>>>> play > >>>>>>>> in their > >>>>>>>> work and thought. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > >>>>>>>> Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > >>>> phenomenon > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > >>>> in > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> development > >>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > >>>> study > >>>>>>>> private speech > >>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>> sociolinguistic > >>>>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > >>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > >>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > >>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > >>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > >>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Peter > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > >>>> to > >>>>>>> convey > >>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > >>>>>>>> Especially > >>>>>>>>> inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > >>>>> Legend > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > >>>> characters > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My questions are: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > >>>> work? > >>>>>> i.e. > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > >>>>> terms > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > >>>>>> possess. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>> Director, > >>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>> Director, > >>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>> > >>>>> Fordham University > >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>> > >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 06:41:18 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 06:41:18 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: <596a1b8a.c11d620a.a743d.580b@mx.google.com> James, This phrase (sign in the mind) reminds me of the concept (symbolic interactionism) and the history of that tradition or discursive community who were linking (symbolic) with (interactionism). Not sure if this is off track or not Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action James, I think you're using "material" in some specific sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than discursive consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which you raised out of my paper about action. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense > perception involved in social practice in a social context > possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign > in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial > expression or bodily movement connected with a particular > feeling. > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > a lesser extent the other words in your message have > meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > only in relation to Form, but their definition of > Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > sense of your last question. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > anything that has material quality but is actually > associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > the intrapsychological within oneself? > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside > of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > human, > social practice. Moving attention to the > sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common sense, > sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > "matter" is > anything more than activity, particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more > like the > holding of relations in some activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that > material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my > contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > >> > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 06:49:42 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 06:49:42 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> Andy, Thanks for this article ?Hegel on Action? The paragraph on (logical concepts) was clarifying in the mutual way we are inclined to take the word itself AS IF the word were the material concept and not take the concept AS activity (itself). I hope I am representing this (reading this) in the way you intended. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action James, I think you're using "material" in some specific sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than discursive consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which you raised out of my paper about action. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense > perception involved in social practice in a social context > possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign > in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial > expression or bodily movement connected with a particular > feeling. > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > a lesser extent the other words in your message have > meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > only in relation to Form, but their definition of > Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > sense of your last question. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > anything that has material quality but is actually > associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > the intrapsychological within oneself? > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside > of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > human, > social practice. Moving attention to the > sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common sense, > sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > "matter" is > anything more than activity, particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more > like the > holding of relations in some activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that > material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my > contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > >> > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > From jamesma320@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 07:00:18 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 15:00:18 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <596a1b8a.c11d620a.a743d.580b@mx.google.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1b8a.c11d620a.a743d.580b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Not sure, Larry. Do you mean George Herbert Mead's symbolic interactionism? *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 15 July 2017 at 14:41, Lplarry wrote: > James, > This phrase (sign in the mind) reminds me of the concept (symbolic > interactionism) and the history of that tradition or discursive community > who were linking (symbolic) with (interactionism). > Not sure if this is off track or not > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > James, I think you're using "material" in some specific > sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something > to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe > practical consciousness rather than discursive > consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of > matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". > I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a > "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than > the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure > what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't > relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which > you raised out of my paper about action. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense > > perception involved in social practice in a social context > > possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign > > in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial > > expression or bodily movement connected with a particular > > feeling. > > > > James > > > > /_____________________________________/ > > > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > > a lesser extent the other words in your message have > > meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > > dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > > doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > > only in relation to Form, but their definition of > > Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > > Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > > like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > > to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > > way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > > said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > > it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > > sense of your last question. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > > anything that has material quality but is actually > > associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > > as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > > practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > > the intrapsychological within oneself? > > > > James > > > > /_____________________________________/ > > > > */James > > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside > > of my > > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > > human, > > social practice. Moving attention to the > > sub-atomic > > level, a field where we have no common sense, > > sensuous > > knowledge, does not help. > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making>> > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > Andy, > > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > > "matter" is > > anything more than activity, particularly when > > considered at the sub-atomic level. > > At that level, matter seems a lot more > > like the > > holding of relations in some activity (not so > > different from the Notion?). > > Or would that be taking things too far? > > -greg > > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > Anyone who got interested in that > > material about > > "Hegel on Action", here is my > > contribution. > > > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > Andy > > > > > > -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making>> > > > > collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making>>> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From jamesma320@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 07:26:52 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 15:26:52 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, apologies for my digression from your point. The sign resides both within and outside the mind - this is my understanding from reading Peirce. Somehow the effect of your article (I'm still reading it) on me is that it makes me think more and more into Peirce... My understanding of "the material" is both interpretative and observable. Although I read Peirce and Vygotsky, the Saussurean/Hallidayan imagery is always present in my mind (due to a linguistics background). Anyway, I feel these thinkers sit together quite comfortably - all their ideas are complementary - and can be distilled into one word: semiotics. James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 15 July 2017 at 13:28, Andy Blunden wrote: > James, I think you're using "material" in some specific sense which is > unknown to me. It seems to me to be something to do with body language as > opposed to speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than discursive > consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of matter" would > simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get > my head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some > place other than the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure > what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it to the > absolutely basic ontological issue which you raised out of my paper about > action. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > >> Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. >> Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense perception >> involved in social practice in a social context possesses the material >> quality of a psychic image (a sign in the mind). This material quality can >> be one's facial expression or bodily movement connected with a particular >> feeling. >> >> James >> >> /_____________________________________/ >> >> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >> >> >> >> On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to >> a lesser extent the other words in your message have >> meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) >> dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy >> doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it >> only in relation to Form, but their definition of >> Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and >> Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't >> like to use the word, because he took it as too linked >> to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific >> way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) >> >> As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I >> said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If >> it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make >> sense of your last question. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: >> >> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out >> anything that has material quality but is actually >> associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, >> as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social >> practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with >> the intrapsychological within oneself? >> >> James >> >> /_____________________________________/ >> >> */James >> Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >> >> >> >> >> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> wrote: >> >> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. >> >> "Matter" in this context is everything outside >> of my >> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is >> human, >> social practice. Moving attention to the >> sub-atomic >> level, a field where we have no common sense, >> sensuous >> knowledge, does not help. >> >> Andy >> >> ----------------------------- >> ------------------------------- >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi >> on-making >> > decision-making> >> > s/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making>> >> >> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Andy, >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if >> "matter" is >> anything more than activity, particularly when >> considered at the sub-atomic level. >> At that level, matter seems a lot more >> like the >> holding of relations in some activity (not so >> different from the Notion?). >> Or would that be taking things too far? >> -greg >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> wrote: >> >> Anyone who got interested in that >> material about >> "Hegel on Action", here is my >> contribution. >> >> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >> >> > > >> > 7830/Hegel_on_Action >> >> > >> >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >> >> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi >> on-making >> > decision-making> >> > s/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making>> >> > /book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> > s/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making>>> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 07:56:19 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 00:56:19 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: <4477da02-6a16-727e-fe5c-326e801e471f@mira.net> My article only goes to issues like "resides both within and outside the mind" in presenting the problem, the dead end, which Hegel found a way out of. The concepts of mind and body are of course which legitimate concepts, and Hegel himself refers to them in this way in one of the quotes in my article. But *they are not fundamental concepts* for me or for Hegel. Further, "within and outside the mind" implies "two substances", i.e., Cartesian dualism, which you have to extract yourself from to make sense of Hegel or my article. "My understanding of 'the material' is both interpretative and observable." I don't quite get that, though don't trouble about that. Ontological claims, such as those in the first few paragraphs of my article have to be taken *just as they are*. They are nothing to do with theories of physics or theories of psychology. Yes, every writer gives you specific insights which are available from their point of view. And that is not limited to philosophy - art, drama, literature, ... all give us insights of their own. But sciences are such that concepts form a system; in each scientific theory all the concepts (if the theory is well constructed) fit together, and *will be incompatible with* the concepts (and terminology) of other theories. To you, all these theories are aspects of semiotics. But neither Saussure not Vygotsky were semioticians, so there is a danger in absorbing their ideas into what, *for them*, is an incompatible frame. You probably speak 6 languages, James, but if you jumble up the words of 6 languages in one sentence it is going to be junk. But you can still enjoy the cognitive and cultural benefits of the world views captured in 6 languages. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 16/07/2017 12:26 AM, James Ma wrote: > Andy, apologies for my digression from your point. The > sign resides both within and outside the mind - this is my > understanding from reading Peirce. Somehow the effect of > your article (I'm still reading it) on me is that it makes > me think more and more into Peirce... > > My understanding of "the material" is both interpretative > and observable. > > Although I read Peirce and Vygotsky, the > Saussurean/Hallidayan imagery is always present in my mind > (due to a linguistics background). Anyway, I feel these > thinkers sit together quite comfortably - all their ideas > are complementary - and can be distilled into one word: > semiotics. > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 13:28, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > James, I think you're using "material" in some > specific sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me > to be something to do with body language as opposed to > speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than > discursive consciousness. "Material" understood as > meaning "made of matter" would simply be the opposite > of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get my > head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if > "mind" was some place other than the material world > where a sign could be located. I'm sure what you are > talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it > to the absolutely basic ontological issue which you > raised out of my paper about action. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling > or sense perception involved in social practice in > a social context possesses the material quality of > a psychic image (a sign in the mind). This > material quality can be one's facial expression or > bodily movement connected with a particular feeling. > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > James, the meaning for words such as > "material" and to > a lesser extent the other words in your > message have > meanings which are extremely context (or > discourse) > dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of > Philosophy > doesn't have a definition of Matter, > considering it > only in relation to Form, but their definition of > Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel > didn't > like to use the word, because he took it as > too linked > to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very > specific > way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I > think I > said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > it's in the mind then it is not material. I > can't make > sense of your last question. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you > rule out > anything that has material quality but is > actually > associated with a mental sign (a sign in > the mind, > as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > practice (you mentioned earlier) to be > tinted with > the intrapsychological within oneself? > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James > > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything > outside > of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this > context is > human, > social practice. Moving attention to the > sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common > sense, > sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > >> > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > "matter" is > anything more than activity, > particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more > like the > holding of relations in some > activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too > far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, > Andy Blunden > > > > > >> > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that > material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my > contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > Andy > > > -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 08:25:45 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 11:25:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: <1500107215796.53455@iped.uio.no> References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu>, , <1500107215796.53455@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Those are the very news vehicles that would be supportive of Vance's analysis. To read something different, you'd have to go to Labor Notes (unions, organizing, labor) and Black Lives Matter https://www.facebook.com/BlackLivesMatter/ The light bulb went on for me when it occurred to me that the poor working class version of Vance's multi-fork dinner party is the food bank. Consider the tremendous amount of organizing that goes into setting up and managing a food bank, keeping it running and supplied year after year, storing the goods, solicting them from places like WalMart. But the social capital encompassed therein does not sell for much. Thanks for your interest. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 15, 2017, at 4:26 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Helena, although a bit late (took some holidays in between moving back to Europe), I would like to join the others in thanking you for your insightful and complete comment on Vance's book. > > With regard to the hopelessness affect that first sparkled this thread, I wonder whether, whereas the hopelessness of the white working-class bringing Trump to power may have been part of a myth, is it hopelessness what the majority of multi-ethnic American society is feeling now concerning the political situation in the US? And if so, how is that collective affect relating to an increase or decrease in the collectives' capacity to act? In the press we see some institutional movements (judges, commissions, hearings), but we read very little on citizens' movement (at least reading the first pages of the Washington Post, the New York Times. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of White, Phillip > Sent: 12 July 2017 16:56 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > good morning, Helen - i read Vance's book a few months ago. as a person who has been involved in literacy instruction all of my professional life, in contrasting your response to Hillbilly Elegy and my response i am reminded again that reading comprehension is grounded in the individual's background knowledge. so, much of the background knowledge i brought to Elegy is situated in decades of working with children in poverty, second-language learners, Shirley Brice Heath's, Deborah Hick's, Jose Limon's, Shiela Valesquez's, Annick Prieur's and John Rechy's work. so that Vance's personal narrative ran true for me. yes, i was taken aback by his political beliefs, occasional word choice's, and especially his personal struggle with internalized violence. i had also noticed that those on the political right and left were hailing his book as an explanatory principle that supported their political values and beliefs. people do that. i found your understanding of the book being grounded in labor rights to be very illuminating. > > > i have found his web site a disappointment. http://www.jdvance.com > > Official website of JD Vance - Home > www.jdvance.com > Welcome to my site! I'm the author of Hillbilly Elegy, and I do other stuff, too. > > > and i thought that he gained a great deal of support from a yale professor - though i don't remember her name and i've not got a copy of the book. i didn't think it was valuable enough to buy. > > > just like taxes and death, we can't avoid political power-plays. and in truth, i find your professional activities as a model to appreciate and emulate. so, many thanks for your continuing coherent voice on this list. > > > phillip > > ________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen > Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 6:05:24 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > Richard, and Greg and Larry, > > Thanks for the reading. > > I totally agree with Richard's suggestion about Arlie Hochschild's excellent book -- the two make a stark contrast. My point, which you probably accept, is that Vance's weak book is serving a political agenda that has a lot of muscle and money behind it right now. > > I wrote my anti-blurb in the hope of finding others on this list who had read the book and had insights into it and how it is being used. In order to distribute it widely (like to the NY Times, where it would probably be submitted int he form of a letter) I'd have to make sure that all my quotes are impeccable, etc -- in other words, write defensively. WHile I don't think I made any mistakes in my summary, it would be a different task to send my critique into the fray. > > Might be worth doing anyway, though. > > Has anyone else read the book? > > H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jul 11, 2017, at 12:40 PM, Richard Beach wrote: > >> Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy more widely. >> >> In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right . >> >> One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their failures in their school experiences. >> >> Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota >> rbeach@umn.edu >> Websites: Digital writing , Media literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core State Standards , Apps for literacy learning , Teaching about climate change >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> Helena, >>> Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? (E.g., New York Times...). >>> I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. >>> Greg >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>>> >>>> A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. >>>> >>>> It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. >>>> >>>> He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. >>>> >>>> His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." >>>> >>>> His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. >>>> >>>> The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. >>>> >>>> In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. >>>> >>>> When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). >>>> >>>> However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. >>>> >>>> In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. >>>> >>>> Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. >>>> >>>> Helena >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Helena Worthen >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>>> >>>>> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? >>>>> >>>>> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? >>>>> >>>>> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >>>>>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >>>>>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >>>>>> Peg >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>>> >>>>>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >>>>>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >>>>>> >>>>>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >>>>>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>> About regency? >>>>>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>>>>>> Here's the link to his bill: >>>>>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>>>>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>>>>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>>>>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherw >>> ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>>>>>> PG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That would be the vice-President! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>>>>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>>>>>> Regent? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>>>>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>>>>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 09:33:54 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 09:33:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <4477da02-6a16-727e-fe5c-326e801e471f@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <4477da02-6a16-727e-fe5c-326e801e471f@mira.net> Message-ID: <596a43c0.0331630a.87287.beac@mx.google.com> Andy, (each) scientific theory generates concepts that form a ?system?. These various scientific systems emerge within particular social practices / activities within historicity. Andy is the ideal (as If) scientific system of practical activity moving towards closure? Each system differentiating from (each) other scientific ?system? which ideally has each scientific system moving towards different types of closures? This being the process of systematic reification. If I am being somewhat clear on your perspective, the theme of science projects tending towards ?closure? is inherent in creating scientific systems as a particular discursive practical activity (until crisis moments) To become aware of this activity allows Us to chart the various (world-views) as an encyclopedia of world-views generated through societal activities guiding our actions. This seems to leave open (values) of which world-views are better modes of activity. The (should) or (perhaps) AS IF realm of world-views as more or less desirable projects. The theme of (motivation) and (crisis) in the background Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 15, 2017 8:00 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action My article only goes to issues like "resides both within and outside the mind" in presenting the problem, the dead end, which Hegel found a way out of. The concepts of mind and body are of course which legitimate concepts, and Hegel himself refers to them in this way in one of the quotes in my article. But *they are not fundamental concepts* for me or for Hegel. Further, "within and outside the mind" implies "two substances", i.e., Cartesian dualism, which you have to extract yourself from to make sense of Hegel or my article. "My understanding of 'the material' is both interpretative and observable." I don't quite get that, though don't trouble about that. Ontological claims, such as those in the first few paragraphs of my article have to be taken *just as they are*. They are nothing to do with theories of physics or theories of psychology. Yes, every writer gives you specific insights which are available from their point of view. And that is not limited to philosophy - art, drama, literature, ... all give us insights of their own. But sciences are such that concepts form a system; in each scientific theory all the concepts (if the theory is well constructed) fit together, and *will be incompatible with* the concepts (and terminology) of other theories. To you, all these theories are aspects of semiotics. But neither Saussure not Vygotsky were semioticians, so there is a danger in absorbing their ideas into what, *for them*, is an incompatible frame. You probably speak 6 languages, James, but if you jumble up the words of 6 languages in one sentence it is going to be junk. But you can still enjoy the cognitive and cultural benefits of the world views captured in 6 languages. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 16/07/2017 12:26 AM, James Ma wrote: > Andy, apologies for my digression from your point. The > sign resides both within and outside the mind - this is my > understanding from reading Peirce. Somehow the effect of > your article (I'm still reading it) on me is that it makes > me think more and more into Peirce... > > My understanding of "the material" is both interpretative > and observable. > > Although I read Peirce and Vygotsky, the > Saussurean/Hallidayan imagery is always present in my mind > (due to a linguistics background). Anyway, I feel these > thinkers sit together quite comfortably - all their ideas > are complementary - and can be distilled into one word: > semiotics. > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 13:28, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > James, I think you're using "material" in some > specific sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me > to be something to do with body language as opposed to > speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than > discursive consciousness. "Material" understood as > meaning "made of matter" would simply be the opposite > of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get my > head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if > "mind" was some place other than the material world > where a sign could be located. I'm sure what you are > talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it > to the absolutely basic ontological issue which you > raised out of my paper about action. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling > or sense perception involved in social practice in > a social context possesses the material quality of > a psychic image (a sign in the mind). This > material quality can be one's facial expression or > bodily movement connected with a particular feeling. > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > James, the meaning for words such as > "material" and to > a lesser extent the other words in your > message have > meanings which are extremely context (or > discourse) > dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of > Philosophy > doesn't have a definition of Matter, > considering it > only in relation to Form, but their definition of > Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel > didn't > like to use the word, because he took it as > too linked > to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very > specific > way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I > think I > said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > it's in the mind then it is not material. I > can't make > sense of your last question. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you > rule out > anything that has material quality but is > actually > associated with a mental sign (a sign in > the mind, > as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > practice (you mentioned earlier) to be > tinted with > the intrapsychological within oneself? > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James > > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything > outside > of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this > context is > human, > social practice. Moving attention to the > sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common > sense, > sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > >> > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > "matter" is > anything more than activity, > particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more > like the > holding of relations in some > activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too > far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, > Andy Blunden > > > > > >> > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that > material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my > contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > Andy > > > -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 09:41:50 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 02:41:50 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <596a43c0.0331630a.87287.beac@mx.google.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <4477da02-6a16-727e-fe5c-326e801e471f@mira.net> <596a43c0.0331630a.87287.beac@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <8a62ca2e-7e4c-7fda-c1db-5695606e3935@mira.net> I don't see anything moving towards closure, Larry. a ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 16/07/2017 2:33 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Andy, > > (each) scientific theory generates concepts that form a > ?system?. > > These various scientific systems emerge within particular > social practices / activities within historicity. > > Andy is the ideal (as If) scientific system of practical > activity moving towards closure? > > Each system differentiating from (each) other scientific > ?system? which ideally has each scientific system moving > towards different types of closures? This being the > process of systematic reification. > > If I am being somewhat clear on your perspective, the > theme of science projects tending towards ?closure? is > inherent in creating scientific systems as a particular > discursive practical activity (until crisis moments) > > To become aware of this activity allows Us to chart the > various (world-views) as an encyclopedia of world-views > generated through societal activities guiding our actions. > > This seems to leave open (values) of which world-views are > better modes of activity. The (should) or (perhaps) AS IF > realm of world-views as more or less desirable projects. > > The theme of (motivation) and (crisis) in the background > > Sent from Mail > for > Windows 10 > > *From: *Andy Blunden > *Sent: *July 15, 2017 8:00 AM > *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > My article only goes to issues like "resides both within and > > outside the mind" in presenting the problem, the dead end, > > which Hegel found a way out of. The concepts of mind and > > body are of course which legitimate concepts, and Hegel > > himself refers to them in this way in one of the quotes in > > my article. But *they are not fundamental concepts* for me > > or for Hegel. Further, "within and outside the mind" implies > > "two substances", i.e., Cartesian dualism, which you have to > > extract yourself from to make sense of Hegel or my article. > > "My understanding of 'the material' is both interpretative > > and observable." I don't quite get that, though don't > > trouble about that. Ontological claims, such as those in the > > first few paragraphs of my article have to be taken *just as > > they are*. They are nothing to do with theories of physics > > or theories of psychology. > > Yes, every writer gives you specific insights which are > > available from their point of view. And that is not limited > > to philosophy - art, drama, literature, ... all give us > > insights of their own. But sciences are such that concepts > > form a system; in each scientific theory all the concepts > > (if the theory is well constructed) fit together, and *will > > be incompatible with* the concepts (and terminology) of > > other theories. To you, all these theories are aspects of > > semiotics. But neither Saussure not Vygotsky were > > semioticians, so there is a danger in absorbing their ideas > > into what, *for them*, is an incompatible frame. You > > probably speak 6 languages, James, but if you jumble up the > > words of 6 languages in one sentence it is going to be junk. > > But you can still enjoy the cognitive and cultural benefits > > of the world views captured in 6 languages. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 16/07/2017 12:26 AM, James Ma wrote: > > > Andy, apologies for my digression from your point. The > > > sign resides both within and outside the mind - this is my > > > understanding from reading Peirce. Somehow the effect of > > > your article (I'm still reading it) on me is that it makes > > > me think more and more into Peirce... > > > > > > My understanding of "the material" is both interpretative > > > and observable. > > > > > > Although I read Peirce and Vygotsky, the > > > Saussurean/Hallidayan imagery is always present in my mind > > > (due to a linguistics background). Anyway, I feel these > > > thinkers sit together quite comfortably - all their ideas > > > are complementary - and can be distilled into one word: > > > semiotics. > > > > > > James > > > > > > /_____________________________________/ > > > > > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 13:28, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > > > James, I think you're using "material" in some > > > specific sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me > > > to be something to do with body language as opposed to > > > speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than > > > discursive consciousness. "Material" understood as > > > meaning "made of matter" would simply be the opposite > > > of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get my > > > head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if > > > "mind" was some place other than the material world > > > where a sign could be located. I'm sure what you are > > > talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it > > > to the absolutely basic ontological issue which you > > > raised out of my paper about action. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > > > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > > > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling > > > or sense perception involved in social practice in > > > a social context possesses the material quality of > > > a psychic image (a sign in the mind). This > > > material quality can be one's facial expression or > > > bodily movement connected with a particular feeling. > > > > > > James > > > > > > /_____________________________________/ > > > > > > */James > > > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > James, the meaning for words such as > > > "material" and to > > > a lesser extent the other words in your > > > message have > > > meanings which are extremely context (or > > > discourse) > > > dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of > > > Philosophy > > > doesn't have a definition of Matter, > > > considering it > > > only in relation to Form, but their > definition of > > > Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > > > Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel > > > didn't > > > like to use the word, because he took it as > > > too linked > > > to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very > > > specific > > > way to do with reproduction of the means of > life.) > > > > > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I > > > think I > > > said it in the paper as succinctly as > possible. If > > > it's in the mind then it is not material. I > > > can't make > > > sense of your last question. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > > > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you > > > rule out > > > anything that has material quality but is > > > actually > > > associated with a mental sign (a sign in > > > the mind, > > > as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > > > practice (you mentioned earlier) to be > > > tinted with > > > the intrapsychological within oneself? > > > > > > James > > > > > > /_____________________________________/ > > > > > > */James > > > > > > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > > No, it would be spreading confusion, > Greg. > > > > > > "Matter" in this context is everything > > > outside > > > of my > > > consciousness. "Activity" in this > > > context is > > > human, > > > social practice. Moving attention to the > > > sub-atomic > > > level, a field where we have no common > > > sense, > > > sensuous > > > knowledge, does not help. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > > Andy, > > > Just musing here but I'm > wondering if > > > "matter" is > > > anything more than activity, > > > particularly when > > > considered at the sub-atomic level. > > > At that level, matter seems a > lot more > > > like the > > > holding of relations in some > > > activity (not so > > > different from the Notion?). > > > Or would that be taking things too > > > far? > > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, > > > Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > > > Anyone who got interested in > that > > > material about > > > "Hegel on Action", here is my > > > contribution. > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From schuckcschuck@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 10:59:57 2017 From: schuckcschuck@gmail.com (Christopher Schuck) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 13:59:57 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu> <1500107215796.53455@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: One good example of such a citizen's movement (at least on a local level) might be the establishment of a Citizen's Police Academy alongside the Oakland Police Department to maintain proper public oversight of police conduct, following a flurry of scandals and cover-ups. The new documentary The Force delves into this a little. I have not actually read the Vance book, only some reviews (including Helen's excellent one). But one aspect that may have brought his book so much exposure and interest in comparison with the Hothschild is that he bills himself as an insider who nevertheless has transcended much of that background, whereas Hothschild explicitly acknowledges herself as an outsider forced to push her comfort zone and expand her worldview in learning to just listen. Vance may come across to many educated urbanites as an exotic would-be Other with a line into that mysterious world, who nevertheless speaks "our" language. Speaking authoritative wisdom tends to come across as more sexy than listening for complex truths. Chris On Saturday, July 15, 2017, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > Helena, although a bit late (took some holidays in between moving back to > Europe), I would like to join the others in thanking you for your > insightful and complete comment on Vance's book. > > With regard to the hopelessness affect that first sparkled this thread, I > wonder whether, whereas the hopelessness of the white working-class > bringing Trump to power may have been part of a myth, is it hopelessness > what the majority of multi-ethnic American society is feeling now > concerning the political situation in the US? And if so, how is that > collective affect relating to an increase or decrease in the collectives' > capacity to act? In the press we see some institutional movements (judges, > commissions, hearings), but we read very little on citizens' movement (at > least reading the first pages of the Washington Post, the New York Times. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of White, Phillip > Sent: 12 July 2017 16:56 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > good morning, Helen - i read Vance's book a few months ago. as a person > who has been involved in literacy instruction all of my professional life, > in contrasting your response to Hillbilly Elegy and my response i am > reminded again that reading comprehension is grounded in the individual's > background knowledge. so, much of the background knowledge i brought to > Elegy is situated in decades of working with children in poverty, > second-language learners, Shirley Brice Heath's, Deborah Hick's, Jose > Limon's, Shiela Valesquez's, Annick Prieur's and John Rechy's work. so > that Vance's personal narrative ran true for me. yes, i was taken aback by > his political beliefs, occasional word choice's, and especially his > personal struggle with internalized violence. i had also noticed that > those on the political right and left were hailing his book as an > explanatory principle that supported their political values and beliefs. > people do that. i found your understanding of the book being grounded in > labor rights to be very illuminating. > > > i have found his web site a disappointment. http://www.jdvance.com > > Official website of JD Vance - Home > www.jdvance.com > Welcome to my site! I'm the author of Hillbilly Elegy, and I do other > stuff, too. > > > and i thought that he gained a great deal of support from a yale professor > - though i don't remember her name and i've not got a copy of the book. i > didn't think it was valuable enough to buy. > > > just like taxes and death, we can't avoid political power-plays. and in > truth, i find your professional activities as a model to appreciate and > emulate. so, many thanks for your continuing coherent voice on this list. > > > phillip > > ________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Helena Worthen > Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 6:05:24 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > Richard, and Greg and Larry, > > Thanks for the reading. > > I totally agree with Richard's suggestion about Arlie Hochschild's > excellent book -- the two make a stark contrast. My point, which you > probably accept, is that Vance's weak book is serving a political agenda > that has a lot of muscle and money behind it right now. > > I wrote my anti-blurb in the hope of finding others on this list who had > read the book and had insights into it and how it is being used. In order > to distribute it widely (like to the NY Times, where it would probably be > submitted int he form of a letter) I'd have to make sure that all my quotes > are impeccable, etc -- in other words, write defensively. WHile I don't > think I made any mistakes in my summary, it would be a different task to > send my critique into the fray. > > Might be worth doing anyway, though. > > Has anyone else read the book? > > H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jul 11, 2017, at 12:40 PM, Richard Beach wrote: > > > Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy > more widely. > > > > In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own > autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s > extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as > reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the > American Right . > > > > One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost > their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like > Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with > their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned > by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their > failures in their school experiences. > > > > Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of > Minnesota > > rbeach@umn.edu > > Websites: Digital writing , Media > literacy , Teaching literature > , Identity-focused ELA Teaching < > http://identities.pbworks.com/>, Common Core State Standards < > http://englishccss.pbworks.com/>, Apps for literacy learning < > http://usingipads.pbworks.com/>, Teaching about climate change < > http://climatechangeela.pbworks.com/> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > >> > >> Helena, > >> Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? > (E.g., New York Times...). > >> I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the > hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. > >> Greg > >> > >> Sent from my iPhone > >> > >>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >>> > >>> A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media > (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It > is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump > voters. > >>> > >>> It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio > whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of > Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's > and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the > industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK > Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed > up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets > through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, > raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a > movie. > >>> > >>> He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, > who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like > "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in > Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there > don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense > of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he > criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. > >>> > >>> His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the > people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." > >>> > >>> His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write > your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it > to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you > should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did > -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity > policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," > so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the > Huffington Post. > >>> > >>> The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It > affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who > were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously > self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is > the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- > tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, > they deserve what they get - are logical. > >>> > >>> In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; > https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/ > 05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not- > working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie > from the git-go. > >>> > >>> When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of > the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a > dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital > (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then > turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among > the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such > thing as society; just individuals and family). > >>> > >>> However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly > productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other > words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still > had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something > negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being > unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" > about the union. > >>> > >>> In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by > dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital > of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes > into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. > Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. > >>> > >>> Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, > I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually > read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, > which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right > -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a > key to Trump voters. > >>> > >>> Helena > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Helena Worthen > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >>> > >>>> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no > reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very > matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I > saw) which struck a chord in the US? > >>>> > >>>> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which > means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big > part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes > called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is > interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - > obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval > hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? > >>>> > >>>> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain > support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support > for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so > on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is > rationalising this? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian > ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on > this...). > >>>>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of > the world" is badge of honor. > >>>>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. > >>>>> Peg > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM > >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > >>>>> > >>>>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between > stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for > removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more > predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him > the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of > themselves by the time the next elections come along. > >>>>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while > Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. > >>>>> > >>>>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would > generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid > - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't > "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of > Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 > years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what > the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some > activism round the country, hasn't he? > >>>>> > >>>>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? > >>>>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at > the moment in the eyes of the world? > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > on-making > >>>>> > >>>>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>> About regency? > >>>>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. > The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of > the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to > "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief > sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, > Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about > presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, > knowledgeable and thorough. > >>>>>> Here's the link to his bill: > >>>>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introdu > ces-bill-e > >>>>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity > >>>>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the > >>>>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or > passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the > framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears > that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's > inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and > there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the > government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such > other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the > President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of > Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to > discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the > issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses > required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to > discharge the same as Acting President; otherw > >> ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides > impeachment) to remove a sitting president. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of > Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most > it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If > hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the > House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative > Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, > the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of > co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and > votes. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't > given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses > of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the > separation of powers and coordination of relations among government > branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling > hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are > a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. > Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? > >>>>>> PG > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol > Macdonald > >>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM > >>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > >>>>>> > >>>>>> That would be the vice-President! > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and > then ... > >>>>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we > hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they > had some damaging information on Clinton. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather > helpless with it too. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Carol > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of > a > >>>>>>> Regent? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> andy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > on-making > >>>>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in > >>>>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in > >>>>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes > how > >>>>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he > >>>>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of > hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. > >>>>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by > >>>>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, > 'enfadado' > >>>>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my > family > >>>>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- > >>>>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- > >>>>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) > >>>>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory > >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative > >>>>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 11:45:38 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 12:45:38 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I must confess to being entirely confused by your suggestion that "matter is everything outside of consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand and there is consciousness on the other hand and never the twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting point for understanding activity, but I would at least like to imagine it could be otherwise. In my work I am trying to ?do this work of imagining how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this another way ?, t? o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the world in two ? right at the get-go? . ? ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there are two types of things in the world - matter and consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and indeed we haven't gotten anywhere). So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or more like consciousness (in that one could imagine gravity being something "outside" of matter in the sense that you are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. ?In solidarity,? -greg? On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my consciousness. > "Activity" in this context is human, social practice. Moving attention to > the sub-atomic level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is anything more than >> activity, particularly when considered at the sub-atomic level. >> At that level, matter seems a lot more like the holding of relations in >> some activity (not so different from the Notion?). >> Or would that be taking things too far? >> -greg >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Anyone who got interested in that material about >> "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. >> >> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >> >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > ion-making> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 11:50:32 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 12:50:32 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: James, I agree that vygotsky, Saussure, and Pierce are playing in the same general activity (semiotics/semiology), but I think they are playing very different games. The strongest contrast seems to be between pierce and Saussure, and with radical and important consequences. Benjamin Lee's book Talking Heads is fantastic at sussing out this difference, and Webb Keane has also done some excellent writing on the issue. Keane's work is particularly relevant in his semiotics of materiality. Perhaps of interest? -greg On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 8:26 AM, James Ma wrote: > Andy, apologies for my digression from your point. The sign resides both > within and outside the mind - this is my understanding from reading Peirce. > Somehow the effect of your article (I'm still reading it) on me is that it > makes me think more and more into Peirce... > > My understanding of "the material" is both interpretative and observable. > > Although I read Peirce and Vygotsky, the Saussurean/Hallidayan imagery is > always present in my mind (due to a linguistics background). Anyway, I feel > these thinkers sit together quite comfortably - all their ideas are > complementary - and can be distilled into one word: semiotics. > > James > > *_____________________________________* > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > * > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 13:28, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > James, I think you're using "material" in some specific sense which is > > unknown to me. It seems to me to be something to do with body language as > > opposed to speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than discursive > > consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of matter" would > > simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get > > my head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some > > place other than the material world where a sign could be located. I'm > sure > > what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it to > the > > absolutely basic ontological issue which you raised out of my paper about > > action. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > >> Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > >> Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense perception > >> involved in social practice in a social context possesses the material > >> quality of a psychic image (a sign in the mind). This material quality > can > >> be one's facial expression or bodily movement connected with a > particular > >> feeling. > >> > >> James > >> > >> /_____________________________________/ > >> > >> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > >> > >> > >> > >> On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > >> a lesser extent the other words in your message have > >> meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > >> dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > >> doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > >> only in relation to Form, but their definition of > >> Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > >> Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > >> like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > >> to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > >> way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > >> > >> As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > >> said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > >> it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > >> sense of your last question. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> Andy Blunden > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >> >> decision-making> > >> > >> On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > >> > >> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > >> anything that has material quality but is actually > >> associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > >> as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > >> practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > >> the intrapsychological within oneself? > >> > >> James > >> > >> /_____________________________________/ > >> > >> */James > >> Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > >> > >> >> >> wrote: > >> > >> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > >> > >> "Matter" in this context is everything outside > >> of my > >> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > >> human, > >> social practice. Moving attention to the > >> sub-atomic > >> level, a field where we have no common sense, > >> sensuous > >> knowledge, does not help. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ----------------------------- > >> ------------------------------- > >> Andy Blunden > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >> > >> > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > >> on-making > >> >> decision-making> > >> >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >> >> decision-making>> > >> > >> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> Andy, > >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if > >> "matter" is > >> anything more than activity, particularly when > >> considered at the sub-atomic level. > >> At that level, matter seems a lot more > >> like the > >> holding of relations in some activity (not so > >> different from the Notion?). > >> Or would that be taking things too far? > >> -greg > >> > >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > >> >> > >> > > >> >> > >> >> >>> wrote: > >> > >> Anyone who got interested in that > >> material about > >> "Hegel on Action", here is my > >> contribution. > >> > >> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > >> > >> 33887830/Hegel_on_Action > >> > > >> >> 7830/Hegel_on_Action > >> > >> 33887830/Hegel_on_Action > >> >> > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > >> -- > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> Andy Blunden > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >> > >> > >> > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > >> on-making > >> >> decision-making> > >> >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >> >> decision-making>> > >> >> /book/origins-collective-decision-making > >> >> decision-making> > >> >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >> >> decision-making>>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 18:01:27 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 11:01:27 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted what I have said in the exact 100% opposite of my meaning, Greg. The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic Church and proposed that matter existed outside of and independently of human consciousness but the nature of matter could be known by the respective programs of rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which guided the development of philosophy and science in the West and remains common sense to this day. *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions of matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist starting point and reconstructed an entire world view beginning from that single concept which, in the spirit of his own times, he called "Spirit". I call it "Activity" and the article shows that this interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. So please, rather than imagining how matter and consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one another and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the future with dreams, be open to taking Activity as the substance of a world view. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > > I must confess to being entirely confused by your > suggestion that "matter is everything outside of > consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the > conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand > and there is consciousness on the other hand and never the > twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting > point for understanding activity, but I would at least > like to imagine it could be otherwise. > > In my work I am trying to > ?do this work of imagining > how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this > another way > ?, t? > o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the > world in two > ? right at the get-go? > . > ? > ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. > You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there > are two types of things in the world - matter and > consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this > involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I > don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation > (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and indeed > we haven't gotten anywhere). > > So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: > what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or > more like consciousness (in that one could imagine gravity > being something "outside" of matter in the sense that you > are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know > you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm > just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. > > ?In solidarity,? > -greg? > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, > social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is > anything more than activity, particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the > holding of relations in some activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 20:27:46 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 21:27:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, difficult indeed! (and you've been doing a fair bit of misinterpreting as well - psychokinesis? As if!). If you won't take my gravity question then can I bother you to ask for an explanation of what you mean when you say that matter exists outside of consciousness? I'm sincerely trying to understand the position that you are setting out, but lots of stumbling blocks along the way. -greg On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted what I have said in > the exact 100% opposite of my meaning, Greg. > > The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the Enlightenment broke with > the monism of the Catholic Church and proposed that matter existed outside > of and independently of human consciousness but the nature of matter could > be known by the respective programs of rationalism and empiricism. This is > the view which guided the development of philosophy and science in the West > and remains common sense to this day. > > *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* > > But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions of matter and > consciousness. He proposed a new monist starting point and reconstructed an > entire world view beginning from that single concept which, in the spirit > of his own times, he called "Spirit". I call it "Activity" and the article > shows that this interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. > > So please, rather than imagining how matter and consciousness could > somehow get mixed up with one another and we can discover psychokinesis and > tell the future with dreams, be open to taking Activity as the substance of > a world view. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> I must confess to being entirely confused by your suggestion that "matter >> is everything outside of consciousness". It sounds like you are starting >> the conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand and there is >> consciousness on the other hand and never the twain shall meet." Perhaps >> that is an essential starting point for understanding activity, but I would >> at least like to imagine it could be otherwise. >> >> In my work I am trying to >> ?do this work of imagining >> how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this another way >> ?, t? >> o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the world in two >> ? right at the get-go? >> . >> ? >> ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. You start by >> assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there are two types of things in the >> world - matter and consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this >> involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I don't suspect we'll >> get very far with that conversation (and we've dabbled in that conversation >> before and indeed we haven't gotten anywhere). >> >> So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: what is the >> nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or more like consciousness (in >> that one could imagine gravity being something "outside" of matter in the >> sense that you are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know you >> are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm just trying to figure >> out how you reconcile all of this. >> >> ?In solidarity,? >> -greg? >> >> >> On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. >> >> "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my >> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, >> social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic >> level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous >> knowledge, does not help. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Andy, >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is >> anything more than activity, particularly when >> considered at the sub-atomic level. >> At that level, matter seems a lot more like the >> holding of relations in some activity (not so >> different from the Notion?). >> Or would that be taking things too far? >> -greg >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> wrote: >> >> Anyone who got interested in that material about >> "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. >> >> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >> >> > > >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi >> on-making >> > decision-making> >> > s/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making>> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > ryThompson> >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 21:26:12 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 14:26:12 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> Message-ID: <9824920e-b387-ba3d-ea60-5740c7e0cafa@mira.net> Firstly, the page of my 15 page article is devoted to showing how if you begin from matter and consciousness you inevitably fall into irretrievable contradictions, so that I hope to convince the reader that it is worth reading the next 14 pages in which activity is taken as the starting point, not matter and consciousness. I have chosen to offer this for discussion on a list devoted to Cultural Historical ACTIVITY Theory because it seemed that such as audience would be open to that idea. The difficulty I think is grasping the philosophical level at which I am deploying these concepts. I am not formulating a new theory of physics, Greg. But you want my opinion on gravity. Gravity is a concept of natural science originating in the 17th century, expressing the observation of a tendency of bodies to accelerate towards each other at a rate proportional to the product of the inertial mass of the two bodies and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. As a result of Einstein's revolution in physics where he refused to take time and space and gravity as entities existing independently of human activity, but rather as interrelated properties of the human activity of measurement, the concept of gravity underwent a modification, in which it is shown to be implicit in the measurement of accelerated frames of reference. But I am not a physicist and maybe I have screwed this up a bit. But of course, I have only told you about the concept of gravity, and you asked me about gravity itself, as something existing independently of the practice of measuring gravity. I don't know about that. What I've read of Einstein tells me that gravity is a appearance. What I will say though is that the concept of gravity has a relatively sound basis in human practice. If I was an electron I would not know about gravity. Matter (in the context in which I am speaking, i.e., not in a lesson on Physics) is a philosophical concept which denotes all that exists outside of consciousness. That is the definition of matter. If you want to define matter differently that's fine, but radical revisions of ontology should not be done lightly. Please try reading past the first page where I spruke the virtues of Activity as a foundational concept, rather than consciousness and matter. But if you are really stuck on matter and consciousness, I have a talk exclusively on this question https://www.academia.edu/9989816/Matter_and_Consciousness and a one hour video too https://vimeo.com/groups/301100/videos/121234193 My reference to psychokinesis was not a misinterpretation. My point was based on the confidence that don't believe in psychokinesis. Why not? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 16/07/2017 1:27 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Yes, difficult indeed! (and you've been doing a fair bit > of misinterpreting as well - psychokinesis? As if!). > If you won't take my gravity question then can I bother > you to ask for an explanation of what you mean when you > say that matter exists outside of consciousness? > I'm sincerely trying to understand the position that you > are setting out, but lots of stumbling blocks along the way. > -greg > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted > what I have said in the exact 100% opposite of my > meaning, Greg. > > The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the > Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic > Church and proposed that matter existed outside of and > independently of human consciousness but the nature of > matter could be known by the respective programs of > rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which > guided the development of philosophy and science in > the West and remains common sense to this day. > > *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* > > But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions > of matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist > starting point and reconstructed an entire world view > beginning from that single concept which, in the > spirit of his own times, he called "Spirit". I call it > "Activity" and the article shows that this > interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. > > So please, rather than imagining how matter and > consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one > another and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the > future with dreams, be open to taking Activity as the > substance of a world view. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > > I must confess to being entirely confused by your > suggestion that "matter is everything outside of > consciousness". It sounds like you are starting > the conversation by saying "there is matter on the > one hand and there is consciousness on the other > hand and never the twain shall meet." Perhaps that > is an essential starting point for understanding > activity, but I would at least like to imagine it > could be otherwise. > > In my work I am trying to > ?do this work of imagining > how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of > this another way > ?, t? > o get a grip on things in some way that does not > split the world in two > ? right at the get-go? > . > ? > ?I assume that for you this is an ontological > commitment. You start by assuming (asserting? > realizing?) that there are two types of things in > the world - matter and consciousness. I'd rather > not start there.? Because this involves a > disagreement in our starting assumptions, I don't > suspect we'll get very far with that conversation > (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and > indeed we haven't gotten anywhere). > > So I thought I would ask a slightly different > question: what is the nature of gravity? Is it > more like matter or more like consciousness (in > that one could imagine gravity being something > "outside" of matter in the sense that you are > saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I > know you are committed to non-dualism in some > sense and I'm just trying to figure out how you > reconcile all of this. > > ?In solidarity,? > -greg? > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside > of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > human, > social practice. Moving attention to the > sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common sense, > sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > "matter" is > anything more than activity, particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more > like the > holding of relations in some activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that > material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my > contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > >> > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 22:19:22 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 22:19:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> Message-ID: <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> Greg, Andy, As I am listening to your discourse from the margins I hear Andy saying (take activity) as the mono basic fundamental approach. I will respond to how I understand this discourse: Consciousness, matter, gravity, are concepts and as concepts are derivative from more basic activity which is primary. Activity as the basic (substance) , concepts as derivative. As substance, activity is NOT COMPOSED of other things. Andy gives the example of the concept (chair) that is not a material object but is an activity. The (entire activity) is REPRESENTED in the concept of the chair. Whatever artifact is considered, it is not the material object that is represented by the conceptual artifact, but the (entire activity) is represented in the conceptual artifact. Mediating artifacts used by philosophers in their social practice are words. Just as we are inclined to IDENTIFY the concepts of ordinary artifacts with the material object ITSELF (rather than the entire activity mediated by the artifact) we likewise are inclined to talk about the concept mediated by the word (such as the word ?being?) AS IF the word were ITSELF the concept (therefore loosing awareness of the entire activity IDENTIFIED in the concept (being) as used by philosophers. So, in Hegel?s time the concept (Spirit) expressed this entire activity, but today the entire activity is better understood as (activity). Both the concept Spirit in Hegel?s time and the concept Activity today, indicate the same phenomena (the entirety of activity). Activity (the entirety of activity) is the one SUBSTANCE that cannot be decomposed into other things. Matter, consciousness, gravity, can be understood as activity (the one substance) so these words represent concepts and concepts are NOT the words, concepts are the activity (the entirety of activity) and activity is more basic than consciousness or material. Andy, not sure if I am taking (activity) as you intended, but is my response to listening to the discourse between you and Greg as I listen from the margins. A tentative probe Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 15, 2017 6:03 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted what I have said in the exact 100% opposite of my meaning, Greg. The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic Church and proposed that matter existed outside of and independently of human consciousness but the nature of matter could be known by the respective programs of rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which guided the development of philosophy and science in the West and remains common sense to this day. *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions of matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist starting point and reconstructed an entire world view beginning from that single concept which, in the spirit of his own times, he called "Spirit". I call it "Activity" and the article shows that this interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. So please, rather than imagining how matter and consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one another and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the future with dreams, be open to taking Activity as the substance of a world view. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > > I must confess to being entirely confused by your > suggestion that "matter is everything outside of > consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the > conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand > and there is consciousness on the other hand and never the > twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting > point for understanding activity, but I would at least > like to imagine it could be otherwise. > > In my work I am trying to > ?do this work of imagining > how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this > another way > ?, t? > o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the > world in two > ? right at the get-go? > . > ? > ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. > You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there > are two types of things in the world - matter and > consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this > involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I > don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation > (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and indeed > we haven't gotten anywhere). > > So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: > what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or > more like consciousness (in that one could imagine gravity > being something "outside" of matter in the sense that you > are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know > you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm > just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. > > ?In solidarity,? > -greg? > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, > social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is > anything more than activity, particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the > holding of relations in some activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 22:23:12 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 15:23:12 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <2c45ef5d-ad7d-178a-694b-a29330d46bf6@mira.net> I am stunned, Larry. You have represented my position perfectly. Thank you. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 16/07/2017 3:19 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Greg, Andy, > > As I am listening to your discourse from the margins I > hear Andy saying (take activity) as the mono basic > fundamental approach. > > I will respond to how I understand this discourse: > > Consciousness, matter, gravity, are concepts and as > concepts are derivative from more basic activity which is > primary. > > Activity as the basic (substance) , concepts as derivative. > > As substance, activity is NOT COMPOSED of other things. > > Andy gives the example of the concept (chair) that is not > a material object but is an activity. The (entire > activity) is REPRESENTED in the concept of the chair. > > Whatever artifact is considered, it is not the material > object that is represented by the conceptual artifact, but > the (entire activity) is represented in the conceptual > artifact. > > Mediating artifacts used by philosophers in their social > practice are words. > > Just as we are inclined to IDENTIFY the concepts of > ordinary artifacts with the material object ITSELF (rather > than the entire activity mediated by the artifact) we > likewise are inclined to talk about the concept mediated > by the word (such as the word ?being?) AS IF the word were > ITSELF the concept (therefore loosing awareness of the > entire activity IDENTIFIED in the concept (being) as used > by philosophers. > > So, in Hegel?s time the concept (Spirit) expressed this > entire activity, but today the entire activity is better > understood as (activity). Both the concept Spirit in > Hegel?s time and the concept Activity today, indicate the > same phenomena (the entirety of activity). > > Activity (the entirety of activity) is the one SUBSTANCE > that cannot be decomposed into other things. > > Matter, consciousness, gravity, can be understood as > activity (the one substance) so these words represent > concepts and concepts are NOT the words, concepts are the > activity (the entirety of activity) and activity is more > basic than consciousness or material. > > Andy, not sure if I am taking (activity) as you intended, > but is my response to listening to the discourse between > you and Greg as I listen from the margins. > > A tentative probe > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > *From: *Andy Blunden > *Sent: *July 15, 2017 6:03 PM > *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted what I > > have said in the exact 100% opposite of my meaning, Greg. > > The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the > > Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic Church > > and proposed that matter existed outside of and > > independently of human consciousness but the nature of > > matter could be known by the respective programs of > > rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which guided > > the development of philosophy and science in the West and > > remains common sense to this day. > > *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* > > But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions of > > matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist starting > > point and reconstructed an entire world view beginning from > > that single concept which, in the spirit of his own times, > > he called "Spirit". I call it "Activity" and the article > > shows that this interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. > > So please, rather than imagining how matter and > > consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one another > > and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the future with > > dreams, be open to taking Activity as the substance of a > > world view. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > > > I must confess to being entirely confused by your > > > suggestion that "matter is everything outside of > > > consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the > > > conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand > > > and there is consciousness on the other hand and never the > > > twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting > > > point for understanding activity, but I would at least > > > like to imagine it could be otherwise. > > > > > > In my work I am trying to > > > ?do this work of imagining > > > how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this > > > another way > > > ?, t? > > > o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the > > > world in two > > > ? right at the get-go? > > > . > > > ? > > > ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. > > > You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there > > > are two types of things in the world - matter and > > > consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this > > > involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I > > > don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation > > > (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and indeed > > > we haven't gotten anywhere). > > > > > > So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: > > > what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or > > > more like consciousness (in that one could imagine gravity > > > being something "outside" of matter in the sense that you > > > are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know > > > you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm > > > just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. > > > > > > ?In solidarity,? > > > -greg? > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > > > > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my > > > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, > > > social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic > > > level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > > > knowledge, does not help. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > Andy, > > > Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is > > > anything more than activity, particularly when > > > considered at the sub-atomic level. > > > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the > > > holding of relations in some activity (not so > > > different from the Notion?). > > > Or would that be taking things too far? > > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > Anyone who got interested in that material about > > > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > -- > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 22:45:35 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 23:45:35 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> <9824920e-b387-ba3d-ea60-5740c7e0cafa@mira.net> Message-ID: ?Thanks very much for the explanation Andy! This is precisely where I was headed in my initial comment about the nature of matter as activity. But apparently I didn't make that very clear and besides, you don't seem much interested in borrowing metaphors from Physics when you can just say it plainly in words. Well enough said. Anyway, your essay on activity is a very welcome contribution to those of us who are trying to get better a better handle on the messy business of activity and who would like to better understand Hegel's take on it all. Thanks very much for this important and substantial essay! (I still have quite a bit of digesting of it to do...) Cheers, greg? On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 10:54 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Without typos.... > >> Firstly, the first page of my 15 page article is devoted to showing how, >> if you begin from matter and consciousness, you inevitably fall into >> irretrievable contradictions, so that I hope to convince the reader that it >> is worth reading the next 14 pages in which activity is taken as the >> starting point, not matter and consciousness. I have chosen to offer this >> for discussion on a list devoted to Cultural Historical ACTIVITY Theory >> because it seemed that such an audience would be open to that idea. >> >> The difficulty I think is grasping the philosophical level at which I am >> deploying these concepts. >> >> I am not formulating a new theory of physics, Greg. But you want my >> opinion on gravity. Gravity is a concept of natural science originating in >> the 17th century, expressing the observation of a tendency of bodies to >> accelerate towards each other at a rate proportional to the product of the >> inertial mass of the two bodies and inversely proportional to the square of >> the distance between them. As a result of Einstein's revolution in physics >> where he refused to take time and space and gravity as entities existing >> independently of human activity, but rather as interrelated properties of >> the human activity of measurement, the concept of gravity underwent a >> modification, in which it is shown to be implicit in the measurement of >> accelerated frames of reference. But I am not a physicist and maybe I have >> screwed this up a bit. But of course, I have only told you about the >> concept of gravity, and you asked me about gravity itself, as something >> existing independently of the practice of measuring gravity. I don't know >> about that. What I've read of Einstein tells me that gravity is an >> appearance. What I will say though is that the concept of gravity has a >> relatively sound basis in human practice. If I was an electron I would not >> know about gravity. >> >> Matter (in the context in which I am speaking, i.e., not in a lesson on >> Physics) is a philosophical concept which denotes all that exists outside >> of consciousness. That is the definition of matter. If you want to define >> matter differently that's fine, but radical revisions of ontology should >> not be done lightly. Please try reading past the first page where I spruke >> the virtues of Activity as a foundational concept, rather than >> consciousness and matter. But if you are really stuck on matter and >> consciousness, I have a talk exclusively on this question >> https://www.academia.edu/9989816/Matter_and_Consciousness and a one hour >> video too https://vimeo.com/groups/301100/videos/121234193 >> >> My reference to psychokinesis was not a misinterpretation. My point was >> based on the confidence that you don't believe in psychokinesis. Why not? >> >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 16/07/2017 1:27 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >>> Yes, difficult indeed! (and you've been doing a fair bit of >>> misinterpreting as well - psychokinesis? As if!). >>> If you won't take my gravity question then can I bother you to ask for >>> an explanation of what you mean when you say that matter exists outside of >>> consciousness? >>> I'm sincerely trying to understand the position that you are setting >>> out, but lots of stumbling blocks along the way. >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted >>> what I have said in the exact 100% opposite of my >>> meaning, Greg. >>> >>> The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the >>> Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic >>> Church and proposed that matter existed outside of and >>> independently of human consciousness but the nature of >>> matter could be known by the respective programs of >>> rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which >>> guided the development of philosophy and science in >>> the West and remains common sense to this day. >>> >>> *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* >>> >>> But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions >>> of matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist >>> starting point and reconstructed an entire world view >>> beginning from that single concept which, in the >>> spirit of his own times, he called "Spirit". I call it >>> "Activity" and the article shows that this >>> interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. >>> >>> So please, rather than imagining how matter and >>> consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one >>> another and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the >>> future with dreams, be open to taking Activity as the >>> substance of a world view. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> >>> On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I must confess to being entirely confused by your >>> suggestion that "matter is everything outside of >>> consciousness". It sounds like you are starting >>> the conversation by saying "there is matter on the >>> one hand and there is consciousness on the other >>> hand and never the twain shall meet." Perhaps that >>> is an essential starting point for understanding >>> activity, but I would at least like to imagine it >>> could be otherwise. >>> >>> In my work I am trying to >>> ?do this work of imagining >>> how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of >>> this another way >>> ?, t? >>> o get a grip on things in some way that does not >>> split the world in two >>> ? right at the get-go? >>> . >>> ? >>> ?I assume that for you this is an ontological >>> commitment. You start by assuming (asserting? >>> realizing?) that there are two types of things in >>> the world - matter and consciousness. I'd rather >>> not start there.? Because this involves a >>> disagreement in our starting assumptions, I don't >>> suspect we'll get very far with that conversation >>> (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and >>> indeed we haven't gotten anywhere). >>> >>> So I thought I would ask a slightly different >>> question: what is the nature of gravity? Is it >>> more like matter or more like consciousness (in >>> that one could imagine gravity being something >>> "outside" of matter in the sense that you are >>> saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I >>> know you are committed to non-dualism in some >>> sense and I'm just trying to figure out how you >>> reconcile all of this. >>> >>> ?In solidarity,? >>> -greg? >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. >>> >>> "Matter" in this context is everything outside >>> of my >>> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is >>> human, >>> social practice. Moving attention to the >>> sub-atomic >>> level, a field where we have no common sense, >>> sensuous >>> knowledge, does not help. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> >>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> Just musing here but I'm wondering if >>> "matter" is >>> anything more than activity, particularly when >>> considered at the sub-atomic level. >>> At that level, matter seems a lot more >>> like the >>> holding of relations in some activity (not so >>> different from the Notion?). >>> Or would that be taking things too far? >>> -greg >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >> >>> > >>> >> >>> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Anyone who got interested in that >>> material about >>> "Hegel on Action", here is my >>> contribution. >>> >>> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> -- >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> >>> >>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >> >> >> >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Jul 15 22:52:47 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 23:52:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Yes, thanks Larry for pointing to the resonances with where I was trying to go and Andy's paper, and for catching that my query about gravity was in the interests of considering gravity as a parallel to activity. Seemed a useful metaphor (along with the idea of matter at the subatomic level). But, of course, I recognize that metaphors are of limited use (helpful for initial grasping but always lacking in that they fail to fully and precisely represent what they are metaphorizing). It is much more precise to simply describe these things in words. -greg On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 11:19 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Greg, Andy, > As I am listening to your discourse from the margins I hear Andy saying > (take activity) as the mono basic fundamental approach. > I will respond to how I understand this discourse: > > Consciousness, matter, gravity, are concepts and as concepts are > derivative from more basic activity which is primary. > Activity as the basic (substance) , concepts as derivative. > > As substance, activity is NOT COMPOSED of other things. > Andy gives the example of the concept (chair) that is not a material > object but is an activity. The (entire activity) is REPRESENTED in the > concept of the chair. > Whatever artifact is considered, it is not the material object that is > represented by the conceptual artifact, but the (entire activity) is > represented in the conceptual artifact. > Mediating artifacts used by philosophers in their social practice are > words. > Just as we are inclined to IDENTIFY the concepts of ordinary artifacts > with the material object ITSELF (rather than the entire activity mediated > by the artifact) we likewise are inclined to talk about the concept > mediated by the word (such as the word ?being?) AS IF the word were ITSELF > the concept (therefore loosing awareness of the entire activity IDENTIFIED > in the concept (being) as used by philosophers. > > So, in Hegel?s time the concept (Spirit) expressed this entire activity, > but today the entire activity is better understood as (activity). Both the > concept Spirit in Hegel?s time and the concept Activity today, indicate > the same phenomena (the entirety of activity). > Activity (the entirety of activity) is the one SUBSTANCE that cannot be > decomposed into other things. > > Matter, consciousness, gravity, can be understood as activity (the one > substance) so these words represent concepts and concepts are NOT the > words, concepts are the activity (the entirety of activity) and activity is > more basic than consciousness or material. > > Andy, not sure if I am taking (activity) as you intended, but is my > response to listening to the discourse between you and Greg as I listen > from the margins. > A tentative probe > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: July 15, 2017 6:03 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted what I > have said in the exact 100% opposite of my meaning, Greg. > > The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the > Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic Church > and proposed that matter existed outside of and > independently of human consciousness but the nature of > matter could be known by the respective programs of > rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which guided > the development of philosophy and science in the West and > remains common sense to this day. > > *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* > > But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions of > matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist starting > point and reconstructed an entire world view beginning from > that single concept which, in the spirit of his own times, > he called "Spirit". I call it "Activity" and the article > shows that this interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. > > So please, rather than imagining how matter and > consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one another > and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the future with > dreams, be open to taking Activity as the substance of a > world view. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > > > > I must confess to being entirely confused by your > > suggestion that "matter is everything outside of > > consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the > > conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand > > and there is consciousness on the other hand and never the > > twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting > > point for understanding activity, but I would at least > > like to imagine it could be otherwise. > > > > In my work I am trying to > > ?do this work of imagining > > how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this > > another way > > ?, t? > > o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the > > world in two > > ? right at the get-go? > > . > > ? > > ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. > > You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there > > are two types of things in the world - matter and > > consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this > > involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I > > don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation > > (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and indeed > > we haven't gotten anywhere). > > > > So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: > > what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or > > more like consciousness (in that one could imagine gravity > > being something "outside" of matter in the sense that you > > are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know > > you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm > > just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. > > > > ?In solidarity,? > > -greg? > > > > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my > > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, > > social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic > > level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > > knowledge, does not help. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > Andy, > > Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is > > anything more than activity, particularly when > > considered at the sub-atomic level. > > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the > > holding of relations in some activity (not so > > different from the Notion?). > > Or would that be taking things too far? > > -greg > > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > Anyone who got interested in that material about > > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making>> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Sat Jul 15 22:57:48 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 15:57:48 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Metaphors help us grasp ideas viscerally, mobilising our practical intelligence to grasp ideas remote from our experience. But understanding basic philosophical concepts is a different problem. It is more one of freeing ourselves from sense-consciousness, stripping away our desire to see and touch an idea. Glad we're all on the same page. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 16/07/2017 3:52 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Yes, thanks Larry for pointing to the resonances with > where I was trying to go and Andy's paper, and for > catching that my query about gravity was in the interests > of considering gravity as a parallel to activity. > Seemed a useful metaphor (along with the idea of matter at > the subatomic level). But, of course, I recognize that > metaphors are of limited use (helpful for initial grasping > but always lacking in that they fail to fully and > precisely represent what they are metaphorizing). It is > much more precise to simply describe these things in words. > -greg > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 11:19 PM, Lplarry > > wrote: > > Greg, Andy, > As I am listening to your discourse from the margins > I hear Andy saying (take activity) as the mono basic > fundamental approach. > I will respond to how I understand this discourse: > > Consciousness, matter, gravity, are concepts and as > concepts are derivative from more basic activity > which is primary. > Activity as the basic (substance) , concepts as > derivative. > > As substance, activity is NOT COMPOSED of other things. > Andy gives the example of the concept (chair) that is > not a material object but is an activity. The (entire > activity) is REPRESENTED in the concept of the chair. > Whatever artifact is considered, it is not the > material object that is represented by the conceptual > artifact, but the (entire activity) is represented in > the conceptual artifact. > Mediating artifacts used by philosophers in their > social practice are words. > Just as we are inclined to IDENTIFY the concepts of > ordinary artifacts with the material object ITSELF > (rather than the entire activity mediated by the > artifact) we likewise are inclined to talk about the > concept mediated by the word (such as the word > ?being?) AS IF the word were ITSELF the concept > (therefore loosing awareness of the entire activity > IDENTIFIED in the concept (being) as used by philosophers. > > So, in Hegel?s time the concept (Spirit) expressed > this entire activity, but today the entire activity is > better understood as (activity). Both the concept > Spirit in Hegel?s time and the concept Activity today, > indicate the same phenomena (the entirety of activity). > Activity (the entirety of activity) is the one > SUBSTANCE that cannot be decomposed into other things. > > Matter, consciousness, gravity, can be understood as > activity (the one substance) so these words represent > concepts and concepts are NOT the words, concepts are > the activity (the entirety of activity) and activity > is more basic than consciousness or material. > > Andy, not sure if I am taking (activity) as you > intended, but is my response to listening to the > discourse between you and Greg as I listen from the > margins. > A tentative probe > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: July 15, 2017 6:03 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted > what I > have said in the exact 100% opposite of my meaning, Greg. > > The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the > Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic Church > and proposed that matter existed outside of and > independently of human consciousness but the nature of > matter could be known by the respective programs of > rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which guided > the development of philosophy and science in the West and > remains common sense to this day. > > *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* > > But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions of > matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist > starting > point and reconstructed an entire world view beginning > from > that single concept which, in the spirit of his own times, > he called "Spirit". I call it "Activity" and the article > shows that this interpretation is true to Hegel's > intention. > > So please, rather than imagining how matter and > consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one another > and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the future with > dreams, be open to taking Activity as the substance of a > world view. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > > > > I must confess to being entirely confused by your > > suggestion that "matter is everything outside of > > consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the > > conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand > > and there is consciousness on the other hand and > never the > > twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting > > point for understanding activity, but I would at least > > like to imagine it could be otherwise. > > > > In my work I am trying to > > ?do this work of imagining > > how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this > > another way > > ?, t? > > o get a grip on things in some way that does not > split the > > world in two > > ? right at the get-go? > > . > > ? > > ?I assume that for you this is an ontological > commitment. > > You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there > > are two types of things in the world - matter and > > consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this > > involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I > > don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation > > (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and > indeed > > we haven't gotten anywhere). > > > > So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: > > what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or > > more like consciousness (in that one could imagine > gravity > > being something "outside" of matter in the sense > that you > > are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know > > you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm > > just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. > > > > ?In solidarity,? > > -greg? > > > > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > > >> > wrote: > > > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my > > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, > > social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic > > level, a field where we have no common sense, > sensuous > > knowledge, does not help. > > > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > Andy, > > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > "matter" is > > anything more than activity, particularly when > > considered at the sub-atomic level. > > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the > > holding of relations in some activity (not so > > different from the Notion?). > > Or would that be taking things too far? > > -greg > > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > Anyone who got interested in that > material about > > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > Andy > > > > > > -- > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch Sat Jul 15 23:09:29 2017 From: Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch (PERRET-CLERMONT Anne-Nelly) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 06:09:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net>, <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7DAA7D3C-7BE5-4202-B5AB-9FD0747E1DDF@unine.ch> Thanks for this. Now I understand where Piaget got his inspiration for several basic premisses of his theory. He could keep hours lecturing on this without mentioning Hegel. He might have believed that the audience knew; or more probably was cautious for political reasons. Anne-Nelly Le 16 juil. 2017 ? 07:21, Lplarry a ?crit : Greg, Andy, As I am listening to your discourse from the margins I hear Andy saying (take activity) as the mono basic fundamental approach. I will respond to how I understand this discourse: Consciousness, matter, gravity, are concepts and as concepts are derivative from more basic activity which is primary. Activity as the basic (substance) , concepts as derivative. As substance, activity is NOT COMPOSED of other things. Andy gives the example of the concept (chair) that is not a material object but is an activity. The (entire activity) is REPRESENTED in the concept of the chair. Whatever artifact is considered, it is not the material object that is represented by the conceptual artifact, but the (entire activity) is represented in the conceptual artifact. Mediating artifacts used by philosophers in their social practice are words. Just as we are inclined to IDENTIFY the concepts of ordinary artifacts with the material object ITSELF (rather than the entire activity mediated by the artifact) we likewise are inclined to talk about the concept mediated by the word (such as the word ?being?) AS IF the word were ITSELF the concept (therefore loosing awareness of the entire activity IDENTIFIED in the concept (being) as used by philosophers. So, in Hegel?s time the concept (Spirit) expressed this entire activity, but today the entire activity is better understood as (activity). Both the concept Spirit in Hegel?s time and the concept Activity today, indicate the same phenomena (the entirety of activity). Activity (the entirety of activity) is the one SUBSTANCE that cannot be decomposed into other things. Matter, consciousness, gravity, can be understood as activity (the one substance) so these words represent concepts and concepts are NOT the words, concepts are the activity (the entirety of activity) and activity is more basic than consciousness or material. Andy, not sure if I am taking (activity) as you intended, but is my response to listening to the discourse between you and Greg as I listen from the margins. A tentative probe Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 15, 2017 6:03 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted what I have said in the exact 100% opposite of my meaning, Greg. The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic Church and proposed that matter existed outside of and independently of human consciousness but the nature of matter could be known by the respective programs of rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which guided the development of philosophy and science in the West and remains common sense to this day. *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions of matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist starting point and reconstructed an entire world view beginning from that single concept which, in the spirit of his own times, he called "Spirit". I call it "Activity" and the article shows that this interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. So please, rather than imagining how matter and consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one another and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the future with dreams, be open to taking Activity as the substance of a world view. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > > I must confess to being entirely confused by your > suggestion that "matter is everything outside of > consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the > conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand > and there is consciousness on the other hand and never the > twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting > point for understanding activity, but I would at least > like to imagine it could be otherwise. > > In my work I am trying to > ?do this work of imagining > how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this > another way > ?, t? > o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the > world in two > ? right at the get-go? > . > ? > ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. > You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there > are two types of things in the world - matter and > consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this > involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I > don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation > (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and indeed > we haven't gotten anywhere). > > So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: > what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or > more like consciousness (in that one could imagine gravity > being something "outside" of matter in the sense that you > are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know > you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm > just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. > > ?In solidarity,? > -greg? > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, > social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic > level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is > anything more than activity, particularly when > considered at the sub-atomic level. > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the > holding of relations in some activity (not so > different from the Notion?). > Or would that be taking things too far? > -greg > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Anyone who got interested in that material about > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > Andy > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From jamesma320@gmail.com Sun Jul 16 00:23:52 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 08:23:52 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <342e5cba-be7a-3797-8dd2-f02057cbe410@mira.net> <596af767.5206630a.98e10.68f9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: I've very much enjoyed this discussion - it's enlightening, thanks to Andy's Marxist verve. I'm an apolitical linguist, more inclined to discourse upon things that are elusive, nuanced and abstract! James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 16 July 2017 at 06:52, Greg Thompson wrote: > Yes, thanks Larry for pointing to the resonances with where I was trying to > go and Andy's paper, and for catching that my query about gravity was in > the interests of considering gravity as a parallel to activity. > Seemed a useful metaphor (along with the idea of matter at the subatomic > level). But, of course, I recognize that metaphors are of limited use > (helpful for initial grasping but always lacking in that they fail to fully > and precisely represent what they are metaphorizing). It is much more > precise to simply describe these things in words. > -greg > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 11:19 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > > Greg, Andy, > > As I am listening to your discourse from the margins I hear Andy saying > > (take activity) as the mono basic fundamental approach. > > I will respond to how I understand this discourse: > > > > Consciousness, matter, gravity, are concepts and as concepts are > > derivative from more basic activity which is primary. > > Activity as the basic (substance) , concepts as derivative. > > > > As substance, activity is NOT COMPOSED of other things. > > Andy gives the example of the concept (chair) that is not a material > > object but is an activity. The (entire activity) is REPRESENTED in the > > concept of the chair. > > Whatever artifact is considered, it is not the material object that is > > represented by the conceptual artifact, but the (entire activity) is > > represented in the conceptual artifact. > > Mediating artifacts used by philosophers in their social practice are > > words. > > Just as we are inclined to IDENTIFY the concepts of ordinary artifacts > > with the material object ITSELF (rather than the entire activity mediated > > by the artifact) we likewise are inclined to talk about the concept > > mediated by the word (such as the word ?being?) AS IF the word were > ITSELF > > the concept (therefore loosing awareness of the entire activity > IDENTIFIED > > in the concept (being) as used by philosophers. > > > > So, in Hegel?s time the concept (Spirit) expressed this entire activity, > > but today the entire activity is better understood as (activity). Both > the > > concept Spirit in Hegel?s time and the concept Activity today, indicate > > the same phenomena (the entirety of activity). > > Activity (the entirety of activity) is the one SUBSTANCE that cannot be > > decomposed into other things. > > > > Matter, consciousness, gravity, can be understood as activity (the one > > substance) so these words represent concepts and concepts are NOT the > > words, concepts are the activity (the entirety of activity) and activity > is > > more basic than consciousness or material. > > > > Andy, not sure if I am taking (activity) as you intended, but is my > > response to listening to the discourse between you and Greg as I listen > > from the margins. > > A tentative probe > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: Andy Blunden > > Sent: July 15, 2017 6:03 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > > > Communication is hard, isn't it? You have interpreted what I > > have said in the exact 100% opposite of my meaning, Greg. > > > > The European Rationalists and Empiricists of the > > Enlightenment broke with the monism of the Catholic Church > > and proposed that matter existed outside of and > > independently of human consciousness but the nature of > > matter could be known by the respective programs of > > rationalism and empiricism. This is the view which guided > > the development of philosophy and science in the West and > > remains common sense to this day. > > > > *Hegel proposed a viable alternative to this ontology* > > > > But he did not do that by providing "new" definitions of > > matter and consciousness. He proposed a new monist starting > > point and reconstructed an entire world view beginning from > > that single concept which, in the spirit of his own times, > > he called "Spirit". I call it "Activity" and the article > > shows that this interpretation is true to Hegel's intention. > > > > So please, rather than imagining how matter and > > consciousness could somehow get mixed up with one another > > and we can discover psychokinesis and tell the future with > > dreams, be open to taking Activity as the substance of a > > world view. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 16/07/2017 4:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > > > I must confess to being entirely confused by your > > > suggestion that "matter is everything outside of > > > consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the > > > conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand > > > and there is consciousness on the other hand and never the > > > twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting > > > point for understanding activity, but I would at least > > > like to imagine it could be otherwise. > > > > > > In my work I am trying to > > > ?do this work of imagining > > > how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this > > > another way > > > ?, t? > > > o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the > > > world in two > > > ? right at the get-go? > > > . > > > ? > > > ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. > > > You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there > > > are two types of things in the world - matter and > > > consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this > > > involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I > > > don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation > > > (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and indeed > > > we haven't gotten anywhere). > > > > > > So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: > > > what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or > > > more like consciousness (in that one could imagine gravity > > > being something "outside" of matter in the sense that you > > > are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know > > > you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm > > > just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. > > > > > > ?In solidarity,? > > > -greg? > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > > > > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my > > > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is human, > > > social practice. Moving attention to the sub-atomic > > > level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > > > knowledge, does not help. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > Andy, > > > Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is > > > anything more than activity, particularly when > > > considered at the sub-atomic level. > > > At that level, matter seems a lot more like the > > > holding of relations in some activity (not so > > > different from the Notion?). > > > Or would that be taking things too far? > > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > Anyone who got interested in that material about > > > "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > -- > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > > collective-decision-making > > > > collective-decision-making>> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From jamesma320@gmail.com Sun Jul 16 00:35:24 2017 From: jamesma320@gmail.com (James Ma) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 08:35:24 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: Hello Greg, thank you so much for the references - they'd be very useful to two manuscripts I've been writing for MCA (planned to finish off after ISCAR conference). Best wishes, James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 15 July 2017 at 19:50, Greg Thompson wrote: > James, > I agree that vygotsky, Saussure, and Pierce are playing in the same general > activity (semiotics/semiology), but I think they are playing very different > games. The strongest contrast seems to be between pierce and Saussure, and > with radical and important consequences. Benjamin Lee's book Talking Heads > is fantastic at sussing out this difference, and Webb Keane has also done > some excellent writing on the issue. Keane's work is particularly relevant > in his semiotics of materiality. > Perhaps of interest? > -greg > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 8:26 AM, James Ma wrote: > > > Andy, apologies for my digression from your point. The sign resides both > > within and outside the mind - this is my understanding from reading > Peirce. > > Somehow the effect of your article (I'm still reading it) on me is that > it > > makes me think more and more into Peirce... > > > > My understanding of "the material" is both interpretative and observable. > > > > Although I read Peirce and Vygotsky, the Saussurean/Hallidayan imagery is > > always present in my mind (due to a linguistics background). Anyway, I > feel > > these thinkers sit together quite comfortably - all their ideas are > > complementary - and can be distilled into one word: semiotics. > > > > James > > > > *_____________________________________* > > > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > > * > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 13:28, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > James, I think you're using "material" in some specific sense which is > > > unknown to me. It seems to me to be something to do with body language > as > > > opposed to speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than discursive > > > consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of matter" would > > > simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to > get > > > my head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some > > > place other than the material world where a sign could be located. I'm > > sure > > > what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it to > > the > > > absolutely basic ontological issue which you raised out of my paper > about > > > action. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > > >> Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > > >> Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense perception > > >> involved in social practice in a social context possesses the material > > >> quality of a psychic image (a sign in the mind). This material quality > > can > > >> be one's facial expression or bodily movement connected with a > > particular > > >> feeling. > > >> > > >> James > > >> > > >> /_____________________________________/ > > >> > > >> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > >> > > >> James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > > >> a lesser extent the other words in your message have > > >> meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > > >> dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > > >> doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > > >> only in relation to Form, but their definition of > > >> Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > > >> Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > > >> like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > > >> to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > > >> way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > >> > > >> As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > > >> said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > > >> it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > > >> sense of your last question. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > > >> On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > >> > > >> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > > >> anything that has material quality but is actually > > >> associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > > >> as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > > >> practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > > >> the intrapsychological within oneself? > > >> > > >> James > > >> > > >> /_____________________________________/ > > >> > > >> */James > > >> Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > >> > > >> > >> >> wrote: > > >> > > >> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > >> > > >> "Matter" in this context is everything outside > > >> of my > > >> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > > >> human, > > >> social practice. Moving attention to the > > >> sub-atomic > > >> level, a field where we have no common sense, > > >> sensuous > > >> knowledge, does not help. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ----------------------------- > > >> ------------------------------- > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> > > >> > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > > >> on-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making>> > > >> > > >> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > >> > > >> Andy, > > >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if > > >> "matter" is > > >> anything more than activity, particularly when > > >> considered at the sub-atomic level. > > >> At that level, matter seems a lot more > > >> like the > > >> holding of relations in some activity (not so > > >> different from the Notion?). > > >> Or would that be taking things too far? > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> > >> > > >> > > > >> > >> > > >> > >> >>> wrote: > > >> > > >> Anyone who got interested in that > > >> material about > > >> "Hegel on Action", here is my > > >> contribution. > > >> > > >> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > >> > > >> > 33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > >> > > > >> > >> 7830/Hegel_on_Action > > >> > > >> > 33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > >> >> > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > > >> on-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making>> > > >> > >> /book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making>>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > >> > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sun Jul 16 02:55:28 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 09:55:28 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> Larry, One thing I remember from Ilyenko interpreting Hegel is the high value he attributes to the concrete universals in contrast to abstract generals. Hegel does not consider the latter also as concepts ; he names them 'notions' coming out of contemplation as sensual given in contrast to rational theoretical working-out. Both these terms appear and realize in 'words' 'firstly' and this 'firstly' means that we are still too far from seeing the 'word' pregnant with all the richness of the 'particulars' and specific peculiarities in each individual component which in their aggregation and unity (unity in diversity) bring out a whole as a concrete universal. Superficial similarities in many repeated items do not bring out 'concepts' like saying 'All swans are white' . This is a 'notion' coming from an abstract general based on an inductive inference . The term syllogism , I think , refers to the same idea even literally. For a concept we can give this example : 'All material substances are extensive' . With swans we could think of one more swan in dark colour in Nature or in artificial manipulation disrupting our notion of its generality of content but with material substance (corporeals in general) any disruption equals extermination of the whole thing itself. And this is good for James to ponder on 'sign in the mind' to see firstly if 'mind' itself is 'material' and secondly how one could put a material something within another something which itself is the outcome of material processes in the material brain without any cognized locus in space . We take the mind's eye as a metaphor surely because it is not tangible and is quite different from the visual material eye in the body. This is Hegel's share in explicating and analyzing 'concepts' just as 'concrete universals'. But as Ilyenko clarifies this is also his doctrine's "Achilles' Heel" because he congeals all other things in them . He accumulates concepts with other concepts to? form categories . For him Absolute Spirit is Primary (hence his idealism) therefore earthly occurrences are considered alienated from that spirit hence all the mismatches observed in Andy's article I think accepted by him at times in clear phraseology in comparison with Marx's theorization of these affairs. Hegel's exemplar is like those theologians who assert they accept all that Darwin said but that all that is managed by God . In Marx's and Ilyenko's view the legitimate negative look at some aspects of Hegel's philosophy could prove one's claim to the effect that Hegel in these respects presents nothing more than Berkleyianism , Humism and Machism because all these thinkers prioritize idea to matter or objective reality. A table is the aggregate of our sensations and nothing more. Ilyenko defines Hegel's concepts as concrete in 'thought' not concrete in 'objective reality' . On Marx's view , it's the reverse order that is , it's working with objective reality (participation in social material production) as practical activity first and then furthering it to the level of rationalization and theorization which ends in providing 'concepts' which at this junction are 'concrete' . Again on the reverse process we begin with a single item or individual thing as 'abstract' . Here the problem manifests itself. If we try to induce similarities in many other things like it and stop at that , we get nothing but an abstract general which is what we find in Formal Logic which does not guarantee our comprehension of essences of things (#accidentals) . If , on the other hand , we seek in that single item something peculiar to it alone which matches its unity with some other peculiarities in other items , then these opposites get aggregated , complement each other in a whole . That whole is then concrete because it contains the whole procedure in its actuality not in its superficial extraction of surface attributes . Then it gets not loose in eruptions and disintegration stuck firmly and tightly in its unification virtually like old enemies who finally get animated in their true consciousnesses . For a concrete example I always have in mind the discrete pieces of a puzzle which in their mere individuality have nothing in common with the whole shape a puzzle forms but when each is considered to have a crucial and definite role and contribution to the formation of the whole shape , it manifests its importance , necessity and indispensability to the ultimate total.? ? ? If I'm not mistaken in understanding Andy , he , on Hegel's lenses , equals 'goal-oriented material activity' with sharing in 'intention' or at times , fusion of intention and activity which is not so productive as to the interests of the exploited and the oppressed . He does say nothing of the corrections made by Marx on Hegel , that is , that Hegel's theory is headlong or upside down ; that it should be switched in a way that it should look upright erected quite firm on its feet. I think you are quite right with your understanding of concept not being activity itself . Regards Haydi? ? ? From: Lplarry To: "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Saturday, 15 July 2017, 18:22:24 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action Andy, Thanks for this article ?Hegel on Action? The paragraph on (logical concepts) was clarifying in the mutual way we are inclined to take the word itself AS IF the word were the material concept and not take the concept AS activity (itself). I hope I am representing this (reading this) in the way you intended. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action James, I think you're using "material" in some specific sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than discursive consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which you raised out of my paper about action. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense > perception involved in social practice in a social context > possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign > in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial > expression or bodily movement connected with a particular > feeling. > > James > > /_____________________________________/ > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >? ? James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to >? ? a lesser extent the other words in your message have >? ? meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) >? ? dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy >? ? doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it >? ? only in relation to Form, but their definition of >? ? Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and >? ? Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't >? ? like to use the word, because he took it as too linked >? ? to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific >? ? way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > >? ? As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I >? ? said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If >? ? it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make >? ? sense of your last question. > >? ? Andy > >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? Andy Blunden >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >? ? > >? ? On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > >? ? ? ? This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out >? ? ? ? anything that has material quality but is actually >? ? ? ? associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, >? ? ? ? as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social >? ? ? ? practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with >? ? ? ? the intrapsychological within oneself? > >? ? ? ? James > >? ? ? ? /_____________________________________/ > >? ? ? ? */James >? ? ? ? Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >? ? ? ? > > > >? ? ? ? On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > >? ? ? ? ? ? "Matter" in this context is everything outside >? ? ? ? of my >? ? ? ? ? ? consciousness. "Activity" in this context is >? ? ? ? human, >? ? ? ? ? ? social practice. Moving attention to the >? ? ? ? sub-atomic >? ? ? ? ? ? level, a field where we have no common sense, >? ? ? ? sensuous >? ? ? ? ? ? knowledge, does not help. > >? ? ? ? ? ? Andy > >? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? ? ? ? ? Andy Blunden >? ? ? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Andy, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Just musing here but I'm wondering if >? ? ? ? "matter" is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? anything more than activity, particularly when >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? considered at the sub-atomic level. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? At that level, matter seems a lot more >? ? ? ? like the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? holding of relations in some activity (not so >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? different from the Notion?). >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Or would that be taking things too far? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -greg > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Anyone who got interested in that >? ? ? ? material about >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "Hegel on Action", here is my >? ? ? ? contribution. > >? ? ? ? https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Andy > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Andy Blunden >? ? ? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> > > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? --? ? ? ? Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Assistant Professor >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Department of Anthropology >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Brigham Young University >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Provo, UT 84602 >? ? ? ? http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jul 16 03:11:11 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 20:11:11 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Haydi, I really don't see how "the interests of the exploited and the oppressed" comes into this. I say nothing of "corrections made by Marx on Hegel" though I make several points of criticism of Hegel and my reading of Marx on Hegel has certainly contributed to my views here. I just don't see any value in quoting Marx in an article on Hegel. I have found that the maxim about "turning Hegel on his head, or rather back on his feet" unhelpful. I'm not saying it is wrong, but it never helped me understand Hegel and has led to a lot of misunderstanding of Hegel and Marx as well. No-one can ever explain what it means without talking nonsense. You say "you are quite right with your understanding of concept not being activity itself" - you misunderstand me. I am saying that a concept is a form of activity. One of the participants in my weekly Hegel Reading Group told me that the main thing he has learnt from the group is to simply read what Hegel wrote. He said that all his life as an Italian Marxist he just repeated what fellow Marxists had told him about Hegel. Now that he has read Hegel he sees how small the differences are. He now understands Marx a lot better for having closely read Hegel. Hope that clarifies a little. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ On 16/07/2017 7:55 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > .... > > If I'm not mistaken in understanding Andy , he , on > Hegel's lenses , equals 'goal-oriented material activity' > with sharing in 'intention' or at times , fusion of > intention and activity which is not so productive as to > the interests of the exploited and the oppressed . He does > say nothing of the corrections made by Marx on Hegel , > that is , that Hegel's theory is headlong or upside down ; > that it should be switched in a way that it should look > upright erected quite firm on its feet. I think you are > quite right with your understanding of concept not being > activity itself . > > Regards > > Haydi > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Lplarry > *To:* "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended > Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Sent:* Saturday, 15 July 2017, 18:22:24 > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > Andy, > Thanks for this article ?Hegel on Action? > The paragraph on (logical concepts) was clarifying in the > mutual way we are inclined to take the word itself AS IF > the word were the material concept and not take the > concept AS activity (itself). > I hope I am representing this (reading this) in the way > you intended. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > James, I think you're using "material" in some specific > sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something > to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe > practical consciousness rather than discursive > consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of > matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". > I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a > "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than > the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure > what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't > relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which > you raised out of my paper about action. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense > > perception involved in social practice in a social context > > possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign > > in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial > > expression or bodily movement connected with a particular > > feeling. > > > > James > > > > /_____________________________________/ > > > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > > > >> > wrote: > > > > James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > > a lesser extent the other words in your message have > > meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > > dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > > doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > > only in relation to Form, but their definition of > > Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > > Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > > like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > > to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > > way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > > > As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > > said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > > it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > > sense of your last question. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > > anything that has material quality but is actually > > associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > > as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > > practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > > the intrapsychological within oneself? > > > > James > > > > /_____________________________________/ > > > > */James > > Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside > > of my > > consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > > human, > > social practice. Moving attention to the > > sub-atomic > > level, a field where we have no common sense, > > sensuous > > knowledge, does not help. > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > Andy, > > Just musing here but I'm wondering if > > "matter" is > > anything more than activity, particularly > when > > considered at the sub-atomic level. > > At that level, matter seems a lot more > > like the > > holding of relations in some activity (not so > > different from the Notion?). > > Or would that be taking things too far? > > -greg > > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy > Blunden > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > Anyone who got interested in that > > material about > > "Hegel on Action", here is my > > contribution. > > > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > Andy > > > > > > -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sun Jul 16 05:58:42 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 12:58:42 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: <1668464638.1769496.1500209922743@mail.yahoo.com> Greg, Obviously Gravity is a concept like many other concepts. And if you want to put one in a tight corner of replying to a specific question you pose , it leans more to the side of consciousness rather than to the side of matter. Why is it you don't ask yourself if there is any affinity between a table , a rock , a hammer , rockets , spaceships and a notion. You have many ideas on your head , you die (apologies) you take all your ideas with yourself to the grave (again apologies) . What remains of you then? What remains of you is matter. An unthinking body. If your ideas are to persist , it's other thinking bodies who should follow. It's for you a scholar scientist who is enriched with many concepts that gravity inserts such a heavy burden on the mind to the extent that he gets dubious and asks himself : "Is not gravity the very force the Earth exerts on things suspending in the air not to go up but fall down towards the Earth?" By the Nature of gravity you lean on all your recalls of all procedures and processes which have led to the creation of the concept 'gravity' . But consider gravity on the mind's eye of an uneducated person who knows nothing in this and lesser and lower respect. You cannot tell him how to fetch gravity but you can tell him to dig the earth. But with bread both of you can think in mutual understanding . This , as you well know , refers to epistemology . In your sphere of knowing gravity exists . But things are different with the things-in-themselves as contrasting with things-for-us. The ontology proper, let's say. Things in themselves do not need our knowledge and awareness of them as Ilyenko repeatedly remarks independent of our consciousness and will. Some people generalize ontology to other domains. For me it's the breakdown of ontology proper. I think what causes you to get baffled with Andy's definition is that he does not add Lenin's extra notion of 'being to itself' in location and space. With out of consciousness , you claim gravity exists and operates . But when we use Lenin's full definition as to being out of consciousness and being on its own as the ontological status of things-in-themselves in specific location , you cannot claim the 'being' 'ontic' of gravity in itself because for gravity to exist it needs your mind 'epistem' and tangibility and specific location in space . The force being exerted does not have these attributes , is not independent from earth , that is , not on its own. If you take , say , energy for matter proper , my arguments are ruled out. I differentiate between matter and attributes of matter. Regards Haydi? ? From: Greg Thompson To: Andy Blunden ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Saturday, 15 July 2017, 23:16:43 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action Andy, I must confess to being entirely confused by your suggestion that "matter is everything outside of consciousness". It sounds like you are starting the conversation by saying "there is matter on the one hand and there is consciousness on the other hand and never the twain shall meet." Perhaps that is an essential starting point for understanding activity, but I would at least like to imagine it could be otherwise. In my work I am trying to ?do this work of imagining how it could be otherwise. I'm trying to think of this another way ?, t? o get a grip on things in some way that does not split the world in two ? right at the get-go? . ? ?I assume that for you this is an ontological commitment. You start by assuming (asserting? realizing?) that there are two types of things in the world - matter and consciousness. I'd rather not start there.? Because this involves a disagreement in our starting assumptions, I don't suspect we'll get very far with that conversation (and we've dabbled in that conversation before and indeed we haven't gotten anywhere). So I thought I would ask a slightly different question: what is the nature of gravity? Is it more like matter or more like consciousness (in that one could imagine gravity being something "outside" of matter in the sense that you are saying "consciousness" is outside of matter)? I know you are committed to non-dualism in some sense and I'm just trying to figure out how you reconcile all of this. ?In solidarity,? -greg? On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 12:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > "Matter" in this context is everything outside of my consciousness. > "Activity" in this context is human, social practice. Moving attention to > the sub-atomic level, a field where we have no common sense, sensuous > knowledge, does not help. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if "matter" is anything more than >> activity, particularly when considered at the sub-atomic level. >> At that level, matter seems a lot more like the holding of relations in >> some activity (not so different from the Notion?). >> Or would that be taking things too far? >> -greg >> >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >>? ? Anyone who got interested in that material about >>? ? "Hegel on Action", here is my contribution. >> >>? ? https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >>? ? >> >>? ? Andy >> >> >>? ? --? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >>? ? Andy Blunden >>? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >>? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>? ? > ion-making> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sun Jul 16 07:16:03 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 14:16:03 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> Andy, please just pay respect to the whole of what I have written. We cannot forget our ideas because you have a strong background in this or that. Any respectable learned fellow could come up with vague notions and those who dare challenge them cannot be considered to be totally ignorant or necessarily on the wrong track or worse uttering nonsense. What do you mean by saying "No-one can ever explain what it means without talking nonsense" . What is the reference for it? To say Hegel have been considered 'idealist' , the last of the German idealists , grounding his philosophy mostly on the Absolute Spirit (idea) reaching therefore to the magnification and strengthening of the powers of the State and its recognition of Civil Rights surrendering the oppressed and the innocent ruled to those monopolistic and absolute rights rendering the innocent accountable to what have come out of them not based on free will but according to the codes of morality prefigured by the very State is nonsensical ? I've been long involved in reading Ilyenko , The rise of the abstract to the concrete in Marx's capital , The dialectical Logic , The piece on Lenin's criticism of the Machists and Bogdanovians as positivists and empirio-critics , The problem of the Ideal , The Universal , The idols and the ideals and his other works . Do you really consider yourself among those who cannot talk about 'it' without talking nonsense? What is the reason behind this? Ilyenko deals with Hegel in brilliant discourse. My talk was not groundless yet I do not claim legitimation . Dialogue is the agenda not monologue disguised in dialogue. Shortly we have processes and products . A concept is a product , the endpoint of a chain of thoughts and actions ; it's neither activity itself nor a form of activity . I've written the details ; you didn't want to go through. This kind of refutation leaves no place for the learners. Regards Haydi? ? From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, 16 July 2017, 14:42:47 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action Haydi, I really don't see how "the interests of the exploited and the oppressed" comes into this. I say nothing of "corrections made by Marx on Hegel" though I make several points of criticism of Hegel and my reading of Marx on Hegel has certainly contributed to my views here. I just don't see any value in quoting Marx in an article on Hegel. I have found that the maxim about "turning Hegel on his head, or rather back on his feet" unhelpful. I'm not saying it is wrong, but it never helped me understand Hegel and has led to a lot of misunderstanding of Hegel and Marx as well. No-one can ever explain what it means without talking nonsense. You say "you are quite right with your understanding of concept not being activity itself" - you misunderstand me. I am saying that a concept is a form of activity. One of the participants in my weekly Hegel Reading Group told me that the main thing he has learnt from the group is to simply read what Hegel wrote. He said that all his life as an Italian Marxist he just repeated what fellow Marxists had told him about Hegel. Now that he has read Hegel he sees how small the differences are. He now understands Marx a lot better for having closely read Hegel. Hope that clarifies a little. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ On 16/07/2017 7:55 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > .... > > If I'm not mistaken in understanding Andy , he , on > Hegel's lenses , equals 'goal-oriented material activity' > with sharing in 'intention' or at times , fusion of > intention and activity which is not so productive as to > the interests of the exploited and the oppressed . He does > say nothing of the corrections made by Marx on Hegel , > that is , that Hegel's theory is headlong or upside down ; > that it should be switched in a way that it should look > upright erected quite firm on its feet. I think you are > quite right with your understanding of concept not being > activity itself . > > Regards > > Haydi > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Lplarry > *To:* "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended > Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Sent:* Saturday, 15 July 2017, 18:22:24 > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > Andy, > Thanks for this article ?Hegel on Action? > The paragraph on (logical concepts) was clarifying in the > mutual way we are inclined to take the word itself AS IF > the word were the material concept and not take the > concept AS activity (itself). > I hope I am representing this (reading this) in the way > you intended. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > James, I think you're using "material" in some specific > sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something > to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe > practical consciousness rather than discursive > consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of > matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". > I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a > "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than > the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure > what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't > relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which > you raised out of my paper about action. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > > Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense > > perception involved in social practice in a social context > > possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign > > in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial > > expression or bodily movement connected with a particular > > feeling. > > > > James > > > > /_____________________________________/ > > > > */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > > > >> > wrote: > > > >? ? James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > >? ? a lesser extent the other words in your message have > >? ? meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > >? ? dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > >? ? doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > >? ? only in relation to Form, but their definition of > >? ? Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > >? ? Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > >? ? like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > >? ? to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > >? ? way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > > >? ? As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > >? ? said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > >? ? it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > >? ? sense of your last question. > > > >? ? Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >? ? Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >? ? > > > > >? ? On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > >? ? ? ? This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > >? ? ? ? anything that has material quality but is actually > >? ? ? ? associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > >? ? ? ? as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > >? ? ? ? practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > >? ? ? ? the intrapsychological within oneself? > > > >? ? ? ? James > > > >? ? ? ? /_____________________________________/ > > > >? ? ? ? */James > >? ? ? ? Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > >? ? ? ? > > > > > > > >? ? ? ? On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > >? ? ? ? > > > >? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? >>> wrote: > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? "Matter" in this context is everything outside > >? ? ? ? of my > >? ? ? ? ? ? consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > >? ? ? ? human, > >? ? ? ? ? ? social practice. Moving attention to the > >? ? ? ? sub-atomic > >? ? ? ? ? ? level, a field where we have no common sense, > >? ? ? ? sensuous > >? ? ? ? ? ? knowledge, does not help. > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >? ? ? ? ? ? Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > >? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >? ? ? ? > > > > >? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? > > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Andy, > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Just musing here but I'm wondering if > >? ? ? ? "matter" is > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? anything more than activity, particularly > when > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? considered at the sub-atomic level. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? At that level, matter seems a lot more > >? ? ? ? like the > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? holding of relations in some activity (not so > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? different from the Notion?). > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Or would that be taking things too far? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -greg > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy > Blunden > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? >> > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? >>>> wrote: > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Anyone who got interested in that > >? ? ? ? material about > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "Hegel on Action", here is my > >? ? ? ? contribution. > > > > https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > >? ? ? ? > > > >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? > > > > >? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? > > > >? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? >> > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Andy > > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > >? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >? ? ? ? > > > > >? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? > > > > > >? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? > > > > >? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? > >> > > > > > > > > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? --? ? ? ? Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Assistant Professor > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Department of Anthropology > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Brigham Young University > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >? ? ? ? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jul 16 07:18:39 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 07:18:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> Message-ID: <596b75cb.d502620a.61bca.da1b@mx.google.com> Andy?s essay has a section on page 5 (Activity AS Subjective Spirit) containing 7 paragraphs. There are a number of notions highlighted in these 7 paragraphs: ? Soul ? Feels ? Habit ? Habituation ? Else ? Sensation Greg, if we turn to this section focusing our attention on (subjective Spirit) I sens (French meaning including -direction) we can engage with your questions concerning the relationality of (consciousness) within activity. I was captivated by these 7 paragraphs Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: James Ma Sent: July 16, 2017 12:37 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Greg Thompson Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action Hello Greg, thank you so much for the references - they'd be very useful to two manuscripts I've been writing for MCA (planned to finish off after ISCAR conference). Best wishes, James *_____________________________________* *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa * On 15 July 2017 at 19:50, Greg Thompson wrote: > James, > I agree that vygotsky, Saussure, and Pierce are playing in the same general > activity (semiotics/semiology), but I think they are playing very different > games. The strongest contrast seems to be between pierce and Saussure, and > with radical and important consequences. Benjamin Lee's book Talking Heads > is fantastic at sussing out this difference, and Webb Keane has also done > some excellent writing on the issue. Keane's work is particularly relevant > in his semiotics of materiality. > Perhaps of interest? > -greg > > > On Sat, Jul 15, 2017 at 8:26 AM, James Ma wrote: > > > Andy, apologies for my digression from your point. The sign resides both > > within and outside the mind - this is my understanding from reading > Peirce. > > Somehow the effect of your article (I'm still reading it) on me is that > it > > makes me think more and more into Peirce... > > > > My understanding of "the material" is both interpretative and observable. > > > > Although I read Peirce and Vygotsky, the Saussurean/Hallidayan imagery is > > always present in my mind (due to a linguistics background). Anyway, I > feel > > these thinkers sit together quite comfortably - all their ideas are > > complementary - and can be distilled into one word: semiotics. > > > > James > > > > *_____________________________________* > > > > *James Ma* *https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa > > * > > > > > > > > On 15 July 2017 at 13:28, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > James, I think you're using "material" in some specific sense which is > > > unknown to me. It seems to me to be something to do with body language > as > > > opposed to speech, maybe practical consciousness rather than discursive > > > consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of matter" would > > > simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". I find it difficult to > get > > > my head around the idea of a "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some > > > place other than the material world where a sign could be located. I'm > > sure > > > what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't relate it to > > the > > > absolutely basic ontological issue which you raised out of my paper > about > > > action. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: > > > > > >> Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. > > >> Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense perception > > >> involved in social practice in a social context possesses the material > > >> quality of a psychic image (a sign in the mind). This material quality > > can > > >> be one's facial expression or bodily movement connected with a > > particular > > >> feeling. > > >> > > >> James > > >> > > >> /_____________________________________/ > > >> > > >> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > >> > > >> James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to > > >> a lesser extent the other words in your message have > > >> meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) > > >> dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy > > >> doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it > > >> only in relation to Form, but their definition of > > >> Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and > > >> Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't > > >> like to use the word, because he took it as too linked > > >> to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific > > >> way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) > > >> > > >> As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I > > >> said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If > > >> it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make > > >> sense of your last question. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > > >> On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: > > >> > > >> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out > > >> anything that has material quality but is actually > > >> associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, > > >> as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social > > >> practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with > > >> the intrapsychological within oneself? > > >> > > >> James > > >> > > >> /_____________________________________/ > > >> > > >> */James > > >> Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden > > >> > > >> > >> >> wrote: > > >> > > >> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. > > >> > > >> "Matter" in this context is everything outside > > >> of my > > >> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is > > >> human, > > >> social practice. Moving attention to the > > >> sub-atomic > > >> level, a field where we have no common sense, > > >> sensuous > > >> knowledge, does not help. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ----------------------------- > > >> ------------------------------- > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> > > >> > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > > >> on-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making>> > > >> > > >> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > >> > > >> Andy, > > >> Just musing here but I'm wondering if > > >> "matter" is > > >> anything more than activity, particularly when > > >> considered at the sub-atomic level. > > >> At that level, matter seems a lot more > > >> like the > > >> holding of relations in some activity (not so > > >> different from the Notion?). > > >> Or would that be taking things too far? > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> > >> > > >> > > > >> > >> > > >> > >> >>> wrote: > > >> > > >> Anyone who got interested in that > > >> material about > > >> "Hegel on Action", here is my > > >> contribution. > > >> > > >> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > >> > > >> > 33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > >> > > > >> > >> 7830/Hegel_on_Action > > >> > > >> > 33887830/Hegel_on_Action > > >> >> > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > > >> on-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making>> > > >> > >> /book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > >> s/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making>>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > >> > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jul 16 08:01:29 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 01:01:29 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I meant specifically that the aphorism about Hegel having to be turned on his head is not useful. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 17/07/2017 12:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Andy, please just pay respect to the whole of what I have written. We cannot forget our ideas because you have a strong background in this or that. Any respectable learned fellow could come up with vague notions and those who dare challenge them cannot be considered to be totally ignorant or necessarily on the wrong track or worse uttering nonsense. What do you mean by saying "No-one can ever explain what it means without talking > nonsense" . What is the reference for it? To say Hegel have been considered 'idealist' , the last of the German idealists , grounding his philosophy mostly on the Absolute Spirit (idea) reaching therefore to the magnification and strengthening of the powers of the State and its recognition of Civil Rights surrendering the oppressed and the innocent ruled to those monopolistic and absolute rights rendering the innocent accountable to what have come out of them not based on free will but according to the codes of morality prefigured by the very State is nonsensical ? I've been long involved in reading Ilyenko , The rise of the abstract to the concrete in Marx's capital , The dialectical Logic , The piece on Lenin's criticism of the Machists and Bogdanovians as positivists and empirio-critics , The problem of the Ideal , The Universal , The idols and the ideals and his other works . Do you really consider yourself among those who cannot talk about 'it' without talking nonsense? What is the reason behind this? Ilyenko deals with Hegel in brilliant discourse. My talk was not groundless yet I do not claim legitimation . Dialogue is the agenda not monologue disguised in dialogue. Shortly we have processes and products . A concept is a product , the endpoint of a chain of thoughts and actions ; it's neither activity itself nor a form of activity . I've written the details ; you didn't want to go through. This kind of refutation leaves no place for the learners. > > Regards > Haydi > > From: Andy Blunden > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Sunday, 16 July 2017, 14:42:47 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > Haydi, I really don't see how "the interests of the > exploited and the oppressed" comes into this. I say nothing > of "corrections made by Marx on Hegel" though I make several > points of criticism of Hegel and my reading of Marx on Hegel > has certainly contributed to my views here. I just don't see > any value in quoting Marx in an article on Hegel. I have > found that the maxim about "turning Hegel on his head, or > rather back on his feet" unhelpful. I'm not saying it is > wrong, but it never helped me understand Hegel and has led > to a lot of misunderstanding of Hegel and Marx as well. > No-one can ever explain what it means without talking > nonsense. You say "you are quite right with your > understanding of concept not being activity itself" - you > misunderstand me. I am saying that a concept is a form of > activity. > > One of the participants in my weekly Hegel Reading Group > told me that the main thing he has learnt from the group is > to simply read what Hegel wrote. He said that all his life > as an Italian Marxist he just repeated what fellow Marxists > had told him about Hegel. Now that he has read Hegel he sees > how small the differences are. He now understands Marx a lot > better for having closely read Hegel. > > Hope that clarifies a little. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > On 16/07/2017 7:55 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> .... >> >> If I'm not mistaken in understanding Andy , he , on >> Hegel's lenses , equals 'goal-oriented material activity' >> with sharing in 'intention' or at times , fusion of >> intention and activity which is not so productive as to >> the interests of the exploited and the oppressed . He does >> say nothing of the corrections made by Marx on Hegel , >> that is , that Hegel's theory is headlong or upside down ; >> that it should be switched in a way that it should look >> upright erected quite firm on its feet. I think you are >> quite right with your understanding of concept not being >> activity itself . >> >> Regards >> >> Haydi >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* Lplarry >> *To:* "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended >> Mind, Culture, Activity" >> *Sent:* Saturday, 15 July 2017, 18:22:24 >> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action >> >> Andy, >> Thanks for this article ?Hegel on Action? >> The paragraph on (logical concepts) was clarifying in the >> mutual way we are inclined to take the word itself AS IF >> the word were the material concept and not take the >> concept AS activity (itself). >> I hope I am representing this (reading this) in the way >> you intended. >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> From: Andy Blunden >> Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action >> >> James, I think you're using "material" in some specific >> sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something >> to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe >> practical consciousness rather than discursive >> consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of >> matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". >> I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a >> "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than >> the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure >> what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't >> relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which >> you raised out of my paper about action. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> >> On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: >>> Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. >>> Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense >>> perception involved in social practice in a social context >>> possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign >>> in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial >>> expression or bodily movement connected with a particular >>> feeling. >>> >>> James >>> >>> /_____________________________________/ >>> >>> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden >> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to >>> a lesser extent the other words in your message have >>> meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) >>> dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy >>> doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it >>> only in relation to Form, but their definition of >>> Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and >>> Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't >>> like to use the word, because he took it as too linked >>> to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific >>> way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) >>> >>> As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I >>> said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If >>> it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make >>> sense of your last question. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >> >>> On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: >>> >>> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out >>> anything that has material quality but is actually >>> associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, >>> as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social >>> practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with >>> the intrapsychological within oneself? >>> >>> James >>> >>> /_____________________________________/ >>> >>> */James >>> Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden >>> >> > >>> >>> > >>> wrote: >>> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. >>> >>> "Matter" in this context is everything outside >>> of my >>> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is >>> human, >>> social practice. Moving attention to the >>> sub-atomic >>> level, a field where we have no common sense, >>> sensuous >>> knowledge, does not help. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> >>> >>> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >> >>> >> >> >> > >>> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> Just musing here but I'm wondering if >>> "matter" is >>> anything more than activity, particularly >> when >>> considered at the sub-atomic level. >>> At that level, matter seems a lot more >>> like the >>> holding of relations in some activity (not so >>> different from the Notion?). >>> Or would that be taking things too far? >>> -greg >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy >> Blunden >>> >>> > >>> > > >> >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> wrote: >>> Anyone who got interested in that >>> material about >>> "Hegel on Action", here is my >>> contribution. >>> >>> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >>> >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >>> >> >> >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> -- >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> >>> >>> >>> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >> >>> >> >> >> > >>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Jul 16 09:52:32 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 09:52:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <596b99dd.4e38630a.c69a4.191a@mx.google.com> Haydi, Your impassioned response I hear as you speaking your wisdom. Your READING from your perspective. As you say the agenda is dialogue. I want to add the term (nurturing) to indicate the agenda, I hope, is (nurturing dialogues) as a value statement. I have saved your passionate response to a file folder for reference in the future. Andy responding is also within the unfolding dialogue but with a differing relation to READING Hegel?s books. I welcome the FELT passion and your contribution to OUR social relationality Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 16, 2017 8:05 AM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action I meant specifically that the aphorism about Hegel having to be turned on his head is not useful. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 17/07/2017 12:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Andy, please just pay respect to the whole of what I have written. We cannot forget our ideas because you have a strong background in this or that. Any respectable learned fellow could come up with vague notions and those who dare challenge them cannot be considered to be totally ignorant or necessarily on the wrong track or worse uttering nonsense. What do you mean by saying "No-one can ever explain what it means without talking > nonsense" . What is the reference for it? To say Hegel have been considered 'idealist' , the last of the German idealists , grounding his philosophy mostly on the Absolute Spirit (idea) reaching therefore to the magnification and strengthening of the powers of the State and its recognition of Civil Rights surrendering the oppressed and the innocent ruled to those monopolistic and absolute rights rendering the innocent accountable to what have come out of them not based on free will but according to the codes of morality prefigured by the very State is nonsensical ? I've been long involved in reading Ilyenko , The rise of the abstract to the concrete in Marx's capital , The dialectical Logic , The piece on Lenin's criticism of the Machists and Bogdanovians as positivists and empirio-critics , The problem of the Ideal , The Universal , The idols and the ideals and his other works . Do you really consider yourself among those who cannot talk about 'it' without talking nonsense? What is the reason behind this? Ilyenko deals with Hegel in brilliant discourse. My talk was not groundless yet I do not claim legitimation . Dialogue is the agenda not monologue disguised in dialogue. Shortly we have processes and products . A concept is a product , the endpoint of a chain of thoughts and actions ; it's neither activity itself nor a form of activity . I've written the details ; you didn't want to go through. This kind of refutation leaves no place for the learners. > > Regards > Haydi > > From: Andy Blunden > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Sunday, 16 July 2017, 14:42:47 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > Haydi, I really don't see how "the interests of the > exploited and the oppressed" comes into this. I say nothing > of "corrections made by Marx on Hegel" though I make several > points of criticism of Hegel and my reading of Marx on Hegel > has certainly contributed to my views here. I just don't see > any value in quoting Marx in an article on Hegel. I have > found that the maxim about "turning Hegel on his head, or > rather back on his feet" unhelpful. I'm not saying it is > wrong, but it never helped me understand Hegel and has led > to a lot of misunderstanding of Hegel and Marx as well. > No-one can ever explain what it means without talking > nonsense. You say "you are quite right with your > understanding of concept not being activity itself" - you > misunderstand me. I am saying that a concept is a form of > activity. > > One of the participants in my weekly Hegel Reading Group > told me that the main thing he has learnt from the group is > to simply read what Hegel wrote. He said that all his life > as an Italian Marxist he just repeated what fellow Marxists > had told him about Hegel. Now that he has read Hegel he sees > how small the differences are. He now understands Marx a lot > better for having closely read Hegel. > > Hope that clarifies a little. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > On 16/07/2017 7:55 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> .... >> >> If I'm not mistaken in understanding Andy , he , on >> Hegel's lenses , equals 'goal-oriented material activity' >> with sharing in 'intention' or at times , fusion of >> intention and activity which is not so productive as to >> the interests of the exploited and the oppressed . He does >> say nothing of the corrections made by Marx on Hegel , >> that is , that Hegel's theory is headlong or upside down ; >> that it should be switched in a way that it should look >> upright erected quite firm on its feet. I think you are >> quite right with your understanding of concept not being >> activity itself . >> >> Regards >> >> Haydi >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* Lplarry >> *To:* "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended >> Mind, Culture, Activity" >> *Sent:* Saturday, 15 July 2017, 18:22:24 >> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action >> >> Andy, >> Thanks for this article ?Hegel on Action? >> The paragraph on (logical concepts) was clarifying in the >> mutual way we are inclined to take the word itself AS IF >> the word were the material concept and not take the >> concept AS activity (itself). >> I hope I am representing this (reading this) in the way >> you intended. >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> From: Andy Blunden >> Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action >> >> James, I think you're using "material" in some specific >> sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something >> to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe >> practical consciousness rather than discursive >> consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of >> matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". >> I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a >> "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than >> the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure >> what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't >> relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which >> you raised out of my paper about action. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> >> On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: >>> Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. >>> Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense >>> perception involved in social practice in a social context >>> possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign >>> in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial >>> expression or bodily movement connected with a particular >>> feeling. >>> >>> James >>> >>> /_____________________________________/ >>> >>> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden >> >>> >> >> wrote: >>> James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to >>> a lesser extent the other words in your message have >>> meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) >>> dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy >>> doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it >>> only in relation to Form, but their definition of >>> Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and >>> Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't >>> like to use the word, because he took it as too linked >>> to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific >>> way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) >>> >>> As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I >>> said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If >>> it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make >>> sense of your last question. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >> >>> On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: >>> >>> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out >>> anything that has material quality but is actually >>> associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, >>> as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social >>> practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with >>> the intrapsychological within oneself? >>> >>> James >>> >>> /_____________________________________/ >>> >>> */James >>> Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden >>> >> > >>> >>> > >>> wrote: >>> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. >>> >>> "Matter" in this context is everything outside >>> of my >>> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is >>> human, >>> social practice. Moving attention to the >>> sub-atomic >>> level, a field where we have no common sense, >>> sensuous >>> knowledge, does not help. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> >>> >>> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >> >>> >> >> >> > >>> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> Just musing here but I'm wondering if >>> "matter" is >>> anything more than activity, particularly >> when >>> considered at the sub-atomic level. >>> At that level, matter seems a lot more >>> like the >>> holding of relations in some activity (not so >>> different from the Notion?). >>> Or would that be taking things too far? >>> -greg >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy >> Blunden >>> >>> > >>> > > >> >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> wrote: >>> Anyone who got interested in that >>> material about >>> "Hegel on Action", here is my >>> contribution. >>> >>> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >>> >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >> >>> >>> >> >> >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> -- >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> >>> >>> >>> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >> >>> >> >> >> > >>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> > >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Jul 16 14:18:08 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 06:18:08 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: In the Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin notes that the Aristotelian syllogism still has a whiff of Platonism about it. Precious metals don't rust. Gold is a precious metal. Therefore gold doesn't rust. I gather that what he means is that in the syllogism it is concrete, sensuous experience with a particular metal which comes dead last. But when we look at human experience as historical activity, we notice that it comes first: that it is thousands of years of experience with a particular metal, from the ancient Egyptians and their obsession with uncorruptibility onward, which leads to the valuation of gold and its exaptation as money, and then generalization to silver. Lenin says that in its idealist form the syllogism is a game: it is this which must be "turned on its head" to see how the concept arises. Today I'm attending a workshop in Wollongong with Clare Painter, who replicated Halliday's Nigel studies with her own children. Clare is talking about how kindy teachers in Australia use picture books. Her own approach uses what she calls "visual grammar", which is a way of applying metafunctional principles to both pictures and text (so for example a picture can be said to be a text from the author, with "ideational" content realized by the figures, and "intepersonal" content realized by the way in which the characters are framed as distant or near, engaging with the child or not). But I'm also reading an essay by Ruqaiya Hasan with a different approach. So then she traces the way in which kindy teachers in Australia teach it. It goes something like this: T (showing a picture of children at school): Where do you think they are? Ss: Kindies, kindies.... T: Yes, they could be kindies, they could be first years. Why do we think that? Ss: The school. T: Right. It's a school not a home. Homes don't have fences like that, do they? Is it morning or afternoon? Ss: Afternoon.... And the T notes the long shadows, and the children notice that the kindies in the picture are facing away from the school building and not towards it. The children are learning not only what the right answer is, but where right answers come from, and what kinds of things constitute evidence for them. And it is here that Ruqaiya takes us to Luria's findings in Kazakhstan, and notes that even the statement "Precious metals do not rust" needs to be built up from experienced examples, not only in ontogenesis but even sociogenetically. If Marx's remark to that effect was not helpful or clarifying, why do you think Vygotsky and Luria (not to mention Lenin) were so taken with it? David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I meant specifically that the aphorism about Hegel having to be turned on > his head is not useful. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 17/07/2017 12:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > >> Andy, please just pay respect to the whole of what I have written. We >> cannot forget our ideas because you have a strong background in this or >> that. Any respectable learned fellow could come up with vague notions and >> those who dare challenge them cannot be considered to be totally ignorant >> or necessarily on the wrong track or worse uttering nonsense. What do you >> mean by saying "No-one can ever explain what it means without talking >> nonsense" . What is the reference for it? To say Hegel have been >> considered 'idealist' , the last of the German idealists , grounding his >> philosophy mostly on the Absolute Spirit (idea) reaching therefore to the >> magnification and strengthening of the powers of the State and its >> recognition of Civil Rights surrendering the oppressed and the innocent >> ruled to those monopolistic and absolute rights rendering the innocent >> accountable to what have come out of them not based on free will but >> according to the codes of morality prefigured by the very State is >> nonsensical ? I've been long involved in reading Ilyenko , The rise of the >> abstract to the concrete in Marx's capital , The dialectical Logic , The >> piece on Lenin's criticism of the Machists and Bogdanovians as positivists >> and empirio-critics , The problem of the Ideal , The Universal , The idols >> and the ideals and his other works . Do you really consider yourself among >> those who cannot talk about 'it' without talking nonsense? What is the >> reason behind this? Ilyenko deals with Hegel in brilliant discourse. My >> talk was not groundless yet I do not claim legitimation . Dialogue is the >> agenda not monologue disguised in dialogue. Shortly we have processes and >> products . A concept is a product , the endpoint of a chain of thoughts and >> actions ; it's neither activity itself nor a form of activity . I've >> written the details ; you didn't want to go through. This kind of >> refutation leaves no place for the learners. >> >> Regards >> Haydi >> >> From: Andy Blunden >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Sent: Sunday, 16 July 2017, 14:42:47 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action >> Haydi, I really don't see how "the interests of the >> exploited and the oppressed" comes into this. I say nothing >> of "corrections made by Marx on Hegel" though I make several >> points of criticism of Hegel and my reading of Marx on Hegel >> has certainly contributed to my views here. I just don't see >> any value in quoting Marx in an article on Hegel. I have >> found that the maxim about "turning Hegel on his head, or >> rather back on his feet" unhelpful. I'm not saying it is >> wrong, but it never helped me understand Hegel and has led >> to a lot of misunderstanding of Hegel and Marx as well. >> No-one can ever explain what it means without talking >> nonsense. You say "you are quite right with your >> understanding of concept not being activity itself" - you >> misunderstand me. I am saying that a concept is a form of >> activity. >> >> One of the participants in my weekly Hegel Reading Group >> told me that the main thing he has learnt from the group is >> to simply read what Hegel wrote. He said that all his life >> as an Italian Marxist he just repeated what fellow Marxists >> had told him about Hegel. Now that he has read Hegel he sees >> how small the differences are. He now understands Marx a lot >> better for having closely read Hegel. >> >> Hope that clarifies a little. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> On 16/07/2017 7:55 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> >>> .... >>> >>> If I'm not mistaken in understanding Andy , he , on >>> Hegel's lenses , equals 'goal-oriented material activity' >>> with sharing in 'intention' or at times , fusion of >>> intention and activity which is not so productive as to >>> the interests of the exploited and the oppressed . He does >>> say nothing of the corrections made by Marx on Hegel , >>> that is , that Hegel's theory is headlong or upside down ; >>> that it should be switched in a way that it should look >>> upright erected quite firm on its feet. I think you are >>> quite right with your understanding of concept not being >>> activity itself . >>> >>> Regards >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *From:* Lplarry >>> *To:* "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended >>> Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> *Sent:* Saturday, 15 July 2017, 18:22:24 >>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action >>> >>> Andy, >>> Thanks for this article ?Hegel on Action? >>> The paragraph on (logical concepts) was clarifying in the >>> mutual way we are inclined to take the word itself AS IF >>> the word were the material concept and not take the >>> concept AS activity (itself). >>> I hope I am representing this (reading this) in the way >>> you intended. >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> From: Andy Blunden >>> Sent: July 15, 2017 5:30 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action >>> >>> James, I think you're using "material" in some specific >>> sense which is unknown to me. It seems to me to be something >>> to do with body language as opposed to speech, maybe >>> practical consciousness rather than discursive >>> consciousness. "Material" understood as meaning "made of >>> matter" would simply be the opposite of "in my imagination". >>> I find it difficult to get my head around the idea of a >>> "sign in the mind" and if "mind" was some place other than >>> the material world where a sign could be located. I'm sure >>> what you are talking about is perfectly good, but I can't >>> relate it to the absolutely basic ontological issue which >>> you raised out of my paper about action. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> >>> On 15/07/2017 8:15 PM, James Ma wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks for such helpful explanation, Andy. >>>> Regarding my last question, I mean one's feeling or sense >>>> perception involved in social practice in a social context >>>> possesses the material quality of a psychic image (a sign >>>> in the mind). This material quality can be one's facial >>>> expression or bodily movement connected with a particular >>>> feeling. >>>> >>>> James >>>> >>>> /_____________________________________/ >>>> >>>> */James Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 15 July 2017 at 09:42, Andy Blunden >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >> >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> James, the meaning for words such as "material" and to >>>> a lesser extent the other words in your message have >>>> meanings which are extremely context (or discourse) >>>> dependent. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy >>>> doesn't have a definition of Matter, considering it >>>> only in relation to Form, but their definition of >>>> Substance will do the trick. I follow Lenin and >>>> Vygotsky in my understanding of matter. (Hegel didn't >>>> like to use the word, because he took it as too linked >>>> to Atomism. Marx used "material" in a very specific >>>> way to do with reproduction of the means of life.) >>>> >>>> As to the philosophical meaning of "matter" I think I >>>> said it in the paper as succinctly as possible. If >>>> it's in the mind then it is not material. I can't make >>>> sense of your last question. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> >>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On 15/07/2017 6:28 PM, James Ma wrote: >>>> >>>> This is interesting to me, Andy. Do you rule out >>>> anything that has material quality but is actually >>>> associated with a mental sign (a sign in the mind, >>>> as Peirce would say)? Do you consider social >>>> practice (you mentioned earlier) to be tinted with >>>> the intrapsychological within oneself? >>>> >>>> James >>>> >>>> /_____________________________________/ >>>> >>>> */James >>>> Ma/*///https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 15 July 2017 at 07:11, Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> >>> > >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> No, it would be spreading confusion, Greg. >>>> >>>> "Matter" in this context is everything outside >>>> of my >>>> consciousness. "Activity" in this context is >>>> human, >>>> social practice. Moving attention to the >>>> sub-atomic >>>> level, a field where we have no common sense, >>>> sensuous >>>> knowledge, does not help. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> > >>> >>>> On 15/07/2017 2:31 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> Just musing here but I'm wondering if >>>> "matter" is >>>> anything more than activity, particularly >>>> >>> when >>> >>>> considered at the sub-atomic level. >>>> At that level, matter seems a lot more >>>> like the >>>> holding of relations in some activity (not so >>>> different from the Notion?). >>>> Or would that be taking things too far? >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Andy >>>> >>> Blunden >>> >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> > >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> Anyone who got interested in that >>>> material about >>>> "Hegel on Action", here is my >>>> contribution. >>>> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/33887830/Hegel_on_Action >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> > >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Jul 16 18:26:15 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 11:26:15 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: That remark by Lenin is his only comment on a passage of a hundred pages or so of the Science of Logic, the passage where in his own idealistic way Hegel is discussing effectively the Party question. It is extremely obscure and I gather it went over Lenin's head. Nonetheless, Lenin's notes were where I got started on Hegel and marked the beginning of the return of Marxists to a study of Hegel in the 20th century. Not Lukacs, not Korsch or Horkheimer, but Lenin. As to Marx's remark in the Afterword to Capital and Engels reference to it in "Ludwig Feuerbach" I always liked it and repeated it to others, too. But it did function as a kind of explanation of why I didn't study Hegel and believed that it was good enough to just read Marx. Once I got started reading Hegel I did not find the aphorism useful. It was kind of obvious that I had to penetrate the hard shell of logical rigmarole to get what I wanted. But how?? The idea of standing it on its head gave me no guidance at all. So I try to dissuade people who might want to tackle Hegel to not use this aphorism as a guide. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ On 17/07/2017 7:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > In the Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin notes that the > Aristotelian syllogism still has a whiff of Platonism > about it. > > Precious metals don't rust. > Gold is a precious metal. > Therefore gold doesn't rust. > > I gather that what he means is that in the syllogism it is > concrete, sensuous experience with a particular metal > which comes dead last. But when we look at human > experience as historical activity, we notice that it comes > first: that it is thousands of years of experience with a > particular metal, from the ancient Egyptians and their > obsession with uncorruptibility onward, which leads to the > valuation of gold and its exaptation as money, and then > generalization to silver. Lenin says that in its idealist > form the syllogism is a game: it is this which must be > "turned on its head" to see how the concept arises. > > .... > > If Marx's remark to that effect was not helpful or > clarifying, why do you think Vygotsky and Luria (not to > mention Lenin) were so taken with it? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > I meant specifically that the aphorism about Hegel > having to be turned on his head is not useful. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jul 18 01:26:53 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:26:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces In-Reply-To: <596a18f0.8356620a.390d7.8142@mx.google.com> References: <9164E7BE-725A-40FF-9F6B-384615446EE8@umich.edu> , <1500111561459.45209@iped.uio.no>, <596a18f0.8356620a.390d7.8142@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1500366434880.92269@iped.uio.no> Yes Larry, moving and being moved surely are moments of a same unit, though that observation still is pretty abstract or general, is not it? Not sensuous without action, not action without sensuous. Yet, we may very well find that someone acted insensibly, or that this or that sensation paralysed us so that we could not act; not event think! Peter's and Mike's and mine experiences of feeling thoughts/thinking feelings trouble a little Harburg's comments that, Music makes you feel a feeling; Words make you think a thought; Songs make you feel a thought. At some points, it may seem that Peter's remarks (that it is pretty difficult to feel thoughts) and Mike's remarks (that it is pretty difficult to think without also feeling) are opposite. But it also may be that both argumentations may have different significance in the light of different inquiry lines. I mean, if we are concerned with defining human action in general, we may then want to assert a unity of affect and action, and of affect and thought, all the way through.Philosophers such as Michel Henry, who has developed a 'Phenomenology of the Flesh' in which 'self-affection' rather than merely the 'sensuous' is foundational to human kind, are also very powerful arguments for holding a unity of intellect and affect. My dear colleague and mentor W-M Roth's is a good example of how such a philosophy can play out in empirical analyses of, e.g., mathematics teaching/learning, and how they can lead to insights of practical relevance too. Yet, we may also want to pursue other lines of inquiry where we are interested not on understanding unity but rather separation. How, if we accept some unity or genetic connection between affect and intellect, do we understand that some human actions appear indeed pretty insensible? Or that some wordings arise so much feeling in us? Words can very well make you cry, or perhaps want to kill yourself, no matter whether they are shouted, whispered, or told by a voice-machine. I don't think that an analysis of the relations between images and text in themselves can throw much light on today's cases of suicide related to cyber-bullying, for example. Words make you think a thought (and poems make you awake some feelings) but they can also make you shoot at someone, if you are well trained, armed, and your superior tells you to do so. A brief reading of Navy Seal memories (like Chris Kyle's or Kevin Lacz's show how much *work* there is in their narrative to account for the fact of coolness in killing; of motive in their doing). The Marilyn Manson?Columbine High School massacre controversy, if only a controversy--may do for an extreme mock-up of how music can be attributed with rational/irrational powers. So, how do we account for those separations between intellect and affect and action? I think that Vygotsky and Marx can be taken to be working towards a concrete approach to the latter question, while building on the general premise that there is a unity. So, back to perezhivanie, and as we (Jornet & Roth) wrote in the final commentary of the special issue, positing that there is unity can only be a start, but no more than that. I think David Kellogg's recent 'fan-fucking-tastic' (his writing!) remarks on 'semiogenesis' were attempting to address these distinction between affect and intellect as an internal relation via a concrete inquiry. Yet, I wonder whether psychological or linguistic inquiry can do, for it seems that each different historical practice exhibits different forms of relation between feelings and reasons. This is as far as I came... I still have to read Andy on Hegel and action to see whether there is light there on these, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lplarry Sent: 15 July 2017 15:30 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces Alfredo, To echo (and therefore amplify) this phrase: ?I can very well (feel) moved by?... This way of saying what is occurring (to be moved by) is i believe what Merleau-Ponty discursively explores AS PASSIVITY. So when exploring (activity) and (action) as moving phenomena we also are exploring (passivity) Moving & being moved by Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: July 15, 2017 2:40 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces Yes, Greg, I also thought of the connection with Perezhivanie when it comes to Peter's very interesting comment on the octave jump in "Some-where," and your comment on the two-part harmony. Definitely must have to do with difference, cause it is difference what we 'feel,' even if in some cases it may be a difference that achieves 'sameness'. Yet, I was also thinking that I can very well 'feel' moved reading a text where there is not sound, no shift in pitch... My two-years daughter, in hearing Trump, was also catching on all those non-verbal (she does not understand much English yet) signals when she called Trump 'enfadado' (angry). But then again, the same can be achieved by only words. I can get very very upset everyday reading the world's news ... So, yes, words can give thoughts, but not just thoughts. I also grew up listening to lots of English-speaking music when I was a child (e.g., my older sister's Suzanne Vega and also Supertramp albums were my favourites). I could not understand much of what they said, but they definitively made me feel. And I would say those were not 'thought-less' feelings. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: 13 July 2017 21:07 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Inner thought in theater pieces And I think I posted this a few months back, but here is a Democracy Now tribute to Yip Harburg that includes an interview with his son (apologies if someone else posted this and I missed it): https://www.democracynow.org/2008/12/25/a_tribute_to_yip_harburg_the Interesting to think about the the octave jump in "Some-where" and how it adds emotional resonance. Seems to resonate with what is being taken up in other threads here regarding perezhivanie, now? Two-part harmony? -greg On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 12:57 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > Mike > > What you say is interesting, but it is not my experience and not that > of any I have talked so far (other than yourself). I can, for example, > imagine winning the lottery. I can imagine even imagine that I felt a > feeling that most would feel on that occurrence; however I do not feel > those feelings if I imagine winning the lottery (I just tried it, by the > way). I can imagine that I came home tired tomorrow evening, I can imagine > that I was tired, but I do not feel tired when I do that imagining (even > though I was tired last night so I know what those feeling were like). It > may quite well be a lack in me and others. > Anyway, how does it feel when you imagine coming home tired or do I > misunderstand. Are you saying you imagine coming home tired and find > yourself feeling something - say irritation - or are you saying, in your > body and mind, you feel what you normally identify as tiredness? > > Ed > > > On Jul 12, 2017, at 10:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Hi Ed-- How could you NOT feel something that was imagined? Imagine you > won > > the lottery? Imagine you come home tired tomorrow evening? Imagine what > you > > like, but imagine it without a feeling about it? sounds like a pathology > (!) > > > > I have discovered that a movie of Finian's rainbow is pretty widely > > accessible. you tube, amazon, elsewhere. If you read the entry in > > wikipedia, or the info I discovered at the Harburg Foundation, you will > be > > able to discern the affinity between Harburg and xmca. For example: > > > > Feisty Irishman Finian McLonergan (Fred Astaire) and his faithful > daughter, > > Sharon (Petula Clark), bearing a pot of gold stolen from the leprechaun > Og > > (Tommy Steele), settle in the village of Rainbow Valley, Missitucky. > Siding > > with local sharecroppers like Woody Mahoney (Don Francks) against a > blustering, > > bigoted local politician (Keenan Wynn), the McLonergans get into a number > > of fanciful scrapes while being pursued by the magical Og, who will > become > > mortal if he doesn't recover his gold. > > > > > > Now I am off to watch the movie! :-) > > > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 7:01 PM, Edward Wall wrote: > > > >> Late to this conversation; however, I been thinking about whether one > can > >> feel something that is imagined and, if so, what would it be like > (there is > >> some debate about this). It would seem that Harberg, to some extent, > says > >> ?yes" with ?Songs make you feel a thought.? Quite interesting. > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> > >>> On Jul 12, 2017, at 7:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> Whoa! Small world. I learn something new about the wonderful Yip > Harberg > >>> and that the Fennyhough is on kindle in adjacent message on xmca! The > >> book > >>> appears to converge on a lot of long term xmca concerns. (And to listen > >> to > >>> Finian's rueful refrain again would be a joy) > >>> :-) > >>> > >>> Having the book simultaneously available and less than 100$ is a great > >>> resource. > >>> > >>> Thanks Peter and Daniel. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Thank you for these compelling and heartfelt thoughts, Peter. I'm > >> scoping > >>>> up the book on Kindle and may have further reflections or questions > for > >> you > >>>> over the next few weeks. There was an NPR Radiolab episode a few years > >> ago > >>>> about people with damaged limbic systems who couldn't make decisions - > >>>> perhaps pertinent to the concept of unity of thought and feeling, > which > >> I > >>>> would also like to take a closer look at. > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards and many thanks, > >>>> > >>>> Daniel > >>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 3:48 PM Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > >>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi, Daniel. > >>>>> > >>>>> Fernyhough's book doesn't delve into the intricacies of a musician's > >>>> *inner > >>>>> ear*, > >>>>> but he does cover internal speech without sound, internal sound > without > >>>>> words, > >>>>> the internal *felt presence* of a person who doesn't speak, and > >> internal > >>>>> voices > >>>>> that are disembodied. From these and other examples he suggests that > >>>>> hearing > >>>>> voices is a much richer phenomenon than just auditory perception: it > is > >>>> the > >>>>> surface > >>>>> level of an inner experience that embraces the imagining of a > *person*, > >>>> who > >>>>> has > >>>>> an individual point of view and a characteristic voice. Only pieces > of > >>>> this > >>>>> inner > >>>>> person may come to be experienced consciously. > >>>>> > >>>>> Regarding the deaf, Fernyhough explores inner signing and inner > >> voices-- > >>>>> yes, > >>>>> deaf people who hear voices internally but who have never had the > >>>>> experience > >>>>> of hearing the voices of others! Many of the internal musical > >> experiences > >>>>> that > >>>>> you mention have auditory parallels in the case studies he presents. > >>>>> > >>>>> As a former musician myself (in my youth), I have always wondered > about > >>>>> those > >>>>> musicians who claim to have perfect pitch. I don't possess that > >> ability, > >>>>> but I have > >>>>> absolutely no need for a tuning device when I tune my guitar strings: > >> my > >>>>> inner > >>>>> (and outer) ear is all I need. > >>>>> > >>>>> Since you raised the issue of the pairings of words and music, I'd > like > >>>> to > >>>>> take this > >>>>> opportunity to share a favorite quote from Yip Harberg, classmate of > >> Ira > >>>>> Gershwin > >>>>> and composer of the words and music for The Wizard of Oz, Finnian's > >>>>> Rainbow, > >>>>> and the Depression-era song Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Harberg > >> gave > >>>> a > >>>>> lot > >>>>> of thought to the relation between music and words, noting that: > >>>>> > >>>>> Music makes you feel a feeling; > >>>>> Words make you think a thought; > >>>>> Songs make you feel a thought. > >>>>> > >>>>> The quote above came to mind as I was eavesdropping on an earlier > >>>>> conversation > >>>>> on this listserv (a month ago!) concerning Vygotsky's notion of the > >> unity > >>>>> of thinking > >>>>> and emotions in the formation of the human personality. Personally, I > >>>> have > >>>>> trouble > >>>>> conjuring up an image of *emotions*, but I have no difficulty > >>>> experiencing > >>>>> emotions > >>>>> when they take a musical form. I am much more comfortable thinking > >> about > >>>>> feelings > >>>>> than I am about feeling thoughts. Intellectualizing emotions is a > >>>> cultural > >>>>> experience > >>>>> that many men excel at, I suspect. > >>>>> > >>>>> My two cents. > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:33 PM, Daniel Hyman < > >>>> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Many thanks to both Ulvi and Peter for the points about internal > >>>> speech, > >>>>>> its role in drama, and Fernyhough's work from last year. As I'm a > >>>>> musician, > >>>>>> they bring to mind (hopefully) related questions (apparently glanced > >> at > >>>>> in > >>>>>> The Voices Within) which I'd be grateful to know more about, in the > >>>>>> contexts of psychology or neurobiology: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Musicians use the term "inner ear" (though "inner voice" might be > >>>> more > >>>>>> specific) to denote the faculty of being able to subjectively "hear" > >>>>>> melody, song, chant/rap (rhythmic words without melody), (groups of) > >>>>>> instruments and the like, untethered to physical sound. The most > >>>> extreme > >>>>>> cases concern composers such as Beethoven, Smetana, and Faur? who > lost > >>>>>> their hearing in adulthood. But anyone who can read a score, > practice > >>>>>> toward matching a concrete tonal image, recall a concert, audiate > what > >>>>> they > >>>>>> are about to play or sing, or receive new musical ideas, does this. > >>>> Need > >>>>>> one only be a trained musician, or are there other paths to this > >>>> ability? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some "inner ear" experiences are paired with words, others with > >>>> events > >>>>>> (e.g., birdcalls, thunderstorms, night sounds of nature, the > quickened > >>>>>> pulse of desire, galloping horses' hooves), some with waves of > >> feelings > >>>>>> that might fit words (or not), some are simply music. How are these > >>>>> alike, > >>>>>> and different? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Some pairings of words and music are socially organized (Mozart > and > >>>> da > >>>>>> Ponte, Rodgers and Hammerstein, George and Ira Gershwin), others > >>>> internal > >>>>>> to one person (Wagner, Mahler). How are these alike and different? > How > >>>>> does > >>>>>> parody (the type where new words are fitted to an old tune) relate > to > >> a > >>>>>> live composer setting words from a past poet? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Tinnitus (ringing in the ears after hearing loss) is now suggested > >> to > >>>>> be > >>>>>> the effect of the brain filling in tones it "thinks" are happening > but > >>>>> not > >>>>>> heard. Is this purely physical, or can experience, training, > >>>> reflection, > >>>>> or > >>>>>> other factors alter it? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I guess the common thread is, what do psychology and neurobiology > >> offer > >>>>> (or > >>>>>> promise) to help us understand these types of musical experience, > >>>>> ability, > >>>>>> and disability? Thanks in advance to anyone moved to chime in, or > >>>>> recommend > >>>>>> readings. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Daniel > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Ulvi ??il > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thank you Peter. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 12 Tem 2017 17:38 tarihinde "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" < > >>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> yazd?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Your questions about the science of inner speech monologue and its > >>>>> use > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the analysis of theatrical material - to convey the internal > >>>> richness > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> ?the ? > >>>>>>>> emotion > >>>>>>>> ? > >>>>>>>> and thought > >>>>>>>> ?? > >>>>>>>> ?of > >>>>>>>> characters > >>>>>>>> ? - are tangentially addressed by Charles Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> in his recent book The Voices Within. Charles is a colleague who > >>>>> works > >>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>> theory of private and inner speech development, but who > specializes > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the dialogicality of inner speech and its role in people who hear > >>>>>> voices > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>> both normal > >>>>>>>> and hallucinatory. While he doesn't directly address the issue of > >>>>>>>> theatrical characters, > >>>>>>>> he does provide insights - based on evidence and research - into > >>>> the > >>>>>>>> creative > >>>>>>>> writing process of novelists, and the various roles that inner > >>>> voices > >>>>>>> play > >>>>>>>> in their > >>>>>>>> work and thought. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I highly recommend this book because of the admirable way in which > >>>>>>>> Fernyhough > >>>>>>>> manages to navigate highly complicated issues concerning a > >>>> phenomenon > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> is largely elusive - even though it constitutes the highest stage > >>>> in > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> development > >>>>>>>> of verbal thinking. As a less courageous researcher, I chose to > >>>> study > >>>>>>>> private speech > >>>>>>>> because the data are empirical and tangible, subject to linguistic > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>> sociolinguistic > >>>>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www. > >>>>>> amazon.com_Voices-2DWithin-2DHistory-2DScience-2D&d=DwIFaQ&c= > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r= > >>>>>> mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m= > >>>>>> iXFaj8Q4I5K2fbAjp7wwg7xDtlZs8s_s7DI7l664u24&s= > >>>>>> DEs5D5eLtGRTqr_XA8tkmjg4GFaAp_30zW3KKzPHIqg&e= > >>>>>>>> Ourselves/dp/0465096808 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Peter > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 2:36 PM, Ulvi ??il > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Nazim Hikmet uses widely inner thought and momologue in a work > >>>> to > >>>>>>> convey > >>>>>>>>> the internal richness of emotion and thought of his characters. > >>>>>>>> Especially > >>>>>>>>> inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The name of the work is Ferhad and Sirin, and another name is > >>>>> Legend > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Anyone can see the very interesting content of the work, > >>>> characters > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>> struggle in a triangle of love. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It is a quite successful work, played by Bolshoi. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My questions are: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of psychology make wide use of such theater > >>>> work? > >>>>>> i.e. > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> terms of the inner thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does the science of pscyhology make use of such theater work in > >>>>> terms > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> human development? i.e. in terms of the "defects" human beings > >>>>>> possess. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>> Director, > >>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Fordham University > >>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > >>>>> Director, > >>>>> Office of Institutional Research > >>>>> > >>>>> Fordham University > >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 > >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 > >>>>> > >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 > >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 > >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jul 18 01:28:31 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:28:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu>, , <1500107215796.53455@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1500366533130.20933@iped.uio.no> Thanks for the link, Helena. And the analogy with the food bank ... illuminating. A ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen Sent: 15 July 2017 17:25 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump Those are the very news vehicles that would be supportive of Vance's analysis. To read something different, you'd have to go to Labor Notes (unions, organizing, labor) and Black Lives Matter https://www.facebook.com/BlackLivesMatter/ The light bulb went on for me when it occurred to me that the poor working class version of Vance's multi-fork dinner party is the food bank. Consider the tremendous amount of organizing that goes into setting up and managing a food bank, keeping it running and supplied year after year, storing the goods, solicting them from places like WalMart. But the social capital encompassed therein does not sell for much. Thanks for your interest. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On Jul 15, 2017, at 4:26 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Helena, although a bit late (took some holidays in between moving back to Europe), I would like to join the others in thanking you for your insightful and complete comment on Vance's book. > > With regard to the hopelessness affect that first sparkled this thread, I wonder whether, whereas the hopelessness of the white working-class bringing Trump to power may have been part of a myth, is it hopelessness what the majority of multi-ethnic American society is feeling now concerning the political situation in the US? And if so, how is that collective affect relating to an increase or decrease in the collectives' capacity to act? In the press we see some institutional movements (judges, commissions, hearings), but we read very little on citizens' movement (at least reading the first pages of the Washington Post, the New York Times. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of White, Phillip > Sent: 12 July 2017 16:56 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > good morning, Helen - i read Vance's book a few months ago. as a person who has been involved in literacy instruction all of my professional life, in contrasting your response to Hillbilly Elegy and my response i am reminded again that reading comprehension is grounded in the individual's background knowledge. so, much of the background knowledge i brought to Elegy is situated in decades of working with children in poverty, second-language learners, Shirley Brice Heath's, Deborah Hick's, Jose Limon's, Shiela Valesquez's, Annick Prieur's and John Rechy's work. so that Vance's personal narrative ran true for me. yes, i was taken aback by his political beliefs, occasional word choice's, and especially his personal struggle with internalized violence. i had also noticed that those on the political right and left were hailing his book as an explanatory principle that supported their political values and beliefs. people do that. i found your understanding of the book being grounded in labor rights to be very illuminating. > > > i have found his web site a disappointment. http://www.jdvance.com > > Official website of JD Vance - Home > www.jdvance.com > Welcome to my site! I'm the author of Hillbilly Elegy, and I do other stuff, too. > > > and i thought that he gained a great deal of support from a yale professor - though i don't remember her name and i've not got a copy of the book. i didn't think it was valuable enough to buy. > > > just like taxes and death, we can't avoid political power-plays. and in truth, i find your professional activities as a model to appreciate and emulate. so, many thanks for your continuing coherent voice on this list. > > > phillip > > ________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen > Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 6:05:24 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > Richard, and Greg and Larry, > > Thanks for the reading. > > I totally agree with Richard's suggestion about Arlie Hochschild's excellent book -- the two make a stark contrast. My point, which you probably accept, is that Vance's weak book is serving a political agenda that has a lot of muscle and money behind it right now. > > I wrote my anti-blurb in the hope of finding others on this list who had read the book and had insights into it and how it is being used. In order to distribute it widely (like to the NY Times, where it would probably be submitted int he form of a letter) I'd have to make sure that all my quotes are impeccable, etc -- in other words, write defensively. WHile I don't think I made any mistakes in my summary, it would be a different task to send my critique into the fray. > > Might be worth doing anyway, though. > > Has anyone else read the book? > > H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jul 11, 2017, at 12:40 PM, Richard Beach wrote: > >> Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy more widely. >> >> In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right . >> >> One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their failures in their school experiences. >> >> Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of Minnesota >> rbeach@umn.edu >> Websites: Digital writing , Media literacy , Teaching literature , Identity-focused ELA Teaching , Common Core State Standards , Apps for literacy learning , Teaching about climate change >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> Helena, >>> Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? (E.g., New York Times...). >>> I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. >>> Greg >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>>> >>>> A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump voters. >>>> >>>> It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a movie. >>>> >>>> He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. >>>> >>>> His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." >>>> >>>> His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the Huffington Post. >>>> >>>> The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, they deserve what they get - are logical. >>>> >>>> In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not-working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie from the git-go. >>>> >>>> When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such thing as society; just individuals and family). >>>> >>>> However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" about the union. >>>> >>>> In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. >>>> >>>> Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a key to Trump voters. >>>> >>>> Helena >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Helena Worthen >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com >>>> >>>>> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I saw) which struck a chord in the US? >>>>> >>>>> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? >>>>> >>>>> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is rationalising this? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on this...). >>>>>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of the world" is badge of honor. >>>>>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. >>>>>> Peg >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>>> >>>>>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of themselves by the time the next elections come along. >>>>>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some activism round the country, hasn't he? >>>>>> >>>>>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? >>>>>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at the moment in the eyes of the world? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>> About regency? >>>>>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, knowledgeable and thorough. >>>>>>> Here's the link to his bill: >>>>>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introduces-bill-e >>>>>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity >>>>>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the >>>>>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherw >>> ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides impeachment) to remove a sitting president. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and votes. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the separation of powers and coordination of relations among government branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? >>>>>>> PG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM >>>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That would be the vice-President! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and then ... >>>>>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they had some damaging information on Clinton. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather helpless with it too. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of a >>>>>>>> Regent? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in >>>>>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in >>>>>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes how >>>>>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he >>>>>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. >>>>>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by >>>>>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, 'enfadado' >>>>>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my family >>>>>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- >>>>>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- >>>>>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) >>>>>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory >>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative >>>>>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue Jul 18 01:35:05 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:35:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump In-Reply-To: References: <1499506856038.79802@iped.uio.no> <7a3497cd-d0b0-4d83-c010-f8882fcd7466@mira.net> <003301d2f98b$ff843330$fe8c9990$@att.net> <57a65bb3-35b5-e059-45a7-c3192f634870@mira.net> <005b01d2f9a7$dc1b3170$94519450$@att.net> <72DEDC6A-D190-4472-B019-74DC91656A1D@gmail.com> <1D929288-298D-4A68-BBFF-3498935DEF6D@umn.edu> <1500107215796.53455@iped.uio.no> , Message-ID: <1500366926515.42617@iped.uio.no> Interesting how 'sexy' seems here to be somewhere far in the side of a continuum, 'complex' truth being at the other end. A ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Christopher Schuck Sent: 15 July 2017 19:59 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] a linguist and a child on D. Trump One good example of such a citizen's movement (at least on a local level) might be the establishment of a Citizen's Police Academy alongside the Oakland Police Department to maintain proper public oversight of police conduct, following a flurry of scandals and cover-ups. The new documentary The Force delves into this a little. I have not actually read the Vance book, only some reviews (including Helen's excellent one). But one aspect that may have brought his book so much exposure and interest in comparison with the Hothschild is that he bills himself as an insider who nevertheless has transcended much of that background, whereas Hothschild explicitly acknowledges herself as an outsider forced to push her comfort zone and expand her worldview in learning to just listen. Vance may come across to many educated urbanites as an exotic would-be Other with a line into that mysterious world, who nevertheless speaks "our" language. Speaking authoritative wisdom tends to come across as more sexy than listening for complex truths. Chris On Saturday, July 15, 2017, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > Helena, although a bit late (took some holidays in between moving back to > Europe), I would like to join the others in thanking you for your > insightful and complete comment on Vance's book. > > With regard to the hopelessness affect that first sparkled this thread, I > wonder whether, whereas the hopelessness of the white working-class > bringing Trump to power may have been part of a myth, is it hopelessness > what the majority of multi-ethnic American society is feeling now > concerning the political situation in the US? And if so, how is that > collective affect relating to an increase or decrease in the collectives' > capacity to act? In the press we see some institutional movements (judges, > commissions, hearings), but we read very little on citizens' movement (at > least reading the first pages of the Washington Post, the New York Times. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of White, Phillip > Sent: 12 July 2017 16:56 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > good morning, Helen - i read Vance's book a few months ago. as a person > who has been involved in literacy instruction all of my professional life, > in contrasting your response to Hillbilly Elegy and my response i am > reminded again that reading comprehension is grounded in the individual's > background knowledge. so, much of the background knowledge i brought to > Elegy is situated in decades of working with children in poverty, > second-language learners, Shirley Brice Heath's, Deborah Hick's, Jose > Limon's, Shiela Valesquez's, Annick Prieur's and John Rechy's work. so > that Vance's personal narrative ran true for me. yes, i was taken aback by > his political beliefs, occasional word choice's, and especially his > personal struggle with internalized violence. i had also noticed that > those on the political right and left were hailing his book as an > explanatory principle that supported their political values and beliefs. > people do that. i found your understanding of the book being grounded in > labor rights to be very illuminating. > > > i have found his web site a disappointment. http://www.jdvance.com > > Official website of JD Vance - Home > www.jdvance.com > Welcome to my site! I'm the author of Hillbilly Elegy, and I do other > stuff, too. > > > and i thought that he gained a great deal of support from a yale professor > - though i don't remember her name and i've not got a copy of the book. i > didn't think it was valuable enough to buy. > > > just like taxes and death, we can't avoid political power-plays. and in > truth, i find your professional activities as a model to appreciate and > emulate. so, many thanks for your continuing coherent voice on this list. > > > phillip > > ________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Helena Worthen > Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 6:05:24 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > > Richard, and Greg and Larry, > > Thanks for the reading. > > I totally agree with Richard's suggestion about Arlie Hochschild's > excellent book -- the two make a stark contrast. My point, which you > probably accept, is that Vance's weak book is serving a political agenda > that has a lot of muscle and money behind it right now. > > I wrote my anti-blurb in the hope of finding others on this list who had > read the book and had insights into it and how it is being used. In order > to distribute it widely (like to the NY Times, where it would probably be > submitted int he form of a letter) I'd have to make sure that all my quotes > are impeccable, etc -- in other words, write defensively. WHile I don't > think I made any mistakes in my summary, it would be a different task to > send my critique into the fray. > > Might be worth doing anyway, though. > > Has anyone else read the book? > > H > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > > On Jul 11, 2017, at 12:40 PM, Richard Beach wrote: > > > Helena, I agree with Greg about sharing your critique of Hillbilly Elegy > more widely. > > > > In doing so, you could consider contrasting Vance?s own > autobiographical, emotional perceptions with the Arlie Hochschild?s > extensive, ethnographic research with white, working-class people as > reported in her book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the > American Right . > > > > One key finding of that research is that many of her participants lost > their well-paying jobs, particularly in the energy industry in places like > Louisiana, are now working in dead-end, boring jobs and are frustrated with > their status, particular given their perceptions of how they are positioned > by a neoliberal discourse that frames that work as a reflection of their > failures in their school experiences. > > > > Richard Beach, Professor Emeritus of English Education, University of > Minnesota > > rbeach@umn.edu > > Websites: Digital writing , Media > literacy , Teaching literature > , Identity-focused ELA Teaching < > http://identities.pbworks.com/>, Common Core State Standards < > http://englishccss.pbworks.com/>, Apps for literacy learning < > http://usingipads.pbworks.com/>, Teaching about climate change < > http://climatechangeela.pbworks.com/> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> On Jul 11, 2017, at 11:16 AM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > >> > >> Helena, > >> Can I recommend that you write a book review for some major outlet? > (E.g., New York Times...). > >> I thought your analysis was incredibly valuable. And considering the > hype the book is getting, there need to be loud and voices responding. > >> Greg > >> > >> Sent from my iPhone > >> > >>> On Jul 11, 2017, at 7:42 AM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >>> > >>> A lousy book that is getting high praise from "mainstream" media > (NYTimes, the Economist) is Hillbilly Elegy by someone named J.D. Vance. It > is being touted as being a key -maybe "the" key - to understanding Trump > voters. > >>> > >>> It tells first-person the story of a boy growing up in central Ohio > whose family is among that many who emigrated north from the mountains of > Kentucky and other lower-midwest and mid-Atlantic states during the 40's > and 50's, somewhat parallel to the black "Great Migration"into the > industrializing cities of the north. The draw in Middletown, Ohio was AK > Steel, where the narrator's grandfather worked. The boy survives a messed > up family, surrounded by drinking and drugs, joins the Marines, gets > through Ohio State U and then on to Yale law school and is now a lawyer, > raising a family in San Francisco. His book is apparently going to be a > movie. > >>> > >>> He identifies himself as a "conservative" and admires Mitch Daniels, > who as gov of Indiana brought back right-to-work. He uses phrases like > "welfare queen" and "on the dole" seriously. He says that employers in > Middletown can't find people to hire for $13 an hour because people there > don't like to work hard. He says that the white working class has no "sense > of agency." When as a teenager he works as a cashier in a grocery store he > criticizes the food choices of people on food stamps. > >>> > >>> His description of the culture he came from sounds a lot like the > people Hillary Clinton called "the deplorables." > >>> > >>> His book sounds to me as if someone said to him, "Why don't you write > your life story and tell how you made good?" So he did. Then he showed it > to someone with access to a publisher who told him, "This is great, but you > should add some policy recommendations based on your experience." So he did > -- and they are basically boot camp for the poor-type policies, austerity > policies. Then someone said, "You probably need to footnote some of this," > so he did a quick internet search and has footnotes to things like the > Huffington Post. > >>> > >>> The book is a mess, but what's alarming is the hype it is getting. It > affirms the myth that Trump was voted in by white working class folk who > were so hopeless that they figured anything, even something obviously > self-destructive, to shake things up would be an improvement. If this is > the way you look at the situation, then the policies that he advocates -- > tough love, austerity, let them learn the consequences of their actions, > they deserve what they get - are logical. > >>> > >>> In fact, Trump voters were not the lowest-income demographic; > https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/ > 05/its-time-to-bust-the-myth-most-trump-voters-were-not- > working-class/?utm_term=.985cd7492401 So the hype is promoting a lie > from the git-go. > >>> > >>> When Vance, the narrator, goes to Yale he is awed by the lifestyles of > the rich. There's a substantial section on choosing the right fork at a > dinner. He also recognizes the quantity of social capital or human capital > (his terms) represented by the networking behavior of the rich. He then > turns is eyes back to Middletown and says there is nothing comparable among > the working class there, just family (kind of like Thatcher's "no such > thing as society; just individuals and family). > >>> > >>> However, AK Steel, which still exists today and is apparently highly > productive, was represented by the UAW -- the workers had a union, in other > words. It turns out that when his grandfather died his grandmother still > had survivor benefits including healthcare, whcih was definitely something > negotiated by the union. However, the only mention of workers being > unionized in the book is the grandfather sitting on the porch "grumbling" > about the union. > >>> > >>> In other words, the social capital of the rich, as represented by > dinner parties and networking, is visible to Vance but the social capital > of the working class, as represented by the political organizing that goes > into having a a union and bargaining a contract, is invisible to him. > Actually, the dinner party is just as political but it does look different. > >>> > >>> Sorry about the long post, a violation of my one-screen rule. However, > I'll bet a lot of people on this list have either heard of or even actually > read this book. I'm arguing that it confirms the Clinton Democrat position, > which is that the Democratic Party can win if it keeps moving to the right > -- and that's why it's getting so much hype, and why it's being used as a > key to Trump voters. > >>> > >>> Helena > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Helena Worthen > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>> Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com > >>> > >>>> On Jul 10, 2017, at 8:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Chris Uhlmann is just a good ABC political reporter. He has no > reputation for being Left or Right or anything. Maybe it is the very > matter-of-factness of his report on the G20 (no different from any others I > saw) which struck a chord in the US? > >>>> > >>>> Greg, I would have thought that the fragmentation of the media which > means that 40% of Americans get their only "news" from Fox has to be a big > part of the explanation ("the echo chamber"). Add to that what is sometimes > called "the reinforcement effect", namely that everything you see is > interpreted in the light of what you already believe and assimilated - > obviously a universal for you anthropologists. The continuing 40% approval > hardly needs explaining. But what breaks the spell??? > >>>> > >>>> Interesting puzzle for me though. The Republicans seem to maintain > support even in areas like Utah where Trump is on the nose, while support > for TrumpCare is running at about 17%. How can Trump's Health policy be so > on the nose while his popularity remains high? What fairy tale is > rationalising this? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>>> On 11/07/2017 4:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>> If we didn't see it, we had help from OZ. (I suspect the Australian > ABC's Chris Uhlmann might not be a favorite on some issues there but on > this...). > >>>>> Some take a nationalist position that looking bad in the "eyes of > the world" is badge of honor. > >>>>> But the rest of us have been woke for a while, Andy. > >>>>> Peg > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 11:50 AM > >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > >>>>> > >>>>> An American friend said to me that if he had to choose between > stupidity and evil, he would choose stupidity. All these options for > removing Trump can only end in President Pence which is worse even if more > predictable. But the longer Trump stumbles along with the GOP defending him > the more likely the chumps who voted for them may ask questions of > themselves by the time the next elections come along. > >>>>> True, all sorts of evil laws are slipping through Congress while > Trump distracts us with his antics, but these measures are reversible. > >>>>> > >>>>> It seems I was wrong in thinking that the repeal of ObamaCare would > generate perezhivaniya for the millions of Trump voters reliant on Medicaid > - they have lied so badly for the past 7 years that they actually can't > "Repeal and Replace" or simply Repeal ObamaCare. Thanks to Fox News none of > Trump's supporters realise this, but if ObamaCare is still in place in 3 > years' time and the government simply withholds funds, then who knows what > the Trumpistas will make of it? Tragic. But he certainly has generated some > activism round the country, hasn't he? > >>>>> > >>>>> How is Trump's sad antics in Europe being seen in America? > >>>>> Do flag-waving Americans realise how stupid America is looking at > the moment in the eyes of the world? > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > on-making > >>>>> > >>>>>> On 11/07/2017 12:51 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>> About regency? > >>>>>> There is a sort of "unfinished" amendment to the US constitution. > The 25th amendment calls for a body to be formed if there is a question of > the need for presidential succession. And now there is a House bill to > "finish" the 25th and establish such a body. Jamie Raskin is the chief > sponsor and there are some co-sponsors so far. Although relatively junior, > Raskin is on important related House committees for doing something about > presidential "inability" and he seems to me to be quite persuasive, > knowledgeable and thorough. > >>>>>> Here's the link to his bill: > >>>>>> https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/raskin-introdu > ces-bill-e > >>>>>> stablish-independent-commission-presidential-capacity > >>>>>> A clause in the middle of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the > >>>>>> 25th amendment is at issue (and if the bill gets introduced and/or > passes would be litigated, no doubt -- we have lots of "intent of the > framers" ouija boards to consult in courts ). As it now it, it appears > that the "other body" proposed would be constituted only if the President's > inability has already been addressed up to a point by some procedures and > there is an impasse between executive and legislative branches of the > government. The amendment's clause allows for the following: "...or such > other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the > President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of > Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to > discharge the powers and duties of his office." As it now provides, the > issue then goes back to the Senate and House (2/3 vote of both houses > required or else the president resumes power and duties) shall continue to > discharge the same as Acting President; otherw > >> ise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Raskin's bill provides for an additional route (besides > impeachment) to remove a sitting president. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Right now (with the Republicans in charge of both houses of > Congress and the Presidency), practically speaking, it seems that the most > it will provide is a venue for careful constitutional discussion. If > hearings are not allowed (by the majority party) to occur officially in the > House of Representative, then it may well occur in forums (Representative > Conyers' approach), People's Hearings or state hearings. Whichever way, > the discussion may involve the judiciary, if Raskin and his growing list of > co-sponsors take that route. And the discussion may move some voters and > votes. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> These aren't quite arrangements for a regent. Jamie Raskin hasn't > given up on the impeachment route: He's active about various other clauses > of the constitution involving ethics, money, and about failures of the > separation of powers and coordination of relations among government > branches. But Maxine Waters is the main member of the House for feeling > hopeful (and a bit happy) on the impeachment front! And I think there are > a few more active and effective people and efforts behind the scenes. > Nothing wrong with a bit of enfadado, though, huh? > >>>>>> PG > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol > Macdonald > >>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2017 6:56 AM > >>>>>> To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: a linguist and a child on D. Trump > >>>>>> > >>>>>> That would be the vice-President! > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think Trump enjoyed being the fly in the ointment at G20, and > then ... > >>>>>> offered to work jointly with Russia on cyber security. And now we > hear that his son went to a meeting with a Russian because he believed they > had some damaging information on Clinton. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Alfredo I think lots of us are feeling 'enfadado' -- but rather > helpless with it too. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Carol > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 8 July 2017 at 11:43, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I was thinking ... does the US system allow for the appointment of > a > >>>>>>> Regent? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> andy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi > on-making > >>>>>>>> On 8/07/2017 7:40 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> We've been perplexed (some may say horrified) by Trump's speech in > >>>>>>>> this list before, as many others in the media have. A linguist in > >>>>>>>> the Washington post (see link below) comments on this and notes > how > >>>>>>>> Trump's speech sounds like (American) everyday speech, like he > >>>>>>>> 'could be a family member or a friend'. She also notes his use of > hyperbolic verbal and gestural devices. > >>>>>>>> ??I was watching the video and my two-years old daughter passed by > >>>>>>>> and saw Trump talking. Pointing at him, my daughter said, > 'enfadado' > >>>>>>>> ('angry' in Spanish). Honestly, I am glad that not many of my > family > >>>>>>>> members or friends sound like that, even the American ones! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/this-linguist- > >>>>>>>> studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she- > >>>>>>>> found/2017/07/07/12f310c6-627d-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_video.html > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph.D (Edin) > >>>>>> Cultural Historical Activity Theory > >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > alternative > >>>>>> email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Jul 18 15:50:10 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 07:50:10 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Well, I'm a little bit torn. On the one hand, my heart is with Haydi; it really does seem to me that the "aphorism" is useful in understanding that marginal note of Lenin's. And that marginal note of Lenin's appears in Chapter Two of Thinking and Speech, so it's useful in understanding Chapter Two of Thinking and Speech. Chapter SEVEN of Thinking and Speech is really an empirical elaboration of Vygotsky's critique of Piagetian neo-Kantianism in Chapter Two, and so it's useful there too. I think Andy more or less acknowledges this when he says that the quote is a one off. I also agree with the general tenor of Haydi's jeremiad against an aristocracy of philosophers who are perfectly willing to recognize their own contribution to the dialectic between theory and practice but who howl about empiricism when it comes to recognizing the immense contributions made by practitioners. This seems to me a violation of both the spirit and the letter of the dialectic, and sociogenetically it seems to me to turn the relationship between philosophy and social practices entirely on its head. That said, I think Andy has a point. I'm at a workshop now, and don't have the library handy, but if I remember correctly then Marx didn't actually create the aphorism about standing Hegel on his head. The right-Hegelian critics of Marx did. What Marx said, responding to the criticism, was that he had FOUND Hegel standing on his head, and put him on his feet again. The problem is that this apposite remark, made in a polemical context, has been conflated with the famous quotation from Economic and Political Manuscripts to the effect that it is not mankind's consciousness which determines his being, but rather his social being that determines his consciousness. If we assume that this is directed against Hegel, we get Hegel entirely wrong: it is precisely with the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of consciousness that we find Hegel and Marx on exactly the same page. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 10:26 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > That remark by Lenin is his only comment on a passage of a hundred pages > or so of the Science of Logic, the passage where in his own idealistic way > Hegel is discussing effectively the Party question. It is extremely obscure > and I gather it went over Lenin's head. Nonetheless, Lenin's notes were > where I got started on Hegel and marked the beginning of the return of > Marxists to a study of Hegel in the 20th century. Not Lukacs, not Korsch or > Horkheimer, but Lenin. > > As to Marx's remark in the Afterword to Capital and Engels reference to it > in "Ludwig Feuerbach" I always liked it and repeated it to others, too. But > it did function as a kind of explanation of why I didn't study Hegel and > believed that it was good enough to just read Marx. Once I got started > reading Hegel I did not find the aphorism useful. It was kind of obvious > that I had to penetrate the hard shell of logical rigmarole to get what I > wanted. But how?? The idea of standing it on its head gave me no guidance > at all. So I try to dissuade people who might want to tackle Hegel to not > use this aphorism as a guide. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > On 17/07/2017 7:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> In the Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin notes that the Aristotelian >> syllogism still has a whiff of Platonism about it. >> >> Precious metals don't rust. >> Gold is a precious metal. >> Therefore gold doesn't rust. >> >> I gather that what he means is that in the syllogism it is concrete, >> sensuous experience with a particular metal which comes dead last. But when >> we look at human experience as historical activity, we notice that it comes >> first: that it is thousands of years of experience with a particular metal, >> from the ancient Egyptians and their obsession with uncorruptibility >> onward, which leads to the valuation of gold and its exaptation as money, >> and then generalization to silver. Lenin says that in its idealist form >> the syllogism is a game: it is this which must be "turned on its head" to >> see how the concept arises. >> >> .... >> >> If Marx's remark to that effect was not helpful or clarifying, why do you >> think Vygotsky and Luria (not to mention Lenin) were so taken with it? >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> I meant specifically that the aphorism about Hegel >> having to be turned on his head is not useful. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> >> > -- From ablunden@mira.net Tue Jul 18 19:14:12 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 12:14:12 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> So far as I can see there are two references to the aphorism in Marx/Engels. Firstly in the famous 1873 Afterword to Capital by Marx and then echoed by Engels in his 1886 "Ludwig Feuerbach." As I said, in so far as a metaphor like this can be right or wrong, I would say it is correct. My problem is that in many many discussions I have had with people identifying themselves as Marxists, this aphorism has functioned as a *barrier *to understanding Hegel and his relation to Marx, something I have had to fight my through before being able to have a fruitful discussion about the issue. Because people are generally locked in to a dichotomy between concepts and the material world (notwithstanding declarations to the contrary), the aphorism is interpreted to mean that Hegel thought that thought determines being and Marx thought that being determines thought, just as you observe, David. Again, it is not that this aphorism is wrong, and really thought determines being. Of course not. The problem is, I think, that it pushes a natural scientific point of view in which the social world goes about its business according to Laws of History and ideas simply reflect that process. A corollary of this is that people are passive expressions of their social conditions and have no responsibility for their thoughts. In the words of "Theses on Feuerbach" - "The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society." Altogether, I prefer to start an interpretation of Hegel either with a blank sheet or from reading Hegel himself, not hearsay. Here are some things I could say about the Hegel-Marx relation which may lend weight to the aphorism: * Hegel wrote at a time when there was no reason to believe (and no-one did believe) that the working class was an agent in history, capable of leading social reform. Indeed in early 19th century the working class did not exist as a class at all. Marx wrote in the wake of huge social movements of the working class which, during his youth, had overthrown the French government. He had every reason to believe that the working class would make history, not (as Hegel and Owen had thought) the educated elite. * Hegel wrote philosophy and worked in a university; Marx wrote in fairly accessible language on politics and social issues, intended for mostly self-educated workers. * Hegel believed that he could anticipate social processes by logical analysis; Marx understood that the logical critique could be reconstructed only on the basis of already-observed social processes, making what was already happening intelligible. But both end up at the same point, namely that history is intelligible. But at a philosophical level, the two writers came to *very similar conclusions*, not opposite conclusions. Politically, they were as different as the philosophy professor and the communist agitator. They lived in different times. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 19/07/2017 8:50 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Well, I'm a little bit torn. On the one hand, my heart is > with Haydi; it really does seem to me that the "aphorism" > is useful in understanding that marginal note of Lenin's. > And that marginal note of Lenin's appears in Chapter Two > of Thinking and Speech, so it's useful in understanding > Chapter Two of Thinking and Speech. Chapter SEVEN of > Thinking and Speech is really an empirical elaboration of > Vygotsky's critique of Piagetian neo-Kantianism in Chapter > Two, and so it's useful there too. I think Andy more or > less acknowledges this when he says that the quote is a > one off. > > I also agree with the general tenor of Haydi's jeremiad > against an aristocracy of philosophers who are perfectly > willing to recognize their own contribution to the > dialectic between theory and practice but who howl about > empiricism when it comes to recognizing the immense > contributions made by practitioners. This seems to me a > violation of both the spirit and the letter of the > dialectic, and sociogenetically it seems to me to turn the > relationship between philosophy and social practices > entirely on its head. > > That said, I think Andy has a point. I'm at a workshop > now, and don't have the library handy, but if I remember > correctly then Marx didn't actually create the aphorism > about standing Hegel on his head. The right-Hegelian > critics of Marx did. What Marx said, responding to the > criticism, was that he had FOUND Hegel standing on his > head, and put him on his feet again. The problem is that > this apposite remark, made in a polemical context, has > been conflated with the famous quotation from Economic and > Political Manuscripts to the effect that it is not > mankind's consciousness which determines his being, but > rather his social being that determines his consciousness. > If we assume that this is directed against Hegel, we get > Hegel entirely wrong: it is precisely with the > phylogenesis and ontogenesis of consciousness that we find > Hegel and Marx on exactly the same page. > > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and > Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean > Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 10:26 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > That remark by Lenin is his only comment on a passage > of a hundred pages or so of the Science of Logic, the > passage where in his own idealistic way Hegel is > discussing effectively the Party question. It is > extremely obscure and I gather it went over Lenin's > head. Nonetheless, Lenin's notes were where I got > started on Hegel and marked the beginning of the > return of Marxists to a study of Hegel in the 20th > century. Not Lukacs, not Korsch or Horkheimer, but Lenin. > > As to Marx's remark in the Afterword to Capital and > Engels reference to it in "Ludwig Feuerbach" I always > liked it and repeated it to others, too. But it did > function as a kind of explanation of why I didn't > study Hegel and believed that it was good enough to > just read Marx. Once I got started reading Hegel I did > not find the aphorism useful. It was kind of obvious > that I had to penetrate the hard shell of logical > rigmarole to get what I wanted. But how?? The idea of > standing it on its head gave me no guidance at all. So > I try to dissuade people who might want to tackle > Hegel to not use this aphorism as a guide. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > On 17/07/2017 7:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In the Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin notes that > the Aristotelian syllogism still has a whiff of > Platonism about it. > > Precious metals don't rust. > Gold is a precious metal. > Therefore gold doesn't rust. > > I gather that what he means is that in the > syllogism it is concrete, sensuous experience with > a particular metal which comes dead last. But when > we look at human experience as historical > activity, we notice that it comes first: that it > is thousands of years of experience with a > particular metal, from the ancient Egyptians and > their obsession with uncorruptibility onward, > which leads to the valuation of gold and its > exaptation as money, and then generalization to > silver. Lenin says that in its idealist form the > syllogism is a game: it is this which must be > "turned on its head" to see how the concept arises. > > .... > > If Marx's remark to that effect was not helpful or > clarifying, why do you think Vygotsky and Luria > (not to mention Lenin) were so taken with it? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > I meant specifically that the aphorism about Hegel > having to be turned on his head is not useful. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > -- > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 18 21:53:01 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 21:53:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> Message-ID: <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> Andy This insight that Hegel anticipated social processes through logical analysis while Marx focused on making intelligible reconstructed phenomena on the basis of already observed social processes, seems to be radically different starting places. Anticipation and reconstruction generating profound relational reflections. >From these two differing starting places (two different historical presents) your reflection that both share a deep affinity by arriving at the same realization: (history is intelligible) Opens up this approach to historicity for our learning community. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 18, 2017 7:16 PM To: David Kellogg; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action So far as I can see there are two references to the aphorism in Marx/Engels. Firstly in the famous 1873 Afterword to Capital by Marx and then echoed by Engels in his 1886 "Ludwig Feuerbach." As I said, in so far as a metaphor like this can be right or wrong, I would say it is correct. My problem is that in many many discussions I have had with people identifying themselves as Marxists, this aphorism has functioned as a *barrier *to understanding Hegel and his relation to Marx, something I have had to fight my through before being able to have a fruitful discussion about the issue. Because people are generally locked in to a dichotomy between concepts and the material world (notwithstanding declarations to the contrary), the aphorism is interpreted to mean that Hegel thought that thought determines being and Marx thought that being determines thought, just as you observe, David. Again, it is not that this aphorism is wrong, and really thought determines being. Of course not. The problem is, I think, that it pushes a natural scientific point of view in which the social world goes about its business according to Laws of History and ideas simply reflect that process. A corollary of this is that people are passive expressions of their social conditions and have no responsibility for their thoughts. In the words of "Theses on Feuerbach" - "The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society." Altogether, I prefer to start an interpretation of Hegel either with a blank sheet or from reading Hegel himself, not hearsay. Here are some things I could say about the Hegel-Marx relation which may lend weight to the aphorism: * Hegel wrote at a time when there was no reason to believe (and no-one did believe) that the working class was an agent in history, capable of leading social reform. Indeed in early 19th century the working class did not exist as a class at all. Marx wrote in the wake of huge social movements of the working class which, during his youth, had overthrown the French government. He had every reason to believe that the working class would make history, not (as Hegel and Owen had thought) the educated elite. * Hegel wrote philosophy and worked in a university; Marx wrote in fairly accessible language on politics and social issues, intended for mostly self-educated workers. * Hegel believed that he could anticipate social processes by logical analysis; Marx understood that the logical critique could be reconstructed only on the basis of already-observed social processes, making what was already happening intelligible. But both end up at the same point, namely that history is intelligible. But at a philosophical level, the two writers came to *very similar conclusions*, not opposite conclusions. Politically, they were as different as the philosophy professor and the communist agitator. They lived in different times. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 19/07/2017 8:50 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Well, I'm a little bit torn. On the one hand, my heart is > with Haydi; it really does seem to me that the "aphorism" > is useful in understanding that marginal note of Lenin's. > And that marginal note of Lenin's appears in Chapter Two > of Thinking and Speech, so it's useful in understanding > Chapter Two of Thinking and Speech. Chapter SEVEN of > Thinking and Speech is really an empirical elaboration of > Vygotsky's critique of Piagetian neo-Kantianism in Chapter > Two, and so it's useful there too. I think Andy more or > less acknowledges this when he says that the quote is a > one off. > > I also agree with the general tenor of Haydi's jeremiad > against an aristocracy of philosophers who are perfectly > willing to recognize their own contribution to the > dialectic between theory and practice but who howl about > empiricism when it comes to recognizing the immense > contributions made by practitioners. This seems to me a > violation of both the spirit and the letter of the > dialectic, and sociogenetically it seems to me to turn the > relationship between philosophy and social practices > entirely on its head. > > That said, I think Andy has a point. I'm at a workshop > now, and don't have the library handy, but if I remember > correctly then Marx didn't actually create the aphorism > about standing Hegel on his head. The right-Hegelian > critics of Marx did. What Marx said, responding to the > criticism, was that he had FOUND Hegel standing on his > head, and put him on his feet again. The problem is that > this apposite remark, made in a polemical context, has > been conflated with the famous quotation from Economic and > Political Manuscripts to the effect that it is not > mankind's consciousness which determines his being, but > rather his social being that determines his consciousness. > If we assume that this is directed against Hegel, we get > Hegel entirely wrong: it is precisely with the > phylogenesis and ontogenesis of consciousness that we find > Hegel and Marx on exactly the same page. > > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and > Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean > Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 10:26 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > That remark by Lenin is his only comment on a passage > of a hundred pages or so of the Science of Logic, the > passage where in his own idealistic way Hegel is > discussing effectively the Party question. It is > extremely obscure and I gather it went over Lenin's > head. Nonetheless, Lenin's notes were where I got > started on Hegel and marked the beginning of the > return of Marxists to a study of Hegel in the 20th > century. Not Lukacs, not Korsch or Horkheimer, but Lenin. > > As to Marx's remark in the Afterword to Capital and > Engels reference to it in "Ludwig Feuerbach" I always > liked it and repeated it to others, too. But it did > function as a kind of explanation of why I didn't > study Hegel and believed that it was good enough to > just read Marx. Once I got started reading Hegel I did > not find the aphorism useful. It was kind of obvious > that I had to penetrate the hard shell of logical > rigmarole to get what I wanted. But how?? The idea of > standing it on its head gave me no guidance at all. So > I try to dissuade people who might want to tackle > Hegel to not use this aphorism as a guide. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > On 17/07/2017 7:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In the Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin notes that > the Aristotelian syllogism still has a whiff of > Platonism about it. > > Precious metals don't rust. > Gold is a precious metal. > Therefore gold doesn't rust. > > I gather that what he means is that in the > syllogism it is concrete, sensuous experience with > a particular metal which comes dead last. But when > we look at human experience as historical > activity, we notice that it comes first: that it > is thousands of years of experience with a > particular metal, from the ancient Egyptians and > their obsession with uncorruptibility onward, > which leads to the valuation of gold and its > exaptation as money, and then generalization to > silver. Lenin says that in its idealist form the > syllogism is a game: it is this which must be > "turned on its head" to see how the concept arises. > > .... > > If Marx's remark to that effect was not helpful or > clarifying, why do you think Vygotsky and Luria > (not to mention Lenin) were so taken with it? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > I meant specifically that the aphorism about Hegel > having to be turned on his head is not useful. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > -- > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Jul 18 22:47:01 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 15:47:01 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> Funnily enough, Marx was only taking Hegel's own advice: "History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 19/07/2017 2:53 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Andy > > This insight that Hegel anticipated social processes > through logical analysis while Marx focused on making > intelligible reconstructed phenomena on the basis of > already observed social processes, seems to be radically > different starting places. > > Anticipation and reconstruction generating profound > relational reflections. > > From these two differing starting places (two different > historical presents) your reflection that both share a > deep affinity by arriving at the same realization: > > (history is intelligible) > > Opens up this approach to historicity for our learning > community. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > *From: *Andy Blunden > *Sent: *July 18, 2017 7:16 PM > *To: *David Kellogg ; > eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > So far as I can see there are two references to the aphorism > > in Marx/Engels. Firstly in the famous 1873 Afterword to > > Capital by Marx and then echoed by Engels in his 1886 > > "Ludwig Feuerbach." As I said, in so far as a metaphor like > > this can be right or wrong, I would say it is correct. My > > problem is that in many many discussions I have had with > > people identifying themselves as Marxists, this aphorism has > > functioned as a *barrier *to understanding Hegel and his > > relation to Marx, something I have had to fight my through > > before being able to have a fruitful discussion about the > > issue. Because people are generally locked in to a dichotomy > > between concepts and the material world (notwithstanding > > declarations to the contrary), the aphorism is interpreted > > to mean that Hegel thought that thought determines being and > > Marx thought that being determines thought, just as you > > observe, David. Again, it is not that this aphorism is > > wrong, and really thought determines being. Of course not. > > The problem is, I think, that it pushes a natural scientific > > point of view in which the social world goes about its > > business according to Laws of History and ideas simply > > reflect that process. A corollary of this is that people are > > passive expressions of their social conditions and have no > > responsibility for their thoughts. In the words of "Theses > > on Feuerbach" - "The materialist doctrine that men are > > products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, > > therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances > > and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change > > circumstances and that the educator must himself be > > educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society > > into two parts, one of which is superior to society." > > Altogether, I prefer to start an interpretation of Hegel > > either with a blank sheet or from reading Hegel himself, not > > hearsay. > > Here are some things I could say about the Hegel-Marx > > relation which may lend weight to the aphorism: > > * Hegel wrote at a time when there was no reason to > > believe (and no-one did believe) that the working class > > was an agent in history, capable of leading social > > reform. Indeed in early 19th century the working class > > did not exist as a class at all. Marx wrote in the wake > > of huge social movements of the working class which, > > during his youth, had overthrown the French government. > > He had every reason to believe that the working class > > would make history, not (as Hegel and Owen had thought) > > the educated elite. > > * Hegel wrote philosophy and worked in a university; > > Marx wrote in fairly accessible language on politics and > > social issues, intended for mostly self-educated workers. > > * Hegel believed that he could anticipate social > > processes by logical analysis; Marx understood that the > > logical critique could be reconstructed only on the > > basis of already-observed social processes, making what > > was already happening intelligible. But both end up at > > the same point, namely that history is intelligible. > > But at a philosophical level, the two writers came to *very > > similar conclusions*, not opposite conclusions. Politically, > > they were as different as the philosophy professor and the > > communist agitator. They lived in different times. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 19/07/2017 8:50 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Well, I'm a little bit torn. On the one hand, my heart is > > > with Haydi; it really does seem to me that the "aphorism" > > > is useful in understanding that marginal note of Lenin's. > > > And that marginal note of Lenin's appears in Chapter Two > > > of Thinking and Speech, so it's useful in understanding > > > Chapter Two of Thinking and Speech. Chapter SEVEN of > > > Thinking and Speech is really an empirical elaboration of > > > Vygotsky's critique of Piagetian neo-Kantianism in Chapter > > > Two, and so it's useful there too. I think Andy more or > > > less acknowledges this when he says that the quote is a > > > one off. > > > > > > I also agree with the general tenor of Haydi's jeremiad > > > against an aristocracy of philosophers who are perfectly > > > willing to recognize their own contribution to the > > > dialectic between theory and practice but who howl about > > > empiricism when it comes to recognizing the immense > > > contributions made by practitioners. This seems to me a > > > violation of both the spirit and the letter of the > > > dialectic, and sociogenetically it seems to me to turn the > > > relationship between philosophy and social practices > > > entirely on its head. > > > > > > That said, I think Andy has a point. I'm at a workshop > > > now, and don't have the library handy, but if I remember > > > correctly then Marx didn't actually create the aphorism > > > about standing Hegel on his head. The right-Hegelian > > > critics of Marx did. What Marx said, responding to the > > > criticism, was that he had FOUND Hegel standing on his > > > head, and put him on his feet again. The problem is that > > > this apposite remark, made in a polemical context, has > > > been conflated with the famous quotation from Economic and > > > Political Manuscripts to the effect that it is not > > > mankind's consciousness which determines his being, but > > > rather his social being that determines his consciousness. > > > If we assume that this is directed against Hegel, we get > > > Hegel entirely wrong: it is precisely with the > > > phylogenesis and ontogenesis of consciousness that we find > > > Hegel and Marx on exactly the same page. > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and > > > Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean > > > Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 10:26 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > That remark by Lenin is his only comment on a passage > > > of a hundred pages or so of the Science of Logic, the > > > passage where in his own idealistic way Hegel is > > > discussing effectively the Party question. It is > > > extremely obscure and I gather it went over Lenin's > > > head. Nonetheless, Lenin's notes were where I got > > > started on Hegel and marked the beginning of the > > > return of Marxists to a study of Hegel in the 20th > > > century. Not Lukacs, not Korsch or Horkheimer, but > Lenin. > > > > > > As to Marx's remark in the Afterword to Capital and > > > Engels reference to it in "Ludwig Feuerbach" I always > > > liked it and repeated it to others, too. But it did > > > function as a kind of explanation of why I didn't > > > study Hegel and believed that it was good enough to > > > just read Marx. Once I got started reading Hegel I did > > > not find the aphorism useful. It was kind of obvious > > > that I had to penetrate the hard shell of logical > > > rigmarole to get what I wanted. But how?? The idea of > > > standing it on its head gave me no guidance at all. So > > > I try to dissuade people who might want to tackle > > > Hegel to not use this aphorism as a guide. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > On 17/07/2017 7:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > In the Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin notes that > > > the Aristotelian syllogism still has a whiff of > > > Platonism about it. > > > > > > Precious metals don't rust. > > > Gold is a precious metal. > > > Therefore gold doesn't rust. > > > > > > I gather that what he means is that in the > > > syllogism it is concrete, sensuous experience with > > > a particular metal which comes dead last. But when > > > we look at human experience as historical > > > activity, we notice that it comes first: that it > > > is thousands of years of experience with a > > > particular metal, from the ancient Egyptians and > > > their obsession with uncorruptibility onward, > > > which leads to the valuation of gold and its > > > exaptation as money, and then generalization to > > > silver. Lenin says that in its idealist form the > > > syllogism is a game: it is this which must be > > > "turned on its head" to see how the concept arises. > > > > > > .... > > > > > > If Marx's remark to that effect was not helpful or > > > clarifying, why do you think Vygotsky and Luria > > > (not to mention Lenin) were so taken with it? > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > I meant specifically that the aphorism about > Hegel > > > having to be turned on his head is not useful. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > From goncu@uic.edu Wed Jul 19 08:01:39 2017 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 10:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Joe Glick In-Reply-To: <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> Message-ID: <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Dear All, According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my sorrow here. Artin Goncu, Ph.D http://www.artingoncu.com/ Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 19 08:17:11 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 08:17:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: Damn! Joe was a long time colleague and friend who introduced me to developmental psychology, engaged with me in our early adventures into cross-cultural psychology, and continued to enrich not only my life, but those of many others over many decades. Sad day in the Cole household and many others around the world. mike On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: > > > Dear All, > > According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world > this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my > sorrow here. > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > http://www.artingoncu.com/ > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > > From leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com Wed Jul 19 08:14:15 2017 From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com (Leif Strandberg) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 17:14:15 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: <0023BA31-EC67-438B-8CE4-0C10782A7EA4@telia.com> Oh, that was sad to hear. I met Joe at ISCRAT conferences in Europe and also in New York where he participated at conferenses together with Lois Holzman and Fred Newman. Joe was very creative and very very funny. In one of my books, I recount Joe's reflections on Piaget's various studies. I'm sad about Joe's passing away. But glad to have met him. He taught me a lot. Leif from Sweden 19 jul 2017 kl. 17:01 skrev "Goncu, Artin" : > > > Dear All, > > According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world > this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my > sorrow here. > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > http://www.artingoncu.com/ > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > From lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Wed Jul 19 10:03:30 2017 From: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org (Lois Holzman) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 13:03:30 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: Among Joe's many endearing qualities, I think I'll will miss most his appreciation for and insightfulness about the absurdity of humanity. He gave so much. I had the privilege of interviewing Joe last year. Since it might be among his last public appearances, for those interested here's the link to the audio. http://eastsideinstitute.org/resources/multimedia/audio/ Lois On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: > > > Dear All, > > According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world > this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my > sorrow here. > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > http://www.artingoncu.com/ > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > > -- Lois Holzman Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy 119 West 23 St, suite 902 New York, NY 10011 Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today | Psychology of Becoming | Mad in America Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World All Stars Project From gutierkd@gmail.com Wed Jul 19 10:26:43 2017 From: gutierkd@gmail.com (Kris Gutierrez) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 10:26:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: <2A6ABAC6-CD21-4DEC-8973-9CE800BB9FC8@gmail.com> this is heartbreaking news! Joe was one of the smartest and most thoughtful persons I knew. Wow. What a loss. Last I heard from him was around a recent posting of his grandchild on FB. very sad indeed. Kris Kris D. Guti?rrez Carol Liu Professor Graduate School of Education University of California, Berkeley 5629 Tolman Hall Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 gutierrkd@berkeley.edu > On Jul 19, 2017, at 8:17 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Damn! > Joe was a long time colleague and friend who introduced me to developmental > psychology, engaged with me in our early adventures into cross-cultural > psychology, and continued to enrich not only my life, but those of many > others over many decades. > > Sad day in the Cole household and many others around the world. > > mike > > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: > >> >> >> Dear All, >> >> According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world >> this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my >> sorrow here. >> >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> http://www.artingoncu.com/ >> Professor Emeritus, >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> College of Education M/C 147 >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jul 19 12:48:20 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2017 04:48:20 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: <2A6ABAC6-CD21-4DEC-8973-9CE800BB9FC8@gmail.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <2A6ABAC6-CD21-4DEC-8973-9CE800BB9FC8@gmail.com> Message-ID: In 2012 when we were preparing to bring out a Korean version of "History of the Development of the Higher Mental Functions" I tried to do a Korean version of Professor Glick's magisterial preface on the Vygotsky of "Though and Language" (that is, the 1962 Hanfmann and Vakar translation) the Vygotsky of "Mind in Society"and Piaget. He was--exactly as others have said--extremely generous, kind, helpful, and insightful, and he even wrote us a beautiful jacket blurb, which I will always treasure. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 2:26 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: > this is heartbreaking news! Joe was one of the smartest and most > thoughtful persons I knew. Wow. What a loss. Last I heard from him was > around a recent posting of his grandchild on FB. very sad indeed. Kris > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Carol Liu Professor > Graduate School of Education > University of California, Berkeley > 5629 Tolman Hall > Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 > gutierrkd@berkeley.edu > > > > > On Jul 19, 2017, at 8:17 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Damn! > > Joe was a long time colleague and friend who introduced me to > developmental > > psychology, engaged with me in our early adventures into cross-cultural > > psychology, and continued to enrich not only my life, but those of many > > others over many decades. > > > > Sad day in the Cole household and many others around the world. > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> Dear All, > >> > >> According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world > >> this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my > >> sorrow here. > >> > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D > >> http://www.artingoncu.com/ > >> Professor Emeritus, > >> University of Illinois at Chicago > >> College of Education M/C 147 > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. > >> Chicago, IL 60607 > >> > >> > >> > > From kindred.jessica@gmail.com Wed Jul 19 13:07:53 2017 From: kindred.jessica@gmail.com (Jessica Kindred) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 16:07:53 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <2A6ABAC6-CD21-4DEC-8973-9CE800BB9FC8@gmail.com> Message-ID: Joe Glick died this morning. He was my mentor, graduate advisor, and lifelong dear friend. The first time I ever saw him, I had a huge crush on him, this scholar in his large bluish gray office. I worked in Sylvia Scribner's lab on the sixth floor of the CUNY graduate school and would walk down the back steps to the fifth floor just to walk by his office several times a day and observe him sitting there surrounded by books and gadgets and often students and colleagues. I stood outside of his classes to listen in before I became his student. That was 1990. Finally one day, I met him. I sat down in his office and we started what became a lifelong conversation. We used to chat between offices on the 90s version of the internet, long streams of witty one liners back and forth. I fell in love with language through those interactions. Joe became my advisor through a PhD that took me as long as I could make it last, 15 years. He protected me from the administration, received me for hours every time I walked into his office or his apartment. He asked me hard questions and told me hard truths. He made me think and work hard and read and write. I visited him twice in the past few months, once in the hospital and once at home. He called me the day after I was laid off just a few weeks ago with advice and warmth and worry. I had just left him a message the day before yesterday saying I was coming next week again to see him at his house. I thought he was getting better. I saw him as recovering. And he was so funny and so undramatic when I visited him that I was sure of it. I told him how much he meant to me and how much I loved him when I visited him in the hospital in April, and for that I am so glad. I'm grateful for this wonderful person and so terribly sad that he is gone. > On Jul 19, 2017, at 3:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In 2012 when we were preparing to bring out a Korean version of "History of > the Development of the Higher Mental Functions" I tried to do a Korean > version of Professor Glick's magisterial preface on the Vygotsky of "Though > and Language" (that is, the 1962 Hanfmann and Vakar translation) the > Vygotsky of "Mind in Society"and Piaget. He was--exactly as others have > said--extremely generous, kind, helpful, and insightful, and he even wrote > us a beautiful jacket blurb, which I will always treasure. > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > >> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 2:26 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: >> >> this is heartbreaking news! Joe was one of the smartest and most >> thoughtful persons I knew. Wow. What a loss. Last I heard from him was >> around a recent posting of his grandchild on FB. very sad indeed. Kris >> >> Kris D. Guti?rrez >> Carol Liu Professor >> Graduate School of Education >> University of California, Berkeley >> 5629 Tolman Hall >> Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 >> gutierrkd@berkeley.edu >> >> >> >>> On Jul 19, 2017, at 8:17 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Damn! >>> Joe was a long time colleague and friend who introduced me to >> developmental >>> psychology, engaged with me in our early adventures into cross-cultural >>> psychology, and continued to enrich not only my life, but those of many >>> others over many decades. >>> >>> Sad day in the Cole household and many others around the world. >>> >>> mike >>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Dear All, >>>> >>>> According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world >>>> this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my >>>> sorrow here. >>>> >>>> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >>>> http://www.artingoncu.com/ >>>> Professor Emeritus, >>>> University of Illinois at Chicago >>>> College of Education M/C 147 >>>> 1040 W. Harrison St. >>>> Chicago, IL 60607 >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Jul 19 13:34:16 2017 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 20:34:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <2A6ABAC6-CD21-4DEC-8973-9CE800BB9FC8@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F933101801@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Joe was one of the most fun academics I ever met (probably along with John Dore the most fun. I took a course they taught together once, people were hanging from the rafters. I had such a good time I forgot where were all supposed to be very serious people talking about very serious things). I still use a lot of Joeisms in my graduate classes. I remember my first visit to SRCD. I went up to him really excited saying I had been to some sessions that really gave me hope, that everybody seemed to be searching for something new. He lit up one of those extra long cigarettes he smoked - Joe was always very dramatic - and said in his best, "Look, I only have time to say this once" voice, Nothing is going to change Michael. Twenty years ago they were saying the same thing about doing new things. In twenty years they're going to be saying the same things about doing new things. That's the way these people are. Joe spoke truth to power, but didn't really care if power never answered back. His attitude seemed to be, "I told them what I think, screw 'em." There were few like him and there will be few to come and it was an honor to be his student. That and his constant twenty year (or more) argument with Harry Beilin was the greatest academic show on earth. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Jessica Kindred Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 4:08 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick Joe Glick died this morning. He was my mentor, graduate advisor, and lifelong dear friend. The first time I ever saw him, I had a huge crush on him, this scholar in his large bluish gray office. I worked in Sylvia Scribner's lab on the sixth floor of the CUNY graduate school and would walk down the back steps to the fifth floor just to walk by his office several times a day and observe him sitting there surrounded by books and gadgets and often students and colleagues. I stood outside of his classes to listen in before I became his student. That was 1990. Finally one day, I met him. I sat down in his office and we started what became a lifelong conversation. We used to chat between offices on the 90s version of the internet, long streams of witty one liners back and forth. I fell in love with language through those interactions. Joe became my advisor through a PhD that took me as long as I could make it last, 15 years. He protected me from the administration, received me for hours every time I walked into his office or his apartment. He asked me hard questions and told me hard truths. He made me think and work hard and read and write. I visited him twice in the past few months, once in the hospital and once at home. He called me the day after I was laid off just a few weeks ago with advice and warmth and worry. I had just left him a message the day before yesterday saying I was coming next week again to see him at his house. I thought he was getting better. I saw him as recovering. And he was so funny and so undramatic when I visited him that I was sure of it. I told him how much he meant to me and how much I loved him when I visited him in the hospital in April, and for that I am so glad. I'm grateful for this wonderful person and so terribly sad that he is gone. > On Jul 19, 2017, at 3:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In 2012 when we were preparing to bring out a Korean version of > "History of the Development of the Higher Mental Functions" I tried to > do a Korean version of Professor Glick's magisterial preface on the > Vygotsky of "Though and Language" (that is, the 1962 Hanfmann and > Vakar translation) the Vygotsky of "Mind in Society"and Piaget. He > was--exactly as others have said--extremely generous, kind, helpful, > and insightful, and he even wrote us a beautiful jacket blurb, which I will always treasure. > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who > -it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > >> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 2:26 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: >> >> this is heartbreaking news! Joe was one of the smartest and most >> thoughtful persons I knew. Wow. What a loss. Last I heard from him was >> around a recent posting of his grandchild on FB. very sad indeed. Kris >> >> Kris D. Guti?rrez >> Carol Liu Professor >> Graduate School of Education >> University of California, Berkeley >> 5629 Tolman Hall >> Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 >> gutierrkd@berkeley.edu >> >> >> >>> On Jul 19, 2017, at 8:17 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Damn! >>> Joe was a long time colleague and friend who introduced me to >> developmental >>> psychology, engaged with me in our early adventures into >>> cross-cultural psychology, and continued to enrich not only my life, >>> but those of many others over many decades. >>> >>> Sad day in the Cole household and many others around the world. >>> >>> mike >>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Dear All, >>>> >>>> According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this >>>> world this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished >>>> to share my sorrow here. >>>> >>>> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >>>> http://www.artingoncu.com/ >>>> Professor Emeritus, >>>> University of Illinois at Chicago >>>> College of Education M/C 147 >>>> 1040 W. Harrison St. >>>> Chicago, IL 60607 >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> From banvenlak@yahoo.com Wed Jul 19 13:50:02 2017 From: banvenlak@yahoo.com (Lakshmi Bandlamudi) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 20:50:02 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <2A6ABAC6-CD21-4DEC-8973-9CE800BB9FC8@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1139581156.739775.1500497402614@mail.yahoo.com> Friends, My good old Joe left me this morning. This photograph was taken at my book release party and this book was dedicated to him. My friend, philosopher and guide...we had the most rewarding friendship for over 30 years. He brought out the best in me or rather catalyzed my transformation from an insecure and confused graduate student to a more mature and self assured academic. Our relationship was so rich- packed with arguments, discussions, laughter and he was merciless in teasing me and I reciprocated with affectionate irreverence...so rare are such relationships and so precious are the memories...when life was all fragmenting he put me together...placed high demands and pushed me...You Will Always Be A Part of Me...???you my Good Old Joe...Lakshmi On Wednesday, July 19, 2017 4:10 PM, Jessica Kindred wrote: Joe Glick died this morning. He was my mentor, graduate advisor, and lifelong dear friend. The first time I ever saw him, I had a huge crush on him, this scholar in his large bluish gray office. I worked in Sylvia Scribner's lab on the sixth floor of the CUNY graduate school and would walk down the back steps to the fifth floor just to walk by his office several times a day and observe him sitting there surrounded by books and gadgets and often students and colleagues. I stood outside of his classes to listen in before I became his student. That was 1990. Finally one day, I met him. I sat down in his office and we started what became a lifelong conversation. We used to chat between offices on the 90s version of the internet, long streams of witty one liners back and forth. I fell in love with language through those interactions. Joe became my advisor through a PhD that took me as long as I could make it last, 15 years. He protected me from the administration, received me for hours every time I walked into his office or his apartment. He asked me hard questions and told me hard truths. He made me think and work hard and read and write. I visited him twice in the past few months, once in the hospital and once at home. He called me the day after I was laid off just a few weeks ago with advice and warmth and worry. I had just left him a message the day before yesterday saying I was coming next week again to see him at his house. I thought he was getting better. I saw him as recovering. And he was so funny and so undramatic when I visited him that I was sure of it. I told him how much he meant to me and how much I loved him when I visited him in the hospital in April, and for that I am so glad. I'm grateful for this wonderful person and so terribly sad that he is gone. > On Jul 19, 2017, at 3:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In 2012 when we were preparing to bring out a Korean version of "History of > the Development of the Higher Mental Functions" I tried to do a Korean > version of Professor Glick's magisterial preface on the Vygotsky of "Though > and Language" (that is, the 1962 Hanfmann and Vakar translation) the > Vygotsky of "Mind in Society"and Piaget. He was--exactly as others have > said--extremely generous, kind, helpful, and insightful, and he even wrote > us a beautiful jacket blurb, which I will always treasure. > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > >> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 2:26 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: >> >> this is heartbreaking news!? Joe was one of the smartest and most >> thoughtful persons I knew.? Wow.? What a loss.? Last I heard from him was >> around a recent posting of his grandchild on FB.? very sad indeed.? Kris >> >> Kris D. Guti?rrez >> Carol Liu Professor >> Graduate School of Education >> University of California, Berkeley >> 5629 Tolman Hall >> Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 >> gutierrkd@berkeley.edu >> >> >> >>> On Jul 19, 2017, at 8:17 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Damn! >>> Joe was a long time colleague and friend who introduced me to >> developmental >>> psychology, engaged with me in our early adventures into cross-cultural >>> psychology, and continued to enrich not only my life, but those of many >>> others over many decades. >>> >>> Sad day in the Cole household and many others around the world. >>> >>> mike >>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Dear All, >>>> >>>> According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world >>>> this morning.? I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my >>>> sorrow here. >>>> >>>> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >>>> http://www.artingoncu.com/ >>>> Professor Emeritus, >>>> University of Illinois at Chicago >>>> College of Education M/C 147 >>>> 1040 W. Harrison St. >>>> Chicago, IL 60607 >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: IMG_0004.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 608792 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170719/df4040fe/attachment-0001.jpg From heckertkrs@yahoo.com Wed Jul 19 14:57:43 2017 From: heckertkrs@yahoo.com (Karen Heckert) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 21:57:43 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: <2142397940.122299.1500501463503@mail.yahoo.com> I am also truly sorry to hear this. I knew him briefly at CUNY/Brooklyn College in the 90's and he gave me some very valuable guidance (besides being one of the none-too-common professors who really care about the students.). Rachel Heckert From: "Goncu, Artin" To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 11:03 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Joe Glick Dear All, According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world this morning.? I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my sorrow here. Artin Goncu, Ph.D http://www.artingoncu.com/ Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jul 20 10:00:50 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2017 10:00:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Message-ID: This article might prove of interest to those who have been discussing LSV's sources in marx and spinoza. mike -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_in_Psycholog.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 568561 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170720/d4dd569e/attachment.pdf From smago@uga.edu Thu Jul 20 10:56:27 2017 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2017 17:56:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Mike Cole uploaded a paper In-Reply-To: <5970eb2871dfc_74453fa79f40609c103519@send-emails-sidekiq-20170720-sympathizes.z0o.us.mail> References: <5970eb2871dfc_74453fa79f40609c103519@send-emails-sidekiq-20170720-sympathizes.z0o.us.mail> Message-ID: Mike just uploaded a classic: From: Academia.edu [mailto:noreply@academia-mail.com] Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2017 1:41 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: Mike Cole uploaded a paper [Academia.edu] Mike Cole just uploaded a paper: [Mike Cole] Mike Cole University of California, San Diego, Communication, Emeritus Cole.Scribner-1975-Ethos.pdf VIEW PAPER P.S. A study recently published in PLOS ONE found that papers uploaded to Academia.edu receive a 69% boost in citations over 5 years. See the study and data here. Academia, 251 Kearny St., Suite 520, San Francisco, CA, 94108 Unsubscribe Privacy Policy Terms of Service ? 2017 Academia From ivan@llaisdy.com Thu Jul 20 11:15:04 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2017 19:15:04 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) Ivan -- festina lente > On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole wrote: > > This article might prove of interest to those who have been discussing > LSV's sources in > marx and spinoza. > mike > From kindred.jessica@gmail.com Thu Jul 20 17:20:19 2017 From: kindred.jessica@gmail.com (Jessica Kindred) Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2017 20:20:19 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <2A6ABAC6-CD21-4DEC-8973-9CE800BB9FC8@gmail.com> Message-ID: <618910B6-BF18-4DAE-88E5-D80F329D7D61@gmail.com> Services for Joe Glick will be held on Thursday July 27, 2017 at Westchester Funeral Home 190 Main Street Eastchester , New York 10709 >From 4pm-8pm > On Jul 19, 2017, at 4:07 PM, Jessica Kindred wrote: > > Joe Glick died this morning. He was my mentor, graduate advisor, and lifelong dear friend. The first time I ever saw him, I had a huge crush on him, this scholar in his large bluish gray office. I worked in Sylvia Scribner's lab on the sixth floor of the CUNY graduate school and would walk down the back steps to the fifth floor just to walk by his office several times a day and observe him sitting there surrounded by books and gadgets and often students and colleagues. I stood outside of his classes to listen in before I became his student. That was 1990. Finally one day, I met him. I sat down in his office and we started what became a lifelong conversation. We used to chat between offices on the 90s version of the internet, long streams of witty one liners back and forth. I fell in love with language through those interactions. Joe became my advisor through a PhD that took me as long as I could make it last, 15 years. He protected me from the administration, received me for hours every time I walked into his office or his apartment. He asked me hard questions and told me hard truths. He made me think and work hard and read and write. I visited him twice in the past few months, once in the hospital and once at home. He called me the day after I was laid off just a few weeks ago with advice and warmth and worry. I had just left him a message the day before yesterday saying I was coming next week again to see him at his house. I thought he was getting better. I saw him as recovering. And he was so funny and so undramatic when I visited him that I was sure of it. I told him how much he meant to me and how much I loved him when I visited him in the hospital in April, and for that I am so glad. I'm grateful for this wonderful person and so terribly sad that he is gone. > > >> On Jul 19, 2017, at 3:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> In 2012 when we were preparing to bring out a Korean version of "History of >> the Development of the Higher Mental Functions" I tried to do a Korean >> version of Professor Glick's magisterial preface on the Vygotsky of "Though >> and Language" (that is, the 1962 Hanfmann and Vakar translation) the >> Vygotsky of "Mind in Society"and Piaget. He was--exactly as others have >> said--extremely generous, kind, helpful, and insightful, and he even wrote >> us a beautiful jacket blurb, which I will always treasure. >> >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >> >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> >> >> >> >>> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 2:26 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: >>> >>> this is heartbreaking news! Joe was one of the smartest and most >>> thoughtful persons I knew. Wow. What a loss. Last I heard from him was >>> around a recent posting of his grandchild on FB. very sad indeed. Kris >>> >>> Kris D. Guti?rrez >>> Carol Liu Professor >>> Graduate School of Education >>> University of California, Berkeley >>> 5629 Tolman Hall >>> Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 >>> gutierrkd@berkeley.edu >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Jul 19, 2017, at 8:17 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Damn! >>>> Joe was a long time colleague and friend who introduced me to >>> developmental >>>> psychology, engaged with me in our early adventures into cross-cultural >>>> psychology, and continued to enrich not only my life, but those of many >>>> others over many decades. >>>> >>>> Sad day in the Cole household and many others around the world. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dear All, >>>>> >>>>> According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world >>>>> this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my >>>>> sorrow here. >>>>> >>>>> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >>>>> http://www.artingoncu.com/ >>>>> Professor Emeritus, >>>>> University of Illinois at Chicago >>>>> College of Education M/C 147 >>>>> 1040 W. Harrison St. >>>>> Chicago, IL 60607 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri Jul 21 02:10:02 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 09:10:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick In-Reply-To: <618910B6-BF18-4DAE-88E5-D80F329D7D61@gmail.com> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com> <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> <629f168022a2e25c18f3aa392e88b0a4.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <2A6ABAC6-CD21-4DEC-8973-9CE800BB9FC8@gmail.com> , <618910B6-BF18-4DAE-88E5-D80F329D7D61@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1500628202672.93052@iped.uio.no> As perhaps many others, I only knew Joe Glick through his introductions to Vygotsky's writings. But, as other times when someone's passing away has been announced here at xmca, I feel fortunate to be able to read and feel so much more about the person behind the writings thanks to the folks who actually got to know him and come to share here. For those like me searching to learn more from him, I attach a recent Psychology & Society paper that, curiously, also speaks about 'second hand knowledge'. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Jessica Kindred Sent: 21 July 2017 02:20 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Joe Glick Services for Joe Glick will be held on Thursday July 27, 2017 at Westchester Funeral Home 190 Main Street Eastchester , New York 10709 >From 4pm-8pm > On Jul 19, 2017, at 4:07 PM, Jessica Kindred wrote: > > Joe Glick died this morning. He was my mentor, graduate advisor, and lifelong dear friend. The first time I ever saw him, I had a huge crush on him, this scholar in his large bluish gray office. I worked in Sylvia Scribner's lab on the sixth floor of the CUNY graduate school and would walk down the back steps to the fifth floor just to walk by his office several times a day and observe him sitting there surrounded by books and gadgets and often students and colleagues. I stood outside of his classes to listen in before I became his student. That was 1990. Finally one day, I met him. I sat down in his office and we started what became a lifelong conversation. We used to chat between offices on the 90s version of the internet, long streams of witty one liners back and forth. I fell in love with language through those interactions. Joe became my advisor through a PhD that took me as long as I could make it last, 15 years. He protected me from the administration, received me for hours every time I walked into his office or his apartment. He asked me hard questions and told me hard truths. He made me think and work hard and read and write. I visited him twice in the past few months, once in the hospital and once at home. He called me the day after I was laid off just a few weeks ago with advice and warmth and worry. I had just left him a message the day before yesterday saying I was coming next week again to see him at his house. I thought he was getting better. I saw him as recovering. And he was so funny and so undramatic when I visited him that I was sure of it. I told him how much he meant to me and how much I loved him when I visited him in the hospital in April, and for that I am so glad. I'm grateful for this wonderful person and so terribly sad that he is gone. > > >> On Jul 19, 2017, at 3:48 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> In 2012 when we were preparing to bring out a Korean version of "History of >> the Development of the Higher Mental Functions" I tried to do a Korean >> version of Professor Glick's magisterial preface on the Vygotsky of "Though >> and Language" (that is, the 1962 Hanfmann and Vakar translation) the >> Vygotsky of "Mind in Society"and Piaget. He was--exactly as others have >> said--extremely generous, kind, helpful, and insightful, and he even wrote >> us a beautiful jacket blurb, which I will always treasure. >> >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >> >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> >> >> >> >>> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 2:26 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: >>> >>> this is heartbreaking news! Joe was one of the smartest and most >>> thoughtful persons I knew. Wow. What a loss. Last I heard from him was >>> around a recent posting of his grandchild on FB. very sad indeed. Kris >>> >>> Kris D. Guti?rrez >>> Carol Liu Professor >>> Graduate School of Education >>> University of California, Berkeley >>> 5629 Tolman Hall >>> Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 >>> gutierrkd@berkeley.edu >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Jul 19, 2017, at 8:17 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Damn! >>>> Joe was a long time colleague and friend who introduced me to >>> developmental >>>> psychology, engaged with me in our early adventures into cross-cultural >>>> psychology, and continued to enrich not only my life, but those of many >>>> others over many decades. >>>> >>>> Sad day in the Cole household and many others around the world. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dear All, >>>>> >>>>> According to a post on facebook by his spouse, Joe Glick left this world >>>>> this morning. I am deeply saddened by this loss, and wished to share my >>>>> sorrow here. >>>>> >>>>> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >>>>> http://www.artingoncu.com/ >>>>> Professor Emeritus, >>>>> University of Illinois at Chicago >>>>> College of Education M/C 147 >>>>> 1040 W. Harrison St. >>>>> Chicago, IL 60607 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 4-Glick_2014__Relations_between_the_individual_and_socio-cultural.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 146770 bytes Desc: 4-Glick_2014__Relations_between_the_individual_and_socio-cultural.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170721/f9900db8/attachment.pdf From smago@uga.edu Fri Jul 21 02:41:16 2017 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 09:41:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Mike Cole uploaded a paper In-Reply-To: <8327f79c-d2ac-1632-006a-75d9f662c798@mira.net> References: <5970eb2871dfc_74453fa79f40609c103519@send-emails-sidekiq-20170720-sympathizes.z0o.us.mail> <8327f79c-d2ac-1632-006a-75d9f662c798@mira.net> Message-ID: Oops, o well. Maybe they can search around From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2017 9:30 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] FW: Mike Cole uploaded a paper After someone told me that the link only goes to my own feed, I downloaded it and am attaching. I am not a fraud. ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 21/07/2017 3:56 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: Mike just uploaded a classic: From: Academia.edu [mailto:noreply@academia-mail.com] Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2017 1:41 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: Mike Cole uploaded a paper [Academia.edu] Mike Cole just uploaded a paper: [Mike Cole] Mike Cole University of California, San Diego, Communication, Emeritus Cole.Scribner-1975-Ethos.pdf VIEW PAPER P.S. A study recently published in PLOS ONE found that papers uploaded to Academia.edu receive a 69% boost in citations over 5 years. See the study and data here. Academia, 251 Kearny St., Suite 520, San Francisco, CA, 94108 Unsubscribe Privacy Policy Terms of Service ? 2017 Academia -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Cole.Scribner-1975-Ethos.pdf.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 2185751 bytes Desc: Cole.Scribner-1975-Ethos.pdf.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170721/82af7b8a/attachment-0001.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Fri Jul 21 03:00:32 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 20:00:32 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Mike Cole uploaded a paper In-Reply-To: References: <5970eb2871dfc_74453fa79f40609c103519@send-emails-sidekiq-20170720-sympathizes.z0o.us.mail> <8327f79c-d2ac-1632-006a-75d9f662c798@mira.net> Message-ID: <84f28b2e-e380-c253-e5f8-3f69bc5a7ea0@mira.net> 1975! A real classic! andy ------------------------------------------------------------ On 21/07/2017 7:41 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > After someone told me that the link only goes to my own feed, I downloaded it and am attaching. I am not a fraud. > > ________________________________ > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jul 21 09:03:51 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 09:03:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Mike Cole uploaded a paper In-Reply-To: <84f28b2e-e380-c253-e5f8-3f69bc5a7ea0@mira.net> References: <5970eb2871dfc_74453fa79f40609c103519@send-emails-sidekiq-20170720-sympathizes.z0o.us.mail> <8327f79c-d2ac-1632-006a-75d9f662c798@mira.net> <84f28b2e-e380-c253-e5f8-3f69bc5a7ea0@mira.net> Message-ID: Peter and Andy -No accounting for taste you misguided classic-o-fiers! Thanks for sending that piece by Joe, Alfredo. i had no seen it and look forward to reading it. mike On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 3:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > 1975! A real classic! > andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > On 21/07/2017 7:41 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> After someone told me that the link only goes to my own feed, I >> downloaded it and am attaching. I am not a fraud. >> >> ________________________________ >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Jul 21 18:10:17 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 18:10:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography Message-ID: July 20, 2017 Dear XMCA-o-philes, I am writing to inform you about the *LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography, *a project begun by LCHC members following the Lab's receipt of the Sylvia Scriner award at AERA several years ago. The site is not perfect. It was created collaboratively over the years through email exchanges and face to face discussions as life allowed. We are still in the process of getting the Forum associated with the document working in a reliable fashion, and other user friendly measure. We are still hunting down those whose life paths we have not had the time/resoures to track down yet. I really is incomplete. But as the death of Joe Glick has reminded me, Time waits for no one. John Gay, who was there at the beginning of this story is still with us but heading toward 90. So the time has come. That Joe joined us in our odd venture provided me with an education in developmental psychology and a life long companion in seeking to understand more deeply, the role of culture in human development. So here, belatedly, is an account of the 50 year history of LCHC up to the time of my retirement. Its future is to be found Section 6 of the web page which can be found at the following address: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu Suggestions of ways to improve this document are warmly welcomed (so long as they are accompanied by the volunteer labor to implement them!).When the Forum is up and running, your comments and contributions to the discussion are most welcome. Mike From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sat Jul 22 04:11:51 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2017 11:11:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1500721915519.45984@iped.uio.no> What a beautiful project, Mike and everyone else involved at LCHC! And what an important document for anyone interested in how CHAT came to the West. Thanks so much, Alfredo. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 22 July 2017 03:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Laurel Friedman Subject: [Xmca-l] The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography July 20, 2017 Dear XMCA-o-philes, I am writing to inform you about the *LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography, *a project begun by LCHC members following the Lab's receipt of the Sylvia Scriner award at AERA several years ago. The site is not perfect. It was created collaboratively over the years through email exchanges and face to face discussions as life allowed. We are still in the process of getting the Forum associated with the document working in a reliable fashion, and other user friendly measure. We are still hunting down those whose life paths we have not had the time/resoures to track down yet. I really is incomplete. But as the death of Joe Glick has reminded me, Time waits for no one. John Gay, who was there at the beginning of this story is still with us but heading toward 90. So the time has come. That Joe joined us in our odd venture provided me with an education in developmental psychology and a life long companion in seeking to understand more deeply, the role of culture in human development. So here, belatedly, is an account of the 50 year history of LCHC up to the time of my retirement. Its future is to be found Section 6 of the web page which can be found at the following address: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu Suggestions of ways to improve this document are warmly welcomed (so long as they are accompanied by the volunteer labor to implement them!).When the Forum is up and running, your comments and contributions to the discussion are most welcome. Mike From laires11@gmail.com Sat Jul 22 05:22:12 2017 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2017 13:22:12 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: <1500721915519.45984@iped.uio.no> References: <1500721915519.45984@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Dear Mike Thank you so much! I see Culture as Action. Best, Lu?sa A. 2017-07-22 12:11 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil : > What a beautiful project, Mike and everyone else involved at LCHC! And > what an important document for anyone interested in how CHAT came to the > West. Thanks so much, Alfredo. > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: 22 July 2017 03:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Laurel Friedman > Subject: [Xmca-l] The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography > > July 20, 2017 > > Dear XMCA-o-philes, > > > > I am writing to inform you about the *LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography, *a > project begun by LCHC members following the Lab's receipt of the Sylvia > Scriner award at AERA several years ago. The site is not perfect. It was > created collaboratively over the years through email exchanges and face to > face discussions as life allowed. We are still in the process of getting > the Forum associated with the document working in a reliable fashion, and > other user friendly measure. We are still hunting down those whose life > paths we have not had the time/resoures to track down yet. I really is > incomplete. > > > > But as the death of Joe Glick has reminded me, Time waits for no one. John > Gay, who was there at the beginning of this story is still with us but > heading toward 90. So the time has come. > > > > That Joe joined us in our odd venture provided me with an education in > developmental psychology and a life long companion in seeking to understand > more deeply, the role of culture in human development. > > > > So here, belatedly, is an account of the 50 year history of LCHC up to the > time of my retirement. Its future is to be found Section 6 of the web page > which can be found at the following address: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu > > > > Suggestions of ways to improve this document are warmly welcomed (so long > as they are accompanied by the volunteer labor to implement them!).When the > Forum is up and running, your comments and contributions to the discussion > are most welcome. > > > > Mike > > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Jul 22 07:44:01 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2017 07:44:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: <1500721915519.45984@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <597364c2.c6ce620a.575db.436e@mx.google.com> Mike, This polyphonic autobiography and the two term taken in conjunction (polyphonic) (autobiography) speaks o the convergence (and divergence) of voices. In the spirit of this conjunction may I suggest including link to joseph Glicks essay (Relations Between the Individual and the Socio-Cultural: the ZPD and the ZPWE and the Philosophy of Second -Hand Knowledge). The back and forth relationship seems to embody this spirit with a history back to the 1960?s. I hear (and listen) to our polyphonic nature Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Luisa Aires Sent: July 22, 2017 5:23 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Laurel Friedman Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography Dear Mike Thank you so much! I see Culture as Action. Best, Lu?sa A. 2017-07-22 12:11 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil : > What a beautiful project, Mike and everyone else involved at LCHC! And > what an important document for anyone interested in how CHAT came to the > West. Thanks so much, Alfredo. > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: 22 July 2017 03:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Laurel Friedman > Subject: [Xmca-l] The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography > > July 20, 2017 > > Dear XMCA-o-philes, > > > > I am writing to inform you about the *LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography, *a > project begun by LCHC members following the Lab's receipt of the Sylvia > Scriner award at AERA several years ago. The site is not perfect. It was > created collaboratively over the years through email exchanges and face to > face discussions as life allowed. We are still in the process of getting > the Forum associated with the document working in a reliable fashion, and > other user friendly measure. We are still hunting down those whose life > paths we have not had the time/resoures to track down yet. I really is > incomplete. > > > > But as the death of Joe Glick has reminded me, Time waits for no one. John > Gay, who was there at the beginning of this story is still with us but > heading toward 90. So the time has come. > > > > That Joe joined us in our odd venture provided me with an education in > developmental psychology and a life long companion in seeking to understand > more deeply, the role of culture in human development. > > > > So here, belatedly, is an account of the 50 year history of LCHC up to the > time of my retirement. Its future is to be found Section 6 of the web page > which can be found at the following address: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu > > > > Suggestions of ways to improve this document are warmly welcomed (so long > as they are accompanied by the volunteer labor to implement them!).When the > Forum is up and running, your comments and contributions to the discussion > are most welcome. > > > > Mike > > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Jul 22 10:05:33 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2017 10:05:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: <597364c2.c6ce620a.575db.436e@mx.google.com> References: <1500721915519.45984@iped.uio.no> <597364c2.c6ce620a.575db.436e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Fine idea to add that paper by Joe, Larry. Although he was a big contributor to the early chapters, he did not send us material for his person page, which has a delightful picture of Joe with Lois and Lenora Fulani taken a year ago. Adding the paper is easy, but it would be great if one of Joe's or recent colleagues would send us a fuller people page for him. Polyphony is not a one party affair! There are a lot of places where addition of articles/chapters/books would enrich the site. If people send suggestions to the contact address on the site, we can insert them in the right places. mike On Sat, Jul 22, 2017 at 7:44 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Mike, > This polyphonic autobiography and the two term taken in conjunction > (polyphonic) (autobiography) speaks o the convergence (and divergence) of > voices. > In the spirit of this conjunction may I suggest including link to joseph > Glicks essay (Relations Between the Individual and the Socio-Cultural: the > ZPD and the ZPWE and the Philosophy of Second -Hand Knowledge). > > The back and forth relationship seems to embody this spirit with a history > back to the 1960?s. > > I hear (and listen) to our polyphonic nature > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Luisa Aires > Sent: July 22, 2017 5:23 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Laurel Friedman > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography > > Dear Mike > > Thank you so much! > I see Culture as Action. > > Best, > Lu?sa A. > > > 2017-07-22 12:11 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil : > > > What a beautiful project, Mike and everyone else involved at LCHC! And > > what an important document for anyone interested in how CHAT came to the > > West. Thanks so much, Alfredo. > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of mike cole > > Sent: 22 July 2017 03:10 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: Laurel Friedman > > Subject: [Xmca-l] The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography > > > > July 20, 2017 > > > > Dear XMCA-o-philes, > > > > > > > > I am writing to inform you about the *LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography, *a > > project begun by LCHC members following the Lab's receipt of the Sylvia > > Scriner award at AERA several years ago. The site is not perfect. It was > > created collaboratively over the years through email exchanges and face > to > > face discussions as life allowed. We are still in the process of getting > > the Forum associated with the document working in a reliable fashion, and > > other user friendly measure. We are still hunting down those whose life > > paths we have not had the time/resoures to track down yet. I really is > > incomplete. > > > > > > > > But as the death of Joe Glick has reminded me, Time waits for no one. > John > > Gay, who was there at the beginning of this story is still with us but > > heading toward 90. So the time has come. > > > > > > > > That Joe joined us in our odd venture provided me with an education in > > developmental psychology and a life long companion in seeking to > understand > > more deeply, the role of culture in human development. > > > > > > > > So here, belatedly, is an account of the 50 year history of LCHC up to > the > > time of my retirement. Its future is to be found Section 6 of the web > page > > which can be found at the following address: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > Suggestions of ways to improve this document are warmly welcomed (so long > > as they are accompanied by the volunteer labor to implement them!).When > the > > Forum is up and running, your comments and contributions to the > discussion > > are most welcome. > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > -- > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > laires@uab.pt > www.uab.pt > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Jul 22 14:42:31 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 23 Jul 2017 06:42:31 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: <1500721915519.45984@iped.uio.no> <597364c2.c6ce620a.575db.436e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Yes, great stuff. Useful stuff. Quotable and citeable stuff! One of the big advantages is that it is (presumably) still editable. In ChapterTwo, the section on Psychological Theories of Cognitive Deficit contains a repetition, to wit: "Deutsch, like Hunt, believed that proper training could help mitigate the effects of insufficient early experience. She pointed to research by Covington (1967) in which children were who designated as higher or lower status on the basis of their parents? education were asked to discriminate between pairs of abstract stimuli. The findings showed a marked difference between the two groups. Happily, after fourteen sessions during which subjects were asked simply to look at the stimuli, the children identified as lower status improved twice as much as the upper status children, by then performing at an indistinguishable level. On the basis of this and related evidence, Deutsch concluded that with appropriate training, children could learn to make the kinds of perceptual distinctions that are important to education like Hunt, believed that proper training could help mitigate the effects of insufficient early experience. She pointed to research by Covington (1967) in which children were who designated as higher or lower status on the basis of their parents? education were asked to discriminate between pairs of abstract stimuli. The findings showed a marked difference between the two groups. Happily, after fourteen sessions during which subjects were asked simply to look at the stimuli, the children identified as lower status improved twice as much as the upper status children, by then performing at an indistinguishable level. On the basis of this and related evidence, Deutsch concluded that with appropriate training, children can learn to make the kinds of perceptual distinctions that are important to education." I didn't realize that Labov's work was directed against Bereiter and Engelmann. I guess this makes it a bit more understandable. Bereiter and Engelmann are almost heroically wrong in their notion that consonant deletion and copula elision (e.g. "Dis bi daw" instead of"This is a big dog") create superwords that cannot be analyzed. This is wrong in the usual way (empirically wrong, as Labov proved). But it's also wrong in a kind of heroic way: it leads to the merciless reduction of language to meaningless parts, something which they then pursued and which they still pursue today, in their pedagogical method. Suppose we discovered (as many elementary school kids do) that cursive script is an impediment to learning how to segment words into letters and thus slows down learning to read and write, particularly for kids from families which don't write in cursive (say, parents who telephone or text each other instead). It's easy enough to start the kids on printing block letters. But we should then not be too surprised to discover that they actually reinvent cursive writing as they develop fluency (and in fact they even reinvent the original purpose of elaborate writing when it first developed, which was to limit literacy to the privileged and the few). So the real question is not the Bereiter and Engelmann question--what is the phonological or graphological technology that stands in the way of universal literacy? It's the Bernstein and Halliday question: why does the technological and even the pedogogical equalization of literacy make so little difference? Why, as Ruqaiya Hasan puts it, was Luria's optimism about the difference that education would make for Uzbek peasants so misplaced? Why, in the USA, does the head start of "Head Start" peter out so fast? We know that kids in lower elementary still talk like their parents. But by middle school they are talking more like each other. So why do they so often use their newfound autonomy from the parental code to reproduce classes in cliques, to reinforce their social isolation instead of break out of it? One explanation is to go outside language altogether, and simply point to the underlying nonlinguistic realities: people with guns and money protecting concentrated forms of property inequality through extreme, institutionally disguised, forms of ritualized violence (in the USSR, orchestrated famines, and closer to home mass incarceration, differential access to health care, and other forms of legal mass murder). But as the very next section of the Polyphonic Autobiography argues, what arises in contexts is realized in texts as well as vice versa--although maybe not at the level of the phoneme and the grapheme. So a better explanation has to include the idea that certain meanings are differentially accessible to children. Because we are talking about meanings, this has more to do with the social context than with some notion of impoverished graphology or reduced phonology. But for the very same reason, these social contexts are not simply people with guns and money but also wordings and even the ways they sound and are spelt. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 at 2:05 AM, mike cole wrote: > Fine idea to add that paper by Joe, Larry. Although he was a big > contributor to the early chapters, he did not send us material for his > person page, which has a delightful picture of Joe with Lois and Lenora > Fulani taken a year ago. > > Adding the paper is easy, but it would be great if one of Joe's or recent > colleagues would send us a fuller people page for him. Polyphony is not a > one party affair! > > There are a lot of places where addition of articles/chapters/books would > enrich the site. If people send suggestions to the contact address on the > site, we can insert them in the right places. > > mike > > > > On Sat, Jul 22, 2017 at 7:44 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > Mike, > > This polyphonic autobiography and the two term taken in conjunction > > (polyphonic) (autobiography) speaks o the convergence (and divergence) > of > > voices. > > In the spirit of this conjunction may I suggest including link to joseph > > Glicks essay (Relations Between the Individual and the Socio-Cultural: > the > > ZPD and the ZPWE and the Philosophy of Second -Hand Knowledge). > > > > The back and forth relationship seems to embody this spirit with a > history > > back to the 1960?s. > > > > I hear (and listen) to our polyphonic nature > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > From: Luisa Aires > > Sent: July 22, 2017 5:23 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: Laurel Friedman > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography > > > > Dear Mike > > > > Thank you so much! > > I see Culture as Action. > > > > Best, > > Lu?sa A. > > > > > > 2017-07-22 12:11 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil : > > > > > What a beautiful project, Mike and everyone else involved at LCHC! And > > > what an important document for anyone interested in how CHAT came to > the > > > West. Thanks so much, Alfredo. > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > Sent: 22 July 2017 03:10 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Cc: Laurel Friedman > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography > > > > > > July 20, 2017 > > > > > > Dear XMCA-o-philes, > > > > > > > > > > > > I am writing to inform you about the *LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography, *a > > > project begun by LCHC members following the Lab's receipt of the Sylvia > > > Scriner award at AERA several years ago. The site is not perfect. It > was > > > created collaboratively over the years through email exchanges and face > > to > > > face discussions as life allowed. We are still in the process of > getting > > > the Forum associated with the document working in a reliable fashion, > and > > > other user friendly measure. We are still hunting down those whose life > > > paths we have not had the time/resoures to track down yet. I really is > > > incomplete. > > > > > > > > > > > > But as the death of Joe Glick has reminded me, Time waits for no one. > > John > > > Gay, who was there at the beginning of this story is still with us but > > > heading toward 90. So the time has come. > > > > > > > > > > > > That Joe joined us in our odd venture provided me with an education in > > > developmental psychology and a life long companion in seeking to > > understand > > > more deeply, the role of culture in human development. > > > > > > > > > > > > So here, belatedly, is an account of the 50 year history of LCHC up to > > the > > > time of my retirement. Its future is to be found Section 6 of the web > > page > > > which can be found at the following address: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > > > > Suggestions of ways to improve this document are warmly welcomed (so > long > > > as they are accompanied by the volunteer labor to implement them!).When > > the > > > Forum is up and running, your comments and contributions to the > > discussion > > > are most welcome. > > > > > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > > laires@uab.pt > > www.uab.pt > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Jul 22 15:19:41 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2017 15:19:41 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography In-Reply-To: References: <1500721915519.45984@iped.uio.no> <597364c2.c6ce620a.575db.436e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Thanks for finding the repitition, David. As many times the text has been read and edited by many people, errors of this sort, and errors of thinking (of course!) remain. It can be edited. We have minimal resources, but enough to fix such errors, so its very helpful to have them pointed out. When we get a Forum functioning, your comments would be just the sort of contribution that would enrich the usefulness of the document. In a later chapter you will see that we found Labov's conclusions concerning the comparability of talk in a formal test and in a less formal conversation at a kids' home are more problematic than people remember. An unfinishable undertaking, in principle. mike On Sat, Jul 22, 2017 at 2:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Yes, great stuff. Useful stuff. Quotable and citeable stuff! > > One of the big advantages is that it is (presumably) still editable. In > ChapterTwo, the section on Psychological Theories of Cognitive Deficit > contains a repetition, to wit: > > "Deutsch, like Hunt, believed that proper training could help mitigate the > effects of insufficient early experience. She pointed to research by > Covington (1967) in which children were who designated as higher or lower > status on the basis of their parents? education were asked to discriminate > between pairs of abstract stimuli. The findings showed a marked difference > between the two groups. Happily, after fourteen sessions during which > subjects were asked simply to look at the stimuli, the children identified > as lower status improved twice as much as the upper status children, by > then performing at an indistinguishable level. On the basis of this and > related evidence, Deutsch concluded that with appropriate training, > children could learn to make the kinds of perceptual distinctions that are > important to education like Hunt, believed that proper training could help > mitigate the effects of insufficient early experience. She pointed to > research by Covington (1967) in which children were who designated as > higher or lower status on the basis of their parents? education were asked > to discriminate between pairs of abstract stimuli. The findings showed a > marked difference between the two groups. Happily, after fourteen sessions > during which subjects were asked simply to look at the stimuli, the > children identified as lower status improved twice as much as the upper > status children, by then performing at an indistinguishable level. On the > basis of this and related evidence, Deutsch concluded that with appropriate > training, children can learn to make the kinds of perceptual distinctions > that are important to education." > > I didn't realize that Labov's work was directed against Bereiter and > Engelmann. I guess this makes it a bit more understandable. Bereiter and > Engelmann are almost heroically wrong in their notion that consonant > deletion and copula elision (e.g. "Dis bi daw" instead of"This is a big > dog") create superwords that cannot be analyzed. This is wrong in the usual > way (empirically wrong, as Labov proved). But it's also wrong in a kind of > heroic way: it leads to the merciless reduction of language to meaningless > parts, something which they then pursued and which they still pursue > today, in their pedagogical method. > > Suppose we discovered (as many elementary school kids do) that cursive > script is an impediment to learning how to segment words into letters and > thus slows down learning to read and write, particularly for kids from > families which don't write in cursive (say, parents who telephone or text > each other instead). It's easy enough to start the kids on printing block > letters. But we should then not be too surprised to discover that they > actually reinvent cursive writing as they develop fluency (and in fact they > even reinvent the original purpose of elaborate writing when it first > developed, which was to limit literacy to the privileged and the few). > > So the real question is not the Bereiter and Engelmann question--what is > the phonological or graphological technology that stands in the way of > universal literacy? It's the Bernstein and Halliday question: why does the > technological and even the pedogogical equalization of literacy make so > little difference? Why, as Ruqaiya Hasan puts it, was Luria's optimism > about the difference that education would make for Uzbek peasants so > misplaced? Why, in the USA, does the head start of "Head Start" peter out > so fast? We know that kids in lower elementary still talk like their > parents. But by middle school they are talking more like each other. So why > do they so often use their newfound autonomy from the parental code to > reproduce classes in cliques, to reinforce their social isolation instead > of break out of it? > > One explanation is to go outside language altogether, and simply point to > the underlying nonlinguistic realities: people with guns and money > protecting concentrated forms of property inequality through extreme, > institutionally disguised, forms of ritualized violence (in the USSR, > orchestrated famines, and closer to home mass incarceration, differential > access to health care, and other forms of legal mass murder). But as the > very next section of the Polyphonic Autobiography argues, what arises in > contexts is realized in texts as well as vice versa--although maybe not at > the level of the phoneme and the grapheme. > > So a better explanation has to include the idea that certain meanings are > differentially accessible to children. Because we are talking about > meanings, this has more to do with the social context than with some notion > of impoverished graphology or reduced phonology. But for the very same > reason, these social contexts are not simply people with guns and money but > also wordings and even the ways they sound and are spelt. > > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 at 2:05 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Fine idea to add that paper by Joe, Larry. Although he was a big > > contributor to the early chapters, he did not send us material for his > > person page, which has a delightful picture of Joe with Lois and Lenora > > Fulani taken a year ago. > > > > Adding the paper is easy, but it would be great if one of Joe's or recent > > colleagues would send us a fuller people page for him. Polyphony is not a > > one party affair! > > > > There are a lot of places where addition of articles/chapters/books would > > enrich the site. If people send suggestions to the contact address on the > > site, we can insert them in the right places. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jul 22, 2017 at 7:44 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > Mike, > > > This polyphonic autobiography and the two term taken in conjunction > > > (polyphonic) (autobiography) speaks o the convergence (and divergence) > > of > > > voices. > > > In the spirit of this conjunction may I suggest including link to > joseph > > > Glicks essay (Relations Between the Individual and the Socio-Cultural: > > the > > > ZPD and the ZPWE and the Philosophy of Second -Hand Knowledge). > > > > > > The back and forth relationship seems to embody this spirit with a > > history > > > back to the 1960?s. > > > > > > I hear (and listen) to our polyphonic nature > > > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > > > From: Luisa Aires > > > Sent: July 22, 2017 5:23 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Cc: Laurel Friedman > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography > > > > > > Dear Mike > > > > > > Thank you so much! > > > I see Culture as Action. > > > > > > Best, > > > Lu?sa A. > > > > > > > > > 2017-07-22 12:11 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil : > > > > > > > What a beautiful project, Mike and everyone else involved at LCHC! > And > > > > what an important document for anyone interested in how CHAT came to > > the > > > > West. Thanks so much, Alfredo. > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > Sent: 22 July 2017 03:10 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Cc: Laurel Friedman > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] The LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography > > > > > > > > July 20, 2017 > > > > > > > > Dear XMCA-o-philes, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I am writing to inform you about the *LCHC Polyphonic Autobiography, > *a > > > > project begun by LCHC members following the Lab's receipt of the > Sylvia > > > > Scriner award at AERA several years ago. The site is not perfect. It > > was > > > > created collaboratively over the years through email exchanges and > face > > > to > > > > face discussions as life allowed. We are still in the process of > > getting > > > > the Forum associated with the document working in a reliable fashion, > > and > > > > other user friendly measure. We are still hunting down those whose > life > > > > paths we have not had the time/resoures to track down yet. I really > is > > > > incomplete. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But as the death of Joe Glick has reminded me, Time waits for no one. > > > John > > > > Gay, who was there at the beginning of this story is still with us > but > > > > heading toward 90. So the time has come. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That Joe joined us in our odd venture provided me with an education > in > > > > developmental psychology and a life long companion in seeking to > > > understand > > > > more deeply, the role of culture in human development. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So here, belatedly, is an account of the 50 year history of LCHC up > to > > > the > > > > time of my retirement. Its future is to be found Section 6 of the web > > > page > > > > which can be found at the following address: lchcautobio.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Suggestions of ways to improve this document are warmly welcomed (so > > long > > > > as they are accompanied by the volunteer labor to implement > them!).When > > > the > > > > Forum is up and running, your comments and contributions to the > > > discussion > > > > are most welcome. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > > > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > > > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > > > laires@uab.pt > > > www.uab.pt > > > > > > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Jul 23 23:42:01 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 06:42:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action In-Reply-To: <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> References: <9d127dbc-e881-e490-332c-7dfc37ad995a@mira.net> <2c20d0d6-415c-8133-f271-e960775fcf36@mira.net> <596a1d82.ccc0620a.29b45.2e0c@mx.google.com> <1158036703.1678338.1500198928889@mail.yahoo.com> <555826253.1813747.1500214563735@mail.yahoo.com> <7d9cf319-e606-74a2-6e0d-e1295dd0946a@mira.net> <596ee5bc.1ba0620a.eaedc.560e@mx.google.com>, <982617de-802c-2c8e-53b2-0d1d13247ae8@mira.net> Message-ID: <1500878527428.18824@iped.uio.no> This is such a valuable thread! It will be available in the xmca webpages for literary reference to anyone, but we really should be finding better ways to store and make this type of threads stand out for future reference. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 19 July 2017 07:47 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action Funnily enough, Marx was only taking Hegel's own advice: "History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 19/07/2017 2:53 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Andy > > This insight that Hegel anticipated social processes > through logical analysis while Marx focused on making > intelligible reconstructed phenomena on the basis of > already observed social processes, seems to be radically > different starting places. > > Anticipation and reconstruction generating profound > relational reflections. > > From these two differing starting places (two different > historical presents) your reflection that both share a > deep affinity by arriving at the same realization: > > (history is intelligible) > > Opens up this approach to historicity for our learning > community. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > *From: *Andy Blunden > *Sent: *July 18, 2017 7:16 PM > *To: *David Kellogg ; > eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Hegel on Action > > So far as I can see there are two references to the aphorism > > in Marx/Engels. Firstly in the famous 1873 Afterword to > > Capital by Marx and then echoed by Engels in his 1886 > > "Ludwig Feuerbach." As I said, in so far as a metaphor like > > this can be right or wrong, I would say it is correct. My > > problem is that in many many discussions I have had with > > people identifying themselves as Marxists, this aphorism has > > functioned as a *barrier *to understanding Hegel and his > > relation to Marx, something I have had to fight my through > > before being able to have a fruitful discussion about the > > issue. Because people are generally locked in to a dichotomy > > between concepts and the material world (notwithstanding > > declarations to the contrary), the aphorism is interpreted > > to mean that Hegel thought that thought determines being and > > Marx thought that being determines thought, just as you > > observe, David. Again, it is not that this aphorism is > > wrong, and really thought determines being. Of course not. > > The problem is, I think, that it pushes a natural scientific > > point of view in which the social world goes about its > > business according to Laws of History and ideas simply > > reflect that process. A corollary of this is that people are > > passive expressions of their social conditions and have no > > responsibility for their thoughts. In the words of "Theses > > on Feuerbach" - "The materialist doctrine that men are > > products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, > > therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances > > and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change > > circumstances and that the educator must himself be > > educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society > > into two parts, one of which is superior to society." > > Altogether, I prefer to start an interpretation of Hegel > > either with a blank sheet or from reading Hegel himself, not > > hearsay. > > Here are some things I could say about the Hegel-Marx > > relation which may lend weight to the aphorism: > > * Hegel wrote at a time when there was no reason to > > believe (and no-one did believe) that the working class > > was an agent in history, capable of leading social > > reform. Indeed in early 19th century the working class > > did not exist as a class at all. Marx wrote in the wake > > of huge social movements of the working class which, > > during his youth, had overthrown the French government. > > He had every reason to believe that the working class > > would make history, not (as Hegel and Owen had thought) > > the educated elite. > > * Hegel wrote philosophy and worked in a university; > > Marx wrote in fairly accessible language on politics and > > social issues, intended for mostly self-educated workers. > > * Hegel believed that he could anticipate social > > processes by logical analysis; Marx understood that the > > logical critique could be reconstructed only on the > > basis of already-observed social processes, making what > > was already happening intelligible. But both end up at > > the same point, namely that history is intelligible. > > But at a philosophical level, the two writers came to *very > > similar conclusions*, not opposite conclusions. Politically, > > they were as different as the philosophy professor and the > > communist agitator. They lived in different times. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 19/07/2017 8:50 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Well, I'm a little bit torn. On the one hand, my heart is > > > with Haydi; it really does seem to me that the "aphorism" > > > is useful in understanding that marginal note of Lenin's. > > > And that marginal note of Lenin's appears in Chapter Two > > > of Thinking and Speech, so it's useful in understanding > > > Chapter Two of Thinking and Speech. Chapter SEVEN of > > > Thinking and Speech is really an empirical elaboration of > > > Vygotsky's critique of Piagetian neo-Kantianism in Chapter > > > Two, and so it's useful there too. I think Andy more or > > > less acknowledges this when he says that the quote is a > > > one off. > > > > > > I also agree with the general tenor of Haydi's jeremiad > > > against an aristocracy of philosophers who are perfectly > > > willing to recognize their own contribution to the > > > dialectic between theory and practice but who howl about > > > empiricism when it comes to recognizing the immense > > > contributions made by practitioners. This seems to me a > > > violation of both the spirit and the letter of the > > > dialectic, and sociogenetically it seems to me to turn the > > > relationship between philosophy and social practices > > > entirely on its head. > > > > > > That said, I think Andy has a point. I'm at a workshop > > > now, and don't have the library handy, but if I remember > > > correctly then Marx didn't actually create the aphorism > > > about standing Hegel on his head. The right-Hegelian > > > critics of Marx did. What Marx said, responding to the > > > criticism, was that he had FOUND Hegel standing on his > > > head, and put him on his feet again. The problem is that > > > this apposite remark, made in a polemical context, has > > > been conflated with the famous quotation from Economic and > > > Political Manuscripts to the effect that it is not > > > mankind's consciousness which determines his being, but > > > rather his social being that determines his consciousness. > > > If we assume that this is directed against Hegel, we get > > > Hegel entirely wrong: it is precisely with the > > > phylogenesis and ontogenesis of consciousness that we find > > > Hegel and Marx on exactly the same page. > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and > > > Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean > > > Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 10:26 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > That remark by Lenin is his only comment on a passage > > > of a hundred pages or so of the Science of Logic, the > > > passage where in his own idealistic way Hegel is > > > discussing effectively the Party question. It is > > > extremely obscure and I gather it went over Lenin's > > > head. Nonetheless, Lenin's notes were where I got > > > started on Hegel and marked the beginning of the > > > return of Marxists to a study of Hegel in the 20th > > > century. Not Lukacs, not Korsch or Horkheimer, but > Lenin. > > > > > > As to Marx's remark in the Afterword to Capital and > > > Engels reference to it in "Ludwig Feuerbach" I always > > > liked it and repeated it to others, too. But it did > > > function as a kind of explanation of why I didn't > > > study Hegel and believed that it was good enough to > > > just read Marx. Once I got started reading Hegel I did > > > not find the aphorism useful. It was kind of obvious > > > that I had to penetrate the hard shell of logical > > > rigmarole to get what I wanted. But how?? The idea of > > > standing it on its head gave me no guidance at all. So > > > I try to dissuade people who might want to tackle > > > Hegel to not use this aphorism as a guide. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > On 17/07/2017 7:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > In the Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin notes that > > > the Aristotelian syllogism still has a whiff of > > > Platonism about it. > > > > > > Precious metals don't rust. > > > Gold is a precious metal. > > > Therefore gold doesn't rust. > > > > > > I gather that what he means is that in the > > > syllogism it is concrete, sensuous experience with > > > a particular metal which comes dead last. But when > > > we look at human experience as historical > > > activity, we notice that it comes first: that it > > > is thousands of years of experience with a > > > particular metal, from the ancient Egyptians and > > > their obsession with uncorruptibility onward, > > > which leads to the valuation of gold and its > > > exaptation as money, and then generalization to > > > silver. Lenin says that in its idealist form the > > > syllogism is a game: it is this which must be > > > "turned on its head" to see how the concept arises. > > > > > > .... > > > > > > If Marx's remark to that effect was not helpful or > > > clarifying, why do you think Vygotsky and Luria > > > (not to mention Lenin) were so taken with it? > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:01 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > I meant specifically that the aphorism about > Hegel > > > having to be turned on his head is not useful. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Jul 24 01:20:01 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 08:20:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] More refs on EM and development. In-Reply-To: References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> <6cdd59e0-b1b8-737d-a68b-f90222b5c564@mira.net> <1496126664245.85005@iped.uio.no> <0CF5EF91-D509-4A50-A061-673E6C5A7B94@r-aquaparks.com> <1496355883437.55868@iped.uio.no> <1496358967173.22684@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1500884408289.53306@iped.uio.no> Hi all, Academia.edu just reminded me of this article by Schegloff and I thought it was relevant to a thread that we were having not long ago, on the occasion of discussing Yasuko Kawatoko's article in the Ueno special issue, about Ethnomethodology and research on development. Martin gave us a number of relevant references (see below). This one adds a CA contribution to them. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: 02 June 2017 01:45 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started Hi Alfredo, In general I would respond that EM is the study of people acting and interacting, and to the extent to which development, of the various kinds that you name, is brought about in practice ? which is entirely! ? EM will offer a way to describe it and explain it. Indeed, one of the classics of EM deals precisely with personal development: becoming a skilled jazz pianist: Sudnow, D. (1974). Ways of the hand: The organization of improvised conduct. Harvard University Press. I?ve published a couple of things where I?ve used Conversation Analysis, closely related to EM, to explore development. The first is a study of a consultation in which a Babalow seeks to guide the personal development of his client: Packer, M. J., & Tibaduiza Sierra, S. (2012). A concrete psychological investigation of if? divination. Revista Colombiana de Psicolog?a, 21(2), 353-369. The other is a study of classroom interaction, in which one can clearly see microgenesis: Packer, M. J. (2011). Schooling: Domestication or ontological construction? In T. Koschmann (Ed.), Theories of learning and studies of instructional practice (pp. 167-188). New York: Springer. > On Jun 1, 2017, at 6:16 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Yes, I agree with what you say. I guess I used the word change where I meant development. So I am going to change my question: > > What do and could do researchers concerned with development (social, personal) with EM. > > You recently shared with us a beautiful book on the topic of development. How does EM feature in it? > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 02 June 2017 00:40 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started > > Hi Alfredo, > > I?ve always thought that EM deals very well with change, because it does not treat stasis as the norm. EM is the study of the methods that people (actants) employ to create and sustain order, various kinds of order. Creating and sustaining order always requires change. > > Martin > > > > On Jun 1, 2017, at 5:24 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > I personally find ethnomethodology EM fascinating and a powerful approach to stick the realities of social life; but I always wondered what does EM do with questions of change. > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ReflectionsOnLanguageDevelopment*.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 4926238 bytes Desc: ReflectionsOnLanguageDevelopment*.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170724/7cff49f3/attachment-0001.pdf From zamorskabeata@gmail.com Mon Jul 24 02:13:31 2017 From: zamorskabeata@gmail.com (Beata Zamorska) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 11:13:31 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Research on School Space Message-ID: Dear colleagues, We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of learning and development? We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any additional information. I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. Best regards Beata Zamorska From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon Jul 24 02:40:39 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 09:40:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1500889246339.82011@iped.uio.no> Dear Beata, although not directly drawing conclusions on how school spaces could be arranged, I have co-authored a couple of papers (one of them here at MCA) where the issue of creativity and space has been a topic in connection to CHAT and in the context of design of learning spaces in science and art museums. Perhaps the literature we review and some of our analyses may be of help. See attachments. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Beata Zamorska Sent: 24 July 2017 11:13 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Research on School Space Dear colleagues, We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of learning and development? We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any additional information. I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. Best regards Beata Zamorska -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Jornet & Steier 2015 The Matter of Space.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 502671 bytes Desc: Jornet & Steier 2015 The Matter of Space.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170724/20881d2c/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Jornet & Jahreie 2013 Enabled.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 264415 bytes Desc: Jornet & Jahreie 2013 Enabled.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170724/20881d2c/attachment-0003.pdf From b.bligh@lancaster.ac.uk Mon Jul 24 02:49:24 2017 From: b.bligh@lancaster.ac.uk (Bligh, Brett) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 09:49:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: <1500889246339.82011@iped.uio.no> References: <1500889246339.82011@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Dear Beata, I have authored or co-authored a few pieces on the relationships between learning and space. My own view, oversimplified perhaps, is that design of school classrooms ought to involve empowering the people who will learn there as opposed to attempting to uncover more generalised 'design principles'. Much of my own work tends to be about universities rather than schools, though the two co-authored pieces are more sector-general since my co-author (Crook) tends to focus on schools. Hope some of it is of use. Best wishes, Brett Best wishes, Brett Bligh Dr. Brett Bligh Co-Director, Centre for Technology Enhanced Learning Lecturer Department for Educational Research Lancaster University County South, Lancaster University, Bailrigg, Lancaster, United Kingdom, LA1 4YL http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/edres/profiles/brett-bligh b.bligh@lancaster.ac.uk +44 (0) 1524 592863 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: 24 July 2017 10:41 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space Dear Beata, although not directly drawing conclusions on how school spaces could be arranged, I have co-authored a couple of papers (one of them here at MCA) where the issue of creativity and space has been a topic in connection to CHAT and in the context of design of learning spaces in science and art museums. Perhaps the literature we review and some of our analyses may be of help. See attachments. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Beata Zamorska Sent: 24 July 2017 11:13 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Research on School Space Dear colleagues, We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of learning and development? We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels' presentation about school buildings during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can't find any additional information. I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. Best regards Beata Zamorska -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: CrookBligh2016.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 781940 bytes Desc: CrookBligh2016.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170724/b0837094/attachment-0005.pdf From bluetanso@googlemail.com Mon Jul 24 05:00:53 2017 From: bluetanso@googlemail.com (Hugh O'Donnell) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 13:00:53 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi, team Well I am trying (virtually). http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 It would be nice to discuss further. Hugh O'Donnell MSc Teacher of English On 24 Jul 2017 10:15, "Beata Zamorska" wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially > school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design > the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of > learning and development? > > We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic > in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings > during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any > additional information. > > I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. > > Best regards > Beata Zamorska > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 24 06:42:03 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 06:42:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> Message-ID: <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> Alexander, Mike, Thanks for the article. Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role of practice in knowing). Two formulas: ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but do not co-incide Action IS individual Practice IS a social category. Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of individual who are separate. Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. They are alike in that both individual action & a single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : A philosophical criterion of (truth). I do not have the background to intelligently comment, but did register this theme as provocative FOR further thought and wording. And for generating intelligent commentary Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Ivan Uemlianin Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Alexander Surmava Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) Ivan -- festina lente > On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole wrote: > > This article might prove of interest to those who have been discussing > LSV's sources in > marx and spinoza. > mike > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 24 06:54:56 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 23:54:56 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you mention to say that *actions* - the individual units of *action* are individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every "individual" action. Or better, so is every "singular" action. A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun form, but on the whole the set of words (action, actions, activity, activities) and the set of words (practice, practices) have no systematic difference running across all disciplines and schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are practices. If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the German words for action (Handlung) and activity (Tatigkeit) are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use Aktivitat at all. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Alexander, Mike, > Thanks for the article. > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role of practice in knowing). > Two formulas: > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but do not co-incide > > Action IS individual > Practice IS a social category. > > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of individual who are separate. > > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. They are alike in that both individual action & a single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > I do not have the background to intelligently comment, but did register this theme as provocative FOR further thought and wording. > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: Ivan Uemlianin > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Alexander Surmava > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > Ivan > > -- > festina lente > > >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole wrote: >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who have been discussing >> LSV's sources in >> marx and spinoza. >> mike >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 24 07:17:00 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 07:17:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> Andy, Following your lead it may be preferable to say single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of variable social actions. This doubling (by including both terms) may crystallize the intended meaning as you mention. Andy is this vein can we also include the term (examples)? Then the moving TRANS forming from single (individual) social acts towards (practices) would indicate the movement from examples to exemplary actions and further movement (historicity) toward (framework) practices. (framework) practices being another doubling. So moving (transforming) from single social examples through exemplary social examples crystallizing in social framework practices. Is this reasonable? Or not Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: July 24, 2017 6:57 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Alexander Surmava Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you mention to say that *actions* - the individual units of *action* are individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every "individual" action. Or better, so is every "singular" action. A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun form, but on the whole the set of words (action, actions, activity, activities) and the set of words (practice, practices) have no systematic difference running across all disciplines and schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are practices. If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the German words for action (Handlung) and activity (Tatigkeit) are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use Aktivitat at all. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Alexander, Mike, > Thanks for the article. > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role of practice in knowing). > Two formulas: > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but do not co-incide > > Action IS individual > Practice IS a social category. > > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of individual who are separate. > > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. They are alike in that both individual action & a single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > I do not have the background to intelligently comment, but did register this theme as provocative FOR further thought and wording. > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: Ivan Uemlianin > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Alexander Surmava > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > Ivan > > -- > festina lente > > >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole wrote: >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who have been discussing >> LSV's sources in >> marx and spinoza. >> mike >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 24 07:21:18 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 00:21:18 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> Message-ID: "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, Larry. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Andy, > > Following your lead it may be preferable to say single > (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of variable > social actions. This doubling (by including both terms) > may crystallize the intended meaning as you mention. > > Andy is this vein can we also include the term (examples)? > > Then the moving TRANS forming from single (individual) > social acts towards (practices) would indicate the > movement from examples to exemplary actions and further > movement (historicity) toward (framework) practices. > > (framework) practices being another doubling. > > So moving (transforming) from single social examples > through exemplary social examples crystallizing in social > framework practices. > > Is this reasonable? > > Or not > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > *From: *Andy Blunden > *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you mention > > to say that *actions* - the individual units of *action* are > > individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > "individual" action. Or better, so is every "singular" action. > > A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun form, but > > on the whole the set of words (action, actions, activity, > > activities) and the set of words (practice, practices) have > > no systematic difference running across all disciplines and > > schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > practices. > > If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > German words for action (Handlung) and activity (Tatigkeit) > > are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > Aktivitat at all. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Alexander, Mike, > > > Thanks for the article. > > > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and did > not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role of > practice in knowing). > > > Two formulas: > > > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > > > > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but do > not co-incide > > > > > > Action IS individual > > > Practice IS a social category. > > > > > > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > individual who are separate. > > > > > > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. They are > alike in that both individual action & a single experiment > are poorly suited to the role of : > > > > > > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > > > > I do not have the background to intelligently comment, > but did register this theme as provocative FOR further > thought and wording. > > > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > > > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > > > > Ivan > > > > > > -- > > > festina lente > > > > > > > > >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > >> This article might prove of interest to those who have > been discussing > > >> LSV's sources in > > >> marx and spinoza. > > >> mike > > >> > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 24 07:21:31 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 07:21:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5976027e.d323620a.6f7bd.0729@mx.google.com> Having just read Joe Glick?s tract I would consider holding in mind the difference in the alternatives ZPD & ZPwe to focus upon space generating the bi-directionality and SENS (French term including directionality) of learning places as dwellings Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Hugh O'Donnell Sent: July 24, 2017 5:03 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space Hi, team Well I am trying (virtually). http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19 It would be nice to discuss further. Hugh O'Donnell MSc Teacher of English On 24 Jul 2017 10:15, "Beata Zamorska" wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially > school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design > the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of > learning and development? > > We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic > in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings > during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any > additional information. > > I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. > > Best regards > Beata Zamorska > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 24 09:01:23 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 09:01:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Andy, I will reference where I got the notion of linking [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting will open another thread. >From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for Intellectual Historians" -2009- PAGE 270: "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual historical method insisting that practiontioners remain agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch explored in a variety of ways during his half century of creative intellectual work. " Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the relationality of [example : framework] through the concept *paradigm* seemed generative?? On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. Extra words like > "singular," "individual" or "single" only confuse the matter. "Examples" is > too vague. > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, Larry. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Andy, > > Following your lead it may be preferable to say single (individual) to > indicate the uniqueness of variable social actions. This doubling (by > including both terms) may crystallize the intended meaning as you mention. > > Andy is this vein can we also include the term (examples)? > > > > Then the moving TRANS forming from single (individual) social acts towards > (practices) would indicate the movement from examples to exemplary actions > and further movement (historicity) toward (framework) practices. > > (framework) practices being another doubling. > > So moving (transforming) from single social examples through exemplary > social examples crystallizing in social framework practices. > > Is this reasonable? > > Or not > > > > > > > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > *From: *Andy Blunden > *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you mention > > to say that *actions* - the individual units of *action* are > > individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > "individual" action. Or better, so is every "singular" action. > > > > A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun form, but > > on the whole the set of words (action, actions, activity, > > activities) and the set of words (practice, practices) have > > no systematic difference running across all disciplines and > > schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are practices. > > > > If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > German words for action (Handlung) and activity (Tatigkeit) > > are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > Aktivitat at all. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Alexander, Mike, > > > Thanks for the article. > > > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing Bernstein he > contrasted (action) with (practice) and did not REPEAT (identity) the > thesis about the role of practice in knowing). > > > Two formulas: > > > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > > > > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but do not co-incide > > > > > > Action IS individual > > > Practice IS a social category. > > > > > > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is nothing other than > the SUM total of the actions of individual who are separate. > > > > > > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. They are alike in that > both individual action & a single experiment are poorly suited to the role > of : > > > > > > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > > > > I do not have the background to intelligently comment, but did register > this theme as provocative FOR further thought and wording. > > > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > > > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > > > > Ivan > > > > > > -- > > > festina lente > > > > > > > > >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > wrote: > > >> > > >> This article might prove of interest to those who have been discussing > > >> LSV's sources in > > >> marx and spinoza. > > >> mike > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Jul 24 09:13:49 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 09:13:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: International Conference on Extended Education In-Reply-To: <03ef87628ae14e9eacfcc0e90e995ab2@erziehung.uni-giessen.de> References: <03ef87628ae14e9eacfcc0e90e995ab2@erziehung.uni-giessen.de> Message-ID: This is a call for papers on "extended education." For those of us who have worked in out of school settings that involve some form of educational activity and those who encourage our universities to engage in community based undergraduate education, this conference ought to be of interest. As a devoted non-traveller, I am staying off airplanes, but others might be closer to the event and want to participate. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Stecher, Ludwig Date: Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 8:16 AM Subject: WG: International Conference on Extended Education To: "mcole@ucsd.edu" Dear Michael Cole, as you may know an international conference for research on extended education will take place at the end of November 2017 at the university of Bamberg, Germany. A few months ago we sent the call to a lot of colleagues working in this field. The conference is part of the activities of the newly launched International Research Network within the WERA (https://wera.site-ym .com/page/ExtendedEducation). Though Marianne Sch?pbach, the organizer, and her colleagues did a lot to advertise the conference we don?t have a lot of submission. The field of research on extended education seems internationally not sufficiently developed at the moment. But we would try to change that because we think that this area of educational research will become more and more important in the future. Because of this I send you this e-mail. You are working in the field of extended education research, published in the International Journal for Research on Extended Education (IJREE; http://www.budrich-journals.de/index. php/IJREE), or did reviews for the journal. You are part of the research community in this field. I would like to ask you thinking again about our call (see attachment). If you see any chance of submitting a paper and come to Bamberg we would be very grateful. If you need more time for submitting that wouldn?t be a problem, we are flexible with the time line (don?t be concerned about the submission deadline mentioned in the attached call). Please let me know if you need further information or if you have any questions. I would be very glad to see you in Bamberg. Best wishes from Giessen university, Ludwig Stecher Editor of the IJREE and Co-Organizer of the WERA IRN Extended Education Prof. Dr. Ludwig Stecher Professur f?r Empirische Bildungsforschung Institut f?r Erziehungswissenschaft Fachbereich 03 Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften Justus-Liebig-Universit?t Gie?en Karl-Gl?ckner-Stra?e 21B D-35394 Gie?en Tel. ++49(0)641 99-24071 (Sekretariat Marie-Luise Dietz) Fax ++49(0)641 99-24079 Email: Ludwig.Stecher@erziehung.uni-giessen.de -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Call for papers Extended Education _8.6.2017_new submission deadline.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 90875 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170724/7558505d/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Flyer_extended_Deadline_08.06.2017.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 210365 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170724/7558505d/attachment-0001.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 24 09:30:35 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 09:30:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] PagesMarshall-de-EJPAP-2016-8-2-12.pdf Message-ID: <597620bd.4531620a.3726d.da4a@mx.google.com> The relation of paradigm to example and framework is explored in this article that explores Fisch?s project (life work) as a doubling: (historian) and (philosopher) within bi-directionality. A complex but thought provoking article engaging with Vico and Peirce as living personalities The same back and forth movement explored by Joseph Glick in the concept ZPwe. PagesMarshall-de-EJPAP-2016-8-2-12.pdf http://lnx.journalofpragmatism.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PagesMarshall-de-EJPAP-2016-8-2-12.pdf Sent from my Windows 10 phone From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Mon Jul 24 09:59:35 2017 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 16:59:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Beata, There was an issue of Mind, Culture and Activity on spatializing sociocultural research in 2006, I think it is 13(3), and Kevin Leander has conducted research advancing these ideas as well. An issue of educational Studies, in 2009 has some articles. I imagine there is more. Best, Jen On 2017-07-24, at 2:13 AM, Beata Zamorska wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of learning and development? > > We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any additional information. > > I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. > > Best regards > Beata Zamorska > From Dana.Walker@unco.edu Mon Jul 24 11:42:40 2017 From: Dana.Walker@unco.edu (Walker, Dana) Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 18:42:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: And there was this key article by Leander in 2002: Leander, K. (2002). Polycontextual construction zones: Mapping the expansion of schooled space and identity. Mind, culture and activity, 9(3), 211-237. Abstract: By analyzing the activity of students building a cabin in a school setting, this article examines how conflicts among schooling and extraschooling activity systems can create an expansive space of identity development and learning. Drawing together activity system theories and theories of social space, the article illustrates how polycontextual conflicts and expansions are spatially contingent and productive of space. Symbolic and material dimensions of social space provide a sharpened lens through which to conceptualize intersystemic conflict and development. As the traffic of conflict and negotiation between modal schooling activity and cabin building is heightened around productions of social space, potential expansion of the systems and persons across them is related to the resolution of spatial dilemmas. Dana On 7/24/17, 9:59 AM, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer" wrote: Dear Beata, There was an issue of Mind, Culture and Activity on spatializing sociocultural research in 2006, I think it is 13(3), and Kevin Leander has conducted research advancing these ideas as well. An issue of educational Studies, in 2009 has some articles. I imagine there is more. Best, Jen On 2017-07-24, at 2:13 AM, Beata Zamorska wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of learning and development? > > We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any additional information. > > I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. > > Best regards > Beata Zamorska > **This message originated from outside UNC. Please use caution when opening attachments or following links. Do not enter your UNC credentials when prompted by external links.** From ablunden@mira.net Mon Jul 24 18:26:15 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 11:26:15 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> I see. This is a slightly different context. The original meaning of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's work, was a "founding exemplar." "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > will open another thread. > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > PAGE 270: > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > creative intellectual work. " > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > Larry. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >> variable social actions. This doubling (by >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >> meaning as you mention. >> >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >> (examples)? >> >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >> (framework) practices. >> >> (framework) practices being another doubling. >> >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >> social framework practices. >> >> Is this reasonable? >> >> Or not >> >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >> *From: *Andy Blunden >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >> mention >> >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >> *action* are >> >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >> >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >> >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >> "singular" action. >> >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >> >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >> form, but >> >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >> activity, >> >> activities) and the set of words (practice, >> practices) have >> >> no systematic difference running across all >> disciplines and >> >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >> practices. >> >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >> >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >> (Tatigkeit) >> >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >> >> Aktivitat at all. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> Andy Blunden >> >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> >> >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >> > Alexander, Mike, >> >> > Thanks for the article. >> >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >> of practice in knowing). >> >> > Two formulas: >> >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >> >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >> >> > >> >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >> do not co-incide >> >> > >> >> > Action IS individual >> >> > Practice IS a social category. >> >> > >> >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >> individual who are separate. >> >> > >> >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >> They are alike in that both individual action & a >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >> >> > >> >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >> >> > >> >> > I do not have the background to intelligently >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >> FOR further thought and wording. >> >> > And for generating intelligent commentary >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> > >> >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >> >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >> >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >> >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >> > >> >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >> >> > >> >> > Ivan >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > festina lente >> >> > >> >> > >> >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >> have been discussing >> >> >> LSV's sources in >> >> >> marx and spinoza. >> >> >> mike >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> > >> > > From avramus@gmail.com Tue Jul 25 15:27:16 2017 From: avramus@gmail.com (Alexandre Sourmava) Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 22:27:16 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4LCAmIFNwaW5vemE=?= In-Reply-To: <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> Message-ID: <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Hi, Larry! Thank you for your attentionto the article. Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topicunder discussion. Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). Thus Vygotsky insisted that ??????????? ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. Sasha Surmava ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): I see. This is a slightly different context. The original meaning of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's work, was a "founding exemplar." "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > will open another thread. > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > PAGE 270: > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.? It is > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > creative intellectual work. " > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >? ? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >? ? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >? ? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > >? ? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >? ? Larry. > >? ? Andy > >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? Andy Blunden >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >? ? > >? ? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >>? ? Andy, >> >>? ? Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>? ? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>? ? variable? social actions. This doubling? (by >>? ? including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>? ? meaning as you mention. >> >>? ? Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>? ? (examples)? >> >>? ? Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>? ? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>? ? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>? ? actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>? ? (framework) practices. >> >>? ? (framework) practices being another doubling. >> >>? ? So moving (transforming) from single social? examples >>? ? through exemplary social? examples crystallizing in >>? ? social framework practices. >> >>? ? Is this reasonable? >> >>? ? Or not >> >>? ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >>? ? *From: *Andy Blunden >>? ? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>? ? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>? ? >>? ? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>? ? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >>? ? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>? ? mention >> >>? ? to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>? ? *action* are >> >>? ? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >> >>? ? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >> >>? ? "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>? ? "singular" action. >> >>? ? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >> >>? ? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>? ? form, but >> >>? ? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>? ? activity, >> >>? ? activities) and the set of words (practice, >>? ? practices) have >> >>? ? no systematic difference running across all >>? ? disciplines and >> >>? ? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>? ? practices. >> >>? ? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >> >>? ? German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>? ? (Tatigkeit) >> >>? ? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >> >>? ? Aktivitat at all. >> >>? ? Andy >> >>? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>? ? Andy Blunden >> >>? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >>? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>? ? >> >> >>? ? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>? ? > Alexander, Mike, >> >>? ? > Thanks for the article. >> >>? ? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>? ? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>? ? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>? ? of practice in knowing). >> >>? ? > Two formulas: >> >>? ? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >> >>? ? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>? ? do not co-incide >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Action IS individual >> >>? ? > Practice IS a social category. >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>? ? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>? ? individual who are separate. >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>? ? They are alike in that both individual action & a >>? ? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > I do not have the background to intelligently >>? ? comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>? ? FOR further thought and wording. >> >>? ? > And for generating intelligent commentary >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > From: Ivan Uemlianin >> >>? ? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >> >>? ? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>? ? > Cc: Alexander Surmava >> >>? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Ivan >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > -- >> >>? ? > festina lente >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>? ? wrote: >> >>? ? >> >> >>? ? >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>? ? have been discussing >> >>? ? >> LSV's sources in >> >>? ? >> marx and spinoza. >> >>? ? >> mike >> >>? ? >> >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Jul 25 17:44:01 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 17:44:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5977e5e4.8727620a.2d8d0.82f8@mx.google.com> Sasha, In my reading I was trying to hear the direction you and Bernstein and Spinoza were taking us. Trying to become clearer on our polyphonic autobiography. I mentioned I lack the background to reflect knowledgeably on the relation of semiotic approaches to antisemiotic approaches. I am also listening carefully to alternative explorations of our human nature that do include phenomenological and narrative approaches to our human nature. Alfredo Jornet, for example, references Star and Bowker to say: ?To experience, to undergo is to be certain. To hear of somebody else?s experience is to be uncertain?. This seems to be an alternative key, opening an alternative threshold to walk through. What attracted Alfredo?s attention to Star? Alfredo says : In Star we found not only a repository of useful analytic concepts, for the study of human activity, but also a passion for understanding the tensions between the sometimes unclassifiable and idiosyncratic lived experience of individual subjects on the one hand and more or less formal social infrastructures that sustain the lived experience of individual subjects on the other hand.? Sasha, the experience is certain, hearing about the experience is uncertain I sense the tension and polyphonic autobiography, including this gap you are exploring between Vygotsky and Bernstein.. I am drawn to the gap Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alexandre Sourmava Sent: July 25, 2017 4:15 PM To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: ???: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hi, Larry! Thank you for your attention to the article. Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topic under discussion. Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?s attempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). Thus Vygotsky insisted that ??????????? ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm of history, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method of conditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical method concerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????? ???? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????? ????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ??????? ? ????????? ????????? ?. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ???? (1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? with its arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanical approach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical. That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had never referred to his ideas. Sasha Surmava ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): I see. This is a slightly different context. The original meaning of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's work, was a "founding exemplar." "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > will open another thread. > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > PAGE 270: > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.? It is > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > creative intellectual work. " > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >? ? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >? ? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >? ? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > >? ? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >? ? Larry. > >? ? Andy > >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? Andy Blunden >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >? ? > >? ? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >>? ? Andy, >> >>? ? Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>? ? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>? ? variable? social actions. This doubling? (by >>? ? including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>? ? meaning as you mention. >> >>? ? Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>? ? (examples)? >> >>? ? Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>? ? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>? ? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>? ? actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>? ? (framework) practices. >> >>? ? (framework) practices being another doubling. >> >>? ? So moving (transforming) from single social? examples >>? ? through exemplary social? examples crystallizing in >>? ? social framework practices. >> >>? ? Is this reasonable? >> >>? ? Or not >> >>? ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >>? ? *From: *Andy Blunden >>? ? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>? ? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>? ? >>? ? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>? ? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >>? ? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>? ? mention >> >>? ? to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>? ? *action* are >> >>? ? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >> >>? ? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >> >>? ? "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>? ? "singular" action. >> >>? ? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >> >>? ? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>? ? form, but >> >>? ? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>? ? activity, >> >>? ? activities) and the set of words (practice, >>? ? practices) have >> >>? ? no systematic difference running across all >>? ? disciplines and >> >>? ? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>? ? practices. >> >>? ? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >> >>? ? German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>? ? (Tatigkeit) >> >>? ? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >> >>? ? Aktivitat at all. >> >>? ? Andy >> >>? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>? ? Andy Blunden >> >>? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >>? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>? ? >> >> >>? ? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>? ? > Alexander, Mike, >> >>? ? > Thanks for the article. >> >>? ? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>? ? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>? ? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>? ? of practice in knowing). >> >>? ? > Two formulas: >> >>? ? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >> >>? ? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>? ? do not co-incide >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Action IS individual >> >>? ? > Practice IS a social category. >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>? ? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>? ? individual who are separate. >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>? ? They are alike in that both individual action & a >>? ? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > I do not have the background to intelligently >>? ? comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>? ? FOR further thought and wording. >> >>? ? > And for generating intelligent commentary >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > From: Ivan Uemlianin >> >>? ? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >> >>? ? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>? ? > Cc: Alexander Surmava >> >>? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > Ivan >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > -- >> >>? ? > festina lente >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>? ? wrote: >> >>? ? >> >> >>? ? >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>? ? have been discussing >> >>? ? >> LSV's sources in >> >>? ? >> marx and spinoza. >> >>? ? >> mike >> >>? ? >> >> >>? ? > >> >>? ? > >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Jul 26 07:36:52 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 07:36:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?IElzIGl0IFJlYWxseSDigJxZZXN0ZXJkYXnigJlzIFdhcuKAnT8g?= =?utf-8?q?What_Gadamer_Has_to_Say_About_What_Gets_Counted_=7C_Moules_=7C_?= =?utf-8?q?Journal_of_Applied_Hermeneutics?= Message-ID: <5978a917.035f620a.fc931.f213@mx.google.com> THIS CAME INTO MY MAILBOX AND IN 8 SHORT PAGES, GENERATES THEMES OF A POLYPHONIC NATURE. INDICATES ANOTHER HISTORICAL SHIFT OCCURRING Is it Really ?Yesterday?s War?? What Gadamer Has to Say About What Gets Counted | Moules | Journal of Applied Hermeneutics Is it Really ?Yesterday?s War?? What Gadamer Has to Say About What Gets Counted http://jah.journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/jah/index.php/jah/article/view/140/pdf Sent from my Windows 10 phone From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 26 08:32:47 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 08:32:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?SXMgaXQgUmVhbGx5IOKAnFllc3RlcmRheeKAmXMgV2Fy4oCd?= =?utf-8?q?=3F_What_Gadamer_Has_to_Say_About_What_Gets_Counted_=7C_?= =?utf-8?q?Moules_=7C_Journal_of_Applied_Hermeneutics?= In-Reply-To: <5978a917.035f620a.fc931.f213@mx.google.com> References: <5978a917.035f620a.fc931.f213@mx.google.com> Message-ID: A journal of applied hermeneutics! I never would have guessed, Larry. Seems like a number of shared concerns and understandings. ' mike On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:36 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > > THIS CAME INTO MY MAILBOX AND IN 8 SHORT PAGES, GENERATES THEMES OF A > POLYPHONIC NATURE. > > INDICATES ANOTHER HISTORICAL SHIFT OCCURRING > Is it Really ?Yesterday?s War?? What Gadamer Has to Say About What Gets > Counted | Moules | Journal of Applied Hermeneutics > Is it Really ?Yesterday?s War?? What Gadamer Has to Say About What Gets > Counted > > > http://jah.journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/jah/index.php/jah/ > article/view/140/pdf > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jul 26 15:57:01 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 07:57:01 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and "irrational" that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" that we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" or even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any sound can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has a name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. The confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a semantic code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic code is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that ?????????? is better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost anything, the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", "conditionality", I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position and Spinoza's. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava wrote: > Hi, Larry! > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the > topicunder discussion. > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence > from mechanical causality). > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and > evolution together.? > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > Sasha Surmava > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): > > > I see. > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > work, was a "founding exemplar." > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Andy, > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > will open another thread. > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > Larry. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> > >> Andy, > >> > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > >> meaning as you mention. > >> > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > >> (examples)? > >> > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > >> (framework) practices. > >> > >> (framework) practices being another doubling. > >> > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > >> social framework practices. > >> > >> Is this reasonable? > >> > >> Or not > >> > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >> > >> *From: *Andy Blunden > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > >> mention > >> > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > >> *action* are > >> > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > >> > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > >> > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > >> "singular" action. > >> > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > >> > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > >> form, but > >> > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > >> activity, > >> > >> activities) and the set of words (practice, > >> practices) have > >> > >> no systematic difference running across all > >> disciplines and > >> > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > >> practices. > >> > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > >> > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > >> (Tatigkeit) > >> > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > >> > >> Aktivitat at all. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > >> Andy Blunden > >> > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >> > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >> collective-decision-making> > >> > >> > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> > >> > Alexander, Mike, > >> > >> > Thanks for the article. > >> > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > >> of practice in knowing). > >> > >> > Two formulas: > >> > >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > >> > >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > >> > >> > > >> > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > >> do not co-incide > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Action IS individual > >> > >> > Practice IS a social category. > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > >> individual who are separate. > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > >> > >> > > >> > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > >> > >> > > >> > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > >> FOR further thought and wording. > >> > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > >> > > >> > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > >> > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > >> > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > >> > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Ivan > >> > >> > > >> > >> > -- > >> > >> > festina lente > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > >> wrote: > >> > >> >> > >> > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > >> have been discussing > >> > >> >> LSV's sources in > >> > >> >> marx and spinoza. > >> > >> >> mike > >> > >> >> > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 26 16:27:31 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 16:27:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis was the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were approriated by Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor. mike On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and "irrational" > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" that > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" or > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any sound > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has a > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. The > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a semantic > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic code > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that ?????????? is > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost anything, > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", "conditionality", > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position and > Spinoza's. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > wrote: > > > Hi, Larry! > > > > > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the > > topicunder discussion. > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > (independence > > from mechanical causality). > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history > and > > evolution together.? > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > > Sasha Surmava > > > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > ?????(?): > > > > > > I see. > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > work, was a "founding exemplar." > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Andy, > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > will open another thread. > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > Larry. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > >> > > >> Andy, > > >> > > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by > > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > >> meaning as you mention. > > >> > > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > >> (examples)? > > >> > > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > >> (framework) practices. > > >> > > >> (framework) practices being another doubling. > > >> > > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > >> social framework practices. > > >> > > >> Is this reasonable? > > >> > > >> Or not > > >> > > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > >> > > >> *From: *Andy Blunden > > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> > > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >> > > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > >> mention > > >> > > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > >> *action* are > > >> > > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > >> > > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > >> > > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > >> "singular" action. > > >> > > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > >> > > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > >> form, but > > >> > > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > >> activity, > > >> > > >> activities) and the set of words (practice, > > >> practices) have > > >> > > >> no systematic difference running across all > > >> disciplines and > > >> > > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > >> practices. > > >> > > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > >> > > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > >> (Tatigkeit) > > >> > > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > >> > > >> Aktivitat at all. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > >> > collective-decision-making> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > >> > > >> > Alexander, Mike, > > >> > > >> > Thanks for the article. > > >> > > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > >> of practice in knowing). > > >> > > >> > Two formulas: > > >> > > >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > >> > > >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > >> do not co-incide > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Action IS individual > > >> > > >> > Practice IS a social category. > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > >> individual who are separate. > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a > > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently > > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > >> FOR further thought and wording. > > >> > > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > >> > > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > >> > > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> > > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > >> > > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > Ivan > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > -- > > >> > > >> > festina lente > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> >> > > >> > > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > >> have been discussing > > >> > > >> >> LSV's sources in > > >> > > >> >> marx and spinoza. > > >> > > >> >> mike > > >> > > >> >> > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Jul 26 16:43:22 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 09:43:22 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion. a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably connect the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer to home. b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like "Even a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how it differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist physiologists like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too. c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard exchange, precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice works either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the cerebrum and between cerebrums. Marie is only six years old Information, please! Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee.... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry) David Kellogg Macquarie University On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis was > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were > approriated by > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor. > > mike > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and > "irrational" > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" > that > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" or > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any > sound > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has a > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. > The > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a semantic > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic code > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that ?????????? > is > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost > anything, > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", > "conditionality", > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position and > > Spinoza's. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > > wrote: > > > > > Hi, Larry! > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning > the > > > topicunder discussion. > > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > antisemiotic. > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > arbitrary > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > > (independence > > > from mechanical causality). > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history > > and > > > evolution together.? > > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? > ? > > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > ????? ? > > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > Pavlov?s > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was > > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > > > > Sasha Surmava > > > > > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > I see. > > > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > > work, was a "founding exemplar." > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > Andy, > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > > will open another thread. > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > > > > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > > Larry. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Andy, > > > >> > > > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by > > > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > > >> meaning as you mention. > > > >> > > > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > > >> (examples)? > > > >> > > > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > > >> (framework) practices. > > > >> > > > >> (framework) practices being another doubling. > > > >> > > > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > > >> social framework practices. > > > >> > > > >> Is this reasonable? > > > >> > > > >> Or not > > > >> > > > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > >> > > > >> *From: *Andy Blunden > > > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> > > > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > >> > > > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > > >> mention > > > >> > > > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > > >> *action* are > > > >> > > > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > > >> > > > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > > >> > > > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > > >> "singular" action. > > > >> > > > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > > >> > > > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > > >> form, but > > > >> > > > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > > >> activity, > > > >> > > > >> activities) and the set of words (practice, > > > >> practices) have > > > >> > > > >> no systematic difference running across all > > > >> disciplines and > > > >> > > > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > > >> practices. > > > >> > > > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > > >> > > > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > > >> (Tatigkeit) > > > >> > > > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > > >> > > > >> Aktivitat at all. > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> > > > >> Andy Blunden > > > >> > > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > >> > > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > decision-making > > > >> > > collective-decision-making> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > >> > > > >> > Alexander, Mike, > > > >> > > > >> > Thanks for the article. > > > >> > > > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > > >> of practice in knowing). > > > >> > > > >> > Two formulas: > > > >> > > > >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > >> > > > >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > > >> do not co-incide > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > Action IS individual > > > >> > > > >> > Practice IS a social category. > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > > >> individual who are separate. > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a > > > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently > > > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > > >> FOR further thought and wording. > > > >> > > > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > >> > > > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > >> > > > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> > > > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > >> > > > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > Ivan > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > -- > > > >> > > > >> > festina lente > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > > >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > > > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > > >> have been discussing > > > >> > > > >> >> LSV's sources in > > > >> > > > >> >> marx and spinoza. > > > >> > > > >> >> mike > > > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 26 20:30:55 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 20:30:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi David-- Sure you can speak for Luria, you often do ! And knowing him does not equal understanding him and his complicated history. Still learning. Vygotsky died early, right on time, perhaps. Luria lived almost as long as i have. And through even more interesting times, worse his luck. I assume Vygotsky was referring to the idea of a "second signaling system" in his comment about Pavlov recognizing the signs were special? Luria and (and others) leaned heavily on this concept in their adjustments to post war Stalinist psychology. It was their use of this concept that created a bridge to the mis-understanding Americans who thought of themselves as learning theorists.It provided a way for me to connect my graduate training with the Vygotskian ideas that Luria was seeking to propagate (by my understanding of him). Hence my interest in your inclusion of conditional reflexes in your list that leads to conventions in a manner that points to some sort of common view. I believe this discussion is not unrelated to the invocation of N.A. Bernshtein by Sasha. On my first day in Luria's lab there were two guests. Me and Nicholas Bernshtein. Just an accident, perhaps . mike On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's > strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion. > > a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls > Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably connect > the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer to > home. > > b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like "Even > a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how it > differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist physiologists > like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too. > > c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard exchange, > precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard > operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular > caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice works > either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the cerebrum > and between cerebrums. > > Marie is only six years old > Information, please! > Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee.... > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc > (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis > was > > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were > > approriated by > > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor. > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and > > "irrational" > > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" > > that > > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" > or > > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any > > sound > > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has > a > > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. > > The > > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a > semantic > > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic > code > > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > > > > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that > ?????????? > > is > > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost > > anything, > > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", > > "conditionality", > > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position > and > > > Spinoza's. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Hi, Larry! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning > > the > > > > topicunder discussion. > > > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > > antisemiotic. > > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > > arbitrary > > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > > > (independence > > > > from mechanical causality). > > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole > realm > > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So > the > > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > history > > > and > > > > evolution together.? > > > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > > > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > ??????????????-????????????? > > ? > > > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > > > > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > > ????? ? > > > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > > > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > > Pavlov?s > > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these > two > > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who > was > > > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > > > > > > Sasha Surmava > > > > > > > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > > ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > > I see. > > > > > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > > > work, was a "founding exemplar." > > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > > > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > Andy, > > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > > > will open another thread. > > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > > > > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > > > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > > > > > > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > > > Larry. > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > decision-making > > > > > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy, > > > > >> > > > > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > > > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > > > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by > > > > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > > > >> meaning as you mention. > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > > > >> (examples)? > > > > >> > > > > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > > > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > > > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > > > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > > > >> (framework) practices. > > > > >> > > > > >> (framework) practices being another doubling. > > > > >> > > > > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > > > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > > > >> social framework practices. > > > > >> > > > > >> Is this reasonable? > > > > >> > > > > >> Or not > > > > >> > > > > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > >> > > > > >> *From: *Andy Blunden > > > > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > > > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >> > > > > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > > > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > >> > > > > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > > > >> mention > > > > >> > > > > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > > > >> *action* are > > > > >> > > > > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > > > >> > > > > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > > > >> > > > > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > > > >> "singular" action. > > > > >> > > > > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > > > >> > > > > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > > > >> form, but > > > > >> > > > > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > > > >> activity, > > > > >> > > > > >> activities) and the set of words (practice, > > > > >> practices) have > > > > >> > > > > >> no systematic difference running across all > > > > >> disciplines and > > > > >> > > > > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > > > >> practices. > > > > >> > > > > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > > > >> > > > > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > > > >> (Tatigkeit) > > > > >> > > > > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > > > >> > > > > >> Aktivitat at all. > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy Blunden > > > > >> > > > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > >> > > > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > > decision-making > > > > >> > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> > Alexander, Mike, > > > > >> > > > > >> > Thanks for the article. > > > > >> > > > > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > > > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > > > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > > > >> of practice in knowing). > > > > >> > > > > >> > Two formulas: > > > > >> > > > > >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > > >> > > > > >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > > > >> do not co-incide > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > Action IS individual > > > > >> > > > > >> > Practice IS a social category. > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > > > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > > > >> individual who are separate. > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > > > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a > > > > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently > > > > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > > > >> FOR further thought and wording. > > > > >> > > > > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > > >> > > > > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > > >> > > > > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >> > > > > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > > >> > > > > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > Ivan > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > -- > > > > >> > > > > >> > festina lente > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> >> > > > > >> > > > > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > > > >> have been discussing > > > > >> > > > > >> >> LSV's sources in > > > > >> > > > > >> >> marx and spinoza. > > > > >> > > > > >> >> mike > > > > >> > > > > >> >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 26 20:37:08 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 20:37:08 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Apropos of Pavlov, conditional reflexes (aka conditioned reflexes). Attached is a book of translations published in 1961. Not sure of the dates of the articles in Russian, but an interesting look at Soviet Psych as interpreted through one Westerner's choice of authors and topics. On page 7 we learn the following: *In this first stage, paedology dominated almost completely the practice of psychology in the Soviet Union. And yet it was then that its defeat was prepared by the truly scientific investigations of I. P. Pavlov and the practical work of the best Soviet teachers.* mike On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 8:30 PM, mike cole wrote: > Hi David-- > > Sure you can speak for Luria, you often do ! And knowing him does not > equal understanding him and his complicated history. Still learning. > > Vygotsky died early, right on time, perhaps. > Luria lived almost as long as i have. And through even more interesting > times, worse his luck. > > I assume Vygotsky was referring to the idea of a "second signaling system" > in his comment about Pavlov recognizing the signs were special? > > Luria and (and others) leaned heavily on this concept in their adjustments > to post war Stalinist psychology. It was their use of this concept that > created a bridge to the > mis-understanding Americans who thought of themselves as learning > theorists.It provided a way for me to connect my graduate training with the > Vygotskian ideas that Luria was seeking to propagate (by my understanding > of him). > > Hence my interest in your inclusion of conditional reflexes in your list > that leads to conventions in a manner that points to some sort of common > view. > > I believe this discussion is not unrelated to the invocation of N.A. > Bernshtein by Sasha. On my first day in Luria's lab there were two guests. > Me and Nicholas Bernshtein. > > Just an accident, perhaps . > > mike > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >> I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's >> strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion. >> >> a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls >> Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably >> connect >> the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer >> to >> home. >> >> b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like >> "Even >> a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how it >> differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist >> physiologists >> like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too. >> >> c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard exchange, >> precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard >> operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular >> caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice works >> either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the >> cerebrum >> and between cerebrums. >> >> Marie is only six years old >> Information, please! >> Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee.... >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc >> (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis >> was >> > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were >> > approriated by >> > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg >> > wrote: >> > >> > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de >> > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and >> > "irrational" >> > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" >> > that >> > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be >> "conventional" or >> > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any >> > sound >> > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything >> has a >> > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be >> named. >> > The >> > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a >> semantic >> > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic >> code >> > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or >> > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. >> > > >> > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that >> ?????????? >> > is >> > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. >> > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost >> > anything, >> > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the >> sign. >> > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov >> are >> > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", >> > "conditionality", >> > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position >> and >> > > Spinoza's. >> > > >> > > David Kellogg >> > > Macquarie University >> > > >> > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava < >> avramus@gmail.com> >> > > wrote: >> > > >> > > > Hi, Larry! >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. >> > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. >> > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment >> concerning >> > the >> > > > topicunder discussion. >> > > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby >> > antisemiotic. >> > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use >> > arbitrary >> > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom >> > > (independence >> > > > from mechanical causality). >> > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that >> > > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole >> realm >> > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So >> the >> > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a >> > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds >> history >> > > and >> > > > evolution together.? >> > > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, >> > > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? >> ????????????? >> > > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? >> ??????????????-????????????? >> > ? >> > > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? >> > > > >> > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? >> > ????? ? >> > > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) >> > > > >> > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? >> > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse >> > Pavlov?s >> > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these >> two >> > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who >> was >> > > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. >> > > > >> > > > Sasha Surmava >> > > > >> > > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden >> > > ?????(?): >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > I see. >> > > > >> > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning >> > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's >> > > > work, was a "founding exemplar." >> > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." >> > > > >> > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances >> > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. >> > > > >> > > > Andy >> > > > >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > > Andy Blunden >> > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy >> > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decisi >> on-making >> > > > >> > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> > > > > Andy, >> > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking >> > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >> > > > > will open another thread. >> > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >> > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >> > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- >> > > > > >> > > > > PAGE 270: >> > > > > >> > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >> > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >> > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >> > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >> > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >> > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >> > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >> > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >> > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >> > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >> > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >> > > > > creative intellectual work. " >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >> > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >> > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? >> > > > > >> > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >> > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > >> > > > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >> > > > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >> > > > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >> > > > > >> > > > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >> > > > > Larry. >> > > > > >> > > > > Andy >> > > > > >> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > > > Andy Blunden >> > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy >> > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- >> > > decision-making >> > > > > > > > > collective-decision-making> >> > > > > >> > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Andy, >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >> > > > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >> > > > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by >> > > > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >> > > > >> meaning as you mention. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >> > > > >> (examples)? >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >> > > > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >> > > > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >> > > > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >> > > > >> (framework) practices. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> (framework) practices being another doubling. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >> > > > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >> > > > >> social framework practices. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Is this reasonable? >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Or not >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> > > > >> >> > > > >> *From: *Andy Blunden >> > > > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >> > > > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > > >> >> > > > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >> > > > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >> > > > >> mention >> > > > >> >> > > > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >> > > > >> *action* are >> > > > >> >> > > > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >> > > > >> >> > > > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >> > > > >> "singular" action. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >> > > > >> >> > > > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >> > > > >> form, but >> > > > >> >> > > > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >> > > > >> activity, >> > > > >> >> > > > >> activities) and the set of words (practice, >> > > > >> practices) have >> > > > >> >> > > > >> no systematic difference running across all >> > > > >> disciplines and >> > > > >> >> > > > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >> > > > >> practices. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >> > > > >> >> > > > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >> > > > >> (Tatigkeit) >> > > > >> >> > > > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Aktivitat at all. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Andy >> > > > >> >> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Andy Blunden >> > > > >> >> > > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> > > > >> >> > > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- >> > > > decision-making >> > > > >> > > > > collective-decision-making> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Alexander, Mike, >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Thanks for the article. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >> > > > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >> > > > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >> > > > >> of practice in knowing). >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Two formulas: >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >> > > > >> do not co-incide >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Action IS individual >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Practice IS a social category. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >> > > > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >> > > > >> individual who are separate. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >> > > > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a >> > > > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently >> > > > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >> > > > >> FOR further thought and wording. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > Ivan >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > -- >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > festina lente >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >> > > > >> wrote: >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >> > > > >> have been discussing >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> LSV's sources in >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> marx and spinoza. >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> mike >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: sovietpsychology.winn.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 4948112 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170726/e9756a6c/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 26 20:43:39 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 20:43:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Science Fiction? Message-ID: The following article from the NY Times was sent by a friend. It contains some interesting history and ideas. Or at least it tells an interesting story. mike https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/make-it-so-star- trek-and-its-debt-to-revolutionary-socialism.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share& smprod=nytcore-ipad Communism?s promise of a workers? paradise chimed with the utopian imagination of science fiction. To strange effect. From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Jul 26 20:49:51 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 20:49:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Great to see this literature being brought together in this way. Thanks to Beata and the *Polish Team* for evoking such useful suggestions. Although it is dated, a paper written with Margie Gallego and LCHC may be relevant to this discussion. In particular it contains maps of classic American classroom and school layouts that reflect practices that a chat perspective is (still) seeking to change. The file I have of the paper is too large for xmca to swallow, but it can be found on Academia. Or contact me directly and I can send to copious servers. Sorry for the inconvenience. Gallego, M. A., Cole, M., & LCHC. (2001). Classroom culture and culture in the classroom. In V. Richardson (Ed.), The Fourth Edition of the Handbook of Research on Teaching, Wash., DC: American Educational Research Association. (pp. 951- ?997). mike On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 2:13 AM, Beata Zamorska wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially > school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design > the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of > learning and development? > > We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic > in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings > during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any > additional information. > > I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. > > Best regards > Beata Zamorska > > From sohyun.meacham@uni.edu Thu Jul 27 00:55:15 2017 From: sohyun.meacham@uni.edu (Sohyun Meacham) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 02:55:15 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Beata, How about Children, Spaces, and Relations book? https://www.amazon.com/Children-Spaces-Relations-Metaproject-Environment/dp/8887960178 Sohyun Meacham, Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Literacy Education University of Northern Iowa > On Jul 24, 2017, at 4:13 AM, Beata Zamorska wrote: > > Dear colleagues, > > We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of learning and development? > > We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any additional information. > > I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. > > Best regards > Beata Zamorska > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jul 27 03:29:18 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 10:29:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4LCAmIFNwaW5v?= =?utf-8?q?za?= In-Reply-To: <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net>, <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> Hi Alexander, a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, link here: ). Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation by a cultural sign' I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if unconstrained and magic) means. In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to social-historical necessity, to human needs? In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it seems to me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, Alfredo From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hi, Larry! Thank you for your attentionto the article. Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topicunder discussion. Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). Thus Vygotsky insisted that ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. Sasha Surmava ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): I see. This is a slightly different context. The original meaning of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's work, was a "founding exemplar." "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > will open another thread. > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > PAGE 270: > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > creative intellectual work. " > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > >? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >? Larry. > >? Andy > >? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? Andy Blunden >? http://home.mira.net/~andy >? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >? > >? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >>? Andy, >> >>? Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>? variable social actions. This doubling (by >>? including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>? meaning as you mention. >> >>? Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>? (examples)? >> >>? Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>? actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>? (framework) practices. >> >>? (framework) practices being another doubling. >> >>? So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>? through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>? social framework practices. >> >>? Is this reasonable? >> >>? Or not >> >>? Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >>? *From: *Andy Blunden >>? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>? >>? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >>? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>? mention >> >>? to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>? *action* are >> >>? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >> >>? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >> >>? "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>? "singular" action. >> >>? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >> >>? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>? form, but >> >>? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>? activity, >> >>? activities) and the set of words (practice, >>? practices) have >> >>? no systematic difference running across all >>? disciplines and >> >>? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>? practices. >> >>? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >> >>? German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>? (Tatigkeit) >> >>? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >> >>? Aktivitat at all. >> >>? Andy >> >>? ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>? Andy Blunden >> >>? http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >>? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>? >> >> >>? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>? > Alexander, Mike, >> >>? > Thanks for the article. >> >>? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>? of practice in knowing). >> >>? > Two formulas: >> >>? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >> >>? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >> >>? > >> >>? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>? do not co-incide >> >>? > >> >>? > Action IS individual >> >>? > Practice IS a social category. >> >>? > >> >>? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>? individual who are separate. >> >>? > >> >>? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>? They are alike in that both individual action & a >>? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >> >>? > >> >>? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >> >>? > >> >>? > I do not have the background to intelligently >>? comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>? FOR further thought and wording. >> >>? > And for generating intelligent commentary >> >>? > >> >>? > >> >>? > >> >>? > >> >>? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >>? > >> >>? > From: Ivan Uemlianin >> >>? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >> >>? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>? > Cc: Alexander Surmava >> >>? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >>? > >> >>? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >> >>? > >> >>? > Ivan >> >>? > >> >>? > -- >> >>? > festina lente >> >>? > >> >>? > >> >>? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>? wrote: >> >>? >> >> >>? >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>? have been discussing >> >>? >> LSV's sources in >> >>? >> marx and spinoza. >> >>? >> mike >> >>? >> >> >>? > >> >>? > >> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jul 27 03:31:47 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 10:31:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4LCAmIFNwaW5v?= =?utf-8?q?za?= In-Reply-To: <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net>, <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com>, <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1501151507025.76654@iped.uio.no> ops, the attachment did not make it; it comes here. The link to the publisher here: http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319398679 Alfredo ________________________________________ From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: 27 July 2017 12:29 To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Alexandre Sourmava Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hi Alexander, a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, link here: ). Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation by a cultural sign' I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if unconstrained and magic) means. In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to social-historical necessity, to human needs? In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it seems to me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, Alfredo From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hi, Larry! Thank you for your attentionto the article. Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topicunder discussion. Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). Thus Vygotsky insisted that ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. Sasha Surmava ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): I see. This is a slightly different context. The original meaning of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's work, was a "founding exemplar." "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > will open another thread. > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > PAGE 270: > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > creative intellectual work. " > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > >? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > >? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >? Larry. > >? Andy > >? ------------------------------------------------------------ >? Andy Blunden >? http://home.mira.net/~andy >? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >? > >? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >>? Andy, >> >>? Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>? variable social actions. This doubling (by >>? including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>? meaning as you mention. >> >>? Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>? (examples)? >> >>? Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>? actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>? (framework) practices. >> >>? (framework) practices being another doubling. >> >>? So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>? through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>? social framework practices. >> >>? Is this reasonable? >> >>? Or not >> >>? Sent from my Windows 10 phone >> >>? *From: *Andy Blunden >>? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>? >>? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >>? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>? mention >> >>? to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>? *action* are >> >>? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >> >>? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >> >>? "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>? "singular" action. >> >>? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >> >>? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>? form, but >> >>? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>? activity, >> >>? activities) and the set of words (practice, >>? practices) have >> >>? no systematic difference running across all >>? disciplines and >> >>? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>? practices. >> >>? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >> >>? German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>? (Tatigkeit) >> >>? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >> >>? Aktivitat at all. >> >>? Andy >> >>? ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>? Andy Blunden >> >>? http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >>? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>? >> >> >>? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>? > Alexander, Mike, >> >>? > Thanks for the article. >> >>? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>? of practice in knowing). >> >>? > Two formulas: >> >>? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >> >>? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >> >>? > >> >>? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>? do not co-incide >> >>? > >> >>? > Action IS individual >> >>? > Practice IS a social category. >> >>? > >> >>? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>? individual who are separate. >> >>? > >> >>? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>? They are alike in that both individual action & a >>? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >> >>? > >> >>? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >> >>? > >> >>? > I do not have the background to intelligently >>? comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>? FOR further thought and wording. >> >>? > And for generating intelligent commentary >> >>? > >> >>? > >> >>? > >> >>? > >> >>? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >>? > >> >>? > From: Ivan Uemlianin >> >>? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >> >>? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>? > Cc: Alexander Surmava >> >>? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >>? > >> >>? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >> >>? > >> >>? > Ivan >> >>? > >> >>? > -- >> >>? > festina lente >> >>? > >> >>? > >> >>? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>? wrote: >> >>? >> >> >>? >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>? have been discussing >> >>? >> LSV's sources in >> >>? >> marx and spinoza. >> >>? >> mike >> >>? >> >> >>? > >> >>? > >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Front Matter.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 160156 bytes Desc: Front Matter.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170727/68954c19/attachment.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 27 05:39:41 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 22:39:41 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being banned across Europe for more than a century. However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and another being thought and the infinitely many others being God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental Psychology is a charade. In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he is a dead end. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Alexander, > > a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, link here: ). > > Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: > > 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation by a cultural sign' > > I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if unconstrained and magic) means. > > In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to social-historical necessity, to human needs? > > In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it seems to me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. > > In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, > Alfredo > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava > Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 > To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Hi, Larry! > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topicunder discussion. > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > Sasha Surmava > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): > > > I see. > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > work, was a "founding exemplar." > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> Andy, >> I will reference where I got the notion of linking >> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >> will open another thread. >> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >> Intellectual Historians" -2009- >> >> PAGE 270: >> >> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >> creative intellectual work. " >> >> >> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >> *paradigm* seemed generative?? >> >> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >> >> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >> Larry. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> >> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> Andy, >>> >>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>> variable social actions. This doubling (by >>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>> meaning as you mention. >>> >>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>> (examples)? >>> >>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>> (framework) practices. >>> >>> (framework) practices being another doubling. >>> >>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>> social framework practices. >>> >>> Is this reasonable? >>> >>> Or not >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> *From: *Andy Blunden >>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> >>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>> >>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>> mention >>> >>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>> *action* are >>> >>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >>> >>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >>> >>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>> "singular" action. >>> >>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >>> >>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>> form, but >>> >>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>> activity, >>> >>> activities) and the set of words (practice, >>> practices) have >>> >>> no systematic difference running across all >>> disciplines and >>> >>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>> practices. >>> >>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >>> >>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>> (Tatigkeit) >>> >>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >>> >>> Aktivitat at all. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> Andy Blunden >>> >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> >>> >>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>> > Alexander, Mike, >>> >>> > Thanks for the article. >>> >>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>> of practice in knowing). >>> >>> > Two formulas: >>> >>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >>> >>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >>> >>> > >>> >>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>> do not co-incide >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Action IS individual >>> >>> > Practice IS a social category. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>> individual who are separate. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>> They are alike in that both individual action & a >>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >>> >>> > >>> >>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >>> >>> > >>> >>> > I do not have the background to intelligently >>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>> FOR further thought and wording. >>> >>> > And for generating intelligent commentary >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> > >>> >>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >>> >>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >>> >>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> >>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >>> >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Ivan >>> >>> > >>> >>> > -- >>> >>> > festina lente >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> >>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>> wrote: >>> >>> >> >>> >>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>> have been discussing >>> >>> >> LSV's sources in >>> >>> >> marx and spinoza. >>> >>> >> mike >>> >>> >> >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jul 27 05:58:38 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 12:58:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no>, Message-ID: <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound like that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism and, consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, vol. 6, p. 122). In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. Understanding this would greatly help me see your points. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being banned across Europe for more than a century. However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and another being thought and the infinitely many others being God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental Psychology is a charade. In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he is a dead end. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi Alexander, > > a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, link here: ). > > Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: > > 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation by a cultural sign' > > I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if unconstrained and magic) means. > > In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to social-historical necessity, to human needs? > > In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it seems to me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. > > In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, > Alfredo > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava > Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 > To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Hi, Larry! > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topicunder discussion. > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > Sasha Surmava > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): > > > I see. > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > work, was a "founding exemplar." > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> Andy, >> I will reference where I got the notion of linking >> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >> will open another thread. >> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >> Intellectual Historians" -2009- >> >> PAGE 270: >> >> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >> creative intellectual work. " >> >> >> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >> *paradigm* seemed generative?? >> >> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >> >> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >> Larry. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> >> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> Andy, >>> >>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>> variable social actions. This doubling (by >>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>> meaning as you mention. >>> >>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>> (examples)? >>> >>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>> (framework) practices. >>> >>> (framework) practices being another doubling. >>> >>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>> social framework practices. >>> >>> Is this reasonable? >>> >>> Or not >>> >>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>> >>> *From: *Andy Blunden >>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> >>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>> >>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>> mention >>> >>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>> *action* are >>> >>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >>> >>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >>> >>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>> "singular" action. >>> >>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >>> >>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>> form, but >>> >>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>> activity, >>> >>> activities) and the set of words (practice, >>> practices) have >>> >>> no systematic difference running across all >>> disciplines and >>> >>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>> practices. >>> >>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >>> >>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>> (Tatigkeit) >>> >>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >>> >>> Aktivitat at all. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> Andy Blunden >>> >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> >>> >>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>> > Alexander, Mike, >>> >>> > Thanks for the article. >>> >>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>> of practice in knowing). >>> >>> > Two formulas: >>> >>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >>> >>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >>> >>> > >>> >>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>> do not co-incide >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Action IS individual >>> >>> > Practice IS a social category. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>> individual who are separate. >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>> They are alike in that both individual action & a >>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >>> >>> > >>> >>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >>> >>> > >>> >>> > I do not have the background to intelligently >>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>> FOR further thought and wording. >>> >>> > And for generating intelligent commentary >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> > >>> >>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >>> >>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >>> >>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> >>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >>> >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >>> >>> > >>> >>> > Ivan >>> >>> > >>> >>> > -- >>> >>> > festina lente >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> >>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>> wrote: >>> >>> >> >>> >>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>> have been discussing >>> >>> >> LSV's sources in >>> >>> >> marx and spinoza. >>> >>> >> mike >>> >>> >> >>> >>> > >>> >>> > >>> > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu Jul 27 05:58:50 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 05:58:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: There are scholars out there that have a take that differs from Andy's. Thus appears to be the case of Antonio Negri (*The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics*), a Marxian scholar. Especially about the dualism there is a different perception. I have read other works that take a stand similar to Negri. Vygotsky (2010, "Fragments") writes that he was going to "bring Spinozism to life in Marxist psychology." This statement allows to be read as Spinozism through a Marxian lens, and the kind of avenue that LSV might have taken may be similar to that of Negri. LSV also does not say he is applying Spinoza, but that the "lightening bolts of Spinoza's thought *illuminate* our inquiry" (my emphasis). Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 5:39 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that Vygotsky maintained > an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess is that it was Spinoza's place in > the history of philosophy as the first person to attempt to overcome > Descartes' dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on > Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's interest and respect. > This effort, for which Spinoza was persecuted, inspired many philosophers > despite Spinoza being banned across Europe for more than a century. > > However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a moment > Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, a.k.a., God or Nature, or > anything else you want to call it, with infinitely many attributes, one > being extension and another being thought and the infinitely many others > being God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky followed the > idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one substance as Activity - for Hegel > under the name of "Spirit." > > As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of insightful > aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist materialism) is right. But > his solution is hopeless and I have not met a single soul who has usefully > appropriated this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its > mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules out free will, > and is a thinly disguised dualism: one substance with two attributes > instead of two substances. Any attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in > experimental Psychology is a charade. > > In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he is a dead end. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> Hi Alexander, >> >> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much >> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the >> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the >> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent >> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some >> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M >> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such >> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, >> link here: ). >> >> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing >> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your >> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to >> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: >> >> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through >> overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical >> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation >> by a cultural sign' >> >> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in >> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply >> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I >> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for >> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an >> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In >> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what >> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word >> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human >> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very >> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if >> unconstrained and magic) means. >> >> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of >> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an >> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one >> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). >> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological >> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a >> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem >> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to >> social-historical necessity, to human needs? >> >> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by imagining >> what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have >> indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think there may be >> more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your article allows, >> but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream uptakes. I am only >> a student on these matters, and I can not know in advance how far we will >> come with this integrative program, but it seems to me that neither >> discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor discarding action for >> the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. >> >> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, >> Alfredo >> >> >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava >> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 >> To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >> Hi, Larry! >> >> >> >> Thank you for your attentionto the article. >> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. >> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the >> topicunder discussion. >> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. >> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary >> sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence >> from mechanical causality). >> Thus Vygotsky insisted that >> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm >> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the >> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a >> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and >> evolution together.? >> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, >> ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? >> ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? >> ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? >> >> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? >> ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) >> >> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? >> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s >> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two >> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was >> Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. >> >> Sasha Surmava >> >> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden >> ?????(?): >> >> >> I see. >> >> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning >> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's >> work, was a "founding exemplar." >> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." >> >> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances >> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking >>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >>> will open another thread. >>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- >>> >>> PAGE 270: >>> >>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >>> creative intellectual work. " >>> >>> >>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>> >>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >>> >>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >>> Larry. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins- >>> collective-decision-making >>> >> decision-making> >>> >>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by >>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>>> meaning as you mention. >>>> >>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>>> (examples)? >>>> >>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>>> (framework) practices. >>>> >>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. >>>> >>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>>> social framework practices. >>>> >>>> Is this reasonable? >>>> >>>> Or not >>>> >>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>>> >>>> *From: *Andy Blunden >>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> >>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>> >>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>>> mention >>>> >>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>>> *action* are >>>> >>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >>>> >>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >>>> >>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>>> "singular" action. >>>> >>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >>>> >>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>>> form, but >>>> >>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>>> activity, >>>> >>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, >>>> practices) have >>>> >>>> no systematic difference running across all >>>> disciplines and >>>> >>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>>> practices. >>>> >>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >>>> >>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>>> (Tatigkeit) >>>> >>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >>>> >>>> Aktivitat at all. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins- >>>> collective-decision-making >>>> >>> decision-making> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>> > Alexander, Mike, >>>> >>>> > Thanks for the article. >>>> >>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>>> of practice in knowing). >>>> >>>> > Two formulas: >>>> >>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >>>> >>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>>> do not co-incide >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Action IS individual >>>> >>>> > Practice IS a social category. >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>>> individual who are separate. >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a >>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently >>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>>> FOR further thought and wording. >>>> >>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >>>> >>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >>>> >>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> >>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >>>> >>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Ivan >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > -- >>>> >>>> > festina lente >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >> >>>> >>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>>> have been discussing >>>> >>>> >> LSV's sources in >>>> >>>> >> marx and spinoza. >>>> >>>> >> mike >>>> >>>> >> >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 27 06:16:29 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 23:16:29 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere outside of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both positions. It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes from that time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-modal/ Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound like that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism and, consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, vol. 6, p. 122). > > In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. > > I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. Understanding this would greatly help me see your points. > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that > Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess > is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy > as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' > dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on > Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's > interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was > persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being > banned across Europe for more than a century. > > However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a > moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, > a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, > with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and > another being thought and the infinitely many others being > God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky > followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one > substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." > > As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of > insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist > materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I > have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated > this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its > mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules > out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one > substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any > attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental > Psychology is a charade. > > In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he > is a dead end. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> Hi Alexander, >> >> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, link here: ). >> >> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: >> >> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation by a cultural sign' >> >> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if unconstrained and magic) means. >> >> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to social-historical necessity, to human needs? >> >> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it seems to me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. >> >> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, >> Alfredo >> >> >> >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava >> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 >> To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >> Hi, Larry! >> >> >> >> Thank you for your attentionto the article. >> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. >> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topicunder discussion. >> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. >> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). >> Thus Vygotsky insisted that >> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? >> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? >> >> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) >> >> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. >> >> Sasha Surmava >> >> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): >> >> >> I see. >> >> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning >> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's >> work, was a "founding exemplar." >> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." >> >> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances >> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> Andy, >>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking >>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >>> will open another thread. >>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- >>> >>> PAGE 270: >>> >>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >>> creative intellectual work. " >>> >>> >>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>> >>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >>> >>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >>> Larry. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> >>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by >>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>>> meaning as you mention. >>>> >>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>>> (examples)? >>>> >>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>>> (framework) practices. >>>> >>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. >>>> >>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>>> social framework practices. >>>> >>>> Is this reasonable? >>>> >>>> Or not >>>> >>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>>> >>>> *From: *Andy Blunden >>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> >>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>> >>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>>> mention >>>> >>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>>> *action* are >>>> >>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >>>> >>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >>>> >>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>>> "singular" action. >>>> >>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >>>> >>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>>> form, but >>>> >>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>>> activity, >>>> >>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, >>>> practices) have >>>> >>>> no systematic difference running across all >>>> disciplines and >>>> >>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>>> practices. >>>> >>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >>>> >>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>>> (Tatigkeit) >>>> >>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >>>> >>>> Aktivitat at all. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>> > Alexander, Mike, >>>> >>>> > Thanks for the article. >>>> >>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>>> of practice in knowing). >>>> >>>> > Two formulas: >>>> >>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >>>> >>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>>> do not co-incide >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Action IS individual >>>> >>>> > Practice IS a social category. >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>>> individual who are separate. >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a >>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently >>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>>> FOR further thought and wording. >>>> >>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >>>> >>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >>>> >>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> >>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >>>> >>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > Ivan >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > -- >>>> >>>> > festina lente >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >> >>>> >>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>>> have been discussing >>>> >>>> >> LSV's sources in >>>> >>>> >> marx and spinoza. >>>> >>>> >> mike >>>> >>>> >> >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu Jul 27 08:16:43 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 15:16:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no>, <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> Message-ID: <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more why would determinism ??imply the absence of free will ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am just a student, ???only that with quite more left to read yet! Alfredo ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden Sent: 27 July 2017 15:16 To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere outside of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both positions. It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes from that time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-modal/ Andy ________________________________ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound like that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism and, consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, vol. 6, p. 122). In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. Understanding this would greatly help me see your points. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being banned across Europe for more than a century. However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and another being thought and the infinitely many others being God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental Psychology is a charade. In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he is a dead end. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: Hi Alexander, a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, link here: ). Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation by a cultural sign' I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if unconstrained and magic) means. In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to social-historical necessity, to human needs? In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it seems to me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, Alfredo From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 To: ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hi, Larry! Thank you for your attentionto the article. Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topicunder discussion. Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). Thus Vygotsky insisted that ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. Sasha Surmava ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): I see. This is a slightly different context. The original meaning of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's work, was a "founding exemplar." "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: Andy, I will reference where I got the notion of linking [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting will open another thread. From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for Intellectual Historians" -2009- PAGE 270: "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual historical method insisting that practiontioners remain agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch explored in a variety of ways during his half century of creative intellectual work. " Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the relationality of [example : framework] through the concept *paradigm* seemed generative?? On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, Larry. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: Andy, Following your lead it may be preferable to say single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of variable social actions. This doubling (by including both terms) may crystallize the intended meaning as you mention. Andy is this vein can we also include the term (examples)? Then the moving TRANS forming from single (individual) social acts towards (practices) would indicate the movement from examples to exemplary actions and further movement (historicity) toward (framework) practices. (framework) practices being another doubling. So moving (transforming) from single social examples through exemplary social examples crystallizing in social framework practices. Is this reasonable? Or not Sent from my Windows 10 phone *From: *Andy Blunden *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity *Cc: *Alexander Surmava *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you mention to say that *actions* - the individual units of *action* are individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every "individual" action. Or better, so is every "singular" action. A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun form, but on the whole the set of words (action, actions, activity, activities) and the set of words (practice, practices) have no systematic difference running across all disciplines and schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are practices. If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the German words for action (Handlung) and activity (Tatigkeit) are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use Aktivitat at all. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Alexander, Mike, > Thanks for the article. > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role of practice in knowing). > Two formulas: > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but do not co-incide > > Action IS individual > Practice IS a social category. > > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of individual who are separate. > > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. They are alike in that both individual action & a single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > I do not have the background to intelligently comment, but did register this theme as provocative FOR further thought and wording. > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: Ivan Uemlianin > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Alexander Surmava > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > Ivan > > -- > festina lente > > >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole wrote: >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who have been discussing >> LSV's sources in >> marx and spinoza. >> mike >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 27 08:49:59 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 01:49:59 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. In a determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice. At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the 1790s, there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free will (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which is probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In my opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a person becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another free being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising restraint and recognising the rights of others (the child development people will relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations. If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the laws of physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough problem to solve. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why > would determinism ??imply the absence of free will* ... In > any case, thanks for the link; I too am just a student, > ???only that with quite more left to read yet! > > > Alfredo > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 > *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & > Spinoza > > It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as > everywhere outside of human life) does not imply > determinism. But Spinoza held both positions. It is a long > time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes from > that time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. > > The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it > thusly: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-modal/ > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound like that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism and, consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, vol. 6, p. 122). >> >> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. >> >> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. Understanding this would greatly help me see your points. >> >> Alfredo >> >> ________________________________________ >> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that >> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess >> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy >> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' >> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on >> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's >> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was >> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being >> banned across Europe for more than a century. >> >> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a >> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, >> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, >> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and >> another being thought and the infinitely many others being >> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky >> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one >> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." >> >> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of >> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist >> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I >> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated >> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its >> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules >> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one >> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any >> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental >> Psychology is a charade. >> >> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he >> is a dead end. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>> Hi Alexander, >>> >>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, link here: ). >>> >>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: >>> >>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation by a cultural sign' >>> >>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if unconstrained and magic) means. >>> >>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to social-historical necessity, to human needs? >>> >>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it seems to me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. >>> >>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, >>> Alfredo >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava >>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 >>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>> >>> Hi, Larry! >>> >>> >>> >>> Thank you for your attentionto the article. >>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. >>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the topicunder discussion. >>> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. >>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom (independence from mechanical causality). >>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that >>> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and evolution together.? >>> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? >>> >>> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) >>> >>> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. >>> >>> Sasha Surmava >>> >>> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden ?????(?): >>> >>> >>> I see. >>> >>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning >>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's >>> work, was a "founding exemplar." >>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." >>> >>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances >>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> Andy, >>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking >>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >>>> will open another thread. >>>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- >>>> >>>> PAGE 270: >>>> >>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >>>> creative intellectual work. " >>>> >>>> >>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >>>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >>>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >>>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >>>> >>>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >>>> Larry. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> >>>> >>>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by >>>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>>>> meaning as you mention. >>>>> >>>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>>>> (examples)? >>>>> >>>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>>>> (framework) practices. >>>>> >>>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. >>>>> >>>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>>>> social framework practices. >>>>> >>>>> Is this reasonable? >>>>> >>>>> Or not >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>>>> >>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden >>>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> >>>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>> >>>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>>>> mention >>>>> >>>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>>>> *action* are >>>>> >>>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >>>>> >>>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >>>>> >>>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>>>> "singular" action. >>>>> >>>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >>>>> >>>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>>>> form, but >>>>> >>>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>>>> activity, >>>>> >>>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, >>>>> practices) have >>>>> >>>>> no systematic difference running across all >>>>> disciplines and >>>>> >>>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>>>> practices. >>>>> >>>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >>>>> >>>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>>>> (Tatigkeit) >>>>> >>>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >>>>> >>>>> Aktivitat at all. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>>> >>>>> > Alexander, Mike, >>>>> >>>>> > Thanks for the article. >>>>> >>>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>>>> of practice in knowing). >>>>> >>>>> > Two formulas: >>>>> >>>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >>>>> >>>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>>>> do not co-incide >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > Action IS individual >>>>> >>>>> > Practice IS a social category. >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>>>> individual who are separate. >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a >>>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently >>>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>>>> FOR further thought and wording. >>>>> >>>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >>>>> >>>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >>>>> >>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> >>>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >>>>> >>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > Ivan >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > -- >>>>> >>>>> > festina lente >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>>>> have been discussing >>>>> >>>>> >> LSV's sources in >>>>> >>>>> >> marx and spinoza. >>>>> >>>>> >> mike >>>>> >>>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jul 27 09:03:06 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 09:03:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Research on School Space In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: That book looks extremely interesting, Sohyun . Thanks for the tip. mike On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 12:55 AM, Sohyun Meacham wrote: > Dear Beata, > How about > Children, Spaces, and Relations book? > https://www.amazon.com/Children-Spaces-Relations- > Metaproject-Environment/dp/8887960178 > Sohyun Meacham, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor of Literacy Education > University of Northern Iowa > > > On Jul 24, 2017, at 4:13 AM, Beata Zamorska > wrote: > > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > We (the Polish team) are working on a project: How Can Space (especially > school space) Support Students and Teachers Creativity? How can we design > the school classroom, furniture and tools to foster the processes of > learning and development? > > > > We are looking for researchers who have conducted research on this topic > in CHAT. I remember Prof. H. Daniels? presentation about school buildings > during the last ISCAR Congress in Sydney. However, I can?t find any > additional information. > > > > I would be grateful if you could give me some suggestions. > > > > Best regards > > Beata Zamorska > > > From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Thu Jul 27 09:13:39 2017 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 12:13:39 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear friends, I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful to this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In the future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the forces that are in play, to bend them to our will. If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at the future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use of conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward than the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use. Hope this helps. Cheers, Peter On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is > whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. In a > determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice. > > > At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the 1790s, > there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free will > (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which is > probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In my > opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a person > becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another free > being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising restraint > and recognising the rights of others (the child development people will > relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the > formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic > freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal > condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum > mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations. > > > If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the laws of > physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough problem to > solve. > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> >> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ??imply the >> absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am just a >> student, ???only that with quite more left to read yet! >> >> >> Alfredo >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* Andy Blunden >> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 >> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere outside >> of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both positions. >> It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes from that >> time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. >> >> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s >> tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh >> 2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP >> Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA >> _lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e= >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >> >>> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he >>> agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound like >>> that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism and, >>> consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, vol. 6, >>> p. 122). >>> >>> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale >>> 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. >>> >>> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why >>> determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. Understanding this >>> would greatly help me see your points. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>> >>> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that >>> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess >>> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy >>> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' >>> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on >>> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's >>> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was >>> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being >>> banned across Europe for more than a century. >>> >>> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a >>> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, >>> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, >>> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and >>> another being thought and the infinitely many others being >>> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky >>> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one >>> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." >>> >>> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of >>> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist >>> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I >>> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated >>> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its >>> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules >>> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one >>> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any >>> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental >>> Psychology is a charade. >>> >>> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he >>> is a dead end. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Alexander, >>>> >>>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much >>>> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the >>>> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose in the >>>> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent >>>> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of some >>>> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by W-M >>>> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such >>>> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter attached, >>>> link here: ). >>>> >>>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing >>>> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your >>>> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was fair to >>>> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: >>>> >>>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through >>>> overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical >>>> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of mediation >>>> by a cultural sign' >>>> >>>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances in >>>> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply >>>> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. When I >>>> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and Speech, for >>>> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an >>>> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. 40). In >>>> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is what >>>> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word >>>> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human >>>> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very >>>> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary (as if >>>> unconstrained and magic) means. >>>> >>>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of >>>> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be only an >>>> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only one >>>> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. 172). >>>> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological >>>> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a >>>> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the problem >>>> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to >>>> social-historical necessity, to human needs? >>>> >>>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by >>>> imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky >>>> would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I think >>>> there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your >>>> article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in mainstream >>>> uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in >>>> advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it seems to >>>> me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor >>>> discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. >>>> >>>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, >>>> Alfredo >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava >>>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 >>>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>> >>>> Hi, Larry! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Thank you for your attentionto the article. >>>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. >>>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning >>>> the topicunder discussion. >>>> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby >>>> antisemiotic. >>>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use >>>> arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom >>>> (independence from mechanical causality). >>>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that >>>> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm >>>> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the >>>> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a >>>> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history and >>>> evolution together.? >>>> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, >>>> ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? >>>> ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????????-????????????? ? >>>> ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? >>>> >>>> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? >>>> ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) >>>> >>>> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? >>>> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s >>>> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two >>>> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was >>>> Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. >>>> >>>> Sasha Surmava >>>> >>>> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden >>>> ?????(?): >>>> >>>> >>>> I see. >>>> >>>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning >>>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's >>>> work, was a "founding exemplar." >>>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." >>>> >>>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances >>>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking >>>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >>>>> will open another thread. >>>>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >>>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >>>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- >>>>> >>>>> PAGE 270: >>>>> >>>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >>>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >>>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >>>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >>>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >>>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >>>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >>>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >>>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >>>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >>>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >>>>> creative intellectual work. " >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >>>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >>>>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >>>>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >>>>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >>>>> >>>>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >>>>> Larry. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= >>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= >>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy >>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA >>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril >>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- >>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW >>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV >>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- >>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ >>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv >>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 >>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea >>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>> >>>>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>>>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>>>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by >>>>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>>>>> meaning as you mention. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>>>>> (examples)? >>>>>> >>>>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>>>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>>>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>>>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>>>>> (framework) practices. >>>>>> >>>>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. >>>>>> >>>>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>>>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>>>>> social framework practices. >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this reasonable? >>>>>> >>>>>> Or not >>>>>> >>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>>>>> >>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden >>>>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>>>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> >>>>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>> >>>>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>>>>> mention >>>>>> >>>>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>>>>> *action* are >>>>>> >>>>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >>>>>> >>>>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >>>>>> >>>>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>>>>> "singular" action. >>>>>> >>>>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >>>>>> >>>>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>>>>> form, but >>>>>> >>>>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>>>>> activity, >>>>>> >>>>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, >>>>>> practices) have >>>>>> >>>>>> no systematic difference running across all >>>>>> disciplines and >>>>>> >>>>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>>>>> practices. >>>>>> >>>>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >>>>>> >>>>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>>>>> (Tatigkeit) >>>>>> >>>>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >>>>>> >>>>>> Aktivitat at all. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy >>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA >>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > >>>>>> >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril >>>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- >>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW >>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV >>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- >>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ >>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv >>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 >>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea >>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > Alexander, Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> > Thanks for the article. >>>>>> >>>>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>>>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>>>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>>>>> of practice in knowing). >>>>>> >>>>>> > Two formulas: >>>>>> >>>>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >>>>>> >>>>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>>>>> do not co-incide >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Action IS individual >>>>>> >>>>>> > Practice IS a social category. >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>>>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>>>>> individual who are separate. >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>>>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a >>>>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently >>>>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>>>>> FOR further thought and wording. >>>>>> >>>>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >>>>>> >>>>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >>>>>> >>>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> >>>>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >>>>>> >>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Ivan >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > -- >>>>>> >>>>>> > festina lente >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>>>>> have been discussing >>>>>> >>>>>> >> LSV's sources in >>>>>> >>>>>> >> marx and spinoza. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> >> > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 27 09:22:58 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 02:22:58 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> Message-ID: I think you are right Peter, that "we control ourselves from the outside," by signs. And signs are of course not made by us, but by those who went before us. This was Vygotsky's view. But I think that bit about the present and future doesn't work. Where did my will come from? It is a product of the past (including ideology and social conditions). Unless of course we are outside of the world. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 28/07/2017 2:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > Dear friends, > > I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it > might be helpful to this discussion to point out the > difference between determinism and pre-determinism. The > *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In the > future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to > sway the forces that are in play, to bend them to our will. > > If this conception is correct, then the problem of free > will (aimed at the future) becomes one of discovering how > activities with signs make use of conditional reflexes > (determination) to forge a different path forward than the > one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of > sign use. > > Hope this helps. > > Cheers, > Peter > > > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > If everything is determined, then all that a human > being can do is whatever is necessary, and if they are > enlightened, be aware of that. In a determined world > free will is impossible because there is no choice. > > > At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany > around the 1790s, there was a lot of debate about the > seeming impossibility of free will (which is of course > still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which is > probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking > for Spinoza.) In my opinion, Fichte made the decisive > breakthrough in saying that a person becomes free when > they were *recognised* as a free being by another free > being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by > exercising restraint and recognising the rights of > others (the child development people will relate to > this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will > with the formation of states in which citizens had > rights; without the basic freedoms enjoyed by citizens > of a state, we are reduced to the animal condition. > Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or > quantum mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just > social relations. > > > If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh > obedient to the laws of physics, chemistry and > biology, have free will - it is a tough problem to solve. > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would > determinism ??imply the absence of free will* ... > In any case, thanks for the link; I too am just a > student, ???only that with quite more left to read > yet! > > > Alfredo > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > > *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 > *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, > Marx, & Spinoza > > It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will > (as everywhere outside of human life) does not > imply determinism. But Spinoza held both > positions. It is a long time since I studied > Spinoza and I don't have notes from that time, so > I can't source my own recollections on this. > > The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains > it thusly: > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.stanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e= > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was > sustained, though I doubt he agreed that this > was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not > sound like that when he writes that '[Spinoza > is] the antithesis to parallelism and, > consequently to the dualism of Descartes' > (English collected works, vol. 6, p. 122). > > In any case, I know of no one arguing these > days to try to wholesale 'apply' Spinoza's > ontology to psychology either. > > I am not sure how you are using the notion > *determinist* or why determinism would be > involved in ruling out *free will*. > Understanding this would greatly help me see > your points. > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, > & Spinoza > > Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual > evidence that > Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in > Spinoza. My guess > is that it was Spinoza's place in the history > of philosophy > as the first person to attempt to overcome > Descartes' > dualism by building a monist, material > philosophy, based on > Descartes' "geometric" method, which held > Vygotsky's > interest and respect. This effort, for which > Spinoza was > persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite > Spinoza being > banned across Europe for more than a century. > > However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky > entertained for a > moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single > substance, > a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you > want to call it, > with infinitely many attributes, one being > extension and > another being thought and the infinitely many > others being > God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that > Vygotsky > followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of > that one > substance as Activity - for Hegel under the > name of "Spirit." > > As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's > works are full of > insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic > project (a monist > materialism) is right. But his solution is > hopeless and I > have not met a single soul who has usefully > appropriated > this substance with infinite attributes. Apart > from its > mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) > *determinist* and rules > out free will, and is a thinly disguised > dualism: one > substance with two attributes instead of two > substances. Any > attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in > experimental > Psychology is a charade. > > In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a > dead dog, but he > is a dead end. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > Hi Alexander, > > a very interesting text, written in > brilliant prose. I very much appreciate > your observations that 'the psychophysical > (and not the psychophysiological) ... > poses a REAL task akin to that which arose > in the course of the evolution of living > and mobile beings', and that 'intelligent > action ... is itself ... congruent with > the real corporeal form of some other > body'. These propositions interest me a > lot. Indeed, and led by W-M Roth, we did > last year co-author a book where we > entertained such propositions with respect > to educational psychology (front matter > attached, link here: ). > > Like you, in that book, we are critical to > Vygotsky's ways of writing about signs, > specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon > reading your article, on the whole, I > wondered whether your characterisation was > fair to Vygotsky's actual legacy. You > describe Vygotsky's position as this: > > 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet > acquires freedom through overcoming > natural determination (the S?R reaction, > the mechanical triggering of a response by > an external stimulus) in the act of > mediation by a cultural sign' > > I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the > term 'sign' in many instances in the > conventional sense you refer to. But this > way of writing sharply contrasts with > other important tenets and arguments in > his legacy. When I read Vygotsky's > characterisations of the 'word' in > Thinking and Speech, for example, I do not > think he 'understands the word > unambiguously as an arbitrary, > conventional sign', as you suggest in your > article (p. 40). In chapter 7, and > paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that > 'the word is what ... is absolutely > impossible for one person but possible for > two. The word is the most direct > manifestation of the historical nature of > human consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. > 285). To me, that suggests a very > different view of words as signs than > simply conventional, arbitrary (as if > unconstrained and magic) means. > > In other places, he also writes that, > 'Freedom, as the opposite of nature, > cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. > Freedom may be only an element of that > nature, not an opposite to natural > necessity but only one of the forms of > this necessity' (English Collected works, > vol. 6, p. 172). Coming from someone who > would also write that any higher > psychological function was first a > societal relation (and what is action if > not a societal relation?), how could he > believe that the solution to the problem > of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he > was committed to social-historical > necessity, to human needs? > > In our book, we try to address these kind > of contradictions by imagining what a > Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would > be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued > the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I > think there may be more common ground > between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than your > article allows, but this is surely not > very much explored in mainstream uptakes. > I am only a student on these matters, and > I can not know in advance how far we will > come with this integrative program, but it > seems to me that neither discarding > semiotics for the primacy of action, nor > discarding action for the primacy of > semiotics are promising paths. > > In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, > Alfredo > > > > > From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Alexandre > Sourmava > > Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 > To:ablunden@mira.net > ; Larry > Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: > Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Hi, Larry! > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > However, I think it can be useful to add > my little comment concerning the > topicunder discussion. > Bernstein?s position is substantially > spinozian and thereby antisemiotic. > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to > Vygotsky?sattempts to use arbitrary sign > as a magic key designed to solve the > problem of freedom (independence from > mechanical causality). > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical > perspective the whole realm ofhistory, > culture, and language is the realm of > arbitrariness. So the method ofconditional > reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > natural-historical methodconcerning human, > of a tie that binds history and evolution > together.? > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? > ??????????? ??? ???????, ????????, ????? ? > ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? > ????????????? ????????? ??????????? > ?????????? ???????? > ??????????????-????????????? ? ?????????? > ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? > ???????? ????????? > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? > ????. ? ??.: ????????????? ????? ? > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > There exists a prejudice that so called > ?Cultural-historical theory? withits > arbitrary signs is a sophisticated > antithesis to coarse Pavlov?s > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from > reality. In fact, these two theories are > identical.That is the reason why Nicolai > Bernstein who was Vygotsky?s good friend > had neverreferred to his ideas. > > Sasha Surmava > > ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy > Blunden > ?????(?): > > > I see. > > This is a slightly different context. The > original meaning > of "paradigm," before the popularisation > of Thomas Kuhn's > work, was a "founding exemplar." > "Exemplar" presumably has the same > etymology as "example." > > The idea of "an example" as being one of > numerous instances > of a process is a different concept, the > opposite really. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Andy, > I will reference where I got the > notion of linking > [example] and [framework]. If this > becomes interesting > will open another thread. > From David L. Marshall titled : > "Historical and > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold > Fisch, a Paradigm for > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > PAGE 270: > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative > to any intellectual > historical method insisting that > practiontioners remain > agnostics about the value of the ideas > they study. It is > the chief contention of this essay > that he is a 'paradigm' > for intellectual historians, a > paradigm in the original > Greek sense of an *example* and in the > DERIVED > contemporary sense of a *framework* > within which the > community of research can proceed. > Indeed it is just such > *doubling* of the philological object > qua example into a > carapace for ongoing action and > thought that Fisch > explored in a variety of ways during > his half century of > creative intellectual work. " > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate > context, but the > relationality of [example : framework] > through the concept > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy > Blunden > > >> wrote: > > "actions" or "an action" ... no > extra word is needed. > Extra words like "singular," > "individual" or "single" > only confuse the matter. > "Examples" is too vague. > > Cannot make sense of the rest of > your message at all, > Larry. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > > > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry > wrote: > > Andy, > > Following your lead it may > be preferable to say > single (individual) to > indicate the uniqueness of > variable social actions. > This doubling (by > including both terms) may > crystallize the intended > meaning as you mention. > > Andy is this vein can we > also include the term > (examples)? > > Then the moving TRANS > forming from single > (individual) social acts > towards (practices) would > indicate the movement from > examples to exemplary > actions and further movement > (historicity) toward > (framework) practices. > > (framework) practices being > another doubling. > > So moving (transforming) > from single social examples > through exemplary social > examples crystallizing in > social framework practices. > > Is this reasonable? > > Or not > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > *From: *Andy > Blunden > > *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > *To: *eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > > > > *Cc: *Alexander > Surmava > > *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: > Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > Larry, when you say "Action > IS individual," did you > mention > > to say that *actions* - the > individual units of > *action* are > > individual? In which can it > is of course a tautology. > > But *action* is irreducibly > *social*, and so is every > > "individual" action. Or > better, so is every > "singular" action. > > A lot of relevant > differences are coded in the English > > language by the use of the > count-noun or mass noun > form, but > > on the whole the set of > words (action, actions, > activity, > > activities) and the set of > words (practice, > practices) have > > no systematic difference > running across all > disciplines and > > schools of thought. For us > CHATters, "activities" are > practices. > > If you read Hegel and Marx, > there is an added issue: the > > German words for action > (Handlung) and activity > (Tatigkeit) > > are more or less inverted > for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > Aktivitat at all. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UHG_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > > > > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > > > > > > On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, > Larry Purss wrote: > > > Alexander, Mike, > > > Thanks for the article. > > > Moving to page 51 I > noticed that when referencing > Bernstein he contrasted > (action) with (practice) and > did not REPEAT (identity) > the thesis about the role > of practice in knowing). > > > Two formulas: > > > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > ? Verification of knowing > THROUGH ?practice? > > > > > > These two formulas closely > RESEMBLE each other but > do not co-incide > > > > > > Action IS individual > > > Practice IS a social category. > > > > > > Sociohistorical (practice) > in the final analysis is > nothing other than the SUM > total of the actions of > individual who are separate. > > > > > > Individual action is LIKE > a single experiment. > They are alike in that both > individual action & a > single experiment are poorly > suited to the role of : > > > > > > A philosophical criterion > of (truth). > > > > > > I do not have the > background to intelligently > comment, but did register > this theme as provocative > FOR further thought and wording. > > > And for generating > intelligent commentary > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > > > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity > > > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > > > Yes very interesting thank > you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > > > > Ivan > > > > > > -- > > > festina lente > > > > > > > > >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, > mike cole > > > > wrote: > > >> > > >> This article might prove > of interest to those who > have been discussing > > >> LSV's sources in > > >> marx and spinoza. > > >> mike > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jul 27 10:29:00 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 10:29:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> Message-ID: That seems right to me, Peter, in my vast ignorance of the original texts being discussed. Your characterization seems to me of a kind with the intuition in the epigram to the lchcautobiogrphy: ?All experience is an arch wherethrough gleams that untravelled world whose margin fades forever and forever when I move. _Tennyson Might freewill be the name of the experience of an organism living in a loosely coupled, non-linear, dynamic system? Of course it is a constrained world.... it is a living system.. but constraint and determinism are not synonyms and the conditional in "conditional reflexes" refers to historical contingency in the life of the organism..... and hence "choice" ( i think that i think). mike On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > Dear friends, > > I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful to > this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and > pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In the > future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the forces > that are in play, to bend them to our will. > > If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at the > future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use of > conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward than > the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use. > > Hope this helps. > > Cheers, > Peter > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is > > whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. In > a > > determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice. > > > > > > At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the 1790s, > > there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free will > > (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which > is > > probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In my > > opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a person > > becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another free > > being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising restraint > > and recognising the rights of others (the child development people will > > relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the > > formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic > > freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal > > condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum > > mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations. > > > > > > If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the laws of > > physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough problem to > > solve. > > > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > >> > >> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ??imply the > >> absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am > just a > >> student, ???only that with quite more left to read yet! > >> > >> > >> Alfredo > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *From:* Andy Blunden > >> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 > >> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >> > >> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere > outside > >> of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both > positions. > >> It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes from > that > >> time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. > >> > >> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: > >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s > >> tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh > >> 2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP > >> Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA > >> _lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e= > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> Andy Blunden > >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > >> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > >> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > >> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > >> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > >> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > >> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > >> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > >> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > >> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> > >>> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he > >>> agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound like > >>> that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism > and, > >>> consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, > vol. 6, > >>> p. 122). > >>> > >>> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale > >>> 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. > >>> > >>> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why > >>> determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. Understanding > this > >>> would greatly help me see your points. > >>> > >>> Alfredo > >>> > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >>> > >>> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that > >>> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess > >>> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy > >>> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' > >>> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on > >>> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's > >>> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was > >>> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being > >>> banned across Europe for more than a century. > >>> > >>> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a > >>> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, > >>> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, > >>> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and > >>> another being thought and the infinitely many others being > >>> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky > >>> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one > >>> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." > >>> > >>> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of > >>> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist > >>> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I > >>> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated > >>> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its > >>> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules > >>> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one > >>> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any > >>> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental > >>> Psychology is a charade. > >>> > >>> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he > >>> is a dead end. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> Andy Blunden > >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > >>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > >>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > >>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > >>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > >>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > >>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > >>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > >>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > >>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Alexander, > >>>> > >>>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much > >>>> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the > >>>> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose > in the > >>>> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that > 'intelligent > >>>> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of > some > >>>> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led by > W-M > >>>> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such > >>>> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter > attached, > >>>> link here: ). > >>>> > >>>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of writing > >>>> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your > >>>> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was > fair to > >>>> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: > >>>> > >>>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through > >>>> overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical > >>>> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of > mediation > >>>> by a cultural sign' > >>>> > >>>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances > in > >>>> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply > >>>> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. > When I > >>>> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and > Speech, for > >>>> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an > >>>> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. > 40). In > >>>> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is > what > >>>> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The > word > >>>> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human > >>>> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very > >>>> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary > (as if > >>>> unconstrained and magic) means. > >>>> > >>>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of > >>>> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be > only an > >>>> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but only > one > >>>> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. > 172). > >>>> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher psychological > >>>> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a > >>>> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the > problem > >>>> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to > >>>> social-historical necessity, to human needs? > >>>> > >>>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by > >>>> imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if > Vygotsky > >>>> would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I > think > >>>> there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than > your > >>>> article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in > mainstream > >>>> uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in > >>>> advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it > seems to > >>>> me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor > >>>> discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. > >>>> > >>>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu> > >>>> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava > >>>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 > >>>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >>>> > >>>> Hi, Larry! > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Thank you for your attentionto the article. > >>>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > >>>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning > >>>> the topicunder discussion. > >>>> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > >>>> antisemiotic. > >>>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > >>>> arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > >>>> (independence from mechanical causality). > >>>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that > >>>> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm > >>>> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the > >>>> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > >>>> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > history and > >>>> evolution together.? > >>>> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > >>>> ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > >>>> ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > ??????????????-????????????? ? > >>>> ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > >>>> > >>>> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > ????? > >>>> ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > >>>> > >>>> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > >>>> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > Pavlov?s > >>>> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two > >>>> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who > was > >>>> Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > >>>> > >>>> Sasha Surmava > >>>> > >>>> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > >>>> ?????(?): > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> I see. > >>>> > >>>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > >>>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > >>>> work, was a "founding exemplar." > >>>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > >>>> > >>>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > >>>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > >>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > >>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > >>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > >>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > >>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > >>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > >>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > >>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > >>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Andy, > >>>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking > >>>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > >>>>> will open another thread. > >>>>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > >>>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > >>>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- > >>>>> > >>>>> PAGE 270: > >>>>> > >>>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > >>>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > >>>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > >>>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > >>>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > >>>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > >>>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > >>>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > >>>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > >>>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > >>>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > >>>>> creative intellectual work. " > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > >>>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > >>>>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? > >>>>> > >>>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > >>>>> > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > >>>>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > >>>>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > >>>>> > >>>>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > >>>>> Larry. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > >>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > >>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > >>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > >>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= > >>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy > >>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA > >>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril > >>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- > >>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW > >>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV > >>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- > >>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ > >>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv > >>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 > >>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea > >>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >>>>> > >>>>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Andy, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > >>>>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > >>>>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by > >>>>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > >>>>>> meaning as you mention. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > >>>>>> (examples)? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > >>>>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > >>>>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > >>>>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > >>>>>> (framework) practices. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > >>>>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > >>>>>> social framework practices. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Is this reasonable? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Or not > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden > >>>>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > >>>>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> > >>>>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > >>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > >>>>>> mention > >>>>>> > >>>>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > >>>>>> *action* are > >>>>>> > >>>>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > >>>>>> > >>>>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > >>>>>> "singular" action. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > >>>>>> > >>>>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > >>>>>> form, but > >>>>>> > >>>>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > >>>>>> activity, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, > >>>>>> practices) have > >>>>>> > >>>>>> no systematic difference running across all > >>>>>> disciplines and > >>>>>> > >>>>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > >>>>>> practices. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > >>>>>> (Tatigkeit) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Aktivitat at all. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>> > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > >>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > >>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > >>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > >>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy > >>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA > >>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril > >>>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- > >>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW > >>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV > >>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- > >>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ > >>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv > >>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 > >>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea > >>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Alexander, Mike, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Thanks for the article. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > >>>>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > >>>>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > >>>>>> of practice in knowing). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Two formulas: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > >>>>>> do not co-incide > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Action IS individual > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Practice IS a social category. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > >>>>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > >>>>>> individual who are separate. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > >>>>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a > >>>>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently > >>>>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > >>>>>> FOR further thought and wording. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Ivan > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > -- > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > festina lente > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > >>>>>> have been discussing > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >> LSV's sources in > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >> marx and spinoza. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu Jul 27 10:45:45 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 10:45:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> Message-ID: The first part of Peter's statement '*Past* is determined..." is pretty well how Mead describes the duration we call present. The second part is not. Peter writes, "there exists opportunities to sway the forces..." Mead emphasizes *emergence*, which means, there is a fundamental unpredictability at work. Sch?tz (1932) distinguishes *because*-motives and *in-order-to-*motives, and describes how determination slips in through a posteriori accounts (because), which does not exist when we orient toward the future. Lucy Suchman takes this up in her two views on plans, which orient for but do not determine situated action. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 10:29 AM, mike cole wrote: > That seems right to me, Peter, in my vast ignorance of the original texts > being discussed. > > Your characterization seems to me of a kind with the intuition in the > epigram to the lchcautobiogrphy: > > ?All experience is an arch wherethrough gleams > that untravelled world whose margin fades > forever and forever when I move. _Tennyson > Might freewill be the name of the experience of an organism living in a > loosely coupled, non-linear, dynamic system? Of course it is a constrained > world.... it is a living system.. but constraint and determinism are not > synonyms and the conditional in "conditional reflexes" refers to historical > contingency in the life of the organism..... and hence "choice" ( i think > that i think). > > mike > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > > > Dear friends, > > > > I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful to > > this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and > > pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In > the > > future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the forces > > that are in play, to bend them to our will. > > > > If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at > the > > future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use of > > conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward > than > > the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use. > > > > Hope this helps. > > > > Cheers, > > Peter > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is > > > whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. > In > > a > > > determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice. > > > > > > > > > At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the 1790s, > > > there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free will > > > (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which > > is > > > probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In > my > > > opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a person > > > becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another > free > > > being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising > restraint > > > and recognising the rights of others (the child development people will > > > relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the > > > formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic > > > freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal > > > condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum > > > mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations. > > > > > > > > > If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the laws > of > > > physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough problem > to > > > solve. > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > > a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > > 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > > SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > > G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > > 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > > Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > > mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > > oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > > >> > > >> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ??imply the > > >> absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am > > just a > > >> student, ???only that with quite more left to read yet! > > >> > > >> > > >> Alfredo > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *From:* Andy Blunden > > >> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 > > >> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >> > > >> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere > > outside > > >> of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both > > positions. > > >> It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes from > > that > > >> time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. > > >> > > >> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: > > >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s > > >> tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh > > >> 2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP > > >> Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA > > >> _lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e= > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > >> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > >> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > >> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > >> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > >> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > >> > > >>> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he > > >>> agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound > like > > >>> that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism > > and, > > >>> consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, > > vol. 6, > > >>> p. 122). > > >>> > > >>> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale > > >>> 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. > > >>> > > >>> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why > > >>> determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. > Understanding > > this > > >>> would greatly help me see your points. > > >>> > > >>> Alfredo > > >>> > > >>> ________________________________________ > > >>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu > > > > > >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > > >>> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 > > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >>> > > >>> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that > > >>> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess > > >>> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy > > >>> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' > > >>> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on > > >>> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's > > >>> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was > > >>> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being > > >>> banned across Europe for more than a century. > > >>> > > >>> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a > > >>> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, > > >>> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, > > >>> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and > > >>> another being thought and the infinitely many others being > > >>> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky > > >>> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one > > >>> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." > > >>> > > >>> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of > > >>> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist > > >>> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I > > >>> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated > > >>> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its > > >>> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules > > >>> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one > > >>> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any > > >>> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental > > >>> Psychology is a charade. > > >>> > > >>> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he > > >>> is a dead end. > > >>> > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> Andy Blunden > > >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > >>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > >>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > >>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > >>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > >>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >>> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Hi Alexander, > > >>>> > > >>>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much > > >>>> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the > > >>>> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose > > in the > > >>>> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that > > 'intelligent > > >>>> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of > > some > > >>>> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led > by > > W-M > > >>>> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such > > >>>> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter > > attached, > > >>>> link here: ). > > >>>> > > >>>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of > writing > > >>>> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your > > >>>> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was > > fair to > > >>>> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: > > >>>> > > >>>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through > > >>>> overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical > > >>>> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of > > mediation > > >>>> by a cultural sign' > > >>>> > > >>>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances > > in > > >>>> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply > > >>>> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. > > When I > > >>>> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and > > Speech, for > > >>>> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an > > >>>> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. > > 40). In > > >>>> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is > > what > > >>>> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. > The > > word > > >>>> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human > > >>>> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very > > >>>> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary > > (as if > > >>>> unconstrained and magic) means. > > >>>> > > >>>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of > > >>>> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be > > only an > > >>>> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but > only > > one > > >>>> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. > > 172). > > >>>> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher > psychological > > >>>> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a > > >>>> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the > > problem > > >>>> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to > > >>>> social-historical necessity, to human needs? > > >>>> > > >>>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by > > >>>> imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if > > Vygotsky > > >>>> would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I > > think > > >>>> there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than > > your > > >>>> article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in > > mainstream > > >>>> uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in > > >>>> advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it > > seems to > > >>>> me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor > > >>>> discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. > > >>>> > > >>>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, > > >>>> Alfredo > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > edu> > > >>>> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava > > >>>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 > > >>>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >>>> > > >>>> Hi, Larry! > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > >>>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > >>>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment > concerning > > >>>> the topicunder discussion. > > >>>> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > > >>>> antisemiotic. > > >>>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > > >>>> arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of > freedom > > >>>> (independence from mechanical causality). > > >>>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > >>>> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole > realm > > >>>> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So > the > > >>>> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > >>>> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > > history and > > >>>> evolution together.? > > >>>> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > >>>> ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? > ????????????? > > >>>> ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > > ??????????????-????????????? ? > > >>>> ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > >>>> > > >>>> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > > ????? > > >>>> ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > >>>> > > >>>> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > >>>> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > > Pavlov?s > > >>>> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these > two > > >>>> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who > > was > > >>>> Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > >>>> > > >>>> Sasha Surmava > > >>>> > > >>>> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > >>>> ?????(?): > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> I see. > > >>>> > > >>>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > >>>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > >>>> work, was a "founding exemplar." > > >>>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > >>>> > > >>>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > >>>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > >>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > >>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > >>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > >>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > >>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >>>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Andy, > > >>>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > >>>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > >>>>> will open another thread. > > >>>>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > >>>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > >>>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > >>>>> > > >>>>> PAGE 270: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > >>>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > >>>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > >>>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > >>>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > >>>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > >>>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > >>>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > >>>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > >>>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > >>>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > >>>>> creative intellectual work. " > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > >>>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > >>>>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > >>>>> > wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > >>>>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > >>>>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > >>>>> Larry. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Andy > > >>>>> > > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= > > >>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy > > >>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA > > >>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > > > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril > > >>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- > > >>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW > > >>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV > > >>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- > > >>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ > > >>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv > > >>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 > > >>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea > > >>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > >>>>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > >>>>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by > > >>>>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > >>>>>> meaning as you mention. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > >>>>>> (examples)? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > >>>>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > >>>>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > >>>>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > >>>>>> (framework) practices. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > >>>>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > >>>>>> social framework practices. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Is this reasonable? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Or not > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden > > >>>>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > >>>>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > >>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > >>>>>> mention > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > >>>>>> *action* are > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > >>>>>> "singular" action. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > >>>>>> form, but > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > >>>>>> activity, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, > > >>>>>> practices) have > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> no systematic difference running across all > > >>>>>> disciplines and > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > >>>>>> practices. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > >>>>>> (Tatigkeit) > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Aktivitat at all. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> ------------------------------ > ------------------------------ > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= > > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy > > >>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA > > >>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril > > >>>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- > > >>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW > > >>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV > > >>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- > > >>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ > > >>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv > > >>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 > > >>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea > > >>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Alexander, Mike, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Thanks for the article. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > >>>>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > >>>>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > >>>>>> of practice in knowing). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Two formulas: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > >>>>>> do not co-incide > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Action IS individual > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Practice IS a social category. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > >>>>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > >>>>>> individual who are separate. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > >>>>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a > > >>>>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently > > >>>>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > >>>>>> FOR further thought and wording. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Ivan > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > -- > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > festina lente > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > >>>>>> have been discussing > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> LSV's sources in > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> marx and spinoza. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> mike > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > Director, > > Office of Institutional Research > > > > Fordham University > > Thebaud Hall-202 > > Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > From shirinvossoughi@gmail.com Thu Jul 27 11:00:43 2017 From: shirinvossoughi@gmail.com (Shirin Vossoughi) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 13:00:43 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] studies of feedback on student writing? Message-ID: Dear all, I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? Thank you, Shirin From smago@uga.edu Thu Jul 27 11:25:42 2017 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 18:25:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This might not be exactly what you're looking for, and it's a bit old by now, but... Smagorinsky, P. (1997). Responding to writers, not writing: A review of 12 Readers Reading: Responding to College Student Writing by Richard Straub and Ronald F. Lunsford. Assessing Writing, 3, 211-220. Available at http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/AW/Assessing Writing--Review of Straub.pdf -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Shirin Vossoughi Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2017 2:01 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] studies of feedback on student writing? Dear all, I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? Thank you, Shirin From s.franklin08@btinternet.com Thu Jul 27 11:46:27 2017 From: s.franklin08@btinternet.com (Shirley Franklin) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 19:46:27 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> I know people in this project have done research on feedback on academic writing. Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies Forum in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly died recently, had a lot to say about it. http://www.thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk/ Shirley Sent from my iPad On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi wrote: > Dear all, > I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or > socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? > Thank you, > Shirin From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Jul 27 13:54:29 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 13:54:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?IFJFOiAgUmU60J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYg?= =?utf-8?q?Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> Message-ID: <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Following Wolff Michael?s lead concerning Mead and Schultz and how *because* and determinism slips in through a posteriori accounts. I am including Vincent Colapietro?s voice as he discusses C. S. Peirce as an exemplary person who saw himself as fulfilling a *role* in an emerging historical *drama*. In paragraph # 11 Vincent describes the way Peirce himself *imaginally* pursued his life project. Vincent is clarifying the meaning of *historical consciousness* as meaning *historical imagination*. 11 Regarding this, he [Peirce] was anything but a spectator. He was self-consciously an agent who took himself to be responsible, in some measure, for the development of a practice. Accordingly, a dramatic sense of his intellectual obligations animated and guided his orientation toward the past and also his involvement in the disputes of his own day, not least of all, the dispute between the progeny of the scholastic realists and the offspring of the Renaissance humanists. In brief, his understanding of the past fostered a consciousness of his role in a drama. More than anything else, this is what I mean by historical consciousness as distinct from historical knowledge. This is a distinction, not a dichotomy or dualism. Peirce was convinced that the reality of the past was, to some extent, discoverable. He was unquestionably a realist, not a skeptic or what is commonly called a constructivist. But he was also a pragmatist. Whatever reality (including the reality of the past) means must be spelled out in terms of habits of conduct bearing upon the future. Part of the difficulty is giving equal weight to both the realist and pragmatist facets of his thought, another part showing how they are anything but incompatible. Vincent?s article describes Peirce?s work as an example that was exemplary on the way to creating a paradigm shift [emerging framework] that guides further inquiry within historical imagination. Vincent also adds this insight: ?While Descartes drew a sharp distinction between intellect and imagination, Peirce returned to the scholastic position [human intelligence is rooted in and depends on our imaginative capacities]. The Poet Alfred Tennyson wrote ?maybe wildest dreams / Are but the needful preludes of the truth? to which Peirce responds: ? I doubt the word *maybe*? Wildest dreams [or fancies] *are* the first steps toward scientific investigation.? [Peirce 1966: 233] Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Wolff-Michael Roth Sent: July 27, 2017 10:48 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza The first part of Peter's statement '*Past* is determined..." is pretty well how Mead describes the duration we call present. The second part is not. Peter writes, "there exists opportunities to sway the forces..." Mead emphasizes *emergence*, which means, there is a fundamental unpredictability at work. Sch?tz (1932) distinguishes *because*-motives and *in-order-to-*motives, and describes how determination slips in through a posteriori accounts (because), which does not exist when we orient toward the future. Lucy Suchman takes this up in her two views on plans, which orient for but do not determine situated action. Michael Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 10:29 AM, mike cole wrote: > That seems right to me, Peter, in my vast ignorance of the original texts > being discussed. > > Your characterization seems to me of a kind with the intuition in the > epigram to the lchcautobiogrphy: > > ?All experience is an arch wherethrough gleams > that untravelled world whose margin fades > forever and forever when I move. _Tennyson > Might freewill be the name of the experience of an organism living in a > loosely coupled, non-linear, dynamic system? Of course it is a constrained > world.... it is a living system.. but constraint and determinism are not > synonyms and the conditional in "conditional reflexes" refers to historical > contingency in the life of the organism..... and hence "choice" ( i think > that i think). > > mike > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > > > Dear friends, > > > > I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful to > > this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and > > pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In > the > > future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the forces > > that are in play, to bend them to our will. > > > > If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at > the > > future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use of > > conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward > than > > the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use. > > > > Hope this helps. > > > > Cheers, > > Peter > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is > > > whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. > In > > a > > > determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice. > > > > > > > > > At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the 1790s, > > > there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free will > > > (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, which > > is > > > probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In > my > > > opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a person > > > becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another > free > > > being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising > restraint > > > and recognising the rights of others (the child development people will > > > relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the > > > formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic > > > freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal > > > condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum > > > mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations. > > > > > > > > > If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the laws > of > > > physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough problem > to > > > solve. > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > > a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > > 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > > SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > > G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > > 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > > Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > > mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > > oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > > >> > > >> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ??imply the > > >> absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am > > just a > > >> student, ???only that with quite more left to read yet! > > >> > > >> > > >> Alfredo > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *From:* Andy Blunden > > >> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 > > >> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >> > > >> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere > > outside > > >> of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both > > positions. > > >> It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes from > > that > > >> time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. > > >> > > >> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: > > >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s > > >> tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh > > >> 2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP > > >> Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA > > >> _lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e= > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > >> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > >> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > >> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > >> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > >> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > >> > > >>> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt he > > >>> agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound > like > > >>> that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to parallelism > > and, > > >>> consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, > > vol. 6, > > >>> p. 122). > > >>> > > >>> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to wholesale > > >>> 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. > > >>> > > >>> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why > > >>> determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. > Understanding > > this > > >>> would greatly help me see your points. > > >>> > > >>> Alfredo > > >>> > > >>> ________________________________________ > > >>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu > > > > > >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > > >>> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 > > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >>> > > >>> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that > > >>> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess > > >>> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy > > >>> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' > > >>> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on > > >>> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's > > >>> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was > > >>> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being > > >>> banned across Europe for more than a century. > > >>> > > >>> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a > > >>> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, > > >>> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, > > >>> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and > > >>> another being thought and the infinitely many others being > > >>> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky > > >>> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one > > >>> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." > > >>> > > >>> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of > > >>> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist > > >>> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I > > >>> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated > > >>> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its > > >>> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules > > >>> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one > > >>> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any > > >>> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental > > >>> Psychology is a charade. > > >>> > > >>> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he > > >>> is a dead end. > > >>> > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> Andy Blunden > > >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > >>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > >>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > >>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > >>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > >>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >>> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Hi Alexander, > > >>>> > > >>>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much > > >>>> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the > > >>>> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which arose > > in the > > >>>> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that > > 'intelligent > > >>>> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of > > some > > >>>> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led > by > > W-M > > >>>> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such > > >>>> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter > > attached, > > >>>> link here: ). > > >>>> > > >>>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of > writing > > >>>> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading your > > >>>> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation was > > fair to > > >>>> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as this: > > >>>> > > >>>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through > > >>>> overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical > > >>>> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of > > mediation > > >>>> by a cultural sign' > > >>>> > > >>>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many instances > > in > > >>>> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing sharply > > >>>> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. > > When I > > >>>> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and > > Speech, for > > >>>> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as an > > >>>> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. > > 40). In > > >>>> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word is > > what > > >>>> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. > The > > word > > >>>> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human > > >>>> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a very > > >>>> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, arbitrary > > (as if > > >>>> unconstrained and magic) means. > > >>>> > > >>>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of > > >>>> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be > > only an > > >>>> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but > only > > one > > >>>> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, p. > > 172). > > >>>> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher > psychological > > >>>> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not a > > >>>> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the > > problem > > >>>> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to > > >>>> social-historical necessity, to human needs? > > >>>> > > >>>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by > > >>>> imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if > > Vygotsky > > >>>> would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I > > think > > >>>> there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than > > your > > >>>> article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in > > mainstream > > >>>> uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know in > > >>>> advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it > > seems to > > >>>> me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, nor > > >>>> discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising paths. > > >>>> > > >>>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, > > >>>> Alfredo > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > edu> > > >>>> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava > > >>>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 > > >>>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >>>> > > >>>> Hi, Larry! > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > >>>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > >>>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment > concerning > > >>>> the topicunder discussion. > > >>>> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > > >>>> antisemiotic. > > >>>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > > >>>> arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of > freedom > > >>>> (independence from mechanical causality). > > >>>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > >>>> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole > realm > > >>>> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So > the > > >>>> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > >>>> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > > history and > > >>>> evolution together.? > > >>>> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > >>>> ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? > ????????????? > > >>>> ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > > ??????????????-????????????? ? > > >>>> ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > >>>> > > >>>> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > > ????? > > >>>> ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > >>>> > > >>>> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > >>>> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > > Pavlov?s > > >>>> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these > two > > >>>> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who > > was > > >>>> Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > >>>> > > >>>> Sasha Surmava > > >>>> > > >>>> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > >>>> ?????(?): > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> I see. > > >>>> > > >>>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > >>>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > >>>> work, was a "founding exemplar." > > >>>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > >>>> > > >>>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > >>>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > >>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > >>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > >>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > >>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > >>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >>>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Andy, > > >>>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > >>>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > >>>>> will open another thread. > > >>>>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > >>>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > >>>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > >>>>> > > >>>>> PAGE 270: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > >>>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > >>>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > >>>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > >>>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > >>>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > >>>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > >>>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > >>>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > >>>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > >>>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > >>>>> creative intellectual work. " > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > >>>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > >>>>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > >>>>> > wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > >>>>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > >>>>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > >>>>> Larry. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Andy > > >>>>> > > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= > > >>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy > > >>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA > > >>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > > > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril > > >>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- > > >>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW > > >>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV > > >>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- > > >>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ > > >>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv > > >>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 > > >>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea > > >>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > >>>>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > >>>>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by > > >>>>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > >>>>>> meaning as you mention. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > >>>>>> (examples)? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > >>>>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > >>>>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > >>>>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > >>>>>> (framework) practices. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > >>>>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > >>>>>> social framework practices. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Is this reasonable? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Or not > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden > > >>>>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > >>>>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > >>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > >>>>>> mention > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > >>>>>> *action* are > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > >>>>>> "singular" action. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > >>>>>> form, but > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > >>>>>> activity, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, > > >>>>>> practices) have > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> no systematic difference running across all > > >>>>>> disciplines and > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > >>>>>> practices. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > >>>>>> (Tatigkeit) > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Aktivitat at all. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> ------------------------------ > ------------------------------ > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > >>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > >>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > >>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > >>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= > > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy > > >>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA > > >>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril > > >>>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- > > >>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW > > >>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV > > >>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- > > >>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ > > >>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv > > >>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 > > >>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea > > >>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Alexander, Mike, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Thanks for the article. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > >>>>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > >>>>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > >>>>>> of practice in knowing). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Two formulas: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > >>>>>> do not co-incide > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Action IS individual > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Practice IS a social category. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > >>>>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > >>>>>> individual who are separate. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > >>>>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a > > >>>>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently > > >>>>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > >>>>>> FOR further thought and wording. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Ivan > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > -- > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > festina lente > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > >>>>>> have been discussing > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> LSV's sources in > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> marx and spinoza. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> mike > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > Director, > > Office of Institutional Research > > > > Fordham University > > Thebaud Hall-202 > > Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Jul 27 14:26:19 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 06:26:19 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Actually, Andy, there are people who defend Spinoza's formulation of a single substance with two modes. Halliday is one. I am another. Consider the way in which you read Hegel. You don't actually use the term for an explanatory principle which he chose, namely "Geist" or "Spirit". Sometimes you use Leontiev's term, "Activity", and sometimes you use your own, much more Spinozan, term: "project". Spinoza actually TELLS us how to read his explanatory principle "Deus Sive Natura", or "God, that is to say, Nature". So the is one substance, and we can call it "Nature". Culture has to be understood as an emergent part of that nature. The two modes are matter, of course, and a form of organization of that matter, a kind of countercurrent to entropy, we can call "meaning". Meaning matter that has been organized in some way to stand for something that is not itself. Nature is one substance, with two modes: matter, that is subject to the laws of thermodynamics (laws which do indeed distinguish between past and future, just as Peter does), and meaning, which is matter that has granted itself temporary surcease from them. David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: I always thought that the great advantage of "project" over "activity" was that it demystifies how this temporary surcease might work among humans. To understand Spinoza's idea of "God"as a semiotic version of "Nature" all we really have to do is to ask ourselves what "projects" might look like among non-human, non-sentient, and non-living entities: colonies, ecologies, and systems. dk On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:54 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Following Wolff Michael?s lead concerning Mead and Schultz and how > *because* and determinism slips in through a posteriori accounts. > > I am including Vincent Colapietro?s voice as he discusses C. S. Peirce as > an exemplary person who saw himself as fulfilling a *role* in an emerging > historical *drama*. > > In paragraph # 11 Vincent describes the way Peirce himself *imaginally* > pursued his life project. Vincent is clarifying the meaning of *historical > consciousness* as meaning *historical imagination*. > > 11 Regarding this, he [Peirce] was anything but a spectator. He was > self-consciously an agent who took himself to be responsible, in some > measure, for the development of a practice. Accordingly, a dramatic sense > of his intellectual obligations animated and guided his orientation toward > the past and also his involvement in the disputes of his own day, not least > of all, the dispute between the progeny of the scholastic realists and the > offspring of the Renaissance humanists. In brief, his understanding of the > past fostered a consciousness of his role in a drama. More than anything > else, this is what I mean by historical consciousness as distinct from > historical knowledge. This is a distinction, not a dichotomy or dualism. > Peirce was convinced that the reality of the past was, to some extent, > discoverable. He was unquestionably a realist, not a skeptic or what is > commonly called a constructivist. But he was also a pragmatist. Whatever > reality (including the reality of the past) means must be spelled out in > terms of habits of conduct bearing upon the future. Part of the difficulty > is giving equal weight to both the realist and pragmatist facets of his > thought, another part showing how they are anything but incompatible. > > Vincent?s article describes Peirce?s work as an example that was > exemplary on the way to creating a paradigm shift [emerging framework] > that guides further inquiry within historical imagination. > > Vincent also adds this insight: > > ?While Descartes drew a sharp distinction between intellect and > imagination, Peirce returned to the scholastic position [human intelligence > is rooted in and depends on our imaginative capacities]. The Poet Alfred > Tennyson wrote ?maybe wildest dreams / Are but the needful preludes of the > truth? to which Peirce responds: > ? I doubt the word *maybe*? Wildest dreams [or fancies] *are* the first > steps toward scientific investigation.? [Peirce 1966: 233] > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: Wolff-Michael Roth > Sent: July 27, 2017 10:48 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > The first part of Peter's statement '*Past* is determined..." is pretty > well how Mead describes the duration we call present. > > The second part is not. Peter writes, "there exists opportunities to sway > the forces..." Mead emphasizes *emergence*, which means, there is a > fundamental unpredictability at work. Sch?tz (1932) distinguishes > *because*-motives > and *in-order-to-*motives, and describes how determination slips in through > a posteriori accounts (because), which does not exist when we orient toward > the future. Lucy Suchman takes this up in her two views on plans, which > orient for but do not determine situated action. > > Michael > > > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 10:29 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > That seems right to me, Peter, in my vast ignorance of the original texts > > being discussed. > > > > Your characterization seems to me of a kind with the intuition in the > > epigram to the lchcautobiogrphy: > > > > ?All experience is an arch wherethrough gleams > > that untravelled world whose margin fades > > forever and forever when I move. _Tennyson > > Might freewill be the name of the experience of an organism living in a > > loosely coupled, non-linear, dynamic system? Of course it is a > constrained > > world.... it is a living system.. but constraint and determinism are not > > synonyms and the conditional in "conditional reflexes" refers to > historical > > contingency in the life of the organism..... and hence "choice" ( i > think > > that i think). > > > > mike > > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: > > > > > Dear friends, > > > > > > I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful > to > > > this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and > > > pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In > > the > > > future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the > forces > > > that are in play, to bend them to our will. > > > > > > If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at > > the > > > future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use > of > > > conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward > > than > > > the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use. > > > > > > Hope this helps. > > > > > > Cheers, > > > Peter > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > > > > If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is > > > > whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. > > In > > > a > > > > determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice. > > > > > > > > > > > > At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the > 1790s, > > > > there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free > will > > > > (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, > which > > > is > > > > probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In > > my > > > > opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a > person > > > > becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another > > free > > > > being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising > > restraint > > > > and recognising the rights of others (the child development people > will > > > > relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the > > > > formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic > > > > freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal > > > > condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum > > > > mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations. > > > > > > > > > > > > If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the > laws > > of > > > > physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough > problem > > to > > > > solve. > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > > > a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > > > 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > > > SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > > > G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > > > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > > > 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > > > Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > > > mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > > > oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > > On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > >> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ??imply the > > > >> absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am > > > just a > > > >> student, ???only that with quite more left to read yet! > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Alfredo > > > >> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *From:* Andy Blunden > > > >> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 > > > >> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > >> > > > >> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere > > > outside > > > >> of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both > > > positions. > > > >> It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes > from > > > that > > > >> time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. > > > >> > > > >> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: > > > >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s > > > >> tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh > > > >> 2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP > > > >> Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA > > > >> _lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e= > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> Andy Blunden > > > >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > > >> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > > >> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > > >> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > > >> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > > >> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > > >> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > > >> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > > >> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > > >> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > >> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt > he > > > >>> agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound > > like > > > >>> that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to > parallelism > > > and, > > > >>> consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, > > > vol. 6, > > > >>> p. 122). > > > >>> > > > >>> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to > wholesale > > > >>> 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. > > > >>> > > > >>> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why > > > >>> determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. > > Understanding > > > this > > > >>> would greatly help me see your points. > > > >>> > > > >>> Alfredo > > > >>> > > > >>> ________________________________________ > > > >>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > edu > > > > > > > >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > >>> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 > > > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > >>> > > > >>> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that > > > >>> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess > > > >>> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy > > > >>> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' > > > >>> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on > > > >>> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's > > > >>> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was > > > >>> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being > > > >>> banned across Europe for more than a century. > > > >>> > > > >>> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a > > > >>> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, > > > >>> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, > > > >>> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and > > > >>> another being thought and the infinitely many others being > > > >>> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky > > > >>> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one > > > >>> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." > > > >>> > > > >>> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of > > > >>> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist > > > >>> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I > > > >>> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated > > > >>> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its > > > >>> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules > > > >>> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one > > > >>> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any > > > >>> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental > > > >>> Psychology is a charade. > > > >>> > > > >>> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he > > > >>> is a dead end. > > > >>> > > > >>> Andy > > > >>> > > > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>> Andy Blunden > > > >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > > >>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > > >>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > > >>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > > >>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > > >>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > > >>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > > >>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > > >>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > > >>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > >>> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>>> Hi Alexander, > > > >>>> > > > >>>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much > > > >>>> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the > > > >>>> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which > arose > > > in the > > > >>>> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that > > > 'intelligent > > > >>>> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of > > > some > > > >>>> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led > > by > > > W-M > > > >>>> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such > > > >>>> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter > > > attached, > > > >>>> link here: ). > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of > > writing > > > >>>> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading > your > > > >>>> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation > was > > > fair to > > > >>>> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as > this: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through > > > >>>> overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical > > > >>>> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of > > > mediation > > > >>>> by a cultural sign' > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many > instances > > > in > > > >>>> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing > sharply > > > >>>> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. > > > When I > > > >>>> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and > > > Speech, for > > > >>>> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as > an > > > >>>> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. > > > 40). In > > > >>>> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word > is > > > what > > > >>>> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. > > The > > > word > > > >>>> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human > > > >>>> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a > very > > > >>>> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, > arbitrary > > > (as if > > > >>>> unconstrained and magic) means. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of > > > >>>> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be > > > only an > > > >>>> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but > > only > > > one > > > >>>> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, > p. > > > 172). > > > >>>> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher > > psychological > > > >>>> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not > a > > > >>>> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the > > > problem > > > >>>> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to > > > >>>> social-historical necessity, to human needs? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by > > > >>>> imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if > > > Vygotsky > > > >>>> would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I > > > think > > > >>>> there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than > > > your > > > >>>> article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in > > > mainstream > > > >>>> uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know > in > > > >>>> advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it > > > seems to > > > >>>> me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, > nor > > > >>>> discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising > paths. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, > > > >>>> Alfredo > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > edu> > > > >>>> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava > > > >>>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 > > > >>>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > > > >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Hi, Larry! > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > > >>>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > > >>>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment > > concerning > > > >>>> the topicunder discussion. > > > >>>> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > > > >>>> antisemiotic. > > > >>>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > > > >>>> arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of > > freedom > > > >>>> (independence from mechanical causality). > > > >>>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > > >>>> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole > > realm > > > >>>> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So > > the > > > >>>> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > > >>>> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > > > history and > > > >>>> evolution together.? > > > >>>> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? > ???????, > > > >>>> ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? > > ????????????? > > > >>>> ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > > > ??????????????-????????????? ? > > > >>>> ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > > > ????? > > > >>>> ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > >>>> > > > >>>> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical > theory? > > > >>>> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > > > Pavlov?s > > > >>>> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these > > two > > > >>>> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein > who > > > was > > > >>>> Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Sasha Surmava > > > >>>> > > > >>>> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > > >>>> ?????(?): > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I see. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > > >>>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > > >>>> work, was a "founding exemplar." > > > >>>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > > >>>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>> Andy Blunden > > > >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > > >>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > > >>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > > >>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > > >>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > > >>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- > > > >>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ > > > >>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC > > > >>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a > > > >>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > >>>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Andy, > > > >>>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > >>>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > >>>>> will open another thread. > > > >>>>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > >>>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > >>>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> PAGE 270: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > >>>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > >>>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is > > > >>>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > >>>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > >>>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > >>>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > >>>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > >>>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > >>>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > >>>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > >>>>> creative intellectual work. " > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > >>>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > >>>>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > >>>>> > wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > >>>>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > >>>>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > >>>>> Larry. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Andy > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> ------------------------------ > ------------------------------ > > > >>>>> Andy Blunden > > > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > > >>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > > >>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > > >>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > > >>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > > >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= > > > >>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy > > > >>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA > > > >>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > > > > > >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril > > > >>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- > > > >>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW > > > >>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV > > > >>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- > > > >>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ > > > >>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv > > > >>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 > > > >>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea > > > >>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Andy, > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > > >>>>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > > >>>>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by > > > >>>>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > > >>>>>> meaning as you mention. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > > >>>>>> (examples)? > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > > >>>>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > > >>>>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > > >>>>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > > >>>>>> (framework) practices. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples > > > >>>>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in > > > >>>>>> social framework practices. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Is this reasonable? > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Or not > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden > > > >>>>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > > >>>>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > > >>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > > >>>>>> mention > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > > >>>>>> *action* are > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > > >>>>>> "singular" action. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > > >>>>>> form, but > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > > >>>>>> activity, > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, > > > >>>>>> practices) have > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> no systematic difference running across all > > > >>>>>> disciplines and > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > > >>>>>> practices. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > > >>>>>> (Tatigkeit) > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Aktivitat at all. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> ------------------------------ > > ------------------------------ > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir > > > >>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc > > > >>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW > > > >>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH > > > >>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= > > >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= > > > >>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy > > > >>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA > > > >>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeN > oWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. > > com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril > > > >>>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- > > > >>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW > > > >>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV > > > >>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- > > > >>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > >>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ > > > >>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv > > > >>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 > > > >>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea > > > >>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Alexander, Mike, > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Thanks for the article. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > > >>>>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > > >>>>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > > >>>>>> of practice in knowing). > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Two formulas: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > > >>>>>> do not co-incide > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Action IS individual > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Practice IS a social category. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > > >>>>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > > >>>>>> individual who are separate. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > > >>>>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a > > > >>>>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently > > > >>>>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > > >>>>>> FOR further thought and wording. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > Ivan > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > -- > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > festina lente > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > > >>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> >> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > > >>>>>> have been discussing > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> >> LSV's sources in > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> >> marx and spinoza. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> >> mike > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> >> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > > > Director, > > > Office of Institutional Research > > > > > > Fordham University > > > Thebaud Hall-202 > > > Bronx, NY 10458 > > > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > > > > > > From ivan@llaisdy.com Thu Jul 27 14:49:05 2017 From: ivan@llaisdy.com (Ivan Uemlianin) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 22:49:05 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?gb2312?b?p7Cn5KfTOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?gb2312?b?YQ==?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Dear David Sorry to quibble, but your email (4th para) doesn't seem to be using "mode" in the same way as Spinoza (in the Ethics). In the Ethics, Substance has infinite Attributes, two of which (the only two humans can be affected by) are Extension and Thought. Modes are finite particulars (eg tables and ideas). How Spinoza would categorise the laws of thermodynamics is a whole nother question. Best wishes Ivan @ilyenkov_et_al -- festina lente > On 27 Jul 2017, at 22:26, David Kellogg wrote: > > Actually, Andy, there are people who defend Spinoza's formulation of a > single substance with two modes. Halliday is one. I am another. > > Consider the way in which you read Hegel. You don't actually use the term > for an explanatory principle which he chose, namely "Geist" or "Spirit". > Sometimes you use Leontiev's term, "Activity", and sometimes you use your > own, much more Spinozan, term: "project". > > Spinoza actually TELLS us how to read his explanatory principle "Deus Sive > Natura", or "God, that is to say, Nature". So the is one substance, and we > can call it "Nature". Culture has to be understood as an emergent part of > that nature. > > The two modes are matter, of course, and a form of organization of that > matter, a kind of countercurrent to entropy, we can call "meaning". Meaning > matter that has been organized in some way to stand for something that is > not itself. Nature is one substance, with two modes: matter, that is > subject to the laws of thermodynamics (laws which do indeed distinguish > between past and future, just as Peter does), and meaning, which is matter > that has granted itself temporary surcease from them. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: I always thought that the great advantage of "project" over "activity" > was that it demystifies how this temporary surcease might work among > humans. To understand Spinoza's idea of "God"as a semiotic version of > "Nature" all we really have to do is to ask ourselves what "projects" might > look like among non-human, non-sentient, and non-living entities: colonies, > ecologies, and systems. > > dk From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Jul 27 16:59:36 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 09:59:36 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Right, Ivan. For Halliday, the difference is "instantiation"--instances of matter and instances of meaning. The point is that there aren't two different phenomena, one infinite and another finite. They are just two different ways of looking at the same thing, like climate and weather, or language and text, or culture and situation. A table is an "instance" of meaning en-mattered (to mint a meaning), and an idea is an "instance" of matter en-meaninged. I don't actually think that either matter or meaning is infinite in exactly the sense that Spinoza had in mind: for my purposes, it is enough to think of a culture as the sum total of all the historical situations, and its language as the sum total of all of its produced texts. When I have to think about the universe, I just think of it as the sum total of all the actually existing matter and all the existing meaning. For now. But to tell the truth, I think about the universe even less than it thinks about me: I am afraid I feel more akin to Spinoza the lens grinder than to Spinoza the philosopher. Mike--thanks for the stuff on pedology. I remember the text--I remember discussing it with you, and how personally affronted you felt by it, actually--but the Genevans (Bernard Schneuwly, Jean-Paul Bronckart, Irina Leopoldoff-Martin) are trying to establish pedology as a "once and future discipline", and this is a project I feel very much part of these days. So I am starting to feel as you do about it. Right now I am writing about questions--how they are formed, how they are used, and how we turn them back on themselves--e.g. what I just did. One of the real problems with Vygotsky's model of concept formation is what Ruqaiya Hasan called its overly experiential focus (the focus on representations). It seems to me that if we think about the adolescent forming a world view in interpersonal terms (that is, inevitably including affect and social power as well as representations of events and entities), we find that "question" is sometimes more useful than "concept". dk On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 7:49 AM, Ivan Uemlianin wrote: > Dear David > > Sorry to quibble, but your email (4th para) doesn't seem to be using > "mode" in the same way as Spinoza (in the Ethics). In the Ethics, Substance > has infinite Attributes, two of which (the only two humans can be affected > by) are Extension and Thought. Modes are finite particulars (eg tables and > ideas). > > How Spinoza would categorise the laws of thermodynamics is a whole nother > question. > > Best wishes > > Ivan > @ilyenkov_et_al > > > -- > festina lente > > > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 22:26, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Actually, Andy, there are people who defend Spinoza's formulation of a > > single substance with two modes. Halliday is one. I am another. > > > > Consider the way in which you read Hegel. You don't actually use the term > > for an explanatory principle which he chose, namely "Geist" or "Spirit". > > Sometimes you use Leontiev's term, "Activity", and sometimes you use your > > own, much more Spinozan, term: "project". > > > > Spinoza actually TELLS us how to read his explanatory principle "Deus > Sive > > Natura", or "God, that is to say, Nature". So the is one substance, and > we > > can call it "Nature". Culture has to be understood as an emergent part of > > that nature. > > > > The two modes are matter, of course, and a form of organization of that > > matter, a kind of countercurrent to entropy, we can call "meaning". > Meaning > > matter that has been organized in some way to stand for something that is > > not itself. Nature is one substance, with two modes: matter, that is > > subject to the laws of thermodynamics (laws which do indeed distinguish > > between past and future, just as Peter does), and meaning, which is > matter > > that has granted itself temporary surcease from them. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > PS: I always thought that the great advantage of "project" over > "activity" > > was that it demystifies how this temporary surcease might work among > > humans. To understand Spinoza's idea of "God"as a semiotic version of > > "Nature" all we really have to do is to ask ourselves what "projects" > might > > look like among non-human, non-sentient, and non-living entities: > colonies, > > ecologies, and systems. > > > > dk > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Jul 27 17:29:21 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 17:29:21 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: David- Your wrote, in part. Mike--thanks for the stuff on pedology. I remember the text--I remember discussing it with you, and how personally affronted you felt by it, actually--but the Genevans (Bernard Schneuwly, Jean-Paul Bronckart, Irina Leopoldoff-Martin) are trying to establish pedology as a "once and future discipline", and this is a project I feel very much part of these days. So I am starting to feel as you do about it. Very interesting to be pointed back to the prior discussion. I had forgotten it. Re-reading it, it seems I was not distressed by the intro essay, which I did not focus on, but by Leontiev's writing, which Clay Spinuzzi asked about. I locked in on that quotation because it identified where LSV stood with the powers that were and a view of pedology that is where Leontiev stood at the time. Notice that Luria is not included in the book. His book on the role of speech in the development of normal and abnormal behavior, which is on the lchc web site, grew out of talks given in London in the late 1950's where he was using second signal language as a mode of survival ( i believe). The internal tensions within the group associated with LSV must have been horrendous. Brrrrr. Good luck on the project to re-cover pedology. It needs recovering! mike mike On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 4:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Right, Ivan. For Halliday, the difference is "instantiation"--instances of > matter and instances of meaning. The point is that there aren't two > different phenomena, one infinite and another finite. They are just two > different ways of looking at the same thing, like climate and weather, or > language and text, or culture and situation. A table is an "instance" of > meaning en-mattered (to mint a meaning), and an idea is an "instance" of > matter en-meaninged. > > I don't actually think that either matter or meaning is infinite in exactly > the sense that Spinoza had in mind: for my purposes, it is enough to think > of a culture as the sum total of all the historical situations, and its > language as the sum total of all of its produced texts. When I have to > think about the universe, I just think of it as the sum total of all the > actually existing matter and all the existing meaning. For now. But to tell > the truth, I think about the universe even less than it thinks about me: I > am afraid I feel more akin to Spinoza the lens grinder than to Spinoza the > philosopher. > > Mike--thanks for the stuff on pedology. I remember the text--I remember > discussing it with you, and how personally affronted you felt by it, > actually--but the Genevans (Bernard Schneuwly, Jean-Paul Bronckart, Irina > Leopoldoff-Martin) are trying to establish pedology as a "once and future > discipline", and this is a project I feel very much part of these days. So > I am starting to feel as you do about it. > > Right now I am writing about questions--how they are formed, how they are > used, and how we turn them back on themselves--e.g. what I just did. One of > the real problems with Vygotsky's model of concept formation is what > Ruqaiya Hasan called its overly experiential focus (the focus on > representations). It seems to me that if we think about the adolescent > forming a world view in interpersonal terms (that is, inevitably including > affect and social power as well as representations of events and entities), > we find that "question" is sometimes more useful than "concept". > > dk > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 7:49 AM, Ivan Uemlianin wrote: > > > Dear David > > > > Sorry to quibble, but your email (4th para) doesn't seem to be using > > "mode" in the same way as Spinoza (in the Ethics). In the Ethics, > Substance > > has infinite Attributes, two of which (the only two humans can be > affected > > by) are Extension and Thought. Modes are finite particulars (eg tables > and > > ideas). > > > > How Spinoza would categorise the laws of thermodynamics is a whole nother > > question. > > > > Best wishes > > > > Ivan > > @ilyenkov_et_al > > > > > > -- > > festina lente > > > > > > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 22:26, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > Actually, Andy, there are people who defend Spinoza's formulation of a > > > single substance with two modes. Halliday is one. I am another. > > > > > > Consider the way in which you read Hegel. You don't actually use the > term > > > for an explanatory principle which he chose, namely "Geist" or > "Spirit". > > > Sometimes you use Leontiev's term, "Activity", and sometimes you use > your > > > own, much more Spinozan, term: "project". > > > > > > Spinoza actually TELLS us how to read his explanatory principle "Deus > > Sive > > > Natura", or "God, that is to say, Nature". So the is one substance, and > > we > > > can call it "Nature". Culture has to be understood as an emergent part > of > > > that nature. > > > > > > The two modes are matter, of course, and a form of organization of that > > > matter, a kind of countercurrent to entropy, we can call "meaning". > > Meaning > > > matter that has been organized in some way to stand for something that > is > > > not itself. Nature is one substance, with two modes: matter, that is > > > subject to the laws of thermodynamics (laws which do indeed distinguish > > > between past and future, just as Peter does), and meaning, which is > > matter > > > that has granted itself temporary surcease from them. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > PS: I always thought that the great advantage of "project" over > > "activity" > > > was that it demystifies how this temporary surcease might work among > > > humans. To understand Spinoza's idea of "God"as a semiotic version of > > > "Nature" all we really have to do is to ask ourselves what "projects" > > might > > > look like among non-human, non-sentient, and non-living entities: > > colonies, > > > ecologies, and systems. > > > > > > dk > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Jul 27 20:41:03 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 13:41:03 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Well it surprises me, David, that you support the idea of thought as an attribute of God. We learn something new every day. I am well aware that Spinoza still has many admirers but you are the first one I have met who goes so far as to see thought as an attribute of God, let alone combine this with Vygotsky's cultural psychology! I accept that my interpretation of Hegel's Geist as activity is not universally shared, but most Hegelians who try to move out of the closed circle of the hermeneutics of old philosophical texts make just this interpretation; but it is generally implicit rather than declared up front, and not thought through. But you misunderstand my interpretation: actions and projects are units of activity. "Projects" is not another name for "activity" and certainly not another name for Geist (to make sense of anything I write it is important not to conflate mass and count nouns). And although A N Leontyev deserves some credit for the symmetries between his Activity Theory and Hegel (so also does Engestrom), but I think it more likely that the Leontyev-Hegel relation was mediated by Vygotsky and Marx, and Leontyev introduced both novel improvements and unfortunate misunderstandings in his appropriation. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 28/07/2017 7:26 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Actually, Andy, there are people who defend Spinoza's formulation of a > single substance with two modes. Halliday is one. I am another. > > Consider the way in which you read Hegel. You don't actually use the term > for an explanatory principle which he chose, namely "Geist" or "Spirit". > Sometimes you use Leontiev's term, "Activity", and sometimes you use your > own, much more Spinozan, term: "project". > > Spinoza actually TELLS us how to read his explanatory principle "Deus Sive > Natura", or "God, that is to say, Nature". So the is one substance, and we > can call it "Nature". Culture has to be understood as an emergent part of > that nature. > > The two modes are matter, of course, and a form of organization of that > matter, a kind of countercurrent to entropy, we can call "meaning". Meaning > matter that has been organized in some way to stand for something that is > not itself. Nature is one substance, with two modes: matter, that is > subject to the laws of thermodynamics (laws which do indeed distinguish > between past and future, just as Peter does), and meaning, which is matter > that has granted itself temporary surcease from them. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: I always thought that the great advantage of "project" over "activity" > was that it demystifies how this temporary surcease might work among > humans. To understand Spinoza's idea of "God"as a semiotic version of > "Nature" all we really have to do is to ask ourselves what "projects" might > look like among non-human, non-sentient, and non-living entities: colonies, > ecologies, and systems. > > dk > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:54 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> Following Wolff Michael?s lead concerning Mead and Schultz and how >> *because* and determinism slips in through a posteriori accounts. >> >> I am including Vincent Colapietro?s voice as he discusses C. S. Peirce as >> an exemplary person who saw himself as fulfilling a *role* in an emerging >> historical *drama*. >> >> In paragraph # 11 Vincent describes the way Peirce himself *imaginally* >> pursued his life project. Vincent is clarifying the meaning of *historical >> consciousness* as meaning *historical imagination*. >> >> 11 Regarding this, he [Peirce] was anything but a spectator. He was >> self-consciously an agent who took himself to be responsible, in some >> measure, for the development of a practice. Accordingly, a dramatic sense >> of his intellectual obligations animated and guided his orientation toward >> the past and also his involvement in the disputes of his own day, not least >> of all, the dispute between the progeny of the scholastic realists and the >> offspring of the Renaissance humanists. In brief, his understanding of the >> past fostered a consciousness of his role in a drama. More than anything >> else, this is what I mean by historical consciousness as distinct from >> historical knowledge. This is a distinction, not a dichotomy or dualism. >> Peirce was convinced that the reality of the past was, to some extent, >> discoverable. He was unquestionably a realist, not a skeptic or what is >> commonly called a constructivist. But he was also a pragmatist. Whatever >> reality (including the reality of the past) means must be spelled out in >> terms of habits of conduct bearing upon the future. Part of the difficulty >> is giving equal weight to both the realist and pragmatist facets of his >> thought, another part showing how they are anything but incompatible. >> >> Vincent?s article describes Peirce?s work as an example that was >> exemplary on the way to creating a paradigm shift [emerging framework] >> that guides further inquiry within historical imagination. >> >> Vincent also adds this insight: >> >> ?While Descartes drew a sharp distinction between intellect and >> imagination, Peirce returned to the scholastic position [human intelligence >> is rooted in and depends on our imaginative capacities]. The Poet Alfred >> Tennyson wrote ?maybe wildest dreams / Are but the needful preludes of the >> truth? to which Peirce responds: >> ? I doubt the word *maybe*? Wildest dreams [or fancies] *are* the first >> steps toward scientific investigation.? [Peirce 1966: 233] >> >> >> >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> From: Wolff-Michael Roth >> Sent: July 27, 2017 10:48 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >> >> The first part of Peter's statement '*Past* is determined..." is pretty >> well how Mead describes the duration we call present. >> >> The second part is not. Peter writes, "there exists opportunities to sway >> the forces..." Mead emphasizes *emergence*, which means, there is a >> fundamental unpredictability at work. Sch?tz (1932) distinguishes >> *because*-motives >> and *in-order-to-*motives, and describes how determination slips in through >> a posteriori accounts (because), which does not exist when we orient toward >> the future. Lucy Suchman takes this up in her two views on plans, which >> orient for but do not determine situated action. >> >> Michael >> >> >> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> -------------------- >> Applied Cognitive Science >> MacLaurin Building A567 >> University of Victoria >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth >> >> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics >> > directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* >> >> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 10:29 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> That seems right to me, Peter, in my vast ignorance of the original texts >>> being discussed. >>> >>> Your characterization seems to me of a kind with the intuition in the >>> epigram to the lchcautobiogrphy: >>> >>> ?All experience is an arch wherethrough gleams >>> that untravelled world whose margin fades >>> forever and forever when I move. _Tennyson >>> Might freewill be the name of the experience of an organism living in a >>> loosely coupled, non-linear, dynamic system? Of course it is a >> constrained >>> world.... it is a living system.. but constraint and determinism are not >>> synonyms and the conditional in "conditional reflexes" refers to >> historical >>> contingency in the life of the organism..... and hence "choice" ( i >> think >>> that i think). >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>> >>>> Dear friends, >>>> >>>> I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful >> to >>>> this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and >>>> pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In >>> the >>>> future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the >> forces >>>> that are in play, to bend them to our will. >>>> >>>> If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at >>> the >>>> future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use >> of >>>> conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward >>> than >>>> the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use. >>>> >>>> Hope this helps. >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> Peter >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>>>> If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is >>>>> whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. >>> In >>>> a >>>>> determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the >> 1790s, >>>>> there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free >> will >>>>> (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, >> which >>>> is >>>>> probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In >>> my >>>>> opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a >> person >>>>> becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another >>> free >>>>> being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising >>> restraint >>>>> and recognising the rights of others (the child development people >> will >>>>> relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the >>>>> formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic >>>>> freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal >>>>> condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum >>>>> mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the >> laws >>> of >>>>> physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough >> problem >>> to >>>>> solve. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>> On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ??imply the >>>>>> absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am >>>> just a >>>>>> student, ???only that with quite more left to read yet! >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *From:* Andy Blunden >>>>>> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 >>>>>> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>> >>>>>> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere >>>> outside >>>>>> of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both >>>> positions. >>>>>> It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes >> from >>>> that >>>>>> time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. >>>>>> >>>>>> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s >>>>>> tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh >>>>>> 2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP >>>>>> Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA >>>>>> _lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e= >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt >> he >>>>>>> agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound >>> like >>>>>>> that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to >> parallelism >>>> and, >>>>>>> consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, >>>> vol. 6, >>>>>>> p. 122). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to >> wholesale >>>>>>> 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why >>>>>>> determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. >>> Understanding >>>> this >>>>>>> would greatly help me see your points. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> edu >>>>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>>>>> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that >>>>>>> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess >>>>>>> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy >>>>>>> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' >>>>>>> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on >>>>>>> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's >>>>>>> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was >>>>>>> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being >>>>>>> banned across Europe for more than a century. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a >>>>>>> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, >>>>>>> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, >>>>>>> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and >>>>>>> another being thought and the infinitely many others being >>>>>>> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky >>>>>>> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one >>>>>>> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of >>>>>>> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist >>>>>>> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I >>>>>>> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated >>>>>>> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its >>>>>>> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules >>>>>>> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one >>>>>>> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any >>>>>>> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental >>>>>>> Psychology is a charade. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he >>>>>>> is a dead end. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>>>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>>>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>>>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>>>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Alexander, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much >>>>>>>> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the >>>>>>>> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which >> arose >>>> in the >>>>>>>> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that >>>> 'intelligent >>>>>>>> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of >>>> some >>>>>>>> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led >>> by >>>> W-M >>>>>>>> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such >>>>>>>> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter >>>> attached, >>>>>>>> link here: ). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of >>> writing >>>>>>>> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading >> your >>>>>>>> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation >> was >>>> fair to >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as >> this: >>>>>>>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through >>>>>>>> overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical >>>>>>>> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of >>>> mediation >>>>>>>> by a cultural sign' >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many >> instances >>>> in >>>>>>>> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing >> sharply >>>>>>>> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. >>>> When I >>>>>>>> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and >>>> Speech, for >>>>>>>> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as >> an >>>>>>>> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. >>>> 40). In >>>>>>>> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word >> is >>>> what >>>>>>>> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. >>> The >>>> word >>>>>>>> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human >>>>>>>> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a >> very >>>>>>>> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, >> arbitrary >>>> (as if >>>>>>>> unconstrained and magic) means. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of >>>>>>>> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be >>>> only an >>>>>>>> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but >>> only >>>> one >>>>>>>> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, >> p. >>>> 172). >>>>>>>> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher >>> psychological >>>>>>>> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not >> a >>>>>>>> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the >>>> problem >>>>>>>> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to >>>>>>>> social-historical necessity, to human needs? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by >>>>>>>> imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if >>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>> would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I >>>> think >>>>>>>> there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than >>>> your >>>>>>>> article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in >>>> mainstream >>>>>>>> uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know >> in >>>>>>>> advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it >>>> seems to >>>>>>>> me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, >> nor >>>>>>>> discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising >> paths. >>>>>>>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, >>>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>> edu> >>>>>>>> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava >>>>>>>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 >>>>>>>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >>>>>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi, Larry! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thank you for your attentionto the article. >>>>>>>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. >>>>>>>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment >>> concerning >>>>>>>> the topicunder discussion. >>>>>>>> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby >>>>>>>> antisemiotic. >>>>>>>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use >>>>>>>> arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of >>> freedom >>>>>>>> (independence from mechanical causality). >>>>>>>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that >>>>>>>> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole >>> realm >>>>>>>> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So >>> the >>>>>>>> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a >>>>>>>> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds >>>> history and >>>>>>>> evolution together.? >>>>>>>> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? >> ???????, >>>>>>>> ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? >>> ????????????? >>>>>>>> ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? >>>> ??????????????-????????????? ? >>>>>>>> ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? >>>> ????? >>>>>>>> ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical >> theory? >>>>>>>> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse >>>> Pavlov?s >>>>>>>> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these >>> two >>>>>>>> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein >> who >>>> was >>>>>>>> Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sasha Surmava >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> ?????(?): >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I see. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning >>>>>>>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's >>>>>>>> work, was a "founding exemplar." >>>>>>>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances >>>>>>>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>>>>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>>>>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>>>>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>>>>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking >>>>>>>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >>>>>>>>> will open another thread. >>>>>>>>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >>>>>>>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >>>>>>>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> PAGE 270: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >>>>>>>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >>>>>>>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >>>>>>>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >>>>>>>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >>>>>>>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >>>>>>>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >>>>>>>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >>>>>>>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >>>>>>>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >>>>>>>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >>>>>>>>> creative intellectual work. " >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >>>>>>>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >>>>>>>>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >>>>>>>>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >>>>>>>>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >>>>>>>>> Larry. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. >> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= >>>>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= >>>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy >>>>>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA >>>>>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= >>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. >> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril >>>>>>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- >>>>>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW >>>>>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV >>>>>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- >>>>>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ >>>>>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv >>>>>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 >>>>>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea >>>>>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>>>>>>>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>>>>>>>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by >>>>>>>>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>>>>>>>>> meaning as you mention. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>>>>>>>>> (examples)? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>>>>>>>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>>>>>>>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>>>>>>>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>>>>>>>>> (framework) practices. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>>>>>>>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>>>>>>>>> social framework practices. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is this reasonable? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Or not >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>>>>>>>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>>>>>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>>>>>>>>> mention >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>>>>>>>>> *action* are >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>>>>>>>>> "singular" action. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>>>>>>>>> form, but >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>>>>>>>>> activity, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, >>>>>>>>>> practices) have >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> no systematic difference running across all >>>>>>>>>> disciplines and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>>>>>>>>> practices. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>>>>>>>>> (Tatigkeit) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Aktivitat at all. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= >>>>>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= >>>>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy >>>>>>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA >>>>>>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeN >> oWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= >>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril >>>>>>>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- >>>>>>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW >>>>>>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV >>>>>>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- >>>>>>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ >>>>>>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv >>>>>>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 >>>>>>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea >>>>>>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Alexander, Mike, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Thanks for the article. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>>>>>>>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>>>>>>>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>>>>>>>>> of practice in knowing). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Two formulas: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>>>>>>>>> do not co-incide >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Action IS individual >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Practice IS a social category. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>>>>>>>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>>>>>>>>> individual who are separate. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>>>>>>>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a >>>>>>>>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently >>>>>>>>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>>>>>>>>> FOR further thought and wording. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > Ivan >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > -- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > festina lente >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>>>>>>>>> have been discussing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> LSV's sources in >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> marx and spinoza. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>> Director, >>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>> >>>> Fordham University >>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>> >> > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jul 28 14:09:53 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2017 06:09:53 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiBSZTogSWx5ZW5rb3YsIE1hcngsICYgU3Bpbm96?= =?utf-8?q?a?= In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Well, maybe you don't read around much these days, Andy. If you look at the work of Yuki Moro and his collaborators, you'll see that my reading of "Teaching on the Emotions" is not that idiosyncratic at all. You know that Hegel said in order to be a philosopher, you must first be a Spinozan. Hegel never said that "Geist" was "Activity". But Spinoza did say that "God" was mere "Nature". So thought is an attribute of nature: Human thinking is simply that part of nature that has become conscious of itself. And the fact that part of nature can become conscious of itself suggests, to me and to Vygotsky (in his epigraph to "Psychology of Art"), that thought and substance are really two attributes of the same phenomenon, Nature. (You may call it Natura Sive Deus if you like to laugh at it: we Spinozans are pretty thick skinned.) Whether it is infinite or finite is an open question: if humans become extinct in the anthoropocene, we can call it finite, but as long as people and hope are around, thought is infinite in potential. I think the reason that I confuse "project" with "Activity" is that I never really accepted Leontiev's distinction between operations, actions, and "activities", or between "activities" and "Activity". Sometimes he treats it as instantiation (i.e. like climate and weather) and sometimes like rank (i.e. like words and sentences). Which is it? David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 12:41 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Well it surprises me, David, that you support the idea of thought as an > attribute of God. We learn something new every day. I am well aware that > Spinoza still has many admirers but you are the first one I have met who > goes so far as to see thought as an attribute of God, let alone combine > this with Vygotsky's cultural psychology! > > I accept that my interpretation of Hegel's Geist as activity is not > universally shared, but most Hegelians who try to move out of the closed > circle of the hermeneutics of old philosophical texts make just this > interpretation; but it is generally implicit rather than declared up front, > and not thought through. > > But you misunderstand my interpretation: actions and projects are units of > activity. "Projects" is not another name for "activity" and certainly not > another name for Geist (to make sense of anything I write it is important > not to conflate mass and count nouns). And although A N Leontyev deserves > some credit for the symmetries between his Activity Theory and Hegel (so > also does Engestrom), but I think it more likely that the Leontyev-Hegel > relation was mediated by Vygotsky and Marx, and Leontyev introduced both > novel improvements and unfortunate misunderstandings in his appropriation. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 28/07/2017 7:26 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Actually, Andy, there are people who defend Spinoza's formulation of a >> single substance with two modes. Halliday is one. I am another. >> >> Consider the way in which you read Hegel. You don't actually use the term >> for an explanatory principle which he chose, namely "Geist" or "Spirit". >> Sometimes you use Leontiev's term, "Activity", and sometimes you use your >> own, much more Spinozan, term: "project". >> >> Spinoza actually TELLS us how to read his explanatory principle "Deus Sive >> Natura", or "God, that is to say, Nature". So the is one substance, and we >> can call it "Nature". Culture has to be understood as an emergent part of >> that nature. >> >> The two modes are matter, of course, and a form of organization of that >> matter, a kind of countercurrent to entropy, we can call "meaning". >> Meaning >> matter that has been organized in some way to stand for something that is >> not itself. Nature is one substance, with two modes: matter, that is >> subject to the laws of thermodynamics (laws which do indeed distinguish >> between past and future, just as Peter does), and meaning, which is matter >> that has granted itself temporary surcease from them. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> PS: I always thought that the great advantage of "project" over "activity" >> was that it demystifies how this temporary surcease might work among >> humans. To understand Spinoza's idea of "God"as a semiotic version of >> "Nature" all we really have to do is to ask ourselves what "projects" >> might >> look like among non-human, non-sentient, and non-living entities: >> colonies, >> ecologies, and systems. >> >> dk >> >> On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:54 AM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >> >> Following Wolff Michael?s lead concerning Mead and Schultz and how >>> *because* and determinism slips in through a posteriori accounts. >>> >>> I am including Vincent Colapietro?s voice as he discusses C. S. Peirce >>> as >>> an exemplary person who saw himself as fulfilling a *role* in an emerging >>> historical *drama*. >>> >>> In paragraph # 11 Vincent describes the way Peirce himself *imaginally* >>> pursued his life project. Vincent is clarifying the meaning of >>> *historical >>> consciousness* as meaning *historical imagination*. >>> >>> 11 Regarding this, he [Peirce] was anything but a spectator. He was >>> self-consciously an agent who took himself to be responsible, in some >>> measure, for the development of a practice. Accordingly, a dramatic sense >>> of his intellectual obligations animated and guided his orientation >>> toward >>> the past and also his involvement in the disputes of his own day, not >>> least >>> of all, the dispute between the progeny of the scholastic realists and >>> the >>> offspring of the Renaissance humanists. In brief, his understanding of >>> the >>> past fostered a consciousness of his role in a drama. More than anything >>> else, this is what I mean by historical consciousness as distinct from >>> historical knowledge. This is a distinction, not a dichotomy or dualism. >>> Peirce was convinced that the reality of the past was, to some extent, >>> discoverable. He was unquestionably a realist, not a skeptic or what is >>> commonly called a constructivist. But he was also a pragmatist. Whatever >>> reality (including the reality of the past) means must be spelled out in >>> terms of habits of conduct bearing upon the future. Part of the >>> difficulty >>> is giving equal weight to both the realist and pragmatist facets of his >>> thought, another part showing how they are anything but incompatible. >>> >>> Vincent?s article describes Peirce?s work as an example that was >>> exemplary on the way to creating a paradigm shift [emerging framework] >>> that guides further inquiry within historical imagination. >>> >>> Vincent also adds this insight: >>> >>> ?While Descartes drew a sharp distinction between intellect and >>> imagination, Peirce returned to the scholastic position [human >>> intelligence >>> is rooted in and depends on our imaginative capacities]. The Poet Alfred >>> Tennyson wrote ?maybe wildest dreams / Are but the needful preludes of >>> the >>> truth? to which Peirce responds: >>> ? I doubt the word *maybe*? Wildest dreams [or fancies] *are* the first >>> steps toward scientific investigation.? [Peirce 1966: 233] >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> From: Wolff-Michael Roth >>> Sent: July 27, 2017 10:48 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>> >>> The first part of Peter's statement '*Past* is determined..." is pretty >>> well how Mead describes the duration we call present. >>> >>> The second part is not. Peter writes, "there exists opportunities to sway >>> the forces..." Mead emphasizes *emergence*, which means, there is a >>> fundamental unpredictability at work. Sch?tz (1932) distinguishes >>> *because*-motives >>> and *in-order-to-*motives, and describes how determination slips in >>> through >>> a posteriori accounts (because), which does not exist when we orient >>> toward >>> the future. Lucy Suchman takes this up in her two views on plans, which >>> orient for but do not determine situated action. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> >>> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> -------------------- >>> Applied Cognitive Science >>> MacLaurin Building A567 >>> University of Victoria >>> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 >>> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth >>> >>> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics >>> >> directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- >>> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 10:29 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> That seems right to me, Peter, in my vast ignorance of the original texts >>>> being discussed. >>>> >>>> Your characterization seems to me of a kind with the intuition in the >>>> epigram to the lchcautobiogrphy: >>>> >>>> ?All experience is an arch wherethrough gleams >>>> that untravelled world whose margin fades >>>> forever and forever when I move. _Tennyson >>>> Might freewill be the name of the experience of an organism living in a >>>> loosely coupled, non-linear, dynamic system? Of course it is a >>>> >>> constrained >>> >>>> world.... it is a living system.. but constraint and determinism are not >>>> synonyms and the conditional in "conditional reflexes" refers to >>>> >>> historical >>> >>>> contingency in the life of the organism..... and hence "choice" ( i >>>> >>> think >>> >>>> that i think). >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] < >>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear friends, >>>>> >>>>> I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful >>>>> >>>> to >>> >>>> this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and >>>>> pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the >>>>> >>>> forces >>> >>>> that are in play, to bend them to our will. >>>>> >>>>> If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use >>>>> >>>> of >>> >>>> conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward >>>>> >>>> than >>>> >>>>> the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use. >>>>> >>>>> Hope this helps. >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> Peter >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is >>>>>> whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that. >>>>>> >>>>> In >>>> >>>>> a >>>>> >>>>>> determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the >>>>>> >>>>> 1790s, >>> >>>> there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free >>>>>> >>>>> will >>> >>>> (which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists, >>>>>> >>>>> which >>> >>>> is >>>>> >>>>>> probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In >>>>>> >>>>> my >>>> >>>>> opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a >>>>>> >>>>> person >>> >>>> becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another >>>>>> >>>>> free >>>> >>>>> being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising >>>>>> >>>>> restraint >>>> >>>>> and recognising the rights of others (the child development people >>>>>> >>>>> will >>> >>>> relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the >>>>>> formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic >>>>>> freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal >>>>>> condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum >>>>>> mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the >>>>>> >>>>> laws >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>> physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough >>>>>> >>>>> problem >>> >>>> to >>>> >>>>> solve. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>> On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ??imply the >>>>>>> absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am >>>>>>> >>>>>> just a >>>>> >>>>>> student, ???only that with quite more left to read yet! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *From:* Andy Blunden >>>>>>> *Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16 >>>>>>> *To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere >>>>>>> >>>>>> outside >>>>> >>>>>> of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both >>>>>>> >>>>>> positions. >>>>> >>>>>> It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes >>>>>>> >>>>>> from >>> >>>> that >>>>> >>>>>> time, so I can't source my own recollections on this. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly: >>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s >>>>>>> tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh >>>>>>> 2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP >>>>>>> Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA >>>>>>> _lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e= >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>>>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>>>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>>>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>>>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>> On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> he >>> >>>> agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> like >>>> >>>>> that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> parallelism >>> >>>> and, >>>>> >>>>>> consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> vol. 6, >>>>> >>>>>> p. 122). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wholesale >>> >>>> 'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why >>>>>>>> determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Understanding >>>> >>>>> this >>>>> >>>>>> would greatly help me see your points. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> >>>> edu >>>> >>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39 >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that >>>>>>>> Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess >>>>>>>> is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy >>>>>>>> as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes' >>>>>>>> dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on >>>>>>>> Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was >>>>>>>> persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being >>>>>>>> banned across Europe for more than a century. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a >>>>>>>> moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance, >>>>>>>> a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it, >>>>>>>> with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and >>>>>>>> another being thought and the infinitely many others being >>>>>>>> God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky >>>>>>>> followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one >>>>>>>> substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of >>>>>>>> insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist >>>>>>>> materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I >>>>>>>> have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated >>>>>>>> this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its >>>>>>>> mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules >>>>>>>> out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one >>>>>>>> substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any >>>>>>>> attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental >>>>>>>> Psychology is a charade. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he >>>>>>>> is a dead end. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>>>>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>>>>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>>>>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>>>>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>>> On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Alexander, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much >>>>>>>>> appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the >>>>>>>>> psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> arose >>> >>>> in the >>>>> >>>>>> course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 'intelligent >>>>> >>>>>> action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> some >>>>> >>>>>> other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> by >>>> >>>>> W-M >>>>> >>>>>> Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such >>>>>>>>> propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> attached, >>>>> >>>>>> link here: ). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> writing >>>> >>>>> about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> your >>> >>>> article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> was >>> >>>> fair to >>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> this: >>> >>>> 'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through >>>>>>>>> overcoming natural determination (the S?R reaction, the mechanical >>>>>>>>> triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mediation >>>>> >>>>>> by a cultural sign' >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> instances >>> >>>> in >>>>> >>>>>> the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> sharply >>> >>>> contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> When I >>>>> >>>>>> read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Speech, for >>>>> >>>>>> example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> an >>> >>>> arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 40). In >>>>> >>>>>> chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> is >>> >>>> what >>>>> >>>>>> ... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The >>>> >>>>> word >>>>> >>>>>> is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human >>>>>>>>> consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> very >>> >>>> different view of words as signs than simply conventional, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> arbitrary >>> >>>> (as if >>>>> >>>>>> unconstrained and magic) means. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of >>>>>>>>> nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> only an >>>>> >>>>>> element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> only >>>> >>>>> one >>>>> >>>>>> of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> p. >>> >>>> 172). >>>>> >>>>>> Coming from someone who would also write that any higher >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> psychological >>>> >>>>> function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a >>> >>>> societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> problem >>>>> >>>>>> of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to >>>>>>>>> social-historical necessity, to human needs? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by >>>>>>>>> imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>> >>>>>> would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> think >>>>> >>>>>> there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> your >>>>> >>>>>> article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mainstream >>>>> >>>>>> uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in >>> >>>> advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> seems to >>>>> >>>>>> me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> nor >>> >>>> discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> paths. >>> >>>> In the hope to sustain productive dialogue, >>>>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> >>>> edu> >>>>> >>>>>> on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava >>>>>>>>> Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27 >>>>>>>>> To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Activity >>> >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi, Larry! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you for your attentionto the article. >>>>>>>>> Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. >>>>>>>>> However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> concerning >>>> >>>>> the topicunder discussion. >>>>>>>>> Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby >>>>>>>>> antisemiotic. >>>>>>>>> Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use >>>>>>>>> arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> freedom >>>> >>>>> (independence from mechanical causality). >>>>>>>>> Thus Vygotsky insisted that >>>>>>>>> ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> realm >>>> >>>>> ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>> >>>>> method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a >>>>>>>>> natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> history and >>>>> >>>>>> evolution together.? >>>>>>>>> (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ???????, >>> >>>> ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ????????????? >>>> >>>>> ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ??????????????-????????????? ? >>>>> >>>>>> ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ????? >>>>> >>>>>> ? ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> theory? >>> >>>> withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Pavlov?s >>>>> >>>>>> mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> two >>>> >>>>> theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> who >>> >>>> was >>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sasha Surmava >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> ?????(?): >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I see. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is a slightly different context. The original meaning >>>>>>>>> of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's >>>>>>>>> work, was a "founding exemplar." >>>>>>>>> "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances >>>>>>>>> of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>>>>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins- >>>>>>>>> 2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ >>>>>>>>> Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC >>>>>>>>> mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a >>>>>>>>> oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>>>> On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>>> I will reference where I got the notion of linking >>>>>>>>>> [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting >>>>>>>>>> will open another thread. >>>>>>>>>> From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and >>>>>>>>>> Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for >>>>>>>>>> Intellectual Historians" -2009- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> PAGE 270: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual >>>>>>>>>> historical method insisting that practiontioners remain >>>>>>>>>> agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is >>>>>>>>>> the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' >>>>>>>>>> for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original >>>>>>>>>> Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED >>>>>>>>>> contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the >>>>>>>>>> community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such >>>>>>>>>> *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a >>>>>>>>>> carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch >>>>>>>>>> explored in a variety of ways during his half century of >>>>>>>>>> creative intellectual work. " >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the >>>>>>>>>> relationality of [example : framework] through the concept >>>>>>>>>> *paradigm* seemed generative?? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. >>>>>>>>>> Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" >>>>>>>>>> only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, >>>>>>>>>> Larry. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>> >>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>> >>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= >>>>>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= >>>>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy >>>>>>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA >>>>>>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= >>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril >>> >>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- >>>>>>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW >>>>>>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV >>>>>>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- >>>>>>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ >>>>>>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv >>>>>>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 >>>>>>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea >>>>>>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Following your lead it may be preferable to say >>>>>>>>>>> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of >>>>>>>>>>> variable social actions. This doubling (by >>>>>>>>>>> including both terms) may crystallize the intended >>>>>>>>>>> meaning as you mention. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy is this vein can we also include the term >>>>>>>>>>> (examples)? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then the moving TRANS forming from single >>>>>>>>>>> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would >>>>>>>>>>> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary >>>>>>>>>>> actions and further movement (historicity) toward >>>>>>>>>>> (framework) practices. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (framework) practices being another doubling. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So moving (transforming) from single social examples >>>>>>>>>>> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in >>>>>>>>>>> social framework practices. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Is this reasonable? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Or not >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *From: *Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM >>>>>>>>>>> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava >>>>>>>>>>> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you >>>>>>>>>>> mention >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to say that *actions* - the individual units of >>>>>>>>>>> *action* are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "individual" action. Or better, so is every >>>>>>>>>>> "singular" action. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun >>>>>>>>>>> form, but >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> on the whole the set of words (action, actions, >>>>>>>>>>> activity, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> activities) and the set of words (practice, >>>>>>>>>>> practices) have >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> no systematic difference running across all >>>>>>>>>>> disciplines and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are >>>>>>>>>>> practices. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> German words for action (Handlung) and activity >>>>>>>>>>> (Tatigkeit) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Aktivitat at all. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>> >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir >>>> >>>>> a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc >>>>>>>>>>> 2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW >>>>>>>>>>> SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH >>>>>>>>>>> G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= >>>>>>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c= >>>>>>>>>>> aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy >>>>>>>>>>> N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA >>>>>>>>>>> U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeN >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> oWHbH6u5oCFpI&e= >>> >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril >>>> >>>>> l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision- >>>>>>>>>>> 2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW >>>>>>>>>>> 8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV >>>>>>>>>>> vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD- >>>>>>>>>>> 6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >>>>>>>>>> t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_ >>>>>>>>>>> origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv >>>>>>>>>>> EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0 >>>>>>>>>>> ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea >>>>>>>>>>> 1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Alexander, Mike, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Thanks for the article. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing >>>>>>>>>>> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and >>>>>>>>>>> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role >>>>>>>>>>> of practice in knowing). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Two formulas: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but >>>>>>>>>>> do not co-incide >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Action IS individual >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Practice IS a social category. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is >>>>>>>>>>> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of >>>>>>>>>>> individual who are separate. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. >>>>>>>>>>> They are alike in that both individual action & a >>>>>>>>>>> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > A philosophical criterion of (truth). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > I do not have the background to intelligently >>>>>>>>>>> comment, but did register this theme as provocative >>>>>>>>>>> FOR further thought and wording. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > And for generating intelligent commentary >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > From: Ivan Uemlianin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Cc: Alexander Surmava >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Ivan >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > -- >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > festina lente >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> This article might prove of interest to those who >>>>>>>>>>> have been discussing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> LSV's sources in >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> marx and spinoza. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>> Director, >>>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>>> >>>>> Fordham University >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>> >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>> >> > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Jul 28 15:44:27 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2017 07:44:27 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> Message-ID: Dear Shirin: I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone of proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky did not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, and being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for the next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever the child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole language ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich environment" and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus on form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was "sociocultural", because it involved interaction between minds which was then "internalized" within the learner's mind. Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which do this: Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern Language Journal, 78, 465-483. De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the equation: Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I too am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can only be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible to popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of proximal development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, and the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really belongs to. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: > I know people in this project have done research on feedback on academic > writing. > Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies > Forum in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly > died recently, had a lot to say about it. > > http://www.thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk/ > > Shirley > Sent from my iPad > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi > wrote: > > > Dear all, > > I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or > > socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? > > Thank you, > > Shirin > > From alexander.surmava@yahoo.com Sat Jul 29 14:27:31 2017 From: alexander.surmava@yahoo.com (Alexander Surmava) Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2017 21:27:31 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza References: <19780253.2813201.1501363651429.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <19780253.2813201.1501363651429@mail.yahoo.com> Hi Alfredo, Thank you for your kind appreciation of my text :-). The idea, that matter (as Spinozian substance) is not something mechanical and dull and to explain human behavior we have no need to make up any uncorporeal substances like souls, psyches, or even immaterial ?activity? is the most fundamental idea of Spinoza and Ilyenkov. In fact, that is ordinary materialism. From the first sight, it seems to be easy, even banal, but in case of non-dialectical approach one risks to fall into a trap of vulgar mechanicalism. More fundamentally I discuss this idea in my book ? Origin of life, psyche and human consciousness or reflexive theory of activity? ??https://www.avramus.com/app/download/5824063863/%D0%9F%D0%A0%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%A5%D0%9E%D0%96%D0%94%D0%95%D0%9D%D0%98%D0%95+%D0%96%D0%98%D0%97%D0%9D%D0%98+%D0%9F%D0%A1%D0%98%D0%A5%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%98+%D0%98+%D0%A7%D0%95%D0%9B%D0%9E%D0%92%D0%95%D0%A7%D0%95%D0%A1%D0%9A%D0%9E%D0%93%D0%9E+%D0%A1%D0%9E%D0%97%D0%9D%D0%90%D0%9D%D0%98%D0%AF+PDF.pdf?t=1486819527 ?? A short sketch of it (?LIFE, PSYCHE, CONSCIOUSNESS?) is available in English at Academia.edu or at my own web site https://www.avramus.com/?/my-texts-in-english/ ?Your attempt to apply this approach in the field of education is very interesting. Can I ask you to send me a text with your basic ideas? What about my critic of Vygotsky?s idea of sign mediation.I only try to retell the logic of so-called ?Triangle of mediation?. If we take into account only the base of the triangle we have a tough stimulus-reactive mechanical determinism and none of freedom, morality, beauty and so long. In other words, we have not a human being, but a computer or a marionette. Evidently, Vygotsky as philosophically literate thinker rejects this as rude mechanicalism.? What does he propose instead of it?First, let us analyze the situation a little closer.If a subject (in fact not a subject but mechanical OBJECT of stimulation) has at his/her disposal only one reaction, one reflex stored up for exactly this stimulus the problem of freedom is insoluble. Therefore, we have to presume that he/she must have minimum two alternative reactions. Say ? reaction of (cowardly) avoidance and reaction of (courageous) struggle.In the latter case, a person (I remind, that in fact ? not a person, but still mechanical marionette) meets a problem of choice.According to LSV in this situation mechanical marionette invents a sign as a magic tool, which can help to solve the problem of choice.?All this do not resemble even science fiction, but rather fantasy, something with magister Yoda with his exceptional ability to telekinesis ... Especially after Ilyenkov?s revolutionary new interpretation of Spinoza.Above all, the situation with an alternative has very little to do with the problem of freedom. A choice means that a subject stays on the low stage of his/her development. Because truly free people do not choose.?However, non-alternative situation is far from freedom too. To put it differently the choise lies on the level of arbitrariness, while freedom lies much higher. Very characteristic illustration of this we can find in Vygotsky?s ?Thinking and speech?. He reminds a scene from Leo Tolstoi?s roman "War and Peace" with Pierre Bezuhov who is trying to choose rather he has to stay in Moscow under Napoleon with the aim to kill this tyrant and ten to one to die himself, or to join Kutuzov?s army and stay alive.The choice is very hard for Pierre, so he decides to play patience and to follow the choice which will prompt it's lot.?Vygotsky retells this scene to illustrate how ?a cultural sign? can help a person to escape Buridan's ass's situation and gain freedom.The irony of this argumentation is that LSV is blind to the fact that in the end Pierre didn?t act in accordance with the lot, but acts honestly, act according his conscience which orders him to stay in Moscow. Thus Pierre Bezuhov acts as a free personality, while Vygotsky?s illustration illustrates something different ? fallacy of his idea of sign mediation.Anyhow, let?s imagine that we don?t? discuss a problem of freedom, but something much more primitive, say ? the problem of arbitrariness. How a person chose one of two alternatives. Probably sign mediation can help in this situation?If an organism (in fact ? not an organism but mechanism) is something entirely determined by external stimulation, like personal computer or Cartesian animal, as well as Cartesian human body, this organism (=mechanism, =PC) will meet a serious problem with interpretation of signs because he will suffer from lack of appropriate organ, organ which can perceive and understand not only ?the thousand natural shocks? but also a subtle shade of sense. In case of a PC I think that is obvious. The similar difficulties forced Descartes to apply to idea of bodiless soul (psyche) and to pineal gland as a media between soul and body.You are quite correct, that Vygotsky sometimes uses the term ?sign? in the conventional sense. But I will insist that this conventional sense is dominating in his theorizing. Thus in ?Tool and sign? he argues in detail that the ability of interpretation of words as merely conventional signs is a characteristic of high level of child?s development. Involving children in special ?renaming? play he demonstrates that younger children often refuse to rename say ?lamp? into ?chair? explaining their refusal by impossibility to sit down on the lamp. This refusal - comments Vygotsky ? demonstrates weakness, lack of development of their thinking. Later, when they grow they will understand, that words are merely conventional signs and as such they have none of meaning, that word?s meanings are established entirely by a societal convention.In fact now we are approaching the next utterly interesting subject ? the problem of origin and nature of ideality. You probably know that Ilyenkov is an author of very interesting dialectical conception of Ideality. This issue is in the focus of intensive discussions between Ilyenkov?s disciples after his death. Just now I am working on the monography concerning this problem. In understanding of ideality lays in fact the border between Spinozian, materialistic approach and alternative, semiotic one.This issue is too serious to discuss it in chat format, but I can not keep from giving a hint :-) ? from my point of view (which I share with my son George) the universal and initial form of ideality is a material tool, something like a hammer, an axe or a spade, while symbols, derived from these tools are something secondary and derived, while all kinds of conventional signs are something tertiary which can not be understood without understanding of universal, starting forms. In this issue, we lean on Ilyenkov's basic ideas and dispute against some contradictions in his system in the same time. ?You are mentioning a popular idea that activity as such is something fundamentally connected with societal relations. That is one more point which would be interesting to discuss. Vygotsky from our perspective was too far from any real understanding of history and culture so that his legacy only by ridiculous mistake is known as ?cultural and historical?. We are not denying the social nature of human activity, but we derive it from social nature of human (material) tools. ?You have mentioned your dream to imagine ?what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish?. I am not sure that this task can be fulfilled, because I think that Vygotsky in the very beginning of his way turned aside from the path which can lead him to Spinoza and Marx to basically wrong semiotic direction. So the continuation of Spinozian quests is better to seek in the texts of Alexey Leont?ev, Nikolai Bernstein and Evald Ilyenkov. And first of all I think that an outline of ?new based on Spinoza and Marx psychology we must seek not in turned yellow manuscripts of theoreticians of the last century, even such brilliant as Leo Vygotsky was, but in our own current investigations. I also hope that our productive dialog will continue.Sasha From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun Jul 30 02:44:46 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2017 09:44:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: <19780253.2813201.1501363651429@mail.yahoo.com> References: <19780253.2813201.1501363651429.ref@mail.yahoo.com>, <19780253.2813201.1501363651429@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1501407885576.11511@iped.uio.no> I am forwarding here more text from Sasha, which did not make it to the list: Dear friends! First, excuse me for the delay with my reaction to your posts. Among other things I met difficulties with putting my answer here (I have put it twice without any effect :-( ). David, thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word ??????????. I agree with you, that the best translation will be ?conventional?. This term coincides well enough with Vygotsky?s idea that mature word in development of infant?s speech is something entirely "random", "reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mere agreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????) As for Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I?ll agree with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's and Pavlov's conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov?s ?teaching? was canonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later, closer to 1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy of Science. So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? evidently shade in Luria?s and Leont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of Vygotsky's idea of HMF and Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not something coincidental. Anyhow, this subject deserves serious inquiry. Mike, your historical meeting with Bernshtein was something fabulous!!! Had you a chance to have a chat with him this time or later, and had you discussed with Alexander Romanovitch Bernstein?s ideas? Thank you Mike for attached pdf with ?Soviet psychology?. It is something fantastically interesting. I am much younger than heroes of the book, so even from my soviet perspective it looks extremely colourful :-) and indeed it explains much? Andy, I like very much your witty formula ?In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he is a dead end? :-) But I decisively disagree with you? I probably have too many objections to Vygotsky's theorizing, but regarding Spinoza?s (and Marx?s) role in future psychology I agree with him absolutely. I can not agree with you that ?Any attempt to deploy Spinozian ontology in experimental Psychology is a charade? too. Surely, it is impossible to try to apply Spinozian ideas to (and even this in the best case) so called ?experimental Psychology? which is based on primitive Cartesian logic. However, I?m sure that Hegels?s motto that Spinozism is a necessary basis of any genuine philosophizing is as true now as it was two hundred years ago, and that it can be applied to psychology as well. All the best! Sasha P.S. In a few days I hope to finish updating of full Russian version of ?Ilyenkov and revolution in psychology?. I?ll put it here and on Academy.edu ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alexander Surmava Sent: 29 July 2017 23:27 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hi Alfredo, Thank you for your kind appreciation of my text :-). The idea, that matter (as Spinozian substance) is not something mechanical and dull and to explain human behavior we have no need to make up any uncorporeal substances like souls, psyches, or even immaterial ?activity? is the most fundamental idea of Spinoza and Ilyenkov. In fact, that is ordinary materialism. From the first sight, it seems to be easy, even banal, but in case of non-dialectical approach one risks to fall into a trap of vulgar mechanicalism. More fundamentally I discuss this idea in my book ? Origin of life, psyche and human consciousness or reflexive theory of activity? ??https://www.avramus.com/app/download/5824063863/%D0%9F%D0%A0%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%A5%D0%9E%D0%96%D0%94%D0%95%D0%9D%D0%98%D0%95+%D0%96%D0%98%D0%97%D0%9D%D0%98+%D0%9F%D0%A1%D0%98%D0%A5%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%98+%D0%98+%D0%A7%D0%95%D0%9B%D0%9E%D0%92%D0%95%D0%A7%D0%95%D0%A1%D0%9A%D0%9E%D0%93%D0%9E+%D0%A1%D0%9E%D0%97%D0%9D%D0%90%D0%9D%D0%98%D0%AF+PDF.pdf?t=1486819527 A short sketch of it (?LIFE, PSYCHE, CONSCIOUSNESS?) is available in English at Academia.edu or at my own web site https://www.avramus.com/?/my-texts-in-english/ Your attempt to apply this approach in the field of education is very interesting. Can I ask you to send me a text with your basic ideas? What about my critic of Vygotsky?s idea of sign mediation.I only try to retell the logic of so-called ?Triangle of mediation?. If we take into account only the base of the triangle we have a tough stimulus-reactive mechanical determinism and none of freedom, morality, beauty and so long. In other words, we have not a human being, but a computer or a marionette. Evidently, Vygotsky as philosophically literate thinker rejects this as rude mechanicalism. What does he propose instead of it?First, let us analyze the situation a little closer.If a subject (in fact not a subject but mechanical OBJECT of stimulation) has at his/her disposal only one reaction, one reflex stored up for exactly this stimulus the problem of freedom is insoluble. Therefore, we have to presume that he/she must have minimum two alternative reactions. Say ? reaction of (cowardly) avoidance and reaction of (courageous) struggle.In the latter case, a person (I remind, that in fact ? not a person, but still mechanical marionette) meets a problem of choice.According to LSV in this situation mechanical marionette invents a sign as a magic tool, which can help to solve the problem of choice. All this do not resemble even science fiction, but rather fantasy, something with magister Yoda with his exceptional ability to telekinesis ... Especially after Ilyenkov?s revolutionary new interpretation of Spinoza.Above all, the situation with an alternative has very little to do with the problem of freedom. A choice means that a subject stays on the low stage of his/her development. Because truly free people do not choose. However, non-alternative situation is far from freedom too. To put it differently the choise lies on the level of arbitrariness, while freedom lies much higher. Very characteristic illustration of this we can find in Vygotsky?s ?Thinking and speech?. He reminds a scene from Leo Tolstoi?s roman "War and Peace" with Pierre Bezuhov who is trying to choose rather he has to stay in Moscow under Napoleon with the aim to kill this tyrant and ten to one to die himself, or to join Kutuzov?s army and stay alive.The choice is very hard for Pierre, so he decides to play patience and to follow the choice which will prompt it's lot. Vygotsky retells this scene to illustrate how ?a cultural sign? can help a person to escape Buridan's ass's situation and gain freedom.The irony of this argumentation is that LSV is blind to the fact that in the end Pierre didn?t act in accordance with the lot, but acts honestly, act according his conscience which orders him to stay in Moscow. Thus Pierre Bezuhov acts as a free personality, while Vygotsky?s illustration illustrates something different ? fallacy of his idea of sign mediation.Anyhow, let?s imagine that we don?t? discuss a problem of freedom, but something much more primitive, say ? the problem of arbitrariness. How a person chose one of two alternatives. Probably sign mediation can help in this situation?If an organism (in fact ? not an organism but mechanism) is something entirely determined by external stimulation, like personal computer or Cartesian animal, as well as Cartesian human body, this organism (=mechanism, =PC) will meet a serious problem with interpretation of signs because he will suffer from lack of appropriate organ, organ which can perceive and understand not only ?the thousand natural shocks? but also a subtle shade of sense. In case of a PC I think that is obvious. The similar difficulties forced Descartes to apply to idea of bodiless soul (psyche) and to pineal gland as a media between soul and body.You are quite correct, that Vygotsky sometimes uses the term ?sign? in the conventional sense. But I will insist that this conventional sense is dominating in his theorizing. Thus in ?Tool and sign? he argues in detail that the ability of interpretation of words as merely conventional signs is a characteristic of high level of child?s development. Involving children in special ?renaming? play he demonstrates that younger children often refuse to rename say ?lamp? into ?chair? explaining their refusal by impossibility to sit down on the lamp. This refusal - comments Vygotsky ? demonstrates weakness, lack of development of their thinking. Later, when they grow they will understand, that words are merely conventional signs and as such they have none of meaning, that word?s meanings are established entirely by a societal convention.In fact now we are approaching the next utterly interesting subject ? the problem of origin and nature of ideality. You probably know that Ilyenkov is an author of very interesting dialectical conception of Ideality. This issue is in the focus of intensive discussions between Ilyenkov?s disciples after his death. Just now I am working on the monography concerning this problem. In understanding of ideality lays in fact the border between Spinozian, materialistic approach and alternative, semiotic one.This issue is too serious to discuss it in chat format, but I can not keep from giving a hint :-) ? from my point of view (which I share with my son George) the universal and initial form of ideality is a material tool, something like a hammer, an axe or a spade, while symbols, derived from these tools are something secondary and derived, while all kinds of conventional signs are something tertiary which can not be understood without understanding of universal, starting forms. In this issue, we lean on Ilyenkov's basic ideas and dispute against some contradictions in his system in the same time. You are mentioning a popular idea that activity as such is something fundamentally connected with societal relations. That is one more point which would be interesting to discuss. Vygotsky from our perspective was too far from any real understanding of history and culture so that his legacy only by ridiculous mistake is known as ?cultural and historical?. We are not denying the social nature of human activity, but we derive it from social nature of human (material) tools. You have mentioned your dream to imagine ?what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if Vygotsky would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish?. I am not sure that this task can be fulfilled, because I think that Vygotsky in the very beginning of his way turned aside from the path which can lead him to Spinoza and Marx to basically wrong semiotic direction. So the continuation of Spinozian quests is better to seek in the texts of Alexey Leont?ev, Nikolai Bernstein and Evald Ilyenkov. And first of all I think that an outline of new based on Spinoza and Marx psychology we must seek not in turned yellow manuscripts of theoreticians of the last century, even such brilliant as Leo Vygotsky was, but in our own current investigations. I also hope that our productive dialog will continue.Sasha From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Jul 31 00:23:52 2017 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 07:23:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza In-Reply-To: References: <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> , Message-ID: Hello, I did my best to follow the thread on Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza and I probably did not read it as closely as I could have, nor did I read the originating article, that is, the one Mike attached as the knot to this thread, but I shall. Of course being a big fan of Spinoza I had to eye-wig in and see what was to be seen on this here persistent thread. I would like to make a contribution as a point in contrast, to what is becoming more prominent in my understanding of the non-dual view of the apparent world as seen through Vedanta. First, and I'm sure I shall be corrected, please note, I see the Western viewpoint (as springing from Descartes) as depicted as a linear rational (and historical) view whereby thought and material are different entities. As I understand, according to Descartes, material comes into being through thought. I think first before I am first. Is this correct? Spinoza, as I understand, saw that there was a historical aspect that Descartes missed that we actually transform material and it transforms our thought and so on, as they weaves through one another. And so on through time. But how could this happen that if material and thought were of different substances? (Am I getting this right?) But he also saw that we are not separate from nature, and are indeed helplessly subject to it, we are nature but nature isn't us. Yet this nature could not be separate from God, and thus with some lens-grinding Spinoza came to see that not only is nature not separate from God, and that nature is not separate from us, but God is also not separate from us because we are of the same "substance" in nature, that we are indeed, as if the same "material." But then what of free will? Are we merely reacting like mechanical robots, or chemical reactions? or is there choice? >From my Vedanta studies there are similarities to the monist Sponiza worldview of nature and God being one substance extending through time, transforming through laws of physics and so forth. I'm not clear how Spinoza saw the mind, and it seems that psychology, not having been named/formed/created historically at that point in time, he had to have a different word for that, which seems to have been "spirit," methinks. So we are at odds at the way translations go not only from one language to another but from one historical moment to another (the way words mind versus spirit are used). But the actual ontology was perhaps the very turtle both psychology's notion of mind and Spinoza's notion of spirit were identically referencing. Just thinking out loud here. Now in Vedanta, the cosmology is such that the mind and the body are indeed one substance, if there is a substance at all. And that the perceivable world, is just a beginningless dance of names and forms, whereby one thing becomes another thing, and its name changes, and so on through time and space. That there is an order of consequences through actions and reactions. Understanding the nature of those actions and reactions helps offer choice to the person, as to what actions one hopes to perform to gain a particular (desired) consequence. And such is the importance of karma, to consider one's actions and the consequences that will come of them. It's just science, but a science incorporating the subtle forms not just the gross. If all that is here is non-dual, as the ancients claimed, then it would have to mean that mind and body are one substance, it seems that quantum physics does show that things are not as solid as we might think, and that the mind is not as unaffected by gross material as we once thought. So if I am understanding the Vedic view of the mind and body being material, that is, of one substance, this substance must exist in name and form across a spectrum, whereby on the one side we have all that is subtle, and on the other we have all that is gross, again in terms of name and form of said substance. A metaphor for this concept could be a consideration of the different forms of water. Solid at one temperature, liquid in another, and steam in yet another. If time and space are relative (i.e., Einstein), then let's pretend that they are infinitely stable if seen at an instant in time (like now, the present moment). Then it does seem that ice is a different "material" than water, and also steam. But in reality their substance is identical: H2O. This is a gross simplification (pun intended), because we have one substance in three forms, but never at the same time, though in the same place. The change is caused by temperature, and we can only see the change of form witnessed through time. But also the name changes too. So there is as if an appearance of a linear change. W1(ice) must pass through W2(water) to become W3(steam) and back again, through time (with the help of temperature), but W occupies the same space, though the volume might change a little. OK, thanks for staying with me this far. As I'm understanding it, there is in the Vedic worldview three gunas (branches, or better "properties") of which the perceivable world consists, these being sattwa (energy, purity, light), rajas (action, movement, heat), and tamas (form, heaviness, inertia, darkness). And every *thing* that can be a *thing* is a unique combination of sattwa, rajas, and tamas. But this is relative. For example a rock as more tamas than a river, which has more rajas than a rock, but the sunlight shining on the rock and the river have more sattwa than either of them. In otherwords, it's all relative. There is tamas and sattva in the river, and rajas and tamas in the sunlight, and sattwa and rajas even in the rock, but those are in smaller ratios than the other dominant properties therein. If we consider Einstein's theory of relativity, E = mc2, then this might also be seen sattwa = tamas multiplied by the speed of rajas. Put another way, that tamas in its gross form is transformed into sattwa its subtle form through rajas, its movement(activity) through time and space. This is from the aspect of the material world, as we (humans) can perceive, through physical laws. That there is only one substance here, by metaphor like water, is what Spinoza (I think) was attempting to "see," through a lens of inquiry and curiosity. How might this inquiry transcend the dualism as presented by Descartes? But I would like to prpose right about now that the dualism as presented by Descartes was "historically invented" as a means to bypass intellectual persecution by the Church fathers (i.e. Galileo). It is not apparent to me that Descartes even believed everything that he wrote, but that it was a story crafted to gift the material world for experimentation (with impunity) to the scientists (so we could really figure out what was going on here in the material world) and to leave the empty carton of the "spiritual" (i.e. the mind) to the Church, which was just like selling the Church a bridge that leads to swampland, really. And it worked! I digress. Because the mind question really is a material question, but of a subtle nature, and it would have to be that if we assert non-duality, which I am, but you do not have to, as that is your choice! :) It ends up that much of cognitive science is showing mind as a material question to be the case, for example by its examination of distributed cognition, embodied thinking, and so on, and also in cultural psychology (like wet water) the way culture's soup creates so much of our human experience. It is all relative, which means, to be relative it must be one unified substance. Mind is created through activity and culture, which also creates activity and culture, as woven threads extending out through time and space in all directions. Substance is a difficult and slippery word, because anything that would be made of this substance couldn't be perceived by us, as we are products of that substance. It gets a bit Escher here if we could. You know staircases collapsing upon one another, or hands drawing themselves, etc. Kind of Mobius strippy. But this creates a reality of turtles all the way down, of infinite regression. That does not work. Spinoza's insight is that there IS a oneness, and that this can be experienced ("seen"), but only through spiritual pursuit of self-examination and inquiry, which was a kind of purification to him. In this sense there is free will, because one is choosing to do this self reflection, but on the other hand there is a necessary result that comes of seeing what is already there, nothing is "produced". Hence the beauty of him being a lensgrinder, is a marvelous metaphor in so many aspects. My intuition is that LSV was attempting to balance Spinoza's substance with Marx's materialism as a way to bring the two together, with the goal of illustrating that there was a predictable "physics" to the way mind develops as a necessary consequence of culture moving through history (i.e. meaning), and vice versa (culture and history being created in turn by mind). This is not a linear summation or consequence, but an intermingling of three properties (in relation to one another), light, mass, and energy or as the ancients called them sattwa, rajas, and tamas, and these properties are always in movement and in consequence to one another, but from the aspect of the perceivable world. >From the aspect of itself, it is static, nothing is changing, and it exists outside of time and space. This is what Spinoza would have called God (or nature), or in Vedanta, "Brahman," which cannot be objectified, but it can be known because it is the only "thing" here, upon which all things depend for existence. Like the pot is dependent upon the clay for its existence. This metaphor useful here for how the clay still "sees itself" as clay even if it is in the shape of the pot, or a plate, but the pot can only "see itself" as a pot if the form is of a particularly named shape, but is no longer one if the pot-shape is shattered, though the clay remains regardless of the presence of the pot-shape or shard-shape. It is still clay. Relative to the pot, the clay is not changing, outside time and space, relative to the pot, which is changing inside time and space. When a pot can only see its own potness, then it appears there can be no unifying principle inside time and space. It is a duality. But if pot can see that its true unifying substance is clay, then its clayness stands outside of time and space, and it continues to exist as long as clay is there, just in transformation from the aspect inside time and space, but eternal from the aspect outside of time and space. Thanks for reading, and thanks also for your commentary. All being food in my pot. :) Kind regards, Annalisa From shirinvossoughi@gmail.com Mon Jul 31 07:32:41 2017 From: shirinvossoughi@gmail.com (Shirin Vossoughi) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 09:32:41 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> Message-ID: Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of your comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and dialectical understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for mediation and practice. Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and world. feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. Shirin On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Dear Shirin: > > I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of > Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" > generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone of > proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky did > not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, and > being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for the > next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever the > child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child > development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to > the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of > development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of > development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). > > But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that > has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory > popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best > practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing > instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole language > ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich environment" > and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus on > form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the > former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was "sociocultural", > because it involved interaction between minds which was then "internalized" > within the learner's mind. > > Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which do > this: > > Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and > second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern > Language Journal, 78, 465-483. > > De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual > scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. > > Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of > self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. > > Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment > dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, Culture, > and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. > > Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the equation: > Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). > Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. > > Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I too > am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can > give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can only > be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible to > popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of > theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. > > I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that > analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then > shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think > that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were > "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. > > But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of proximal > development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, and > the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really > belongs to. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < > s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > I know people in this project have done research on feedback on academic > > writing. > > Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies > > Forum in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly > > died recently, had a lot to say about it. > > > > http://www.thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk/ > > > > Shirley > > Sent from my iPad > > > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi > > wrote: > > > > > Dear all, > > > I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or > > > socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? > > > Thank you, > > > Shirin > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 31 08:08:41 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 09:08:41 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> Message-ID: Shirin, I find your suggestions for writing feedback as dialogue (and as "writing itself") to be a really fantastic idea. My question is: How to accomplish your task in a world in which education and indeed knowledge have been thoroughly capital-ized? How to fit this into the educational system of today in which not only do universities treat students as so many widgets to put out, but students see often see themselves (or, at least, their "skills" and "knowledge") in precisely this same way? My anthropology students regularly tell me of the interrogations that they endure with friends and family who ask them "But how can you make money with an anthropology degree?" I'm unsure whether to tell my students that there are a million ways to make money with an anthropology degree or whether I should tell them to respond with "That's a stupid question" and to go on to interrogate the grounds of the question. The former is more practical, the latter is more revealing. Shirin, I'm wondering if you are encountering this sort of thing? And if so, how might you "sell" such an alternative pedagogy to a capital-ized university and its students? Just for a little more context, I regularly have conversations with a colleague in my department who was, for the past two years, tasked with leading our students in the final write-up stage of their theses. He found that they were often uninterested in feedback-as-dialogue. Rather, the vast majority were interested in feedback as a way of telling them how to get the grade that they wanted. He was incredibly thoughtful and thorough in his comments and feedback but the students tended to ignore this feedback unless it had teeth (i.e. was directly connected with grades). I am in a culturally peculiar context, but I'm not sure exactly how peculiar. Shirin, do you encounter this same kind of thing at Northwestern? (or other places you have taught?). Perhaps you have some writing on this somewhere? -greg On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:32 AM, Shirin Vossoughi wrote: > Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of your > comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and dialectical > understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for mediation and > practice. > > Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the > ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm > after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of > educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts > towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and world. > feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. > > Shirin > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Dear Shirin: > > > > I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of > > Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" > > generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone > of > > proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky did > > not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, and > > being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for the > > next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever the > > child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child > > development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to > > the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of > > development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of > > development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). > > > > But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that > > has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory > > popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best > > practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing > > instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole > language > > ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich environment" > > and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus > on > > form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the > > former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was > "sociocultural", > > because it involved interaction between minds which was then > "internalized" > > within the learner's mind. > > > > Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which > do > > this: > > > > Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and > > second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern > > Language Journal, 78, 465-483. > > > > De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual > > scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. > > > > Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of > > self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. > > > > Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment > > dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, > Culture, > > and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. > > > > Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the > equation: > > Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). > > Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. > > > > Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I > too > > am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can > > give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can only > > be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible to > > popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of > > theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. > > > > I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that > > analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then > > shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think > > that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were > > "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. > > > > But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of > proximal > > development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, and > > the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really > > belongs to. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < > > s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > I know people in this project have done research on feedback on > academic > > > writing. > > > Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies > > > Forum in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly > > > died recently, had a lot to say about it. > > > > > > http://www.thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk/ > > > > > > Shirley > > > Sent from my iPad > > > > > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Dear all, > > > > I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or > > > > socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? > > > > Thank you, > > > > Shirin > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From Andrew.Coppens@unh.edu Mon Jul 31 08:49:32 2017 From: Andrew.Coppens@unh.edu (Coppens, Andrew) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 15:49:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> Message-ID: Hi Shirin, Greg, others, Thanks, this is a topic very near to my own interests as well. I?m not aware of much research on ?writing as dialogue? that encourages expansive learning, unfortunately. Related, there is a good deal of supporting evidence against the capitalization of academic work (e.g., Alexander Sidorkin?s excellent work) and grades as extrinsic rewards (e.g., Alfie Kohn?s dogged fight). Maja Wilson?s book Rethinking Rubrics has also been helpful. Both instructors and students collude in the capitalization of academic work, though we tend to blame each other. I don?t use grades in my classes, which are writing intensive (a practice I learned from Barbara Rogoff and UC Santa Cruz, which for many years did not use letter grades opting for narrative performance evaluations; there are other institutions still doing so). The pushback I get from students on this puts sweat on my pre-tenure brow each semester, but I strongly feel that it is worth it. For nearly all of my students, this is the only time in their 15+ year schooling career that they?ve participated in a non-letter-grade assessment system, and most are studying to become teachers. Many students eventually come to agree with a narrative, ideas-focused approach, but some don?t. Many of those that don?t are with me when we?re working closely together on their ideas in a paper, but are unwilling to ?experiment? with their GPA in a broader sense. And, I understand that concern. Greg ? It has also been my experience that when grades and written feedback exist side-by-side, written feedback gets reduced to or interpreted as explaining the grade. The way in which the form of assessment drives what?s possible is very powerful here. It conveys ? again, to both students and instructors ? a strong sense of what the ?conversation" is supposed to be about, as well as what our relationship is to each other. For me, one of the most promising transformations in expansive approaches to writing as a collaboration/conversation, supported by certain kinds of written comments and less so by others I would imagine, is that it has a meaningful purpose other than its evaluation. I?ve often overlooked the proximal, more intimate purpose of writing for communication, looking for a way to make student writing ?count? in a conventional sense (e.g., getting it published in one or another venue ? I?ve been using Wikipedia for this for a few years). But, I think there?s a great deal of meaning to be accessed in evolving a relationship and conversation, in writing, that is basically about developing and sharing an idea. I continue to try new things. Very interested to hear what others are thinking/doing. Happy also to share how I ?sell? this to both students and my Department. / Andrew --- Andrew D. Coppens Education Dept., University of New Hampshire 302 Morrill Hall, 603-862-3736 www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppens @andrewcoppens On Jul 31, 2017, at 11:08 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: Shirin, I find your suggestions for writing feedback as dialogue (and as "writing itself") to be a really fantastic idea. My question is: How to accomplish your task in a world in which education and indeed knowledge have been thoroughly capital-ized? How to fit this into the educational system of today in which not only do universities treat students as so many widgets to put out, but students see often see themselves (or, at least, their "skills" and "knowledge") in precisely this same way? My anthropology students regularly tell me of the interrogations that they endure with friends and family who ask them "But how can you make money with an anthropology degree?" I'm unsure whether to tell my students that there are a million ways to make money with an anthropology degree or whether I should tell them to respond with "That's a stupid question" and to go on to interrogate the grounds of the question. The former is more practical, the latter is more revealing. Shirin, I'm wondering if you are encountering this sort of thing? And if so, how might you "sell" such an alternative pedagogy to a capital-ized university and its students? Just for a little more context, I regularly have conversations with a colleague in my department who was, for the past two years, tasked with leading our students in the final write-up stage of their theses. He found that they were often uninterested in feedback-as-dialogue. Rather, the vast majority were interested in feedback as a way of telling them how to get the grade that they wanted. He was incredibly thoughtful and thorough in his comments and feedback but the students tended to ignore this feedback unless it had teeth (i.e. was directly connected with grades). I am in a culturally peculiar context, but I'm not sure exactly how peculiar. Shirin, do you encounter this same kind of thing at Northwestern? (or other places you have taught?). Perhaps you have some writing on this somewhere? -greg On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:32 AM, Shirin Vossoughi wrote: Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of your comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and dialectical understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for mediation and practice. Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and world. feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. Shirin On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Dear Shirin: I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone of proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky did not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, and being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for the next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever the child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole language ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich environment" and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus on form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was "sociocultural", because it involved interaction between minds which was then "internalized" within the learner's mind. Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which do this: Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern Language Journal, 78, 465-483. De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the equation: Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I too am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can only be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible to popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of proximal development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, and the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really belongs to. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: I know people in this project have done research on feedback on academic writing. Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies Forum in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly died recently, had a lot to say about it. https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk_&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r=T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m=Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s=ZUJX4MQ64FQpHTkDTctQKvgNmO7_anSsnUffmaXYejY&e= Shirley Sent from my iPad On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi > wrote: Dear all, I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? Thank you, Shirin -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__byu.academia.edu_GregoryThompson&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r=T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m=Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s=2I7yxfBLCBIrsPahSJUgYrJsL7n5a6jlg4l7na88wL0&e= From glassman.13@osu.edu Mon Jul 31 10:08:22 2017 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 17:08:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F933181971@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> So here is an interesting story about the concept of feedback (not apocryphal from what I have been able to figure out, but probably also limited in scope). The concept of feedback was discussed a great deal at the Macy's conferences on cybernetics. In particular second order cybernetics with Bateson and Mead and Lewin (and a host of others). The concept of continuous feedback loops that led to evolution of thought and action became a really important topic. If you read the works of these thinkers it is really apparent. It is the central topic of Bateson's Mind and Nature I think (I wonder why his metaphor of bumps in the road creating feedback loops never gained more traction). Anyway as the story goes the members of this particular conference were really interested in pushing feedback forward as a concept. Lewin, who is one of my favorites characters from academic history, it sounded like he was a total trip to be around, was so excited with the concept he immediately went out and started telling people about it. Only the way he explained it it sounded more like something you give somebody (a product) than a process, a continuous loop in which all involved are constantly changing and readjusting. So Lewin comes back to the next meeting of the conference and they tell him, "No, no you're explaining it wrong. People are thinking that feedback is something one organism gives another organism. Lewin realizes his mistake and tells everybody not to worry, he's going to fix everything. A few days later he drops dead of a heart attack. And we have bee struggling with the concept of feedback ever since. Andrew I admire your note giving grades. It is something I have stopped doing a while ago. But there is definitely push back from students, who have been taught to expect this, and from faculty no matter what they say. For those who are interested Alison Koenka who is a post doc in my department has done some really interesting work on this. She basically found that giving grades is detrimental to motivation (this is crossing theoretical boundaries I know) on a whole host of issues. Basically it seems nothing good comes from giving grades. If you give the type of process oriented feedback it really improves motivation. I know she had presented this a bunch of places, not sure if she has it published yet. But really interesting. But we are going to continue feedback as product, in the form of grades....because. sight. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Coppens, Andrew Sent: Monday, July 31, 2017 11:50 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? Hi Shirin, Greg, others, Thanks, this is a topic very near to my own interests as well. I?m not aware of much research on ?writing as dialogue? that encourages expansive learning, unfortunately. Related, there is a good deal of supporting evidence against the capitalization of academic work (e.g., Alexander Sidorkin?s excellent work) and grades as extrinsic rewards (e.g., Alfie Kohn?s dogged fight). Maja Wilson?s book Rethinking Rubrics has also been helpful. Both instructors and students collude in the capitalization of academic work, though we tend to blame each other. I don?t use grades in my classes, which are writing intensive (a practice I learned from Barbara Rogoff and UC Santa Cruz, which for many years did not use letter grades opting for narrative performance evaluations; there are other institutions still doing so). The pushback I get from students on this puts sweat on my pre-tenure brow each semester, but I strongly feel that it is worth it. For nearly all of my students, this is the only time in their 15+ year schooling career that they?ve participated in a non-letter-grade assessment system, and most are studying to become teachers. Many students eventually come to agree with a narrative, ideas-focused approach, but some don?t. Many of those that don?t are with me when we?re working closely together on their ideas in a paper, but are unwilling to ?experiment? with their GPA in a broader sense. And, I understand that concern. Greg ? It has also been my experience that when grades and written feedback exist side-by-side, written feedback gets reduced to or interpreted as explaining the grade. The way in which the form of assessment drives what?s possible is very powerful here. It conveys ? again, to both students and instructors ? a strong sense of what the ?conversation" is supposed to be about, as well as what our relationship is to each other. For me, one of the most promising transformations in expansive approaches to writing as a collaboration/conversation, supported by certain kinds of written comments and less so by others I would imagine, is that it has a meaningful purpose other than its evaluation. I?ve often overlooked the proximal, more intimate purpose of writing for communication, looking for a way to make student writing ?count? in a conventional sense (e.g., getting it published in one or another venue ? I?ve been using Wikipedia for this for a few years). But, I think there?s a great deal of meaning to be accessed in evolving a relationship and conversation, in writing, that is basically about developing and sharing an idea. I continue to try new things. Very interested to hear what others are thinking/doing. Happy also to share how I ?sell? this to both students and my Department. / Andrew --- Andrew D. Coppens Education Dept., University of New Hampshire 302 Morrill Hall, 603-862-3736 www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppens @andrewcoppens On Jul 31, 2017, at 11:08 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: Shirin, I find your suggestions for writing feedback as dialogue (and as "writing itself") to be a really fantastic idea. My question is: How to accomplish your task in a world in which education and indeed knowledge have been thoroughly capital-ized? How to fit this into the educational system of today in which not only do universities treat students as so many widgets to put out, but students see often see themselves (or, at least, their "skills" and "knowledge") in precisely this same way? My anthropology students regularly tell me of the interrogations that they endure with friends and family who ask them "But how can you make money with an anthropology degree?" I'm unsure whether to tell my students that there are a million ways to make money with an anthropology degree or whether I should tell them to respond with "That's a stupid question" and to go on to interrogate the grounds of the question. The former is more practical, the latter is more revealing. Shirin, I'm wondering if you are encountering this sort of thing? And if so, how might you "sell" such an alternative pedagogy to a capital-ized university and its students? Just for a little more context, I regularly have conversations with a colleague in my department who was, for the past two years, tasked with leading our students in the final write-up stage of their theses. He found that they were often uninterested in feedback-as-dialogue. Rather, the vast majority were interested in feedback as a way of telling them how to get the grade that they wanted. He was incredibly thoughtful and thorough in his comments and feedback but the students tended to ignore this feedback unless it had teeth (i.e. was directly connected with grades). I am in a culturally peculiar context, but I'm not sure exactly how peculiar. Shirin, do you encounter this same kind of thing at Northwestern? (or other places you have taught?). Perhaps you have some writing on this somewhere? -greg On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:32 AM, Shirin Vossoughi wrote: Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of your comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and dialectical understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for mediation and practice. Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and world. feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. Shirin On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Dear Shirin: I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone of proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky did not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, and being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for the next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever the child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole language ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich environment" and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus on form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was "sociocultural", because it involved interaction between minds which was then "internalized" within the learner's mind. Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which do this: Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern Language Journal, 78, 465-483. De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the equation: Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I too am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can only be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible to popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of proximal development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, and the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really belongs to. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: I know people in this project have done research on feedback on academic writing. Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies Forum in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly died recently, had a lot to say about it. https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk_&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r=T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m=Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s=ZUJX4MQ64FQpHTkDTctQKvgNmO7_anSsnUffmaXYejY&e= Shirley Sent from my iPad On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi > wrote: Dear all, I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? Thank you, Shirin -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__byu.academia.edu_GregoryThompson&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r=T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m=Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s=2I7yxfBLCBIrsPahSJUgYrJsL7n5a6jlg4l7na88wL0&e= From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Mon Jul 31 10:51:14 2017 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 17:51:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F933181971@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F933181971@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael and all I 'teach' that the formative assessment process needs to be separated from the summative - e.g. That formative feedback accompanied by grades leads to students ignoring the formative (I forget the research reference I usually cite but I guess it is Dylan Wiliam ? then yes there is the whole literature on intrinsic/extrinsic that supports this). So OK, lets reflect - what about our own learning? The 'authoritative' source of feedback on our teaching now in our (UK) university system is the 'National Student Survey' which grades the students' satisfaction with x, y and z. This is mirrored internally with every course unit questionnaire-evaluation, tied to particular teachers and their performance. It's an interesting reflection of what we academics have been doing to the students as a matter of 'course'? And of course we academics are pretty ambivalent about it ('I see your student satisfaction score is below the average for the programme, Professor Hardman'). At what was claimed to be the insistence of the feedback from students, our T&L committees decided it would be 'good practice' to provide 'formative assessment' mid-course to students - this was understood to be in the form of a 'graded' activity (!) - the students wanted to know 'how they were doing' mid-term, and 'whether they really needed to work harder at this course unit' to achieve their grade needs/requirememts (obviously compared to their other assessed units). It can be a hard lesson to receive such feedback from one's students: one realises there may be a few contradictions between motives in what we might think is a joint educational activity. But still, the main conflict is not between students/learners, and academics/teachers ? I think there is more to this problem than that. :-) Julian On 31/07/2017 18:08, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Glassman, Michael" wrote: >So here is an interesting story about the concept of feedback (not >apocryphal from what I have been able to figure out, but probably also >limited in scope). The concept of feedback was discussed a great deal at >the Macy's conferences on cybernetics. In particular second order >cybernetics with Bateson and Mead and Lewin (and a host of others). The >concept of continuous feedback loops that led to evolution of thought and >action became a really important topic. If you read the works of these >thinkers it is really apparent. It is the central topic of Bateson's Mind >and Nature I think (I wonder why his metaphor of bumps in the road >creating feedback loops never gained more traction). Anyway as the story >goes the members of this particular conference were really interested in >pushing feedback forward as a concept. Lewin, who is one of my favorites >characters from academic history, it sounded like he was a total trip to >be around, was so excited with the concept he immediately went out and >started telling people about it. Only the way he explained it it sounded >more like something you give somebody (a product) than a process, a >continuous loop in which all involved are constantly changing and >readjusting. > >So Lewin comes back to the next meeting of the conference and they tell >him, "No, no you're explaining it wrong. People are thinking that >feedback is something one organism gives another organism. Lewin >realizes his mistake and tells everybody not to worry, he's going to fix >everything. A few days later he drops dead of a heart attack. And we have >bee struggling with the concept of feedback ever since. > >Andrew I admire your note giving grades. It is something I have stopped >doing a while ago. But there is definitely push back from students, who >have been taught to expect this, and from faculty no matter what they say. > >For those who are interested Alison Koenka who is a post doc in my >department has done some really interesting work on this. She basically >found that giving grades is detrimental to motivation (this is crossing >theoretical boundaries I know) on a whole host of issues. Basically it >seems nothing good comes from giving grades. If you give the type of >process oriented feedback it really improves motivation. I know she had >presented this a bunch of places, not sure if she has it published yet. >But really interesting. > >But we are going to continue feedback as product, in the form of >grades....because. sight. > >Michael > >-----Original Message----- >From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >[mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Coppens, Andrew >Sent: Monday, July 31, 2017 11:50 AM >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? > >Hi Shirin, Greg, others, > >Thanks, this is a topic very near to my own interests as well. I?m not >aware of much research on ?writing as dialogue? that encourages expansive >learning, unfortunately. Related, there is a good deal of supporting >evidence against the capitalization of academic work (e.g., Alexander >Sidorkin?s excellent work) and grades as extrinsic rewards (e.g., Alfie >Kohn?s dogged fight). Maja Wilson?s book Rethinking Rubrics has also been >helpful. Both instructors and students collude in the capitalization of >academic work, though we tend to blame each other. > >I don?t use grades in my classes, which are writing intensive (a practice >I learned from Barbara Rogoff and UC Santa Cruz, which for many years did >not use letter grades opting for narrative performance evaluations; there >are other institutions still doing so). The pushback I get from students >on this puts sweat on my pre-tenure brow each semester, but I strongly >feel that it is worth it. For nearly all of my students, this is the only >time in their 15+ year schooling career that they?ve participated in a >non-letter-grade assessment system, and most are studying to become >teachers. Many students eventually come to agree with a narrative, >ideas-focused approach, but some don?t. Many of those that don?t are with >me when we?re working closely together on their ideas in a paper, but are >unwilling to ?experiment? with their GPA in a broader sense. And, I >understand that concern. > >Greg ? It has also been my experience that when grades and written >feedback exist side-by-side, written feedback gets reduced to or >interpreted as explaining the grade. The way in which the form of >assessment drives what?s possible is very powerful here. It conveys ? >again, to both students and instructors ? a strong sense of what the >?conversation" is supposed to be about, as well as what our relationship >is to each other. > >For me, one of the most promising transformations in expansive approaches >to writing as a collaboration/conversation, supported by certain kinds of >written comments and less so by others I would imagine, is that it has a >meaningful purpose other than its evaluation. I?ve often overlooked the >proximal, more intimate purpose of writing for communication, looking for >a way to make student writing ?count? in a conventional sense (e.g., >getting it published in one or another venue ? I?ve been using Wikipedia >for this for a few years). But, I think there?s a great deal of meaning >to be accessed in evolving a relationship and conversation, in writing, >that is basically about developing and sharing an idea. > >I continue to try new things. Very interested to hear what others are >thinking/doing. Happy also to share how I ?sell? this to both students >and my Department. > >/ Andrew > >--- >Andrew D. Coppens >Education Dept., University of New Hampshire >302 Morrill Hall, 603-862-3736 >www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppensofile/Andrew_Coppens> >@andrewcoppens > >On Jul 31, 2017, at 11:08 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: > >Shirin, >I find your suggestions for writing feedback as dialogue (and as "writing >itself") to be a really fantastic idea. >My question is: How to accomplish your task in a world in which education >and indeed knowledge have been thoroughly capital-ized? >How to fit this into the educational system of today in which not only do >universities treat students as so many widgets to put out, but students >see often see themselves (or, at least, their "skills" and "knowledge") >in precisely this same way? >My anthropology students regularly tell me of the interrogations that >they endure with friends and family who ask them "But how can you make >money with an anthropology degree?" I'm unsure whether to tell my >students that there are a million ways to make money with an anthropology >degree or whether I should tell them to respond with "That's a stupid >question" and to go on to interrogate the grounds of the question. The >former is more practical, the latter is more revealing. >Shirin, I'm wondering if you are encountering this sort of thing? And if >so, how might you "sell" such an alternative pedagogy to a capital-ized >university and its students? >Just for a little more context, I regularly have conversations with a >colleague in my department who was, for the past two years, tasked with >leading our students in the final write-up stage of their theses. He >found that they were often uninterested in feedback-as-dialogue. Rather, >the vast majority were interested in feedback as a way of telling them >how to get the grade that they wanted. He was incredibly thoughtful and >thorough in his comments and feedback but the students tended to ignore >this feedback unless it had teeth (i.e. was directly connected with >grades). >I am in a culturally peculiar context, but I'm not sure exactly how >peculiar. Shirin, do you encounter this same kind of thing at >Northwestern? >(or other places you have taught?). >Perhaps you have some writing on this somewhere? >-greg > > > > >On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:32 AM, Shirin Vossoughi > >wrote: > >Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of >your comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and >dialectical understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for >mediation and practice. > >Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the >ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm >after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of >educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts >towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and world. >feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. > >Shirin > >On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg >> >wrote: > >Dear Shirin: > >I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of >Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" >generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone >of proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky >did not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, >and being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for >the next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever >the child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child >development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to >the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of >development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of >development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). > >But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that >has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory >popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best >practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing >instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole >language ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich >environment" >and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus >on form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that >the former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was >"sociocultural", because it involved interaction between minds which was >then "internalized" >within the learner's mind. > >Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which do >this: > >Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and >second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern >Language Journal, 78, 465-483. > >De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual >scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. > >Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of >self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. > >Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment >dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, >Culture, and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. > >Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the >equation: >Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). >Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. > >Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I >too am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I >can give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can >only be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is >possible to popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic >forms of theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. > >I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that >analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then >shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think >that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were >"unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. > >But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of >proximal development was not and never will be a form of corrective >feedback, and the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory >that it really belongs to. > >David Kellogg >Macquarie University > > > >On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < >s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: > >I know people in this project have done research on feedback on academic >writing. >Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies >Forum in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly >died recently, had a lot to say about it. > >https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.thinkingwriting.qm >ul.ac.uk_&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r=T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJB >SXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m=Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s=ZUJX4MQ64F >QpHTkDTctQKvgNmO7_anSsnUffmaXYejY&e= > >Shirley >Sent from my iPad > >On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi >> >wrote: > >Dear all, >I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or >socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? >Thank you, >Shirin > > > > > > > >-- >Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >Assistant Professor >Department of Anthropology >880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >Brigham Young University >Provo, UT 84602 >https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__byu.academia.edu_Grego >ryThompson&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r=T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJ >BSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m=Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s=2I7yxfBLC >BIrsPahSJUgYrJsL7n5a6jlg4l7na88wL0&e= > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Jul 31 10:57:22 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 10:57:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> Message-ID: <597f6f97.8e66620a.2d5ac.5cf9@mx.google.com> This topic and the direction that it has now taken exploring feedback as (response) to MEANING generation in contrast to feedback as (grades and grading practices) is a topic that has touched all our lives. Moving back to an earlier topic of the relation of situational examples that are exempliary examples as assumptive practices. Exploring alternative practices that engage shifting our assumptions leading towards, generating paradigm shifts. Shifting examples AND shifting frameworks may contain a key insight in exploring anticipated approaches to consider. Grades, as mentioned in this thread, are the common experience occurring over a 15 year period that most of us are encountering in our common sense societal practices. Therefore grades becoming meaningful within our instituting or institutional settings among communities of learners. In what ways do we counter these grading (facts)? (virtues?) It may be worthwhile to consider grades as presenting certain *virtues* now institutionalized and the response to consider would be presenting (not representing) alternative *virtues* through alternative exempliary examples on their way to institutionalizing these alternative virtues. Therefore, to present (a) single alternative exempliary example where grades are put aside will have limited transformative power to shift dispositions of institutionalized grading practices. What seems required is a multitude or polyphonic autobiography of non-grading exempliary examples. If these alternative non-grading alternatives become a ground swell then slowly our current common sense SHIFTS FROM a few alternative examples to becoming instituting paradigms or frameworks generating a NEW common sense ( meaning ). It seems if academia cannot make this shift ( in direction) the alternative is developing alternative institutes that are instituting differing *virtues* in alternative small group situations. We would then require ways of *documenting*? these exempliary non-grading practices occurring in our current contemporary actuality. Brings us back to the topic of writing feedback (responses) to student writing that express non-grading virtues. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Greg Thompson Sent: July 31, 2017 8:11 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? Shirin, I find your suggestions for writing feedback as dialogue (and as "writing itself") to be a really fantastic idea. My question is: How to accomplish your task in a world in which education and indeed knowledge have been thoroughly capital-ized? How to fit this into the educational system of today in which not only do universities treat students as so many widgets to put out, but students see often see themselves (or, at least, their "skills" and "knowledge") in precisely this same way? My anthropology students regularly tell me of the interrogations that they endure with friends and family who ask them "But how can you make money with an anthropology degree?" I'm unsure whether to tell my students that there are a million ways to make money with an anthropology degree or whether I should tell them to respond with "That's a stupid question" and to go on to interrogate the grounds of the question. The former is more practical, the latter is more revealing. Shirin, I'm wondering if you are encountering this sort of thing? And if so, how might you "sell" such an alternative pedagogy to a capital-ized university and its students? Just for a little more context, I regularly have conversations with a colleague in my department who was, for the past two years, tasked with leading our students in the final write-up stage of their theses. He found that they were often uninterested in feedback-as-dialogue. Rather, the vast majority were interested in feedback as a way of telling them how to get the grade that they wanted. He was incredibly thoughtful and thorough in his comments and feedback but the students tended to ignore this feedback unless it had teeth (i.e. was directly connected with grades). I am in a culturally peculiar context, but I'm not sure exactly how peculiar. Shirin, do you encounter this same kind of thing at Northwestern? (or other places you have taught?). Perhaps you have some writing on this somewhere? -greg On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:32 AM, Shirin Vossoughi wrote: > Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of your > comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and dialectical > understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for mediation and > practice. > > Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the > ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm > after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of > educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts > towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and world. > feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. > > Shirin > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Dear Shirin: > > > > I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of > > Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" > > generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone > of > > proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky did > > not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, and > > being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for the > > next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever the > > child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child > > development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to > > the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of > > development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of > > development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). > > > > But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that > > has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory > > popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best > > practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing > > instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole > language > > ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich environment" > > and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus > on > > form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the > > former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was > "sociocultural", > > because it involved interaction between minds which was then > "internalized" > > within the learner's mind. > > > > Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which > do > > this: > > > > Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and > > second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern > > Language Journal, 78, 465-483. > > > > De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual > > scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. > > > > Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of > > self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. > > > > Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment > > dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, > Culture, > > and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. > > > > Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the > equation: > > Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). > > Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. > > > > Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I > too > > am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can > > give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can only > > be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible to > > popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of > > theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. > > > > I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that > > analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then > > shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think > > that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were > > "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. > > > > But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of > proximal > > development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, and > > the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really > > belongs to. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < > > s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > I know people in this project have done research on feedback on > academic > > > writing. > > > Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies > > > Forum in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly > > > died recently, had a lot to say about it. > > > > > > http://www.thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk/ > > > > > > Shirley > > > Sent from my iPad > > > > > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Dear all, > > > > I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or > > > > socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? > > > > Thank you, > > > > Shirin > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Jul 31 12:23:11 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 13:23:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F933181971@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F933181971@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael, I'd be interested in hearing more about Alison Koenka's work (perhaps she could share a summary or some writing). Andrew, I'd be curious to hear how you "sell" this to various parties involved (esp. at the departmental and higher levels of admin, but also to the students). -greg On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 11:08 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > So here is an interesting story about the concept of feedback (not > apocryphal from what I have been able to figure out, but probably also > limited in scope). The concept of feedback was discussed a great deal at > the Macy's conferences on cybernetics. In particular second order > cybernetics with Bateson and Mead and Lewin (and a host of others). The > concept of continuous feedback loops that led to evolution of thought and > action became a really important topic. If you read the works of these > thinkers it is really apparent. It is the central topic of Bateson's Mind > and Nature I think (I wonder why his metaphor of bumps in the road creating > feedback loops never gained more traction). Anyway as the story goes the > members of this particular conference were really interested in pushing > feedback forward as a concept. Lewin, who is one of my favorites > characters from academic history, it sounded like he was a total trip to be > around, was so excited with the concept he immediately went out and started > telling people about it. Only the way he explained it it sounded more like > something you give somebody (a product) than a process, a continuous loop > in which all involved are constantly changing and readjusting. > > So Lewin comes back to the next meeting of the conference and they tell > him, "No, no you're explaining it wrong. People are thinking that feedback > is something one organism gives another organism. Lewin realizes his > mistake and tells everybody not to worry, he's going to fix everything. A > few days later he drops dead of a heart attack. And we have bee struggling > with the concept of feedback ever since. > > Andrew I admire your note giving grades. It is something I have stopped > doing a while ago. But there is definitely push back from students, who > have been taught to expect this, and from faculty no matter what they say. > > For those who are interested Alison Koenka who is a post doc in my > department has done some really interesting work on this. She basically > found that giving grades is detrimental to motivation (this is crossing > theoretical boundaries I know) on a whole host of issues. Basically it > seems nothing good comes from giving grades. If you give the type of > process oriented feedback it really improves motivation. I know she had > presented this a bunch of places, not sure if she has it published yet. > But really interesting. > > But we are going to continue feedback as product, in the form of > grades....because. sight. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Coppens, Andrew > Sent: Monday, July 31, 2017 11:50 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? > > Hi Shirin, Greg, others, > > Thanks, this is a topic very near to my own interests as well. I?m not > aware of much research on ?writing as dialogue? that encourages expansive > learning, unfortunately. Related, there is a good deal of supporting > evidence against the capitalization of academic work (e.g., Alexander > Sidorkin?s excellent work) and grades as extrinsic rewards (e.g., Alfie > Kohn?s dogged fight). Maja Wilson?s book Rethinking Rubrics has also been > helpful. Both instructors and students collude in the capitalization of > academic work, though we tend to blame each other. > > I don?t use grades in my classes, which are writing intensive (a practice > I learned from Barbara Rogoff and UC Santa Cruz, which for many years did > not use letter grades opting for narrative performance evaluations; there > are other institutions still doing so). The pushback I get from students on > this puts sweat on my pre-tenure brow each semester, but I strongly feel > that it is worth it. For nearly all of my students, this is the only time > in their 15+ year schooling career that they?ve participated in a > non-letter-grade assessment system, and most are studying to become > teachers. Many students eventually come to agree with a narrative, > ideas-focused approach, but some don?t. Many of those that don?t are with > me when we?re working closely together on their ideas in a paper, but are > unwilling to ?experiment? with their GPA in a broader sense. And, I > understand that concern. > > Greg ? It has also been my experience that when grades and written > feedback exist side-by-side, written feedback gets reduced to or > interpreted as explaining the grade. The way in which the form of > assessment drives what?s possible is very powerful here. It conveys ? > again, to both students and instructors ? a strong sense of what the > ?conversation" is supposed to be about, as well as what our relationship is > to each other. > > For me, one of the most promising transformations in expansive approaches > to writing as a collaboration/conversation, supported by certain kinds of > written comments and less so by others I would imagine, is that it has a > meaningful purpose other than its evaluation. I?ve often overlooked the > proximal, more intimate purpose of writing for communication, looking for a > way to make student writing ?count? in a conventional sense (e.g., getting > it published in one or another venue ? I?ve been using Wikipedia for this > for a few years). But, I think there?s a great deal of meaning to be > accessed in evolving a relationship and conversation, in writing, that is > basically about developing and sharing an idea. > > I continue to try new things. Very interested to hear what others are > thinking/doing. Happy also to share how I ?sell? this to both students and > my Department. > > / Andrew > > --- > Andrew D. Coppens > Education Dept., University of New Hampshire > 302 Morrill Hall, 603-862-3736 > www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppens researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppens> > @andrewcoppens > > On Jul 31, 2017, at 11:08 AM, Greg Thompson mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Shirin, > I find your suggestions for writing feedback as dialogue (and as "writing > itself") to be a really fantastic idea. > My question is: How to accomplish your task in a world in which education > and indeed knowledge have been thoroughly capital-ized? > How to fit this into the educational system of today in which not only do > universities treat students as so many widgets to put out, but students see > often see themselves (or, at least, their "skills" and "knowledge") in > precisely this same way? > My anthropology students regularly tell me of the interrogations that they > endure with friends and family who ask them "But how can you make money > with an anthropology degree?" I'm unsure whether to tell my students that > there are a million ways to make money with an anthropology degree or > whether I should tell them to respond with "That's a stupid question" and > to go on to interrogate the grounds of the question. The former is more > practical, the latter is more revealing. > Shirin, I'm wondering if you are encountering this sort of thing? And if > so, how might you "sell" such an alternative pedagogy to a capital-ized > university and its students? > Just for a little more context, I regularly have conversations with a > colleague in my department who was, for the past two years, tasked with > leading our students in the final write-up stage of their theses. He found > that they were often uninterested in feedback-as-dialogue. Rather, the vast > majority were interested in feedback as a way of telling them how to get > the grade that they wanted. He was incredibly thoughtful and thorough in > his comments and feedback but the students tended to ignore this feedback > unless it had teeth (i.e. was directly connected with grades). > I am in a culturally peculiar context, but I'm not sure exactly how > peculiar. Shirin, do you encounter this same kind of thing at Northwestern? > (or other places you have taught?). > Perhaps you have some writing on this somewhere? > -greg > > > > > On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:32 AM, Shirin Vossoughi < > shirinvossoughi@gmail.com > wrote: > > Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of > your comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and > dialectical understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for > mediation and practice. > > Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the > ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm > after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of > educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts > towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and world. > feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. > > Shirin > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Dear Shirin: > > I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of > Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" > generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone > of proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky > did not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, > and being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for > the next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever > the child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child > development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to > the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of > development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of > development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). > > But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that > has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory > popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best > practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing > instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole language > ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich environment" > and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus on > form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the > former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was "sociocultural", > because it involved interaction between minds which was then "internalized" > within the learner's mind. > > Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which do > this: > > Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and > second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern > Language Journal, 78, 465-483. > > De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual > scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. > > Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of > self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. > > Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment > dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, Culture, > and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. > > Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the > equation: > Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). > Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. > > Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I too > am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can > give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can only > be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible to > popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of > theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. > > I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that > analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then > shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think > that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were > "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. > > But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of proximal > development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, and > the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really > belongs to. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < > s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: > > I know people in this project have done research on feedback on academic > writing. > Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies Forum > in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly died > recently, had a lot to say about it. > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www. > thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk_&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r= > T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m= > Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s=ZUJX4MQ64FQpHTkDTctQKvgNmO7_ > anSsnUffmaXYejY&e= > > Shirley > Sent from my iPad > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi mailto:shirinvossoughi@gmail.com>> > wrote: > > Dear all, > I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or > socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? > Thank you, > Shirin > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__byu. > academia.edu_GregoryThompson&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r= > T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m= > Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s= > 2I7yxfBLCBIrsPahSJUgYrJsL7n5a6jlg4l7na88wL0&e= > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Jul 31 17:00:10 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 09:00:10 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F933181971@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: One dialogic-pluralogic way of making sure that writing gets read and commented on is to upload to an e-class. That's what my wife does. But Korean students tend to appraise each other's work uncritically, while Korean teachers tend to comment only on the "verbalization". So she's trying to shift comments to "Theme". "Theme" really has two meanings: it's a grammatical category we hardly ever think about in English (although it's decisively marked in Korean, with the particle "eun/neun"). It means the "intension" of a sentence: the point of the sentence that is most speaker oriented, most deictic, most "I-am-here-and-this-is-what-I-am-on-about" and consequently the least defining. When you start a sentence, in English, "With respect to...", or "Regarding...." or "In terms of ...", you are trying to put something that is not the Subject in the Theme position (which is what makes the Theme marked). Of course, paragraphs have Themes too. We usually call them "topic sentences", but that disguises their real function, which is speaker oriented, deictic, and NOT defining (because the defining bit comes at the end). Even a good long nominal group has a Theme, like "that fat old humpback whale" ("that" is deictic, "fat, old" are more descriptive, "humpback"is classifying, and "whale" is definitive). But the main thing is that a book has a Theme: the title. Vygotsky writes about how titles "absorb sense" in the reading, so that the Theme becomes Rheme by the time you turn the last page. One of the skills my wife has to teach is how to read a title for Theme. A couple of years ago, she was trying to do this with the work of Oscar Wilde. One of the students responded quite strongly to the tragic work, but not to the comic work, and she wondered why, since Wilde is mostly known for his comic work. He dropped the class after midterms, and went back to his home country; when his classmates were sitting their finals, he killed himself. That was two years ago, and his classmates are graduating this year. My wife is still trying to work out how to respond to writing "by theme", and she even wrote an article about it, just published in MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749039.2017.1351990 I don't know if this really counts as a CHAT method of responding to writing; I think of it as more social-semiotic. In this case, it didn't work. But maybe for students who don't kill themselves, it gets better. David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: Greg--why is "how do you make money with an anthro degree?" a stupid question for someone who is not yet an anthro professor? Actually, I was asking myself something rather similar about my linguistics degree just this morning..... d On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 4:23 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Michael, I'd be interested in hearing more about Alison Koenka's work > (perhaps she could share a summary or some writing). > Andrew, I'd be curious to hear how you "sell" this to various parties > involved (esp. at the departmental and higher levels of admin, but also to > the students). > -greg > > On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 11:08 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > So here is an interesting story about the concept of feedback (not > > apocryphal from what I have been able to figure out, but probably also > > limited in scope). The concept of feedback was discussed a great deal at > > the Macy's conferences on cybernetics. In particular second order > > cybernetics with Bateson and Mead and Lewin (and a host of others). The > > concept of continuous feedback loops that led to evolution of thought and > > action became a really important topic. If you read the works of these > > thinkers it is really apparent. It is the central topic of Bateson's Mind > > and Nature I think (I wonder why his metaphor of bumps in the road > creating > > feedback loops never gained more traction). Anyway as the story goes the > > members of this particular conference were really interested in pushing > > feedback forward as a concept. Lewin, who is one of my favorites > > characters from academic history, it sounded like he was a total trip to > be > > around, was so excited with the concept he immediately went out and > started > > telling people about it. Only the way he explained it it sounded more > like > > something you give somebody (a product) than a process, a continuous loop > > in which all involved are constantly changing and readjusting. > > > > So Lewin comes back to the next meeting of the conference and they tell > > him, "No, no you're explaining it wrong. People are thinking that > feedback > > is something one organism gives another organism. Lewin realizes his > > mistake and tells everybody not to worry, he's going to fix everything. A > > few days later he drops dead of a heart attack. And we have bee > struggling > > with the concept of feedback ever since. > > > > Andrew I admire your note giving grades. It is something I have stopped > > doing a while ago. But there is definitely push back from students, who > > have been taught to expect this, and from faculty no matter what they > say. > > > > For those who are interested Alison Koenka who is a post doc in my > > department has done some really interesting work on this. She basically > > found that giving grades is detrimental to motivation (this is crossing > > theoretical boundaries I know) on a whole host of issues. Basically it > > seems nothing good comes from giving grades. If you give the type of > > process oriented feedback it really improves motivation. I know she had > > presented this a bunch of places, not sure if she has it published yet. > > But really interesting. > > > > But we are going to continue feedback as product, in the form of > > grades....because. sight. > > > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Coppens, Andrew > > Sent: Monday, July 31, 2017 11:50 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? > > > > Hi Shirin, Greg, others, > > > > Thanks, this is a topic very near to my own interests as well. I?m not > > aware of much research on ?writing as dialogue? that encourages expansive > > learning, unfortunately. Related, there is a good deal of supporting > > evidence against the capitalization of academic work (e.g., Alexander > > Sidorkin?s excellent work) and grades as extrinsic rewards (e.g., Alfie > > Kohn?s dogged fight). Maja Wilson?s book Rethinking Rubrics has also been > > helpful. Both instructors and students collude in the capitalization of > > academic work, though we tend to blame each other. > > > > I don?t use grades in my classes, which are writing intensive (a practice > > I learned from Barbara Rogoff and UC Santa Cruz, which for many years did > > not use letter grades opting for narrative performance evaluations; there > > are other institutions still doing so). The pushback I get from students > on > > this puts sweat on my pre-tenure brow each semester, but I strongly feel > > that it is worth it. For nearly all of my students, this is the only time > > in their 15+ year schooling career that they?ve participated in a > > non-letter-grade assessment system, and most are studying to become > > teachers. Many students eventually come to agree with a narrative, > > ideas-focused approach, but some don?t. Many of those that don?t are with > > me when we?re working closely together on their ideas in a paper, but are > > unwilling to ?experiment? with their GPA in a broader sense. And, I > > understand that concern. > > > > Greg ? It has also been my experience that when grades and written > > feedback exist side-by-side, written feedback gets reduced to or > > interpreted as explaining the grade. The way in which the form of > > assessment drives what?s possible is very powerful here. It conveys ? > > again, to both students and instructors ? a strong sense of what the > > ?conversation" is supposed to be about, as well as what our relationship > is > > to each other. > > > > For me, one of the most promising transformations in expansive approaches > > to writing as a collaboration/conversation, supported by certain kinds of > > written comments and less so by others I would imagine, is that it has a > > meaningful purpose other than its evaluation. I?ve often overlooked the > > proximal, more intimate purpose of writing for communication, looking > for a > > way to make student writing ?count? in a conventional sense (e.g., > getting > > it published in one or another venue ? I?ve been using Wikipedia for this > > for a few years). But, I think there?s a great deal of meaning to be > > accessed in evolving a relationship and conversation, in writing, that is > > basically about developing and sharing an idea. > > > > I continue to try new things. Very interested to hear what others are > > thinking/doing. Happy also to share how I ?sell? this to both students > and > > my Department. > > > > / Andrew > > > > --- > > Andrew D. Coppens > > Education Dept., University of New Hampshire > > 302 Morrill Hall, 603-862-3736 > > www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppens > researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppens> > > @andrewcoppens > > > > On Jul 31, 2017, at 11:08 AM, Greg Thompson > mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > Shirin, > > I find your suggestions for writing feedback as dialogue (and as "writing > > itself") to be a really fantastic idea. > > My question is: How to accomplish your task in a world in which education > > and indeed knowledge have been thoroughly capital-ized? > > How to fit this into the educational system of today in which not only do > > universities treat students as so many widgets to put out, but students > see > > often see themselves (or, at least, their "skills" and "knowledge") in > > precisely this same way? > > My anthropology students regularly tell me of the interrogations that > they > > endure with friends and family who ask them "But how can you make money > > with an anthropology degree?" I'm unsure whether to tell my students that > > there are a million ways to make money with an anthropology degree or > > whether I should tell them to respond with "That's a stupid question" and > > to go on to interrogate the grounds of the question. The former is more > > practical, the latter is more revealing. > > Shirin, I'm wondering if you are encountering this sort of thing? And if > > so, how might you "sell" such an alternative pedagogy to a capital-ized > > university and its students? > > Just for a little more context, I regularly have conversations with a > > colleague in my department who was, for the past two years, tasked with > > leading our students in the final write-up stage of their theses. He > found > > that they were often uninterested in feedback-as-dialogue. Rather, the > vast > > majority were interested in feedback as a way of telling them how to get > > the grade that they wanted. He was incredibly thoughtful and thorough in > > his comments and feedback but the students tended to ignore this feedback > > unless it had teeth (i.e. was directly connected with grades). > > I am in a culturally peculiar context, but I'm not sure exactly how > > peculiar. Shirin, do you encounter this same kind of thing at > Northwestern? > > (or other places you have taught?). > > Perhaps you have some writing on this somewhere? > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:32 AM, Shirin Vossoughi < > > shirinvossoughi@gmail.com > > wrote: > > > > Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of > > your comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and > > dialectical understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for > > mediation and practice. > > > > Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the > > ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm > > after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of > > educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts > > towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and world. > > feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. > > > > Shirin > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > Dear Shirin: > > > > I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of > > Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural theory" > > generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the "zone > > of proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: Vygotsky > > did not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do tasks, > > and being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready for > > the next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn whatever > > the child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child > > development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent to > > the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of > > development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of > > development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). > > > > But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage that > > has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory > > popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best > > practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing > > instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole > language > > ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich environment" > > and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus > on > > form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the > > former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was > "sociocultural", > > because it involved interaction between minds which was then > "internalized" > > within the learner's mind. > > > > Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which > do > > this: > > > > Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation and > > second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern > > Language Journal, 78, 465-483. > > > > De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual > > scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. > > > > Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis of > > self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. > > > > Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment > > dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, > Culture, > > and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. > > > > Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the > > equation: > > Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). > > Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. > > > > Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I > too > > am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can > > give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can only > > be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible to > > popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of > > theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. > > > > I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that > > analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then > > shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think > > that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were > > "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. > > > > But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of > proximal > > development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, and > > the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really > > belongs to. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < > > s.franklin08@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > I know people in this project have done research on feedback on academic > > writing. > > Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies > Forum > > in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly died > > recently, had a lot to say about it. > > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www. > > thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk_&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r= > > T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m= > > Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s= > ZUJX4MQ64FQpHTkDTctQKvgNmO7_ > > anSsnUffmaXYejY&e= > > > > Shirley > > Sent from my iPad > > > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi > mailto:shirinvossoughi@gmail.com>> > > wrote: > > > > Dear all, > > I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or > > socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? > > Thank you, > > Shirin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__byu. > > academia.edu_GregoryThompson&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r= > > T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m= > > Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s= > > 2I7yxfBLCBIrsPahSJUgYrJsL7n5a6jlg4l7na88wL0&e= > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- From shirinvossoughi@gmail.com Mon Jul 31 19:25:30 2017 From: shirinvossoughi@gmail.com (Shirin Vossoughi) Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 21:25:30 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? In-Reply-To: References: <8A81BAFB-0AF9-4328-8F11-41B7F63CDF7B@btinternet.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F933181971@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Very thankful for all of your thoughtful comments and questions. I'm especially ruminating on the idea of non grading virtues (reminded me of non-market values) and second the desire to learn more from Andrew about how you introduce and frame this idea to students. Greg in response to your earlier email I realize now that I have built in some early encouragements for engaging with written feedback (such as having students submit rough and revised drafts of essays, with time between to engage with the feedback on the rough drafts as mediation/support for ways to revise). I have noticed that most students do seem to engage with the written commentary over time, though it often comes as a surprise. In addition to direct feedback on the writing, a lot of my comments are aimed at a dialogue about the ideas (a practice I really learned in the undergraduate course tied to Kris Gutierrez' 5th Dimension site at UCLA). In working with TA's I always find myself saying that its in feedback on student writing that I really learn and re-learn the theory. I feel like if I'm thinking hard about how to challenge them to go deeper we are in a good place. This meaning-making exchange is part of what I'm interested in looking at more closely, as well as feedback as a trust and even dignity-generative activity (Manuel Espinoza) that can open the space for students to think on paper. Greg, perhaps it is helpful that my courses are often focused on learning theory, so the theoretical concepts can be applied to how we organize the classroom itself (including feedback on writing) in meta-cognitive ways that invite students to examine their own assumptions and expectations about teaching and learning. But it's undoubtedly rife with tension within institutional structures. I'm currently organizing a summer bridge program and navigating the imperative to offer an alternative experience of reading and writing (the university as it could be [Boal]) knowing what they are likely to encounter in the university as it is. Shirin On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 7:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > One dialogic-pluralogic way of making sure that writing gets read and > commented on is to upload to an e-class. That's what my wife does. But > Korean students tend to appraise each other's work uncritically, while > Korean teachers tend to comment only on the "verbalization". > > So she's trying to shift comments to "Theme". "Theme" really has two > meanings: it's a grammatical category we hardly ever think about in English > (although it's decisively marked in Korean, with the particle "eun/neun"). > It means the "intension" of a sentence: the point of the sentence that is > most speaker oriented, most deictic, most > "I-am-here-and-this-is-what-I-am-on-about" and consequently the least > defining. When you start a sentence, in English, "With respect to...", or > "Regarding...." or "In terms of ...", you are trying to put something that > is not the Subject in the Theme position (which is what makes the Theme > marked). > > Of course, paragraphs have Themes too. We usually call them "topic > sentences", but that disguises their real function, which is speaker > oriented, deictic, and NOT defining (because the defining bit comes at the > end). Even a good long nominal group has a Theme, like "that fat old > humpback whale" ("that" is deictic, "fat, old" are more descriptive, > "humpback"is classifying, and "whale" is definitive). But the main thing is > that a book has a Theme: the title. Vygotsky writes about how titles > "absorb sense" in the reading, so that the Theme becomes Rheme by the time > you turn the last page. > > One of the skills my wife has to teach is how to read a title for Theme. A > couple of years ago, she was trying to do this with the work of Oscar > Wilde. One of the students responded quite strongly to the tragic work, but > not to the comic work, and she wondered why, since Wilde is mostly known > for his comic work. He dropped the class after midterms, and went back to > his home country; when his classmates were sitting their finals, he killed > himself. > > That was two years ago, and his classmates are graduating this year. My > wife is still trying to work out how to respond to writing "by theme", and > she even wrote an article about it, just published in MCA: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749039.2017.1351990 > > > I don't know if this really counts as a CHAT method of responding to > writing; I think of it as more social-semiotic. In this case, it didn't > work. But maybe for students who don't kill themselves, it gets better. > > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: Greg--why is "how do you make money with an anthro degree?" a stupid > question for someone who is not yet an anthro professor? Actually, I was > asking myself something rather similar about my linguistics degree just > this morning..... > > d > > > On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 4:23 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Michael, I'd be interested in hearing more about Alison Koenka's work > > (perhaps she could share a summary or some writing). > > Andrew, I'd be curious to hear how you "sell" this to various parties > > involved (esp. at the departmental and higher levels of admin, but also > to > > the students). > > -greg > > > > On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 11:08 AM, Glassman, Michael > > > wrote: > > > > > So here is an interesting story about the concept of feedback (not > > > apocryphal from what I have been able to figure out, but probably also > > > limited in scope). The concept of feedback was discussed a great deal > at > > > the Macy's conferences on cybernetics. In particular second order > > > cybernetics with Bateson and Mead and Lewin (and a host of others). > The > > > concept of continuous feedback loops that led to evolution of thought > and > > > action became a really important topic. If you read the works of these > > > thinkers it is really apparent. It is the central topic of Bateson's > Mind > > > and Nature I think (I wonder why his metaphor of bumps in the road > > creating > > > feedback loops never gained more traction). Anyway as the story goes > the > > > members of this particular conference were really interested in pushing > > > feedback forward as a concept. Lewin, who is one of my favorites > > > characters from academic history, it sounded like he was a total trip > to > > be > > > around, was so excited with the concept he immediately went out and > > started > > > telling people about it. Only the way he explained it it sounded more > > like > > > something you give somebody (a product) than a process, a continuous > loop > > > in which all involved are constantly changing and readjusting. > > > > > > So Lewin comes back to the next meeting of the conference and they tell > > > him, "No, no you're explaining it wrong. People are thinking that > > feedback > > > is something one organism gives another organism. Lewin realizes his > > > mistake and tells everybody not to worry, he's going to fix > everything. A > > > few days later he drops dead of a heart attack. And we have bee > > struggling > > > with the concept of feedback ever since. > > > > > > Andrew I admire your note giving grades. It is something I have stopped > > > doing a while ago. But there is definitely push back from students, > who > > > have been taught to expect this, and from faculty no matter what they > > say. > > > > > > For those who are interested Alison Koenka who is a post doc in my > > > department has done some really interesting work on this. She > basically > > > found that giving grades is detrimental to motivation (this is crossing > > > theoretical boundaries I know) on a whole host of issues. Basically it > > > seems nothing good comes from giving grades. If you give the type of > > > process oriented feedback it really improves motivation. I know she > had > > > presented this a bunch of places, not sure if she has it published yet. > > > But really interesting. > > > > > > But we are going to continue feedback as product, in the form of > > > grades....because. sight. > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Coppens, Andrew > > > Sent: Monday, July 31, 2017 11:50 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: studies of feedback on student writing? > > > > > > Hi Shirin, Greg, others, > > > > > > Thanks, this is a topic very near to my own interests as well. I?m not > > > aware of much research on ?writing as dialogue? that encourages > expansive > > > learning, unfortunately. Related, there is a good deal of supporting > > > evidence against the capitalization of academic work (e.g., Alexander > > > Sidorkin?s excellent work) and grades as extrinsic rewards (e.g., Alfie > > > Kohn?s dogged fight). Maja Wilson?s book Rethinking Rubrics has also > been > > > helpful. Both instructors and students collude in the capitalization of > > > academic work, though we tend to blame each other. > > > > > > I don?t use grades in my classes, which are writing intensive (a > practice > > > I learned from Barbara Rogoff and UC Santa Cruz, which for many years > did > > > not use letter grades opting for narrative performance evaluations; > there > > > are other institutions still doing so). The pushback I get from > students > > on > > > this puts sweat on my pre-tenure brow each semester, but I strongly > feel > > > that it is worth it. For nearly all of my students, this is the only > time > > > in their 15+ year schooling career that they?ve participated in a > > > non-letter-grade assessment system, and most are studying to become > > > teachers. Many students eventually come to agree with a narrative, > > > ideas-focused approach, but some don?t. Many of those that don?t are > with > > > me when we?re working closely together on their ideas in a paper, but > are > > > unwilling to ?experiment? with their GPA in a broader sense. And, I > > > understand that concern. > > > > > > Greg ? It has also been my experience that when grades and written > > > feedback exist side-by-side, written feedback gets reduced to or > > > interpreted as explaining the grade. The way in which the form of > > > assessment drives what?s possible is very powerful here. It conveys ? > > > again, to both students and instructors ? a strong sense of what the > > > ?conversation" is supposed to be about, as well as what our > relationship > > is > > > to each other. > > > > > > For me, one of the most promising transformations in expansive > approaches > > > to writing as a collaboration/conversation, supported by certain kinds > of > > > written comments and less so by others I would imagine, is that it has > a > > > meaningful purpose other than its evaluation. I?ve often overlooked the > > > proximal, more intimate purpose of writing for communication, looking > > for a > > > way to make student writing ?count? in a conventional sense (e.g., > > getting > > > it published in one or another venue ? I?ve been using Wikipedia for > this > > > for a few years). But, I think there?s a great deal of meaning to be > > > accessed in evolving a relationship and conversation, in writing, that > is > > > basically about developing and sharing an idea. > > > > > > I continue to try new things. Very interested to hear what others are > > > thinking/doing. Happy also to share how I ?sell? this to both students > > and > > > my Department. > > > > > > / Andrew > > > > > > --- > > > Andrew D. Coppens > > > Education Dept., University of New Hampshire > > > 302 Morrill Hall, 603-862-3736 > > > www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppens > > researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Coppens> > > > @andrewcoppens > > > > > > On Jul 31, 2017, at 11:08 AM, Greg Thompson < > > > mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > Shirin, > > > I find your suggestions for writing feedback as dialogue (and as > "writing > > > itself") to be a really fantastic idea. > > > My question is: How to accomplish your task in a world in which > education > > > and indeed knowledge have been thoroughly capital-ized? > > > How to fit this into the educational system of today in which not only > do > > > universities treat students as so many widgets to put out, but students > > see > > > often see themselves (or, at least, their "skills" and "knowledge") in > > > precisely this same way? > > > My anthropology students regularly tell me of the interrogations that > > they > > > endure with friends and family who ask them "But how can you make money > > > with an anthropology degree?" I'm unsure whether to tell my students > that > > > there are a million ways to make money with an anthropology degree or > > > whether I should tell them to respond with "That's a stupid question" > and > > > to go on to interrogate the grounds of the question. The former is more > > > practical, the latter is more revealing. > > > Shirin, I'm wondering if you are encountering this sort of thing? And > if > > > so, how might you "sell" such an alternative pedagogy to a capital-ized > > > university and its students? > > > Just for a little more context, I regularly have conversations with a > > > colleague in my department who was, for the past two years, tasked with > > > leading our students in the final write-up stage of their theses. He > > found > > > that they were often uninterested in feedback-as-dialogue. Rather, the > > vast > > > majority were interested in feedback as a way of telling them how to > get > > > the grade that they wanted. He was incredibly thoughtful and thorough > in > > > his comments and feedback but the students tended to ignore this > feedback > > > unless it had teeth (i.e. was directly connected with grades). > > > I am in a culturally peculiar context, but I'm not sure exactly how > > > peculiar. Shirin, do you encounter this same kind of thing at > > Northwestern? > > > (or other places you have taught?). > > > Perhaps you have some writing on this somewhere? > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:32 AM, Shirin Vossoughi < > > > shirinvossoughi@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > > > > Thank you for these David, very interesting. I sympathize with many of > > > your comments and am drawn to the moments when the more complex and > > > dialectical understandings of the ZPD become a meaningful tool for > > > mediation and practice. > > > > > > Your thoughts on the term "feedback" also got me thinking about the > > > ideological baggage that term may carry so thank you for that. What I'm > > > after these days is a way to understand the specific qualities of > > > educators' written commentary on student writing that support shifts > > > towards more expansive relationships with writing, ideas, self and > world. > > > feedback as dialogue, in a sense. but also as writing in itself. > > > > > > Shirin > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > Dear Shirin: > > > > > > I'm currently writing a rather tiresome article on the distortions of > > > Vygotsky's ideas we find in Lantolf, Thorne, and "sociocultural > theory" > > > generally. I won't bore you with the details: the gist is that the > "zone > > > of proximal development" was never designed to be tautological: > Vygotsky > > > did not think that the "next zone" was defined by being able to do > tasks, > > > and being able to do tasks was how you knew that the child was ready > for > > > the next zone of development (i.e. "the child is ready to learn > whatever > > > the child is ready to learn"). It was based on a serious study of child > > > development and an attempt to establish age periods that were immanent > to > > > the process of development itself (i.e. defined by the pace of > > > development--crises and stable periods--but relatable to the fruits of > > > development--as observable in language and verbal thinking). > > > > > > But inevitably part of what I have to do is to take out the garbage > that > > > has accrued around Vygotsky's name, to show how sociocultural theory > > > popularized Vygotsky by reducing all his ideas into extant "best > > > practices". At the time (the early nineties in second language writing > > > instruction) best practices were starting to move away from whole > > language > > > ideas based on providing the young writer with a "print rich > environment" > > > and plentiful "input" towards more social-behaviorist notions of "focus > > on > > > form" and "corrective feedback". The theoretical rationale was that the > > > former approach had been "cognitivist" whle the latter was > > "sociocultural", > > > because it involved interaction between minds which was then > > "internalized" > > > within the learner's mind. > > > > > > Here are some key articles from Lantolfian "sociocultural theory" which > > do > > > this: > > > > > > Aljaafreh, A. & Lantolf, J.P. (1994). Negative feedback as regulation > and > > > second language learning in the zone of proximal development. Modern > > > Language Journal, 78, 465-483. > > > > > > De Guerrero, M.C.M. & Villamil, O.S. (2000). Activating the ZPD: Mutual > > > scaffolding in L2 peer revision. Modern Language Journal, 84, 51-68. > > > > > > Poehner, M.E. (2012). The zone of proximal development and the genesis > of > > > self-assessment. Modern Language Journal, 96 (4) 610-622. > > > > > > Poehner, M.E. & Lantolf, J.P. (2010). Vygotsky?s teaching-assessment > > > dialectic and L2 education: The case for Dynamic Assessment. Mind, > > Culture, > > > and Activity, 17 (4) 312-330. > > > > > > Poehner, M.E. and Lantolf, J.P. (2013). Bringing the ZPD into the > > > equation: > > > Capturing L2 development during Computerized Dynamic Assessment (C-DA). > > > Language Teaching Research, 17 (3) 323-342. > > > > > > Needless to say, I don't recommend any of these. Don't get me wrong: I > > too > > > am an agitator and not a propagandist; I want a few simple ideas I can > > > give to lots of teachers rather than a whole complex system that can > only > > > be mastered by a few. Like you, I firmly I believe that it is possible > to > > > popularize without vulgarizing, and I even think the demotic forms of > > > theory are the most democratic and ultimately the most profound. > > > > > > I too have a strong sympathy for the teacher training approach that > > > analyzes best practices and tries to abstract best principles, and then > > > shows how these are perfectly compatible with high theory. I even think > > > that at some point it is useful to try to show teachers that they were > > > "unconscious" Vygotskyans all the long. > > > > > > But this stuff isn't that. It's just bait and switch: The zone of > > proximal > > > development was not and never will be a form of corrective feedback, > and > > > the very word "feedback" suggests the behaviorist theory that it really > > > belongs to. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 3:46 AM, Shirley Franklin < > > > s.franklin08@btinternet.com> > wrote: > > > > > > I know people in this project have done research on feedback on > academic > > > writing. > > > Also, we discussed people's work on this in the Academic Literacies > > Forum > > > in the Institute of Education in London. Brian Street, who sadly died > > > recently, had a lot to say about it. > > > > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www. > > > thinkingwriting.qmul.ac.uk_&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r= > > > T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m= > > > Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s= > > ZUJX4MQ64FQpHTkDTctQKvgNmO7_ > > > anSsnUffmaXYejY&e= > > > > > > Shirley > > > Sent from my iPad > > > > > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 19:00, Shirin Vossoughi > > mailto:shirinvossoughi@gmail.com>> > > > wrote: > > > > > > Dear all, > > > I am writing to ask if anyone might have suggestions for CHAT or > > > socio-cultural studies of written feedback on student writing? > > > Thank you, > > > Shirin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__byu. > > > academia.edu_GregoryThompson&d=DwIFaQ&c=c6MrceVCY5m5A_KAUkrdoA&r= > > > T292xnKwVOMtoHKpeIK_s9mDPzJBSXg6AqnqQfLlAoc&m= > > > Q7JWnLWOxMzH0kIzXYwfdMZBM51LHFXIf1cAZ6I2-fE&s= > > > 2I7yxfBLCBIrsPahSJUgYrJsL7n5a6jlg4l7na88wL0&e= > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > From avramus@gmail.com Fri Jul 28 13:55:54 2017 From: avramus@gmail.com (Alexandre Sourmava) Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 20:55:54 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6CdCe0YLQsjogUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4?= =?utf-8?q?=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <742523756.2174699.1501275354151@mail.yahoo.com> Dearfriends! First, excuse me for the delay with my reaction to your posts. Among otherthings I met difficultieswith putting my answer here. David,thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word ??????????. I agree with you, that the best translation willbe ?conventional?. This term coincides well enoughwith Vygotsky?s idea that mature word in developmentof infant?s speech is something entirely "random","reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mereagreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????)? As for Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I?llagree with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's andPavlov's conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov?s ?teaching? wascanonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later, closer to1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy of Science.So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? evidently shade in Luria?s andLeont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of Vygotsky's idea of HMFand Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not something coincidental. Anyhow, thissubject deserves seriousinquiry. Mike, yourhistorical meeting with Bernshtein was something fabulous!!! ?Had you a chance to have a chat with him this time orlater, and had you discussed with Alexander Romanovitch Bernstein?s ideas? Thank you Mike for attached pdf with ?Soviet psychology?. It is somethingfantastically interesting. I am much younger than heroes of thebook, so even from my soviet perspective it looks extremely colourful :-) and indeedit explains much? Andy, Ilike very much your witty formula ?In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he?is adead end? :-) But I decisively disagree with you? I probably have too many objections to Vygotsky's theorizing, but regarding Spinoza?s(and Marx?s) role in future psychology I agree with him absolutely. I can not agree with you that ?Any?attempt to deploy Spinozian ontology in experimental?Psychologyis a charade? too. Surely, it is impossible to try to apply Spinozian ideas to (andeven this in the best case) so called ?experimental?Psychology? which is basedon primitive Cartesian logic. ? However, I?m sure that Hegels?smotto that Spinozism is a necessary basis of any genuine philosophizing is as true now as it was twohundred years ago, and that it can be applied to psychology as well. ? All the best! Sasha P.S. In a few days I hope to finish updating of full Russianversion of ?Ilyenkov and revolution in psychology?. I?ll put it here and onAcademy.edu ??: mike cole ????: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" ??????????: ???????, 27 ???? 2017 6:35 ????: [Xmca-l] Re: ???: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza Hi David-- Sure you can speak for Luria, you often do ! And knowing him does not equal understanding him and his complicated history. Still learning. Vygotsky died early, right on time, perhaps. Luria lived almost as long as i have. And through even more interesting times, worse his luck. I assume Vygotsky was referring to the idea of a "second signaling system" in his comment about Pavlov recognizing the signs were special? Luria and (and others) leaned heavily on this concept in their adjustments to post war Stalinist psychology. It was their use of this concept that created a bridge to the mis-understanding Americans who thought of themselves as learning theorists.It provided a way for me to connect my graduate training with the Vygotskian ideas that Luria was seeking to propagate (by my understanding of him). Hence my interest in your inclusion of conditional reflexes in your list that leads to conventions in a manner that points to some sort of common view. I believe this discussion is not unrelated to the invocation of N.A. Bernshtein by Sasha. On my first day in Luria's lab there were two guests. Me and Nicholas Bernshtein. Just an accident, perhaps . mike On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's > strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion. > > a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls > Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably connect > the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer to > home. > > b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like "Even > a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how it > differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist physiologists > like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too. > > c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard exchange, > precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard > operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular > caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice works > either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the cerebrum > and between cerebrums. > > Marie is only six years old > Information, please! > Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee.... > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc > (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis > was > > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were > > approriated by > > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor. > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and > > "irrational" > > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" > > that > > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" > or > > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any > > sound > > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has > a > > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. > > The > > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a > semantic > > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic > code > > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > > > > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that > ?????????? > > is > > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost > > anything, > > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", > > "conditionality", > > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position > and > > > Spinoza's. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Hi, Larry! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning > > the > > > > topicunder discussion. > > > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > > antisemiotic. > > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > > arbitrary > > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > > > (independence > > > > from mechanical causality). > > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole > realm > > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So > the > > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > history > > > and > > > > evolution together.? > > > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > > > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > ??????????????-????????????? > > ? > > > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > > > > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > > ????? ? > > > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > > > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > > Pavlov?s > > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these > two > > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who > was > > > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > > > > > > Sasha Surmava > > > > > > > >? ? ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > > ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > >? I see. > > > > > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > > > work, was a "founding exemplar." > > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > > > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > Andy, > > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > > > will open another thread. > > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > > > > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > > > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.? It is > > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > >? ? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > > >? ? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > > >? ? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > > > > > > >? ? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > > >? ? Larry. > > > > > > > > > >? ? Andy > > > > > > > > > >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >? ? Andy Blunden > > > > >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > >? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > decision-making > > > > >? ? > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > > > > >? ? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Andy, > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > > > >>? ? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > > > >>? ? variable? social actions. This doubling? (by > > > > >>? ? including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > > > >>? ? meaning as you mention. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > > > >>? ? (examples)? > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > > > >>? ? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > > > >>? ? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > > > >>? ? actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > > > >>? ? (framework) practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? (framework) practices being another doubling. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? So moving (transforming) from single social? examples > > > > >>? ? through exemplary social? examples crystallizing in > > > > >>? ? social framework practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Is this reasonable? > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Or not > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? *From: *Andy Blunden > > > > >>? ? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > > > >>? ? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >>? ? > > > > >>? ? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > > > >>? ? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > > > >>? ? mention > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > > > >>? ? *action* are > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > > > >>? ? "singular" action. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > > > >>? ? form, but > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > > > >>? ? activity, > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? activities) and the set of words (practice, > > > > >>? ? practices) have > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? no systematic difference running across all > > > > >>? ? disciplines and > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > > > >>? ? practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > > > >>? ? (Tatigkeit) > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Aktivitat at all. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Andy > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Andy Blunden > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > > decision-making > > > > >>? ? > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Alexander, Mike, > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Thanks for the article. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > > > >>? ? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > > > >>? ? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > > > >>? ? of practice in knowing). > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Two formulas: > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > > > >>? ? do not co-incide > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Action IS individual > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Practice IS a social category. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > > > >>? ? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > > > >>? ? individual who are separate. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > > > >>? ? They are alike in that both individual action & a > > > > >>? ? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > I do not have the background to intelligently > > > > >>? ? comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > > > >>? ? FOR further thought and wording. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Ivan > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > -- > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > festina lente > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > > > >>? ? wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > > > >>? ? have been discussing > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> LSV's sources in > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> marx and spinoza. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> mike > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From avramus@gmail.com Sat Jul 29 03:51:44 2017 From: avramus@gmail.com (Alexandre Sourmava) Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2017 10:51:44 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza References: <543595242.2483287.1501325504079.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <543595242.2483287.1501325504079@mail.yahoo.com> Dearfriends! First, excuse me for the delay with my reaction to your posts. Among otherthings I metdifficulties with putting my answer here (I have sent it twice without any effect :-( ). David,thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word ??????????. I agree with you, that the best translation willbe ?conventional?. This term coincides well enoughwith Vygotsky?s idea that mature word in development of infant?s speech is something entirely "random","reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mereagreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????)? As for Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I?llagree with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's andPavlov's conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov?s ?teaching? wascanonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later, closer to1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy ofScience. So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? evidently shade in Luria?sand Leont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of Vygotsky's idea ofHMF and Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not something coincidental. Anyhow,this subject deserves seriousinquiry. Mike, yourhistorical meeting with Bernshtein was something fabulous!!! ?Had you a chance to have a chat with him this time orlater, and had you discussed with Alexander Romanovitch Bernstein?s ideas? Thank you Mike for attached pdf with ?Soviet psychology?. It is somethingfantastically interesting. I am much younger than heroes of thebook, so even from my soviet perspective it looks extremely colourful :-) andindeed it explains much? Andy, Ilike very much your witty formula ?In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he?is adead end? :-) But I decisively disagree with you? I probably have too many objections to Vygotsky's theorizing, but regardingSpinoza?s (and Marx?s) role in future psychology I agree with him absolutely. I can not agree with you that ?Any?attempt to deploy Spinozian ontology in experimental?Psychologyis a charade? too. Surely, it is impossible to try to apply Spinozian ideas to(and even this in the best case) so called ?experimental?Psychology? whichis based on primitive Cartesian logic.? However, I?m sure thatHegels?s motto that Spinozism is a necessary basis of any genuine philosophizing is as true now as it was twohundred years ago, and that it can be applied to psychology as well.? All the best! Sasha P.S. In a few days I hope to finish updating of fullRussian version of ?Ilyenkov and revolution in psychology?. I?ll put it hereand on Academy.edu From avramus@gmail.com Sun Jul 30 16:13:50 2017 From: avramus@gmail.com (Alexandre Sourmava) Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2017 23:13:50 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6CdCe0YLQsjogUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4?= =?utf-8?q?=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <373558886.3421481.1501456430687@mail.yahoo.com> Mike,your historical meeting with Bernshtein wassomething fabulous!!! ?Had you a chance to have a chat with him this time or later, and hadyou discussed with Alexander Romanovitch Bernstein?s ideas? Thank you Mike for attachedpdf with ?Soviet psychology?. It is something fantastically interesting. I am muchyounger than heroes of the book, so even from my soviet perspectiveit looks extremely colourful :-) and indeed it explains much? Sasha ???????, 27 ???? 2017 6:35 mike cole ?????(?): Hi David-- Sure you can speak for Luria, you often do ! And knowing him does not equal understanding him and his complicated history. Still learning. Vygotsky died early, right on time, perhaps. Luria lived almost as long as i have. And through even more interesting times, worse his luck. I assume Vygotsky was referring to the idea of a "second signaling system" in his comment about Pavlov recognizing the signs were special? Luria and (and others) leaned heavily on this concept in their adjustments to post war Stalinist psychology. It was their use of this concept that created a bridge to the mis-understanding Americans who thought of themselves as learning theorists.It provided a way for me to connect my graduate training with the Vygotskian ideas that Luria was seeking to propagate (by my understanding of him). Hence my interest in your inclusion of conditional reflexes in your list that leads to conventions in a manner that points to some sort of common view. I believe this discussion is not unrelated to the invocation of N.A. Bernshtein by Sasha. On my first day in Luria's lab there were two guests. Me and Nicholas Bernshtein. Just an accident, perhaps . mike On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I can't speak for Luria, Mike--you knew him and I didn't. But Vygotsky's > strategy with Pavlov seems to me more than mere discretion. > > a) He doesn't pull any punches when he's talking about Watson. He calls > Thorndike the "Last of the Mohicans". I think people could probably connect > the dots, and see that he was really talking about something much closer to > home. > > b) When he does talk about Pavlov (e.g. in HDHMF) he says things like "Even > a physiologist like Pavlov has to admit the uniqueness of the sign, how it > differs from other forms of stimulus". If even anti-mentalist physiologists > like Pavlov recognize this, then we should recognize it too. > > c) He likes Pavlov's comparison of the cerebrum to a switchboard exchange, > precisely because the switchboard doesn't explain either the switchboard > operator, the caller, or the receiver. Of course, positing a homuncular > caller, switchboard operator and receiver doesn't explain how choice works > either, but it is a step in the right direction, viz., outside the cerebrum > and between cerebrums. > > Marie is only six years old > Information, please! > Try to put me through to her in Memphis, Tennessee.... > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KrbPlr4Wskc > (In Memoriam, Chuck Berry) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:27 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > What is the difference for Pavlov, David? For him the unit of analysis > was > > the conditional reflex. He studied mostly dogs but his ideas were > > approriated by > > Luria et al when it seemed like the better part of valor. > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de > > > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and > > "irrational" > > > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator" > > that > > > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" > or > > > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any > > sound > > > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has > a > > > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named. > > The > > > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a > semantic > > > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic > code > > > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or > > > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein. > > > > > > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that > ?????????? > > is > > > better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality. > > > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost > > anything, > > > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign. > > > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are > > > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex", > > "conditionality", > > > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position > and > > > Spinoza's. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Hi, Larry! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you for your attentionto the article. > > > > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct. > > > > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning > > the > > > > topicunder discussion. > > > > Bernstein?s position is substantially spinozian and thereby > > antisemiotic. > > > > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky?sattempts to use > > arbitrary > > > > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom > > > (independence > > > > from mechanical causality). > > > > Thus Vygotsky insisted that > > > > ?Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole > realm > > > > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So > the > > > > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a > > > > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds > history > > > and > > > > evolution together.? > > > > (?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????, > > > > ????????, ????? ? ??? ??????? ??????????. ? ???? ?????? ????????????? > > > > ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? > ??????????????-????????????? > > ? > > > > ?????????? ? ????????, ????, ??????? ????????? ???????? ????????? > > > > > > > > ??????????. ?. ??????????????? ????? ? ????. ? ??.: ????????????? > > ????? ? > > > > ????(1917-1927 ??.)?. ?., 1928, ?. 30.) > > > > > > > > There exists a prejudice that so called ?Cultural-historical theory? > > > > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse > > Pavlov?s > > > > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these > two > > > > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who > was > > > > Vygotsky?s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas. > > > > > > > > Sasha Surmava > > > > > > > >? ? ???????, 25 ???? 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden > > > ?????(?): > > > > > > > > > > > >? I see. > > > > > > > > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning > > > > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's > > > > work, was a "founding exemplar." > > > > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example." > > > > > > > > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances > > > > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > > > > > > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > Andy, > > > > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking > > > > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting > > > > > will open another thread. > > > > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and > > > > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for > > > > > Intellectual Historians" -2009- > > > > > > > > > > PAGE 270: > > > > > > > > > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual > > > > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain > > > > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.? It is > > > > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm' > > > > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original > > > > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED > > > > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the > > > > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such > > > > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a > > > > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch > > > > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of > > > > > creative intellectual work. " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the > > > > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept > > > > > *paradigm* seemed generative?? > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > >? ? "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed. > > > > >? ? Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single" > > > > >? ? only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague. > > > > > > > > > >? ? Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all, > > > > >? ? Larry. > > > > > > > > > >? ? Andy > > > > > > > > > >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >? ? Andy Blunden > > > > >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > >? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > decision-making > > > > >? ? > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > > > > >? ? On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Andy, > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Following your lead it may be preferable to say > > > > >>? ? single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of > > > > >>? ? variable? social actions. This doubling? (by > > > > >>? ? including both terms) may crystallize the intended > > > > >>? ? meaning as you mention. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Andy is this vein can we also include the term > > > > >>? ? (examples)? > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Then the moving TRANS forming from single > > > > >>? ? (individual) social acts towards (practices) would > > > > >>? ? indicate the movement from examples to exemplary > > > > >>? ? actions and further movement (historicity) toward > > > > >>? ? (framework) practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? (framework) practices being another doubling. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? So moving (transforming) from single social? examples > > > > >>? ? through exemplary social? examples crystallizing in > > > > >>? ? social framework practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Is this reasonable? > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Or not > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? *From: *Andy Blunden > > > > >>? ? *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM > > > > >>? ? *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >>? ? > > > > >>? ? *Cc: *Alexander Surmava > > > > >>? ? *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you > > > > >>? ? mention > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? to say that *actions* - the individual units of > > > > >>? ? *action* are > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? individual? In which can it is of course a tautology. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? "individual" action. Or better, so is every > > > > >>? ? "singular" action. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun > > > > >>? ? form, but > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? on the whole the set of words (action, actions, > > > > >>? ? activity, > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? activities) and the set of words (practice, > > > > >>? ? practices) have > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? no systematic difference running across all > > > > >>? ? disciplines and > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are > > > > >>? ? practices. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? German words for action (Handlung) and activity > > > > >>? ? (Tatigkeit) > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Aktivitat at all. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Andy > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? Andy Blunden > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > > > decision-making > > > > >>? ? > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Alexander, Mike, > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Thanks for the article. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing > > > > >>? ? Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and > > > > >>? ? did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role > > > > >>? ? of practice in knowing). > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Two formulas: > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > ? Knowing THROUGH ?action? > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > ? Verification of knowing THROUGH ?practice? > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but > > > > >>? ? do not co-incide > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Action IS individual > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Practice IS a social category. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is > > > > >>? ? nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of > > > > >>? ? individual who are separate. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment. > > > > >>? ? They are alike in that both individual action & a > > > > >>? ? single experiment are poorly suited to the role of : > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > A philosophical criterion of (truth). > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > I do not have the background to intelligently > > > > >>? ? comment, but did register this theme as provocative > > > > >>? ? FOR further thought and wording. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > And for generating intelligent commentary > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > From: Ivan Uemlianin > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Cc: Alexander Surmava > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan) > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > Ivan > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > -- > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > festina lente > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole > > > > >>? ? wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> This article might prove of interest to those who > > > > >>? ? have been discussing > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> LSV's sources in > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> marx and spinoza. > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> mike > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? >> > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > >>? ? > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From avramus@gmail.com Thu Jul 27 20:20:54 2017 From: avramus@gmail.com (Alexandre Sourmava) Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 03:20:54 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?0J7RgtCyOiAgUmU6CdCe0YLQsjogUmU6IElseWVua292LCBNYXJ4?= =?utf-8?q?=2C_=26_Spinoza?= In-Reply-To: References: <34B9071B-F6EB-4519-9BD1-8F4F08734536@llaisdy.com> <5975f8dd.4982620a.73b1d.de93@mx.google.com> <5976016e.06b9630a.9e646.aee8@mx.google.com> <0c2bc66b-266c-6a05-8a75-93ed6bd50283@mira.net> <626607897.1178989.1501021636466@mail.yahoo.com> <1501151358067.38295@iped.uio.no> <1501160318554.73200@iped.uio.no> <664d01d4-17f9-19f8-a530-78bdd8e12652@mira.net> <1501168603399.55180@iped.uio.no> <103e4390-a9dc-b71d-ddba-f003640d48d3@mira.net> <597a5305.0bca620a.287f7.9819@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <2033939024.1348779.1501212054193@mail.yahoo.com> Dearfriends! Hi all! First, excuse me for the delay with my reaction to your posts. David,thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of word ??????????. I agree with you, that the best translation willbe conventional. This term coincides well enoughwith Vygotsky?s idea that mature word in developmentof infants speech is something entirely "random","reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mereagreement (conventions). (See ??????? ? ???? ? ???????? ????????)? As for Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I?llagree with David again, I do think that it was not mere discretion. Pavlov?s ?teaching?was canonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later, closerto 1950 ? the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy ofScience. So a fresh trauma of this ?historical event? evidently shade in Luria?sand Leont?ev?s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of Vygotsky's idea ofHMF and Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not something coincidental. Anyhow,this subject deserves seriousinquiry. Mike, your historical meetingwith Bernshtein was something fabulous!!!?Have you a chance to have a chat with him this time or later, and have you discussed withAlexander Romanovitch Bernstein?s ideas? Thank you Mike for attached pdf with ?Soviet psychology?. It is somethingfantastically interesting. I am much younger than heros of thisbook, so even from my soviet perspective it looks extremely colourful :-) and indeedit explains much? Andy, I like very much your witty formula ?In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer adead dog, but he?is a dead end? :-) But I decisively disagree with you? I probably have too many objections to Vygotsky's theorizing, but regarding Spinoza?s(and Marx?s) role in future psychology I agree with him absolutely. I can not agree with you that ?Any?attempt to deploy Spinozian ontology in experimental?Psychologyis a charade? too. Surely, it is impossible to try to apply Spinozian ideas tobased on primitive Cartesian logic (and even this in the best case) so called ?experimental?Psychology?.? However, I?m sure that Hegels?smoto that Spinozism is a necessary basis of any genuine philosophizing is as true now as it was twohundred years ago, and that it can be applied to psychology as well. ? All the best! Sasha In afew days I hope to finish updating of full Russian version of the article ?Ilyenkovand revolution in psychology? and I will put it here and on Academy.edu ???????, 28 ???? 2017 3:32 mike cole ?????(?): David- Your wrote, in part. Mike--thanks for the stuff on pedology. I remember the text--I remember discussing it with you, and how personally affronted you felt by it, actually--but the Genevans (Bernard Schneuwly, Jean-Paul Bronckart, Irina Leopoldoff-Martin) are trying to establish pedology as a "once and future discipline", and this is a project I feel very much part of these days. So I am starting to feel as you do about it. Very interesting to be pointed back to the prior discussion. I had forgotten it. Re-reading it, it seems I was not distressed by the intro essay, which I did not focus on, but by Leontiev's writing, which Clay Spinuzzi asked about. I locked in on that quotation because it identified where LSV stood with the powers that were and a view of pedology that is where Leontiev stood at the time. Notice that Luria is not included in the book. His book on the role of speech in the development of normal and abnormal behavior, which is on the lchc web site, grew out of talks given in London in the late 1950's where he was using second signal language as a mode of survival ( i believe). The internal tensions within the group associated with LSV must have been horrendous. Brrrrr. Good luck on the project to re-cover pedology. It needs recovering! mike mike On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 4:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Right, Ivan. For Halliday, the difference is "instantiation"--instances of > matter and instances of meaning. The point is that there aren't two > different phenomena, one infinite and another finite. They are just two > different ways of looking at the same thing, like climate and weather, or > language and text, or culture and situation. A table is an "instance" of > meaning en-mattered (to mint a meaning), and an idea is an "instance" of > matter en-meaninged. > > I don't actually think that either matter or meaning is infinite in exactly > the sense that Spinoza had in mind: for my purposes, it is enough to think > of a culture as the sum total of all the historical situations, and its > language as the sum total of all of its produced texts. When I have to > think about the universe, I just think of it as the sum total of all the > actually existing matter and all the existing meaning. For now. But to tell > the truth, I think about the universe even less than it thinks about me: I > am afraid I feel more akin to Spinoza the lens grinder than to Spinoza the > philosopher. > > Mike--thanks for the stuff on pedology. I remember the text--I remember > discussing it with you, and how personally affronted you felt by it, > actually--but the Genevans (Bernard Schneuwly, Jean-Paul Bronckart, Irina > Leopoldoff-Martin) are trying to establish pedology as a "once and future > discipline", and this is a project I feel very much part of these days. So > I am starting to feel as you do about it. > > Right now I am writing about questions--how they are formed, how they are > used, and how we turn them back on themselves--e.g. what I just did. One of > the real problems with Vygotsky's model of concept formation is what > Ruqaiya Hasan called its overly experiential focus (the focus on > representations). It seems to me that if we think about the adolescent > forming a world view in interpersonal terms (that is, inevitably including > affect and social power as well as representations of events and entities), > we find that "question" is sometimes more useful than "concept". > > dk > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 7:49 AM, Ivan Uemlianin wrote: > > > Dear David > > > > Sorry to quibble, but your email (4th para) doesn't seem to be using > > "mode" in the same way as Spinoza (in the Ethics). In the Ethics, > Substance > > has infinite Attributes, two of which (the only two humans can be > affected > > by) are Extension and Thought. Modes are finite particulars (eg tables > and > > ideas). > > > > How Spinoza would categorise the laws of thermodynamics is a whole nother > > question. > > > > Best wishes > > > > Ivan > > @ilyenkov_et_al > > > > > > -- > > festina lente > > > > > > > On 27 Jul 2017, at 22:26, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > Actually, Andy, there are people who defend Spinoza's formulation of a > > > single substance with two modes. Halliday is one. I am another. > > > > > > Consider the way in which you read Hegel. You don't actually use the > term > > > for an explanatory principle which he chose, namely "Geist" or > "Spirit". > > > Sometimes you use Leontiev's term, "Activity", and sometimes you use > your > > > own, much more Spinozan, term: "project". > > > > > > Spinoza actually TELLS us how to read his explanatory principle "Deus > > Sive > > > Natura", or "God, that is to say, Nature". So the is one substance, and > > we > > > can call it "Nature". Culture has to be understood as an emergent part > of > > > that nature. > > > > > > The two modes are matter, of course, and a form of organization of that > > > matter, a kind of countercurrent to entropy, we can call "meaning". > > Meaning > > > matter that has been organized in some way to stand for something that > is > > > not itself. Nature is one substance, with two modes: matter, that is > > > subject to the laws of thermodynamics (laws which do indeed distinguish > > > between past and future, just as Peter does), and meaning, which is > > matter > > > that has granted itself temporary surcease from them. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > PS: I always thought that the great advantage of "project" over > > "activity" > > > was that it demystifies how this temporary surcease might work among > > > humans. To understand Spinoza's idea of "God"as a semiotic version of > > > "Nature" all we really have to do is to ask ourselves what "projects" > > might > > > look like among non-human, non-sentient, and non-living entities: > > colonies, > > > ecologies, and systems. > > > > > > dk > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >