[Xmca-l] Re: Perezhivanie of perezhivanie

[mike cole]

excellent journal, too.
:-)
mike

On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 2:16 PM, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
> wrote:

> Ho ho ho!
>
> >
> > Well, it would be better that they obtain larger stockings!  :)
> >
> > M
>
> >
> >> On Dec 19, 2017, at 4:09 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> Those who find that Martin's book won't quite fit in their stockings
> should
> >> look at Martin's 2008 article "Is Vygotsky relevant?"
> >>
> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749030701798607
> >>
> >> Scrooges can get a free pre-draft by googling "Is Vygotsky Relevant".
> For
> >> some reason the LCHC link doesn't work any more, and the paper doesn't
> >> appear to be on Martin's website any more either.
> >>
> >>
> >> David Kellogg
> >>
> >> Recent Article in *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 24 (4) 'Metaphoric,
> >> Metonymic, Eclectic, or Dialectic? A Commentary on “Neoformation: A
> >> Dialectical Approach to Developmental Change”'
> >>
> >> Free e-print available (for a short time only) at
> >>
> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAWPBtmPM8knMCNg6sS6/full
> >>
> >>
> >> On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 4:58 AM, Martin John Packer <
> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
> >>> wrote:
> >>
> >>> On Dec 18, 2017, at 7:43 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> <mailto:d
> >>> kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> For example, when Wolff-Michael says that Vygotsky rejected
> >>> both "scientific" and "interpretive" psychology, he doesn't mention the
> >>> context, which is "History of the Crisis in Psychology". Vygotsky's
> talking
> >>> about reflexology on the one hand and Dilthey's "interpretive"
> psychology
> >>> on the other. It's not about "quantitative" and "qualitative" research
> at
> >>> all.
> >>>
> >>> If this is what Michael was referring to, then yes Vygotsky does reject
> >>> Dilthey’s approach to social science, and he rejects Dilthey’s
> division of
> >>> the natural sciences and the human sciences — sciences of spirit — as
> yet
> >>> another version of dualism. It’s not quite true that this has nothing
> to do
> >>> with contemporary conceptions of ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’
> research,
> >>> in so far as people on both sides of this divide today continue to
> accept
> >>> Dilthey’s proposal that the natural sciences can provide ‘explanation’
> >>> whereas the human sciences, using interpretive investigation, can
> provide
> >>> only ‘description.’ I reject this proposal.
> >>>
> >>> There are other problems with Dilthey’s version of interpretive
> inquiry. I
> >>> write in SQR that on the one hand "hermeneutics, for Dilthey, is the
> theory
> >>> of how life discloses and expresses itself in cultural works....
> >>> Interpretation aims to go beyond subjectivity to the
> 'thought-constituting
> >>> work' of life itself. For Dilthey, understanding is not a purely
> cognitive
> >>> matter, but life grasping life in and through a full and rich contact
> that
> >>> escapes rational theorizing.”
> >>>
> >>> This remains a powerful idea. However, on the other hand:
> >>>
> >>> “[Dilthey] recognized that the objects of inquiry in the human sciences
> >>> are historical phenomena, but he could not fully accept the
> implications of
> >>> his own belief that the inquirer, the interpreter, is also always
> >>> historically situated. It is ironic that someone who emphasized the
> >>> historical character of our experience wanted to provide
> interpretations
> >>> that would transcend history.... If we are thoroughly involved in
> history
> >>> it is difficult to see how we can achieve an objective viewpoint on
> human
> >>> phenomena, yet this was the goal that Dilthey struggled all his life to
> >>> achieve. He had accepted the dominant ideology of science as an
> activity
> >>> that provides objective knowledge, but he could not identify a solid
> >>> foundation for objective knowledge in the human sciences, whose
> legitimacy
> >>> he sought to define.”
> >>>
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>>
> >
> >
>
>


-- 
"The past isn't dead, it isn't even past."
- William Faulkner