[Xmca-l] Fw: Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading
Haydi Zulfei
haydizulfei@rocketmail.com
Tue Aug 22 11:36:27 PDT 2017
----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 22:40:47
Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading
Thank you for your solemn answering , Andy.
I follow your responses not my questions. I admit too many questions but they are related at least for me.
I have not reached 'moment' in Hegel yet but first it was Wolff-Michael years ago who referred to it on debates and ever since I've got to be clear with it at no cost. If I may ... I would say "each moment IS the whole" might be a little bit faulty ; and it might cross your saying of wholes and parts to David ; being a whole despite containing parts ; you here differentiate between moments and parts yet I do not get the distinction ; I would say if moments and parts are matters of Natures of Phenomena or again it's our 'mind' which creates the problem , ontology/epistemology things! ; is it the case that whatever thing we're talking about , finites vs infinite , determinate being/emptiness/filledness/nothingness/transition/becoming/concepts/notion/ought/actuality vs clock parts , we can talk of wholes and parts?
Could we say parts of a clock are moments of its wholeness ? Surely No. Does its wholeness refer to its functioning as measuring of time ? I would not enter topic of activity. But David's 'uncongealed relations' could be a case in point. Could say phenomena and processes if looked at in their unified oneness , contiguous cosmos/world/universe , are wholes and thencefrom moments in each angle of visioning .
Right with 'sum of the parts etc. part=component yet 'exclusive' does not work. In the entity or body of the clock , parts/components find a meaning not in their disparity and separateness/discreteness . A matter of 'inclusion' . This takes us right to the Theses in regard to objects not dealt with sensually and the very congealed human relations in 'commodities' .
I wonder if so far 'realm' is elucidated.
Again with permission , if determinate being is 'emptiness' as for Hegel , nothingness also emptiness for him , 'becoming' attained out of their interaction . Am I mistaken with these terms in Hegel. He repeatedly returns to these terms and I cannot understand or imagine such mechanism with 'material' and 'ideal' in Mind. In our previous discussion I talked of Hegel as the Master of Categories and Concepts (Notion) but not of 'matter' as Marx was ; Such argumentation in the body of the Logic puts me in doubt again as to the very small difference you mentioned. I do confirm your sagacity in such matters but the fact is that I really struggle with the complications . Determinate being 'part' of Being as nothing? Being=Notion , not least close to 'matter' ? Actuality part of 'reflection' ? What reflection? Reflection of Nothingness ? I still continue to understand , Andy.
With 'who' I meant types of philosophers . This I should pursue to know myself. I'm still bound to materialism vs idealism as this latter one as taking us to nowhere where nothing is full of everything not the idea emanating from complex matter.
Thank you ! Whole is a Relative term ! That's it !
Figuring out what IS mediating between actions , as you strongly grasp to it and teach us , is , artefacts as signs . Either I'm erring or artefacts ARE NOT thoughts. Evidence is 'Thinking and Speech' .
Many thanks for this : [Lenin was fully aware of the 'different senses' in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage.]
Today I should repeatedly give my thanks to you , Andy , because I feel so close to you in understanding. Of course Hegel does not stop at criticizing Spinoza maybe because Spinoza is not a man of Notion as he himself is or maybe for some Spinoza is more idealistic than Hegel is . I'd like to quote just one reference in this respect. But it needs another post.
Thank you you were so patient as to be ready and willing to answer my questions . It's very good to learn from others in an appropriate manner. I'll be back to learn more when necessary. Have a sweet good night!
Best wishes
Haydi
P.S.
thought will not apply itself to finding out what is impliedin the Notion, then it can be directed to the world of actuality where suchproportions show themselves to be completely unreal. just because thought is supposed to be superiorto actuality, to dwell apart from it in higher regions and therefore to beitself determined as an ought-to-be, on the one hand, it does not advance to the Notion, and, onthe other hand, it stands in just as untrue a relation to actuality as it doesto the Notion. If, however, an existence contains the Notion not merely asan abstract in-itself, but as an explicit, self-determined totality, asinstinct, life, ideation, etc., then in its own strength it overcomes thelimitation and attains a being beyond it. What, however, the thing-in-itself is in truth, what trulyis in itself, of this logic is the exposition, in which however somethingbetter than an abstraction is understood by 'in-itself', namely, what somethingis in its Notion; but the Notion is concrete within itself, is comprehensiblesimply as Notion, and as determined within itself and the connected whole ofits determinations, is cognisable. the first was only an implicit (ansich seiende) alteration belonging to theinner Notion or rather, since in fact they are directlyconnected, that is in their Notion We must observe the development of this Notion, which manifests itself, however, rather as anentanglement and a contradiction. This contradiction is atonce to be found in the circumstance that the limit, as something's negationreflected into itself, contains ideally in it the moments of something and other, and these,as distinguished moments, are at the same time posited in the sphere ofdeterminate being as really, qualitatively distinct. It is in accordance with this difference of something fromits limit that the line appears as line only outside its limit, the point; theplane as plane outside the line; the solid as solid only outside its limitingsurface. It is primarily this aspect of limit which is seized bypictorial thought — the self-externality of the Notion — and especially, too,in reference to spatial objects. just as one, for example as hundredth, is the limit, butalso the element, of the whole hundred. so that the point, through its Notion, passes out of itselfinto the line, moves in itself and gives rise to the line, and so on, lies in the Notionof limit which is immanent in the something. From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 19:22:39
Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fw: Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading
Haydi, you know that is far too many questions at once for me. But I will try some quick-fire answers and see how far I can get. 'Moment' has a special meaning in Hegel, not unrelated to its mathematical meaning: each moment is the whole, but at a different level of generality.
'Part' and 'component' are not really scienific words, but I would say that 'components' are implicitly mutually exclusive parts that add up to the whole, whereas 'part' has not such connotation, but could be overlapping, but in "the sum of the parts etc ..." parts means components.
Don't really know what you mean by "realm". Are we talking Hegelian categories here? "Determinate Being" (Dasein) is part of Being, whereas Actuality is part of Reflection.
"Who affirms?" Don't see how "who comes in here. "Whole" is a relative term, so yes, we can hierachies of wholes. "How do we determine thought from action?" We have to figure out what is mediating between actions, so as to make sense of actions. Lenin was fully aware of the different senses in which Hegel and Marx used the term "Being" and Lenin generally followed Marx in his usage. I think "Being is Nothing" is Hegel's idea, though he is recapitulating early Greek thought. SPinoza did not see it that way. I follow Lenin for a definition of "Matter" - "a philosophical category denoting everything that exists outside of consciousness." But yes, it is a Substance.
... time for me to go to bed. Andy
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
https://andyblunden.academia.edu/research On 23/08/2017 12:14 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
Andy,
First I confess my limits in discussion.
David , Excuse me for intrusion. I really have questions to ask Andy to be understood.
Andy--to your saying "but precisely because it is a whole despite being not made up of anything other than the parts."
What is the difference between 'moment' and 'part' 'component'. And what is the realm of each?
You have not discriminated between wholes generally ; I'd like to ask if 'finites' are parts of the 'infinite' .
Does 'determinate being' enter the realm of 'actuality' ? If yes , who affirms who rejects? In what way? If yes , is the 'actuality' a whole? Do we have hierarchies of actual wholes ? In what way do they interact? How do we determine thought from action , actuality from corpus?
Which of the two does Lenin affirm , determinate being as empty or Being as empty? Nothing is actual? Is Spinoza for Being as empty or Hegel?
Please don't think I'm muddying anything , No! I was dragged to this point. I do want to get cleared.
Is this a good definition for matter ? General Monistic substance which gives birth to the whole Universe. Does such Universe accept partioning? If yes , is Hegel for it or against it? What about Marx? 'Notion' comes everywhere in Hegel . Is it a neglect of translation for 'concept' or what Hegel really means is just Notion? Is Notion 'matter' for Hegel?
I sincerely hope I will not receive the type of response one of our dearest friends received .
Still student
Haydi
----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, 22 August 2017, 8:53:44
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky,Marx, & summer reading
I think it's more a case that the Kellogg Test#c fails the
Activity Theory test, just as the Kellogg Test#a fails
Marx's Capital.
The whole is greater than the part (if it is a genuine
whole) not because there are some additional parts you
forgot to add up but precisely because it is a whole despite
being not made up of anything other than the parts.
I am reminded of A N Leontyev's "accusation" that taking
/perezhivniya /a units of personality set up a logical
circle: "... / perezhivanie/, as the specific form through
which the whole personality manifests itself, now occupies
the place that formerly belonged to the whole personality of
the child,” that is, determining the child’s
/ perezhivanie/“... a logical vicious circle." Leontyev
seems to think that teh only genuine form of science is
reductionism.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 22/08/2017 11:48 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
What other than commodities are the units of capital
composed of? That's easy. Commodities are human relations
in a congealed form. Ergo, units of capital are made of
human relations in an uncongealed form. You are not a
fetishist, are you?
My point about actions and activities was precisely that
activities are NOT made up of anything more than actions;
that's why activity fails the third test.
I think that Engestrom tries to show some of the abstract
rules, the community relations and the division of labor
that subtends all this activity, but the distinctions
between (e.g.) rules and division of labor, or division of
labor and community, are not too clear. As you say,
blurring is a problem, if our goal is analysis, and an
analysis that shows the heterogeneity (the
distinctiveness) of parts.
dk
David Kellogg
Macquarie University
Recent Article: Vygotsky, Halliday, and Hasan: Towards
Conceptual Complementarity
Free E-print Downloadable at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/W7EDsmNSEwnpIKFRG8Up/full
On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
Wow! That's a radical claim, David! What other things
(or events) are activities composed of??
And while you're at it, what other than commodities
are units of capital composed of?
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
<http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
On 22/08/2017 6:21 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
Helena:
Yes, the idea that activity is made up of actions,
and that if we take away
actions from activity nothing remains (Leontiev).
To me, this is an
admission that the whole is merely a sum of parts.
Compare Vygotsky's
thought experiment of structuring a game in such a
way that we take away
all the roles and we see that abstract rules
remain (Chapter Seven in* "Mind
in Society")*.
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