[Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
David Kellogg
dkellogg60@gmail.com
Sun Aug 6 13:35:55 PDT 2017
(For some terrible reason, this note from Sasha ended up in my spam filter.
I remember using a yahoo account for many years and having the same
problem.... Anyway, I will keep an eye on my trash from now on.)
At the last ISCAR in Sydney, Mohammad El-Hammoumi urged me to read Marx's
ethnographic notebooks. I'm embarrassed to say that I have only started
doing so now (in anticipation of meeting him again at ISCAR in Quebec and
having him check to see if I've done my homework). One of the important
things about the notebooks that Mohammad pointed out to me was that they
suggest that Marx was much more of a cultural relativist in anthropology
than the Stalinists with their five-stage universal model of human progress
were: Primitive communism isn't a universal stage; non-feudal
precapitalisms existed (and the "Asian mode of production" is a place
holder, an algebraic "x" like Vygotsky's "neoformation", for dealing with
this possibility); socialism is a human potential subject to all the
vicissitudes of human volition and not a pre-ordained destiny. Some of the
more "backward" societies (e.g. Russia and the USA) are closer to achieving
socialism than the more "progressive" ones (e.g. England and Germany). This
surprises me a little, because I have always been in the extreme
developmentalist wing of xmca (my Vygotsky is not a philosopher but a
pedologist). But I imagine it comes as no surprise to Mike, or to Martin
Packer, or to Greg Thompson.
Or to Sasha. I think the point Sasha makes here is a very tricky but very
important one: it is possible for "conventionality" to be both a sign of
backwardness AND a sign of progress in language development. Take, for
example, intonation. Part of intonation is natural in precisely the sense
that Sasha is puzzled about: most if not all languages use a falling
intonation for long declaratives, simply because as you speak the air
pressure in the lungs decreases and this creates a tendency of the
frequency of vocal cord vibration to fall. It is natural, not in the sense
that Halliday means (that is, defining and not associative, essential and
not accidental, and evolved rather than designed). It is natural in the
sense that we share it with animals (I am listening to morning birds here
in Sydney, and I can hear falling intonation; whale songs are almost always
falling in their intonation).
But part of intonation is natural in the other sense as well, and this is
why it can and does differ from culture to culture in languages. Here in
Australia, when people tell stories, they use a LOT of rising intonation at
the end of their clauses ("ya reckon?") although the end of the turn itself
still tends to fall. This indicates continuation, non-completion in the
clause and termination, completeess in the turn. It does so by means that
were originally natural (that is, shared with birds and whales) but which
have been exapted by cultural means, just as the natural perceptual
experience of blackness is exapted by cultural means in the expression
"blackbird". We can see the same thing in stress: on the one hand, the
loudness and slowness and distinctness of "BLACK" in "Look at that
BLACKbird" is iconic: it is loud, slow, and distinct for reasons that have
nothing to do with the symbol itself. But on the other hand, this
naturalness is being exapted by cultural means, because "black" here is a
Classifier (not an Epithet, like "ugly" or "nasty") and it suggests that it
is the species that is noteworthy and not the perceptual experience of the
color.
And so I think it is perfectly possible for "conventionality" to play a
double role as well: it can be a "natural", associative function in the
early stage of language development (when a baby learns to associate milk
with a particular shape and color of a bottle or with an apron) and it can
also be a "cultural", conventional function and play the key role in
concept formation (when the adolescent learns to associate a configuration
of vowels and consonants with a particular concept). What will not work,
alas, is the universal five step process of concept formation we find in
Thinking and Speech, Chapter Five. I think that the reason why Vygotsky
doesn't refer to this five step process in his final lectures on school age
thinking (and he explicitly criticizes it in Chapter Six of Thinking and
Speech) is that he recognized that, like the Stalinist five-step move
through human history, it was far too teleological to reflect the real
diversity in paths of development.
--
David Kellogg
Macquarie University
"The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit:
Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with
Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare"
Free Chapters Downloadable at:
https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf
Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations
on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children
Free E-print Downloadable at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full
--
David Kellogg
Macquarie University
"The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit:
Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with
Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare"
Free Chapters Downloadable at:
https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf
Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations
on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children
Free E-print Downloadable at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full
On Fri, Aug 4, 2017 at 6:50 AM, Alexander Surmava <
alexander.surmava@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Dear David:
>
> Thank youfor your interest in the whole issue and for hard task of reading
> of my longtext :-) .
>
> The issuewith interpretation of the very idea of freedom is utterly
> interesting andimportant for our theoretical needs, so I’ll wait for your
> promised postimpatiently :-)
>
> As forconventionality or alternatively meatiness of LSV’s understanding of
> sign thatis also one of the most important problem for discussion cause it
> closely sidewith the problem of ideality and therefore with the problem of
> essence of thinkingor psyche.
>
> You areabsolutely correct with your “blackbird” illustration. No doubt
> that the ruleof combination of two radicals ("black” and “bird") has
> nothing to dowith any lot, but it is something meaty, something what we can
> explain asmovement according to the shape of our object.
>
> You arealso quite correct that in case of infant’s neologisms like
> “mazoline” insteadof “Vazelin” Vygotsky again didn’t apply to any
> conventionality or chance.
>
> But let uslook through Vygotsky’s "A tool and a symbol...". You probably
> rememberLSV’s dissertation about the nature of verbal sign:
>
> “Experimentsshow that both in plan and in speech the child is far from
> consciouslyrealizing the relativity of the sign operation or of
> the arbitrarilyestablished connection of sign and meaning. In order to
> become an object’s(word’s) sign, the stimulus finds support
> in the properties of the designatedobject itself. Not
> ‘everything can represent everything’ for the child in thisgame. The
> objects’ real properties and their sign meanings come into
> complexstructural interaction during play. Thus, for the child, the word is
> linked tothe object through the latter’s properties and is
> incorporated in onestructure, common to it. That is why the child
> in our experiments refuses tocall the floor a mirror (it cannot walk on a
> mirror), bur has no qualms at transforming a chair into a train,
> using its properties in play, i.e.manipulating it as if it were a train.
> When asked to call a lamp ‘table’ andvice versa, the child refuses,
> because one ‘can’t write on a lamp, or turn on atable’. To change (or
> swap) meanings for the child means to change theproperties of objects.”
>
> Thus Vygotsky treats conventionality of the verbal sign as a
> characteristic of it'smaturity. Contrary, Vygotsky estimates children’s
> attempts to find “support in the properties ofthe designated object itself”
> in naming the object as acharacteristic of infant's naïveté, it’s
> backwardness. It is easyto give more examples of such argumentation. But I
> think that there is no needfor this.Ilyenkovand his friend Alexander
> Ivanovitch Meshcheriakov (deafblind children’strainer) insisted that all
> attempts to teach a deafblind child to speak based on(mis)understanding of
> verbal signs as arbitrary or conventional signs leads todead end. Speech
> doesn’t develop. The same fact was described by Ann Sullivan –
> famousteacher of American deafblind woman Ellen Keller.
>
> On thecontrary, the path which starts from involving deafblind children
> into humanobject oriented activity mediated by all kind of human tools -
> chamber-pots,plates, spoons, tables, clothes etc. - gives them a chance to
> grasp somethingthat lies in the basis of speech and that enables them to
> study symbolic (likeArmslan - American Sign Language) and later even verbal
> language.
>
> All thiscan be commented in details in the context of Ilyenkov’s
> understanding ofIDEALITY and human tools as initial and universal form of
> human ideality.
>
> But takinginto account my low speed in English writing (I hope that soon
> I’ll improveit :-) ) I’ll abstain from further explanations for a while. As
> for theproblem of Vygotsky’s attitude to Pavlov and his theory. Could you
> or anybodyelse explain me – WHAT does Vygotsky mean by the term of NATURAL
> or LOW psychicfunction? And why does he define them as PSYCHIC?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Sasha
>
>
>
>
> четверг, 3 августа 2017 0:50 David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> писал(а):
>
>
> Dear Sasha:
>
> Thanks for the reply. I took the time to read the English version of your
> paper with great interest and large areas of agreement. But the areas of
> disagreement, which I'll talk about in another post on "free will as
> infinite selection", were actually the zones of greatest interest.
>
> I think Vygotsky doesn't accept conventionality as a pervasive principle in
> language, and neither do I. Take, for example, Vygotsky's example
> "blackbird". We can say that the phonemes/graphemes (the language-specific
> sequence of vowels and consonants) is conventional; we know this because
> other languages do it differently. But once we take the "salto mortale" of
> accepting that "black" means the (original) color of ink and "bird" means a
> winged animal descended from the dinosaurs, the pairing of "black" and
> "bird" to describe the blackbird is natural and not conventional: it obeys
> laws that are clear even to the half-enculturated child.
>
> I think that is why Vygotsky can give many examples of "child made"
> language ("mazoline", etc.) that are non-conventional and why he can link
> these Mondegreens to actual etymological processes and actual words
> ("sidewalk"). Saussure's principle applies to language in only one place,
> and it happens to be the only place in which Saussure was completely
> competent as a linguist: sounding. Saussure's principle does not apply to
> either wording or meaning: these are not purely conventional but natural.
>
> I think Vygotsky did not accept Pavlov as a human psychologist, but only as
> an animal behaviorist. Of course, he was deferential, just as you or I
> would defer to Mike (who was once an animal behaviorist himself), and just
> as Mike himself would defer to a Luria or a Bernstein. Mere bad manners
> doesn't make you an original thinker. I will agree to call this deference
> discretion: Vygotsky didn't like to pick fights and lose them.
>
> I think that's why Vygotsky concentrates his fire on Watson, and Thorndike
> and not Pavlov, why he points to Pavlov the animal behaviorist's insightful
> remarks about the sign to shame his psychologist colleagues (this is
> similar to what he does in shaming Piaget and Freud with the biologizing
> Bleuler), and why he uses Pavlov's metaphor of a "telephone switchboard"
> for his own purposes
>
> I didn't just include the Chuck Berry song in memory of a great musician; I
> think that the lyrics show us the very point you are making about the sign.
> You are certainly right that by itself, treated as just another instrument,
> the sign doesn't have the power to confer free will on the human marionette
> that Watson, Thorndike--and Pavlov--imagine. If a human is a puppet on a
> string, it doesn't help to put another puppet in control of the string and
> then put the human in control of the other puppet.
>
> But that's not what signs do. That's only what casting lots, tying knots,
> and counting on your fingers APPEAR to do. When humans have do these
> things, they try to go beyond the appearance. They imagine that casting
> lots conveys messages from God, that knots tie themselves (as the Russian
> formalists said), and that counting on fingers taps into some World Three
> of eternal discoveries (Popper).
>
> And when they have been giving these unlikely explanations for thousands of
> years, some humans begin to notice that the voice of the gods sounds very
> familiar, that the knot tying of one child is unlike that of another, and
> that some cultures count toes and elbows. Dorothy looks under the curtain
> and realizes that the Wizard of Oz is only a wizened old man, and it turns
> out you don't need his help after all. Soon people are making decisions in
> their own heads, remembering with imaginary knots, and memorizing Maxwell's
> equations.
>
> Of course, you and I get the joke. This is no more happening "inside the
> head", with an "individual" memory, than it is happening in a lot, a knot,
> or on your fingers. It's happening in a whole culture--many thousands of
> years of thinking. But the thinking isn't "passed on" through language;it
> is recreated and re-elaborated with every generation. The telephone
> switchboard, like the conventional phoneme/grapheme, is useful at one point
> and one point only: helping the caller get in touch with Marie. But the
> actual communication between father and daughter is not conventional or
> automatic at all. It's natural; i.e. it's hard work.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Alexandre Sourmava <avramus@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > David, thank you for your kind advice with more exact translation of
> word «
> > условный». I agree with you, that the best translation will be
> > “conventional”. This term coincides well enough with Vygotsky’s idea that
> > mature word in development of infant’s speech is something entirely
> > "random", "reason-less", and "irrational", something established by mere
> > agreement (conventions). (See “Орудие и знак в развитии ребенка”) As for
> > Vygotsky's attitude to Pavlov and his entirely Cartesian theory, I’ll
> agree
> > with your idea again. I do think that similarity of Vygotsky's and
> Pavlov's
> > conceptions is based not on mere discretion. Pavlov’s “teaching” was
> > canonized as something ideologically obligatory substantially later,
> closer
> > to 1950 – the year of so called Pavlovian session of the Soviet Academy
> of
> > Science. So a fresh trauma of this “historical event” evidently shade in
> > Luria’s and Leont’ev’s mind the earlier situation. The affinity of
> > Vygotsky's idea of HMF and Pavlov's Second Signaling System is not
> > something coincidental. Anyhow, this subject deserves serious inquiry.
> > Sasha
> >
> >
> > четверг, 27 июля 2017 1:57 David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> писал(а):
> >
> >
> > Translation is tough. For example, the French word "arbitraire" in de
> > Saussure has none of the sense of "random", "reason-less", and
> "irrational"
> > that we find in "arbitrary". It's actually more like the "arbitrator"
> that
> > we find in "arbitration": a better translation would be "conventional" or
> > even "conditional". All Saussure really wants to tell us is that any
> sound
> > can be made to express anything. It's not so much that "everything has a
> > name" (as Helen Keller put it). It's more like everything can be named.
> The
> > confusion between what IS meant in a language or a register or a semantic
> > code and what CAN BE meant in a language or a register or a semantic code
> > is really the crux of Labov's demagogic (not to say "reasonless" or
> > "irrational") critique of (Basil) Bernstein.
> >
> > I'm not a native speaker of Russian. But it seems to me that условности
> > is better translated in the same way: conditionality, or conventionality.
> > Since the sign is "neutral" in the sense that it could be almost
> anything,
> > the bulk of the meaning making still falls to the receiver of the sign.
> > Once we understand that THIS is the way that Vygotsky and Volosinov are
> > using notions like "neutral sign," "conditional reflex",
> "conditionality",
> > I don't see that there is any difference between Vygotsky's position and
> > Spinoza's.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Macquarie University
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:27 AM, Alexandre Sourmava <avramus@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > Hi, Larry!
> >
> >
> >
> > Thank you for your attentionto the article.
> > Your retelling of the topic is quite correct.
> > However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment concerning the
> > topicunder discussion.
> > Bernstein’s position is substantially spinozian and thereby antisemiotic.
> > Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky’sattempts to use arbitrary
> > sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of freedom
> (independence
> > from mechanical causality).
> > Thus Vygotsky insisted that
> > ”Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole realm
> > ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So the
> > method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a
> > natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds history
> and
> > evolution together.”
> > («В самом широком философском смысле этого терминавесь мир истории,
> > культуры, языка — это царство условности. В этом смысле методусловных
> > рефлексов приобретает широчайшее значение методаприродно-исторического в
> > применении к человеку, узла, который связывает историюи эволюцию»
> >
> > ВыготскийЛ. С. Психологическая наука в СССР. В кн.: «Общественные науки в
> > СССР(1917-1927 гг.)». М., 1928, с. 30.)
> >
> > There exists a prejudice that so called “Cultural-historical theory”
> > withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse Pavlov’s
> > mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these two
> > theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein who was
> > Vygotsky’s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas.
> >
> > Sasha Surmava
> >
> > вторник, 25 июля 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> писал(а):
> >
> >
> > I see.
> >
> > This is a slightly different context. The original meaning
> > of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's
> > work, was a "founding exemplar."
> > "Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example."
> >
> > The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances
> > of a process is a different concept, the opposite really.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > ------------------------------ ------------------------------
> > Andy Blunden
> > http://home.mira.net/~andy
> > http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective- decision-making
> > <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
> >
> > On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
> > > Andy,
> > > I will reference where I got the notion of linking
> > > [example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting
> > > will open another thread.
> > > From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and
> > > Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for
> > > Intellectual Historians" -2009-
> > >
> > > PAGE 270:
> > >
> > > "Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual
> > > historical method insisting that practiontioners remain
> > > agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is
> > > the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm'
> > > for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original
> > > Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED
> > > contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the
> > > community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such
> > > *doubling* of the philological object qua example into a
> > > carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch
> > > explored in a variety of ways during his half century of
> > > creative intellectual work. "
> > >
> > >
> > > Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the
> > > relationality of [example : framework] through the concept
> > > *paradigm* seemed generative??
> > >
> > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden
> > > <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > >
> > > "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed.
> > > Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single"
> > > only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague.
> > >
> > > Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all,
> > > Larry.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > ------------------------------ ------------------------------
> > > Andy Blunden
> > > http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy
> > <http://home.mira.net/~andy>>
> > > http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective-
> > decision-making
> > <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
> > > <http://www.brill.com/ products/book/origins-
> > collective-decision-making
> > <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>>
> > >
> > > On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Andy,
> > >>
> > >> Following your lead it may be preferable to say
> > >> single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of
> > >> variable social actions. This doubling (by
> > >> including both terms) may crystallize the intended
> > >> meaning as you mention.
> > >>
> > >> Andy is this vein can we also include the term
> > >> (examples)?
> > >>
> > >> Then the moving TRANS forming from single
> > >> (individual) social acts towards (practices) would
> > >> indicate the movement from examples to exemplary
> > >> actions and further movement (historicity) toward
> > >> (framework) practices.
> > >>
> > >> (framework) practices being another doubling.
> > >>
> > >> So moving (transforming) from single social examples
> > >> through exemplary social examples crystallizing in
> > >> social framework practices.
> > >>
> > >> Is this reasonable?
> > >>
> > >> Or not
> > >>
> > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> > >>
> > >> *From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> > >> *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM
> > >> *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd. edu <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> > >> *Cc: *Alexander Surmava <mailto:monada@netvox.ru>
> > >> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> > >>
> > >> Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you
> > >> mention
> > >>
> > >> to say that *actions* - the individual units of
> > >> *action* are
> > >>
> > >> individual? In which can it is of course a tautology.
> > >>
> > >> But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every
> > >>
> > >> "individual" action. Or better, so is every
> > >> "singular" action.
> > >>
> > >> A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English
> > >>
> > >> language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun
> > >> form, but
> > >>
> > >> on the whole the set of words (action, actions,
> > >> activity,
> > >>
> > >> activities) and the set of words (practice,
> > >> practices) have
> > >>
> > >> no systematic difference running across all
> > >> disciplines and
> > >>
> > >> schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are
> > >> practices.
> > >>
> > >> If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the
> > >>
> > >> German words for action (Handlung) and activity
> > >> (Tatigkeit)
> > >>
> > >> are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use
> > >>
> > >> Aktivitat at all.
> > >>
> > >> Andy
> > >>
> > >> ------------------------------ ------------------------------
> > >>
> > >> Andy Blunden
> > >>
> > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy
> > <http://home.mira.net/~andy>>
> > >>
> > >> http://www.brill.com/products/ book/origins-collective-
> > decision-making
> > <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>
> > >> <http://www.brill.com/ products/book/origins-
> > collective-decision-making
> > <http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
> > >>
> > >> > Alexander, Mike,
> > >>
> > >> > Thanks for the article.
> > >>
> > >> > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing
> > >> Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and
> > >> did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role
> > >> of practice in knowing).
> > >>
> > >> > Two formulas:
> > >>
> > >> > • Knowing THROUGH ‘action’
> > >>
> > >> > • Verification of knowing THROUGH ‘practice’
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but
> > >> do not co-incide
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > Action IS individual
> > >>
> > >> > Practice IS a social category.
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is
> > >> nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of
> > >> individual who are separate.
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment.
> > >> They are alike in that both individual action & a
> > >> single experiment are poorly suited to the role of :
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > A philosophical criterion of (truth).
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > I do not have the background to intelligently
> > >> comment, but did register this theme as provocative
> > >> FOR further thought and wording.
> > >>
> > >> > And for generating intelligent commentary
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > Sent from Mail for Windows 10
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > From: Ivan Uemlianin
> > >>
> > >> > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM
> > >>
> > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >>
> > >> > Cc: Alexander Surmava
> > >>
> > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan)
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > Ivan
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> > --
> > >>
> > >> > festina lente
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole
> > >> <mcole@ucsd.edu> <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> >>
> > >>
> > >> >> This article might prove of interest to those who
> > >> have been discussing
> > >>
> > >> >> LSV's sources in
> > >>
> > >> >> marx and spinoza.
> > >>
> > >> >> mike
> > >>
> > >> >> <Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_ in_Psycholog.pdf>
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > David Kellogg
> > Macquarie University
> >
> > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit:
> > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with
> > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare"
> >
> > Free Chapters Downloadable at:
> >
> > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-
> > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf
> >
> > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some
> Ruminations
> > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children
> >
> > Free E-print Downloadable at:
> >
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full
> >
> >
> >
>
>
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